Response to rsborn (re: Moral Landscape)

Please, allow me an opportunity to respond as your opponent.

I view the axiomatic foundations of scientific inquiry as Ethical Choices, that is, choices made guided by and entirely within the domain of Ethics. To explain why, I will attempt to make clear what I take to be the definition of Ethics.

Ethics is the study of *how to live*. In contrast, Moral Ethics is the study of how to live *according to a framework for assigning the properties of **Good** and **Evil** to entities*. By making this contrast, I hope to illuminate my stance that Ethics is a larger field of study than Moral Ethics and that Moral Ethics is one of several subsets of Ethics inquiry.

I would like to further point out that there is a linguistic tripwire when discussing Ethics, and I hope to avoid terminological disputes by pointing it out so that we may keep clear of the trap. Epistemology being the study of knowledge, a line of inquiry regarding the nature knowledge can be said, unequivocally, to be an epistemological, or epistemic, inquiry. An equivocation exists when the topic changes to Ethics. By the above formulation, one would assume that a line of inquiry regarding methods of living might be considered an *ethical* inquiry. However, *ethical* has come to take on an additional normative meaning, as being opposed to unethical. There is no such thing as being unepistemological, excepting the cases where one is saying that the object described has nothing to do with epistemology. However, unethical carries judgment of the object as counter to the good life, and therefore, using ethical as a descriptor can be be very troubling. I will endeavor, therefore, as I hope you will, to make clear my meaning without relying too heavily on this descriptor.

The axioms underpinning scientific inquiry are very powerful axioms. They allow for efficient, precise, and meaningful methods of inquiry and these properties are reflected in the results of scientific inquiry; science has been a self-correcting system of exploration without peer in human history. Had the axioms been different, either more permissive or more restrictive regarding methods, domains, ideas, or argumentative forms, science may have suffered in its efficiency, precision, or effectiveness. However, we must remember that these are axioms. They are assumed to be true, without any argument for establish truth. Indeed, any formulation of why one of these axiom stands inevitably appeals to the results that they produce, not something inherent to the axiom itself or that which it describes.

It is this appeal to desirable results - precision, repeatability, self-correction, coherence - that makes the selection of these axioms an exercise in Ethics. These axioms represent the results of decisions about *how to act* within the domain of empirical inquiry, a subset of the total scope of human activity. When entertaining new axioms to add or existing axioms to remove from the foundations of scientific inquiry, the decision making process will always fall to a description of the results. If, for example, it was proposed that experiments need not be repeatable to be considered by the scientific community, the objection will certainly be that without repeatability the system would not be self-correcting. The imaginary proponent of this idea might then issue a challenge demanding to know why self-correction is so important as to disallow valuable (in his perspective) experimentation. As the argument continues it will necessarily hinge on the argument that self-correction is useful in the service of avoiding false beliefs therefore offering the greatest chance at an accurate assessment of the natural world. Should this agitator for change continue to argue, he will undoubtedly challenge why those things are desirable, perhaps even invoking Descartes or Hume to cast doubt on our ability to ever achieve such an assessment.

We've all seen this argument. We've all been agitated by someone who brings solipsism and strong skepticism into an argument which had previously been about some far more pragmatic concerns. But how should our hero respond against this solipsistic assault? What I have found is that the response is always the same: **axioms are choices in the servitude of values**. Why is self-correction in science a worthy goal, because it facilitates fewer false beliefs for shorter durations. Why is such a result desirable? Because false belief is to be avoided in favor of uncertainty. This is not a truth, it is a statement of value. It is a guidepost on the plains of Ethics. Each of the axioms underpinning scientific inquiry are such guideposts. They are stated values, decisions about *how to live*, not as a weight to be pushed down upon others but as a mantle to be taken up by all those so inclined.

