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Abu Sayyaf Group (Islamic Studies)

Jul 19th, 2017
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  1. Introduction
  2.  
  3. The Abu Sayyaf, also known as Al-Harakat al-Islamiyah (Islamic movement), is one of several Muslim movements seeking to establish an Islamic state in the southern Philippines. However, their violent activities directed randomly at private citizens and lack of ideological grounding have generated questions on the nature and purposes of the organization. Stories on the genesis of the Abu Sayyaf vary, with some media reports asserting that it was created by the Philippine military as a way of infiltrating Muslim movements and others claiming that its founder was genuinely motivated to establish an Islamic state. Sources, however, are in agreement regarding Abu Sayyaf’s founder, Abdurazak Janjalani, a former member of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) who studied in Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan and who left the MNLF because he felt that its chairman, Nur Misuari, was pursuing a secular path in the group’s quest for an independent Muslim state. Janjalani was also reported to have fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The name Abu Sayyaf, meaning “father of the swordsman,” was Janjalani’s nom de guerre, which, in turn, is derived from the name of Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf, Janjalani’s mentor at a training camp in Afghanistan. While still organizing the movement in the early 1990s, Janjalani also preached at the mosques in Basilan and Zamboanga and those discourses are major sources of information on Janjalani’s ideological leanings. A major focus of his sermons was pursuing jihad fi sabil lillah (struggle in the path of God), including martyrdom, which he believed to be the only way to achieve a pure Islamic state. Janjalani demonstrated his anti-Christian sentiments in attacking Christian missionaries and launching campaigns against Christian symbols. He led the movement for less than a decade and was killed in an encounter with the police in 1998. His brother, Khaddafy Janjalani, took over the leadership but multiple factions developed within the group, especially after Khaddafy’s death in a clash with the military. In the 1980s, the Abu Sayyaf was reported to have received financial support from the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), which was run by Mohammad Khalifa, the brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden. In recent times, the Abu Sayyaf has gained notoriety for its tactic of kidnapping, especially foreign nationals, to secure ransom monies. The ransom payments fund the movement and its members. Studies show linkages of the Abu Sayyaf group with both al-Qaeda and the Jamiah Islamiah of Indonesia, in terms of funding and training, as well as with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines. The United States lists the Abu Sayyaf as a terrorist organization, and its operations, together with its transnational linkages, are major reasons that, since 11 September 2001, US military aid has been extended to the Philippines.
  4.  
  5. General Overviews
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  7. Works focusing on the Abu Sayyaf have multiplied in the last ten years. Banlaoi 2008, a compilation of essays on the group, was published online by the nongovernmental organization Philippine Institute for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. Gunaratna 2001 provides a concise introduction to the Abu Sayyaf. Chalk 2001, Abuza 2003, and Gross 2007 look at the Abu Sayyaf within the context of separatist movements in Southeast Asia while Wadi 1996 and Tan 2003 situate the Abu Sayyaf within Philippine Muslim movements that aim for a separate state but employ different methods to attain a similar goal. Scholars writing on the subject use the same materials, including military reports that are at times conflicting. Ugarte 2008 explains that this reliance is due to the lack of primary sources concerning the Abu Sayyaf, particularly on the organization and ideology of the group. The death of Abu Sayyaf’s founder, Abdul Razzak Janjalani, in less than a decade after the group’s formation and the fact that most of his discourses in his native Tausug language have neither been translated nor published further exacerbates the problem of sources.
  8.  
  9. Abuza, Zachary. Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003.
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  11. Provides general information on the Abu Sayyaf as one of the radical groups operating in Southeast Asia and notes the group’s transformation from “parochial jihadis” to international terrorists. Also discussed are state responses to terrorism.
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  13.  
  14. Banlaoi, Rommel. Al-Harakatul al-Islamiyyah: Essays on the Abu Sayyaf Group. Quezon City, Philippines: Philippines Institute for Political Violence and Terrorism (PIPVTR), 2008.
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  16. Includes four previously published essays that have been revised and updated. Looks at the evolution of the Abu Sayyaf within the context of terrorism in the Philippines. Useful for both undergraduates and graduate students studying the movement.
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  18.  
  19. Chalk, Peter. “Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanao and Aceh.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24 (2001): 241–269.
