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Samuel P. Huntington Roasting Over an Open Fire

Dec 11th, 2016
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  1. Oh boy, this one is gonna be fun. Confused about the name? Huntington is that dude behind that hateful and frankly unsubstantiated claim that Muslims are somehow inherently incapable of integrating into ‘Western society’. That is to say their culture prevents them.
  2. As you can likely infer, yes, that is totally pathetic and misinformed sensationalism.
  3. With this compilation, I’ll go over many studies detailing the reason for extremist leanings (alienation is a big factor), the extensive oppression without warrant (both socially and economically), and of course tearing the Huntington thesis to shreds.
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  7. =======AN INITIAL AND THOROUGH KICKOFF=======
  8. Confused? Well, the reason is because this following short section will yield enough to satisfy the average person. And by that I mean the first study provided is fucking massive. 456 pages, 500+ sources from a vast variety of places. Yea.
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  12. “First we show with new data that the much hailed European social model is a myth, when you compare poverty rates in OECD countries and in Europe on the basis of absolute income data, and not just poverty lines in terms of national means. The more that absolute poverty grows in Western Europe, largely due to failed integration policies, and due to the fact that the European Union expands and takes in new members characterized by low average incomes and large scale poverty rates of their own, the old national and relative poverty lines (in terms of 60% of the national median) become obsolete.
  13. As large scale poverty of Europe's Muslim communities threatens to grow, political radicalism might fall on a fertile ground. But we present materials, based on the ESS that give strong support to the hypothesis that passive support for Islamist radicalism in Europe and the complete distrust in democracy does not exceed 400.000 persons. We also compare our research results with the recent PEW data. By and large, the two datasets yield the same results. Regrettable as Islamist extremism in Europe might be, it is a far way from alarmist views that present Islam in Europe as such as being incompatible with the future of democracy.
  14. We also find strong evidence that Muslim communities in Europe are not different from other religious communities in their tendency towards secularism. We also find that Muslim economic and social alienation in Europe very much corresponds to deficiencies of the implementation of the Lisbon process. Using the ESS cross-national and quantitative data, we first estimate a new UNDP-type index of Muslim development in Europe, based on
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  16. * the percentage of the Muslim community living above poverty
  17. * the percentage of the Muslim community expressing trust in democracy
  18. * the percentage of the Muslim community expressing trust in the legal system
  19. * the percentage of the Muslim community expressing trust in parliament
  20. * the percentage of the Muslim community expressing trust in the police
  21.  
  22. Likewise, we construct another UNDP type index, which we call Muslim empowerment index, which measures
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  24. * a small difference in the percentage of the non-Muslim communities and the Muslim community of a European country living above poverty
  25. * a small difference in the percentage of the non-Muslim communities and the Muslim community of a European country expressing trust in democracy
  26. * a small difference in the percentage of the non-Muslim communities and the Muslim community of a European country expressing trust in the legal system
  27. * a small difference in the percentage of the non-Muslim communities and the Muslim community of a European country expressing trust in parliament
  28. * a small difference in the percentage of the non-Muslim communities and the Muslim community of a European country expressing trust in the police”
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  30. “It is shown furthermore that the analysis of the new UN data on migration balances per total population in over 100 countries also supports the socio-liberal view that ceteris paribus, not only Islam, but also inward migration are very much compatible with successful and egalitarian patterns of development. While neo-liberal globalization, ceteris paribus, contributes to the social polarization of the host countries of transnational capital penetration, Muslim communities or membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference are to be regarded as socially stabilizing and growth enhancing factors. “
  31.  
  32. https://papers.ssrn.com/soL3/papers...
  33. *Full text is currently available.*
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  35.  
