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China in Africa (African Studies)

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Mar 21st, 2018
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  1. Introduction
  2. The presence of China in Africa has increased rapidly, as measured by the number of Chinese living in Africa or the quantity of goods and services, aid, and investments coming from China. The consequences will be discussed in this article, focusing on the economic relations between China and Africa and looking at the political and social consequences. After presenting some general overviews and works of reference, the goals of China in Africa are reviewed. Next, Chinese aid, trade, and investments are discussed, dealing with the issue of whether these three instruments for cooperation are always separated clearly and how effective they are. Some of the issues concerning China’s presence in Africa are examined: (1) Is China pushing the so-called Beijing consensus, and will this be at the expense of the Washington consensus? (2) What is the role of public and private Chinese enterprises in Africa, and to what extent do the Chinese respect local environmental and labor regulations? (3) What is the role of Special Economic Zones created by China, which often specify the conditions for foreign investment in the country concerned? Several sources cited deal with different countries or different sectors in which Chinese or Chinese firms are particularly active and are summarized under Country Studies and Sectorial Experiences. The final sections are African Voices, on the different issues discussed, and Chinese Voices and International Fora (FOCAC), which provides reflections on the International Forum for co-operation between Africa and China where the collaboration takes shape.
  3.  
  4. General Overviews
  5. Several general introductions to the topic in the category of info sheets or policy briefs are found in Konijn 2012 and the Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch. However, Brautigam 2009 and Halper 2012 also provide the broader picture, and Manji and Marks 2007 and Alden 2007 are also helpful. Van Dijk 2009 is an edited volume that focuses on a few specific issues. Dollar 2008 draws the lessons from China’s economic success for African countries.
  6.  
  7. Alden, C. China in Africa. London and New York: Zed, 2007.
  8.  
  9. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  10.  
  11. Infrastructural improvements help African countries, and China secures loans and provides investments. The author points out that everyday life is changing for millions of Africans because of that. Cheap Chinese imports mean that, for the first time, poor people can afford new clothes, shoes, or radios.
  12.  
  13. Find this resource:
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  15.  
  16. Brautigam, D. The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
  17.  
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  19.  
  20. Brautigam situates the current relationship between China and Africa within a historical framework that goes back to the 1960s. She emphasizes that Chinese motivations are not short-term commercial interests, but rather strategic, broader, and longer-term interests. Her argument is that China is genuinely interested in extending to Africa the lessons it learned from its own development and that what may appear to be commercial moves are the result of careful thinking about mutually beneficial activities.
  21.  
  22. Find this resource:
  23.  
  24.  
  25. Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch. Weekly News Briefing and China Monitor.
  26.  
  27. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  28.  
  29. The Centre has a blog called Links We Like, which regularly introduces interesting sources of information on China–Africa relations. The focus of this series is on academic and news websites, but they also feature governmental, nongovernmental and private sector sources.
  30.  
  31. Find this resource:
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  33.  
  34. Dollar, D. Lessons from China for Africa. Policy Research Working Paper 4531. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008.
  35.  
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  37.  
  38. This is one of the first publications in which the lessons learned from China’s successful development after 1978 are drawn for the African continent. The author emphasizes that the expansion of China’s infrastructure network was a major component of China’s development strategy.
  39.  
  40. Find this resource:
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  42.  
  43. Halper, S. The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century. New York: Basic Books, 2012.
  44.  
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  46.  
  47. Halper argues that the Chinese model of development, labeled as “market authoritarianism” is gaining adherence. He finds that the “Washington consensus” is being replaced by the “Beijing consensus.” The focus of the book is on the growing power of China in the developing world, arguing that China’s approach to Africa’s need is better adapted than the slow and patronizing post-colonial approach of European investors.
  48.  
  49. Find this resource:
  50.  
  51.  
  52. Konijn, P. China in Africa: A Profile of Political and Economic Relations. Leiden, The Netherlands: African Studies Centre, 2012.
  53.  
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  55.  
  56. The info sheet provides information on the role of trade, investments, and aid in China–Africa relations. Special attention is paid to migration and an example is given of “resources-for-infrastructure” loans, which China has signed with several countries. Available online by subscription.
  57.  
  58. Find this resource:
  59.  
  60.  
  61. Manji, F., and S. Marks. African Perspectives on China in Africa. Chicago: Pambazuka, 2007.
  62.  
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  64.  
  65. This is one of the few systematic overviews of China’s involvement in Africa. The authors ask whether China is the last in a series of exploiters of Africa’s raw materials, or whether China will really help the Africans “to free themselves from the tyranny of the neo-liberal policies.”
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  67. Find this resource:
  68.  
  69.  
  70. Van Dijk, M. P., ed. The New Presence of China in Africa. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009.
  71.  
  72. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  73.  
  74. The presence of China in Africa has increased rapidly, as measured by the number of Chinese living in Africa and by the quantity of trade, aid, and investments. Van Dijk concludes that the Chinese government helps Chinese entrepreneurs by providing market information and visas, facilitating access to loans, and helping with money transfers. Preference is given to Chinese investments in strategically important industries, such as oil and minerals.
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  76. Find this resource:
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  78.  
  79. Reference Works
  80. Works of reference included in this section provide a more detailed coverage of some of the issues related to China’s presence in Africa. Alden, et al. 2008 deals with the question of whether China is an alternative for Western efforts to help Africa to develop. Brautigam 2016 discusses whether Africa will be able to feed China in the near future. Warmerdam 2015 gives a very elaborate overview of the history and development of China’s development co-operation in Africa. Marks 2009 deals with civil society, and Lee, et al. 2007 discusses China’s support for African dictators. Carmody 2011 gives attention to the strategy behind China’s presence, which is also the topic of the section China’s Goals in Africa. Finally, Rotberg 2008 is one of the early overview works concerning China in Africa and looks at aid, trade, and the power that China is wielding in Africa.
  81.  
  82. Alden, C., D. Large, and R. Soares de Oliveira, eds. China Returns to Africa: A Superpower and a Continent Embrace. London: Hurst, 2008.
  83.  
  84. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  85.  
  86. Will China position itself as an alternative to the rich countries (the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] member countries), or will Western efforts aimed at socializing China as a “responsible” power in Africa influence conformation to currently prevailing standards in the aid and investment field.
  87.  
  88. Find this resource:
  89.  
  90.  
  91. Brautigam, D. Will Africa Feed China? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
  92.  
  93. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  94.  
  95. Brautigam is impressed with what she views as the breadth and sophistication of China’s Africa policy and contrasts it with the self-serving and near-sighted thinking of Western countries. It is important to test these points of view empirically. According to Brautigam, Chinese influence across the African continent may be growing, but there is little evidence of a massive state-sponsored land grab in Africa, which would serve to feed China.
  96.  
  97. Find this resource:
  98.  
  99.  
  100. Carmody, Pádraig. The New Scramble for Africa. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2011.
  101.  
  102. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  103.  
  104. The author questions whether Chinese investments in Africa are part of a coordinated strategy of the all-powerful Chinese government to obtain raw materials for China’s industry.
  105.  
  106. Find this resource:
  107.  
  108.  
  109. Lee, M., H. Melber, S. Naidu, et al. China in Africa. Edited by H. Melber. Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007.
  110.  
  111. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  112.  
  113. In this publication, the authors discuss whether China is supporting, directly or indirectly, corrupt authoritarian regimes and dictators in Africa.
  114.  
  115. Find this resource:
  116.  
  117.  
  118. Marks, S., ed. Strengthening the Civil Society Perspective: China’s African Impact. Cape Town: Fahamu, 2009.
  119.  
  120. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  121.  
  122. The editor intends to strengthen the civil society perspective on China’s presence in Africa. A number of the contributing authors try to assess their impact on the country where they did research (see also Nkotto 2009 [cited under Country Studies: West Africa: Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal] and Park 2009 [cited under Country Studies: Southern Africa: Namibia, South Africa, and Mauritius]).
  123.  
  124. Find this resource:
  125.  
  126.  
  127. Rotberg, R. I., ed. China into Africa: Aid, Trade, and Influence. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008.
  128.  
  129. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  130.  
  131. One of the early overview works, which looks at aid, trade, and the power that China is wielding in Africa. China’s foreign aid pre-1978 is described as “ideological,” whereas post-1978 its new nature is called “mercantile.”
  132.  
  133. Find this resource:
  134.  
  135.  
  136. Warmerdam, W. “Having, Giving, Taking: Understanding China’s Development Cooperation in Africa.” PhD diss., International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University at Rotterdam, 2015.
  137.  
  138. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  139.  
  140. Warmerdam addresses five questions: Can we understand Chinese development Co-operation through the categories of other foreign aid ideologies? What effect do industrial nations’ foreign aid norms and practices have on Chinese foreign aid, and what effect does Chinese foreign aid have on them? How does China conceptualize South–South cooperation? Are Chinese and Western aid complementary? Finally, does Chinese development cooperation contribute to recipients taking ownership of their own development processes?
  141.  
  142. Find this resource:
  143.  
  144.  
  145. Journals
  146. Some authoritative journals have published special issues on China’s relations with Africa. Other popular journals, such as Jeune Afrique (24 August 2012), regularly pay attention to the topic, particularly if issues, such as violation of labor or environmental rights, are discussed. Two other special issues are discussed: Ajakaiye and Kaplinsky 2009 takes a more quantitative approach, and another appears in the Journal of Asian and African Studies, which takes a more qualitative approach to the issue of China’s presence in Africa.
  147.  
  148. Ajakaiye, O., and R. Kaplinsky. “China in Africa: A Relationship in Transition.” In Special Issue: China in Africa: A Relationship in Transition. European Journal of Development Research 21.4 (2009): 479–484.
  149.  
  150. DOI: 10.1057/ejdr.2009.30Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  151.  
  152. The editors of this special issue point to the growing economic importance of the relationship between China and Africa. However, it is not only economic relations that bind, but also important political alliances and cultural spillovers.
  153.  
  154. Find this resource:
  155.  
  156.  
  157. Jeune Afrique (24 August 2012).
  158.  
  159. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  160.  
  161. This issue considers that the Chinese government makes no separation between aid, trade, and economic relations. The journal gives examples of this and claims, for example, in a separate section on China and Africa that Senegalese officials discussing land transactions with a Chinese delegation had no idea whether they talked to government officials or Chinese private investors.
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  163. Find this resource:
  164.  
  165.  
  166. Journal of Asian and African Studies 52.6 (2016): 873–893.
  167.  
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  169.  
  170. This issue deals with Chinese versus Indian strategies in Africa. Panda, the editor of this special issue, looks at the role of China and India in the international system. The articles delve deeper into various types of Chinese and Indian presence. These illustrate a newly emerging trend of deeper analysis and look at either the international contextualization and regimes of China and India and their expansion into Africa, or at meso- and micro-levels of that expansion.