  20. DOI: 10.1080/10576100116748Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  21. A comparative study that views armed separatism in Southeast Asia as displaying similar local causes. Aceh is seen as the most volatile of the three cases, which will have long-term implications for the members of the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) and the region.
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  23.  
  24. Gross, Max L. A Muslim Archipelago. Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College, 2007.
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  26. Provides the historical contexts in which insurgency in four countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand) developed. The chapter on the Philippines discusses the approaches of Philippine presidents, from Marcos to Arroyo, to the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and Abu Sayyaf. Good comparative introduction for undergraduates and nonspecialists.
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  28.  
  29. Gunaratna, Rohan. “The Evolution and Tactics of the Abu Sayyaf Group.” Jane’s Intelligence Review (July 2001): 29–32.
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  31. Useful introduction to the Abu Sayyaf, including beginnings, activities, foreign linkages, financial networks, and activities.
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  33.  
  34. Tan, Samuel K. Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle. Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies, 2003.
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  36. Offers a “tentative” assessment of the origins, objectives, ideology, and method of struggle of the Abu Sayyaf using Abu Sayyaf documents and pronouncements. The first edition of the book was published in 1995 and the present edition includes a chapter on the Abu Sayyaf. The bibliographic essay should have been updated.
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  38.  
  39. Ugarte, Eduardo F. “The Alliance System of the Abu Sayyaf, 1993–2000.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31 (2008): 125–144.
  40. DOI: 10.1080/10576100701812902Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  41. Uses Thomas Kiefer’s theoretical framework for analyzing the alliance system of the Abu Sayyaf. Notes issues regarding the use of intelligence reports that, at times, depend on the purposes of the issuing agency.
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  43.  
  44. Wadi, Julkipli. “Philippine Political Islam and the Emerging Fundamentalist Strand.” Social Science Information 24 (January–June 1996): 26–34.
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  46. Views the Abu Sayyaf within the context of Philippine Muslim movements and considers it as constituting a fundamentalist strand.
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  48.  
  49. Roots of Muslim Separatism in the Philippines
  50.  
  51. Like the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the goal of the Abu Sayyaf is to establish an independent Islamic state in the southern Philippines. It is necessary, therefore, to look at the Abu Sayyaf in the context of other movements that advance the cause of Muslim separatism in the Philippines. Glang 1969 traces the secessionist movement not only to the Muslim colonial experience, but also to neglect of Muslims by the national government and by their own Muslim leaders. Tan 1977 looks at the various movements directed against the American colonial government. George 1980 echoes Glang’s causes of Muslim secessionism. Majul 1985 focuses on the development of the Moro National Liberation Front while Che Man 1990 provides a comparison between the causes and nature of the Philippine and Thai Muslim movements. Like the others, Rodil 2004 views economic and political deprivation as root causes of grievances that, in turn, led Muslims to organize secessionist movements. McKenna 1998 presents a different approach in using theories of hegemony and ethnonationalism to explain how ordinary urban Muslims view secessionism. Works on Muslim separatism basically see contemporary problems in the southern Philippines as traceable to colonial policies that marginalized Muslims. These materials are dated but, nevertheless, they provide the background for understanding contemporary Muslim separatist movements in the Philippines.
  52.  
  53. Che Man, W. K. Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand. Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1990.
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  55. Comparative study of Philippine and Thai Muslim secessionist movements and the persistence of ethnicity in the historical struggles of the two peoples. Appendixes include documents of the movements.
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  57.  
  58. George, T. J. S. Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.
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  60. Sorts out the causes of the Muslim rebellion in the Philippines, which range from cultural and religious marginalization during the colonial period to the assimilation policies of the government to the settlement of Christians. George is a journalist and writes in that style, with some parts of the book requiring further documentation.
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  62.  
  63. Glang, Alunan. Muslim Secession or Integration? Quezon City, Philippines: R. P. Garcia, 1969.
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  65. Dated but still useful for its discussion of the Muslim Independence Movement and the Moro leaders of the time. Also included are documents of the movement in the appendixes.
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  67.  
  68. Majul, Cesar A. The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines. Berkeley, CA: Mizan, 1985.
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  70. Focus is on the Moro National Liberation Front but provides the historical background for the development of secessionism as a response to the policies of the colonial and independent governments and the injustices to the Muslims that resulted.
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  72.  
