MEETING 3
<Avinite> Firstly is that there are a couple of other good places on IRC to discuss philosophy - just thought you might be interested
<Avinite> Those are: ##philosophy on irc.freenode.net, and #philosophy on irc.undernet.org
<Avinite> Just generally good places to be aware of
<Avinite> Second - for those of you living in the UK, theres a great conference on Wittgenstein this Monday/Tuesday
<Avinite> at Birkbeck College, London
<Avinite> And the third thing, a bit more relevant
<Avinite> is I want to call more central emphasis to one of the themes of this book that I'd like to stress which is that
<Avinite> "our language could be otherwise than it actually is"
<Avinite> The whole process of thinking about imaginary language games is, of course a part of this
<Avinite> And its a very important part of understanding Wittgenstein in general, the structure of our language is in some sense not necessary
<Avinite> Foucalt's "The Order of Things"
<Avinite> begins with a quote from a Chinese encyclopedia (which is actually fake,)
<Avinite> which classifies animals according to the following criteria:
<Avinite> quotes
<Avinite> a ‘certain Chinese encyclopedia’ in which it is written that ‘animals are
<Avinite> divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame,
<Avinite> (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in
<Avinite> the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a
<Avinite> very fine camelhair brush, (1)
<Avinite> et cetera,
<Avinite> (m) having just broken the water
<Avinite> pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies’.
<Avinite> Instead of 'mammal', 'insect', 'reptile' and so on
<Avinite> So theres nothing necessary about those categories
<Avinite> If the fictionality of this example makes it less convincing
<Avinite> We can point to other cultures which really do group their language separately than our own
<Avinite> For instance, theres a tribe in Malawi which classifies deer as a type of 'mushroom'
<Avinite> Since they both have the same texture to their flesh when eaten
<Avinite> And, in many parts of rural Northern Thailand, chickens are considered "not birds"
<Avinite> So I'll just ask you to keep that in mind through the next sections, particularly surrounding 50-60ish
Avinite> Hmmm
<Lemniscate> Sorry, but by this do you suggest the structure of our language to be unnecessary (as in ancilliary), or merely that one can structure language in a variety of sufficient ways?
<Avinite> Hmmm
<Avinite> I don't understand the distinction, I'm afraid
<AxlBrainSlut> is the point here that the relationship between the name and the object named is essentially arbitrary?
<AxlBrainSlut> meaning, one shouldn't fixate on the name as  if it had any special relation to the object
<Lemniscate> That is, is it the way in which our categories work that is the problem or is it that there could be different categories that is the problem?
<AxlBrainSlut> sorry, you can address lemniscate first
<Avinite> Yes, AxlBrainSlut, but also that category membership is arbitrary (one can imagine a culture which had 'invisible' as a colour, perhaps, that sort of thing?)
<Avinite> AND that language structures like commanding/questioning themselves could be different
<Avinite> Lemniscate - there is no problem, but our categories are somewhat 'arbitrary'
<Avinite> The conference next week, by the way, includes a talk on the section we read this week
<Avinite> On the whole, stranger arriving in a foreign country, section
<Avinite> So if its interesting, I'll tell you about it briefly next meeting?
<Lemniscate> Please do.
<Pooka> i'd be interested hear yes, just don't have time this month to go.
<Avinite> Thats a shame, Pooka, but theres plenty of Wittgenstein stuff going on in Reading as well
<Avinite> Okay so
<Avinite> The traditional first question: How did everyone find the reading
<Avinite> ?
<Avinite> For me? Some parts of it were very difficult. There's a lot more "doesnt this contradict...?" and "WHAT DOES THIS MEAN?"s written in my notes
<AxlBrainSlut> as usual, i'll understand most of a section and then there will be one line that seems like a non-sequitur
<Witty> I found it very understandable, and something that makes sense to anyone who is bilingual. When you are, you're perfectly aware that the same word can have different meanings, and different things can be named differently, and under different criteria.
