The  Heysel Stadium
1.6  It  was  opened  in  1930.  It  has  been  regularly  used  for  football  matches,  including  an  international
football match a  few weeks before  the 29 M ay, between  Belgium and  France, at which the attendance was
about the same as at the Liverpool/Juventus game.
1.7  The Stadium is owned by the City of Brussels and leased to the Belgian Football Association. There
had  been  no  criticism  by  the  Belgian  Football  Association  nor  by  UEFA,  who  are  the  body  controlling
European  football, of the facilities at the ground or of the structure.
1.8  A  plan  of the  Stadium  is  at  Appendix  C.  There  are  two  open  terraces  at  each  end  of the  ground
marked “X”,  “Y ” and “Z” and “O”,  “N” and  “M ”  respectively.  Between  the two sets of terraces are two
stands.  The  stand  marked  Tribune  2  was  built  in  about  1980.  Apart  from  that,  the  Stadium  is  as  it  was
constructed  in  1930.  It  is  the  largest  of its  kind  in  Belgium  and  provides  facilities  not  only  for  football
matches but for athletics.
1.9  The terraces at “X”, “Y ” and “Z” were formed of a slope of approximately  1  in  10 at the shallowest
and  about  1  in  6  at  the  steepest.  The  surface  of the  terraces  was  earth  with  only  the  nosing  of the  steps
being formed in concrete. Over the years the concrete nosing has deteriorated, and  rusted re-inforcing bars
have been exposed. The edges were uneven and jagged where pieces of concrete had broken off. The general
condition  of the  terracing may  be described  as  poor.  The  crush  barriers  showed  signs  of deterioration  to
both  the concrete  uprights  and the  re-inforcement.  On  the day  of the  match  the perimeter fence consisted
basically  of two  barriers.  One was a  brick  structure;  the other,  on  the terrace side,  was wire fencing about
two metres high.
1.10  There was a  barrier dividing  Block  i4Y ”  from  Block  “Z”.  It consisted of two  lines  of tubular steel
hand  rail  fixed  by  metal straps to  the  top of the existing concrete crush  barrier uprights.  It  thus formed  a
passageway  from  top  to  bottom  of  the  terrace.  To  one  of  the  continuous  hand  rails  were  fixed  fairly
lightweight  steel  posts  approximately  2.5-3  metres  high.  Tied  to  the  steel  posts  was  plastic  coated  wire
3
mesh fencing. This composite construction, whilst forming a physical barrier, was not of sufficient strength
to resist the determined efforts to breach it.  It was removed by physical force during the charge by English
fans from  Block  “Y ”  into  Block “Z”.
1.11  The flank  wall  where  the disaster occurred  was  about  three  metres high  at  its  maximum,  reducing
to just under  two metres adjacent to  the terrace.  The brickwork  wall  did  not  appear to  have  been  bedded
in mortar nor fixed  in  any  other  way  to  the concrete wall.  The  buttresses  of the  wall  were such  that  they
would  not  assist  in  restraining  the  wall  from  movement  when  subjected  to  crowd  pressure.  It  was  not
constructed as a crush barrier. Not surprisingly, it was not adequate to act as such. The wall and perimeter
fence  in  front  of the  terrace  were  of fairly  light  construction  which  readily  collapsed  under  the  forward
pressure of the crowd.
1.12  There were three places of entry and exit at the back  of Blocks “X”,  “Y ” and  “Z”  and three single
access doors  from  the terraces  onto  the  pitch.  There were  no  turnstile  controlled  access  points,  but  some
control  was exercised  by  gatemen.  It  was  thus  impossible to  know  the  numbers  going  into  each block  or
to  prevent  overcrowding  in  one  block.  In  addition  there were  gaps  in  the  boundary  walls  through  which
entry was effected by a number of spectators into Blocks “X”  and “Y”.
1.13  Having regard to the state of the crush barriers and fences, and the general condition of the terraces
it seems  unlikely,  had  it  been  located  in  this country,  that  a  certificate  would  have  been  issued  under the
Safety  of Sports  Grounds  Act  1975  for  this  part  of the  ground.  However,  the  poor  state  of  the  terraces
played  no part in  the tragedy.