  73. McKenna, Thomas. Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.
  74. DOI: 10.1525/california/9780520210158.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  75. Based on extensive fieldwork in Cotabato, Philippines. Takes a different approach from other works on the subject in analyzing the responses of the urban masses to the problem of separatism. Critiques earlier studies and shows that ordinary Muslims join the movement for different reasons and not necessarily to attain an independent nation.
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  77.  
  78. Rodil, B. R. The Minoritization of the Indigenous Communities of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. Davao City, Philippines: Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao, 2004.
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  80. Provides a clear and concise presentation of how the state system of land ownership and use displaced the indigenous peoples of the Philippines, including Muslims and Lumads (non-Muslim minorities), and reduced them to minority status.
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  82.  
  83. Tan, Samuel K. The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle, 1900–1972. Makati, Philippines: Filipinas Foundation, 1977.
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  85. Using a historical approach, the author analyzes the armed struggles and their causes from the early period of American rule to the eve of the imposition of martial law in the Philippines. Notes the patterns and similarities of the struggles through time. Useful appendixes included.
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  87.  
  88. Beginnings
  89.  
  90. Rommel Banlaoi has a number of works on the Abu Sayyaf, and each of them, Banlaoi 2006a, Banlaoi 2006b, and Banlaoi 2008, provides an introduction to the beginnings of the movement. Abuza 2005 focuses on the reemergence of the Abu Sayyaf and, like the other works, includes the beginnings of the group. These works cite each other and each constitutes similar versions on the development of the Abu Sayyaf. It is inevitable, therefore, that the bibliography on the Abu Sayyaf is repetitive. Turner 1995 includes a chronology of the activities of the Abu Sayyaf, and Tan 2003 has translated some of the discourses of the founder of the Abu Sayyaf and uses these materials to construct the beginnings of the movement. Tan 2003 has also been cited by the others. Coronel-Ferrer 1997 focuses on the peace process in the Philippines and includes an annotated list of various groups that promote or threaten peace. The Abu Sayyaf is included among the latter.
  91.  
  92. Abuza, Zachary. Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf. Carlisle, PA: Army War College Strategic Institute, 2005.
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  94. Provides a brief historical background of the organization of the Abu Sayyaf, its decline, and its regeneration beginning in 2003 when it was involved in a bombing incident in Davao City. Explains the connections among the Abu Sayyaf, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and Jamiah Islamiah as a major reason for the former’s regeneration.
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  96.  
  97. Banlaoi, Rommel. “The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism.” Southeast Asian Affairs (2006a): 247–262.
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  99. Discusses the allegation that the Abu Sayyaf was created by the government in order to infiltrate Muslim movements. Relies primarily on intelligence records and interviews with the military and members of the Muslim movements. It is problematic as to whether the Abu Sayyaf has abandoned banditry.
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  101.  
  102. Banlaoi, Rommel. “The Roots and Evolution of Terrorist Movements in the Philippines: The Abu Sayyaf Experience.” In Building a CATR Research Agenda: Proceedings of the Third Bi-annual International Symposium of the Center for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR) Held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, 1-3 March 2006. Edited by Caroline Ziemke, Sutu Limaye, Kongdon Oh Hassig, and John T. Hanley, Jr., 19–40. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, 2006b.
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  104. Traces the evolution of terrorist movements in the Philippines focusing on the Abu Sayyaf. Essentially similar to the first chapter of Banlaoi 2008.
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  106.  
  107. Banlaoi, Rommel. Al Harakatul al Islamiyyah: Essays on the Abu Sayyaf Group. Quezon City, Philippines: Philippine Institute for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR), 2008.
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  109. The roots and evolution of the Abu Sayyaf as a terrorist movement in the Philippines are discussed in chapter 1 along with the issue of the use of the term terrorism.
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  111.  
  112. Coronel-Ferrer, Miriam, ed. Peace Matters: A Philippine Peace Compendium. Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies, 1997.
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  114. Compendium of peace organizations, activities, and profiles of rebel groups. Section on the Abu Sayyaf mentions various theories on the organization of the movement and the tension between the Abu Sayyaf and the Moro National Liberation Front. Useful introduction to various movements in the Philippines as well as peace activities of the government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
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  116.  
  117. Tan, Samuel. Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle. Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies, 2003.
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  119. The value of Tan’s work lies in his having used Abu Sayyaf documents that were not accessible to other scholars in tracing the beginnings of the movement.