<Avinite> Yes absolutely, particularly the part about the dolls, for me
<Joe_> Like stated above it seemed to repeat a bit but that didn't bother me. The example of Augustine's language theory being compared to a foreigner in a country helped me a bit but also confused me.
<Avinite> That's true Witty
<Avinite> I think foreigner in a country is really at the heart of a lot of the stuff this week
<Avinite> Because the heart of this week in an absolute nutshell to me seemed to be that "ostensive definitions can only work against a cultural background where they are a practice"
<Avinite> Obviously theres much more to it
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<Avinite> So lets start at the beginning:
<Avinite> 23 seemed to echo a lot of the stuff from last time
<Avinite> And almost parody philosophers of language who try and make everything out to be a declarative sentence of some sort
<Avinite> It's saying "we CAN make it all out to be declarative.." (in the same way that "we CAN make all tools out to modify something"
<Lemniscate> Could his terminology in the section be considered equally satirical?
<Lemniscate> The hyperbole of "countless", the almost-joke of "proposition-radical"...
<Lemniscate> They imply things beyond them which perhaps are not contained in the sense in which they are used.
<Avinite> My edition doesn't have "proposition-radical," but there's still a sense in which thats true
<Avinite> He adopts a very different type of language in this section than others
<Avinite> It's visible also in the original German, (I don't speak German but...) the words are much longer!
<Avinite> haha
<Lemniscate> What does your edition use as his "chemical" expression near the end?
<Lemniscate> (Right before Frege)
<Avinite> Hmm
<Avinite> Mine doesn't even mention Frege!
<Lemniscate> Or is my edition bupkiss?
<Lemniscate> Probably
<Pooka> ye they are very different here
<Lemniscate> It's a pdf; it is likely.
<Pooka> the hacker print one vs the pdf
<Joe_> Does it also mention a boxer's stance?
<Lemniscate> Yes.
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<Pooka> the list of examples in the pdf is about half the length, but missing Frege bit
<Avinite> Oh yes!
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<Avinite> A "sentence radical"
<Joe_> Ok I think we have the same edition then
<Avinite> The boxer stance bit is in a separate box for me
<Joe_> same
<Pooka> ah yes
<Avinite> Its interesting that he refers to a picture of a boxer as a type of language
<Avinite> Given that for him previously - ALL language had a picturing role ( Tractatus)
<Avinite> but now this is only one type
<#Avinite#>###30 So what about 24/25?
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 25 is absolutely maddening, I had to do all sorts of reading around on this one
#18#<#Witty#>## he explains animals to communicate with language, but it's not developed?
#18#<#Witty#>## animals do*
#18#<#Pooka#>## i think it is just phrased backwards, as part of his way of discussion
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 'Phrased backwards'?
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 I mean, if it IS a point about animals - some philosophers write an entire book on this topic!
#18#<#Pooka#>## if you follow the arguments from end of para to the beginning it makes more sense
#18#<#Pooka#>## animals use methods of communication which are lang, it is only not lang if you exclude such common things from the definition of lang
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 Yes I see, and "giving orders" is a part of OUR language, but obviously not of theirs, because otherwise they would have a system for it
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 ?
#18#<#Pooka#>## that makes even more sense, i'd been trying to link the parts of our lang to animals, e.g. bees giving little dance-stories and commands to each other
#18#<#Lemniscate#>## They would have a system which we recognise to be prepared for such a purpose.
#18#<#Pooka#>## but that was just me
<Lemniscate> (or none at all)
<Avinite> Yes, thats right Pooka, but they are not necessarily even remotely translatable to ours
<Lemniscate> (or so he illustrates the popular conception)
<Avinite> Here's what Baker and Hacker say about this section:
<Avinite> “the thoughts that thinking is in principle independent to and prior to language, and language is a means for expressing thoughts” are misconceptions.
<Avinite> Jeez, thats a bit much to draw from this single paragraph, perhaps...
