The thesis

	I am bound to the freedom of acting onward.

	The thesis is formed from three frames of constitution: passive, embedded experience and intersubjectively embedded experience. The passive frame sets the motivation that shapes the second, while the second is already co-forming with the first and with the third. The common denominator of these is an immanent act-inertia. The generic teleological formulation of the act-inertia is “to aim at further aiming”. The transcendental invariant constraint is the act-less ground.
	Passivities are the originary acts. Passivities persist onward, in the formed limits of their persistence. Against the act-less transcendental, passivities center the living body around its further centering against the transcendental. The centering-forward is the passive act-inertia. The persistence of this passive act-inertia is active experience. In this frame, the passively acting body is an organism-environment of acts. Once active experience is formed, the passive act-inertia becomes the horizon of tactility. Passivities retent into an originary mood of “aliveness” and into an I-can for tactility, distance perception and movement.
	The second frame. Active experience forms through a double binding. Active experience is both bound to passivities and to the embedding that it forms through tactile collision and through modes of tactility (i.e. sight). I perceive the embedding and the embedding transcends my act of perception. When embedded, the organism-environment becomes a felt interior. My formation of an embedding motivates me to move with my whole interior. Movements retents into a unity of mood and I-can (or I-cannot). Modes of movement are bound to both passivities and to the embedding, and are only free to move further. In act, a modal movement is a willed movement. In retention, a modal movement motivates further movements, through not necessarily in the same mode. This is the act-inertia of the second frame: to move and to embed myself further. This act-inertia infiltrates three distinct modes of movement: the will to focus, the will to play and the will to search.
	The third frame. My passive “aliveness” persistently motivates my perception of other beings to form with an apperception of their “aliveness”. The apperception of “aliveness” in others binds me to form my movements from this apperception. My embedding forms as an embedding of living beings and another's embedding forms as an embedding that includes me as a living being. In an intersubjective context, I-can co-focus with or against another, co-play with or against another, or co-search with or against another. In the intersubjective frame, I am bound to co-form my movements with others, and I am only free to go further.
	In each frame, an idea of freedom is uncovered as a freedom of acting onward. By further acting through the act-inertia and not against it, freedom is formed as an emerging underlying attitude that overshadows acts. Freedom is not decided in between acts. In mid-act, I am not free. In mid-act, I am only bound for further freer acts, in the middle of which I would not be free. Freedom is the result of persistent active experience that does not turn against the passively originating act-inertia of “onward-ness”. Acts that are decided beforehand from this attitude are the acts of an agent. Pre-free acts are ante-agency acts. As an agent I am only free to try again, to fail, or to succeed. As an agent, I-can fully reflect.

	A side consequence of the thesis is that any post-agent morality is originary to any aesthetic. Morality forms from passivities in a way in which aesthetics does not. Morality is formed through the apperception of “aliveness” in others. Aesthetic is formed upon but differentiated from this apperception. Any aesthetic has an immanent morality. On the other hand, any aesthetic forms from the movement superposing of animated and non-animated embeddings. Through this, the immanent morality is usually obscured, or forgotten. A pure aesthetic in actu can only be formed by individuals that do not form the apperception of “aliveness” when perceiving others. This constitutive frame binds us to reconsider the full phenomenological reformation of the old project of axiology as a “science” of values.