  36. =======ALIENATION: RADICALISM, ECONOMY, INTERRELATIONS=======
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  40. “This paper argues that both socio-economic disadvantage and political factors, such as the West’s foreign policy with regard to the Muslim world, along with historical grievances, play a part in the development of Islamic radicalized collective action in Western Europe. We emphasise the role of group identity based individual behaviour in organising collective action within radicalized Muslim groups. Inasmuch as culture plays any role at all in radicalization, it is because individuals feel an imperative to act on the basis of their Muslim identity, something to which different individuals will attach varying degrees of salience, depending on how they place their Muslim identity based actions in the scheme of their multiple identities. We also emphasize the role of the opportunistic politician, from the majority European community, in fomenting hatred for Muslims, which also produces a backlash from radicalized political Islam. We present comparative evidence on socio-economic, political and cultural disadvantage faced by Muslim minorities in five West European countries: Germany, the UK, France, Spain and the Netherlands.”
  41.  
  42. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers...
  43. *Full text is currently available.*
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  46. “The vast majority of Muslims in Europe are not involved in radical activities, and the July 2011 killing spree in Norway by a far-right extremist serves as a stark reminder that the perpetrators of violent extremism may be of any ethnicity, religion, or political ideology. However, events such as the March 2004 Madrid bombings by an Al Qaeda-inspired group of North Africans, the November 2004 murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a young Dutch Muslim extremist, and the July 2005 attacks on London’s mass transit system carried out by young Muslims born and/or raised in the United Kingdom, have brought the issue of “homegrown” Islamist extremism to the forefront of European political debate. In particular, such incidents have raised questions about whether European governments have done enough to promote the integration of Muslims into mainstream European society. Many experts believe that while far from the sole cause of radicalization and terrorism, past failures to fully integrate Muslims into European civic, political, and economic life may leave some European Muslims more vulnerable to extremist ideologies. European governments have responded with a mix of strategies aimed, on the one hand, at improving the integration of Muslims, and on the other hand, at strengthening security measures and tightening immigration and asylum policies to prevent radicalization and combat terrorism.”
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  48. http://isndemo.atlasproject.eu/asse...
  49. *Full text is currently available.*
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  51.  
  52. “Muslims are the largest religious minority in Europe, and Islam is the fastest growing religion. Europe's Muslim population is ethnically and linguistically diverse, and Muslim immigrants in Europe hail from a variety of Middle Eastern, African, and Asian countries, as well as Turkey. Over the last few years, European countries have stepped up efforts to integrate more fully their expanding Muslim populations. Recent terrorist acts in Europe such as the July 2005 London bombings that were carried out by young Muslims born and/or bred in Europe have given further impetus to these initiatives. The widescale riots and violence that broke out in late October 2005 throughout France in reaction to the deaths of two young Muslims also highlight the alienation and discrimination that some European Muslims feel and the need for European governments to address such societal tensions.”
  53.  
  54. http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=ge...
  55. *Full text is currently available.*
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  58. “A review of the growing literature on the Muslim population in Europe shows that it remains poorly captured in official statistics. There is no authoritative map of the distribution of Muslims in Europe, and little quantitative evidence on their demographic, social or economic characteristics. This paper undertakes a systematic review of the conceptual and methodological issues surrounding the quantification of Muslim populations. With few countries routinely collecting data on religious affiliation, this is generally based on an estimation of the association between religion and some other measure of identity, such as country of birth or nationality. The rationale for the various 'religiousproxy' methods, and their limitations, is discussed in relation to the range of different data regimes observed across the region. The paper argues that changes in the political status of Muslim populations (following naturalization) and the manner of their growth (increasingly driven by natural increase) have meant that in statistical terms, they represent a disappearing target. The paper concludes that meaningful statistics on the Muslims in Europe will increasingly depend on the direct measurement of religious affiliation.”
  59.  
  60. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/...
  61. http://booksc.org/book/35805323
  62. *Full text is currently available.*
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  65. “Among migration scholars, immigrant religiosity has become an important variable in understanding immigrant incorporation into the new society, but less studied are determinants of varying immigrant religious outcomes. Using a subsample of immigrant Muslims within the European Social Survey (2002, 2004, 2006), contexts of immigrant receptivity as less or more welcoming are tested on immigrant Muslim religious outcomes using multi-level modelling. Results confirm the hypothesis that less welcoming immigrant contexts are associated with higher religious outcomes among Muslim immigrants in comparison to the host region's religiosity.”
