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- Leaked by LoxoSRB from Serbian Hacktivists 035
- https://www.facebook.com/SerbianHacktivists035
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
- ў
- In the 1990s, wars and political instability provided an opportunity for Al Qaeda and other
- terrorist groups to infiltrate the Balkans. However, U.S. and European peacekeeping troops, aid,
- and the prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration have helped to bring more stability to the region in
- recent years. Moreover, the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States underscored for the
- countries of the region the dangers of global terrorism, and resulted in increased U.S. attention
- and aid to fight the terrorist threat. In part as a result, many experts currently do not view the
- Balkans as a key region harboring or funding terrorists, in contrast to the Middle East, South
- Asia, Southeast Asia, and Western Europe. However, experts note that the region may play a
- secondary role in terrorist plans, as a transit point for terrorists, as well as for recuperation.
- Moreover, they agree that the region's continuing problems continue to leave it vulnerable to
- terrorist groups in the future.
- U.S. officials have cited the threat of terrorism in the Balkans as an important reason for the need
- for continued U.S. engagement in the region. In addition to the need to take steps to directly
- combat terrorist infrastructure in the region, U.S. officials say that U.S. efforts to bring stability to
- the region also help to fight terrorism. They note that political instability, weak political and law
- enforcement institutions and poverty provide a breeding ground for terrorist groups. U.S.
- objectives are also outlined in the 9/11 Commission Report and the President's National Strategy
- for Combating Terrorism, which calls for the United States to work with other countries to deny
- terrorists sponsorship, support and sanctuary, as well as working to diminish the underlying
- conditions that terrorists seek to exploit.
- The United States has a variety of instruments to fight terrorism in the Balkans. One is the direct
- involvement of U.S. troops in Kosovo. The United States provides bilateral counterterrorism
- assistance to the countries of the region. The overall U.S. aid program to the region, aimed at
- bringing stability through strengthening the rule of law and promoting economic reform, also
- serves to combat the sometimes lawless climate in which terrorists can thrive. U.S. aid helps to
- develop Bosnia's export control regime, including over weapons of mass destruction and dual-use
- technology. The United States has encouraged regional cooperation on terrorism and international
- crime through the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI). In the longer term, efforts
- to stabilize the region, and thereby perhaps reduce its attractiveness to terrorists, are also
- dependent upon integrating it into Euro-Atlantic institutions. The second session of the 110th
- Congress may consider legislation affecting possible terrorist threats in the Balkans, including in
- the FY2009 foreign aid appropriations process.
- For more information on terrorism, see CRS Report RL33600, International Terrorism: Threat,
- Policy, and Response, by Raphael F. Perl; CRS Report RL32522, U.S. Anti-Terror Strategy and
- the 9/11 Commission Report, by Raphael F. Perl; CRS Report RL32518, Removing Terrorist
- Sanctuaries: The 9/11 Commission Recommendations and U.S. Policy, coordinated by Francis T.
- Miko; and CRS Report RL33038, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, by Kenneth
- Katzman.
- Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
- Bosnia and Herzegovina.................................................................................................................. 2
- Bosnia's Counterterrorism Efforts ............................................................................................ 4
- Albania ............................................................................................................................................ 6
- Serbia............................................................................................................................................... 7
- Kosovo............................................................................................................................................. 8
- U.S. Policy..................................................................................................................................... 10
- Congressional Response.......................................................................................................... 12
- Conclusion..................................................................................................................................... 12
- Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 12
- In the 1990s, wars and political instability provided an opportunity for Al Qaeda and other
- terrorist groups to infiltrate the Balkans. However, U.S. and European peacekeeping troops, aid,
- and the prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration have helped to bring more stability to the region in
- recent years. Moreover, the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States underscored for the
- countries of the region the dangers of global terrorism, and resulted in increased U.S. attention
- and aid to fight the terrorist threat. In addition, some countries outside of the region, especially
- Saudi Arabia, which were formerly key sources of terrorists and terrorist financing, have cracked
- down on Islamic militants, which has in turn had a positive impact on the Balkans. As a result of
- these factors, many experts currently do not view the Balkans as a key region harboring or
- funding terrorists, at least when compared to the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, Southeast
- Asia, and Western Europe.
- Nevertheless, experts caution that the region may continue to play a role in terrorist plans, largely
- as a transit route for terrorists, as well as for bases for attacks in other regions, such as Western
- Europe. There have also been efforts to recruit people from the region into terrorist groups.
