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Wars of German Unification (Military History)

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  1. Introduction
  2.  
  3. The German empire came into being as a result of three successful wars fought by Prussia between the years 1864 and 1871, and its creation is widely—and rightly—regarded as the greatest political and diplomatic event of the 19th century. As a result of these three wars, Prussia gained the mastery of Germany and assumed a position of unrivaled domination in the configuration of the great powers of Europe. The question of why Prussia expanded as fast as she did may be discussed in two contexts. The first context emphasizes economic factors and Prussia’s success in this area against the other powers, Austria most of all. By the mid-19th century, the Rhineland provinces given to Prussia in 1815 as a barrier against France had become an industrial powerhouse and the heartland of Germany’s economic strength. The second context stresses the weakness of Prussia and how this weakness was surmounted by very strong leaders who concentrated their attention on centralizing the government and building a strong army, with much of the state’s budget being devoted to its expansion. This army came to be regarded as the foundation of state power, its main line of defense, and its only true frontier. The second of these contexts constitutes the bulk of the literature on the wars of German unification, though the importance of the first cannot be denied.
  4.  
  5. General Overviews
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  7. A number of instructive overviews tackle, albeit from different angles, the problems the wars gave rise to. Hargreaves 1991 is a useful compendium of important documents. Showalter 1975 has no rival and is unlikely ever to have any. Showalter 2004 is no less significant a contribution, with extensive footnotes that form a guide to the historiography on the subject. Craig 1955 is a magisterial analysis from an author who is arguably the leading American historian of Germany in the 20th century, indispensable for its analysis of key actors. Walter 2003 accumulates valuable information on recruitment and presents it with flair and clarity. Hamerow 1969 focuses on the Prussian sociopolitical system on the eve of unification. Hamerow 1972 sees unification as the product of nationalism. Böhme 1971 stresses the importance of economic forcess—virtually to the exclusion of everything else. Carr 1991 is a brief, well-balanced, and reliable guide.
  8.  
  9. Böhme, Helmut, ed. The Foundation of the German Empire: Select Documents. Translated by Agatha Ramm. London: Oxford University Press, 1971.
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  11. English translation of Die Reichsgründung, first published in 1967. Sees unification overwhelmingly, indeed almost exclusively, as a reaction to the ebb and flow of middle-class economic pressures. Stirred a great controversy when first published.
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  13. Carr, William. The Origins of the Wars of German Unification. London: Longman, 1991.
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  15. Draws the general outline clearly and competently. Short but rich bibliography makes the book ideal for classroom use.
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  17. Craig, Gordon A. The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955.
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  19. Classic work, exquisitely written. Particularly strong on political themes. Military institutions seen in terms of long historical trends and developments.
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  21. Hamerow, Theodore S. The Social Foundations of German Unification, 1858–1871. Vol. 1, Ideas and Institutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969.
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  23. Historiography of the highest order, combining both reflection and erudition. Especially useful for long translations from contemporary records.
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  25. Hamerow, Theodore S. The Social Foundations of German Unification, 1858–1871. Vol. 2, Struggles and Accomplishments. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972.
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  27. An indispensable account, strong on dissection of events and unrivaled in simplifying complex issues. Discusses wars against broad social, ideological, economic, and institutional backgrounds. Well-balanced narrative makes the book suitable for undergraduate courses.
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  29. Hargreaves, David. Bismarck and German Unification. Documents and Debates. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991.
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  31. Compact survey. Illuminates diplomatic developments clearly. Valuable undergraduate resource.
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  33. Showalter, Dennis E. Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology, and the Unification of Germany. Hamden, CT: Archon, 1975.
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  35. Pathbreaking, painstaking analysis of how the Prussian army met the technological challenges of the industrial revolution. Many important revisionist theses. A model of insight, originality, and sheer intellectual firepower.
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  37. Showalter, Dennis E. The Wars of German Unification. London: Hodder Arnold, 2004.
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  39. Incisive and comprehensive study containing important observations on issues debated by leading German authorities. Especially strong on development of strategy.
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  41. Walter, Dierk. Preussische Heeresreformen, 1807–1870: Militärische Innovation und der Mythos der “Roonschen Reform”. Paderborn, Germany: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2003.
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  43. Definitive study on the subject, based on exhaustive research. Challenges the view that the army was isolated from rest of society.
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  45. Reference Works
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  47. There are no modern reference works on the Danish or Austro-Prussian wars. There is, however, a rich literature on the war of 1870–1871, most of it concentrating on Otto Von Bismarck’s role in the conflict and disputing the idea that the Germany created in 1871 was natural or inevitable. Becker 2003a and Becker 2003b present an important collection of data on Bismarckian policy down to the middle of the July crisis of 1870. Becker 2007 extends arguments made earlier to support his claim that Bismarck was responsible for the war. Becker 2008 goes further and presents the struggle as a provoked-defensive war by Bismarck. Wetzel 2008 argues that the war had much to do with the French search for declining prestige. Oncken 1928, though old, is an authoritative survey of French policy between 1863 and 1870.
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  49. Becker, Josef. “The Franco-Prussian Conflict of 1870 and Bismarck’s Concept of a ‘Provoked Defensive War’: A Response to David Wetzel.” Central European History 41 (2008): 93–109.
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  51. Trenchantly written and persuasive argument that Bismarck was bent on a collision course with France in the summer of 1870. Produces documents from German archives not used in Becker 2003a, Becker 2003b, and Becker 2007. Detailed chronological table and bibliography. Available online by subscription.
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  53. Becker, Josef, ed. Bismarcks spanische “Diversion” 1870 und der preußisch-deutsche Reichsgründungskrieg. Vol. 1, Der Weg zum spanischen Thronangebot: Spätjahr1866–4. April 1870. Paderborn, Germany: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2003a.
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  55. Lucidly assembles 312 items of source material—letters, diary entries, memoranda—emanating from the tireless and telling pens of the outstanding personalities of the period documents for February 4, 1867 to April 1, 1870. Very helpful on long-range origins of the crisis. Introduction is a scathing indictment of Bismarck’s policy.
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  57. Becker, Josef, ed. Bismarcks spanische “Diversion” 1870 und der preußisch-deutsche Reichsgründungskrieg. Vol. 2, Aus der Krise der kleindeutschen Nationalpolitik in die preußisch-französische Julikrise 1870: 5. April 1870–12. Juli 1870. Paderborn, Germany: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2003b.
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  59. A compilation of an additional 507 items relating mainly to the July crisis. Stimulating and controversial. See review of Volume 2, as well as Volume 1 (Becker 2003a), by David Wetzel in Central European History 37 (2004): 606–612.
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  61. Becker, Josef, ed. Bismarcks spanische “Diversion” 1870 und der preußisch-deutsche Reichsgründungskrieg. Vol. 3, Spanische Diversion, “Emser Depesche” und Reichsgründungslegende bis zum Ende der Weimarer Republik. Paderborn, Germany: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2007.
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  63. First 58 documents important for the Ems telegram and the French declaration of war. Valuable appendices.
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  65. Oncken, Hermann. Napoleon III and the Rhine: The Origin of the War of 1870–1871. Translated by Edwin H. Zeydel. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928.
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  67. Translation of Die Rheinpolitik Kaiser Napoleons III von 1863 bis 1870 und der Ursprung des Krieges von 1870/71. Introduction to an extensive documentary collection that first appeared in 1926. Sees Napoleon III’s obsession with creating a buffer state on the Rhine as the major cause of war. General narrative survey especially useful for nonspecialist readers.
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  69. Wetzel, David. “A Reply to Josef Becker’s Response.” Central European History 41 (2008): 111–124.
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  71. Stresses the importance of actions taken by leading French figures in the run-up to the war of 1870. Argues that these made war probable, if not inevitable. Available online by subscription.
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  73. Bibliographies
  74.  
  75. Bibliographies of the Franco-Prussian war and the personalities connected to it—with Otto Von Bismarck, of course, in the starring role—exist in profusion. Some are old, but they are none the worse for that. Palat 1896 still stands as a monumental treatise, unsurpassed in comprehensiveness for the events it covers. Wedlich 1970 is particularly strong on political and military issues. Born 1966 presents all titles up to the time it was published. Naujoks 1979 describes the changes in historiographical fashion that took place during the 1970s. The essays in Gall 1971 emphasize Bismarck’s flexibility in handling the issues with which he was confronted.
  76.  
  77. Born, Karl Erich, ed. Bismarck-Bibliographie: Quellen und Literatur zur Geschichte Bismarcks und seiner Zeit. Cologne: Grote, 1966.
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  79. Comprehensive and chronologically organized. Contains 6,138 titles. Impressive scholarship. Indispensable guide, but requires good command of academic German. Not recommended for use below graduate level.
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  81. Gall, Lothar, ed. Das Bismarck-Problem in der Geschichtsschreibung nach 1945. Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1971.
