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Truecrypt Programmer Found Dead

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May 29th, 2014
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  1. The binary on the website is capable only to decode encrypted data, not encode, and may contain trojan (seems like it doesn't, but don't believe me). The binary is signed with the valid (usual) key. All old versions are wiped, the repository is wiped too.
  2.  
  3. Assumption #1 The website is presumed hacked, the keys are presumed compromised. Please do not download or run it. And please don't switch to bitlocker.
  4.  
  5. Latest working version is 7.1a. Version 7.2 is a hoax
  6.  
  7. On the SourceForge, the keys were changed before any TrueCrypt files uploaded, but now they are deleted and the old keys got reverted back.
  8.  
  9. Why I think so: strange key change, why bitlocker?
  10.  
  11. Assumption #2 Something bad happened to TrueCrypt developers (i.e. take down or death) or to TrueCrypt itself (i.e. found the worst vulnerability ever) which made them do such a thing. So this version is legit
  12.  
  13. Why I think so: all files are with valid signatures, all the releases are available (Windows; Linux x86, x86_64, console versions, Mac OS, sources), the binaries seems like was built on the usual developer PC (there are some paths like c:\truecrypt-7.2\driver\obj_driver_release\i386\truecrypt.pdb, which were the same for 7.1a). License text is changed too (see the diff below).
  14.  
  15. Why is it ridiculous for TrueCrypt developers to suggest moving to BitLocker? Well, TrueCrypt was strictly against of using TPM because it may contain extra key chains which allow agencies like NSA to extract your private key. So why would they suggest such a thing and not other open-source alternatives? It looks like a clear sign that the developer can't say he's in danger so he did this. As many suppose, this could be the sort of warrant canary
  16.  
  17. Assumption #2 is more likely true than assumption #1. Sad but true.
  18.  
  19. Assumption #3 7.1a is backdoored and the developer wants all users to stop using it.
  20.  
  21. Why I think so: there is a website http://truecryptcheck.wordpress.com which contains all the hash sums for TrueCrypt 7.1a. Is has only 1 blog record from August 15, 2013, only for TrueCrypt and only for 7.1a. It's a bit strange to make a website with the hash sums for only one program and only one version of it.
  22.  
  23. SourceForge sent emails on 22 May, they said they changed password algorithms and everybody should change their passwords.
  24.  
  25. SourceForge claims everything is as usual (from https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7813121):
  26.  
  27. Providing some details from SourceForge:
  28.  
  29. We have had no contact with the TrueCrypt project team (and thus no complaints).
  30.  
  31. We see no indicator of account compromise; current usage is consistent with past usage.
  32.  
  33. Our recent SourceForge forced password change was triggered by infrastructure improvements not a compromise. FMI see http://sourceforge.net/blog/forced-password-change/
  34.  
  35. Thank you,
  36.  
  37. The SourceForge Team communityteam@sourceforge.net
  38. TrueCrypt developers are unknown and currently there is no way to know who is who and who should we listen to.
  39.  
  40. From wikileaks twitter https://twitter.com/wikileaks/status/471769936038461440:
  41.  
  42. (1/4) Truecrypt has released an update saying that it is insecure and development has been terminated http://truecrypt.sf.net
  43.  
  44. (2/4) the style of the announcement is very odd; however we believe it is likely to be legitimate and not a simple defacement
  45.  
  46. (3/4) the new executable contains the same message and is cryptographically signed. We believe that there is either a power conflict..
  47.  
  48. (4/4) in the dev team or psychological issues, coersion of some form, or a hacker with access to site and keys.
  49. From Matthew Green (one of TrueCrypt auditor) twitter https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/471752508147519488:
  50.  
  51. @SteveBellovin @mattblaze @0xdaeda1a I think this is legit.
  52. TrueCrypt Setup 7.1a.exe:
  53.  
  54. sha1: 7689d038c76bd1df695d295c026961e50e4a62ea
  55. md5: 7a23ac83a0856c352025a6f7c9cc1526
  56. TrueCrypt 7.1a Mac OS X.dmg:
  57.  
  58. sha1: 16e6d7675d63fba9bb75a9983397e3fb610459a1
  59. md5: 89affdc42966ae5739f673ba5fb4b7c5
  60. truecrypt-7.1a-linux-x86.tar.gz:
  61.  
  62. sha1: 0e77b220dbbc6f14101f3f913966f2c818b0f588
  63. md5: 09355fb2e43cf51697a15421816899be
  64. truecrypt-7.1a-linux-x64.tar.gz:
  65.  
  66. sha1: 086cf24fad36c2c99a6ac32774833c74091acc4d
  67. md5: bb355096348383987447151eecd6dc0e
  68. Diff between latest version and the hoax one: https://github.com/warewolf/truecrypt/compare/master...7.2
  69.  
  70. Screenshot: http://habrastorage.org/getpro/habr/post_images/da1/1bf/6a5/da11bf6a5225fa718987ba4e54038fc1.png
  71.  
  72. Topics: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7812133
  73.  
  74. http://www.reddit.com/r/netsec/comments/26pz9b/truecrypt_development_has_ended_052814/
  75.  
  76. http://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/26pxol/truecrypt_is_dead/
  77.  
  78. http://www.reddit.com/r/crypto/comments/26px1i/truecrypt_shutting_down_development_of_truecrypt/
  79.  
  80. http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/05/truecrypt-is-not-secure-official-sourceforge-page-abruptly-warns/
  81.  
  82. http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/05/true-goodbye-using-truecrypt-is-not-secure/
  83.  
  84. Twitter stream: https://twitter.com/search?q=truecrypt&src=typd
  85.  
  86. You may join IRC #truecrypt@irc.freenode.net, although there is no OPs right now.
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