4chanWittgenstein On Certainty meeting 3

11:02 AM <•Chadtech> Here is the agenda I worked out last night:
11:02 AM <Pooka> back
11:02 AM <•Chadtech> Item 0: 319
11:02 AM <•Chadtech> Item 1: 347 - 352
11:02 AM <•Chadtech> Item 2: 360+ Knowledge as a decision
11:02 AM <•Chadtech> Item 3: 383 : Can ‘meaning’ be dreamt?
11:02 AM <•Chadtech> Item 4: 392 and 253
11:02 AM <•Chadtech> Any other additions?w
11:02 AM <Pooka> nope
11:03 AM <Pooka> thomas said he'd be late
11:03 AM <Pooka> (im eating dinner atm, so ill be slow to reply first part of this as well)
11:03 AM <jack-frost> I like it.
11:03 AM <•Chadtech> Okay. I guess we could take it kind of slow at first.
11:04 AM <•Chadtech> Item 0 then, section 319.
11:04 AM <•Chadtech> 319. But wouldn't one have to say then, that there is no sharp boundary between propositions of logic and empirical proposi- tions? The lack of sharpness is that of the boundary between rde and empirical proposition.
11:04 AM <•Chadtech> between the rule***
11:04 AM <Pooka> my reason for wanting to look at 319 was simply that i didn't really understand it. at all.
11:04 AM <•Chadtech> Oops, 'boundary between rule***'
11:05 AM <jack-frost> same Pooka
11:05 AM <•Chadtech> I liked looking back on this one, it got me thinking. Is there something in particular you guys dont get about this one?
11:05 AM <•Chadtech> Is it the rule part?
11:06 AM <jack-frost> I was of the understanding that logic was not empirical and a priori (but that has more to do with the tractatus which W isn't using for anything here).
11:06 AM <jack-frost> Am I just completely off base?
11:07 AM <Pooka> is it just saying that there is a gredation of classification, rather than an absolute cut off for empirical vs logical?
11:07 AM <•Chadtech> Jack I dont think you are off base.
11:07 AM <Pooka> due to W.'s ideas about rules and maths and proof
11:08 AM <•Chadtech> No, I got the impression that the gredation is between the empirical proposition and a rule.
11:08 AM <jack-frost> That sounds like it. I mean an example of gray areas could be the a posteriori necessity stuff Kripke talks about. The rules of logic don't completely help you out in cases like that.
11:09 AM <Pooka> ah yes chadtech, it  says it right there, oops
11:09 AM <•Chadtech> Hmm
11:10 AM <•Chadtech> But now I dont know. Is that really acceptable to bring in rules as a distinct object?
11:10 AM <jack-frost> So we  get the fuzziness because we cannot fully distinguish between an investigation and following rules? The rules don't lead to discoveries, they just provide a guideline?
11:10 AM <•Chadtech> Because Jack just used the term 'rules of logic' and that seemed like a fairly normal use of the word 'rules'.
11:12 AM <•Chadtech> So the other day, in our discussion with Thomas, I said there is no distinct difference between 'reason' and 'cause'. And if reason is just the logical species of the two. Perhaps there doesnt need to be a sharp distinction between logic and rule.
11:12 AM <•Chadtech> In a sense, this blurriness is between logic and rule, and empirical proposition and rule, but isnt transative between the two.
11:14 AM <•Chadtech> Should we move on? Anything else to say on item zero?
11:15 AM <jack-frost> I don't get it, but rule-following has always been a huge obstacle for me.
11:15 AM <jack-frost> We can move on I suppose. Maybe come back later if we feel up to it.
11:15 AM <•Chadtech> Im really not sure what to think about Wittgenstein's use of the word 'rule' anymore. I want to say its analytically 'that which guides our actions'. But I could assign that definition to many other philosophical terms.
11:16 AM <Pooka> im not wholly set on it either, but happy to move on to the sodding tree section
11:16 AM <•Chadtech> Okay.
11:16 AM <•Chadtech> Item 1 then. Sections 347 - 352
11:16 AM <Pooka> main thing i got from this was context of use
11:17 AM <Pooka> and phrases being used in a specific use, vs analysed in the abstract
11:18 AM <jack-frost> Sounds right. The sentences all have a definite meaning and definition, but without context you cannot say you have a full definition.
11:18 AM <jack-frost> Outside analysis only gives syntax (if that makes sense, it's not the word I'm looking for, but hopefully you get the idea).
11:18 AM <•Chadtech> So I guess before we get into meaning. Wittgenstein says multiple times in various books that 'meaning is use'. I have found it generally helpful (even outside of reaidng Wittgenstein) to replace the word 'meaning' with 'use' when I encounter it.
11:19 AM <Pooka> yes
11:20 AM <jack-frost> So in this case would there just be an infinite number of definitions because of the infinite potential contexts/language games? Even given a context, we cannot say we have any definition at all it seems.