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  83. Engaging and enlightening analysis of the vast accumulation of Bismarckiana in the period with which it deals. Presents Bismarck both as a statesman and political tactician who possessed a sense of restraint and limits.
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  85. Naujoks, Eberhard. “Ein Jahrzehnt Forschung über Bismarcks Pressepolitik.” Francia 7 (1979): 508–526.
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  87. A searching exposition that covers topics like censorship and control. Introduction especially strong. Straightforward, graceful style an added bonus.
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  89. Palat, Barthélemy Edmond. Bibliographie générale de la Guerre de 1870–1871: Répertoire alphabétique et raisonné des publications de toute nature concernant la guerre franco-allemande parues en France et à l’étranger. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1896.
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  91. Classic work, covering the war from beginning to end and in every theater of operation. Strong on battlefield strategy. The starting point for any serious student of the subject.
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  93. Wedlich, Widolf. “Der deutsch-französische Krieg 1870/71: Literaturbericht und Auswahlbibliographie mit Anhang ‘Die Presse der Jahre1870–71’.” Jahresbibliographie: Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte 42 (1970): 395–458.
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  95. Celebrates the centenary of the founding of the German empire and gives the literature from 1850 to 1970. Bulk of essays concentrate on relations between military and political figures.
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  97. Otto Von Bismarck
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  99. That Bismarck was the driving personality in the three wars that led to the unification of Germany cannot be denied. If he had never risen to the top of Prussian politics, the unification of Germany would probably have taken place anyway, but surely neither at the same time nor quite in the same way. Some of the works listed in the Bibliographies section reappear here. Born 1966 remains the essential tool. Steinberg 2011 is a lucid and concise life. Bled 2010 is a comprehensive examination of the influences that shaped Bismarck’s thought. Pflanze 1990 is a work of depth, originality, and insight, though it contains no bibliography. Gall 1986 rebuts the idea that Bismarck’s wars were in any sense planned affairs. Eyck 1968 argues that Bismarck was really a throwback to an earlier time and a clear impediment to the development of German democracy. Engelberg 1985 sees Bismarck as a wicked man with few redeeming features. Taylor 1955 is a delightful biography, short, compact, written in the author’s inimitable style, and particularly strong on the military and diplomatic themes.
  100.  
  101. Bled, Jean-Paul. Bismarck. Paris: Perrin, 2010.
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  103. Richly textured account of thorough and dispassionate scholarship. Questions the assumption of direct continuity between Otto Von Bismarck and Adolf Hitler.
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  105. Born, Karl Erich, ed. Bismarck-Bibliographie: Quellen und Literatur zur Geschichte Bismarcks und seiner Zeit. Cologne: Grote, 1966.
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  107. Listed titles reach back to first biography published in 1888. Stresses military and political issues.
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  109. Engelberg, Ernst. Bismarck: Urpreusse und Reichsgründer. Berlin: Siedler, 1985.
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  111. Outgrowth of author’s doctoral dissertation, which, for political reasons, could not be published when it was composed in the 1960s. Stresses subject’s role as a guardian of order who unified Germany to resist social change and forces of democracy. Very critical of Bismarck. Best read with Gall 1986 and Pflanze 1990, which offer opposing perspectives.
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  113. Eyck, Eric. Bismarck and the German Empire. 3d ed. London: Allen & Unwin, 1968.
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  115. Abridged version of a three-volume work published in Zurich between 1941 and 1943. Still invaluable. Strong on dissection of character and unrivaled in simplifying great issues. Critical of Bismarck’s use of foreign policy to destroy German liberalism.
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  117. Gall, Lothar. Bismarck: The White Revolutionary. Vol. 1, 1815–1871. Translated by J. A. Underwood. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986.
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  119. English translation of Bismarck: Der weisse Revolutionär first published in 1980. Major postwar biography. Emphasizes Bismarck’s aim was to strengthen Prussia, not to unite Germany. Depicts him as accelerating historical processes despite his conservative convictions.
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  121. Pflanze, Otto. Bismarck and the Development of Germany. 2d ed. 3 vols. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.
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  123. Updated version of a volume first published in 1963. Sees Bismarck as the latest and last in a series of figures who transformed the state in order to maintain social order.
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  125. Steinberg, Jonathan. Bismarck: A Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
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  127. Detailed narrative based on contemporaries’ diaries, letters, and memoirs. Three-quarters of book devoted to period before 1871. Presents Bismarck as part of a continuum that includes Hitler.
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  129. Taylor, A. J. P. Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955.
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  131. Short, compact biography replete with anecdotes and epigrams. Indispensable undergraduate resource that can also be recommended as bedside reading for the general public.
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  133. Helmut von Moltke
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  135. If Otto von Bismarck was the central political and diplomatic figure in the wars of unification, then Moltke, chief of the Prussian general staff from 1857 to 1871 and chief of the German general staff from 1871 to 1888, was the dominant military actor. Kessel 1957 remains the standard life, beautifully balanced, masterly in its control of the sources, and a delight to read. The first hundred pages of Bucholz 1991, while no substitute for Kessel 1957, are a clear and concise examination of Moltke’s thought; they understand the technicalities of his strategic plans and have a fine grasp of the period. Bucholz 2001 is packed with valuable and stimulating information on the various aspects of the general staff. Zuber 2008 wastes no affection on its subject; it dissents from previous views on Moltke, arguing that his strategical concepts were hardly original and his influence on military thinking virtually nil. Holborn 1986 presents an incomparable picture of the general staff and Moltke’s relationship to it. Stadelmann 1950 shows how deep was the cleavage between Moltke and Bismarck in the war of 1870–1871. Förster 1992 is a useful anthology of Moltke’s writings; it covers a wide range of subjects and by is no means limited to military affairs.
  136.  
  137. Bucholz, Arden. Moltke, Schlieffen, and Prussian War Planning. New York: Berg, 1991.
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  139. First half of the book is a clear, evenhanded analysis of the development of Moltke’s thought. Shows impact of events during his youth in shaping his outlook on military affairs. Good bibliography. Splendid teaching aid.
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  141. Bucholz, Arden. Moltke and the German Wars, 1864–1871. New York: Palgrave, 2001.
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  143. Comprehensive and insightful account emphasizing the concept of risk introduced by Moltke and his understanding of the impact of the railroad on the face of war. Especially strong on Moltke’s role in the development of the general staff.
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  145. Förster, Stig, ed. Moltke: Vom Kabinettskrieg zum Volkskrieg; Eine Werkauswahl. Bonn, Germany: Bouvier Verlag. 1992.
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  147. A selection of Moltke’s own writings published over the years, particularly good on his critical insights on the impact of railroads and technology on strategy.
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  149. Holborn, Hajo. “The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff.” In Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Edited by Peter Paret, 281–295. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
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  151. Searching examination of Moltke’s rise to power and the revolutionary impact of his theory on the art of war. Attempts to explain his desire to subordinate politics to military concerns. Valuable for undergraduates.
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  153. Kessel, Eberhard. Moltke. Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler, 1957.
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  155. Though old, still the standard life. Superb analysis of the evolution of Moltke’s thought. An updated version of the work first published by the same author in 1935.
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  157. Stadelmann, Rudolf. Moltke und der Staat. Krefeld, Germany: Scherpe-Verlag, 1950.
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  159. A work that still holds its own. Disentangles the details of Moltke’s strategy and the crucial impact it played in the war of 1870–1871. Appendix reproduces copies of memoranda on the titanic conflict with Bismarck.
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  161. Zuber, Terence. The Moltke Myth: Prussian War Planning, 1857–1871. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2008.
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  163. Critical revisionist view of its subject. Argues that Moltke’s reputation is overblown and based on superficial readings of critical source materials. Stimulating and controversial. Balanced by Holborn 1986 and Bucholz 1991.
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  165. Napoleon III
  166.  
  167. Emperor of the French since 1852, Napoleon III was constantly on the mind of Otto von Bismarck in the first two German wars and dominated his calculations in the final one. Bresler 1999 provides a compelling political narrative leading up to the debacle of 1870. Baguley 2000 stresses the shortcomings of Napoleon III and the debilitating effects of his bladder problems. Barker 1967, on the other hand, is a vigorously argued anti-Bismarck, anti-German account. Price 1997 provides a bird’s-eye view of the problems dealing with the empire’s foreign policy. Aronson 1970 is an excellent, blow-by-blow popular account stressing personal rivalries.
  168.  
  169. Aronson, Theo. The Fall of the Third Napoleon. London: Cassell, 1970.
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  171. Riveting account of the disasters that led to defeat in 1870. Ascribes failures to the short-sightedness of Napoleon as a strategist and military commander. Excellent reading for the nonspecialist and undergraduate.
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  173. Baguley, David. Napoleon III and His Regime: An Extravaganza. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000.