- Moreover, observers agree that the region's continuing problems leave it vulnerable to terrorist
- groups in the future. The July 2004 report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
- the United States (known as the 9/11 Commission) referred to Central and Eastern Europe as a
- region potentially vulnerable to terrorists, due to significant Muslim populations and weak border
- controls and security services.1 This problem may increase if terrorists currently concentrated in
- Iraq disperse to the Balkans and other regions. Some sources, especially Serbian and Russian
- experts and officials, have claimed that the Balkans continue to form a more dangerous threat to
- the United States and neighboring Western Europe than is usually acknowledged.2
- Although large numbers of indigenous Muslims live in the Balkans, due to its poverty and
- instability the region has not attracted large numbers of Muslim immigrants, who have been an
- important source of recruits for Islamic extremists in Western Europe. Moreover, opposition to
- terrorism has been strong among Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and Albanians, the largest
- indigenous Muslim groups in the Balkans. These groups are generally more secular in outlook
- than Muslims elsewhere. Most view themselves as part of Europe and are grateful for the
- perceived U.S. role in defending them against Serbian aggression in the 1990s, and for the
- continuing U.S. contribution to the security of their countries.
- Charges of terrorism are often used as political weapons among countries or ethnic groups to try
- to attract international support for their cause. For example, Serbian and Bosnian Serb politicians
- often make charges of Al Qaeda training camps in Bosnia and Kosovo in an effort to discredit
- Bosniaks and Albanians. For their part, Bosniak and Albanian leaders deny the charges and
- accuse the Serbs of supporting "terrorism" by harboring indicted war criminals. Some observers
- say that the terrorist threat is in fact much less serious than the region's more pressing problems,
- such as corruption, poverty, and potential political instability. They say that the international
- focus on the terrorist threat may divert attention from these more relevant issues.
- 1
- 9/11 Commission Report, p. 366-367. For a text of the report, see http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm.
- 2
- Discussions with U.S. and European officials.
- On the other hand, this rivalry between groups and the international focus on terrorism may have
- some positive aspects. It may push countries in the Balkans to cooperate zealously with the
- United States on terrorism issues, in hopes of securing U.S. support for their regional goals and
- Euro-Atlantic integration. In addition, there may be additional political support in the United
- States and other countries for dealing with the region's problems if they are viewed as a potential
- source of terrorism.
- Given these factors, perhaps of greater concern to most experts than the existence of a significant
- Muslim population in the Balkans is the weakness of government institutions, rampant corruption
- and poverty. However, despite these difficulties, the countries in the region have provided very
- good cooperation with the United States in the Global War on Terrorism, according to U.S.
- officials.3 Consistent with U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted in the post-9/11 fight
- against terrorism, these countries have worked with the United States and other countries to arrest
- or expel terrorist suspects, shut down non-governmental organizations linked with terrorism, and
- freeze or seize assets of persons and groups suspected of terrorist financing.
- This report focuses on three countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and Serbia (including
- Serbia's Kosovo province, which is currently under international supervision). The report deals
- with the role of Islamic terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda rather than indigenous nationalist
- groups pursuing local or regional objectives.
- Ј
- After the breakup of Communist Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina was torn apart by a civil
- war between Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Serbs, and Croats from 1992 to 1995. The war
- resulted in the deaths of many thousands of persons and the displacement and impoverishment of
- large parts of the population. A desperate Bosniak-dominated Bosnian government, facing an
- international arms embargo and outgunned by breakaway Bosnian Serb forces, accepted the help
- of Iran, as well as several thousand Islamic radicals, mercenaries, and others. The 1995 Dayton
- Peace Accords, which ended the conflict, required all foreign forces to leave Bosnia.
- Most did, but some Islamic radicals remained behind. It is estimated that about 700 to 1,000
- former fighters stayed behind in Bosnia after the war and became Bosnian citizens by marrying
- Bosnian women. Others received citizenship through bribing Bosnian officials. Some Al Qaeda
- operatives in Bosnia had connections to members of Bosnia's intelligence service, another legacy
- of Bosniak wartime cooperation with Islamic militants. The experience of the Bosnia conflict has
- also had an impact on terrorist groups worldwide. Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda figures mention
- the Bosnian war as a place where Al Qaeda was active, and as an important militant Islamic
- cause. Terrorist recruiting videos often include footage of combat in Bosnia.
- In addition to fighters, Bosniaks also received assistance during and after the war from Islamic
- charities and humanitarian organizations, many of them from Saudi Arabia. Some of these groups
- served as fronts for Al Qaeda, which used them for planning attacks in Bosnia and elsewhere. In
- the view of some observers, Saudi Arabian-built mosques at which some extremist foreign and
- 3
- For background on counterterrorism efforts in Europe in the aftermath of 9/11, see CRS Report RL31612, European
- Counterterrorist Efforts: Political Will and Diverse Responses in the First Year After September 11, coordinated by
- Paul Gallis, October 11, 2002, and CRS Report RS22030, U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism, by Kristin Archick.
- Bosnian clerics continue to preach hatred of the United States and Western countries may enhance
- terrorist recruiting efforts.4 According to U.S. officials, the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo and U.S.
- military bases in Bosnia were subject to several terrorist threats after September 11, 2001.