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  172. Find this resource:
  173.  
  174.  
  175. Panda, J. P. “Institutionalizing the African Reach: Reviewing China’s and India’s Multilateral Drives.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 52.6 (2016).
  176.  
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  178.  
  179. The author wonders whether China’s and India’s multilateral bonding in Africa merely represents a part of a new shallow multilateralism, or whether it is a regenerated and deliberately extended multilateral approach that helps both Asian giants to engage more loosely with African countries bilaterally.
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  181. Find this resource:
  182.  
  183.  
  184. China’s Goals in Africa
  185. The new presence of China in Africa is recent, but it has increased rapidly. It can be measured by the number of Chinese living in Africa or by the intensity of development aid, trade, and investment flows. What are the goals that China is trying to achieve? In less than twenty years, over one million Chinese people have settled in Africa. To what extent does this lead to conflicts, and does it also make China more vulnerable because China would have to defend these people if the local population turned against them? Why are so many Chinese in Africa? According to some sources, the Chinese are only in Africa to increase market channels. India and Indians have been in Africa since colonial times and have built solid business networks, particularly in East and Southern Africa. On the contrary, the presence of China in Africa is much more recent, but it has increased rapidly. Asche and Schüller 2008 looks at China’s presence in Africa in terms of an opportunity but also as a risk, whereas Kurlantzick 2006 notes that China is exporting its own “brand of capitalism.” Goldstein, et al. 2006 emphasizes that China is in Africa to buy raw materials, but at least this has driven up the prices of these products and hence the income of the African governments. Jacoby 2007 emphasizes that China’s goal is to establish partnerships with different African countries to facilitate trade and investments. However, Bosshard 2007 rightly stresses the importance of using guidelines for foreign investors when becoming more active in Africa. Broadman, et al. 2006 even suggests that China will promote manufacturing activities in Africa so that these industries can benefit from the favorable conditions for export to the European Union and the United States. Currently, several assessments are available to explain how these policies work in practice (e.g., Burke, et al. 2007). Chinese migrants in Africa can also be considered as new agents of development (Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2009). On the other hand, as Winters and Yusuf 2007 has asked, are these African countries “dancing with giants”?
  186.  
  187. Asche, H., and M. Schüller. China’s Engagement in Africa: Opportunities and Risks for Development. Eschborn, Germany: GTZ, 2008.
  188.  
  189. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  190.  
  191. According to the authors, China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) and development aid are increasing rapidly, and aid, investments, and trade mutually reinforce each other in the case of China. They provide data that about one million Chinese have settled in Africa for different reasons.
  192.  
  193. Find this resource:
  194.  
  195.  
  196. Bosshard, P. “China and the West in Africa: Shared Interests?” China Monitor 19 (June 2007): 8–10.
  197.  
  198. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  199.  
  200. The author documents China’s cooperation with the World Bank and notes that China is also working with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on matters of Corporate Social Responsibility and has asked the OECD to explain the Guidelines for the Multinational Enterprises to Chinese firms with the goal of encouraging Chinese firms to start adopting these best practices.
  201.  
  202. Find this resource:
  203.  
  204.  
  205. Broadman, H. G., G. Isik, S. Plaza, X. Ye, and Y. Yoshino. Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New Economic Frontier. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006.
  206.  
  207. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  208.  
  209. Broadman and colleagues suggest that both China and India’s South–South commerce with Africa is about far more than natural resources. They are optimistic that this opens the way for Africa to become a processor of commodities and a competitive supplier of goods and services to these countries. This would be a major departure from Africa’s long-established relations with the North.
  210.  
  211. Find this resource:
  212.  
  213.  
  214. Burke, C., L. Corkin, and N. Tay. “China’s Engagement of Africa: Preliminary Scoping of African Case Studies, Angola, Ethiopia, Gabon, Uganda, South Africa, and Zambia. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch, 2007.
  215.  
  216. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  217.  
  218. The authors assess the presence of China in six countries as part of a wider scoping exercise undertaken by the Centre for Chinese Studies of the University of Stellenbosch.
  219.  
  220. Find this resource:
  221.  
  222.  
  223. Goldstein, A., N. Pinaud, H. Reisen, and X. Chen. The Rise of China and India: What’s in It for Africa? OECD Development Centre Studies. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006.
  224.  
  225. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  226.  
  227. China’s and India’s appetites for raw materials have driven up commodity prices and thus helped to boost growth in Africa.
  228.  
  229. Find this resource:
  230.  
  231.  
  232. Jacoby, U. “Getting Together: The New Partnership between China and Africa for Aid and Trade.” Finance and Development 44.2 (June 2007).
  233.  
  234. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  235.  
  236. China is fast becoming the major trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2008, it replaced the European Union and the United States as Africa’s major trading partner. China’s goal is to create Free Trade Areas (FTAs) with African countries or groups of countries. This plan is modeled on the European approach of signing Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with its former colonies in Africa, which are World Trade Organization (WTO)–compatible and are based on reciprocity.
  237.  
  238. Find this resource:
  239.  
  240.  
  241. Kurlantzick, J. “Beijing’s Safari: China’s Move into Africa and Its Implications for Aid, Development, and Governance.” Policy Outlook—China Program. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006.
  242.  
  243. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  244.  
  245. The author investigated the impact of China’s entry in Africa on aid, development, and governance. He argues that China is exporting its own “brand of capitalism” and has caused the World Bank to start investing again in infrastructure after a period of being hesitant to do so. The appropriate response to the potential impact of China on the international aid architecture is to work with China; this would empower those Chinese officials who want to make aid more transparent.
  246.  
  247. Find this resource:
  248.  
  249.  
  250. Mohan, G., and M. Tan-Mullins. “Chinese Migrants in Africa as New Agents of Development? An Analytical Framework.” European Journal of Development Research 21.4 (2009): 588–605.
  251.  
  252. DOI: 10.1057/ejdr.2009.22Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  253.  
  254. The authors find migration to Africa has increased on the back of initiatives by the Chinese government. The authors analyze the policies of China toward internationalization and Africa and conclude that, for Africans, the Chinese presence is marked by Chinese traders in the markets. Integration has been limited, and tensions have arisen in some countries and have been exploited by African politicians.
  255.  
  256. Find this resource:
  257.  
  258.  
  259. Winters, L. A., and S. Yusuf, eds. Dancing with Giants, China, India and the Global Economy. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007.
  260.  
  261. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  262.  
  263. After the end of the Cold War in 1989, the Western nations and the former Soviet Union no longer had to compete for the favors of African governments. In fact, the presence of Russians and Eastern Europeans in Africa vanished, and new actors came to the scene, including China, a country that is now very visibly present. It must be noted that currently Russia, India, and Japan are also trying again to increase their presence in Africa.
  264.  
  265. Find this resource:
  266.  
  267.  
  268. Aid, Trade, or Investments
  269. The three types of partnerships between China and African countries are through aid, trade, and investments. Very few studies have been done about the effectiveness of Chinese aid or trade arrangements. This section focuses on the problems facing aid, trade, and investments. One question is whether problems in partnerships between Chinese and African enterprises are also leading to problems in the relations with the African countries concerned. This question is discussed under Chinese Aid, Trade and Chinese Traders in Africa, and Investments.
  270.  
  271. Chinese Aid
  272. China uses a different definition of aid than that used by Western countries (Organisation for Economic and Co-operation and Development 2006 and Development Assistance Committee 2013). Chaponnière 2009 provides an analysis based on the limited information that is available. Cornelissen and Taylor 2000 adds that China has been neglecting the human rights issue when providing aid, and Grimm, et al. 2010 notes that Chinese aid also faces ownership problems. McCormick 2008 argues that the lines between the different forms of intervention (aid, trade, and foreign direct investment [FDI]) are often blurred. Moyo 2009 is negative about aid but positive about China’s role in Africa, whereas Mohamed Nour 2011 points to the positive and negative effects of Chinese aid in the case of Sudan. Finally, Wissenbach 2009 suggests that the European Union could develop triangular co-operation with China and work together in Africa.
  273.  
  274. Chaponnière, J. R. “Chinese Aid to Africa, Origins, Forms, and Issues.” In The New Presence of China in Africa. Edited by M. P.van Dijk, 55–82. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009.
  275.  
  276. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  277.  
  278. The geographical distribution of China’s official aid is not known because China provides no systematic data on aid, only press releases. Chaponnière provides a historical overview and points to the institutions involved. He analyzes the different forms in which aid is provided and its approximate geographical distribution. Then he discusses the major issues concerning aid to Africa, in particular to what extent Chinese aid will converge toward Western practice.
  279.  
  280. Find this resource:
  281.  
  282.  
  283. Cornelissen, S., and I. Taylor. “The Political Economy of China and Japan’s Relationship with Africa: A Comparative Perspective.” The Pacific Review 13.4 (2000): 615–633.
  284.  
  285. DOI: 10.1080/095127400455350Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  286.  
  287. The authors note that China has been neglecting human rights offenses in aid recipient nations.
  288.  
  289. Find this resource:
  290.  
  291.  
  292. Development Assistance Committee. Overview of Aid by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2013.
  293.  
  294. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  295.  
  296. China is providing mainly loans to African governments, but loans or credit lines are combined mostly with aid, trade, and investments, according to the Official Development Aid (ODA) criteria of the DAC report. No data are supplied by China to the OECD, but the DAC report has added a few pages on the aid provided by emerging economies, based on existing sources.
  297.  
  298. Find this resource:
  299.  
  300.  
  301. Grimm, S., H. Höß, K. Knappe, M. Siebold, J. Sperrfechter, and I. Volger. Coordinating China and DAC Development Partners: Challenges to the Aid Architecture in Rwanda. Bonn, Germany: German Development Institute, 2010.
  302.  
  303. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  304.  
  305. China does not provide budget or sector support, and the question arises whether China adds or removes countries from recipient ownership. China’s foreign aid is considered demand driven, but this research in Rwanda suggests that Asian donors’ engagement might also be suffering from the ownership problem.
  306.  
  307. Find this resource:
  308.  
  309.  
  310. McCormick, D. “China and India as Africa’s New Donors: The Impact of Aid on Development.” Review of African Political Economy 35.1 (2008): 73–92.
  311.  
  312. DOI: 10.1080/03056240802011501Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  313.  
  314. The author convincingly shows that the lines between the different forms of intervention (aid, FDI, etc.) are often blurred.
  315.  
  316. Find this resource:
  317.  
  318.  
  319. Mohamed Nour, S. Assessment of Effectiveness of China Aid in Financing Sudan. Working Papers Series 2011–005. Maastricht, The Netherlands: United Nations University, 2011.