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  175. Balanced, lucid overview of the events of the empire’s last years. Emphasizes the influence of chauvinistic personalities as a factor leading to the war of 1870. Excellent undergraduate resource.
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  177. Barker, Nancy Nichols. Distaff Diplomacy: The Empress Eugénie and the Foreign Policy of the Second Empire. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967.
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  179. Argues that French rulers in the decade leading up to the war of 1870 did nothing more than resist the designs of an expansionist Prussia. Sympathetic to the controversial figure who was Napoleon III’s wife.
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  181. Bresler, Fenton. Napoleon III: A Life. London: HarperCollins, 1999.
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  183. Best biography in English. Emphasizes governmental excesses and the role of Empress Eugénie behind the collapse of 1870.
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  185. Price, Roger. Napoleon III and the Second Empire. London: Routledge, 1997.
  186. DOI: 10.4324/9780203276884Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  187. Compact survey. Outlines Napoleon’s objectives in economic and foreign affairs. Good historiographical overview of the man and his government. Short length makes it a good fit in undergraduate seminars.
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  189. Public Opinion/Press
  190.  
  191. Public attitudes were of critical importance in driving France and Prussia into war in 1870 and were, as Naujoks 1967 demonstrates, by no means absent in the wars of 1863–1864 and 1866. Case 1954 is an argument that opinion in France demanded war in 1870. Stengers 1956 concludes that this pressure was uneven. Carroll 1931 argues that the French government deliberately created a climate of fear to justify its decision to take up arms. Naujoks 1968 shows how Otto von Bismarck manipulated the press throughout the 1860s. Benjamin 1932 documents government attempts to shut down journalistic organs during the war of 1870.
  192.  
  193. Benjamin, Hazel C. “Official Propaganda and the French Press during the Franco-Prussian War.” Journal of Modern History 4.2 (1932): 214–230.
  194. DOI: 10.1086/235868Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  195. Dated, though not obsolete, study of government attempts to censor newspapers. Slender documentation the only drawback. Available online by subscription.
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  197. Carroll, E. Malcolm. French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 1870–1914. New York: Century, 1931.
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  199. Old but still valuable examination of government attempts to influence the press. Argues that Napoleon III used public opinion as a smokescreen to justify anti-German policies. Good bibliography.
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  201. Case, Lynn M. French Opinion on War and Diplomacy during the Second Empire. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1954.
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  203. Invaluable account using prefectural reports to show how the government managed to collect opinion. Excellent annotated bibliography.
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  205. Naujoks, Eberhard. “Bismarck und die Organisation der Regierungspresse.” Historische Zeitschrift 205.1 (1967): 46–80.
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  207. Incisive examination of how Bismarck used the official press in the 1860s. Long quotations from archives. Complex structure of some of its arguments suits this book to graduate-level courses. Available online by subscription.
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  209. Naujoks, Eberhard. Bismarcks auswärtige Pressepolitik und die Reichsgründung (1865–1871). Wiesbaden, Germany: F. Steiner, 1968.
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  211. Pioneering study of Bismarck’s attempt to control the press. Wide-ranging source base and extensive footnotes form a guide to historiography on the subject.
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  213. Stengers, Jean. “Aux origines de la guerre de 1870: Gouvernement et opinion publique.” Revue Belge de Philologie et d’Histoire 34.3 (1956): 701–747.
  214. DOI: 10.3406/rbph.1956.2000Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  215. An examination of the government’s reaction to public pressures on issues of security and prestige. Basic source for a critically important issue.
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  217. Staff Officers and Generals
  218.  
  219. A study of the wars of German unification yields some valuable pictures of both staff officers and generals—on the battlefield and off. Verdy du Vernois 1968 exposes the ideas and sentiments of Otto von Bismarck’s many opponents on the general staff. Blumenthal 1903 shows how Helmuth von Moltke came to be regarded a putative messiah among his staff. Bronsart von Schellendorff 1954 provides an insightful military view of Bismarck’s diplomacy during the siege of Paris. Frederick III 1988 reconstructs the war of 1870 from the viewpoint of the king and his son. Chanzy 1872 contains the impressions of a leading French commander who nearly wrecked the negotiations for an armistice.
  220.  
  221. Blumenthal, Leonhard von. Journals of Field-Marshall Count von Blumenthal for 1866 and 1870–71. Translated by A. D. Gillespie-Addison. Edited by Albrecht von Blumenthal. London: E. Arnold, 1903.
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  223. Translation of Tagebücher des Generalfeldmarschall Graf von Blumenthal aus den Jahren 1866 und 1870/71, which first appeared in 1902. Author was chief of staff to army of the crown prince and an opponent of Moltke’s. Documents this rivalry in riveting fashion.
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  225. Bronsart von Schellendorff, Paul. Geheimes Kriegstagebuch, 1870–1871. Edited by Peter Rassow. Bonn, Germany: Athenäum-Verlag, 1954.
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  227. Author was in charge of movements. Valuable for armistice negotiations. An earlier English translation, The Duties of the General Staff, appeared in 1905.
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  229. Chanzy, Antoine Eugène. Campagne de 1870–1871: La deuxième armée de la Loire. 4th ed. Paris: H. Plon, 1872.
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  231. Old but still invaluable account of a general who tried to destroy armistice negotiations. Long quotations from contemporary sources.
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  233. Frederick III. The War Diary of the Emperor Frederick III, 1870–1871. Translated and edited by A. R. Allinson. New York: H. Fertig, 1988.
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  235. Translation of Kriegstagebuch, a war journal authored by the crown prince who would (for a short time) later become Germany’s emperor. Invaluable for efforts made by its author to settle the Moltke–Bismarck rivalry. First appeared in 1926.
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  237. Verdy du Vernois, Julius von. With the Royal Headquarters in 1870–71. New York: Greenwood, 1968.
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  239. Translation of Im grossen Hauptquartier 1870–71, first published in 1895. Illustrates the enormous influence wielded by Moltke over his staff. Author was chief of German intelligence and the principal instrument in Moltke’s strategy.
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  241. Diplomats
  242.  
  243. Frischbier 2008 discusses how Otto von Bismarck’s ideas were communicated to the public. Busch 1898 is an exemplary study of the origins, execution, and consequences of the chancellor’s diplomacy in 1870–1871. Thiers 1915 displays the problems faced by the able French diplomat in bringing the war to an end.
  244.  
  245. Busch, Moritz. Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of His History. 3 vols. London: Macmillan, 1898.
  246. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  247. Blow-by-blow account of Bismarck’s major decisions by his chief assistant of twenty years. Translation of his journals originally published in installments from 1871 to 1893. Old but indispensable.
  248. Find this resource:
  249. Frischbier, Wolfgang. Heinrich Abeken 1809–1872: Eine Biographie. Paderborn, Germany: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2008.
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  251. Important, deeply researched, and forcefully presented analysis of one of Bismarck’s principal aides. Shows how the chancellor used the press to shape opinion against Helmuth von Moltke in 1870–1871.
  252. Find this resource:
  253. Thiers, Adolphe. Memoirs of M. Thiers, 1870–1873. Translated by F. M. Atkinson. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1915.
  254. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  255. Translation of a three-volume work, Notes et souvenirs de M. Thiers 1870–1873, first published in 1873. Vital source for the peace negotiations.
  256. Find this resource:
  257. Spanish Revolution of 1868
  258.  
  259. Complications of the Spanish revolution of 1868 drove Prussia and France to war in 1870. Rubio 1989 is the fundamental source. Smith 1950, though old, provides a clear overview of the situation. Konetzke 1972 stresses French military adventurism and sees the German response as essentially defensive. Emerit 1969 emphasizes the influence of Napoleon’s ministers. Baumeister 1997 gives vivid portraits of all the key actors. Haffer 2010 places the revolution in the context of Naploeon III’s personality.
  260.  
  261. Baumeister, Martin. “Isabella II: 1833–1868.” In Die spanischen Könige: 18 historische Porträts vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart. Edited by Walther L. Bernecker, Carlos Collado Seidel, and Paul Hoser, 224–243. Munich: C. H. Beck, 1997.
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  263. Vivid character study of the Spanish queen Isabella II and the factors that led to her downfall. Downgrades economic and political factors and emphasizes politics and personalities. Introduces printed Spanish sources.
  264. Find this resource:
  265. Emerit, Marcel. “L’opinion de Napoléon III sur la question du trône d’Espagne en 1869.” Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine 16.3 (1969): 431–438.
  266. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  267. Argues that Napoleon’s attitude toward the revolution shifted during the course of the year. Based on material from the French records. A model of compression. Available online by subscription.
  268. Find this resource:
  269. Haffer, Dominik. Europa in den Augen Bismarcks: Bismarcks Vorstellungen von der Politik der europäischen Mächte und vom europäischen Staatensystem. Paderborn, Germany: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2010.