- However, Bosnian opposition to terrorism has been broad, despite the still-deep ethnic divide in
- the country. The United States still enjoys a strong reservoir of support in Bosnia, especially
- among Bosniaks, for bringing peace to the country and providing post-war aid. The largely
- secular and European outlook among Bosniaks has caused friction with foreign Islamic
- extremists. Efforts by the Islamists to recruit Bosniaks into their organizations have met with
- limited success.5 Some Bosniaks fear that terrorists will give Bosnia a bad name in Europe,
- thereby hindering their ability to travel there and setting back Bosnian efforts to join European
- institutions. On the other hand, some experts are concerned that widespread unemployment
- among Bosniak youth, coupled with dissatisfaction with U.S. foreign policy, could aid terrorist
- recruitment.
- The 2005 State Department terrorism report discusses an Islamist extremist organization called
- Active Islamic Youth, which is associated with former foreign Islamic fighters in Bosnia. It says
- that the group engages in outreach activities aimed at Bosnian youth and publishes materials
- promoting Islamic fundamentalism, religious intolerance, and anti-Western rhetoric.
- In 2006, a joint U.S.-Croatian intelligence report reportedly said the terrorist groups were
- attempting to recruit so-called "white Muslims," from Bosnia and other Balkan countries, whose
- physical appearance might arouse less suspicion in Europe than a person of Middle Eastern
- appearance. Bosnian officials have offered mixed assessments of this threat: some say that it is a
- significant concern, while others admit it as a possibility but note that they have no concrete
- evidence so far for widespread recruiting efforts of this kind.6
- In addition to facing the same problems of poverty and corruption as other countries in the region,
- Bosnia also suffers from institutional failings that are a result of Bosnia's recent development.
- The Dayton Peace Accords divided Bosnia and Herzegovina into two semi-autonomous
- "entities"--the largely Bosniak-Croat Federation and the mainly Bosnian Serb Republika
- Srpska--with a weak central government. Critics have charged that this structure has stymied
- Bosnia's efforts to develop effective government institutions. The 2006 State Department Country
- Reports on Terrorism notes that, while Bosnia's counterterrorism cooperation with the United
- States was good, the weakness of the Bosnian state "made it vulnerable to exploitation as a
- terrorist safe haven or as a potential staging ground for terrorist operations in Europe."
- U.S. and international efforts to strengthen the central government have been resisted by the
- Bosnian Serbs, who frequently charge the Bosniaks with terrorist ties. In May 2005, Bosnian Serb
- police chief Dragomir Andan claimed that the terrorists who carried out the March 2004 Madrid
- bombings had been trained at alleged Al Qaeda camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina. EU police and
- other officials in Bosnia said that they had seen no evidence to support such charges. Such
- charges have coincided with an ongoing effort by international officials in Bosnia to put the
- police, a key pillar of Bosnian Serb leaders' power, under central government control in order to
- more effectively combat organized crime and terrorism.
- 4
- Stephen Schwartz, "The Failure of Europe in Bosnia," The Weekly Standard, June 20, 2005.
- 5
- Discussions with U.S. officials.
- 6
- William J. Kole, "Terrorists Recruiting `White Muslims," Associated Press wire dispatch, April 17, 2006.
- U.S. officials have lauded Bosnia's efforts in the fight against terrorism. In his 2002 State of the
- Union Address, President Bush singled out Bosnia specifically for praise for its cooperation with
- the United States. In January 2002, Bosnia handed over to the United States Bensayah Belkacem,
- whom U.S. officials believed could be a high-ranking figure in Al Qaeda, as well as five other
- suspects. The suspects were originally from Algeria, although four gained Bosnian citizenship.
- All are currently interned at U.S. facilities in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The rendition of these men
- to the United States was sharply criticized by Bosnian legal experts as a violation of the rule of
- law, as has their continued detention in Cuba.7 Bosnian prosecutors formally exonerated the men
- in 2004 after an investigation, and Bosnia formally requested that the four Bosnian citizens be
- released from U.S. custody in February 2005. The United States has so far rejected Bosnia's
- request.
- In cooperation with U.S. investigators, Bosnian authorities have investigated Islamic charities
- suspected of having ties with Bin Laden. In March 2002, Bosnian police raided Bosnian offices
- of the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF), which is headquartered in Illinois. Police
- found weapons, military manuals, a fraudulent passport, photographs of Bin Laden, and other
- items. BIF leader Enaam Arnaout, who was charged in US courts with concealing his relationship
- to al-Qaida, received an 11-year sentence, albeit for fraud, not on terrorism charges.
- A subsequent Bosnian raid on another group, a local branch of Saudi-based Al-Haramain Islamic
- Foundation, uncovered tapes calling for attacks on peacekeepers in Bosnia. Another raid, this
- time on the Sarajevo office of the Saudi High Commission for Relief, netted anti-Semitic and
- anti-American materials, as well as photos of U.S. military installations.8 Other Al Qaeda fronts,
- such as Vazir (Al-Haramain's successor organization) and the Global Relief Fund were also shut
- down. In 2004, the Bosnian government disrupted the operations of al-Furqan (a.k.a. Sirat
- Istikamet), al-Haramain and al-Masjed al-Aqsa Charity Foundation, and Taibah International, all
- Al Qaeda-linked organizations. Experts note that when some Al Qaeda front organizations are
- closed down, others often spring up to replace them. The 2005 State Department terrorism report
- said that the government remained vigilant against previously shut NGOs renewing their
- activities. Authorities continued to investigate other organizations, private companies, and
- individuals for links to terrorist financing. In February 2005, Bosnian state and entity-level
- governments agreed to form a single joint database of all NGOs and associations in Bosnia.