The Arrangements for the Game
1.14  By 24 April  1985  the finalists were known.  A meeting was held by the Belgian  Football Association
at its own Headquarters. There were present M. Roosens, the Secretary of the Belgian Football Association,
a number of police officers, a member of the gendarmerie and representatives of Liverpool  Football Club.
1.15  In  Belgium the policing is carried out  by  both  the  local  police  force and  by  the gendarmerie,  who
are  a  national  body  organised  on  military  lines.  The  Brussels  police  were  to  be  responsible  for  the  area
including Blocks “O”,  “N” and “M ”, and  the gendarmerie for Blocks “X ”,  “Y ” and “Z”.
1.16  It  was  agreed  that  the  distribution  and  the  positioning  of spectators  should  be  organised  so  that
English fans would be positioned in Blocks “X” and “Y ” of the terraces, in “U ”, “V” and “W ” (in Tribune
2) and in  “A”,  “F”,  "B”  and  “D”  (in  Tribune  1). Juventus were to  be accommodated in  Blocks  “O”  and
“N”  of the  terraces,  in  “Q”,  “P”  and  “W ”  (in  Tribune  2)  and  in  “G”,  “L”,  “I”  and  “K”  (in Tribune  1).
It was agreed that each side would be issued with some  14,500 tickets of which  11,000 were for the terraces.
1.17  It  was  arranged  by  the  Belgian  Football  Association  that  Block  “Z”  and  Block  “M ”  would  be
allocated  to  neutral  spectators,  and  Liverpool  Football  Club  officials  were  told  that  a  maximum  of five
tickets per person would  be sold  to  spectators.  There was agreement that there should be a  barrier put up
between  Block  “Y ”  and  Block “Z’\  and another barrier between  Block “N” and  Block “M ”.  The Belgian
Football  Association had  agreed  with  the authorities  that  there  should  be  at  least  one  gendarme  on  each
of the steps of the segregation gangway between  Block  “Z”  and the English fans in  Block “Y ”. These and
other  matters  were  discussed,  including  the  times  of  opening  the  ground  and  how  English  fans  should
arrive.  There  were  further meetings  during  M ay  in  Belgium  and  England.  One  matter  which  was  agreed
was that there should be a ban  on the sale of alcohol  around  the ground.
1.18  Thus it was hoped that the English fans and Juventus supporters would be properly segregated and
that they would  be physically prevented  from being able to  get at or to throw missiles at each  other.  They
would be contained within their own areas. However, the officer-in-charge of the gendarmerie at the ground
did not fully understand what his instructions were, nor unfortunately had he attended any of the meetings
preceding  the  game.  In  the  result,  for  a  number  of different  reasons,  the  gendarmerie  presence  between
Blocks “Y ”  and “Z” was insufficient.
1.19    The advance intelligence was, broadly, that the English fans would present little or no trouble. This
had a marked effect on the precautions which were taken. Liverpool have a good record, so far as European
competitions,  in  which  they  have  played  for  some  22  years,  are  concerned.  Their  management  has  long
experience  and  they  sought  to  take  the  normal  precautions  to  prevent  the  unauthorised  acquisition  of
tickets, to co-ordinate travel arrangements and  to liaise with the Belgian authorities.
4
1.20  So  far  as  the  sponsored  travel  arrangements  were  concerned,  supporters  were  accompanied  by
officers of the British Transport Police. That generally seems  to have gone off without difficulty.  However,
one  group  of  unsponsored  supporters  were  refused  passage  by  a  Belgian  vessel  and  there  was  a  further
group of 400 unsponsored coach  travellers who had apparently had  a great deal too much  to drink.