  320.  
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  322.  
  323. Chinese aid to Sudan greatly increased between 1999 and 2008 and caused positive and negative effects. The positive effect was that it offered alternative and complementary resources. The negative was that Sudan’s debt to China increased from 0.9 percent to 13.45 percent between 1999 and 2007. The effectiveness is undermined because it tied aid to maintaining access to oil.
  324.  
  325. Find this resource:
  326.  
  327.  
  328. Moyo, D. Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is Another Way for Africa. London: Penguin, 2009.
  329.  
  330. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  331.  
  332. Moyo is positive about Chinese FDI and considers it as an alternative for corrupting foreign aid. Zambia elected Michael Sata as president, and he said he wanted to kick out all the Chinese when elected. The Chinese government threatened to withdraw from Zambia if Sata were elected, but Sata moderated his statements and then emphasized that he wanted other countries to respect local labor and environmental laws.
  333.  
  334. Find this resource:
  335.  
  336.  
  337. Organisation for Economic and Co-operation and Development. Evaluating the Effectiveness and the Efficiency of Partnerships, Workshop, 12 September 2006. Paris: OECD Environment Directorate, ENV/EPOC, 2006.
  338.  
  339. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  340.  
  341. Most donors agree that Official Development Aid (ODA) is only a benefit if it satisfies a number of criteria. The Chinese government calls certain types of assistance development “co-operation,” but most of the loans provided would not be classified as such by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, which uses criteria such as a minimal grant component in a loan deal to define it as ODA.
  342.  
  343. Find this resource:
  344.  
  345.  
  346. Wissenbach, U. “The EU’s Response to China’s Africa Safari: Can Triangular Co-Operation Match Needs?” European Journal of Development Research 21.4 (2009): 662–674.
  347.  
  348. DOI: 10.1057/ejdr.2009.25Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  349.  
  350. The European Union proposed trilateral co-operation to achieve synergies of the contribution of the European Union and China to Africa’s development. The author studies what kind of actor China is in Africa, whether China is in Africa because it is strong or weak, and what the trilateral approach of the European Union implies for Africa as a player in international relations.
  351.  
  352. Find this resource:
  353.  
  354.  
  355. Trade and Chinese Traders in Africa
  356. Traders for most ordinary African citizens are often the most tangible face of China’s engagement with Africa (African Research Institute 2012). The stereotype is that many Chinese workers remained in Africa after their construction company finished its job. Many Chinese migrate to Africa on their own, ordering one or two containers of cheap products, which are often not available locally, that they sell there as wholesalers or eventually as retailers. However, life is becoming gradually more difficult for these speculators, leaving many, especially the smaller Chinese private entrepreneurs, uncertain about their future, including how to obtain new working permits and visas. African people have frequent interactions with Chinese traders and shopkeepers who have a prominent position in many East African cities. However, the literature distinguishes between wholesalers and retail traders and concludes that there are both gains and losses from the trade relations. According to Ademola, et al. 2009, the negative effects dominate. However, as Lemoine 2010 notes, China has been very successful in increasing its exports to Africa and has now become the major trading partner. McNamee, et al. 2012 shows that Chinese traders employ limited numbers of local workers and face many hostilities. Van Dijk 2009 gives an overview of different trade regimes to conclude that China is not particularly favorable for Africa’s export, compared to the European Union or the United States (see also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2012). The same point is made by Broadman 2008. Giovannetti and Sanfilippo 2009 even shows that Chinese exporters are crowding out African export firms. African countries have a limited range of products that have shown comparative advantage. The technology gap is one reason that their products cannot compete with Chinese heavy industrial products, high-tech electronics, and processed products (Shinyekwa and Othieno 2011).
  357.  
  358. Ademola, O. T., A. S. Bankole, and A. O. Adewuyi. “China–Africa Trade Relations: Insights from AERC Scoping Studies.” European Journal of Development Research 21.4 (2009): 485–505.
  359.  
  360. DOI: 10.1057/ejdr.2009.28Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  361.  
  362. The authors analyze the impact of China–Africa trade relations, showing both gains and losses arising from China–Africa trade relations, and the negative effects often outweigh the positive. Concerted policy measures are needed, including obtaining enhanced market access to the Chinese market as well as policies eliminating capacity constraints for exports in African countries. The authors used the insights from AERC scoping studies (see also African Research Institute 2012).
  363.  
  364. Find this resource:
  365.  
  366.  
  367. African Research Institute. “Between Extremes: China and Africa.” Briefing Note 1202. London: Africa Research Institute, October 2012.
  368.  
  369. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  370.  
  371. ARI notes that most Africans know Chinese traders and shopkeepers are working in many African towns and villages, but usually they are perceived to provide poor-quality products. Some African authorities have reacted to the demand for increased regulation. Chinese traders in Malawi are restricted, for example, to setting up businesses in four cities, whereas Botswana has created a list of professions that are exclusive to its own nationals.
  372.  
  373. Find this resource:
  374.  
  375.  
  376. Broadman, H. G. “China and India Go to Africa.” Foreign Affairs 87.2 (March–April 2008): 95–109.
  377.  
  378. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  379.  
  380. Broadman notes that China and India are active in Africa. However, high Asian tariff rates on some African products discouraged African exports. China has already introduced a zero tariff on 45 percent of its imports and announced plans to lower its tariffs further.
  381.  
  382. Find this resource:
  383.  
  384.  
  385. Giovannetti, G., and M. Sanfilippo. “Do Chinese Exports Crowd-out African Goods? An Econometric Analysis by Country and Sector.” European Journal of Development Research 21.4 (2009): 506–530.
  386.  
  387. DOI: 10.1057/ejdr.2009.20Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  388.  
  389. The authors measure the indirect effects of Chinese exports to Africa on African exports. They show significant evidence for a displacement effect at different levels: sector, product, region, and market.
  390.  
  391. Find this resource:
  392.  
  393.  
  394. Lemoine, F. “Past Successes and New Challenges: China’s Foreign Trade at a Turning Point.” China and World Economy 18.3 (2010): 1–23.
  395.  
  396. DOI: 10.1111/j.1749-124X.2010.01193.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  397.  
  398. China has recorded a remarkable trade performance, driven by international processing and off-shoring strategies of foreign firms. Diversification of Chinese exports and their technological upgrading have been phenomenal. China’s economy has faced the adverse effects of an export-led growth and is now forced to rebalance its economy. This may lead to major changes in foreign trade. In the foreseeable future, China is unlikely to become the driver of international demand.
  399.  
  400. Find this resource:
  401.  
  402.  
  403. McNamee, T., with G. Mills, S. Manoeli, et al. Africa in Their Words: A Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola. Discussion Paper 2012/03. Johannesburg: The Brenthurst Foundation, 2012.
  404.  
  405. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  406.  
  407. Based on a survey, the authors found Chinese traders in South Africa employed the smallest number of local workers. They mention crime, corruption, and intra-Chinese competition as problems. Chinese traders in Botswana reported an increasing sense of hostility toward them. In Lesotho, none of the Chinese traders planned to stay in the long term; high crime rates, poor education, and low quality of life are the main reasons for their decision.
  408.  
  409. Find this resource:
  410.  
  411.  
  412. Shinyekwa, I., and L. Othieno. “Uganda’s Revealed Comparative Advantage: The Evidence with the EAC and China.” EPRC Research Series 80. Kampala, Uganda: Economic Policy Research Centre, 2011.
  413.  
  414. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  415.  
  416. Trade between China and Uganda rose from 16.5 million to over 251.2 million USD between 2001 and 2009. The trade imbalance has risen from 16 million in 2001 to over 228.7 million USD in 2009. The authors argue that Uganda has a limited range of products that have revealed comparative advantage. The technology gap is one reason Ugandan products cannot compete with Chinese heavy industrial products, high-tech electronics, and processed products.
  417.  
  418. Find this resource:
  419.  
  420.  
  421. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. World Investment Report: Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations, 2012.
  422.  
  423. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  424.  
  425. China has agreed most-favored-nation (MFN) clauses with forty-one African countries. It also has its own preference system for partner countries, such as South Africa. South Africa alone represents about 25 percent of China’s trade with Africa and is involved in negotiations on a free-trade agreement. Such agreements already have been concluded with a few other African countries. UNCTAD notes that China is the fourth largest investor in Africa after Singapore, India, and Malaysia.
  426.  
  427. Find this resource:
  428.  
  429.  
  430. Van Dijk, M. P. “Competing Trade Policies with Respect to Africa.” In The New Presence of China in Africa. Edited by M. P. van Dijk, 101–115. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009.
  431.  
  432. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  433.  
  434. Van Dijk analyzes trade policies as an instrument and compares the trade advantages provided by the EU, the US, and China in terms of tariffs, non-tariff barriers, rules of origin, and the required reciprocity. The EU and the US trade policies do compare favorably with China’s trade policy with respect to Africa. China has contributed to “booming Africa,” partially through infrastructure, partially through foreign direct investment (FDI) and aid, and partially because of the additional demand for raw materials.
  435.  
  436. Find this resource:
  437.  
  438.  
  439. Investments
  440. Foreign direct investments (FDI) can contribute to economic growth, but much depends on the conditions, such as creation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) (Berger 2008). The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2007 and following years) shows the increase in Chinese investments in Africa (see also Renard 2011). Case studies show that some countries get unwanted retail traders (Uganda) or too many Chinese workers (Ethiopia) (Van Dijk 2017). Baah and Jauch 2009 analyzes Chinese investments in Africa from a worker’s perspective. Kaplinsky 2012 predicts a rise in Chinese investments in Africa, because of increased cost-reducing foreign investment as leading Chinese firms see opportunities to invest in Africa. Kaplinsky and Morris 2009 and Kragelund and van Dijk 2009 all conclude that most investments go into natural resources and the construction of infrastructure.
  441.  
  442. Baah, A. Y., and H. Jauch, eds. Chinese Investments in Africa: A Labour Perspective. Accra, Ghana: Africa Labour Research Network, 2009.
  443.  
  444. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  445.  
  446. Baah and Jauch analyze Chinese investments in Africa from a worker’s perspective and investigate employment conditions, which do not always conform to local labor legislation.
  447.  
  448. Find this resource:
  449.  
  450.  
  451. Berger, A. “The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in China’s Foreign Policy.” Contribution to the EADI General Conference: Global Governance for Sustainable Development, Geneva, 2008. Bonn, Germany: German Development Institute, 2008.
  452.  
  453. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  454.  
  455. China pledged to encourage mutual investments. It agreed to conclude bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and, to the extent possible, avoid double taxation. China and its partners have established a China–Africa Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry to facilitate further trade and investment between them. China stated that it would create a China–Africa Development Fund to support “well-established and reputable Chinese companies in making investment in projects in Africa.”