- Bosnian officials have been charged with providing aid to terrorists. In November 2004, the
- Bosnian government charged fifteen former Bosnian officials with illegally helping former
- foreign Islamic fighters in Bosnia gain Bosnian citizenship from 1995-2000.9 In 2005, six former
- Federation officials went on trial for their role in helping to establish an alleged terrorist training
- camp in Bosnia with Iran's help during the mid-1990s. Iran, designated as an active supporter of
- terrorism by the United States, has not been viewed as closely linked with Al Qaeda, although it
- supports groups such as Hizbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Israel's
- 7
- Daniel Williams, "Hand-Over of Terrorism Suspects to U.S. Angers Many in Bosnia," Washington Post, January 31,
- 2002.
- 8
- Andrew Purvis, "Money Trouble," "Time Magazine Europe, July 1, 2002.
- 9
- Nezavisne Novine, January 28, 2005, as carried by the BBC Monitoring Service.
- occupied territories, among other groups. However, most experts believe that Iran sharply scaled
- back its activities in Bosnia soon after the end of the Bosnian war in 1995.10
- In 2005, the Bosnian government set up a Citizenship Review Commission to strip Bosnian
- citizenship from naturalized citizens who fraudulently obtained their citizenship, have no
- substantial ties to Bosnia at present, or obtained their citizenship because of government error or
- misconduct. The commission reviews the citizenship status of former Islamic fighters and
- withdraws citizenship, when appropriate. About 1,300 cases fell within the commission's
- mandate. In August 2007, Bosnian officials said that they had revoked the citizenship of 613
- persons who were granted citizenship improperly.11
- Those persons whose citizenship has been revoked must leave Bosnia or be deported, but Bosnian
- authorities reportedly do not know the whereabouts of many of them, because the addresses given
- on their citizenship applications are often out of date. Some of them may reportedly have changed
- their names, gone into hiding, are residing in other countries, or have already been detained by
- authorities in other countries as suspected terrorists. In 2006, Bosnia deported two former Islamic
- fighters, including one who had returned to Bosnia in 2005 after serving time in a French prison
- for a terrorist bombing in the 1990s. In December 2007, Bosnia deported another former foreign
- fighter to Algeria. Others have been able to avoid deportation through a lengthy appeals process.
- Some observers have asserted that the push to deport the remaining foreign fighters in Bosnia is
- due to strong U.S. pressure. In August 2007, Raffi Gregorian, a senior U.S. diplomat in Bosnia,
- said that there were "more than ten and less than 100" Al Qaeda supporters among the former
- Islamic fighters. In September 2007, a Bosnian newspaper claimed that Bosnian central
- government Security Minister Tarik Sadovic estimated the number of persons posing a threat to
- national security in Bosnia was "less than 50," not all of whom still remained in Bosnia.12
- In October 2005, Bosnian Federation police arrested two terrorist suspects with links to terrorist
- networks in Western Europe and confiscated weapons and explosives. One is a Swedish citizen of
- Bosnian origin and the other a Turkish national living in Denmark. They were accused of
- planning a terrorist attack in Bosnia or elsewhere in Europe with the aim of forcing Bosnia or
- other countries to pull their troops out of Iran and Afghanistan. The men went on trial in July
- 2006. They were convicted in January 2007 and sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging
- from eight to fifteen years.
- In recent years, with constant international prodding, Bosnia and Herzegovina has set up central-
- government-level institutions that are in part aimed at helping it fight terrorism and organized
- crime. Bosnia has deployed a State Border Service (SBS) throughout virtually all of the country's
- territory. The 2005 State Department terrorism report says that the "SBS is considered one of the
- better border services in Southeast Europe," but notes that the SBS does not control a few illegal
- crossing points and that many official border posts are understaffed. Ministries of Defense and
- Security were established in 2004, and the two entity-level intelligence services were merged into
- a single Bosnian State Intelligence and Security Agency (OSA) state-level service. Bosnia has
- established the State Investigative and Protection Agency (SIPA), responsible for investigating
- 10
- Stephen Schwartz, "Wahhabism and al-Qaeda in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, October 24,
- 2004.
- 11
- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, December 18, 2007.
- 12
- Reuters news agency dispatch, September 5, 2007.
- complex crimes including terrorism, illegal trafficking, organized crime, and smuggling of
- weapons of mass destruction. SIPA has a financial intelligence unit (FIU), and a sub-unit of its
- Criminal Investigation Department is dedicated to counterterrorism and WMD. An
- Interministerial Counterterrorism Task Force coordinates the counterterrorism activities of these
- central government bodies.