The Sale of Tickets for Block  “Z”
1.21  There  were  various  alarms  about  the  sale  of black  market  tickets  and  forged  tickets.  One  of the
matters of concern for the Liverpool Club was the sale of tickets for Block  “Z”.  By the UEFA instructions,
no  blocks of tickets  were  to  be  sold  at  the venue of the match  except in  small  quotas.  What  happened  to
the sale of some of the  tickets for  Block  “Z”  was described by  M.  Roosens.  He said  that  there were  some
3,000  tickets available  for  sale on  the first day and  they  were put  in  the  hands  of a  M.  Desment who  had
been  selling  tickets  for the last twenty years.  The sale  took  place at  the  Heysel  Stadium,  and  a notice  was
put  up saying that they were available  for 300  Belgian  francs each  and  that  the maximum  which  could  be
purchased  was  five per person.  When  the staff arrived  there was  already  a massive queue before  sales had
started.  M.  Desment later walked  through the crowds and  noticed that there were more tickets  being sold
to foreigners than to Belgians. He enquired from  M.  Roosens whether the sale should be stopped. The sale
was in fact stopped.  By then they had sold 2,000 to 3,000 tickets.
1.22 Because tickets were being sold from five different windows it was impossible to control who bought
them.  It was quite clear from  all  the evidence  that some organisations had  been  buying large quantities of
tickets.  They  did  this  by  using  a  large  number  of their  employees  to  take  it  in  turns  to  go  to  the  ticket
windows.  M.  Roosens  agreed  in  evidence  that  people  had  left  the  Stadium  with  whole  rolls  of  tickets.
Additionally,  M.  Roosens  allowed  1,000  tickets  to  be  sold  to  a  director  of a  sports  club  committee  who
apparently  sold  them  to  an  insurance  company  which  sponsored  the  club.  One  witness  spoke  of a  travel
agent from  Sicily  with  60  tickets  for  Block  “Z”  which  he was  selling  outside  the ground  at  100  times  the
official price.
1.23  It  is  quite  clear  that  whether  the  tickets  found  their  way  onto  the  black  market  or  not,  a  large
number  of tickets  for  Block  “Z”  came  into  the  hands  of Juventus  supporters.  The  effect  was,  therefore,
that all the careful preparations for the segregation of the English and Italian fans were rendered useless.
The events of 29 May
1.24 It is not surprising that there is a great deal of conflicting evidence about the events of this day even
from experienced  witnesses  such  as police officers.  Contradictions about the  behaviour of the  English fans
before the game abound.  I set out here as best I can  some of the evidence presented to me.
1.25  Elaborate  arrangements  were  made  within  the  Belgian  authorities  for  meeting  and  escorting  the
English supporters after their arrival in  Belgium  and  on  the train.  Unfortunately,  because  of the  timetable
which the shipping companies operated, large numbers of English fans arrived in Brussels well before kick-
off.
1.26 The  behaviour of the English  fans in  the centre  of Brussels gave a  foretaste  of what was to  happen
later  in  the  day.  It is  only  necessary  to  refer  to  one  or two  incidents  so  as  to  give  an  idea  of how  some,
albeit a small minority of the English supporters, were behaving.  It is said  that about 2,000 supporters had
taken  over  the  Grand’  Place  and  the  surrounding  area.  They  were  throwing  beer  bottles  at  the  Belgian
Police, they were spitting, they were hurling beer at cars. One witness described the Grand' Place as looking
like a broken glass  factory.  One supporter,  who had drunk  too much and was wearing a  toy British police
helmet,  stood  at  a  nearby  cross-roads  directing  traffic,  thereby  causing  severe  dislocation  of  traffic.  A
jeweller’s  shop was  robbed by English fans.  Other fans were  bathing in  the  fountains.  A witness described
a  grocer’s shop  being pillaged.  The  steps  of the  Stock  Exchange were  invaded.  A number of English fans
arrived  at  Jette  from  the  train.  They  already  had  drink  with  them,  although  a  good  deal  of  it   was
confiscated. They tried to get into the buses provided for them without paying. In this they were unsuccessful
because  the  bus  driver  simply  refused  to  drive  them.  A  very  experienced  senior  British  police  officer
described the conduct of the English fans as the worst he had ever seen.
1.27 Other witnesses, however,  gave a totally different picture.  Some supporters have written to say that
while there was some noise, the general behaviour was good, the atmosphere friendly and relaxed, and that
far  from  the  police  standing  by  while  something  akin  to  a  riot  was  taking  place,  the  police  were  heavy
handed,  interfering  with  people  who  were  merely  singing  and  enjoying  themselves  and  treating  both  sets
of supporters to an excessive display of authority.