11:21 AM <Pooka> maybe, but im not sure that was the point for these sections
11:21 AM <Pooka> oh one specific bit in this section as well
11:21 AM <Pooka> end of 349
11:21 AM <Pooka> 'For how a sentence is meant can be expressed by an expansion of it and may therefore be made part of it.'
11:22 AM <Pooka> made sense up to 'and may therefore be made part of it'
11:22 AM <Pooka> don't 'get'  the end part there
11:22 AM <•Chadtech> Jack I think I see what you mean in your syntax comment. I would think that maybe this sentence, as in, the ink words on a page, just has no use. Or not use is evident.
11:23 AM <•Chadtech> Like, a very bizarre kitchen utensil that you have no use for.
11:23 AM <•Chadtech> Yeah Pooka, I dont understand that bit either.
11:23 AM <jack-frost> I think it has something to do with intention being part of the context. You can be in the right situation and say the right words, but you have to intend the words to be for that context.
11:23 AM → tapemix joined (~tape@179.53.41.172)
11:24 AM <Pooka> hi
11:24 AM <•Chadtech> Hello.
11:24 AM <tapemix> hi
11:24 AM <Pooka> We're were just talking about Sections 347 - 352
11:24 AM <Pooka> *we were
11:24 AM <tapemix> I actually only came to watch :x
11:24 AM <•Chadtech> Why would you have to intend the words to be for that context jack?
11:25 AM <jack-frost> I'm trying to think of an example right now.
11:26 AM <•Chadtech> I think meaning is independent of intention.
11:26 AM <Pooka> but i think here he is saying some things have a strange or doubtful meaning outside of context or intention
11:26 AM <Pooka> (he -> Witt.)
11:26 AM <jack-frost> Like saying "I hate Napolean" works if you're a Russian in 1805 and it works if I have a shitty cat named Napolean. If my cat knocks over my soda but I say it with the politcal nonsense of 1805 is makes no sense.
11:26 AM <jack-frost> Horrible example and I feel stupid for saying it.
11:27 AM <Pooka> see §348
11:27 AM <Pooka> 'meaning is not determined by the situation, yet stands in need of such determination'
11:28 AM <Pooka> (brb)
11:28 AM <•Chadtech> What would satisfy this need for determination?
11:28 AM <•Chadtech> Wittgenstien also talked about learning and practice being a source of knowledge. I liked that bit.
11:28 AM <•Chadtech> Perhaps practice determines.
11:29 AM <jack-frost> That sentence seems contradictory to me. Is W making more of an epistemological argument? There is the meaning, but we need the situation to know the meaning?
11:29 AM <Pooka> (bk)
11:30 AM <Pooka> i took it to mean, maybe:
11:30 AM <Pooka> hmm
11:30 AM <Pooka> er
11:30 AM <•Chadtech> Whats contradictory jack?
11:31 AM <•Chadtech> There is a meaning, and its not determined by the situation.
11:31 AM <•Chadtech> However, it does need to be determined.
11:31 AM <jack-frost> It's not determined but it needs it. I might be conflating need and determined as too similar in meaning.
11:31 AM <•Chadtech> Perhaps... the need is due to the situation.
11:31 AM <Pooka> yes, but at the same time they  have 'meaning only in certain contexts
11:32 AM <Pooka> so, he says the words in 'i am here' only has meaning in certain contexts, but then that meaning is not detmined by the context … but still needs such determination
11:32 AM <jack-frost> So what I'm seeing it as based on your comment chad is that it isn't determined by the situation, we just use the situation to determine it.
11:33 AM <Pooka> oh that makes more sense
11:33 AM <•Chadtech> it might help to think about word use in various degrees of broadness. For example I think it would be just as proper to say the meaning of 'Jack' is to refer, or the use could be to refer to jack
11:33 AM <•Chadtech> So whats the meaning of 'here'?
11:34 AM <•Chadtech> Er, I dont know.
11:34 AM <•Chadtech> So yeah, we have some general technical sense of 'I', 'am', and 'here'.
11:34 AM <•Chadtech> And we have an ambiguous need in specific contexts.
11:35 AM <•Chadtech> Do you think I am being too forgiving to Wittgenstein?
11:35 AM <•Chadtech> I am starting to think so.
11:35 AM <jack-frost> In what way?
11:36 AM <Pooka> yes, the words I am here have some general technical sense
11:36 AM <•Chadtech> Well by trying to come up with some explaination for what Wittgenstein said.
11:36 AM <Pooka> but as a combined phrases there are situations where they are meaningless
11:36 AM <•Chadtech> Anyway I find it to be an interesting subject. Because I have never heard anyone talk about degrees of meaning. Its probably a silly thing to investigate, but I am impressed that I have never heard anyone investigate it.
11:37 AM <Pooka> partly because they are redundant (the person can see you anyway) and partly because there is nothing in that situation to give them determination
11:37 AM <Pooka> their meaning is not being determined by the situation, but needs to be (because meaning is use)
11:38 AM <•Chadtech> Is there anything about the context that determines the usefulness of the words?