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  121.  
  122. Turner, Mark. “Terrorism and Secession in the Southern Philippines: The Rise of the Abu Sayyaf.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 17.1 (1995): 1–19.
  123. DOI: 10.1355/CS17-1ASave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  124. Traces the emergence of the Abu Sayyaf from a small group to one of the most feared in the Philippines. Places the Abu Sayyaf within the context of the Philippine socioeconomic and political situation and as a manifestation of a centuries-old conflict between the government and Muslims. Includes a chronology of Abu Sayyaf activities from 1992 to 1995.
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  126.  
  127. Organizational Structure
  128.  
  129. Banlaoi 2006 and Banlaoi 2008 discuss the organizational structure as envisioned by Abdurazak Janjalani, but Ugarte 2008 finds it difficult to verify Banlaoi’s reconstruction because of the lack of primary materials. The author presents case studies to show media representations of the Abu Sayyaf, which, in turn, makes understanding the configuration of the group difficult. To Ugarte 2009, the inconsistencies of military and media reports on the organization of the Abu Sayyaf resulted in the misapplication of the Abu Sayyaf label. This observation is shared by Turner 2003, who adds that the budget of the military is affected by the level of violence waged by the Abu Sayyaf in the southern Philippines. Gutierrez 1999 rejects the use of the terms rebel or revolutionary to describe the Abu Sayyaf and, like Turner 2003, views the adherents of the Abu Sayyaf as successful entrepreneurs of violence who have managed to survive in spite of the military operations against them. Wadi 2003, Collier 2006, and the others mentioned above describe the organization of the Abu Sayyaf as a system of alliances that reflect the factional nature and patron-client relationship that are characteristic of Philippine politics and, more specifically, of factions and alliances among Muslim groups.
  130.  
  131. Banlaoi, Rommel. “The Abu Sayyaf: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism.” Southeast Asian Affairs (2006): 247–262.
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  133. Rommel contends that Janjalani’s unrealized organizational plans for the Abu Sayyaf included an Islamic Executive Council that would have included two committees, one for fund-raising and Islamic education and the other for agitation and propaganda activities. Banlaoi’s reconstruction is based mainly on military sources that other authors have questioned.
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  135.  
  136. Banlaoi, Rommel. Al-Harakatul al-Islamiyyah: Essays on the Abu Sayyaf Group. Quezon City, Philippines: Philippines Institute for Political Violence and Terrorism (PIPVTR), 2008.
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  138. Chapter 2 discusses the envisioned organizational structure and leadership dynamics of the movement. Provides tables listing the Basilan- and Sulu-based names of Abu Sayyaf groups and their respective leaders.
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  140.  
  141. Collier, Kit. “Terrorism: Evolving Regional Alliances and State Failure in Mindanao.” Southeast Asian Affairs (2006): 26–38.
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  143. Calls for the need to look at interpersonal relationships among members of terrorist groups as a guide to understanding the dynamics of the movements. This is a departure from the usual treatment of the linkages as institutional.
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  145.  
  146. Gutierrez, Eric. “New Faces of Violence in Muslim Mindanao.” In Rebels, Warlords and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines. Edited by Kristina Gaerlan and Mara Stankovich, 351–362. Quezon City, Philippines: Institute for Popular Democracy, 1999.
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  148. Rejects the description of the Abu Sayyaf as a revolutionary or rebel movement in favor of one that defines the adherents as “entrepreneurs in violence” who are motivated by profit. Volume is useful for understanding the different facets of Muslim separatism in the Philippines.
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  150.  
  151. Turner, Mark. “The Management of Violence in a Conflict Organization: The Case of the Abu Sayyaf.” Public Organization Review 3.4 (December 2003): 387–401.
  152. DOI: 10.1023/B:PORJ.0000004816.29771.0fSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  153. Uses organizational analyses on the Abu Sayyaf’s development and maintenance of organizational structures that fit the environment in which it operates. It is a small group but one that has developed the ability to move quickly in the jungle terrain and outpace the military.
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  155.  
  156. Ugarte, Eduardo F. “The Alliance System of the Abu Sayyaf, 1993–2000.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31.2 (2008): 125–144.