5
1.28  Yet  other  witnesses  talk  of a  carnival  atmosphere  with  British  and  Italian  fans  fraternising  freely
with each  other,  taking photographs and exchanging mementoes and favours. This view  was supported by
a senior police officer to  whom  I  spoke when  I  was in Belgium.
Events at  the Stadium
1.29  The  first  incident  recorded  in  the  Brussels  Police  Report  took  place  at  3.55  pm  when  some  of the
temporary  fencing,  which  had  been  erected  all  round  the  Stadium,  was  knocked  down  by  Juventus
supporters.  It  was  erected  to  enable  the  Police more  easily  to  search  fans.  It  was  about  a  kilometre  long,
comprising fifty  sections.  By  about  4  pm  about  thirty  or  more  sections  had  already  been  knocked  down.
This was not, apparently, considered serious by the police,  because it was only intended to provide a buffer
between  ihe  supporters  and  the  ticket  barrier.  The police and  gendarmes intended  to  search  fans  near  the
outside fence with a view to confiscating sticks or other weaponry.  It is perfectly clear from all  the evidence
that  there  were  insufficient  police  or  gendarmes  to  search  all  spectators.  Additionally  it  was  wholly
impossible to search people and at the same time to make sure that they did not retrieve weapons that had
been confiscated.
1.30  There  is  a  great  body  of evidence  that  the  searching  was  perfunctory;  that  because  of the  absence
of turnstiles and  the presence of holes in  the perimeter wall, a large number of people got into the Stadium
without  tickets;  that  those  who  had  tickets  inside  were  able  to  pass  them  back  to  those  outside  who  did
not.  Weapons  which  were confiscated  earlier were  retrieved.  The  weapons  varied.  There  were  sticks  used
to carry  flags, pieces of tree trunks,  bottles and  stones.  Additionally, it is clear that a number of spectators
had  had  too  much  to drink and  a ban  on the sale of alcohol  outside the ground  was not enforced.  Bottles
of drink  were on sale at a number of stalls,  thus providing more ammunition  for the fans.
1.31  At  5.15  pm  there  was  a  police  report  that  some  of the  perimeter  fence  in  Block  “N”,  occupied  by
Juventus  supporters,  had  been  cut.  At  5.46  pm  there  was  a  report  that  Italian  supporters  were  beginning
to  vent  their anger on  the police.  At  5.55  pm  there  was  a  report  that  there  was general  disorder in  Block
“O”,  that  supporters  were  becoming  agitated  and  that  200  of  them  were  beginning  to  get  worked  up,
hurling insults  at  the police  in  the segregation  gangway.  A  few minutes  later there was  a  mass invasion  of
Block  tfcM ” by supporters because Blocks “O” and  “N” were full.
1.32  Commissioner  Meura  of the  Brussels  City  Police  said  that  some  of his  officers  inside  the  stadium
were pelted with missiles by the Italians, who were attempting to use riot tactics, surging forward en masse
and  retreating.  He  decided  that  what  he  must  do  was  to  protect  the  pitch  and,  although  some  of  the
perimeter  fencing  intended  to  protect  the  pitch  was  knocked  over,  he  succeeded  in  preventing  a  pitch
invasion.  However,  some 27  police were injured  as a  result  of concrete and metal  objects  being  thrown  at
the Juventus end  of the ground.
1.33  The  Police  report  records a  request  at  7.06  pm  for  re-inforcements  in  the  gangway  of Blocks  “N”
and  “M ”,  where the situation suddenly took a turn for the worse.  And the report continues:
“It should  be noted that the relative calm in  the upper parts of sections “N”,  “M” and  “O” only served
to  camouflage  the  jeers  and  provocation  which  a  few  hundred  Juventus  fanatics  were  directing  at  the
police  lower  down.  They  began  to  cause  trouble  between  5.55  pm  and  7.25  pm;  initially  in  a  fairly
moderate way, there was a
\
 hour during which insults were being hurled at the police and the supporters
were trying to break through the fencing (Heras fencing shaken several times). The police in the gangway
could  not  prevent  5  to  6  metres  of fencing  from  being  torn  down  at  about  7  pm.  Then  30  metres  were
forced  and  trampled down so  as to give direct  access to the track.  All  this despite the use of shields and
truncheons by the police, several of whom  were injured.  It should  also be noted  that stones and/or lumps
of concrete  and  some  beer  bottles,  20  in  all,  were  raining  down  onto  the  track.  Some  hooligans  from
amongst the supporters were even  running up to the police with sticks  and iron bars.”