- In June 2004, Bosnia adopted laws aimed at strengthening state-level law enforcement
- capabilities. The set of laws includes legislation giving SIPA law enforcement and investigative
- authority for state-level crimes, including terrorism, and a law on prevention of money
- laundering. The Bosnian State Court and the State Prosecutor's Office also deal with terrorism
- cases. However, most state-level bodies, with the partial exception of the State Border Service,
- are not fully staffed or operational and lack funds, resources, and qualified personnel.13 Bosnia
- and Herzegovina is a party to the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.
- The 2005 State Department terrorism report noted that, although Bosnia possesses
- counterterrorism laws, prosecutors have had difficulty in linking illegal activities to specific
- terrorism charges. As a result, they have sometimes sought to convict suspects on such charges as
- illegal arms possession, arms smuggling, and conspiracy, which often result in lighter sentences.
- As in the case of Bosnia, instability in Albania gave a foothold to Al Qaeda in the 1990s. Poor
- internal security, lax border controls, and high rates of crime produced an environment conducive
- to terrorist activity. Some foreign Islamic extremists used Albania as a safe haven and gained
- Albanian citizenship. Some former Albanian officials were thought to maintain links with these
- foreign extremists. Islamic non-governmental organizations, some of them fronts for Al Qaeda,
- were established in Albania after the collapse of the Communist regime in 1991. The situation
- worsened during civil unrest in Albania in 1997, when central authority broke down and large
- military weapons stocks were looted. Wars in neighboring Kosovo in 1999 and Macedonia in
- 2001 also had a negative impact on Albania's stability.
- Terrorist threats in the middle and late 1990s caused the temporary closure of the U.S. embassy in
- Albania and the cancellation of planned visits to Albania by senior U.S. officials. In 1998,
- Albania and the United States foiled a planned attack on the U.S. embassy in Tirana, raided an Al
- Qaeda forgery ring, and arrested several Al Qaeda figures.14 Since the September 11, 2001
- attacks, some media sources and political leaders from Serbia have alleged that ethnic Albanian
- "terrorists" continue to maintain links with Islamic terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. The
- Albanian government denies that terrorist training camps are present on its territory. U.S. and
- European government experts say that Albania does not at the moment appear to harbor a serious
- terrorist threat.15
- In 2004, Albania announced the discovery of chemical weapons stocks acquired by the
- Communist regime in Albania during the 1970s. Albanian officials had not known of their
- existence until they were discovered by accident in a bunker. Although this cache is now guarded,
- 13
- State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, 2004, from the State Department website, http://www.state.gov.
- 14
- 9/11 Commission Report, p. 127 and 2005 State Department Country Reports on Terrorism.
- 15
- Discussions with U.S. and European officials.
- it had been unguarded during the disorder of the 1990s. Moreover, due to a lack of documentation
- by the former regime, it is uncertain if there are other unreported stocks. Experts have expressed
- concern that some of these potentially could have fallen into the hands of terrorists.16 In 2004, the
- government arrested local arms traffickers for dealing in surface-to-air missiles, which the State
- Department believes may have been intended for "regional extremists."
- Albania continues to cooperate closely with the United States and other governments in sharing
- information and investigating terrorist-related groups and activities, according to U.S. officials.
- Albania adopted a national action plan against terrorism in 2002. Albania has expelled suspected
- Islamic extremists and terrorists. Albania has also cooperated extensively to block financial and
- other assets of persons and groups operating in Albania with suspected links to terrorists.
- In 2004, the Albanian Parliament passed a strong money-laundering law that included antiterrorist
- financing provisions, bringing Albania's legislation into compliance with international standards.
- Since December 2004, the Albanian government has frozen the assets of four organizations
- (Taibah, International Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, Al Haramein, and Global Relief
- Foundation) and four individuals (Nabil Abdul Saydi, Patricia Rosa Vinck, Yasin Al-Kadi, and
- Abdul Latif Saleh), all identified by the United Nations as suspected of supporting or funding
- extremist groups or organizations.17
- In January 2007, Albania strengthened its Criminal Code in order to bring it into line with
- counterterrorism legislation in EU countries. Among other provisions, the Code provides for the
- prosecution of those recruiting or training persons for terrorist acts, or for providing training in
- the creation or use of weapons for criminal purposes.
- Albania has ratified all 12 UN international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.
- However, the effectiveness of the government's counterterrorist efforts are hampered by
- inadequate financial resources, corruption, a lack of fully trained officers responsible for borders
- and ports, and poor communications and data processing infrastructure.18
- According to the 2002 Serbian census, Muslims make up only about 3% of Serbia's population of
- 7.5 million (excluding the province of Kosovo, a Serbian province that is currently under
- international supervision). Most are concentrated in the Sandzak region of southwestern Serbia.
- They are Muslims of Slavic ethnicity, often referred to as Bosniaks or simply as Muslims. In
- addition, ethnic Albanian Muslims are concentrated in the Presevo valley region of southeastern
- Serbia, bordering on Kosovo.