<Pooka> hmmm
<Avinite> But its probably how it all ties into the later stuff, really

<Pooka> i can see how that would relate to other stuff about thought, private lang etc, does seem a lot from that one para in isolation
<Avinite> Yeah absolutely, Baker Hacker is an exegesis but not necessarily a chronological one
<AxlBrainSlut> i'm not sure what he means to point out when he says "but--they simply do not talk."
<Avinite> So they draw from all over the book - perhaps not the best for our purposes
<Avinite> It's odd, isn't it, AxlBrainSlut
<AxlBrainSlut> actually, i kind of get it.
<AxlBrainSlut> maybe.
<Pooka> the first bit suggests that because they do not talk
<Pooka> they cannot think
<AxlBrainSlut> they don't talk, but they use language
<Pooka> then he says, no, they think, but don't talk
<Lemniscate> Primitive language.
<Avinite> Maybe 'talk' in the 1950s or German, meant 'verbal audible conversation' more simply than it does today
<Avinite> I'm liable to call IRC 'talking'
<Pooka> i think here talk and lang are the same
<Avinite> Maybe Wittgenstein is more sympathetic to the idea that there are non-talking types of language?
<Avinite> Oh, you think?
<Pooka> he is taking 'talk' from a common phrase about animals, to set an example
<Avinite> Yes, but he doesn't want to deny that animals have any language at all
<Pooka> than taking the example into his phrasing, by swapping lang to talk
<Pooka> *then taking the example
<Avinite> Yeah, thats interesting
<Pooka> that's what i make of the 'Or better yet:' phrase
<Lemniscate> Yes; he is specifying the example that he has put forward.
<AxlBrainSlut> so when you say "here talk and lang are the same" do you mean in the common phrase about animals or in witty's conception?
<Pooka> to make it better, clearer, in his own words
<Avinite> I think I see your guys' reading
<Avinite> It was my first impression too
<Avinite> but, he surely doesn't want to deny that animals have a language?!
<Pooka> i think he does
<Lemniscate> The phrase "they simply do not talk" could be considered weighted in the example, which he then sharpens into a point
<Avinite> So what does that make of the later Wittgenstein famous aphorism "If a lion could talk, we could not understand it?"
<Avinite> Etc
<Pooka> hmm
<Avinite> I always thought that meant
<Avinite> "they have a language... but its not reconcilable with our own"
<Pooka> ah there he means talk as in talk
<Lemniscate> Talk as in "human talk"?
<Avinite> I think he means... like
<Pooka> as in a recognisable verb and noun phrase system etc
<Avinite> We look at animals and see they are not talking like we do
<Lemniscate> Yep
<Avinite> But I don't know, its all a bit opaque
<Avinite> Right, so, good, moving on a little
<Lemniscate> Is this not simply analogous to the stranger in a different country?
<Avinite> Hmm, do you think so?
<Pooka> in what way?
<AxlBrainSlut> i don't think so.
<Lemniscate> Well, if we consider ourselves to be a stranger in a strange land of lions,
<AxlBrainSlut> i thought stranger in a different country was meant to emphasize that the learner brings something with him that helps him form his idea of the new language.
<Avinite> The stranger in a strange land idea is based on the idea that all human languages have fundementally the same sort of structure
<Avinite> We can still make mistakes about "over here, they have male/female nouns" or "the verb goes HERE"
<Avinite> but we know that they have ways of asking questions / ways of declaring things / ways of using nouns and verbs
<Pooka> i think it more sets a scope for the sheer range of acts that can  be considered as part of language -- animals use a different set to what we see as lang, does not mean it is not communication, and it is foolish to say animals do not think just because we do not parse their lang
<Lemniscate> Yes.
Lemniscate> That is what I was getting at.
<Avinite> Yeah, absolutely
<Avinite> Great, so
<Avinite> 26 and 27?