  66.  
  67. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/...
  68. http://booksc.org/book/30929771
  69. *Full text is currently available.*
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  72. “Building on the work of Granovetter [1973. “The Strength of Weak Ties.” American Journal of Sociology 78 (6): 1360–1380.], weak ties are assumed to play a vital role in processes of integration. In this paper, the focus lies on weak ties that cut across ethnic boundaries, connecting Muslim immigrants to members of the ethnic majority in six European host societies. The aim is twofold: a descriptive analysis of the existence of those crosscutting weak ties amongst different groups of Muslim immigrants and an explanatory analysis focusing on the structural factors that make the establishment of such ties more likely. In the latter part, the native populations are also taken into account, allowing for a bidirectional perspective. Using ordinal logistic regression models, we found that emancipatory factors such as education and language skills are positively associated with having weak ties, whereas conservative values and religiosity decrease the likelihood of establishing many weak ties. A diverse neighbourhood appears to play a pivotal role in the formation of weak ties from both a native and an immigrant perspective.”
  73.  
  74. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/...
  75. http://booksc.org/book/50980942
  76. *Full text is currently available.*
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  79. “Most Muslims in Western Europe are economic migrants. In the majority of cases they opted to leave their countries of origin to obtain employment with high wages (in relation to those obtaining in their own countries) in the hope of accumulating savings with which to start a new life at home after a few years. However, with changes in immigration policies, there has been a growing tendency to settle in host countries (in particular, in Britain and France) and to use savings to finance the passages of families and dependents. In this paper we shall attempt first to take a brief look at factors leading to migration in five Western European countries, namely Britain, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium. We shall then examine the contribution of Muslim workers to labour markets in these countries and their industrial distribution. Furthermore, since most European countries are experiencing severe economic recession we shall take a brief look at its effects on Muslim workers in the five countries and finally we shall attempt to examine factors of racial discrimination and consequent segregation of these migrant workers both socially and at work.”
  80.  
  81. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/...
  82. http://booksc.org/book/37990808
  83. *Full text is currently available.*
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  86. “There is widespread interest in understanding anti-Muslim prejudice in Europe, but there is little systematic evidence about the extent and patterns of the prejudice. Using data from the 1999–2000 wave of European Values Study this article examines the extent and determinants of anti-Muslim prejudice in both Western and Eastern Europe. We find that prejudice against Muslims was more widespread than prejudice against other immigrants, and that the effects of individual and country-level predictors of prejudice resemble those found in research on anti-minority prejudice in general. Fairly similar results were obtained for both Eastern and Western Europe, but the aggregate levels of prejudice are higher in the East. Our results imply that Muslims in Europe were particularly prone to becoming targets of prejudice, even before the attacks of September 11. The results give some support to group-conflict theory, mainly with regard to the effects of the unemployment. However, the size of Muslim population in a country does not seem to increase the level of anti-Muslim prejudice.”
  87.  
  88. http://www.sciencedirect.com/scienc...
  89. *Full text is currently available.*
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  92. “There are two extreme viewpoints on the issue of Muslim integration into Europe. On the one hand, Muslims are accused of resisting peaceful integration into European society, as evidenced by events such as the bombing in London and the riots in France in 2005. On the other hand, Europeans are accused of being increasingly hostile toward Muslim and other immigrants, as evidenced by the popularity of European anti-immigration parties or the growing number of legislative attempts to limit the use of religious symbols, including the veil worn by Muslim women.
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  94. Poll results provide very limited support for either of these extreme positions. Rather, our data reveal that, while religion remains an important part of their identity, Muslim residents of London, Paris, and Berlin also identify strongly with the country in which they live. In all three cities, strong majorities of Muslims -- 68% in Paris, 85% in Berlin, and 88% in London -- say religion is an important part of their lives. These figures stand in stark contrast to those found among the general population: only 23% of French, 36% of British, and 41% of German respondents overall consider religion to be an important part of their lives.