- Islamic terrorism has not been seen as a major threat in Serbia. However, a recent incident has
- raised some concerns. In March 2007, Serbian police raided a training camp for Islamic
- extremists in a cave in Sandzak and arrested four local Muslim men. They also found weapons,
- explosives, military uniforms and other supplies. On April 20, 2007, Serbian police raided the
- hideout of Ismail Prenetic, who Serbian police said was the leader of a terrorist group. Prenetic
- 16
- Joby Warrick, "Albania's Bunkers of Death," Washington Post, January 22, 2005, 4.
- 17
- Albanian newspaper Shekulli, December 22, 2004, as carried by BBC Monitoring.
- 18
- State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, 2006, from the State Department website, http://www.state.gov/.
- was shot dead by police after he or an accomplice lobbed a grenade at them. In January 2008, 15
- men associated with the terrorist camp went on trial in Serbia.
- The 2006 State Department Country Reports on Terrorism said that Serbia has been "eager to
- cooperate with the United States on a wide range of issues including border security, information
- sharing, antiterrorism financing, and export control." In June 2005, Serbian police arrested
- Abdelmajid Bouchar in a train traveling from the Hungarian border to Belgrade. A policeman
- became suspicious in part because he claimed to be an Iraqi refugee on route to Western Europe,
- despite the fact that he was traveling in the opposite direction at the time. Bouchar, a Moroccan,
- is a key suspect in the 2004 train bombings in Madrid, Spain. Serbian authorities extradited him
- to Spain in August 2005. Serbian police believe that he may have been only passing through
- Serbia, noting that the country lies on key transportation routes between Europe and Asia, but that
- they could not be certain whether he had contacts with terrorist supporters in Serbia or elsewhere
- in the region. Despite its effective action in the Bouchar case, Serbia, like other countries in the
- region, suffers from serious corruption and organized crime problems, and this situation could in
- principle make the country vulnerable to terrorism.
- In 1998 and 1999, ethnic Albanian guerrillas in Serbia's Kosovo province, angry at Serbian
- repression, fought an increasingly violent conflict with Serbian troops in the province. The United
- States and its NATO allies, outraged by Serb atrocities against ethnic Albanian civilians and
- fearing that the conflict could drag in other countries and destabilize the region, engaged in a
- NATO bombing campaign against Serbia from March to June 1999. Yugoslav leader Slobodan
- Milosevic agreed to withdraw his forces from the province in June 1999, clearing the way for the
- deployment of U.S. and other NATO peacekeepers. Since the departure of Serbian troops from
- Kosovo in 1999, Kosovo has been administered by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo
- (UNMIK), as called for by UN Security Council Resolution 1244.
- Serbian and Russian intelligence sources have repeatedly asserted the existence of a strong Al
- Qaeda presence in Kosovo, allegedly including training camps. However, observers have warned
- that caution is needed in assessing these claims, given that both countries have an interest in
- discrediting Kosovar Albanians, particularly their claims to independence from Serbia. There
- have been few reports from Western sources of terrorists operating from Kosovo. Radical Islamic
- organizations, some with links to terrorism, have attempted to recruit followers among Kosovo
- Albanian Muslims but these attempts have met with limited success. Ethnic Albanian nationalists
- have committed terrorist attacks on Serbian civilians in Kosovo, but there is little evidence so far
- that they are working with Al Qaeda or other radical Islamic groups.
- Some observers have expressed concern that powerful ethnic Albanian organized criminal groups
- from Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia (which play key roles in organized crime in Europe and the
- United States) could form an alliance with terrorist groups, but so far no such links have been
- detected, according to U.S. officials.19
- 19
- Tony Lacy, "Hunt for `Terrorism Nexus' Changes How FBI Handles Crime," USA Today, August 19, 2004, and
- discussions with U.S. officials.
- UNMIK has devolved many powers to Kosovo's Provincial Institutions of Self-Government
- (PISG), but the main responsibility for security lies with UNMIK and the NATO-led
- peacekeeping force KFOR. UNMIK's Counterterrorism Task Force has the main responsibility
- for counterterrorism efforts. In addition, the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) has established its own
- Counterterrorism Unit, with six officers.
- According to U.S. officials, UNMIK has successfully prosecuted individuals for terrorism and
- developed new tools to combat terrorist financing. In 2004, UNMIK established a Financial
- Information Center to monitor suspicious financial transactions and deter money laundering and
- identify sources of terrorist financing. In 2005, UNMIK police froze the assets of 34 individuals
- and groups on suspicion of links to terrorist activity. UNMIK's Central Intelligence Unit (CIU)
- continues to cooperate closely with the United States and other governments in sharing
- information and investigating terrorist-related groups and activities. UNMIK and the KPS
- monitored individuals entering Kosovo at official points of entry. Since July 2005, an UNMIK
- regulation has required persons who are not employed by an international organization to register
- with the KPS' Office of Foreign Registration upon entering Kosovo.