1.34  The  report  describes  one  hooligan  at  the  Juventus  end  getting  through  the  fencing  and  onto  the
pitch itself and sprinkling salt between  the goal-posts; and there is a report of another incident when a pair
of hand-cuffs  were  taken  from  a  police  officer  by  a  hooligan  who  got  onto  the  pitch;  subsequently  they
were returned.  Although  it had  been arranged  that Juventus supporters should  have  Blocks “O” and  “N”
and  that  kkM ”  should  be  allocated  to  neutral  supporters,  it  is  clear  that  Block  “M ”  was  occupied  by
Juventus supporters.  Both the police and the gendarmerie described  to me the behaviour of the Italian fans
up to  this stage as worse than  that of the English  fans.
1.35 What meanwhile was happening at the other end of the ground,  in  Blocks “X”, “Y ” and “Z”? The
first  signs  of unrest  among  the  English  fans  appeared  during the  youth  match  which  had  been  organised
6
to keep  the spectators occupied; this occurred somewhere between 6.15 pm and  6.30 pm. The  English  fans
fired  flares  and  rockets  and  threw  stones  into  Block  “Z”,  which  was  beginning  to  be  occupied  by  what
were  clearly  Italian  supporters.  There  was  also  a  number  of  English  fans  in  Block  “Z”  who  sought  to
escape  into  Block  “Y” .  According to  Captain  Mahieu,  who  was  in  charge  of the gendarmerie  responsible
for  patrolling  the  area  between  Block  “Y ”  and  Block  “Z”,  everything  was  calm  between  6.15  pm  and  7
pm.  Accordingly  he  had  gone  out  of the  Stadium;  so  too  had  Lieutenant  Bonnet who  was  his  second-in-
command,  to  investigate  a  criminal  complaint  and  to  see  about  closing  Block  “X”.  It  appears  there  were
about  15,000 spectators in  Blocks “X” and  “Y ”  and  about  5,000 in  Block  “Z”.
1.36  There  is  no  doubt  but  that  somewhere  between  7.15  pm  and  7.30  pm  English  fans  charged  Block
“Z”.  Preceding this there had been an exchange of missiles between  Blocks “Z” and  “Y”. There were three
charges  by  English  fans.  The  first  two  seemed  to  have  been  repulsed;  the  third  resulted  in  the  Italian
supporters in Block  “Z”, who were seeking to escape towards the perimeter, being squashed and suffocated
by the press of large numbers.
Extreme  Political  Parties
1.37  There  was  evidence  about  the  presence  of supporters  from  the  extreme  right.  The  Mayor  gave
evidence  at  the  Inquiry  that  he  had  seen  British  and  Italian  spectators  wearing  the  political  insignia  of
parties of the extreme right and carrying flags. One British supporter, himself a referee, said that the ground
outside  the  Stadium  was  littered  with  British  National  Front  leaflets,  some  overprinted  by  the  British
National  Party with their address.  One witness spoke of passengers on  the boat crossing the Channel  with
National  Front insignia singing songs of hatred and exhibiting violence.
1.38  Mr  John  Smith,  Chairman  of  Liverpool  Football  Club,  spoke  of  how  six  members  of  Chelsea
National Front had boasted to him of their part in provoking the violence and said that they seemed proud
of their handiwork.  Mr Bob Paisley, a former manager of Liverpool  Football Club, said that he was forced
to  leave  the  Directors’  Box  at  the  start  of the  game  as  dozens  of fans  poured  over  the  dividing  wall  and
that  the  person  next  to  him  claimed  that  he  was  a  Chelsea  supporter and  was  wearing  a  National  Front
badge.  A  number  of  banners  decorated  with  swastikas  were  recovered  after  the  match,  including  one
marked  “Liverpool  Edgehill”.  There  was  also  evidence  that  the  flag  of a  right  wing  organisation,  "New
Order”, was being flown by a small group of Juventus fans.  A banner with  “England  for the  English”  and
“Europe for the English” was observed and a contingent of the National  Front were clearly seen in  Blocks
“X”  and  “Y ”.  One party  leaving  Brussels main  station  was  observed  to  be  Londoners  wearing  Liverpool
colours, carrying Union  Flags and having National  Front and  swastika  tattoos.