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  96. However, the idea that their higher religiosity implies a weaker sense of national identity is simply false. In London and Paris, when Muslims were not forced to choose between religious and national identity, they tended to associate themselves with both. In fact, in none of the three countries were Muslim residents significantly less likely than the populations at large to say they identify strongly with their country. (In the United Kingdom, they were actually somewhat more likely to do so.)"
  97.  
  98. http://media.gallup.com/WorldPoll/P...
  99. *Full text is currently available.*
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  102. “This paper examines relationships between religiosity and intolerance towards Muslims and immigrants among Europeans living in non-Muslim majority countries by applying multilevel modeling to European Values Study data (wave four, 2010). Thus relationships across 44 national contexts are analyzed. The analysis found large between-country differences in the overall levels of intolerance towards immigrants and Muslims. Eastern Europeans tend to be more intolerant than Western Europeans. In most countries Muslims are less accepted than immigrants,—a finding which reflects that in post-9/11 Europe Islamophobia is prevalent and many still see Muslims with suspicion. A key result is that believing matters for the citizen’s attitudes towards Muslims and immigrants. Across Europe, traditional and modern fuzzy beliefs in a Higher Being are strongly negatively related to intolerance towards immigrants and Muslims, while fundamentalism is positively related to both targets of intolerance. Religious practice and denominational belonging on the other hand matter far less for the citizen’s propensity to dislike the two out-groups. With the only exception of non-devout Protestants who do not practice their religion, members of religious denominations are not more intolerant than non-members. The findings are valid for the vast majority of countries although countries differ in the magnitude of the effects.”
  103.  
  104. http://link.springer.com/article/10...
  105. *Full text is currently available.*
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  107.  
  108. “Islam is judged as not fitting to culture.
  109. Only 16.6% of the German respondents agree to the statement: ”The Muslim culture fits well into Germany”. This is the lowest proportion compared to all other observed countries! In France and Portugal about 50% and in Britain and the Netherlands about 39% somewhat or strongly agree to this statement with respect to their countries; in Poland and Hungary “Europe” was addressed instead due to the very low percentage of Muslims in these countries.
  110.  
  111. Prejudices toward Muslims are common.
  112. The data mirror worries that people feel to be a stranger in their own country. 44% of the Europeans somewhat or strongly agree to the statement: “There are too many Muslims in [country / in Europe in Poland and Hungary]”. We have to mind that de facto the proportion of Muslims in European countries is rather low. E.g., whereas 50% of the Italians agree that there are too many Muslims in Italy, the percentage of Muslims in Italy is estimated by official statistics of about 2%. In Poland (47% agreement) and Hungary (60.7% agreement) the maximum proportion of Muslims in the population is 1%. In Germany, with an estimated proportion of about 5% Muslims, 46% agree that there are „too many Muslims”. In France with a similar percentage of Muslims we observe only 36% agreement. Note that these are results of a representative sample, i.e. not only respondents living in big cities that often have a higher percentage of Muslims but also from rural areas that very often have a very low rate of Muslims were interviewed.
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  114. The Islam is perceived as an intolerant religion.
  115. There is broad consensus of respondents that “the Islam is a religion of intolerance” (respectively, in France the disagreement to “The Islam is a religion of tolerance” was measured). 52.2% of the respondents in Germany and 54.4% of the European respondents agreed somewhat or strongly. However, the same respondents who belong to the vast majority of the Christian confession agreed to racist, anti-Semitic, sexist and homophobe statements. Religious persons (following one of the Christian religions) agree to these prejudice significantly more than non-religious persons (with or without religion). They do not seem to be aware that they are intolerant towards several groups themselves: There is only a moderate relation of group-focused enmity (interrelated syndrome of several prejudices) and the extent to which the respondents estimate themselves to be racist (r = .22).
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  117. Muslims are suspected to be intolerant.