  157. DOI: 10.1080/10576100701812902Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  158. Using the findings of Thomas Kiefer (The Tausug: Violence and Law in a Philippine Moslem Society. Illinois: Waveland, 1972), Ugarte analyzes the similarities between the traditional Tausug (a Muslim tribe in the southern Philippines) alliance system and the Abu Sayyaf and shows that there are characteristics of traditional alliance systems that persist through time. Very useful; also notes the inconsistencies in the military reports.
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  160.  
  161. Ugarte, Eduardo F. “The ‘Lost Command’ of Julhani Jillang: An Alliance from the Southwestern Philippines.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32 (2009): 303–321.
  162. DOI: 10.1080/10576100902746651Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  163. Interesting perspective on the organization of the Abu Sayyaf, claiming that the members are bound together not by an ideology but rather by friendship and kinship ties and a shared history of opposition to the Philippine government. Alliance networks provide the basis of larger organizations and the loyalties remain within the small alliance.
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  165.  
  166. Wadi, Julkipli. “They’ve Come This Far.” Newsbreak, 1 January 2003.
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  168. Asserts that the Abu Sayyaf is a loose group of disenchanted Muslim youth and its existence is due to the government’s having allowed the group to play a “contradictory role” in Philippine politics. Article is very critical of the way that the Philippine government has dealt with the Abu Sayyaf.
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  170.  
  171. Ideological Basis of the Movement
  172.  
  173. Few materials are available on the ideological basis of the Abu Sayyaf group. Adbul Razak Janjalani expounded his ideas in his khutbahs (sermons) in the mosque in Sulu and Basilan but they were in Tausug and the translations have yet to be published. Tan 2003, Wadi 1996, and Wadi 2003 had access to the materials and their works refer to the khutbahs (sermons) delivered by Janjalani. These studies have been cited, in turn, by the authors of other works, such as Banlaoi 2006.
  174.  
  175. Banlaoi, Rommel. “The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism.” Southeast Asian Affairs (2006): 247–262.
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  177. The article includes a section on the ideological inclination of the Abu Sayyaf, which is based mainly on its founder’s (Janjalani) religious and political ideas advocating jihad as a way of seeking justice for Philippine Muslims.
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  179.  
  180. Tan, Samuel. Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle. Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines Center for Integrative Studies, 2003.
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  182. This second edition includes a chapter on the Abu Sayyaf. Tan analyzes the origins and ideological bases of the movement based on the oral statements and written literature of members of the group and asserts that the Abu Sayyaf’s ideological orientation fits into the al-Qaeda network.
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  184.  
  185. Wadi, Julkipli. “Philippine Political Islam and the Emerging Fundamentalist Strand.” Social Science Information 24 (January–June 1996): 26–34.
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  187. Considers the Abu Sayyaf as a fundamentalist strand of Philippine political Islam. Looks at the ideological patterns of the movement and traces the development of radical Islamic thought in the Philippines to the colonial period. Also notes how Philippine Muslim movements are affected by the international confluences of political Islam via Philippine ulama (sing. alim, religious scholar) returning from the Middle East.
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  189.  
  190. Wadi, Julkipli. “They’ve Come This Far.” Newsbreak, 1 January 2003.
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  192. Article notes the political thought of Janjalani through his fatwas (religious rulings) and sermons delivered in mosques in which he emphasized jihad as warfare to be waged as a personal obligation.
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  194.  
  195. Financing the Movement
  196.  
  197. Kidnapping for ransom is the main source of income of the Abu Sayyaf, with extortion and monthly so-called revolutionary taxes as other sources of revenue, as Gunaratna 2001 discusses. Few sources indicate the amount of ransom money and how the funds are used. Aventajado 2004, written by the Philippine government representative in the negotiations with the Abu Sayyaf on the 2000 kidnapping, narrates the hostage negotiation process, including issues on who was going to pay and the amount of ransom money to be paid. Burnham and Merrill 2003, a memoir written by one of the foreign hostages taken on Sipadan Island, includes discussions by Abu Sayyaf members of ransom money. Cueto 2000 details the distribution of ransom money and notes the involvement of other factions, such as a Chinese drug syndicate, in the kidnapping. In addition to indicating who received how much of the ransom money, Mustafa and Young 2000 also tracks down how it was used. Although Herrera 2000 deals largely with the link between the Philippine secretary of tourism and the International Islamic Relief Organization. the article gives information on individuals involved with the organization who are suspected of helping fund the Abu Sayyaf. Agence-France Presse 2012 notes that kidnapping has served as the Abu Sayyaf’s main source of income in recent years. The main sources of information for ransom are Philippine newspapers such as the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star, but the amounts involved are not usually revealed. Newspaper articles are not always accessible online but are always available in Philippine libraries.