11:38 AM <•Chadtech> Here is an analogy, is there anything '1', about an object that is counted?
11:39 AM <Pooka> in answer to the first question i think yes, as to the second im not sure the analogy matches
11:39 AM <Pooka> looking back at what we read so far
11:39 AM <Pooka> we had lots of examples where if we were to doubt it (some specific fact or proposition), we would not even know what it meant to doubt it
11:40 AM <•Chadtech> Really?
11:40 AM <•Chadtech> Do you have an example?
11:40 AM <Pooka> lemme see if i can search the pdf
11:41 AM <jack-frost> I'm not following the 1 analogy but it looks like the determination of usefulness is if it accomplishes something. 349 seems to lend support to this: argument as to the type of tree etc.
11:41 AM <Pooka> §24
11:41 AM <•Chadtech> We count objects for practical reasons. And the objects designation in the process of counting is a result of that use.
11:41 AM <•Chadtech> Its not inherent in the object counted.
11:42 AM <•Chadtech> The same could be said of 'here' and 'I'. And that use crosses between use-cases.
11:42 AM <jack-frost> Oh ok. That fits with how I was interpretating the section. It accomplishes something, in the number case, we remember an amount the object is part of.
11:45 AM <•Chadtech> Im not seeing the connection with section 24.
11:45 AM <•Chadtech> Though I find section 24 interesting.
11:45 AM <•Chadtech> I dont think Wittgenstein is implying that we do doubt it, given we dont know what it would mean to doubt it. Still though, I am not sure how that is related to context.
11:46 AM <Pooka> 24 was for exemplifying a specific part of my point, rather direct application to 348
11:46 AM <jack-frost> Outside of the idealist's context, the doubt makes no sense?
11:47 AM <Pooka> yes looking at it it's not a great example, i was just searching through for first thing that matched phrasing
11:47 AM <Pooka> id be happy to go back to 24 later though if people wanted to, after we go through agenda
11:47 AM <•Chadtech> Yeah, Im good with moving on; as interesting as it was.
11:48 AM <jack-frost> Yeah we can do that.
11:48 AM <Pooka> 383 is a really nice one anyway
11:49 AM <•Chadtech> Item 2 is sections 360+
11:49 AM <Pooka> oops sorry
11:49 AM <Pooka> was a bit too eager
11:49 AM <•Chadtech> Im stoked for section 383 as well.
11:49 AM <•Chadtech> haha.
11:49 AM <Pooka> ^^
11:49 AM <•Chadtech> Anyway, yeah sections 360+
11:50 AM <Pooka> ah yes these were nice ones as well
11:50 AM <•Chadtech> I had as a subheadline 'Knowledge as a decision'
11:50 AM <Pooka> yes
11:50 AM <•Chadtech> And that was based off a suggestion from Jack
11:50 AM <Pooka> or even, knowledge tested against a pre-existing decision
11:51 AM <Pooka> i have already decided x, so y must be see in context of that decision of what i count as knowledge and tested against that
11:51 AM <jack-frost> this was really weird to me. Like the things we do not doubt were a conscious decision.
11:51 AM <jack-frost> Oh! New knowledge makes more sense pooka. We decide how to build the building, we blindly assume the ground is there.
11:51 AM <Pooka> i saw these bits partly in terms of the whole 'riverbed' part of the first week
11:52 AM <Pooka> we've sort of made a decision about a part of the riverbed
11:53 AM <•Chadtech> Is 362 the first instance of 'decision'?
11:53 AM <•Chadtech> I really dont understand this decision business.
11:54 AM <Pooka> if i give my line of reasoning of decision from 362 in terms of 361, you tell me if it makes sense, or if im wrong?
11:54 AM <•Chadtech> In 368, is he saying the knowledge, or the exclaimation is a decision?
11:54 AM <jack-frost> Here's my understanding of it: we have our undoubtable propositions/knowledge and we use that as a backdrop to decide what future undetermined propositions will work in our system.
11:55 AM <•Chadtech> Aight pooka.
11:55 AM <Pooka> actaully 368 trips me up a bit, the last sentence of it anyway
11:56 AM <Pooka> ok this doesn't exactly match 361 actually, hmm, still:
11:56 AM <•Chadtech> Jack, my biggest concern is where we would be if we decoupled directions (decisions) and the backdrop of knowledge.
11:56 AM <•Chadtech> How could that be independent?
11:56 AM <Pooka> say i make a decision about if god exists
11:57 AM <Pooka> from that decision, i might then rule certain later possible pieces of knowledge as admissible or not
11:57 AM <Pooka> indeed, based on the decision i made, certain later things might just make no sense at all
11:57 AM <Pooka> as they conflict with the decision
11:58 AM <Pooka> 364 is nice
11:58 AM <•Chadtech> Do people really decide things like that though? If God exists? I suppose thats a fine use of the word 'decision', but there is a lot of baggage associated with decisions that seems inappropriate regarding propositions like 'God exists'.