  118. One of the most common prejudices towards the Islam and Muslims is that they do not treat women and men equally. Additionally many Muslims are reproached of intolerance towards homosexuality. The data show that 78% of the Europeans and 76% of the Germans somewhat or strongly agreed to the statement that: “Muslim’s attitudes towards women contradict our values”. Europeans of several countries vastly agree in their perception of attitude differences between themselves and Muslims opinion with only minor variation in Portugal and Poland with 72% agreement. It seems to be worthwhile to know that at the same time 60% of the Europeans support the view that: “Women should take their roles as wife and mother more seriously” (please see the attached graph for details). In Germany 53%, in Poland even 87% and in Hungary 88% of the samples agree. In addition 42,6% of the European and 38% of the Germans and 88% of the Polish respondents reject the statement: “There is nothing immoral about homosexuality”. Obviously Europeans use a double standard when judging about Muslims.
  119.  
  120. Prejudices against Muslims are linked to other prejudices.
  121. Europeans not only hold negative attitudes towards Muslims but to several other groups, like Jews, Blacks, migrants, women and homosexuals. To give some examples there are 49% of the German population and 41% of the Europeans in the other countries who agree to the opinion: “Jews try to take advantage of having been victims during the Nazi era.” 30% of the Germans and 31% of the Europeans believe: “There is a natural hierarchy between black and white people.” These statements are indicators for traditional anti-Semitism respectively blatant racism. Our analyses prove that there is a syndrome of Group-focused Enmity in each of the observed countries. This means that a person who is prejudiced toward one group has a significant higher probability to devalue other groups as well. We can prove that a general support of hierarchies between groups (ones are up and ones are below) leads to a devaluation of these specific groups.”
  122.  
  123. http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/ikg/zic...
  124. *Full text is currently available.*
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  127. “The article discusses various estimates of Muslim populations in Europe, showing that the public debate on numbers reflects academia’s difficulties in quantifying the Muslim populations. Projections of growth in the number of Muslims in Europe are exaggerated both in academia and in the public in general, leading to the construction of myths on the future number of Muslims in Europe. In this article various methods in the field of demography of religion are discussed on the basis of the Danish case. A more precise estimation of Muslims based on national statistics is proposed for countries where direct data on religious affiliation is not available.”
  128.  
  129. http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/...
  130. http://booksc.org/book/48992793
  131. *Full text is currently available.*
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  133.  
  134. “This study focuses on Muslim fertility in Europe. Evidence from 25 countries suggests that the Muslim total fertility rate is on average 47% higher than the national level. However, we find a significant difference in the level of fertility of native-born Muslims and immigrant Muslims. The native-born have a 19% higher total fertility rate, while immigrants have 62% higher fertility. Our main research question is whether religion is an important determinant of fertility outcome, or whether the other characteristics that are specific for Muslims in Europe (e.g. socio-economics, migrant status, and religiosity) determine the observed difference in fertility. To answer this question, we focus on three case studies: Spain, where most Muslims are immigrants; Bulgaria, where most Muslims are native; and Greece, which has significant shares of both recent migrants and native Muslims. Our findings suggest that the immigrant status of Muslims and their socio-economic status are more important than religion in terms of explaining their high fertility”
  135.  
  136. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/...
  137. *Full text is currently available.*
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  140. “Anti-minority prejudice is a general anomalous phenomenon in Europe. Several empirical studies have shown that anti-Muslim discrimination is more serious and profound. The Muslim community is the most important minority in Europe. The question is whether racism is the reason for the social discrimination against Muslims in Europe. In this paper, to explain the areas of discrimination it is divided into: "underlying reasons" and "driving reasons". Anti-Muslim discrimination in Europe is a result of the background of various forms of racism in Europe (as a precedent cultural background) and is the effect of political opportunism (as a new phenomenon). Discrimination required certain objective conditions of existence to be in place. Political opportunism is the stimulus of anti-Muslim discrimination. The political and economic interest of some political groups in Western culture, led to anti-Muslim discrimination in Europe.”
  141.  
  142. http://psiw.journals.ikiu.ac.ir/art...
  143. *Full text is currently available.*
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