  270. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  271. Chapter on the July crisis of 1870 (nearly one hundred pages) is a model of scholarly exposition, massively documented, concluding that Bismarck was in no hurry to unify Germany through war.
  272. Find this resource:
  273. Konetzke, Richard. “Spanien, die Vorgeschichte des Krieges von 1870, und die deutsche Reichsgründung.” Historische Zeitschrift 214.3 (1972): 580–613.
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  275. Substantial contribution drawing on Spanish, Prussian, and French sources. Bismarck’s attitude toward the revolution was one of wait and see; he had no plan laid down beforehand to use it as pretext for war against France. Available online by subscription.
  276. Find this resource:
  277. Rubio, Javier. España y la guerra de 1870. 3 vols. Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1989.
  278. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  279. Landmark work showing background of revolution. Last volume is a compendium of 250 documents from the Madrid archives.
  280. Find this resource:
  281. Smith, Willard A. “The Background of the Spanish Revolution of 1868.” American Historical Review 55.4 (1950): 787–810.
  282. DOI: 10.2307/1841161Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  283. Insightful analysis of the problem, very critical of French policy. Extensive use of contemporary Spanish documents. Clarity of style suits article to undergraduate- and graduate-level courses. Available online by subscription.
  284. Find this resource:
  285. Danish War 1863–1864
  286.  
  287. The origins of the Danish war sprang directly from the Schleswig-Holstein question, as notorious as it was complex. Carr 1963 provides a clear introduction to the problem. Steefel 1932 remains the standard work in English. Jürgensen 1992 sees Otto von Bismarck’s aims as rooted as much in European as in Prussian politics. Buchner 1965 emphasizes the pressure of French politics as the driving force in international complications.
  288.  
  289. Buchner, Rudolf. Die deutsch-französische Tragödie, 1848–1864: Politische Beziehungen und psychologisches Verhältnis. Würzburg, Germany: Holzner-Verlag, 1965.
  290. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  291. Careful study. Stresses the ambitions of a restless Napoleon III.
  292. Find this resource:
  293. Carr, William. Schleswig-Holstein, 1815–48: A Study in National Conflict. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1963.
  294. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  295. Excellent introduction. Emphasizes expansionist Danish aims. Sees Prussian moves as reaction to these. Uses published Danish sources.
  296. Find this resource:
  297. Jürgensen, Kurt. “Die preußische Lösung der Schleswig-Holstein-Frage 1863–1867.” In Bismarck und seine Zeit. Edited by Johannes Kunisch, 57–80. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1992.
  298. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  299. Able treatment. Contends that Bismarck’s overriding concern was not to provoke war but to maintain the legitimacy of treaties. Footnotes provide a valuable guide to literature on subject.
  300. Find this resource:
  301. Steefel, Lawrence D. The Schleswig-Holstein Question. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932.
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  303. Old but still indispensable account. Argues that Bismarck was a clever gambler, not a diplomatic genius. Draws on sources from all archives, including Danish.
  304. Find this resource:
  305. Austro-Prussian War
  306.  
  307. Prussia’s defeat of Austria in 1866 was the decisive event in the wars of German unification and a turning point in the history of Europe. Some of the titles in the section on Otto Von Bismarck may be consulted here. Wawro 1996 is the standard work. Pflanze 1990 provides a good overview of the problem as seen not only from a German but also a European background. Clark 1934 and Friedjung 1966 are very critical of Habsburg policy. Rumpler 1980 stresses Austria’s attempt to cope with institutional and political weakness.
  308.  
  309. Clark, Chester Wells. Franz Joseph and Bismarck: The Diplomacy of Austria before the War of 1866. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934.
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  311. Old, but still valuable, account, critical of Austrian emperor Franz Joseph. Argues that his attempts to preserve the status quo in Italy and Germany were shortsighted and played into Bismarck’s hands. Based on thorough examination of Austrian, Prussian, and British archives.
  312. Find this resource:
  313. Friedjung, Heinrich. The Struggle for Supremacy in Germany, 1859–1866. Translated by A. J. P. Taylor and W. L. McElwee. New York: Russell & Russell, 1966.
  314. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  315. Abridged, annotated translation of the classic Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland 1859 bis 1866, which first appeared in 1899. Contends war was unavoidable, but that Bismarck brilliantly took advantage of opportunities to bring it on. Translation originally published in 1935.
  316. Find this resource:
  317. Pflanze, Otto. Bismarck and the Development of Germany. 2d ed. 3 vols. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 1990.
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  319. Stimulating, convincing chapter on the war emphasizes how it upended political calculations of major European states. Bismarck, a revolutionary, used war to kill Prussian liberalism and expand in Europe.
  320. Find this resource:
  321. Rumpler, Helmut. “Österreich-Ungarn und die Gründung des deutschen Reichs.” In Special Issue: Europa und die Reichsgründung: Preussen-Deutschland in der Sicht der grossen europäischen Mächte 1860–1880. Edited by Eberhard Kolb. Historische Zeitschrift 6 (1980): 136–169.
  322. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  323. Vigorous, revisionist defense of Austria’s actions in the run-up to the war. Detailed analysis of policies advocated by different ministers. Available online by subscription.
  324. Find this resource:
  325. Wawro, Geoffrey. The Austro-Prussian War: Austria’s War with Prussia and Italy in 1866. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
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  327. Seminal work. Stresses Austrian incompetence more than Prussian genius as the overriding factor that decided the war. Narrative brilliance suits the book to undergraduates.
  328. Find this resource:
  329. Franco-Prussian War
  330.  
  331. The origins of the Franco-Prussian war have produced a monographic literature that can only be described as a vast sea. Sorel 1875 is no antique but a priceless gem. Lord 1924 is an evenhanded examination of the subject while stressing Bismarck’s desire to entrap France. Wetzel 2001 focuses on political rivalries within the French cabinet. Kolb 1970 concludes that Napoleon III’s ministers sought war as revenge for the defeat in 1866—a thesis to which Halperin 1973 is a response. Dittrich 1962 emphasizes Napoleon III’s military and political adventurism. Ohnezeit 2009 locates the war’s origins in the domestic factors in each country. Steefel 1962 provides a balanced and reliable guide to the dilemmas facing both sides. Wetzel 2012 sees Bismarck’s goals as restrained and is critical of the military.
  332.  
  333. Dittrich, Jochen. Bismarck, Frankreich, and die spanische Thronkandidatur der Hohenzollern: Die “Kriegschuldfrage” von 1870. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1962.
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  335. Comprehensive examination of the crisis. Thesis that Bismarck used candidacy not to provoke war with, but revolution in, France influenced a generation of scholars. Valuable documentary appendix contains material from the private archives of the Sigmaringen family.
  336. Find this resource:
  337. Halperin, S. William. “The Origins of the Franco-Prussian War Revisited: Bismarck and the Hohenzollern Candidature for the Spanish Throne.” Journal of Modern History 45.1 (1973): 83–91.
  338. DOI: 10.1086/240893Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  339. A response to Kolb 1970. Short, but valuable, contribution to the historiography of the problem. Available online by subscription.
  340. Find this resource:
  341. Kolb, Eberhard. Der Kriegsausbruch 1870: Politische Entscheidungsprozesse und Verantwortlichkeiten in der Julikrise 1870. Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970.
  342. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  343. Compact, beautifully written study. Exonerates Bismarck while criticizing France for provoking Prussia and seeking a privileged role in the system.
  344. Find this resource:
  345. Lord, Robert Howard. Origins of the War of 1870: New Documents from the German Archives. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1924.
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  347. Classic account. Argues both sides were responsible for the war. French bellicosity was exploited by Bismarck to explode the crisis. Documents in appendix were incorporated into Bismarck’s collected works by the German editors.
  348. Find this resource:
  349. Ohnezeit, Maik. “Der deutsch-französische Krieg 1870/71: Vorgeschichte, Ursachen, und Kriegsausbruch.” In Der deutsch-französische Krieg 1870/71: Vorgeschichte, Verlauf, Folgen. Edited by Jan Ganschow, Olaf Haselhorst, and Maik Ohnezeit, 17–82. Graz, Austria: Ares, 2009.
  350. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  351. Comprehensive examination of the factors and personalities that unchained war. Criticizes French policy before and during the July crisis. Extensive documentation.
  352. Find this resource:
  353. Sorel, Albert. Histoire diplomatique de la guerre franco-allemande. 2 vols. Paris: Plon et Cie, 1875.
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  355. Age notwithstanding, this classic history remains indispensable. Author had access to private papers of French ministers. English translation a century and a half overdue.
  356. Find this resource:
  357. Steefel, Lawrence D. Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962.
  358. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  359. Thorough, sober examination of topic. Finds responsibility for war on both sides. Well documented.
  360. Find this resource:
  361. Wetzel, David. A Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III, and the Origins of the Franco-Prussian War. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2001.