11:58 AM <Pooka> if i KNOW this is my foot, would i ever be prepared to consider something that contradicts it?
11:59 AM <jack-frost> Independent? I don't quite see the issue. The backdrop can stand alone as it allows other things to stand, it doesn't require anything. We could decide some other proposition to stand on it or throw it away.
11:59 AM <Pooka> the contradiction might make no sense, i mean, i KNOW it is my foot, if i truly know it then anything contradiction that is instantly negated
12:00 PM <Pooka> actually, scrap my God example : /
12:00 PM <jack-frost> Going to the God thing though. This is where I get tripped up. I get deciding to believe in God, how would that be knowledge though?
12:00 PM <jack-frost> Oh. Works with feet as well I guess.
12:00 PM <Pooka> so keeping on feet
12:00 PM <•Chadtech> Pooka, perhaps in the face of this contradiction, a new game is developed. The proposition 'this is my foot' is not scraped, but abandoned, if that makes sense.
12:01 PM <Pooka> i have to decide if id ever accept something in opposition to the feet
12:01 PM <jack-frost> We just decide that certain propositions make no sense in this scenario. we could make a new language game, however.
12:01 PM <Pooka> i KNOW it is my foot. new evidence comes to light -- do i consider this? i must make a decision here, wether or not i even countenance the doubt
12:02 PM → thomas___ joined (3ef36e36@gateway/web/freenode/ip.62.243.110.54)
12:02 PM <•Chadtech> Hey Thomas.
12:03 PM <thomas___> Hello. How's it going? Sorry I've been busy
12:03 PM <Pooka> hi thomas, we are on 360--368ish
12:03 PM <•Chadtech> We are generally discussing if one can decide to adopt certain pieces of knowledge.
12:03 PM <thomas___> Is there anything I should know? Have you gotten any absolute divine knowledge so far?
12:04 PM <Pooka> yes
12:04 PM <•Chadtech> What Pooka said.
12:04 PM <Pooka> hitler did apparently die in berlin in 1945
12:04 PM <Pooka> so that's settled
12:04 PM <Pooka> ;p
12:05 PM <•Chadtech> If we decide whether... 'to handle' contradictions to God or out feet... is this decision random?
12:05 PM <•Chadtech> Certaintly is based off something. Then the question is what this basis is. Is it within the scope, or outside the scope, of this knowledge?
12:05 PM <Pooka> it might depend on the 'know' in question as well
12:05 PM <Pooka> so 366
12:05 PM <Pooka> 'i know' or 'i believe i know'
12:06 PM <Pooka> in the second i might be inclined to allow a doubt to be considered
12:06 PM <Pooka> oh sorry chad didn't read your second point before replying
12:06 PM <jack-frost> Wait! I think the first sentence of 368 offers a solution to this. "he will recognize no experience as proof...that is after all a decision."
12:06 PM <•Chadtech> Its all right.
12:07 PM <Pooka> agreed jack
12:07 PM <thomas___> I have something
12:07 PM <jack-frost> Were we going about this the wrong way? We take the foot as a given, without deciding anything, then we only decide what counts as evidence for/against.
12:07 PM <Pooka> yea, i think my initial line of thinking was wrong
12:08 PM <•Chadtech> At first glance, I was thinking that Wittgenstein was saying 'I believe I know' and 'I know' are synonymous.
12:08 PM <jack-frost> We don't decide knowledge, just what are  the justifications
12:08 PM <thomas___> Can I say something of 361? Sorry if I'm backtracking
12:08 PM <Pooka> please do
12:08 PM <•Chadtech> Jack Ill reply to you in a moment.
12:09 PM <jack-frost> Ok.
12:10 PM <thomas___> "It has been revealed to me by God that it is so ... if anything happened to conflict with this knowledge, I would regard *that* as deception". So, if something is learned by God, and you learn something else, this 'new' learning must be the deception, and not the first one (the teachings of God is divine, and so on)
12:11 PM <•Chadtech> Well I think when Wittgenstein says something is learned by God, he doesnt mean its been learned by a formal religious education or anything. More so that it had supernatural origin in our mind.
12:11 PM <thomas___> So, how do we go about this argument? If we find something that conflict with this God given belief, and it conflicts 'strongly' enough, i.e. God said I didn't have a hand, I clearly do, and the things God say CANNOT be untrue categorically, we can deduce that this is not the word of God.
12:11 PM <Pooka> also that it is an authority that cannot be questioned at all, in a religious context
12:11 PM <thomas___> Yes exactly, to both of you
12:12 PM <thomas___> The problem is then, isn't this clear indication that people cannot talk to God? Since the conflicts become so great.
12:13 PM <•Chadtech> What does that mean though? Is that just incidentally true, given that people avoid conflict?