  456.  
  457. Find this resource:
  458.  
  459.  
  460. Kaplinsky, R. “No Simple Pattern to Chinese Foreign Investment.” East Asia Forum Quarterly 4.2 (April–June 2012): 24–26.
  461.  
  462. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  463.  
  464. As wage costs continue to rise in China, there will be an increase in cost-reducing foreign investment by leading Chinese firms. They fracture their value chains by outsourcing labor-intensive and technologically simple tasks. The most likely beneficiaries of this will be the East Asian region. Kaplinsky sees few signs that either Africa or Latin America will become sources for cost-reducing Chinese investments in the near future.
  465.  
  466. Find this resource:
  467.  
  468.  
  469. Kaplinsky, R., and M. Morris. “Chinese FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa: Engaging with Large Dragons.” European Journal of Development Research 21.4 (2009): 551–569.
  470.  
  471. DOI: 10.1057/ejdr.2009.24Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  472.  
  473. The authors focus on the engagement of Chinese state-owned firms with sub-Saharan Africa. They analyze FDI in resources and infrastructure, assess these investments, and discuss to what extent they are bundled with aid and trade. The article concludes that SSA countries should maximize the opportunities opened to them by their resources based on adopting a focused response to Chinese investors.
  474.  
  475. Find this resource:
  476.  
  477.  
  478. Kragelund, P., and M. P. van Dijk. “China’s Investments in Africa.” In The New Presence of China in Africa. Edited by M. P. van Dijk, 83–101. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009.
  479.  
  480. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  481.  
  482. Chinese companies are investing heavily in Africa. Investments are concentrated in oil-producing countries, such as Angola, Nigeria, and Sudan, or in countries with a large amount of raw material, such as Zambia. China’s policy with respect to investments in Africa is closely related to the development of its aid and trade policies regarding Africa. The authors seek to compare Chinese FDI in Africa with FDI from other sources.
  483.  
  484. Find this resource:
  485.  
  486.  
  487. Renard, Mary-Françoise. “China’s Trade and FDI in Africa.” African Development Bank Group Working Paper 126 (May 2011). Tunis, Tunisia: African Development Bank, 2011.
  488.  
  489. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  490.  
  491. The author finds that China’s FDI to the continent has increased rapidly. In 1996, China’s FDI stock on the continent was valued at 56 million USD; by 2007, it was at 4.46 billion USD. FDI flows have also been increasingly rapidly. From 2007 to 2008, the FDI flows increased by 81 percent.
  492.  
  493. Find this resource:
  494.  
  495.  
  496. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. World Investment Report. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations, 2007.
  497.  
  498. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  499.  
  500. On the basis of statistics on international investments provided by UNCTAD’s world investment report at the end of 2006, China had invested more than 10 billion USD in sub-Saharan Africa. Total FDI inflows in Africa were 30 billion USD in 2006, twice the 2004 level, concerning mainly natural resources. About 90 percent of these FDIs are concentrated in ten countries. The importance of Chinese FDI is increasing rapidly.
  501.  
  502. Find this resource:
  503.  
  504.  
  505. Van Dijk, M. P. “China’s Financial and Aid Flows into Africa and Their Effects.” In Foreign Capital Flows and Economic Development in Africa: The Impact of BRICS versus OECD. Edited by E. Wamboye and E. A. Tiruneh, pp. 51–69. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
  506.  
  507. DOI: 10.1057/978-1-137-53496-5_3Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  508.  
  509. Foreign direct investments (FDI) can contribute to economic growth, but it is important that developing countries create the conditions to allow it to be effective. Two cases show that both Uganda and Ethiopia welcome Chinese investments, although they are also aware that they do not want Chinese retail traders (Uganda) or too many Chinese workers (Ethiopia). The author presents a classification of Chinese engagements in Africa.
  510.  
  511. Find this resource:
  512.  
  513.  
  514. Issues
  515. In the debate on China’s role in Africa, several issues have come up. First, which development model is China pushing? Does its increased presence mean the Beijing consensus is winning over the traditional Washington (World Bank, IMF, and donors) approach to development? Second, are only Chinese state-owned enterprises very active outside China? More recent research shows Chinese private enterprises also have a role abroad; therefore, it is necessary to look at how they deal with labor and the environment because their record at home is not always good. Third, why are the Chinese being blamed for bringing their own workers to other countries to build the roads or work in their factories? Research shows that this very much depends on the attitude of the receiving country; if the country does not provide the visas, China will only send Chinese management. Finally, what is the real purpose of Friendship Zones? Some researchers are very critical about the “duplication of China’s success.” They point to the fact that China dictates the conditions for its investment in the country concerned.
  516.  
  517. The Washington versus the Beijing Consensus
  518. Williamson 2002 mentions the main points of the Washington consensus, which is sometimes summarized as “liberalize and privatize.” The Beijing consensus gives priority to stability and accepts an important role for the government in the development process. Some consider the two views as conflicting (Gore 2000 and Leonard 2008), whereas others consider the two as complementary (Ramo 2004). Huang 2010 argues that the Washington consensus better describes the Chinese growth experience and that it may also be relevant for other developing countries. Schmitz 2006 points to the fact that Chinese value chain organizers are increasingly setting standards and/or making existing standards applicable or irrelevant. This means the entry of China into the global economy affects the relevance of different labor and environmental standards.
  519.  
  520. Gore, C. “The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing Countries.” World Development 28.5 (2000): 789–804.
  521.  
  522. DOI: 10.1016/S0305-750X(99)00160-6Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  523.  
  524. Gore argues that the Washington consensus was a shift not only from state-led to market-oriented policies but also from the way in which development problems were framed. Key changes were the partial globalization of development policy analysis and a shift from historicism to a historical performance assessment. He considers the demise of the Washington consensus inevitable because its methodology and ideology are in contradiction.
  525.  
  526. Find this resource:
  527.  
  528.  
  529. Huang, Y. “Debating China’s Economic Growth: The Beijing Consensus or the Washington Consensus.” Academy of Management Perspectives 24.2 (2010): 31–47.
  530.  
  531. DOI: 10.5465/AMP.2010.51827774Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  532.  
  533. The Washington consensus views China’s experience much the same as growth experience elsewhere. It is the result of financial liberalization, private entrepreneurship, and political opening. Huang argues that the Washington consensus fits the Chinese growth experience better and that this may also be relevant for other countries.
  534.  
  535. Find this resource:
  536.  
  537.  
  538. Leonard, M. What Does China Think? London: Fourth Estate, 2008.
  539.  
  540. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  541.  
  542. Leonard notes that the Beijing consensus could be the worst ideological menace to the Western world since the collapse of communism. Whereas the Washington consensus favors privatization, the Beijing consensus encourages the use of public money and a push to protect public property. These differences contribute to the positive image of China in Africa where Asian heterodox strategies have long been regarded with deep interest.
  543.  
  544. Find this resource:
  545.  
  546.  
  547. Ramo, J. C. The Beijing Consensus. London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2004.
  548.  
  549. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  550.  
  551. China’s approach to development has led Ramo to propose the concept of a “Beijing consensus” as opposed to the “Washington consensus.” According to Ramo, both pursue the same goals but in a different order of priority, with Beijing giving priority to stability and development, whereas the Washington consensus viewing reforms as a precondition for stability and development.
  552.  
  553. Find this resource:
  554.  
  555.  
  556. Schmitz, H. “Asian Drivers: Typologies and Questions.” IDS Bulletin 37.1 (2006): 54–61.
  557.  
  558. DOI: 10.1111/j.1759-5436.2006.tb00247.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  559.  
  560. Chinese value chain organizers are increasingly setting standards and/or making existing standards applicable or irrelevant, and experts do not know enough about how the entry of China in the global economy affects the relevance of, for example, ILO and FSC standards.
  561.  
  562. Find this resource:
  563.  
  564.  
  565. Williamson, J. “Did the Washington Consensus Fail” Outline of a Speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 6 November 2002.
  566.  
  567. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  568.  
  569. Williamson mentions ten points as part of the consensus: fiscal discipline, reordering public expenditure priorities, tax reform, liberalizing interest rates, competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, liberalization of inward foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation, and property rights as the ten reforms originally presented.
  570.  
  571. Find this resource:
  572.  
  573.  
  574. The Role of Public and Private Chinese Enterprises
  575. How many Chinese enterprises are in Africa? In 2006, the Chinese Export–Import (EXIM) Bank estimated that there were about 800 Chinese companies operating in Africa. This section focuses on the role of one actor—public or private Chinese companies. The central hypothesis of much research on China in Africa was that China’s strategy is driven primarily by a form of state capitalism exported overseas. The articles cited deal with the differences between the strategies of private and public enterprises in Africa. The conclusion is that the issues at the enterprise level are different from the issues raised by aid and trade at the national level. An increasing number of empirical studies at the enterprise level are now available (Warmerdam and van Dijk 2016). Some concern China’s private enterprises in Africa (Gu 2009 and Shen 2013); some discuss public Chinese companies (Warmerdam and van Dijk 2013). These sources also point to the importance of training programs for Ugandan workers in the company to enable them eventually to replace Chinese staff. Knorringa 2009 and van Dijk 2013 point to the need for both types of enterprises to adhere to certain standards. Knorringa discusses responsible production in Africa, whereas van Dijk focuses on respecting human, labor, and environmental rights.
  576.  
  577. Gu, J. “China’s Private Enterprises in Africa and the Implications for African Development.” European Journal of Development Research 21.4 (2009): 570–587.
  578.  
  579. DOI: 10.1057/ejdr.2009.21Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  580.  
  581. Gu notes that estimates regarding the numbers of Chinese enterprises in Africa vary considerably. Is there a difference between the Chinese state-owned enterprises and Chinese private companies active in Africa? The author evaluates the characteristics and motivations of Chinese private companies in Africa. Chinese private companies have followed their own paths to Africa, whereas the primary factors driving private investment are African market opportunities, competition within China, and the presence of a strong entrepreneurial spirit.
  582.  
  583. Find this resource:
  584.  
  585.  
  586. Knorringa, P. “Responsible Production in Africa: The Rise of China as Threat or Opportunity?” In the New Presence of China in Africa. Edited by M. P. van Dijk, 177–199. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009.
  587.  
  588. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  589.  
  590. Do Chinese companies comply with local legislation, and do they undertake corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities to improve their image? The author prefers to use the phrase “responsible production” instead, which he defines as “situations where lead actors in value chains make a deliberate effort to include throughout their supply chain, labor and environmental standards that go beyond the existing minimum legal requirements” (p. 178).
  591.  
  592. Find this resource:
  593.  
  594.  
  595. Shen, X. “Private Chinese Investment in Africa: Myths and Realities.” Policy Research Working Papers 6311. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013.