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  363. Stresses personalities, especially those on the French side; argues that they shaped Bismarck’s policy more than he shaped theirs. Bibliographical essay. There is also a 2003 paperback version.
  364. Find this resource:
  365. Wetzel, David. A Duel of Nations: Germany, France, and the Diplomacy of the War of 1870-1871. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012.
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  367. Again focuses on personalities. Emphasizes multiple problems faced by Bismarck during war. Denies war made Germany more secure. Bibliographical essay.
  368. Find this resource:
  369. Königgrätz
  370.  
  371. Königgrätz, the decisive battle of the Austro-Prussian war, also decided the fate of Germany’s future. Some titles in the section on the Austro-Prussian War may be consulted here. Craig 1964 remains the classic account. Franzel 1968 is a comprehensive guide with an abundance of maps. Wawro 1996 is a dramatic reminder of the price one generally has to pay for infidelity to commitments. Fesser 1994 is an elegant essay that discusses the impact of the victory on Prussian politics. Müller 2007 ties abstract theory to concrete battlefield maneuvers.
  372.  
  373. Craig, Gordon A. The Battle of Königgrätz: Prussia’s Victory over Austria, 1866. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964.
  374. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  375. Magisterial work. Provides deep insight into technological developments, showing why they were a key component of the Prussian victory. Good bibliography. Excellent for undergraduate courses.
  376. Find this resource:
  377. Fesser, Gerd. Königgrätz-Sadowa: Bismarcks Sieg über Österreich. Berlin: Brandenburgisches Verlagshaus, 1994.
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  379. Cogent explanation of the battle. Judicious selection of representative documents comprises the last half of this small volume.
  380. Find this resource:
  381. Franzel, Emil. 1866, il mondo casca: Das Ende des alten Europa. 2 vols. Vienna: Herold, 1968.
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  383. Exhaustive study of the conflict stressing the importance of the Austrian naval campaign against the Italians. Good bibliography.
  384. Find this resource:
  385. Müller, Klaus. 1866: Bismarcks deutscher Bruderkrieg: Königgrätz und die Schlachten auf deutschem Boden. Graz, Austria: Ares, 2007.
  386. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  387. Cogent analysis with many chronological tables. Stresses impact of battle on the collective memory of Austrians.
  388. Find this resource:
  389. Wawro, Geoffrey. The Austro-Prussian War: Austria’s War with Prussia and Italy in 1866. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
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  391. Trenchantly written account of the battle forms the last two hundred pages of this incomparable work. Unpacks Austrian strategy and the blunders of chief commander Benedek.
  392. Find this resource:
  393. Sedan
  394.  
  395. The French defeat at Sedan led to the overthrow of the empire of Napoleon III, and the shadow of that defeat lay across French political life for more than half a century. The final chapters of Wawro 2003 come close to being definitive on the battle and can be read with pleasure and profit. Howard 2001 is an outstanding contribution that tells the truth without hero worship or mudslinging. Rothney 1969 emphasizes collective memory. Fuselier-Guillaume 2006 is an absorbing drama in which we learn a great deal about the French army and about human nature in general. Mitchell 1979 convincingly demonstrates the impact of the defeat on the development of political, social, and economic institutions.
  396.  
  397. Fuselier-Guillaume, Mireille. Sedan 1870: L’émouvant récit du caporal Louis Oberhauser. Saint-Cyr-sur-Loire, France: A. Sutton, 2006.
  398. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  399. Reproduces the short but riveting narrative of a young soldier and the horrors with which he was confronted during the war. Good case study of the relationship between frontline troops and their commanders. A bestseller in France when it first appeared.
  400. Find this resource:
  401. Howard, Michael. The Franco Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870–1871. 2d ed. New York: Routledge, 2001.
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  403. A book in a thousand. Shows how the battle reflected economic, technological, and social changes and was a window into battles of the future. Suitable for all levels of readership.
  404. Find this resource:
  405. Mitchell, Allan. The German Influence in France after 1870: The Formation of the French Republic. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979.
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  407. Cogent analysis of the defeat and its relationship to party politics, finance, and tariffs. The army became untouchable and a poster child of the left.
  408. Find this resource:
  409. Rothney, John. Bonapartism after Sedan. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969.
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  411. Lucid account of Bonapartist influence in France after the defeat. Excellent bibliography, suited to upper undergraduate- and graduate-level students.
  412. Find this resource:
  413. Wawro, Geoffrey. The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870–1871. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
  414. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511511820Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  415. Magisterial work based on exhaustive use of French and German military archives. Argues that the battle’s outcome owed more to the failure of French commanders than to the brilliance of German generals.
  416. Find this resource:
  417. Siege of Paris
  418.  
  419. The siege of Paris began on September 19, 1870, and was not ended until January 23, 1871. Christiansen 1994 is a most able book, written with grace and wit. Horne 1965 stresses the depravity of the ruling classes. Guillemin 1960 emphasizes the brutality of the Germans and the bravery of the Parisian citizenry. Haselhorst 2009 challenges many accepted views on weaponry and battlefield strategy.
  420.  
  421. Christiansen, Rupert. Paris Babylon: The Story of the Paris Commune. New York: Viking, 1994.
  422. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  423. Riveting account—half narrative, half chronology—not only of the commune but also of the siege that led to it. Brings home the impact of the war on the city’s population. Magic of narration suits this work to undergraduate seminars.
  424. Find this resource:
  425. Guillemin, Henri. La capitulation (1871). Paris: Gallimard, 1960.
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  427. Searching analysis of the factors that led to defeat, stressing heroism and sacrifices made by the population. Forceful update of the author’s 1959 study.
  428. Find this resource:
  429. Haselhorst, Olaf. “Waffe, Waffengebrauch, und Taktik im Deutsch-Französischen Krieg.” In Der deutsch-französische Krieg 1870/71: Vorgeschichte, Verlauf, Folgen. Edited by Jan Ganschow, Olaf Haselhorst, and Maik Ohnezeit, 229–242. Graz, Austria: Ares, 2009.
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  431. Exceptionally lucid and concise description of strategic problems associated with siege warfare. German arms were not superior to French; advantages lay in willingness to take risks and superiority of maneuver.
  432. Find this resource:
  433. Horne, Alistair. The Fall of Paris: The Siege and the Commune, 1870–1871. London: Macmillan, 1965.
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  435. Fascinating popular account of the subject. Beautifully written and powerfully argued. Perfect for undergraduates.
  436. Find this resource:
  437. Alsace-Lorraine
  438.  
  439. The annexation of Alsace and most of Lorraine by Germany in 1871 provoked bitter reactions on the French side that lasted down to 1918 and beyond. Some of the titles in the section on Sedan may be consulted here. Howard 2001 is a clear demonstration of the various pressures at work on Bismarck. Kolb 1989 is an equally clear demonstration that Otto von Bismarck’s attitude toward annexation evolved as the war developed. Wawro 2003 is an analysis of the problem in the eyes of both belligerents by an author who writes as well as he sees. Roth 1990 argues that no single factor led Bismarck to demand annexation—but Roth 1976 shows why it scarred the French psyche. Gall 1968 is a clear outline of the problem based on an unrivaled command of the sources. Fenske 1971 is a model case study. Ohnezeit 2009 shows both the emotional response to the annexation and how it reshaped German political life.
  440.  
  441. Fenske, Hans. “Das Elsaß in der deutschen öffentlichen Meinung von 1820 bis 1866.” Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins 119 (1971): 233–280.
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  443. Excellent account of the historical background of the problem based on examination of documents in regional archives. Public pressure influenced Bismarck’s decision but was by no means the sole determining factor.
  444. Find this resource:
  445. Gall, Lothar. “Zur Frage der Annexion von Elsaß und Lothringen 1870.” Historische Zeitschrift 206.2 (1968): 265–326.
  446. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  447. Demonstrates without question that Bismarck’s decision was one he arrived at independently and without the pressure of external forces. Massive documentation. Available online by subscription.
  448. Find this resource:
  449. Howard, Michael. The Franco Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870–1871. 2d ed. New York: Routledge, 2001.
  450. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  451. Absorbing narrative. Credits Bismarck with exercising moderation against demands of more aggressive military men.
  452. Find this resource:
  453. Kolb, Eberhard. Der Weg aus dem Krieg: Bismarcks Politik im Krieg und die Friedensanbahnung, 1870/71. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989.
  454. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  455. Incisive, major account of the factors influencing Bismarck’s policy with respect to the two provinces. Based on exhaustive research in the five major European languages by a master diplomatic and military historian.
  456. Find this resource:
  457. Ohnezeit, Mark. “Das Ende des Deutsch-Französischen Krieges, die Reichsgründung und die Annexion Elsaß-Lothringens.” In Der deutsch-französische Krieg 1870/71: Vorgeschichte, Verlauf, Folgen. Edited by Jan Ganschow, Olaf Haselhorst, and Maik Ohnezeit, 190–228. Graz, Austria: Ares, 2009.