12:13 PM <thomas___> i.e. I was told by God to circumsize my child. A lot of things come up that says circumsition is not beneficial and so on and that it might be immoral (see female circumsition in Africa).
12:13 PM <thomas___> I don't know.
12:14 PM <jack-frost> What would count as God given? How would it be known that it's God given? (dunno if this goes past your argument though)
12:14 PM <thomas___> My problem is, I accept that you say "God told me x", that then x is true. The question might be whether God ever 'tells' anyone anything. If things he says cannot be doubted, can they be meaningful at all? I.e. we cannot talk to God
12:15 PM <thomas___> Like someone saying that God told them to kill someone. This is an extreme person. A normal example could be that God told him to pray. The question is, did you really talk to God on equal terms? How did you understand 'him'?
12:15 PM <•Chadtech> So just prior to your arrival we were talking about meaning a bit. I shared that 'meaning' is almost always synonymous with 'use' in Wittgenstein's writing. Just in case you hadnt read that.
12:16 PM <thomas___> I'm not trying to bring religion down, but it seems to me as if there is some kind of way of telling of 'fake' religious people who claim all sorts of things here. For example, a Christian who studied the Bible might tell someone that clearly God didn't tell him homosexual marriages was wrong.
12:16 PM <thomas___> Meaning is use, yes. I just wanted to air some thoughts I have, we can continue with 368 now
12:16 PM <•Chadtech> Yeah, you cant argue with God.
12:17 PM <•Chadtech> Our relationship with God is not symmetrical.
12:17 PM <thomas___> Something must be able to be false to make sense (Popper?), saying 'Oh God told me' is nonsensical. Not from an atheist point of view but from a religious one, where you assume the existence of God.
12:19 PM <thomas___> My itch was the sentence "It has been revealed to me by God". The word of God is true, so what has been revealed is true, any other evidence is deception or likewise. Since 'any other evidence is deception' is nonsensical, we cannot have things revealed by God. Sorry to take up so much space.
12:19 PM <thomas___> Sorry guys this was beside Wittgenstein, please let's go back to what Jackfrost said
12:19 PM <•Chadtech> Yeah Jack, you mentioned 368.
12:20 PM <•Chadtech> I made a comment a bit ago. Namely that 'decision' might be a decision to exclaim.
12:20 PM <•Chadtech> Not a decision to believe.
12:20 PM <jack-frost> Oh yeah. It seemed to me that our only decisions are what counts as evidence one way or the other.
12:20 PM <•Chadtech> If it was a decision to exclaim, I think that takes some wind out of the question.
12:21 PM <•Chadtech> So is 'decision' a kind of proposition?
12:21 PM <jack-frost> I would say behavior. We act as if X could falsify Y and that Z cannot.
12:22 PM <jack-frost> Could we observe someone make a decision about evidence?
12:22 PM <•Chadtech> OH, is that what we are saying? Because 'decision' has two senses. One to refer to the set of options, and one to refer to a specfic option. You mean by decision the latter?
12:22 PM <jack-frost> Disregard that question. I worded my thought wrong.
12:23 PM <•Chadtech> I think you are on to something though.
12:23 PM <jack-frost> Yeah something like that.
12:23 PM <thomas___> It is interesting in its nature, decision. You can decide to believe something is true, but not that it is true.
12:24 PM <jack-frost> I had an example and I lost it.
12:25 PM <•Chadtech> Tentatively, I think the answer to your question Jack 'could we observe someone make a decision about evidence?'
12:25 PM <•Chadtech> is yes.
12:25 PM <•Chadtech> By decision, I think it would help to specify, we mean belief (not knowledge).
12:25 PM <•Chadtech> We demonstrate a sense of the proposition, by our behavior regarding it.
12:26 PM <•Chadtech> Thats really sloppy, but I think it satisfies our current discussion.
12:26 PM <jack-frost> Yes, that's a way to word it. For some reason I just couldn't form a good example of how I meant it.
12:27 PM <jack-frost> We never say "the idealist is right, we could not have hands" we just ignore the idealist.
12:28 PM <jack-frost> "the idealist is wrong, we do have hands."*
12:28 PM <•Chadtech> So I mentioned I got my degree in Economics. When economists do empirical research, they never suspect someone is doing what they dont want to do. They do however suspect, that what they want is more convoluted.
12:28 PM <jack-frost> My thoughts are all jumbled ;_;
12:28 PM <•Chadtech> Maybe thats an example.
12:28 PM <•Chadtech> Anyway, maybe we should move onto 383?
12:29 PM <Pooka> dream on
12:29 PM <jack-frost> Yeah, let's move on.
12:29 PM <•Chadtech> Item 3, section 383 : Can 'meaning' be dreamt?
12:30 PM <jack-frost> The argument here makes perfect sense to me and I feel ashamed that I never thought of it when I read Descartes. The little note I wrote here when I first read OC says :Descartes destroyed in one sentence!"