I hope it has started to become clear how your opponent may be able to respond to your argument. Simply put, such axioms as Harris is proposing must be stated without appealing to some objective reality but instead by appealing to the desirability of results. In fact, this is how the axioms may even be tested: by stating clearly the values to be promoted, it can be determined which axioms must effectively cultivate results in accordance with those values. An argument that presents an alternative set of axioms regarding the values can be met with arguments of ethics. If maximizing a quantity is not the goal, but instead some more esoteric is proposed, your opponent can meet you with the challenge the maximizing a quantity is actually achievable whereas your esoteric alternative is either nor achievable or perhaps even that we cannot know when we have achieved it and therefore is a poor guidepost on the open field of Ethics. Your opponent may state that we must make axiomatic choices in accordance with our values in such a way that makes achievable a reality imbued with our values, much like science has made achievable a reality that we understand better. If these axiomatic choices leave behind the old gods and spectres that people cling tirelessly to, so be it; the old gods have ceased to be valuable in the furtherance of our goals.

I have no doubt that an opponent such as Harris would be willing to change any of the particulars of the axioms of an Sciencia Ethica, proposing that by arguing about the particular quantifiable system we have already accepted that this base premises are at least possible and that we should continue to refine our arguments until we can arrive at axioms that support acting on a particular set of values.

That the epistemic axioms of science don't dictate which theories are correct is not analogous to the claim that Harris's axioms have dictated with ethical theories are correct. The epistemic axioms of science do, in fact, decide which theories are allowed to be permitted into the arena and at which point they should be discarded, much as Harris's axioms do to the ethical discussion. Harris's attempt seems to be an attempt replicate the move from metaphyics to science in the field of Ethics, perhaps to a practice of Applied Ethics. In this way, science need not empirically demonstrate that maximizing well-being is valuable, in much the same way science does not need to justify that avoiding false belief is valuable. Stating that science cannot empirically support either of Harris's axioms is equivalent to saying science cannot empirically support the value of logical argument. These two ideas are given and the attack misses its mark.

Consider a conversation in the distant past that represents the process of deciding that presuming an external world is a good axiom for science. One might say that we need an axiom that posits an external world full of objects made up of the 4 elements and energized by the movements of the first mover. One opponent may counter that we are still debating whether or not an external world even exists. Another may counter that the 4 elements are up for debate. A third may argue that the first mover is not a certainty. In this conversation, the first opponent has missed the boat; he is firmly entrenched in the field of metaphysics and has not yet perceived the value such an axiom would bring to civilization as it enables empirical inquiry to proceed more efficiently. The other 2 opponents, though, have not argued that such an axiom should not exist but that the axiom as proposed is too specific. At this point, the proponent of the axiom and the last 2 opponents are now participants in the process of establishing the axiom through debate. What will eventually happen is that each aspect of the axiom, each consequence, will be considered, debated, and the most powerful, least restrictive formulation of the axiom will be adopted by the 3 and promoted to others. As others begin adopting the axiom in their lines of inquiry, more and more refinement will occur, additional axioms will be added in the furtherance of shared values, and science will be born.

By arguing that the axioms are too specific and exclude powerfully viable alternatives you have entered in Harris's project to discover what the content of said axioms ought to be in the promotion of shared values. That such axioms may exist is an implicit conclusion and now it's just the work of hammering out the details.

Ergo, I do not accept that your argument has successfully defended the opposite stance of the thesis "science can determine objective [truths in the field of Ethics]". Your argument seems to tacitly agree with the core premise of the thesis and instead argues against the particular implementation chosen by Harris.

As a cynic, I propose this is precisely why you were chosen to be Harris's debate partner. Unlike someone arguing that the natural world is still an open topic, by arguing about the details you have demonstrated that you are willing to be convinced that science *can* determine objective truths in the field of Ethics but that you are strongly opposed to the current formulation of the axioms underpinning such determination. This makes you a valuable contributor to the conversation and will aid in Harris's attempts to refine the axioms he is proposing to further his goal of moving into an empirically-backed field of Applied Ethics.

If you read this far, I thank you for your time and for your contribution to this forum. I wish you great pleasure and challenge in your debate with Harris and look forward to reading some of it whenever it is published.