  458. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  459. Outstanding analysis of Bismarck’s role in the annexation decision that stresses the importance of personalities. Deeply researched with extensive footnotes but densely written; requires strong command of academic German. Definitely a graduate-level resource.
  460. Find this resource:
  461. Roth, François. La Lorraine annexée: Étude sur la présidence de Lorraine dans l’Empire allemand, 1870–1918. Nancy, France: Université de Nancy II, 1976.
  462. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  463. Major multiarchival examination of long-range effect of annexation on the German empire. Argues that it brought Germany more problems than it solved.
  464. Find this resource:
  465. Roth, François. La Guerre de 1870. Paris: Fayard, 1990.
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  467. Pioneering, riveting, and detailed study. Examines motives, debates, passions evoked by the war. Sees 1870 as a pivotal moment in modern history.
  468. Find this resource:
  469. Wawro, Geoffrey. The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870–1871. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
  470. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511511820Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  471. Presents Bismarck as inflexible against French pressure. Persuasive, thoroughly documented, and vigorously argued.
  472. Find this resource:
  473. Metz
  474.  
  475. The French disaster at Metz on October 29, 1870, and the responsibility of the commander, François Achille Bazaine, in negotiating with Otto von Bismarck is a topic that continues to engage the attention of historians. Some of the titles in the section on Sedan and Alsace-Lorraine may be consulted here. Wawro 2003 sheds new light on Bazaine’s activities. Baumont 1971 concludes that Bazaine was guilty of the crimes with which he was charged—an argument Maurice Baumont extends in his biography (Baumont 1978). Semur 2009 reproduces documents from Bazaine’s trail.
  476.  
  477. Baumont, Maurice. L’échiquier de Metz: Empire ou république, 1870. Paris: Hachette, 1971.
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  479. Riveting story. Author had access to private papers of Duc d’ Aumale, who prosecuted Bazaine for war crimes. Concludes Bazaine was guilty of treason.
  480. Find this resource:
  481. Baumont, Maurice. Bazaine: Les secrets d’un maréchal, 1811–1888. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1978.
  482. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  483. Shows the effects of Bazaine’s earlier career on his handling of problems at Metz. Extension and reconsideration of Baumont 1971.
  484. Find this resource:
  485. Semur, François-Christian. L’affaire Bazaine: Un maréchal devant ses juges. Turquant, France: Cheminements, 2009.
  486. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  487. Colorful, impressionistic interpretation. Emphasizes the decisive role of Bazaine’s personality in the ordeal during and following the war.
  488. Find this resource:
  489. Wawro, Geoffrey. The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870–1871. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
  490. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511511820Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  491. Draws on French military archives to show Bazaine’s secret aims included installing himself as a dictator of France with German support.
  492. Find this resource:
  493. Bismarck vs. Moltke
  494.  
  495. The rivalry between Otto von Bismarck and Helmuth von Moltke after Sedan was a drama every bit as absorbing as the war itself. Some of the titles in General Overviews, Helmut von Moltke, Sedan, Alsace-Lorraine, and Metz may be consulted here. Craig 1955 is a spirited and convincing defense of the chancellor, as is Howard 2001. Wawro 2003 sees the conflict largely in military terms, though it is by no means devoid of political implications. Bucholz 2001 is a thematic approach that relates the dispute to earlier problems. Showalter 2004 explains how William I came to side with Bismarck. Kolb 1989 emphasizes the danger to the German empire if Moltke had gotten his way.
  496.  
  497. Bucholz, Arden. Moltke and the German Wars, 1864–1871. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave, 2001.
  498. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  499. Good on the origins of the problem. Extensive notes are useful for historiography.
  500. Find this resource:
  501. Craig, Gordon A. The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945. Oxford: Clarendon, 1955.
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  503. Chapter on the subject excels on every count. Brilliant style and thorough acquaintance with evidence. Sees Moltke’s policy as a recipe for disaster. Designed for all levels of readership.
  504. Find this resource:
  505. Howard, Michael. The Franco Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870–1871. 2d ed. New York: Routledge, 2001.
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  507. Shows Moltke’s unchecked sway over the general staff and the effect this had on his duel with Bismarck.
  508. Find this resource:
  509. Kolb, Eberhard. Der Weg aus dem Krieg: Bismarcks Politik im Krieg und die Friedensanbahnung, 1870/71. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989.
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  511. Summarizes the conflict from a diplomatic standpoint. Argues that Bismarck wanted war to end quickly, even if brutally. Sees Moltke’s strategy as an invitation to foreign intervention. Exhaustive research in the five major European languages.
  512. Find this resource:
  513. Showalter, Dennis. The Wars of German Unification. London: Hodder Arnold, 2004.
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  515. Excellent analytical survey of the dispute based on the latest scholarship. Important in showing what factors led the king to finally side with Bismarck.
  516. Find this resource:
  517. Wawro, Geoffrey. The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870–1871. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
  518. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511511820Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  519. Balanced view of struggle; not unsympathetic to Moltke.
  520. Find this resource:
  521. Russian Reaction to the Outbreak of the Wars
  522.  
  523. Russia was the power most on the mind of all the belligerents in the three wars of German unification. Burgaud 2010 argues compellingly that mistrust of, rather than loyalty to, Bismarck was the guiding thread of tsarist policy throughout this period. Mosse 1958 concludes that Otto von Bismarck was no superman. Askew 1951 argues that Russian diplomacy was hamstrung by military weakness.
  524.  
  525. Askew, William C. “Russian Military Strength on the Eve of the Franco-Prussian War.” Slavonic and East European Review 30.74 (December 1951): 185–205.
  526. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  527. Reproduces a long memorandum by war minister Dmitri Milyutin to argue that Russia was not prepared for any extensive undertakings outside her borders. Available online by subscription.
  528. Find this resource:
  529. Burgaud, Stéphanie. La politique russe de Bismarck et l’unification allemande: Mythe fondateur et réalités politiques. Strasbourg, France: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2010.
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  531. Challenges the idea that Bismarck secured Russian goodwill in 1866 or 1870. Sees Russia as a more independent player than generally recognized.
  532. Find this resource:
  533. Mosse, Werner E. The European Powers and the German Question, 1848–71: With Special Reference to England and Russia. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1958.
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  535. Contends that divergent interests of powers favored Bismarck; no great strokes of policy were involved. Based on Austrian and British documents.
  536. Find this resource:
  537. Black Sea Crisis
  538.  
  539. The Black Sea Crisis of 1870–1871 threatened Bismarck’s plan to keep the war with France localized. Some of the titles in Russian Reaction to the Outbreak of War may be consulted here. The last hundred pages of Rheindorf 1925 emphasize Bismarck’s dexterity in resolving the crisis. Mosse 1963 stresses the role of the press and the opposition in determining British policy. Burgaud 2010 argues that Russia’s policy was formed without regard to Bismarck’s reaction. Beyrau 1980 stresses the role of personalities in resolving the outcome.
  540.  
  541. Beyrau, Dietrich. “Der deutsche Komplex: Russland zur Zeit der Reichsgründung.” In Special Issue: Europa und die Reichsgründung: Preussen-Deutschland in der Sicht der grossen europäischen Mächte 1860–1880. Edited by Eberhard Kolb. Historische Zeitschrift 6 (1980): 63–107.
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  543. Stimulating account of Bismarck’s relations with the Russian chancellor Alexander Gorchakov. Emphasizes the former’s skill and dexterity and the latter’s vanity and superficiality. Available online by subscription.
  544. Find this resource:
  545. Burgaud, Stéphanie. La politique russe de Bismarck et l’unification allemande: Mythe fondateur et réalités politiques. Strasbourg, France: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2010.
  546. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  547. Argues that Russia was not dependent on Bismarck for support at all. Nullification of the Black Sea clauses was a step long planned.
  548. Find this resource:
  549. Mosse, W. E. “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The British Public and the War Scare of November 1870.” Historical Journal 6.1 (1963): 38–58.
  550. DOI: 10.1017/S0018246X0000090XSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  551. Emphasizes the real danger of war in October 1870. Extensive use of archival sources. Available online by subscription.
  552. Find this resource:
  553. Rheindorf, Kurt. Die Schwarze-Meer- (Pontus-) Frage vom Pariser Frieden von 1856 bis zum Abschluss der Londoner Konferenz von 1871. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1925.
  554. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  555. Old, but still the best study of the problem. Thirty-three-page appendix reproduces documents from French and Russian archives.
  556. Find this resource:
  557. Austria-Hungary
  558.  
