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Politics and Foreign Policy of Iran (International Relations

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  1. Introduction
  2. A nation of rich intellectual and historical background, Iran is indeed one of the oldest surviving civilizations in the world. Its political and intellectual depth has profoundly shaped a region of the world known as the Middle East. From the time of the prophet Zoroaster, to the potent and vast Persian empires, to the revolution of 1979, and to the 2009 Green Movement, its impact throughout the region has been remarkably real and consistent. Iran’s modern history began with Reza Khan (also known as Reza Shah), a military officer in Persia’s Cossack Brigade, who successfully staged a coup against the government of the Qajar dynasty and crowned himself the first shah of the Pahlavi dynasty. He was known for launching an ambitious campaign to modernize the country by laying down the infrastructure of a broad-based, nationwide education system, building a national railroad system, and improving the nation’s health care. By the mid-1930s, he officially renamed Iran as the heir and modern inception of the “Persian Empire.” Following the Second World War, the British and Soviets, who were suspicious of Reza Shah’s friendly relationship with and approach toward Germany, occupied western and southern Iran, forcing him to abdicate in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, who subsequently succeeded him. The young Shah then faced a significant challenge to his rule by Iran’s nationalist Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq who attempted to nationalize the British-owned oil industry. The shah ultimately lost the power struggle with Mossadeq and left the country, only to be brought back with the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency and MI 6, which collaborated with Pahlavi to carry out a coup to overthrow Mossadeq in August of 1953. The shah’s repressive apparatus, and his failed “White Revolution,” mismanaged economy, and fast-paced socioeconomic Westernization spurred widespread popular resentment and opposition that included a broad spectrum of dissent, culminating in the 1979 Iranian Revolution that toppled the Pahlavi dynasty. Spearheaded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (b. 1902–d. 1989), the 1979 revolution toppled the regime of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, ending 2,500 years of monarchy. Since its inception, the Islamic Republic of Iran has guaranteed its political longevity by defending itself against real or imagined external enemies, thereby garnering the nationalist support of its population. By 2009, however, the Islamic Republic faced a new challenge: the Green Movement, which manifested in a green wave, reminiscent of the “color revolutions” in the Ukraine and Georgia posed a homegrown and popular threat to the country’s power structure. Although the suppression of that movement kept in check the reformist movement, the election of Hassan Rouhani in 2013 has held the prospects of much anticipated change and social freedom in a country that faces many formidable challenges, including the youth bulge, unemployment, as well as social and political restrictions. The conclusion of Iran’s nuclear deal with the P5+1 group (the United States, China, Russia, UK, and France, along with Germany) in 2015 promises the beginning of a new era in building a relationship between Iran and the West aimed at addressing broader issues—such as the stabilization of programs in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Syrian war, the refugee crisis, and the future of the region’s tempestuous political composition.
  3.  
  4. Dynasties, Unification, and Agreements
  5. Iran was reunified in the 19th century under the Qajar dynasty (1790–1890) but was subsequently defeated by the British in the south and Russia in the north. Historians appear to be in agreement over the Qajar kings’ modus operandi. Lacking a strong and centralized army, police, and infrastructure with which to govern the country, Iran’s central government had to rely on bribes, foster internal factional conflicts, divide opposing forces, and hold hostages (“guests”) from powerful tribes and families in Tehran. Keddie 2006 provides a comprehensive analysis about historical and sociocultural forces at work in late-19th-century Iran and is essential reading to learn more about the failure of the Qajar dynasty and the rise of the Pahlavi dynasty. Keddie 2006 notes that what proved more perilous than powerful tribes and families for the power of the government was in fact the great influence and authority of the Shi’ia ulama. Under the humiliating Treaty of Turkmanchai (1828), an agreement signed by Russia and Persia at the village of Turkmanchai, East Azerbaijan province, northwest of Iran, the Aras River was established as the common boundary between Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Armenia. This treaty forced Iran to cede part of Persian Armenia to Russia and to grant extraterritorial rights. In the so-called Talbot Concession (1891), the Qajar regime granted a concession to Major Gerald Talbot for a monopoly on all tobacco sold in Iran—which was followed by the Tobacco Revolt. Protests against the Talbot Concession erupted in Shiraz, Tehran, and Tabriz. In December 1891 Mirza Hasan Shirazi (marja-i taqlid) declared the use of tobacco a war against the Hidden Imam (Mahdi). This fatwa (religious edict) led to the tobacco boycott. During the Tobacco Revolt (1891–1892) and subsequently during the Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911), an important sector of the ulama helped lead popular movements against a government widely regarded as complacent to the encroachments of foreign imperialists. In the early 20th century the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement divided Iran between Russia and Britain. By the end of the First World War (1918), Iran had become a battleground, resulting in an economic catastrophe—northern Iran was the country’s breadbasket, and much farmland there was ruined by the invading armies. The Anglo-Persian Agreement (1919) practically rendered Iran a British protectorate, with Iran becoming dependent on outside support for maintaining an internal army and building its railroads and other infrastructure.