<Pooka> relates very much to talk we had here on the builders' game
<Pooka> and how much must be packed into 'slab' if it is to function in the way needed
<Avinite> Yeah, I think so, its retreading the same ground
<Lemniscate> Hang on -
<Avinite> Of course Lemniscate, go on
Lemniscate> If we were, for example, to consider an exclamation such as "water" - e.g., my house is on fire and I call for "water!"...
<Avinite> Yeah
<Lemniscate> One could consider the word "water!" as being a command for a language-game of sorts, but naturally there is the problem that unless they were to see the fire and understand which language-game we are playing, they would not know what to do...
<Avinite> Absolutely
<Lemniscate> Can it be said that the meaning of the word "water" is the same by what I mean when I say "water!"?
<Lemniscate> *same as
<Pooka> no
<Avinite> Hmmm
<Pooka> it is the same combination of letters, but i think in different game and context
<Lemniscate> See, "definition through use" would have it that the word "water" in this game means what I say by "water" in this game.
<Avinite> Absolutely
<Pooka> i think one refers to an action/demand/request
<Pooka> and one refers to a substance
<Pooka> the second is a part of the first
<Avinite> "Water!" is a sort of request for help, right?
<Pooka> a demand for the substance
<Lemniscate> Indeed, Avinite
<Pooka> but demanding a substance and stating a substance are two different things
<Avinite> And you learn to do this
<Avinite> not in terms of learning nouns but in terms of learning how you can modify your voice to make commands, the fact that you can scream something and have people come to help you
<Joe_> Context seems to be the issue. Like,  I could shout "water!' because my house is on fire or because I see a huge puddle in my yard?
<Avinite> I could be part of a group looking for a lake to go swimming in
<Avinite> shouting "WATER!" as we all run towards the lake jumping in
<Avinite> It has this crazy variety of uses
<Lemniscate> But the statement of "water", if we were to consider this as a noun for a substance rather than a command, could simply provoke in the recipient of this noun a string of logical response - e.g. "I see a fire," or "He is desperate" - which leads to his conclusion that he should fetch water.
<Avinite> That's true, someone could independently come to the conclusion
<Avinite> Lets remove someone else being there
<Avinite> Someone just screams "WATER!" in the hope that someone else is there
<Pooka> it could, but i think the ! after the water shows it is not that use
Avinite> Does it still count as just the name of a noun?
<Lemniscate> Naturally it is tinged with a desire for there to be water, or for others to procure water, or potentially for there to be a clear liquid of some kind to douse the flames...
<Lemniscate> But is there not a difference between "bring water!" and "water!"?
<Avinite> I think they're the same, in a sense
<Lemniscate> Yes, but an unnecessarily long formulation of the latter could not be taken seriously as being desperate
<Avinite> Yes
<Lemniscate> (which could probably be understood in the framework of a language-game)
<Avinite> "please bring me some water for reasons x y z "!!!!!!!
<Avinite> How about something like "Help!"
<Avinite> It's a command, right? Not a noun
<Lemniscate> What is the difference between a command and an expression of desire?
<Lemniscate> *+that someone should do a thing
<Avinite> Nothing, really
<Pooka> one works through power, the other empathy?
<Avinite> You COULD choose to write a question in that way
<Avinite> Any question
<Avinite> In the same way that you could say that any tool modifies
<Witty> Wit said that commands can be expressed with questions, for example "Would you like to sit here?", so why can't a command be enclosed in the form on a noun?
<Lemniscate> Could you elaborate on how that question is a command?
<Witty> it's the example provided, I can't legitimately elaborate on an example I didn't create
<Lemniscate> Er, I mean, did Wit legitimise it?
<Witty> But I can envision situations where it is used as a command
<Lemniscate> Okay, like what?
<Witty> like someone organizing a table at dinner, being polite with the guests
<Avinite> Imagine something similar said by an FBI agent whilst taking a suspect into an interrogation room, perhaps?
<Witty> everyone usually has asigned seats already
<Avinite> Or that!