12:31 PM <Pooka> yes, exactly
12:31 PM <•Chadtech> Haha...
12:31 PM <Pooka> it's like an inverted cogito
12:31 PM <Pooka> that destroys itself in dbout
12:31 PM <jack-frost> This goes back to earlier in OC though where W says that to doubt meanings means to doubt everything. You can't just stop.
12:31 PM <jack-frost> Or something to that effect.
12:31 PM <•Chadtech> Ive never read Descarte. Is there like a specific book or essay where he says this point?
12:32 PM <jack-frost> Meditations on First Philosophy
12:32 PM <jack-frost> Talks about how in dreams he's never wrong about analytic statements so they must be true in all cases.
12:33 PM <•Chadtech> I like the question of whether use can be a delusion. Like suppose I am dreaming now. Does the word 'Jack' have a use? I guess not since there is no referent, or an instance of me referring.
12:33 PM <jack-frost> But in light of 383 the correctness they bear is only coincidental at best so you cannot trust the meanings in dreams.
12:34 PM <jack-frost> Aside: How have you never read Descartes!? Meditations is a really fun read.
12:35 PM <jack-frost> Where is the delusion comment?
12:35 PM <thomas___> Cogito ergo sum assumes the existence of res cogitas, it's been tossed around so much, his cogito argument
12:36 PM <•Chadtech> Wittgenstein doesnt say 'delusion'. I just meant delusion because one is dreaming in Wittgenstein's sentence.
12:36 PM <•Chadtech> Like, this is true right: 'If I speak in a dream, my words dont exist.'
12:37 PM <jack-frost> They do exist I would say. But only in the dream and their meanings are suspect.
12:38 PM <•Chadtech> Why are their meanings suspect?
12:38 PM <jack-frost> I would go back to your comment earlier and say they probably don't have much use in W's sense.
12:38 PM <thomas___> I have a belt for lifting, and it can be tied in different holes depending on how thick or thin you are. I dream I was putting it on, but it was if my body had no mass, I could keep tightening it, as if I tightened it around a pencil. It was weird.
12:38 PM <jack-frost> I meant that the meanings they get are dreamt as well.
12:39 PM <jack-frost> The meanings wouldn't be the same as they are in real life.
12:39 PM <•Chadtech> If the dream exists, in any sense of existing. Could I re-enact the same circumstance in real life and in the dream?
12:40 PM <•Chadtech> How are the meanings not the same then?
12:40 PM <Pooka> things in dreams are not real, they are dreams, so if 'i may be dreaming' occurs inside a dream itself, it is by default meaningless
12:40 PM <jack-frost> But for use as well, there is no real context besides one's own head. If I said "I am here" in a dream it would be nonsensical even if I said it to a person in my dream.
12:40 PM <•Chadtech> Pooka, because nothing actually happens when you dream the meaning?
12:41 PM <Pooka> sort of, it's just a non starter
12:42 PM <•Chadtech> Hmm. I think I get what you guys are getting at, even if I cant settle on an expression.
12:42 PM <Pooka> in the context of a make-believe, even my questioning of wether or not this is a make-believe is make-believe
12:44 PM <jack-frost> Hopefully this works: True statements made in a story are true, but only in the story. For the real world, they don't have a sense (I'm using sense very loosly here).
12:44 PM <•Chadtech> Yeah, Pooka thats about how I feel. But I think I would have to conclude that the whole dream just doesnt qualify as ever occuring. No object in the dream exists. But certainly there is a basis for the conversation of a dream. There must be a fact corresponding to a dream statement. And I think that encourages Jack quite fairly to think a dream does exist.
12:45 PM <•Chadtech> I dont know. Do we have any other angles on 383?
12:45 PM <•Chadtech> Should we move on?
12:45 PM <Pooka> im not sure if that statment matters here
12:46 PM <Pooka> well it does, but as a question
12:46 PM <Pooka> if we see 'i may be dreaming' as speculative
12:46 PM <thomas___> Maybe 'no object in the dream exists' is too rigid. The objects in dreams don't exists in the esense we normally take about existence, with empirical data and so on, but the dream itself exists (can be meassured)
12:46 PM <Pooka> it doesn't matter if it is true
12:46 PM <Pooka> because if it is true it is imaginary
12:46 PM <Pooka> therefore, senseless
12:47 PM <Pooka> im not sure how 383 extents to thoughts in dreams in general
12:47 PM <jack-frost> For the objects not existing could we just say that they only exist as perception? We clearly have a perception just no object of perception.
12:47 PM <Pooka> and the point written is very specifically about wether or not you are dreaming ot start with
12:47 PM <Pooka> *extends to
12:47 PM <Pooka> but the object not existing is the dream itself here
12:48 PM <Pooka> i may be dreaming doubts the whole of what you think might be 'reality' it doubts the world
12:49 PM <•Chadtech> The existence of perception is a dangerous direction, because then we have to wonder in what ways we are acquainted with the perception objects. It seems to go on forever.