  596.  
  597. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  598.  
  599. The significance of Chinese private-sector investment is already visible in the burgeoning manufacturing sector in some parts of Africa, and the trend will continue to grow in the near future. The underlying force behind this trend is the increased pressure of industrial restructuring in coastal China, a force that drives some labor-intensive firms to relocate to other parts of the developing world, including Africa.
  600.  
  601. Find this resource:
  602.  
  603.  
  604. Van Dijk, M. P. “How Are Chinese Companies Dealing with Human, Labour and Environmental Rights in Africa?” Human Rights Defender 22.3 (2013): 9–11.
  605.  
  606. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  607.  
  608. Van Dijk analyzes three cases of Chinese companies’ violations in this article. Some Chinese companies active in Africa have human rights problems or do not comply with local environmental and labor standards. Human rights groups have criticized China for supporting the Sudanese government in exchange for oil. Chinese companies are violating environmental legislation in Gabon and labor legislation in Ghana. According to these sources, the companies violate human, labor, and environmental rights, but China denies the charges.
  609.  
  610. Find this resource:
  611.  
  612.  
  613. Warmerdam, W., and M. P. van Dijk. “Chinese State-Owned Enterprise Investments in Uganda: Findings from a Recent Survey of Chinese Firms in Kampala.” Journal of Chinese Political Science 18.3 (2013): 281–301.
  614.  
  615. DOI: 10.1007/s11366-013-9250-6Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  616.  
  617. Warmerdam and van Dijk studied forty-two Chinese enterprises in Kampala. They found that more private Chinese enterprises invested in Uganda than publicly owned enterprises. However, many of the Chinese companies investing in Uganda are state-owned companies, and some are the results of a Chinese development or construction project. The authors also point to the importance of training programs for Ugandan workers in private and public Chinese companies to enable them eventually to replace Chinese staff.
  618.  
  619. Find this resource:
  620.  
  621.  
  622. Warmerdam, W., and M. P. van Dijk. “What’s Your Story? Chinese Private Enterprises in Kampala, Uganda.” Journal of Asian and African Studies (25 January 2016): 1–21.
  623.  
  624. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  625.  
  626. The authors analyze the role of private Chinese firms through a survey. They show that many of these companies are relatively small and recently created, motivated by the potential of local markets. What are the problems they face investing in Uganda? Life is becoming gradually more difficult for these businesses, leaving many, especially smaller, Chinese private entrepreneurs uncertain about their future in terms of obtaining work permits and visas. Available online by subscription.
  627.  
  628. Find this resource:
  629.  
  630.  
  631. The Role of Special Economic Zones
  632. A new phenomenon is that China not only is building Friendship Zones but also is using these Special Economic Zones in Africa to export to Europe and the United States on its own (negotiated) terms and benefiting from the trade arrangements of the country concerned. Davies 2008 argues that the Chinese government usually negotiates conditions, such as the price of land, tax-free import of equipment and raw material, and tax-free profits during a certain number of years. Alves 2011 analyzes the achievements of this type of project in Zambia. Shortcomings at the implementation level need to be addressed by both Chinese investors and Zambian authorities if the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) is to move beyond a low-skilled labor zone, concerned mainly with processing natural resources. Gadzala 2010 is even more critical about the project, whereas Goswami 2007 draws lessons from China’s experience with SEZs, which also often led to conflicts with farmers losing their land. Chinese researchers themselves try to do the same thing as shown by the report NexGen Global Forum 2015. Haugen and Carling 2005 gives a different perspective by pointing out that in the early 21st century Chinese investors increasingly opt for places at the edge of the Chinese diaspora, rather than joining established communities of overseas Chinese because this provides better business opportunities.
  633.  
  634. Alves, A. C. “The Zambia–China Cooperation Zone at a Crossroads: What Now.” SAIIA Policy Briefing 41, China in Africa Project. South Africa Institute of International Affairs, January 2011.
  635.  
  636. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  637.  
  638. The Zambia–China Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ) was the first economic and trade cooperation zone in Africa. This policy brief analyzes the history and achievements of the project. Several shortcomings at the implementation level need to be addressed by both Chinese investors and Zambian authorities if the ZCCZ is to move beyond low-skilled labor employment and resources supply.
  639.  
  640. Find this resource:
  641.  
  642.  
  643. Davies, M. J. “Special Economic Zones: China’s Developmental Model Comes to Africa.” In China into Africa: Aid, Trade, and Influence. Edited by R. I. Rotberg, 137–154. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008.
  644.  
  645. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  646.  
  647. Davies argues that China’s developmental model comes to Africa in the form of special economic zones, in which the Chinese government usually negotiates conditions, such as the price of land, tax-free import of equipment and raw material, and tax-free profits during a certain number of years.
  648.  
  649. Find this resource:
  650.  
  651.  
  652. Gadzala, A. W. “From Formal- to Informal-Sector Employment: Examining the Chinese Presence in Zambia.” Review of African Political Economy 37.123 (2010): 41–59.
  653.  
  654. DOI: 10.1080/03056241003637904Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  655.  
  656. Despite the positive impact of Chinese businesses in Zambia (limited job creation, infrastructure development, and affordable consumer goods), Chinese traders, through their business networks and enclave business nature, are displacing Zambian business owners. Zambia’s lax imposition of regulatory guidelines facilitates China’s exploitation of the Zambian economy. Although Zambia’s immigration law requires immigrants to secure work permits prior to their arrival in the country, these documents are not examined until the workers are already in Zambia.
  657.  
  658. Find this resource:
  659.  
  660.  
  661. Goswami, B. “SEZs: Lessons from China” India Together (9 February 2007).
  662.  
  663. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  664.  
  665. Goswami uses China’s experience when drawing lessons to build Special Economic Zones in other parts of the world. Resentment over the loss of farmland, corruption, worsening pollution, and arbitrary evictions by property developers are the main reasons for unrest in the early 21st century. Adding insult to injury, the Olympic Games themselves led to forced evictions, resettlements, and the like. Economic progress seems to take priority over political, environmental, and social progress.
  666.  
  667. Find this resource:
  668.  
  669.  
  670. Haugen, H. Ø., and J. Carling. “On the Edge of the Chinese Diaspora: The Surge of Baihuo Business in an African City.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 28.4 (2005): 639–662.
  671.  
  672. DOI: 10.1080/01419870500092597Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  673.  
  674. The authors argue that Chinese investors increasingly opt for places at the edge of the Chinese diaspora, rather than joining established communities of overseas Chinese because this provides better business opportunities.
  675.  
  676. Find this resource:
  677.  
  678.  
  679. NexGen Global Forum. Industrial Parks and Globalization: Experience Sharing between China and Africa. 16–18 December 2015, Tsingua University, Beijing.
  680.  
  681. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  682.  
  683. China is late in the globalization process; originally, its industries served mainly the Southeast Asian region. An increasing number of Chinese companies have gained control over total value chains (Lenovo, Huawei, mining companies, etc.), and now they have to develop new markets for their products, sometimes produced in special China–Africa Friendship Zones. During this conference, a comparison was made between these and the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in China.
  684.  
  685. Find this resource:
  686.  
  687.  
  688. Country Studies
  689. In the globalization process, it is difficult to determine the best place to concentrate investments in Africa. Several factors play a role. One factor is favorable trade arrangements with other countries, for example, the framework of a free trade agreement with the European Union or the United States, such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), or international agreements, such as the Everything But Arms (EBA) arrangement for least-developed countries. Other factors to consider are a policy environment that is positive, labor that is available and cheap, a strategy that fits in with that of China or the company concerned, and positive relations between the political leadership. For this reason, China is investing heavily in Ethiopia, creating among others a Special Economic Zone (a China–Ethiopia Friendship Zone), forty-five kilometers from Addis Ababa on the road to Djibouti. China’s strategy is primarily driven by a form of state capitalism exported overseas, whereas India’s strategy is primarily led by the Indian private sector together with proactive Indo-African business diasporas. The Government of India plays a real but limited subsidiary role. This section summarizes a number of specific country studies on the role of China in the local economy.
  690.  
  691. West Africa: Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal
  692. In this section, different country cases are reviewed to illustrate the main issues in the debate on China’s presence in Africa. Evidence is presented for Chinese companies working in Cameroon and their effect on the environment (Nkotto 2009) and the effects on employment in Ghana (Baah, et al. 2009 and Idun-Arkhurst 2008). Nigeria is an example of a major oil-rich country that has resisted several attempts led by Chinese State corporations to access Nigeria’s vast energy resources (Akinola 2015). Senegal is interesting because there could be land-grabbing (Buckley 2013), and the role of the local business climate for foreign investment is described as not very favorable (Hazard, et al. 2009). Kernen 2010 looks at the role of Chinese traders in Senegal and Mali.
  693.  
  694. Akinola, O. “The Political Economy of Chinese and Indian Trade, Aid and Investments in Nigeria: A Comparative Analysis.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 17 December 2015.
  695.  
  696. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  697.  
  698. Akinola’s article deals with the difficult and tense relationship between China and Nigeria. It shows an example of another major oil-rich country, which has resisted several attempts led by Chinese State corporations to access Nigeria’s vast energy resources. On the contrary, private sector-based relations with India have been rather smooth. Available online by subscription.
  699.  
  700. Find this resource:
  701.  
  702.  
  703. Baah, A. Y., K. N. Otoo, and E. F. Ampratwurm. “Chinese Investments in Ghana.” In Chinese Investments in Africa: A Labour Perspective. Edited by A. Y. Baah and H. Jauch, 85–123. Accra, Ghana: African Labour Research Network, 2009.
  704.  
  705. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  706.  
  707. The authors analyze the loss of jobs in Ghana due to cheap Chinese imports that often out-compete locally made substitutes. Local retailers state that some Chinese companies are active in the retail sector, which is in fact reserved for Ghanaian entrepreneurs. They argue that some Chinese retailers register as manufacturers but engage in retail.
  708.  
  709. Find this resource:
  710.  
  711.  
  712. Buckley, L. “Chinese Land-Based Interventions in Senegal.” Development and Change 44.2 (2013): 429–450.
  713.  
  714. DOI: 10.1111/dech.12016Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  715.  
  716. Buckley uses ethnographic methodologies to examine practices and discourse on agricultural governance. She shows how different repertoires for land management are negotiated and reshaped by different subjects in a kind of improvised dance, in which individuals’ improvisations lead to unanticipated outcomes. Land-grabbing is not a linear process of state or corporate takeover, but rather a dynamic process among state actors, corporate players, and citizens.
  717.  
  718. Find this resource:
  719.  
  720.  
  721. Hazard, E., L. de Vries, M. A. Barry, A. A. Anouan, and N. Pinaud. “The Development Impact of Asian Drivers on Senegal.” The World Economy 32.11 (2009): 1563–1585.