- PISG, in cooperation with UNMIK, increased monitoring of 11 foreign NGOs suspected of
- extremism and issued regulations restricting their activities, including the appropriation of one
- mosque. It also required each NGO to submit documentation that explains its projects and shows
- its bank accounts. The Kosovo Islamic Community (KIC) evaluated foreign NGOs and prohibited
- them from using public facilities for gatherings if their views were found to be extremist.
- Kosovo's counterterrorism efforts are hampered by porous boundary lines easily crossed by
- individuals trafficking in people or goods. An insufficient number of KPS border officials limited
- the ability to monitor wide expanses of mountainous terrain between crossing points. Corruption
- among border and customs officials is also a problem. KFOR patrols Kosovo's border, but many
- smuggling routes exist that would allow potential terrorists to evade detection. Terrorism
- investigations are hindered by witness intimidation and weak witness protection laws.20
- In August 2007, seven inmates broke out of a prison in western Kosovo with the help of prison
- guards. One of the men was Ramadan Shiti, a convicted terrorist from Syria. Several of the men
- have been recaptured, but Shiti remains at large.
- In early 2008, the United States and most EU countries may recognize Kosovo' independence.
- Under a plan for supervised independence, UNMIK may be succeeded by the International
- Civilian Representative (ICR) that will lack UNMIK's direct administrative control. However, the
- ICR would have the power to void any decisions or laws of the Kosovo government that are
- inconsistent with the plan, as well as the power to remove Kosovo government officials who act
- in a way that is inconsistent with the settlement. The ICR's mandate would last until an
- international steering group determines that Kosovo has implemented the settlement. The first
- review of settlement implementation would take place after two years.
- Under the plan, a mission under the EU's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) would
- monitor and advise the Kosovo government on all issues related to the rule of law, specifically the
- police, courts, customs officials, and prisons. It would also have the ability to assume "limited
- executive powers" to ensure that these institutions work properly. KFOR will likely retain control
- 20
- State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, 2006, from the State Department website, http://www.state.gov/.
- of overall security for Kosovo for a considerable time after a status settlement, but could be
- eventually replaced by an EU force. The United States and its allies may have to ensure that
- Kosovo's counterterrorism efforts remain strong as the country acquires greater control over its
- security as an independent state.
- ў
- U.S. officials have cited the threat of terrorism in the Balkans as an important reason for the need
- for continued U.S. engagement in the region. In addition to the need to combat terrorist
- infrastructure in the region, U.S. officials say that U.S. efforts to bring stability to the region also
- help to fight terrorism. They note that political instability, weak political and law enforcement
- institutions and poverty provide a breeding ground for terrorist groups. These objectives are also
- outlined in the President's National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which calls for the United
- States to work with other countries to deny terrorists sponsorship, support and sanctuary, as well
- as to work to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit.
- The United States has a variety of instruments to fight terrorism in the Balkans. One is the direct
- involvement of U.S. troops. NATO-led peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Kosovo (dubbed
- SFOR and KFOR respectively) have provided important resources for anti-terrorist efforts in the
- region. NATO troops and intelligence services work with their local counterparts and
- independently to track down and arrest suspected terrorists. The powerful influence exercised by
- international officials in Bosnia and Kosovo gives the United States more freedom to arrest and
- deport terrorists than in many European countries, which might object on civil liberties or other
- grounds.
- SFOR withdrew from Bosnia in late 2004, and was replaced by an EU-led force. The changeover
- resulted in the departure almost all of the U.S. troops in Bosnia. The European Union-led
- successor force to SFOR has counterterrorism as part of its mandate. In Kosovo, KFOR has
- 16,000 troops, including about 1,600 U.S. troops, which are expected to remain in Kosovo after
- the province's status is resolved. KFOR may eventually be replaced by an EU-led force, although
- U.S. and European officials stress that KFOR will remain in Kosovo for some time after status is
- determined. The reduction of direct international control over Kosovo will require the United
- States and other countries to establish close links with Kosovo government structures. The United
- States and its allies have made the creation of effective mechanism for fighting organized crime
- and terrorism one of its objectives in Kosovo.
- The overall U.S. aid program to the region, aimed at bringing stability to the region through
- strengthening the rule of law and promoting economic reform, also serves to combat the
- sometimes lawless climate in the region in which terrorists can thrive. For FY2008, the President
- requested $32.95 million for Bosnia, $20 million for Albania, $53.25 million for Serbia, and
- $151.65 million for Kosovo. The relatively large sum for Kosovo for FY2008, and an additional
- $279 million for Kosovo in an FY2007 supplemental funding request, is owing to a U.S. desire to
- support Kosovo quickly after its political status is determined.