  198.  
  199. Agence-France Presse. “Abu Sayyaf Relies on Kidnapping to Survive.” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 3 February 2012.
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  201. Informative piece on kidnapping as the means by which the Abu Sayyaf secures funding since support from the Middle East has declined and US-supported Philippine military activities have taken a toll on the movement.
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  203.  
  204. Aventajado, Roberto N. 140 Days of Terror: In the Clutches of the Abu Sayyaf. Pasig City, Philippines: Anvil, 2004.
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  206. Presents the details of the process as well as the sources, manner of payment, and amount of ransom money. Book discusses the involvement of other governments, especially Libya, in providing ransom money for the international hostages; partly a response to critics of the hostage negotiations and to questions on who received the money.
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  208.  
  209. Burnham, Gracia, and Dean Merrill. In the Presence of My Enemies. Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House, 2003.
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  211. Account of the kidnapping of the author and twenty-three others in May and June 2001. The authors recount the negotiations and bargaining between the Abu Sayyaf and government representatives, which gives an idea of the amount of ransom and how it is distributed among members of the Abu Sayyaf.
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  213.  
  214. Cueto, Donna S. “Source Says Some Groups Took Cuts on P9-M Payoff.” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10 August 2000.
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  216. An article written on the basis of police reports and interviews that raises issues on the amount and distribution of ransom money among the Abu Sayyaf and its affiliates. Should be read alongside Aventajado 2004.
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  218.  
  219. Gunaratna, Rohan. “The Evolution and Tactics of the Abu Sayyaf Group.” Jane’s Intelligence Review 13 (July 2001): 29–32.
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  221. Part of the article discusses the sources of revenue of the Abu Sayyaf aside from kidnapping for ransom.
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  223.  
  224. Herrera, Christine. “Gemma Linked to Bin Laden Group Funding Abu Sayyaf, MILF.” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10 August 2000.
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  226. Useful for getting information on the workings of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), an entity established by a brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden in the Philippines that has been reputed to be supporting the Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
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  228.  
  229. Mustafa, Noralyn, and Alexander Young. “How Abu Sayyaf Divided P245-M Loot.” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 17 August 2000.
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  231. Presents details on the distribution of ransom money to Abu Sayyaf members based on police reports and other sources.
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  233.  
  234. Defining the Abu Sayyaf
  235.  
  236. Movements are usually defined by their goals and the types of activities they pursue. In the early years, the Abu Sayyaf declared as its goal the establishment of an independent Islamic state in the southern Philippines. However, Ugarte 2010, Ugarte 2008, and Torres 2001 question the classification of Abu Sayyaf as a secessionist movement since the group’s initial goal of establishing an Islamic state has been muted by their kidnapping for ransom activities and random attacks against civilian populations in recent years. Turner 1995 explores the military’s perception of the Abu Sayyaf. Gutierrez 1999 sees the members of the Abu Sayyaf as both predators and social bandits who specialize in the enterprise of violence while Banlaoi 2006 views the involvement of the Abu Sayyaf in bombing activities as an indicator of the group’s transformation into a terrorist organization.
  237.  
  238. Banlaoi, Rommel. “The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism.” Southeast Asian Affairs (2006): 247–262.
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  240. Defines and classifies terrorism in the Philippines and considers the earlier activities of the Abu Sayyaf to have been acts of banditry, which have evolved into acts of terrorism in line with other contemporary global terrorist movements.
  241. Find this resource:
  242.  
  243. Gutierrez, Eric. “New Faces of Violence in Muslim Mindanao.” In Rebels, Warlords and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines. Edited by Kristina Gaerlan and Mara Stankovich, 351–362. Quezon City, Philippines: Institute for Popular Democracy, 1999.
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  245. Presents a typology of violence under which groups can be classified and concludes that the Abu Sayyaf is a new group that engages in violence as a business enterprise. Findings raise questions on the view of the Abu Sayyaf as a group motivated on the basis of religion.
  246. Find this resource:
  247.  