<Avinite> Imagine at a dinner party "would you like to sit here, please?" "No, I wouldn't like that"
<AxlBrainSlut> all of these examples: fbi agent, dinner party, burning house...they all suggest context defines the meaning of the word, don't they?
<Lemniscate> Yes, they do; they set the scene of the game.
<Pooka> i think so Axl: you can put a command in a noun, but it is then different from the 'basic' noun as it has a different use context
<Lemniscate> Perhaps I'll just leave it at the fact that if one's interlocutor refuses to play the game, there is no game; he is in these situations autonomous to a degree.
<Avinite> Refuses to play the game, so, for example - "Water!!"
<Avinite> And then the response is: "Is the name for a colourless liquid that.

<Avinite> Something like this?
<Lemniscate> That is a comical example
<Avinite> Takes it as a straight up noun
<Lemniscate> but
<Pooka> realise we have sort of done this now, but i liked the example at the end of 27
<Pooka> 'how singular is the use of a person's name to *call* him!
<Lemniscate> one might equally consider that the shouting person is still meaning a thing from "water!!"
<Avinite> Oh yes, he's definitely meaning something, Lemniscate
<Lemniscate> but we can only suggest or hazard at this parallel with his desires because we are also playing the game.
<Avinite> Pooka: yes, the difference in tone of voice when I say your name or CALL it
<Avinite> Okay, so
<Avinite> Let's skip ahead a little, we've got a lot to cover
<Lemniscate> Yes, sorry
<Avinite> No worries
<Avinite> Let's go to 28-31
<Avinite> The idea that
<Lemniscate> Here one might be better able to quote Baker Hacker
<Lemniscate> oh, go ahead
<Avinite> any ostensive definition can be bady interpreted
<Avinite> Oh, no please, you go ahead
<Lemniscate> I was going to highlight what I suspect is a problem with his regression in 29
<Witty> it was pretty neat to read it, Rosetta Stone teaches things in attempted immersion, or ostensive definition via images. So, by a certain point, you've learned to refer to a group of woman as they, and learned to say the verb to eat. And then an image shows up with three women eating, and you have no idea what they are trying to say. You confuse the possible definitions.
<Avinite> Yeah Witty, Rosetta Stone is pretty great example of a trying to immerse you as a stranger in a strange land!
<Avinite> Lemniscate: go on, please
Lemniscate> Before I continue, what did Baker Hacker mean by "thought"?
<Lemniscate> (in your quotation)
<Avinite> Hmm
<Avinite> Its a big question, but I guess its the idea that thoughts are something non-lingual which we then translate into language in order to express
<Lemniscate> So, something like the "natural language of all peoples"?
<Avinite> Yeah, you can tie it into Chomsky or Fodor in modern philosophy of mind
<Lemniscate> I was meaning Augustine...
<AxlBrainSlut> we're meant to think of "thoughts" as a subset of what goes on in the brain rather than all of the brain's activity, right?
<Avinite> Yes, I suppose so
<Avinite> Augustine is cool too
<Lemniscate> By "thoughts" they are meaning the capacity to mean things?
<Avinite> Almost, yes
<Lemniscate> Almost?
<Avinite> I'll go with 'yes'
<Lemniscate> Then I cannot understand this in the context of Section 29, for Wittgenstein necessarily, to escape his regression, works a definition without words.
<Avinite> Ah
<Lemniscate> (Not that whoever hears this definition is aware of what it means, but it is a definition nonetheless)
<Avinite> that does seem problematic, yes
Avinite> So how can we understand "colour" in a way without infinite regress, but with words (which lead to infinite regress)
<Avinite> I think the solution here is something like:
<Avinite> We understand it with words (which CAN lead to infinite regress)
<Avinite> (but don't necessarily)
<Lemniscate> (yes, one could build another house)
<Avinite> you CAN always build another house on the road, but you don't have to
<Avinite> Yeah, it's a potential infinite regress
<Avinite> not an *actual* infinite regress
<Lemniscate> In at least a circular sense; it has no foundation.