- In Bosnia, part of the U.S. aid supports technical assistance, training and equipment to build the
- capacities of the police forces in both entities, the State Border Service, the State Information and
- Protection Agency, the High Judicial Prosecutorial Council and other organizations. One project,
- co-funded with the EU, was the donation of an integrated data network for Bosnia's police
- forces.21 U.S. aid also helps to develop Bosnia's export control regime, including over weapons of
- mass destruction and dual-use technology. U.S. aid to Albania also includes assistance to
- strengthen Albania's border controls, port security, and law enforcement agencies, and cut off
- terrorist financing. Aid to Kosovo includes funds to strengthen the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)
- and Kosovo's judiciary.
- The United States views the region, with its reputation as a crossroads for various forms of
- smuggling, as an important participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative, which aims to work
- to interdict WMD-related items. The United States has encouraged regional cooperation on
- terrorism and international crime through the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI).
- SECI's Regional Center to Combat Transborder Crime, based in Romania, attempts to build
- cooperation to combat organized crime and various forms of trafficking, enhance border security,
- and improve training for border security personnel.
- U.S. assistance also includes bilateral aid to the countries of the region to fight terrorism. The
- Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program provides equipment and training to fight terrorism, with
- an emphasis on training the trainers. ATA programs provide advice to countries on
- counterterrorism and police administration and management, how to teach counterterrorism in
- police academies, and modern interrogation and investigative techniques. The Administration
- requested $650,000 in ATA assistance for Bosnia for FY2008.
- In the longer term, efforts to stabilize the region and thereby perhaps reduce its attractiveness to
- terrorists, are also dependent upon integrating it into Euro-Atlantic institutions. The prospect of
- Euro-Atlantic integration for the region is encouraging these countries to take steps that will
- enable them to more effectively fight terrorism. The European Union has stated its goal of
- incorporating all of the countries of the region into the EU, although this prospect seems a long
- way off, with the possible exception of Croatia.
- All of the countries of the region are seeking or may one day seek NATO membership as well.
- Three NATO candidate states--Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia--are linked in the U.S.-
- brokered "Adriatic Charter," which is aimed at improving their qualifications for NATO
- membership. The Adriatic Charter countries have contributed troops to peacekeeping efforts in
- Afghanistan. In addition, Albania and Macedonia have contributed soldiers to U.S.-led operations
- in Iraq. One or all of the Adriatic Charter countries may be invited to join NATO at the alliance's
- April 2008 summit. Most observers believe that Croatia's qualifications for membership are
- stronger than those of the other two countries.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina lacks the prospect of NATO membership until it unifies its police forces,
- implements key political reforms, and cooperates with the International Criminal Tribunal for the
- former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, it has deployed a small military contingent to Iraq and joined
- NATO's Partnership for Peace program in December 2006. Kosovo's undetermined status
- excludes it from even potential EU and NATO membership, at least until its independence is
- recognized.
- 21
- HINA Croatian news agency press dispatch, April 13, 2005.
- Congress has dealt with the issue of Islamic terrorism in the Balkans through hearings and
- legislation on global counterterrorism issues, providing funding and oversight for programs aimed
- at combating terrorism worldwide, mainly in regions such as the Middle East and South Asia
- where the threat is deemed to be the greatest, but also in other regions, such as the Balkans. In
- addition, Congress has appropriated foreign aid for the Balkans aimed at enhancing stability and
- improving the rule of law in the region, objectives that also bolster counterterrorism efforts.
- Since the deployment of U.S. forces to Bosnia in 1995, in annual appropriations bills Congress
- has authorized to President to withhold aid to Bosnia if he certifies that the Bosnian Federation
- (the Bosniak-Croat entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) is not complying with provisions of
- the Dayton Peace Accords that require the withdrawal of foreign forces from Bosnia or if Bosnian
- intelligence cooperation with state sponsors of terrorism or terrorist organizations has not ceased.
- The Administration has not withheld U.S. aid to Bosnia on the basis of these provisions.
- The United States and its allies have been able to reduce the terrorist threat from the Balkans over
- the past decade for several reasons, some of which may be applicable to other regions and others
- not. The U.S. insistence that all foreign forces leave Bosnia in 1995, backed up by Congressional
- aid conditions, may have reduced the possible threat to U.S. forces in Bosnia in the immediate
- post-war period as well as removed a serious threat to Bosnian stabilization efforts. U.S. military
- interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo were perceived by Muslims in the region to be undertaken to
- benefit them, thereby bolstering pro-American sentiment. Most elites in the region, both Muslim
- and otherwise, view the region's future as integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions, making them
- especially eager to help the United States fight terrorism in the region.
- However, observers note that complacency would be unwise. Conditions could emerge that could
- increase the terrorist threat in the future. The stability of the region is fragile and law enforcement
- and other public institutions are still weak. Some terrorists now fighting in Iraq may decide to
- redeploy to other regions, including the Balkans, in the future. Conversely, future recruits from
- the Balkans could also go to Iraq to join the insurgency. Terrorists could obtain weapons and
- explosives from the region's thriving black market in such items for use in attacks in Western
- Europe or other regions.
- Steven Woehrel
- Specialist in European Affairs
- swoehrel@crs.loc.gov, 7-2291
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