  722.  
  723. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9701.2009.01250.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  724.  
  725. The authors argue that Senegal has a more developed partnership with India than with China. The country has not yet managed to become a big foreign direct investment (FDI) recipient, maybe because of the business environment and the limited market. The country is rather used as a logistical and commercial basis for importation and re-exportation than as a production base.
  726.  
  727. Find this resource:
  728.  
  729.  
  730. Idun-Arkhurst, I. Ghana’s Relations with China. Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs, 2008.
  731.  
  732. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  733.  
  734. After 1983, Chinese companies became active in Ghana. Issues discussed are the infrastructure built by the Chinese, illegal gold mining by Chinese citizens, and resettlement related to a dam constructed by Chinese contractors. Idun-Arkhurst concludes that the relation is both beneficial and detrimental in its effects, but most stakeholders consider it to be positive because the Chinese brought affordable products, created some jobs, and made some investments or transferred technology.
  735.  
  736. Find this resource:
  737.  
  738.  
  739. Kernen, A. “Small and Medium-Sized Chinese Businesses in Mali and Senegal.” African and Asian Studies 9 (2010): 252–268.
  740.  
  741. DOI: 10.1163/156921010X515950Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  742.  
  743. Kernen provides a positive reflection on Chinese traders in Mali and Senegal. He states that the organization of local business communities and the ability of these business communities to put pressure on local authorities to promote the benefits of their business and curtail the negative impacts of Chinese business has led to a generally positive business environment.
  744.  
  745. Find this resource:
  746.  
  747.  
  748. Nkotto, H. N. “China and the Environment in Cameroon.” In Strengthening the Civil Society Perspective: China’s African Impact. Edited by S. Marks, 28–39. Cape Town: Fahamu, 2009.
  749.  
  750. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  751.  
  752. The author found that, in Cameroon, Chinese businesses did not perform worse than entrepreneurs from other countries regarding complying with local laws when appropriate monitoring systems were in place.
  753.  
  754. Find this resource:
  755.  
  756.  
  757. Central Africa: Congo, Sudan, and Uganda
  758. The Chinese presence in Central Africa is remarkable. In most countries, the English language may facilitate Chinese investments. A study concerning Uganda analyzes the emergence of Chinese private enterprises in Uganda, based on a survey of local small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Kampala (Warmerdam and van Dijk 2013). The collected data shows that many of these companies are relatively small and recently created by fresh Chinese entrants, motivated by the potential of local markets in Uganda and the subregion. Other sources on Uganda are Ghosh 2011; Guloba, et al. 2010; Obwona and Kilimani 2007; Ugandan Traders Bemoan Chinese Shopkeeper Influx, a Stabroek News article; Seruwagi 2012; and Allen and Baguma 2012. Sudan (Large 2007 and Van Dijk 2009) and Congo (Marysse and Geenen 2009) are more controversial examples of China’s engagement in Africa.
  759.  
  760. Allen, K., and E. Baguma. “China–Uganda Relations: Closer Is Not Necessarily Better.” China Brief 13.1 (2012): 12–16.
  761.  
  762. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  763.  
  764. The authors question the benefits to Uganda’s economy of China’s engagement given the increasingly large presence of Chinese traders and Beijing’s support for natural resource investments. Customers prefer cheaper, more easily available products over those locally produced; hence, Chinese manufacturers push local producers out of the market through increased competition.
  765.  
  766. Find this resource:
  767.  
  768.  
  769. Ghosh, P. “Uganda Traders Strike to Protest High Prices, Influx of Asians.” International Business Times, 7 July 2011.
  770.  
  771. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  772.  
  773. According to the author, Chinese and Indian entrepreneurs flooding the market in Uganda with cheap goods were undercutting local business rates and leading to protests. The Chinese have now replaced Indian traders as the primary target of resentment and hostility by African traders.
  774.  
  775. Find this resource:
  776.  
  777.  
  778. Guloba, M., N. Kilimani, and W. Nabiddo. “Impact of Chinese-Africa Relations: A Case Study of Uganda.” Final report submitted to the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC). Nairobi, Kenya: African Economic Research Consortium, 2010.
  779.  
  780. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  781.  
  782. The African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) scoping studies provide insights into country-specific impacts of China and India using a uniform conceptual framework. This Uganda Scoping Study focuses on the impact of Chinese aid to Uganda specifically and does not address other channels of interaction.
  783.  
  784. Find this resource:
  785.  
  786.  
  787. Large, D. “China and the Changing Context of Development in Sudan.” Development 50.3 (2007): 57–62.
  788.  
  789. DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.development.1100405Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  790.  
  791. Sudan is often called the most controversial case in the wave of Chinese engagements with Africa. Its role in the developments in the South Sudan and the Darfur regions and the pressure on China before the Olympics in 2008 are important factors in understanding China’s role in Africa.
  792.  
  793. Find this resource:
  794.  
  795.  
  796. Marysse, S., and S. Geenen. “Win-Win or Unequal Exchange? The Case of the Sino-Congolese Co-operation Agreements.” Journal of Modern African Studies 47.3 (2009): 371–396.
  797.  
  798. DOI: 10.1017/S0022278X09003978Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  799.  
  800. In 2008, an agreement with China pledged millions of tons of copper and cobalt to China in exchange for roads, railways, and other infrastructure for Congo. It was not a win-win situation, but an example of unequal exchange. Investments had to be repaid with mineral resources, and the terms of reimbursement were not concessional at all. Congo would miss tax revenues because China had negotiated tax holidays for the project.
  801.  
  802. Find this resource:
  803.  
  804.  
  805. Obwona, G., and N. Kilimani. “China–Africa Economic Relations: The Case of Uganda.” Economic Policy Research Center. Nairobi, Kenya: African Economic Research Consortium, 2007.
  806.  
  807. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  808.  
  809. The authors conclude that a reduction in the trade gap between Uganda and China is unattainable in the near future. The government should increase the productivity of Uganda’s exports to China to maximize the benefits of the special preferential treatment it receives. They see the greatest potential in agricultural commodities. This is an area in which Chinese investment is still low, whereas China has well-known expertise in the area.
  810.  
  811. Find this resource:
  812.  
  813.  
  814. Seruwagi, Moses Kalisa. “Ugandan Trade Liberalisations ‘Hindering not Helping’.” African Review of Business and Technology (29 February 2012).
  815.  
  816. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  817.  
  818. Many Ugandan business owners and traders welcomed Chinese investment, but they demanded that it be real investment in productive industries to help further Uganda’s industrialization and socioeconomic development, not simply to engage in trade and wholesale.
  819.  
  820. Find this resource:
  821.  
  822.  
  823. “Ugandan Traders Bemoan Chinese Shopkeeper Influx.” Stabroek News 9 July 2011.
  824.  
  825. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  826.  
  827. Shopkeepers in Uganda went on strike to protest rising fuel and commodity prices, an unstable exchange rate, and increased competition from Chinese and Indian businesses that were flooding the market with cheap goods, undercutting local business owners. Chinese traders have now replaced Indian traders as the primary target of resentment and hostility. Traders interviewed said they had no major problems with Indians, but the Chinese traders were accused of hoarding dollars.
  828.  
  829. Find this resource:
  830.  
  831.  
  832. Van Dijk, M. P. “The Political Impact of the Chinese in Sudan.” In The New Presence of China in Africa. Edited by M. P. van Dijk, 141–157. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009.
  833.  
  834. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  835.  
  836. Van Dijk shows how China operates politically in Sudan. The issues are what the developments were in Darfur and whether China’s arms deliveries contributed to the crisis. The question is posed whether China used conditions when providing aid and investing in Sudan. Looking at the strategic objectives and trade policies of China with respect to Sudan, the author questions if China is an alternative for the Western development model.
  837.  
  838. Find this resource:
  839.  
  840.  
  841. Warmerdam, W., and M. P. van Dijk. “China–Uganda and the Question of Mutual Benefits.” South African Journal of International Affairs 20.2 (2013): 271–295.
  842.  
  843. DOI: 10.1080/10220461.2013.811339Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  844.  
  845. Warmerdam and Van Dijk found that more private Chinese enterprises invested in Uganda than publicly owned enterprises. However, the latter also tends to have higher investments and turnover. The authors assessed the benefits of cooperation with China. They suggest that Uganda should take a more active role in determining what is desirable and what is not allowed.
  846.  
  847. Find this resource:
  848.  
  849.  
  850. East Africa: Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zambia
  851. This section presents case studies concerning countries with a substantial Chinese engagement over a number of years: Ethiopia (Geda 2008), Rwanda (African Center for Economic Transformation 2010); Tanzania (Bastholm 2007; Mashindano, et al. 2008; Men 2014; and Moshi and Mtui 2008) and Zambia (Bastholm and Kragelund 2009 and Kragelund 2007).
  852.  
  853. African Center for Economic Transformation. “Looking East: China’s Engagements with Africa.” Rwanda Country Case Study. Accra, Ghana: ACET, 2010.
  854.  
  855. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  856.  
  857. Chinese traders are perceived to provide low quality goods and compete with local traders. ACET called on Rwanda to develop a more “proactive” policy to encourage investment in sectors such as ICT and agribusiness, to channel investments to achieve the government’s Vision 2020 policy.
  858.  
  859. Find this resource:
  860.  
  861.  
  862. Bastholm, A. Chinese Strategic Investments in the Agricultural Sector in Tanzania, Trends and Prospects. Leiden, The Netherlands: ECAS Conference at the Africa Studies Centre, 2007.
  863.  
  864. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  865.  
  866. The author examines the main motives and strategies of Chinese investments in Tanzania. He analyzes critically the Chinese “strategic” investments in the agricultural sector and wonders in which direction they will develop.
  867.  
  868. Find this resource:
  869.  
  870.  
  871. Bastholm, A., and P. Kragelund. “State-Driven Chinese Investments in Zambia: Combining Strategic Interests and Profits.” In The New Presence of China in Africa. Edited by M. P. van Dijk, 117–141. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009.
  872.  
  873. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  874.  
  875. From their study of mining, construction, and agriculture, the authors conclude that the Chinese State is a central player in driving Chinese investments. Most Chinese investments in Zambia target mining, or mining-related activities. The Chinese State directs and assists these investments at the highest political level. Lastly, the authors hint at how the Chinese State makes use of investments in other sectors to render investments in the mining sector possible.
  876.  
  877. Find this resource:
  878.  
  879.  
  880. Geda, A. Scoping Study on the Chinese Relation with Sub Saharan Africa: The Case of Ethiopia. Nairobi, Kenya: African Economic Research Consortium (AERC), 2008.
  881.  
  882. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  883.  