12:49 PM <•Chadtech> 'I may be dreaming' is true, even if you arent dreaming right?
12:50 PM <Pooka> i think from 383 Witt says it is 'senseless'
12:50 PM <Pooka> so, presumably, not true
12:50 PM <•Chadtech> So always false?
12:50 PM <Pooka> mmmh i don't think so
12:50 PM <•Chadtech> If its senseless is only have one truth value.
12:50 PM <Pooka> not directly, just, senseless, meaningless, not even sensible to ask
12:50 PM <jack-frost> Neither. Just nonsense.
12:50 PM <•Chadtech> Okay.
12:51 PM <•Chadtech> Yeah okay. Im with you guys.
12:51 PM <Pooka> 'it is raining, but i might be dreaming' ok you might, but by adding that second part onto the end you make it senseless, because if it was dreaming then the whole plane of reference kinda disapears anyway
12:51 PM <thomas___> The point with Descartes is the 'matrix' pseudo problem, 'whoa, what if we were dreaming even now?' Wittgenstein shows that it is senseless to say so, perhaps.
12:53 PM <•Chadtech> If I was dreaming, there is no occurrence of the word 'dream'.
12:53 PM <•Chadtech> Perhaps in another sense, if I am dreaming, there is not referent of the word 'dream'.
12:53 PM <Pooka> 'and indeed it is also being dreamed that these words have any meaning'
12:53 PM <•Chadtech> From 'both ends' dreaming removes the sense of the proposition.
12:54 PM <thomas___> You can ask 'am i dreaming' now, and when you are dreaming, can you not? Don't we have vivid dreams that seem real as they happen?
12:55 PM <•Chadtech> I dont think you can ask if you are dreaming, if you are in fact dreaming.
12:56 PM <•Chadtech> Like, imagine a person sleeping. And they are sleeping restlessly, and you hear a sleeping person say the word 'Am I dreaming?'
12:56 PM <•Chadtech> Does that count as asking?
12:56 PM <•Chadtech> words**
12:56 PM <Pooka> brb
12:56 PM <thomas___> I've been wondering whether or not I've been dreaming while I have been dreaming. I then got a conclusion that I was in fact dreaming (i woke up, or something absurd happened). If I ask myself if I dream now, I have not yet to get an answer.
12:57 PM <thomas___> The point is, in both cases, it's meaningless, as Wittgenstein shows. So when you ask in the "matrix" movie, well, can't they be in a new matrix in this 'real' world? No, it's senseless, stop it.
12:58 PM <jack-frost> Interesting point thomas, nothing wacky has happened in the real world when I aks the question. But chad's question, I don't think anyone would count it as asking if they heard it. Most would just laugh at the sleeping person.
12:58 PM <jack-frost> We couldn't reasonably answer it in any way.
12:59 PM <•Chadtech> So then, when one dreams the proposition of 'I am dreaming'. They simply dont ask the question at all. The proposition never really exists to begin with.
12:59 PM <•Chadtech> Even if one utters it in the awake world.
12:59 PM <thomas___> They ask themselves, don't they?
1:00 PM <thomas___> We are looking at the def. of a question here
1:01 PM <thomas___> Imagine you see a person on the trainstation, saying to himself, 'oh did i miss the train?', he says this believing he is alone. Then he will not expect an answer, I see. And it's not a question perhaps. It's a doubt none the less, and can be seen as a question for oneself perhaps.
1:02 PM <•Chadtech> I think presenting this as a question was a mistake.
1:02 PM <•Chadtech> There is a fact corresponding to 'I missed the train'.
1:02 PM <•Chadtech> But if one is dreaming, one has no relationship to the fact 'I am dreaming'.
1:02 PM <•Chadtech> I dont know.
1:03 PM <•Chadtech> Maybe we should move on?
1:03 PM <thomas___> But one may wake up, and remember he wondered "am i dreaming", and think "ha, of course I was dreaming, why couldn't I tell".
1:03 PM <thomas___> Yes, we all agree here, it seems.
1:03 PM <•Chadtech> But he didnt actually wonder that. I mean, a mental state is not an occurance.
1:04 PM <•Chadtech> Alright, well, maybe we could get back to this later. Ill definitely be thinking about it.
1:04 PM <thomas___> Let's take a personal example. I have wondered "wait, am I actually dreaming", which was first affirmated as I woke up. Usually I wake up soonly after, as this questioning is perhaps a sign that I am in the process of waking up already
1:05 PM <thomas___> It's a good point by W. Where do we go now
1:05 PM <Pooka> thought i could still be in a dream
1:05 PM <Pooka> my seeming to wake up does not mean i am now out of a dream
1:06 PM <•Chadtech> If 'I am actually dreaming', denied when you dont wake up?