1.39  Apart  from  their  presence,  there  is  very  little  hard  evidence  that  they  caused  any  of the  violence.
Commissioner Meura said that he had not seen anyone from any extreme right wing organisation  wearing
any insigna.  On  5 July a press statement was issued by the Merseyside Police which said:
“There is no evidence to suggest that any National Front members were involved in the riot at the Heysel
Stadium  in Brussels.”
What lessons are to be learned?
1.40  A  Parliamentary  Commission  of Enquiry  was  set  up  in  Belgium  on  12  June  1985.  It  reported  on  9
July  1985.
1.41  The Commission concluded  in this way:
“It should be emphasised from  the outset  that it  was the  British  supporters  who  mounted  the  disastrous
charge into Section “Z”. They bear the main  responsibility  for the terrible events that followed  and this
must remain the case for whatever blame might be attributed to others as having aggravated the matter.”
An extract  from their conclusions appears in Appendix D.
1.42  When  I  spoke  with  M.  Collignon,  the  Chairman  of the  Parliamentary  Commission  of Enquiry  in
Brussels in November, he told me that the only matter in his report that on reflection he might like to alter
was to make rather more criticism of the Belgian and European football authorities and less of the individual
members of the gendarmerie.
1.43  In  his  principal  statement  to  Parliament  about  the  Heysel  disaster,  the  Belgian  Minister  of  the
Interior said:
7
“Everyone  knows  that  those  guilty  of the  violence,  those  responsible  for  the  deaths  of the  victims,  are
the violent groups among the English supporters/’
He also referred  to the
“collective  responsibility  of English  society  which  tolerates  this  violence  and  tries  to  channel  it  without
wanting to eliminate it.”
He  said  that  the  organisers  of the  match  were  the  second  group  of people  responsible.  With  regard  to
the role of the police and gendarmerie, he said that  the overall plan had  been adequate.  He acknowledged
that  there  had  been  errors  in  execution  and  announced  measures  to  improve  training  and  equipment  to
remedy  these  deficiencies.  He  added  that  if in  future  a larger police deployment  was  necessary,  he  would
prefer  to  ban  matches.  He  did  not  want  to  turn  Brussels,  even  for a  day,  into  a  police  state,  for  the  sake
of those who liked to manifest their violence.
1.44 The lessons to be learned  from  the disaster can be summarised in  this way:
(a)  It is essential  that opposing fans at matches  such  as this  should  be properly  segregated  so  that  there
is no possibility of their being within attacking distance of each  other.  Missiles from  rival supporters
caused  enormous problems  and  contributed  in  no  small  way  to  the  disorder which  occurred.  So  far
as  domestic  football  is  concerned,  that  means  ensuring  either  that  there  is  an  unoccupied  space
between  opposing  factions  or  that  the physical  method  of securing  segregation  is  such  that they  are
unable to attack or bombard each other with missiles.
(b)  Sales of tickets need to be properly controlled so  that segregation can be effectively enforced.  One of
the problems of all-ticket matches is that ticket touts may be able to purchase numbers of tickets and
sell  them  indiscriminately;  the effect of this is  to put the whole segregation policy at risk.  Police need
to  be  aware  if this  occurs.  In  Scotland  any  person  who  in  a  public  place  touts  for  the  purpose  of
selling so  as  to give another person cause  for annoyance commits  a criminal  offence  under the Civic
Government (Scotland) Act  1982.
(c)  It is clear that a large number of spectators, particularly the English, had consumed substantially too
much  drink,  and  that  they  were  able  to  take  drink  into  the  ground.  This  is  now  covered  by  the
provisions of the  Sporting  Events  (Control  of Alcohol  etc)  Act  1985  in  England  and  Wales and  by
the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act  1980.