  559. How did Austria react to the defeat she suffered in the war against Prussia in 1866, and what policies did the newly established monarchy of Austria-Hungary adopt toward the protagonists, Prussia and France, in the war of 1870? What were the alternatives to these? Were there any? Some of the titles in the section on the Austro-Prussian War may be consulted here. Lutz 1979 provides a searching analysis of the questions facing Vienna, expanding, modifying, and occasionally correcting arguments developed by Schmitt 1968. Rumpler 1980 is a stimulating defense of the government’s position. Rothenberg 1976 is an outstanding account showing how the military sought to struggle with institutional change. Wawro 1995 is an equally outstanding account showing the failures of military leaders to adopt to technological change. Wawro 1996 ties defective military strategy to problems of money.
  560.  
  561. Lutz, Heinrich. Österreich-Ungarn und die Gründung des Deutschen Reiches: Europ. Entscheidungen, 1867–1871. Frankfurt: Propyläen, 1979.
  562. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  563. Sympathetic to Austria-Hungary. Illuminates struggle between leading figures in the government during the war of 1870. Comprehensive notes and bibliography, but involved style demands considerable knowledge of academic German.
  564. Find this resource:
  565. Rothenberg, Gunther E. The Army of Francis Joseph. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1976.
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  567. Standard history of the army, strong on the period 1848–1867. Concludes that the army was superior to the dynasty it was charged with defending
  568. Find this resource:
  569. Rumpler, Helmut. “Österreich-Ungarn und die Gründung des deutschen Reichs.” In Special Issue: Europa und die Reichsgründung: Preussen-Deutschland in der Sicht der grossen europäischen Mächte 1860–1880. Edited by Eberhard Kolb. Historische Zeitschrift 6 (1980): 136–169.
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  571. Excellent, vigorously argued exposition about Austria-Hungary’s compatibility with the new German empire. Contends that Habsburg rulers were not bent on a policy of revenge. Wide range of sources. Available online by subscription.
  572. Find this resource:
  573. Schmitt, Hans A. “Count Beust and Germany, 1866–1870: Reconquest, Realignment, or Resignation?” Central European History 1 (1968): 20–34.
  574. DOI: 10.1017/S000893890001476XSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  575. Clear, evenhanded, important essay on the dilemmas faced by Austria-Hungary’s prime minister, Count Friedrich von Beust, during the years it covers. Especially sensitive to problems posed by reorganization of monarchy in 1867. Convincing rehabilitation of a neglected, underrated diplomat. Available online by subscription.
  576. Find this resource:
  577. Wawro, Geoffrey. “An ‘Army of Pigs’: The Technical, Social and Political Bases of Austrian Shock Tactics, 1859–1866.” Journal of Military History 59 (1995): 407–434.
  578. DOI: 10.2307/2944616Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  579. Concise analysis of defects in Austrian strategy. Charts political, economic, and especially linguistic problems in Austrian war plans. Draws extensively on material from war ministry. Excellent undergraduate resource. Available online by subscription.
  580. Find this resource:
  581. Wawro, Geoffrey. “Inside the Whale: The Tangled Finances of the Austrian Army, 1848–1866.” War in History 3 (1996): 42–65.
  582. DOI: 10.1177/096834459600300102Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  583. Broadly based, richly textured survey based on painstaking archival research. Concludes economic disarray and bureaucratic overlap played a major role in Austria’s defeat in 1866. Available online by subscription.
  584. Find this resource:
  585. France
  586.  
  587. French policy during the first two wars of German unification and the crisis with Prussia that led to the final one has provoked some important and wide-ranging debates. Geuss 1959 stresses the conspiratorial nature of Napoleon III’s regime and the reasons why Bismarck found it impossible, in the end, to deal with it. Pottinger 1966, by contrast, argues that it was Bismarck who was conspiratorial and devious. Echard 1983 goes further and suggests that Napoleon III’s motives throughout the period were pacific, not aggressive, in nature. Zeldin 1958 is an unrivaled examination of the institutions of the regime and clearly demonstrates the connection between domestic and international events.
  588.  
  589. Echard, William E. Napoleon III and the Concert of Europe. Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1983.
  590. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  591. Spirited, revisionist statement that Napoleon III consistently sought to deal with problems posed by German unification through a European congress only to be frustrated by Bismarck at every turn. Extensive use of French documents.
  592. Find this resource:
  593. Geuss, Herbert. Bismarck und Napoleon III: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der preussisch-französischen Beziehungen, 1851–1871. Cologne: Böhlau, 1959.
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  595. Old, but still valuable, account of the relations of the two figures during the two decades it covers. Argues that Bismarck sought to cooperate with, not conspire against, Napoleon III. Based on Prussian and French sources.
  596. Find this resource:
  597. Pottinger, E. Ann. Napoleon III and the German Crisis, 1865–1866. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966.
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  599. Controversial, but important, defense of Napoleon III and his policies toward Prussia in the run-up to the war against Austria in 1866. Argues that Napoleon aimed at German unification—on terms compatible with the European system. Extensive documentation.
  600. Find this resource:
  601. Zeldin, Theodore. The Political System of Napoleon III. New York: St. Martin’s, 1958.
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  603. Magisterial survey of the structure of the French political system. Especially strong on the events and personalities involved in the disaster of 1870. Excellent bibliography.
  604. Find this resource:
  605. Germany
  606.  
  607. Germany’s meteoric and stormy rise to preeminence in the years between 1864 and 1870 evoked passions of all kinds, not least among the Germans themselves. Some of the works cited in General Overviews may be consulted here. Schieder and Deuerlein 1970 assembles essays by writers of great authority on all aspects of the question. Stern 1977 upset many accepted views when it first appeared. Gall 1987 is a short but valuable analysis of Otto von Bismarck’s policies toward the south German states. Böhme 1971 is a window into economic and social forces of the time.
  608.  
  609. Böhme, Helmut, ed. The Foundation of the German Empire: Select Documents. Translated by Agatha Ramm. London: Oxford University Press, 1971.
  610. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  611. Wide-ranging, controversial analysis of economic and social forces that resulted in German unification.
  612. Find this resource:
  613. Gall, Lothar. “Bismarcks Süddeutschlandpolitik, 1866–1870.” In Europa vor dem Krieg von 1870: Mächtekonstellation, Konfliktfelder, Kriegsausbruch. Edited by Eberhard Kolb, 23–32. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1987.
  614. DOI: 10.1524/9783486595505Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  615. Analysis of Bismarck’s multisided policy in dealing with the four states south of the river Main during the four years preceding the outbreak of war in 1870. Available online by subscription.
  616. Find this resource:
  617. Schieder, Theodor, and Ernst Deuerlein, eds. Reichsgründung, 1870/71: Tatsachen, Kontroversen, Interpretationen. Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1970.
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  619. Sixteen essays, all richly documented, by leading authorities on social, military, and political themes. Particularly instructive on Bismarck’s relations with the military figures.
  620. Find this resource:
  621. Stern, Fritz. Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder, and the Building of the German Empire. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977.
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  623. Classic account of Bismarck’s relations with his banker, Gerson von Bleichröder. Extensive use of the latter’s private papers. Literary grace makes this work an ideal source for undergraduates.
  624. Find this resource:
  625. Great Britain
  626.  
  627. Preoccupation with domestic problems and the American Civil War prevented extensive involvement by Britain in the three German wars. Still, all the powers who fought in them sought, at one time or another and with varying degrees of success, to influence London. Hildebrand 1980 is an unrivaled examination of the twists and turns in British policy between 1864 and 1870. Hildebrand 1977 is strong on public opinion. Millman 1965 is a compact survey of the diplomacy of the July crisis of 1870.
  628.  
  629. Hildebrand, Klaus. “Die deutsche Reichsgründung im Urteil der britischen Politik.” Francia 5 (1977): 399–424.
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  631. Richly detailed investigation into the motives of British policy during the July crisis of 1870 based on thorough examination of archival records and private papers of Prime Minister William Ewart Gladstone. Concentrates on Gladstone’s preoccupation with plebiscites and distaste for Prussian militarism.
  632. Find this resource:
  633. Hildebrand, Klaus. “Grossbritannien und die deutsche Reichsgründung.” In Special Issue: Europa und die Reichsgründung: Preussen-Deutschland in der Sicht der grossen europäischen Mächte 1860–1880. Edited by Eberhard Kolb. Historische Zeitschrift 6 (1980): 9–62.
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  635. Authoritative analysis of British diplomatic options and initiatives manifesting quiet sympathy for Prussia. Argues that London would have preferred to see Otto von Bismarck annex the states of south Germany in 1866 when it would have caused no trouble for France. Available online by subscription.
  636. Find this resource:
  637. Millman, Richard. British Foreign Policy and the Coming of the Franco-Prussian War. Oxford: Clarendon, 1965.
  638. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  639. Searching study of pressures faced by the government. Argues that British domestic and military weakness were major determinants of policy. Extensive use of archival material.
  640. Find this resource:
  641. Italy
  642.  