<Pooka> i thought the house example did not match the words
<Lemniscate> Therefore it needs the cornerstone of a "wordless" definition
<Lemniscate> Go on
<Pooka> the house situation is one of state i think
<Pooka> if the road is straight, not a loop, they do not regree
<Pooka> i could add one
<Pooka> but it has not been added now, fine, it could be, but is not atm
<Pooka> the words … i can;t see how that matches, this words example seems like Derrida's deferred meaning dictionary
<Avinite> What is Derrida's deferred meaning dictionary?
<Lemniscate> Yes, perhaps "regress" was too-loaded a word to use
<Pooka> i go to look upa word in a dictionary
<Avinite> Right
<Lemniscate> "Water, see fluid"... "Fluid, see Chemistry"
<Pooka> it tells me what it means, in terms of other words
<Avinite> Yes, and you can always go back
<Pooka> i look up those words, i get more words, etc
<Pooka> ah having typed it out i see how that is more similar to houses now
<Pooka> you could always keep turning the pages
<Pooka> you could always built more houses
<Avinite> Yeah, but equally you could always just... stop
<Pooka> but with the words
<Pooka> if you stop you do not understand
<Avinite> Don't you?
<Avinite> Keep in mind this isn't about a dictionary
<Avinite> it's about explaining an ostensive definition
<Lemniscate> The dictionary example is actually very good
<Avinite> I agree with a dictionary, if you stop then you don't understand (if all you know is the dictionary)
<Lemniscate> (defining words in terms of other words)
<Pooka> i think i find the example and the preceding text hard to get, or maybe i misunderstood
<Pooka> i read most of 29 as against ostentation, because it shows a regress
<Lemniscate> But if Wittgenstein can give at least one definition to a single word, other terms might be able to be explained
<Avinite> Hold on a second
<Lemniscate> I thought it to be against ostentation through words which were not ostensively defined
<Avinite> he says "don't say: "there isn't a last explanation")
<Pooka> everything is always understood by something else, which needs more etc. if this is such a strong attack, why then say 'DONT SAY:there isnt a last explanation'
<Avinite> Because there IS a last explanation for Wittgenstein
<Pooka> surely you *should* say that
<Avinite> just as there IS a last house in the road
<Avinite> you CAN always go back, but you CAN always build more houses.
<Lemniscate> He says, "don't say that there isn't a last explanation"
<Avinite> but there is a last house / last explanation
<Avinite> even if more can be requested
<Pooka> i assumed the explanation was possible but of a different type
<Lemniscate> double negative
<Lemniscate> ?
<Avinite> Yeah, so there IS a last explanation
<Pooka> *meant ostensive not ostentatious !

#18#<#Lemniscate#>## Yes, one can continue to add pages to the dictionary, or one could not
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 30 and 31 made sense to me, with 31 being a nice little analogy to illustrate 30
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 We cant understand "this is sepia" without knowing that they are talking about colour, and what colours are
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 Sorry, I get the sense that you weren't finished with 28-29, feel free to stay on those also
#18#<#AxlBrainSlut#>## and more generally, what we know about what we're being taught the name of will affect how we learn
#18#<#AxlBrainSlut#>## yeah?
#18#<#AxlBrainSlut#>## referring to 30/31
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 Yeah,
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 "This is the king" does strike me as useless, when pointing at a chess piece
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 unless the person understands the rules of chess beforehand
#18#<#Lemniscate#>## Only if that is all that he says.
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 Yeah
#18#<#Lemniscate#>## I can understand being able to play a game without formulating rules, but how can one play a game without learning rules?
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 One does learn rules before they play a game, for sure

<Pooka> implicit vs explicit i think
<Pooka> you learn them without fully knowing it
<Pooka> it is like grammar
<Lemniscate> Yes, I took formulation to be the latter and learning to be the former
<Lemniscate> Am I wrong?