  248. Torres, Jose. Into the Mountain: Hostaged by the Abu Sayyaf. Quezon City, Philippines: Claretian, 2001.
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  250. Book deals with more than the kidnapping of a Catholic priest of the Claretian order. Chapter on Abu Sayyaf includes material on the beginnings of the group as narrated by members who were interviewed by the author. Helpful for understanding both the activities and the genesis of the movement.
  251. Find this resource:
  252.  
  253. Turner, Mark. “Terrorism and Secession in the Southern Philippines: The Rise of the Abu Sayyaf.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 17.1 (1995): 1–19.
  254. DOI: 10.1355/CS17-1ASave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  255. A section of the article looks at the composition of the Abu Sayyaf and how it is perceived by others, particularly the military, which has often portrayed the members as “extremist bandits.” Questions intelligence reports on the hierarchical structure of the group.
  256. Find this resource:
  257.  
  258. Ugarte, Eduardo F. “The Phenomenon of Kidnapping in the Southern Philippines.” Southeast Asia Research 16.3 (2008): 293–341.
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  260. Calls for a critical analysis of the government’s portrayal of the Abu Sayyaf as composed of kidnappers and criminals. Kidnapping is not a monopoly of the group and, at times, it is outsourced to them by power brokers in Mindanao, thus making the characterization of the Abu Sayyaf as a group of Islamist militants problematic.
  261. Find this resource:
  262.  
  263. Ugarte, Eduardo. “‘In a Wilderness of Mirrors’: The Use and Abuse of the ‘Abu Sayyaf’ Label in the Philippines.” Southeast Asia Research 18.3 (2010): 373–413.
  264. DOI: 10.5367/sear.2010.0002Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  265. Characterization of the Abu Sayyaf as a “militant Islamist organization” by the media and the military is questioned and analyzed using the propaganda model proposed by Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky. Raises critical issues with implications for public perception and military operations.
  266. Find this resource:
  267.  
  268. International Linkages
  269.  
  270. The connection between the Abu Sayyaf and al-Qaeda, which is explored in Abuza 2002 and International Crisis Group 2008, became an issue that was prominently discussed after 11 September 2001. Tan 2003 focuses more on the Moro National Liberation Front but devotes a chapter to the Abu Sayyaf, which has developed ideological linkages to al-Qaeda and Jamiyah Islamiyya. Ressa 2003 contends that these movements and their radicalism are grounded in local political, economic, historical, and social problems, and they are linked by al-Qaeda’s ideology to other regional movements. Collier 2006 (cited under Organizational Structure) sees these regional alliances as based more on the interpersonal relationships of members of the movement, which were formed in varying conditions, including experiences gained in exile, training camps, and combat. Vitug and Gloria 2000 views the Abu Sayyaf within the context of other regional and global Muslim movements. Arsenault 2011 discusses how plans for 9/11 were initially hatched in the Philippines, suggesting the linkage between the Abu Sayyaf and al-Qaeda. In February 2012, the Philippine military launched an airstrike in territory controlled by the Abu Sayyaf in Sulu. Evangelista 2012 reports that three leaders, including a Singaporean and two Malaysian members of the Jamiah Islamiah, were among those who were killed, thus further supporting the assertion that the Abu Sayyaf is connected with foreign terrorists. However, what the implications are of these linkages with other movements remains an open question.
  271.  
  272. Abuza, Zachary. “Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 24.3 (December 2002): 427–465.
  273. DOI: 10.1355/CS24-3ASave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  274. Article provides historical background to the various movements linked with al-Qaeda in the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Burma. The al-Qaeda linkage grew out of personal connections with Asian mujahedins (fighters) who were involved in the Afghan war.
  275. Find this resource:
  276.  
  277. Arsenault, Adrienne. The Forgotten Front. CBC News, 8 September 2011.
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  279. Gives the viewer an idea of the Abu Sayyaf and Philippine military activities against the group as well as clips of American troops in the southern Philippines participating in the war on terror. Comments from journalists Maria Ressa and Ces Drilon, who was once held hostage, on the connections between al-Qaeda and the Abu Sayyaf.
  280. Find this resource:
  281.  
  282. Evangelista, Katherine. “3 Terrorist Leaders, 12 Followers Killed in Sulu Raid.” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2 February 2012.
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  284. Describes the airstrike and identifies the leaders who were killed and for whose arrest or capture the United States had offered rewards. Questions about the report linger since the bodies of the leaders have not been found.