  884. The success of Chinese firms in Ethiopia is explained by the political ties the Chinese government created with the Ethiopian government, low bidding prices offered by Chinese firms, financing options given to the Ethiopian government, the level of wages of Ethiopian personnel, and the poor institutional capability of the Ethiopian experts in ministries dealing with Chinese firms. He argues that the losers are the small-scale clothing and footwear producers.
  885.  
  886. Find this resource:
  887.  
  888.  
  889. Kragelund, P. “Chinese Drivers for African Development? The Effects of Chinese Investments in Zambia.” In Africa in China’s Global Strategy. Edited by M. Kitissou, 162–181. London: Adonis and Abbey, 2007.
  890.  
  891. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  892.  
  893. Kragelund studies to what extent Chinese investments in Zambia have a positive effect. Are they real drivers for development?
  894.  
  895. Find this resource:
  896.  
  897.  
  898. Kragelund, P. “Part of the Disease or Part of the Cure? Chinese Investments in the Zambian Mining and Construction Sectors.” European Journal of Development Research 21.4 (2009): 644–661.
  899.  
  900. DOI: 10.1057/ejdr.2009.23Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  901.  
  902. Kragelund argues that Chinese investments in these two sectors resemble other foreign investments, but the sheer size and growth of the investments trigger local reactions.
  903.  
  904. Find this resource:
  905.  
  906.  
  907. Mashindano, O., D. Ngowi, and F. Ringo. Effects of Counterfeit Goods on the Tanzanian Economy: The Case of Manufacturing Sector. Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania: Economic and Social Research Foundation, 2008.
  908.  
  909. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  910.  
  911. The authors asked Chinese managers why they invested in Tanzania and how these investments compared to Chinese investments in neighboring countries. They studied the ownership structure of Chinese companies, their importance and motives for being in Tanzania, the role of Chinese employees, and training of local workers. One of the effects of Chinese trade relations is the competitive effect, which is a significant threat to Tanzanian producers and exporters.
  912.  
  913. Find this resource:
  914.  
  915.  
  916. Men, T. “Place-based and Place-bound Realities: A Chinese Firm’s Embeddedness in Tanzania.” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 43.1 (2014): 103–138.
  917.  
  918. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  919.  
  920. The author presents a single case study of how one Chinese firm operates in Dar es Salaam. The findings show the firm’s intention to localize its business strategies and engage a local labor force, but similarly reveals the inherent cultural, behavioral, and social norms of Chinese management, which may create organizational challenges and power differentials in the workplace.
  921.  
  922. Find this resource:
  923.  
  924.  
  925. Moshi, H. P. B, and J. M. Mtui. “Scoping Studies on China–Africa Economic Relations: The Case of Tanzania.” Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: Economic Research Bureau, 2008.
  926.  
  927. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  928.  
  929. The composition of trade between China and Tanzania has changed. It averaged only 2 percent of the total exports between 1996 and 2002, a small amount compared to the main trading partners—the United Kingdom (39 percent), India (35 percent), Germany (20 percent), and South Africa (4 percent). However, the exports to China increased to an average of 11 percent during the 2003–2006 period, whereas exports with Germany and India dropped to 8 percent and 11 percent, respectively.
  930.  
  931. Find this resource:
  932.  
  933.  
  934. Southern Africa: Namibia, South Africa, and Mauritius
  935. The Southern Africa region is represented by three interesting cases: South Africa as the more developed country, Namibia as a resource-rich country, and Mauritius as a bridge between Asia and Africa. Ancharaz 2009 studies how Chinese investments in manufacturing affect the small island economy of Mauritius. The studies of Chinese traders in Namibia by Dobler 2009 were very critical about the traders’ behavior, viewing them as looking for short-term gains and preferring to import from China rather than setting up local production units. Jauch and Sakaria 2009 concludes that Namibia is not really benefiting from the Chinese investments. In addition, Park 2009 found that Chinese business owners in South Africa often provide low-quality goods.
  936.  
  937. Ancharaz, V. “David v. Goliath: Mauritius Facing Up to China.” European Journal of Development Research 21.4 (2009): 622–643.
  938.  
  939. DOI: 10.1057/ejdr.2009.26Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  940.  
  941. Mauritius, with no exploitable natural resources, is facing acute Chinese competition in its traditional markets. Ancharaz shows that Chinese aid to finance construction and infrastructure projects has been a welcome relief, even when it has been tied to the use of Chinese labor and inputs. He notes that China is using Mauritius strategically as a platform to penetrate the African market.
  942.  
  943. Find this resource:
  944.  
  945.  
  946. Dobler, G. “Chinese Shops and the Formation of a Chinese Expatriate Community in Namibia.” The China Quarterly 199 (2009): 707–727.
  947.  
  948. DOI: 10.1017/S0305741009990178Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  949.  
  950. Chinese business owners only seek short-term gains to send back to China, according to the author. Chinese traders claim that they provide employment opportunities for residents and that, unlike their Namibian colleagues, they pay the local taxes. Dobler finds that it is often cheaper for Chinese companies to import from China than to establish a local production unit. However, Chinese business owners are also concerned about the protection of their interests.
  951.  
  952. Find this resource:
  953.  
  954.  
  955. Jauch, H., and I. Sakaria. “Chinese Investments in Namibia.” In Chinese Investments in Africa: A Labor Perspective. Edited by A. Y. Baah and H. Jauch, 203–237. Accra, Ghana: Africa Labour Research Network, 2009.
  956.  
  957. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  958.  
  959. The authors claim that Chinese small traders provide little benefit to Namibia’s overall development. This has led to widespread criticism of Chinese traders in the Namibian media.
  960.  
  961. Find this resource:
  962.  
  963.  
  964. Park, Y. J. “Chinese Enclave Communities and Their Impact on South African Society.” In Strengthening the Civil Society Perspective: China’s African Impact. Edited by S. Marks, 113–127. Cape Town: Fahamu, 2009.
  965.  
  966. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  967.  
  968. The author notes that Chinese traders in South Africa are perceived to provide low-quality goods and the people often complain about this.
  969.  
  970. Find this resource:
  971.  
  972.  
  973. Sectorial Experiences
  974. The role of China is clear in certain economic sectors, such as agriculture (Villoria 2009), building roads or other infrastructure (General Directorate for the Treasury and Economic Policy 2007; Foster, et al. 2008; and Goldstein 2007), textiles (Van Dijk 2009), and shoes (Tegegne 2006), whereas others deal with the influence of China on good governance (Gill, et al. 2007), innovation and climate change issues (Schmitz and Messner 2008), or the financial sector (Sanya 2013).
  975.  
  976. Foster, V., W. Butterfield, C. Chen, and N. Pushak. “Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa.” Trends and Policy Options 5. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008.
  977.  
  978. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  979.  
  980. Foster and colleagues focus on the role of China as an infrastructure financier for sub-Saharan Africa. The authors point to the importance of different sources of finance for African countries and the original instruments used by China, such as resource-backed loans and tied aid.
  981.  
  982. Find this resource:
  983.  
  984.  
  985. General Directorate for the Treasury and Economic Policy. Pénétration du marché mondial du BTP par les entreprises Chinoise. Ministry for the Economy and Finance, Paris, March 2007.
  986.  
  987. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  988.  
  989. According to this DGPTE study, Chinese enterprises control over half of the African market for major construction and civil engineering projects.
  990.  
  991. Find this resource:
  992.  
  993.  
  994. Gill, B., C. Huang, and J. S. Morrisson. “Assessing China’s Growing Influence in Africa.” China Security 3.3 (Summer 2007): 3–21.
  995.  
  996. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  997.  
  998. The tripling of US assistance to Africa in public health, economic development, good governance, the substantial enlargement of military commitment since 9/11, and the increasing volume of two-way trade in the private sector, concentrated in the energy field, reflect rising US interests in Africa. However, China and the United States have been absorbed in their separate, respective spheres, enlarging their presence in Africa with little systematic or substantive reference to each other.
  999.  
  1000. Find this resource:
  1001.  
  1002.  
  1003. Goldstein, A. “Chinese Contractors in Africa: Insight from a Survey.” Paper presented at the L’Afrique dans le Commerce Mondial meeting, 19 September 2007. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2007.
  1004.  
  1005. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  1006.  
  1007. Goldstein organized a survey among Chinese construction firms in Africa. The results show that 40 percent of the contracts executed by these enterprises are financed from Chinese funds. According to MOFCOM data, these contracts were worth a total of 6 billion USD in 2005, which means that 2.4 billion USD worth was funded by China.
  1008.  
  1009. Find this resource:
  1010.  
  1011.  
  1012. Sanya, Samuel. “Banks Cash in on China–Uganda Trade.” New Vision 15 January 2013.
  1013.  
  1014. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  1015.  
  1016. The author argues that African banks working together with their Chinese counterparts to lower the trade costs and ease access to the renminbi (RMB) will further facilitate the imports from China by African nationals.
  1017.  
  1018. Find this resource:
  1019.  
  1020.  
  1021. Schmitz, H., and D. Messner, eds. Poor and Powerful: The Rise of China and India and the Implications for Europe. Discussion paper 13/2008. Bonn, Germany: German Development Institute, 2008.
  1022.  
  1023. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  1024.  
  1025. The book focuses on China and India as innovation powers and their role in finding solutions to global climate change. In both of these fields, Europe needs to address issues of conflict and competition but also to find ways of working together with China and India. China buys wood in Congo-Brazzaville and iron ore in South Africa because its manufacturing activities require them, but it exports the results through different global value chains.
  1026.  
  1027. Find this resource:
  1028.  
  1029.  
  1030. Tegegne, G. E. “Asian Imports and Coping Strategies of Medium, Small and Micro Firms: The Case of Footwear Sector in Ethiopia.” Contribution to the “Rapid Industrialization of China and India: Domestic and International Consequences” Workshop. EADI Working Group on Industrial Development in the Third World, with the University of Antwerp, March 31–April 1, 2006.
  1031.  
  1032. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  1033.  
  1034. Tegegne analyzes the competition from Chinese shoes and its devastating effect on the Ethiopian shoe industry. He shows, however, that the Ethiopian factories recaptured part of the market after restructuring. Now the Chinese are producing shoes in Ethiopia for export to Europe and the United States.
  1035.  
  1036. Find this resource:
  1037.  
  1038.  
  1039. Van Dijk, M. P. “The Impact of the Chinese in Other African Countries and Sectors.” In The New Presence of China in Africa. Edited by M. P. van Dijk, 157–177. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009.
  1040.  
  1041. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  1042.  
  1043. The chapter 8 brings together the experiences with China’s presence in five African countries and goes into some detail for sectors in which Chinese investors are active. The presence of China in Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe is discussed, and the experiences in agriculture, textiles, and the financial, construction, and mining sectors are analyzed.