<Pooka> many people can speak grammatically correct english – but might struggle for fully formulate the rules they use
<Pooka> yet they can 'play the game of correct grammar' even though they do not know how to formulate it as a set of rules
<Lemniscate> Yes, though have they still not "learned" how to play the game?
<AxlBrainSlut> words themselves, too. plenty of people use words that they would struggle to define outside of their use.
<AxlBrainSlut> (without looking at a dictionary, that is)
<Pooka> yes, both are learning, but without pre-formulated rules

#18#<#Pooka#>## ah sorry i see, that does not answer your first point
#18#<#Lemniscate#>## Perhaps it's a silly semantic question
#18#<#Pooka#>## your learnt rules, you did not *formulate* rules
#18#<#Lemniscate#>## "learning the game" vs. "learning rules"...
#18#<#Lemniscate#>## Never mind; forget it
#18#<#Pooka#>## and you may be unable for formulate them, even if you play the game very well -- of you could , but you'd have to really think it out from the basics
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 Theres a sense in which you can act in accordance with a rule without learning it
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 If I whip you every time you start walking with your left foot forward
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 I don't know, could it be said you've learnt the rule "dont walk with your left foot forward"
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 After a time, you act in accordance with it
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 But noone explicitly told you it
#18#<#Pooka#>## i think in your example yes, because it is very simple
#18#<#Pooka#>## in terms of grammar and word meaning there are so many and in such combination
Lemniscate> Well, it could equally be the rule "walking with my left foot forward causes me to be struck with a whip"
<Pooka> that it is very hard to a lay-person to track the rules use without a lot of codification
<Avinite> Yes, quite so, but Pooka is right, with language/grammar it gets more complicated very quickly
<Pooka> so walking example works, but would be easy to reverse-formulate the rules, i think
<Avinite> I think anyone who has learnt another language in school has thought "wow, why doesn't English have all these formal rules for grammar structure, "past participle" and tenses for verbs?2
<Avinite> before realizing that it does, you just don't think of it in that way
#18#<#Pooka#>## yep
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#18#<#Pooka#>## i liked 31, but the rest seemed to be the same stuff that gets repeated all the way to 38, i.e. the vagueness of ostensive definition
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 Yeah, its a lot of repetition on the same theme
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 Starting with 'two nuts' by the way, ties it all back to Frege
#18#<#Lemniscate#>## There is something quite distinct, though
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 who had a big problem with the fact that numbers couldnt be ostensively taught because 'two nuts' could be interpreted where 'two' refers to the type of nut
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 (it's his example.)
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#31#<#Avinite#>###30 But Wittgenstein responds (31-38) that all ostensive definition can be vague
#18#<#Lemniscate#>## Equally as vague as the meaning of a word.
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#18#<#Lemniscate#>## (that is, what one means by a word)
#18#<#Pooka#>## fun compared to the tractatus. young witt sould have said it in one sentence and expected everyone to get it or be a dunce
#18#<#Pooka#>## here he argues it from many different angles over again until you really get it (almost too much)
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 Yes, he goes on and on, but each section does have a slightly different theme
#18#<#AxlBrainSlut#>## from 36: "we say that a
#18#<#AxlBrainSlut#>## spiritual [mental, intellectual]
#18#<#AxlBrainSlut#>## activity corresponds to these words."