  285. Find this resource:
  286.  
  287. International Crisis Group. “The Philippines: Counter-insurgency vs. Counter-terrorism in Mindanao.” Asia Report 152. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2008.
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  289. A section of the report includes a brief discussion of the beginnings of the Abu Sayyaf group but pays more attention to its linkages with al-Qaeda and Jamiah Islamiah.
  290. Find this resource:
  291.  
  292. Ressa, Maria A. Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al Qaeda’s Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia. New York: Free Press, 2003.
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  294. Based on intelligence reports, military dispatches, and interviews with members of the Abu Sayyaf and other Muslim groups. Part personal narrative of Ressa’s work as an investigative journalist for CNN and eventually as bureau chief in Indonesia. Emphasizes the linkages among the Jamiah Islamiah, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and al-Qaeda but needs to discuss the implications of these linkages.
  295. Find this resource:
  296.  
  297. Tan, Samuel. Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle. Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines Center for Integrative Studies, 2003.
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  299. Discusses the internationalization of the Muslim movements in the Philippines, particularly the Moro National Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf with the former seeking support from the Organization of Islamic Conference and the latter pursuing connections with the al-Qaeda network. One of the early works on the international dimension of Philippine Muslim movements.
  300. Find this resource:
  301.  
  302. Vitug, Maritess, and Glenda Gloria. Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao. Quezon City, Philippines: Institute for Popular Democracy, 2000.
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  304. Like Banlaoi 2008 (cited under General Overviews), this is one of the most-cited works on Philippine separatism and the Abu Sayyaf in terms of information on the group. The book cites several accounts that raise further questions on the relationship between the Abu Sayyaf and the military.
  305. Find this resource:
  306.  
  307. The United States, the War on Terror, and the Abu Sayyaf
  308.  
  309. The Abu Sayyaf has been considered a terrorist organization by the United States since 1977. Abinales and Quimpo 2008 and McGeary, et al. 2002 note how political and international analysts describe the Philippines after 11 September as the “second front in the war on terror.” The existence of the Abu Sayyaf and the reported linkages with other groups, such as the Jamiah Islamiah and al-Qaeda, are reasons that are cited for the continued military presence of the United States in the southern Philippines. A number of works, such as Herbert Docena’s chapter (titled “Unconventional Warfare: Are US Special Forces Engaged in an ‘Offensive War’ in the Philippines?”) in Abinales and Quimpo 2008 focus on the role of the United States in curbing terrorism and, at the same time, critique the presence of American troops in the country. The Philippines participated as a member of the US-led coalition in Iraq but eventually pulled out after a Filipino was kidnapped in the country. Tyner 2005 explores the factors that led to the country’s participation in the US-led coalition and looks at the connection between Philippine foreign policy and labor migration.
  310.  
  311. Abinales, Patricio, and Nathan Gilbert Quimpo. The US and the War on Terror in the Philippines. Manila, Philippines: Anvil, 2008.
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  313. Four chapters are on US involvement in the southern Philippines. Renato Cruz de Castro looks at the security alliance between the United States and the Philippines; Herbert Docena questions the presence of US troops; Patricio Abinales analyzes the acceptance by Filipinos of American troops; Nathan Gilbert Quimpo examines US participation in solving the “ethnic conflict” in the southern Philippines.
  314. Find this resource:
  315.  
  316. McGeary, Johanna, Nelly Sindayen, Mark Thompson, and Phil Zabriskie. “Next Stop Mindanao.” Time, 28 January 2002.
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  318. Short article on sending US troops to the southern Philippines to train the military in an effort to help disband the Abu Sayyaf.
  319. Find this resource:
  320.  
  321. Tyner, James A. Iraq, Terror and the Philippines’ Will to War. Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005.
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  323. Provides an innovative view of Philippine foreign policy under President Arroyo as guided by Catholic-informed political fundamentalism, which intersected with the political fundamentalism of President George W. Bush.
  324. Find this resource:
  325.  
  326. US Department of State. Country Reports: East Asia and Pacific Overview. In Country Reports on Terrorism 2005. By US Department of State, 59–83. Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US Department of State.
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  328. Provides a brief description of Abu Sayyaf activities in the Philippines and describes efforts by the Philippine and US governments to curb terrorism. See pp. 77–80.
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