1:06 PM <thomas___> No. But as W. shows, in either sense, it's meaningless. Also, the question we ponder here "wait, am I dreaming" feels vastly different from when we ask it in a dream.
1:06 PM <thomas___> What Chad?
1:07 PM <•Chadtech> You said ' am I actually dreaming' is affirmated as I woke up'
1:07 PM <•Chadtech> Should you have never woke up, but it be denied instead?
1:07 PM <•Chadtech> would it be denied**
1:07 PM <thomas___> Problem of induction surely? You will never know (in this experiment) if you are actually dreaming, we can only know 'Oh, I WAS dreaming'.
1:08 PM <thomas___> But this thought experiment is nonsensical.
1:09 PM <jack-frost> So it can never be answered in an affirmative, present tense format?
1:09 PM <•Chadtech> Yeah I guess there is an experimental element, but only by committing all experience to a kind of experiment. But I like where you ended your comment. Perhaps a sense is only discovered retroactively. Which is exactly what W says in section 24 (the one Pooka brought up).
1:11 PM <•Chadtech> Is Item 3 exhausted? Should we move on?
1:11 PM <jack-frost> So...all in favor of moving forward?
1:11 PM <Pooka> yep
1:11 PM <jack-frost> Oh yeah
1:11 PM <Pooka> 383 is a very fun one, but let's move on
1:11 PM <•Chadtech> Aight.
1:11 PM <thomas___> yes
1:12 PM <•Chadtech> Item 4: Sections 392, and 253
1:13 PM <•Chadtech> So I added this one on because I thought these two were hitting on a point I found interesting.
1:13 PM <•Chadtech> But now that I am looking at both I am not sure that common point is really there.
1:14 PM <•Chadtech> In 253, I think W starts to present knowledge as a more basic condition than believe. Which is kind of the opposite of how cis-epistemology seems to treat the subject. Namely that knowledge is a belief with the positive condition of being justified and true.
1:15 PM <•Chadtech> But W often seems to present belief as knowledge with the positive condition of having an alternative.
1:15 PM <jack-frost> cis-epistemology?
1:15 PM <•Chadtech> I was just joking.
1:16 PM <•Chadtech> I just meant epistemology as a large majority of philosophy academics talk about it: A true and justified belief.
1:16 PM <jack-frost> Ah ok.
1:17 PM <jack-frost> So The way I'm seeing these two propositions is something akin to knowledge as decision we talked earlier. We have something we don't bother to justify, we could doubt and reason about it, but we don't. We just take it.
1:18 PM <jack-frost> What does he mean by role of contradiction in mathematics though?
1:18 PM <•Chadtech> Yeah, and I think I see W saying that in 392. In my comment about there being an alternative, I think what you say about decision, and what W says about language games, are in the same vein.
1:19 PM <•Chadtech> The boundaries themselves have definition.
1:19 PM <Pooka> does 392 have any relation to W.'s logical space (in tractatus i think?)
1:19 PM <•Chadtech> Pooka, I think it precludes the logical space in the tractatus.
1:19 PM <thomas___> Hey did you take up 321?
1:20 PM <Pooka> no (thomas)
1:20 PM <•Chadtech> Jack, I want to say that the role of the contradiction is just a guide post of what get tallied as true or false.
1:20 PM <•Chadtech> But I am not comfortable with that. I want to find a reason that we use proof by contradiction.
1:21 PM <jack-frost> Ah ok. I was thinking it would be an actual mathematical concept or theory or something
1:21 PM <thomas___> Proof by contradiction? Like an indirect proof?
1:22 PM <thomas___> It exists in logic and mathematics.
1:22 PM <•Chadtech> I dont know what indirect proof is.
1:22 PM <•Chadtech> But yeah, you can prove not P, if you know Q, and that P -> ~Q.
1:22 PM <•Chadtech> Contrapositive.
1:22 PM <•Chadtech> P -> Q = ~Q -> ~P
1:22 PM <thomas___> It's if you want to prove x. You assume non-x, and you show how this is absurd, or contradicting, therefore x must be true.
1:23 PM <•Chadtech> Yeah.
1:23 PM <thomas___> You assume the opposite of what you want to prove, show how it cannot be this way by neccesity and bobs your uncle
1:24 PM <•Chadtech> Are sections 392 and 253 not very controversial then?
1:25 PM <jack-frost> They seem straightforward to me. What was the possible  connection you had that you discarded?
1:25 PM <•Chadtech> I think I read 253 into 392
1:26 PM <•Chadtech> Still related, but not identical.
1:26 PM <•Chadtech> Maybe we should close out this meeting? Is Item 4 exhausted?
1:27 PM <jack-frost> I'm fine with closing. Get all settled for next time.
1:27 PM <Pooka> yes fine
1:27 PM <Pooka> are we frege-ing?
1:27 PM <•Chadtech> Alright. Ill call the meeting the closed then.
1:27 PM <•Chadtech> CALL.