  1044.  
  1045. Find this resource:
  1046.  
  1047.  
  1048. Villoria, N. “China’s Growth and the Agricultural Exports of Sub-Saharan Southern Africa.” European Journal of Development Research 21.4 (2009): 531–550.
  1049.  
  1050. DOI: 10.1057/ejdr.2009.27Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  1051.  
  1052. The author explores whether China’s growth has stimulated agricultural exports in selected countries in Southern Africa. It finds that, although China has moderately increased agricultural prices, exports of agricultural products from these countries have not seemed to benefit from these price increases.
  1053.  
  1054. Find this resource:
  1055.  
  1056.  
  1057. African Voices
  1058. It is sometimes noted that African countries have no reaction to the Chinese penetration of their economies, hence the need to consult some African voices. The Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch is monitoring the Chinese engagement with Africa (Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch 2006). Some authors, such as Moyo 2012, Tegegne 2006, and Uche 2009, are quite positive about China’s actions, whereas others, such as Gueye 2006, Ndjio 2009, and Sautman and Hairong 2016 are more critical about China’s activities on the continent.
  1059.  
  1060. Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch. China’s Interest and Activity in Africa’s Construction and Infrastructure Sectors. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch, 2006.
  1061.  
  1062. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  1063.  
  1064. The Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch was one of the first research institutes to study systematically the issues related to China’s new presence. In the beginning, most attention went to the dominant role of China in the construction sector, in particular, the building of infrastructure.
  1065.  
  1066. Find this resource:
  1067.  
  1068.  
  1069. Gueye, M. “Why Africa Considers China an Opportunity.” Third World Resurgence 196 (2006): 9.
  1070.  
  1071. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  1072.  
  1073. Many Africans consider China’s presence an opportunity to diminish the dependence on Europe and the United States. The country provides new opportunities for aid and trade and does not impose the same conditions as the Western countries.
  1074.  
  1075. Find this resource:
  1076.  
  1077.  
  1078. Moyo, D. Winner Take All. London: Penguin, 2012.
  1079.  
  1080. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  1081.  
  1082. The Chinese have a coordinated strategy to conquer Africa and have been very successful in the early 21st century, according to Moyo.
  1083.  
  1084. Find this resource:
  1085.  
  1086.  
  1087. Ndjio, B. “‘Shanghai Beauties’ and African Desires: Migration, Trade and Chinese Prostitution in Cameroon.” European Journal of Development Research 21.4 (2009): 606–621.
  1088.  
  1089. DOI: 10.1057/ejdr.2009.31Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  1090.  
  1091. Ndjio discusses the ambivalent attitude of local men toward Chinese migrant sex workers. For Cameroonians, these Chinese migrants are part of the cheap and depreciated commodities that China is exporting to Cameroon through its well-organized trade networks, controlled by Chinese traders from overseas. These Asian sex workers are perceived as cheap bodies and junk sex, which reflects the general perception of China-sourced goods at large.
  1092.  
  1093. Find this resource:
  1094.  
  1095.  
  1096. Sautman, B., and Yan Hairong. “The Discourse of Racialization of Labour and Chinese Enterprises in Africa.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 39.12 (2016): 2149–2168.
  1097.  
  1098. DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2016.1139156Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  1099.  
  1100. A “race” and labor conjunction has been theorized based on Global North investment in the Global South. Chinese enterprises in Africa allowed the authors to analyze it in a South–South setting. Contrary to dominant discourses, Chinese employers are not the sole racializers of the African–Chinese interface. Chinese and Africans, employers and employees, as well as Western actors, co-constitute racialization, but South–South racializations of labor markedly differ from the North–South exemplar.
  1101.  
  1102. Find this resource:
  1103.  
  1104.  
  1105. Tegegne, W. “Angel or Devil? The Re-Rise of China and Its Impact on Africa.” Capital 4.4 (2006): 1–2.
  1106.  
  1107. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  1108.  
  1109. The Chinese approach to economic development is often presented as a political and economic alternative. Tegegne writes about what he calls the “re-rise of China” and its impact on Africa. He continues that China is a new alternative and that the nature of China’s engagement appears to be pure business. The approach is straightforward with no strings attached, no ideological tint, and no fuss about internal affairs of the countries concerned.
  1110.  
  1111. Find this resource:
  1112.  
  1113.  
  1114. Uche, C. “Trade and Industrial Policy in Africa: The Impact of China’s Growing Influence in the Region.” Paper presented at the 2009 Asia–Pacific Economic and History Conference, Tokyo, February 2009.
  1115.  
  1116. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  1117.  
  1118. The author welcomes greater trade between China and Africa but, at the same time, states that African countries need to develop clearly defined industrialization programs.
  1119.  
  1120. Find this resource:
  1121.  
  1122.  
  1123. Chinese Voices and International Fora (FOCAC)
  1124. The foundations for China’s collaboration with Africa were laid already in 1964, during a visit of the then–prime minister Premier Zhou Enlai to eleven African countries. He delivered a speech in Accra where he formulated the “eight principles” for Chinese aid: equality between partners, mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty, the use of grants or zero-interest loans and easy rescheduling, emphasis on building the self-reliance of the beneficiary, and respect for obligations. China’s strategic partnership with Africa took shape during the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit in November 2006 in Beijing (Forum on China–Africa Cooperation 2006). In the 2006 China Entrepreneurship Forum, two documents were adopted by the participants: The “Beijing Declaration” as well as the “Action Plan, 2007–2008.” The Chinese strategy in Africa is outlined in the documents of the Chinese government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China 2007 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China 2008). The FOCAC meetings are held every two years, and Eom, et al. 2016 is an enthusiastic report on the meeting held in 2015. Hofmann, et al. 2007 and Niu 2014 are more critical, whereas Hamam and Toomel 2010 argues that Africa needs to prepare its own strategy. Anshan, et al. 2012 argues that the functioning of the forum needs to be improved.
  1125.  
  1126. Anshan, L., L. Haifang, P. Huaqiong, Z. Aiping, and H. Wenping. FOCAC Twelve Years Later: Achievements, Challenges and the Way Forward. Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2012.
  1127.  
  1128. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  1129.  
  1130. The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is a biannual event and a platform to promote mutually beneficial South–South cooperation between China and Africa. In the decade from 2000 to 2010, FOCAC achieved a deepening of China–Africa relations; however, the current arrangement needs to be improved going forward by expanding space for private sector and civil society participation.
  1131.  
  1132. Find this resource:
  1133.  
  1134.  
  1135. Eom, J., J. Hwang, Y. Xia, and D. Brautigam. Looking Back and Moving Forward: An Analysis of China–Africa Economic Trends and the Outcomes of the 2015 Forum on China–Africa Cooperation. Policy Brief 9. Washington, DC: SAIS China–Africa Research Initiative, Johns Hopkins University, 2016.
  1136.  
  1137. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  1138.  
  1139. In December 2015, a FOCAC meeting was held in Johannesburg. The authors situate China’s evolving economic relations with Africa. This news brief discusses China–Africa trade, China–Africa loan finance, Chinese FDI in Africa, and the highlights of the 2015 FOCAC summit.
  1140.  
  1141. Find this resource:
  1142.  
  1143.  
  1144. Forum on China–Africa Cooperation. “Beijing Action Plan 2007–2009,” Beijing, 3–5 November 2006. Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
  1145.  
  1146. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  1147.  
  1148. The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is a biannual event and a platform to discuss collaboration between China and African governments. The summit during the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation in 2006 strengthened the ties between the government of China and the African nations that were represented. Participants consolidated plans to continue cooperating in all areas of trade and development. Media attention focused on the economic and political consequences of this new partnership. Annual conferences with African leaders were announced at the summit.
  1149.  
  1150. Find this resource:
  1151.  
  1152.  
  1153. Hamam, D., and K. Toomel. “Africa Needs a Strategy for ‘Emerging Partners.’” Africa Renewal 24.4 (December 2010): 23.
  1154.  
  1155. DOI: 10.18356/941d5379-enSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  1156.  
  1157. Does China export cheap products, or are its exports satisfying basic needs in Africa? The quality of its products is sometimes poor, and Chinese products are cheap. They benefit African consumers; however, local manufacturers targeting national markets have been hurt by competitive imports from emerging economies. In some countries, the industry has organized a counter-initiative. In Ethiopia, for example, the shoe industry has partially recovered (see Tegegne 2006, cited under Sectorial Experiences).
  1158.  
  1159. Find this resource:
  1160.  
  1161.  
  1162. Hofmann, K., J. Kretz, M. Roll, and S. Sperling. “Contrasting Perceptions: Chinese, African, and European Perspectives on the China–Africa Summit.” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 2 (2007): 75–90.
  1163.  
  1164. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  1165.  
  1166. The “Beijing Declaration” as well as the “Action Plan 2007–2008” consisted of promises from the Chinese side for substantial investments and assistance as well as credit for 3 billion USD, preferential credit for 2 billion USD, and the doubling of Chinese development aid by 2009. It was agreed to establish a Chinese–African Chamber of Trade; in addition, investment agreements were established with eleven African states.
  1167.  
  1168. Find this resource:
  1169.  
  1170.  
  1171. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China. The Beijing Action Plan (2007–2009). Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2007.
  1172.  
  1173. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  1174.  
  1175. This successor of the Addis Ababa Plan (2004–2006), builds on the Africa Policy, but the Action Plan includes several concrete initiatives. Although the China–Africa policy document is very vague on how the activities are to be financed, who will initiate them, and how they are coordinated, it hints at the importance China currently gives Africa in economic and political terms.
  1176.  
  1177. Find this resource:
  1178.  
  1179.  
  1180. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China. China’s African Policy. Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2008.
  1181.  
  1182. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  1183.  
  1184. China’s principles when dealing with African countries are “sincerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and common development.” This policy note focuses on “harmonious development and co-operation in economic, political, cultural, and financial domains.” It was the background document for the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation. It shows a systematic approach to improving relations with African countries. The main element is that the China–Africa friendship is embedded in a long history of interchange.
  1185.  
  1186. Find this resource:
  1187.  
  1188.  
  1189. Niu Z. “China’s Development and Its Aid Presence in Africa: A Critical Reflection from the Perspective of Development Anthropology.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 51.2 (September 2014): 199–221.
  1190.  
  1191. DOI: 10.1177/0021909614545699Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  1192.  
  1193. China’s conceptualization of development has drawn much from Western development discourse but also evolved with its own features. This concept follows with China’s foreign assistance or aid presence in Africa, which, the author holds, is imprinted with China’s development practice concepts and is illustrated by a case of Chinese development aid in Ethiopia. The article eventually discusses the would-be roles of Chinese anthropologists, who have been surprisingly absent in the early 21st century.
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