  643. Italy was clearly the weakest of the European powers during this time, but she was the center of much diplomatic activity prior to the outbreaks of the wars of 1866 and 1870. Some of the titles in the section on Königgrätz may be consulted here. Tapié 1971 traces the attempts by various actors to create an Italo-Austro-French alliance and argues that such an alliance was never in the cards. Chabod 1996 stresses the effect of the occupation of Rome on the minds of Catholics throughout Europe. Similarly, Miko 1962 sees that occupation as a turning point in world history, when the thousand-year existence of the Ecclesiastical City came to an end. Lil 1966 argues that Italian policy misjudged French intentions in the run-up to war in 1870. Halperin 1963 focuses on Italian efforts first to prevent the 1870 war and then to keep it confined to the two belligerents. di Nola 1956 provides a backdrop to all these events. Wawro 1996 is an unsurpassed account on the neglected naval operations and the Italian campaigns in the war of 1866, as is Franzel 1968.
  644.  
  645. Chabod, Federico. Italian Foreign Policy: The Statecraft of the Founders. Translated by William McCuaig. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.
  646. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  647. Translation of the 1951 classic Storia della politica estera italiana dal 1870 al 1896. Cogent analysis of the factors influencing Napoleon III’s decision to withdraw French troops from Rome in 1870. Tremendous bibliography.
  648. Find this resource:
  649. di Nola, Carlo. La situazione europea e la politica italiana dal 1867 al 1870. Rome: Dante Alighieri, 1956.
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  651. Useful survey of developments surrounding demise of the papal state. Short, compact, well argued. Defends the Italian government.
  652. Find this resource:
  653. Franzel, Emil. 1866, il mondo casca: Das Ende des alten Europa. 2 vols. Vienna: Herold, 1968.
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  655. Excellent examination of defeat inflicted on Italy by Austria at the battle of Lissa. The Habsburg navy was superior to the Italian in almost every way, but defeat owed much to the personal rivalry of Italian commanders.
  656. Find this resource:
  657. Halperin, S. William. Diplomat under Stress: Visconti-Venosta and the Crisis of July 1870. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.
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  659. Overview of frantic, last-minute efforts by the Italian statesman to avert war in 1870. Persuasively presents its protagonist as a first-rate, though unrecognized, statesman who sought to avert war. Extensive documentation from Italian, Austrian, and British archives.
  660. Find this resource:
  661. Lil, Rudolf. “Aus den italienisch-deutschen Beziehungen, 1869–1876.” Quellen und Forschungen aus Italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 46 (1966): 399–454.
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  663. Rapid, high-level, and sweeping account of debates on Italian policy. Wide-ranging documentation.
  664. Find this resource:
  665. Miko, Norbert. Das Ende des Kirchenstaates. Vol. 2. Vienna: Herold, 1962.
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  667. Massively detailed study dealing almost exclusively with diplomatic exchanges from August 11 to September 22, 1870. Author had access to archives hitherto closed by the Vatican.
  668. Find this resource:
  669. Tapié, Victor Lucien. Autour d’une tentative d’alliance entre la France et l’Autriche, 1867–1870. Vienna: Böhlau, 1971.
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  671. Brilliant portrait of Italian-Austrian-French alliance negotiations and Paris’s decision to occupy Rome. Delusions and excessive confidence of the French caused the alliance’s demise. Exhaustive use of source material from the countries with which it deals.
  672. Find this resource:
  673. Wawro, Geoffrey. The Austro-Prussian War: Austria’s War with Prussia and Italy in 1866. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
  674. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  675. Second and third chapters provide a vivid account of the development of the Italian campaign showing how this contributed to the debacle at Königgrätz.
  676. Find this resource:
  677. Russia
  678.  
  679. “Russia,” Otto von Bismarck once observed, “is more of an elementary force than a government . . . and she must be treated like bad weather.” All the major actors—Danish, Austrian, French, and Prussian—in the three wars of unification attempted, with varying degrees of success, to win the favor of St. Petersburg. Some of the titles in the section Russian Reaction to Outbreak of the Wars may be consulted here. Beyrau 1987 calls for renewed appreciation of able diplomats. Beyrau 1974 is a window into the competing influences for the tsar’s mind—a point forcefully updated by Beyrau 1980. Burgaud 2010 is a critical, revisionist view of Bismarckian policy against the background of social and economic power structures.
  680.  
  681. Beyrau, Dietrich. Russische Orientpolitik und die Entstehung des deutschen Kaiserreiches 1866–1870/71. Wiesbaden, Germany: Otto Harrassowitz, 1974.
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  683. Outstanding analysis of Russian policy from the end of the Austro-Prussian war to the defeat of France by Germany in 1871. Argues that Bismarck took advantage of French expansionist designs to secure Russian favor in 1870 conflict. Written in clear, easy-to-read German and based on Prussian and Russian documents.
  684. Find this resource:
  685. Beyrau, Dietrich. “Russland zur Zeit der Reichsgründung.” In Special Issue: Europa und die Reichsgründung: Preussen-Deutschland in der Sicht der grossen europäischen Mächte 1860–1880. Edited by Eberhard Kolb. Historische Zeitschrift 6 (1980): 63–137.
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  687. Another important contribution to the evolution of Russian diplomatic strategy by a writer of great authority. Particularly informative on relations between the foreign ministry and the press.
  688. Find this resource:
  689. Beyrau, Dietrich. “Russische Interessenzonen und europäisches Gleichgewicht 1860–1870.” In Europa vor den Krieg von 1870: Mächtekonstellation, Konfliktfelder, Kriegsausbruch. Edited by Eberhard Kolb, 65–76. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1987.
  690. DOI: 10.1524/9783486595505Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  691. Compact statement of competing views of tsarist foreign policy during the years it covers. Excellent supplementary reading for graduate students. Available online by subscription.
  692. Find this resource:
  693. Burgaud, Stéphanie. La politique russe de Bismarck et l’unification allemande: Mythe fondateur et réalités politiques. Strasbourg, France: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2010.
  694. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  695. Sweeping, revisionist account challenging the argument that Bismarck secured his aims in dealings with St. Petersburg. Based on previously unexamined Russian material as well as documents in German and French archives. Excellent bibliography.
  696. Find this resource:
  697. Impact of 1870
  698.  
  699. The Franco-Prussian war cut deep into the consciousness of European minds. Some of the titles in Alsace-Lorraine and Franco-Prussian War may be consulted here. Ganschow 2009 stresses the precedents the war of 1870 would set for the Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907. Schroeder 2004 argues that the too-powerful victory of Prussia made Germany an insecure hegemon—a point also developed by Levillain and Riemenschneider 1990. Kolb 1989 credits Bismarck’s genius in ending the war swiftly and on terms Germany wanted. Roth 1990 sees its implications as reaching down to the present day.
  700.  
  701. Ganschow, Jan. “Kriegsvölkerrecht im Deutsch-Französischen Krieg 1870/71.” In Der deutsch-französische Krieg 1870/71: Vorgeschichte, Verlauf, Folgen. Edited by Jan Ganschow, Olaf Haselhorst, and Maik Ohnezeit, 283–430. Graz, Austria: Ares, 2009.
  702. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  703. Assesses the war from the standpoint of international law and its importance for precedents of laws adopted by the London conference of 1871 and Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907.
  704. Find this resource:
  705. Kolb, Eberhard. Der Weg aus dem Krieg: Bismarcks Politik im Krieg und die Friedensanbahnung, 1870/71. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989.
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  707. Argues that the peace treaty was not overly severe compared with those of 1807 and 1919. Mountains of documentation.
  708. Find this resource:
  709. Levillain, Philippe, and Rainer Riemenschneider, eds. La Guerre de 1870/71 et ses consequences: Actes du XXe colloque historique franco-allemand organisé à Paris, du 10 au 12 octobre 1984 et du 14 au 15 octobre 1985. Bonn, Germany: Bouvier, 1990.
  710. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  711. Stimulating collection of essays produced for an international conference of scholars assessing the economic, political, diplomatic, and cultural situation in Germany and France in the immediate aftermath of the war. More than twenty excellent pieces.
  712. Find this resource:
  713. Roth, François. La Guerre de 1870. Paris: Fayard, 1990.
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  715. Magisterial analysis by the great French historian. Assesses the lasting wound on the French psyche as a result of defeat. Especially good on the war’s impact on cities in eastern France.
  716. Find this resource:
  717. Schroeder, Paul W. “The Lost Intermediaries: The Impact of 1870 on the European System.” In Systems, Stability and Statecraft: Essays on the International History of Modern Europe. By Paul W. Schroeder. Edited by David Wetzel, Robert Jervis, and Jack S. Levy, 77–95. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
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  719. Landmark article that first appeared in International History Review 6 (1984). Absorption into the Germany of four states south of the Main destabilized the European system, overbalanced German power, and led to the eventual estrangement of Germany and Russia. Powerfully argued and thoroughly documented. 1984 version available online by subscription.
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