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 Oh yes
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 Very interesting
#18#<#AxlBrainSlut#>## would like to hear your take on this
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 Okay, of course
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 So Wittgenstein is very interested in the confusions that come about by way of our 'internal' vocabulary
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 'meaning' 'thinking of' 'expecting'
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 And the way that they in particular can lead to all sorts of confusions
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 He's sometimes called a behaviourist (who rejects all forms of inner process)
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 And its a valid interpretation, but if he is a behaviourist its a queer type of behaviourist
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 But anyway, um
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 The idea here, specifically is
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 To suggest that "pointing at the colour" and "pointing at the shape" are different in that we MEAN something different by each thing
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 is not to say that its a completely internal process of meaning that occurs in our heads
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 Otherwise, (for one thing,) how could it be communicated? It would seem that meaning different things internally whilst pointing is useless
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 " a host of similar cases" supports the idea that he will talk about mental words a lot more later
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 In fact, pointing at the colour/shape isn't anything to do with "meaning"
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 it's to do with
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 context/ mannerism/ social conventions
#18#<#AxlBrainSlut#>## right. and he does expand on this later?
#31#<#Avinite#>###30 Yeah absolutely, think of this as a little teaser?
#18#<#Lemniscate#>## About the "crucial superstition" in 38...
<Avinite> mhm
<Lemniscate> Is this example, that of taking meaning from a piece of information, is the person taking the meaning doing so from the context and relations of parts of the information?
<Avinite> I think so, yes
<Avinite> It's misinterpreted by the interlocutor, but usefull so?
<Avinite> He's taking the meaning by assuming that IS refers to 'is the same as'
<Avinite> No, wait, 'is called'
<Avinite> but actually 'is' could be referring to 'is the same as'
<Avinite> Someone could be just pointing and saying "thats blue.." but he misinterprets as saying "that [colour] is called "blue""
<Lemniscate> Is the "crucial superstition" (which I am guessing to be a perjorative term) that they derive the meaning from the relations within the information? (not the context, for this is what Wittgenstein is contending)
<Avinite> The first - a fact about the object, the second - a fact about the colour
<Lemniscate> (and therefore would not likely be superstition)
<Avinite> Yes, I think so?
<Avinite> Does anyone else have anything they wanted to raise?
<Lemniscate> Moreover, if we are to consider this "information" to be part of a language game designed to convey information about the state of a thing, and one can mean the nature of the thing from this state of the thing, this can be counted the playing of a different language-game?
<Lemniscate> (that of definition?)
<Avinite> Absolutely!
<Avinite> One is the language game of description, the other is the game of 'naming' or 'definition'
<Avinite> And they speak at cross purposes
<Avinite> it happens to be useful here, but isn't always
<Avinite> Imagine I say
<Avinite> "sugar is white"
<Avinite> and you think "oh, sugar must be another word for 'white'"
<Avinite> In that case, we've committed the same sort of jump, but it's broken
<Lemniscate> Right
<Avinite> It just so happens that its coherent in the first case
<Avinite> Alright, now
<Avinite> if anyone else has anything to add?
<Avinite> If not, we should organize the time of the next meeting,
<Lemniscate> Ah, I have just one question.
<Avinite> Please go ahead
<Lemniscate> In the closing of Section 39, what does he mean by replacing the "name" of Excalibur with words that name simples? And what is achieved by this?
<Lemniscate> (it might be called something other than "simples" in your edition)
<Avinite> 'simples' is a really loaded Wittgensteinian term
<Avinite> and the next twenty or so sections all deal with it
<Avinite> I should really have cut this weeks meeting at 38
<Avinite> Broadly, a simple is any named object which cannot be broken down into constituent parts
<Avinite> So when we talk about "chair"
<Avinite> (according to early Wittgenstein)
<Avinite> we are really talking about the combination of 'chairleg' and 'chairleg' and 'chairleg' and 'seat' and 'back'
<Avinite> But all of those can of course be broken down into 'carbon atom 1' 'carbon atom 2'
<Avinite> And those can further be broken down...
<Avinite> But underlying it all are the simple names, which are all combined to make 'chair'
<Avinite> So 'Nothung' / 'Excalibur' should be replaced by 'hilt' 'blade' 'handle'
<Avinite> or more specifically... 'iron atom 1' 'iron atom 2'
<Avinite> and so on
<Lemniscate> Does he give examples of simples?
<Avinite> Not a single one! haha
<Avinite> It's a big criticism of early Witt