(d)  In  addition  to  the  fact  that a number of fans  were able  to get  into  the ground  without  paying,  most
of them  were also  able  to  get  in without  being effectively  searched;  if they  were  searched,  they were
able  to  recover weapons  which  they  subsequently  used.  This  is particularly  relevant to  the power  of
the police to search at sports grounds in the  United  Kingdom.
(e)  While  the  structure  of the  police  in  Belgium  is  different  from  that  in  Britain  there  was  obviously  a
breakdown  in  communications and instructions both prior to and during the course of the match.  It
was accepted  by  the Commandant  of the  gendarmerie  that mistakes  had  been  made.  The important
lesson  for  us  to  learn  is  that  there  needs  to  be  strict co-operation  between  the football  club  and  the
police;  that  the  police  need  to  lay  down  and  observe  fixed  procedures  and  that the communications
need  to be efficient.  There was  also criticism at the lack  of liaison  between  the Headquarters outside
the ground and those inside the ground. There needs to be good early planning with close co-operation
between  all  the  relevant  authorities and clear decisions made.  Those  who  are  to  be in charge  on  the
day  need  to have taken part in  the planning and to clearly understand  their role.
(0  Another  lesson  which  can  be  learnt  is  that  in  order  to  enforce  segregation,  apart  from  physical
barriers,  it  is  necessary  to  have  present  a  sufficient  number  of  properly  instructed  police  to  take
effective  action  at  the  first  sign  of  trouble.  If  there  are  perimeter  fences,  they  should  contain  an
adequate  number  of doors  in  them;  they  need  to  be  manned  and  to  be  opened  immediately  in  the
event of an emergency.
(g)  It is clear that,  notwithstanding the previous good record of any particular club,  those who go to see
that club play can  readily  behave like  hooligans, particularly when  affected  by  drink.  Unfortunately
a previous good  record  is no guarantee of good behaviour in the future.
(h)  The final and most important lesson, which I cannot too strongly or too frequently emphasise is that
if hooligans  did  not  behave  like  hooligans at  football  matches  there would  be no  such  risk  of death
or injury.
8
EUROPEAN  CONVENTION
1.45  In  August  1985  “The  European  Convention  on  Spectator  Violence  and  Misbehaviour  at  Sports
Events and in  Particular at  Football  Matches” was agreed.  It  has at the moment  been  signed  by  ten of the
parties.  It has been ratified by four.
1.46 The key points are that the Contracting Parties shall:
1.  co-ordinate  the  policies  and  actions  of  Government  Departments  and  other  public  agencies  against
spectator violence and  misbehaviour (Article 2);
2.  secure  that  adequate  public  order  resources  are  employed  to  counter  outbreaks  of  violence  and
misbehaviour  near  and  inside  grounds  and  along  transit  routes  used  by  spectators;  and  facilitate  co­
operation and exchange of information between  police forces of different localities (Article 3.1);
3.  seek  to  ensure  that  offenders  (especially  visiting  supporters)  are  identified,  prosecuted  and  that  they
receive  appropriate  penalties (Articles 5 and 3.1(c));
4. encourage the co-ordination of travel  arrangements to inhibit potential troublemakers from  leaving to
attend  matches (Article 3.3);
5.  introduce  procedures  to  identify  problem  matches  in  advance  and  for  effective  co-operation  between
authorities and clubs on  precautions and measures to be taken (Article 4);
6. encourage the use of stewards in supporters9 clubs for crowd control  and  information (Article 3.2);
7.  press  football  and  local  authorities  and  stadium  owners  and  clubs  to  take  the  necessary  practical
measures for problem matches, eg in the design, improvement and selection of stadia, segregation, alcohol
control, ticket sales,  the exclusion of drunks and  troublemakers etc (Article 3.4);
8. encourage football  authorities to review their regulations continuously (Article 6.3);
9.  looking  further  ahead,  take  social  and  educational  measures  to  promote  the  more  positive  side  of
sport, eg fair play  and  active participation (Article  3.5); and
10. establish a standing committee to police the operation of the Convention and to propose improvements
(Article 8).
1.47 This is a blueprint for European  football, which has lessons for our domestic game.
9