  6.  
  7. Akhavi, S. Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980.
  8.  
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  10.  
  11. Akhavi discusses how various factions within the clergy have responded to the government’s efforts to foster modernization and secularization, while giving special attention to the changes in the madrasahs, or theological colleges. He examines the main themes of the Ayatullah Khymayni’s book, Islamic Government, and concludes by exploring the alignments among the clergy in the past that demonstrate how they may develop in the future.
  12.  
  13. Find this resource:
  14.  
  15.  
  16. Algar, Hamid. Religion and State in Iran, 1785–1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.
  17.  
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  19.  
  20. Algar examines the interests of the ulama and their influence on political developments in the Qajar period up to 1906. His central argument is that they played a fairly consistent role throughout the 19th century. The efforts to reform and bolster the powers of the state by the Qajars were vehemently opposed by the ulama in large part because they threatened the powers and privileges of the ulama.
  21.  
  22. Find this resource:
  23.  
  24.  
  25. Arjomand, S. A. The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Organization and Societal Change in Shi’ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
  26.  
  27. DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226924809.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  28.  
  29. Arjomand calls into question oversimplified and politically charged views of the politics of Shi’ite Islam. He offers a well-documented and well-researched sociological and historical study of Shi’ism and the political order of pre-modern Iran that lay at the heart of what later became Khomeini’s theocracy.
  30.  
  31. Find this resource:
  32.  
  33.  
  34. Gasiorowsky, Mark, and Malcolm Byrne. Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004.
  35.  
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  37.  
  38. Gasiorowsky and Byrne present one of the most authoritative accounts of the turbulent political climate that led to the overthrow of Mosaddeq, the confrontation between Iran and Britain for control over Iran’s oil, the strategic considerations that led US officials to opt for a coup, and the details of the coup itself. The book provides an in-depth analysis into not only the coup d’état itself but also the events that ultimately led to it.
  39.  
  40. Find this resource:
  41.  
  42.  
  43. Keddie, Nikki R. Modern Iran: Roots and Result of Revolution. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006.
  44.  
  45. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  46.  
  47. Keddie examines historical, socioeconomic, cultural, and political roots of the 1979 revolution. She also provides insightful commentary on Iran’s nuclear and foreign policy, its relations with the United Nations and the United States, increasing conservative and hardline proclivities in the government, and recent developments in the country’s social change, human rights issues, and political dynamics.
  48.  
  49. Find this resource:
  50.  
  51.  
  52. Litvak, M. Shi’i Scholars of Nineteenth-Century Iraq: The ‘Ulama of Najaf and Karbala. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
  53.  
  54. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  55.  
  56. Litvak writes that the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala in 19th-century Ottoman Iraq were the most prominent Shi’i centers of learning. The author examines the sociopolitical dynamics of these communities and the historical development of Shi’i leadership. The book’s unique contribution lies not only in providing the historical debates but also in broadening an understanding of modern Shi’ism.
  57.  
  58. Find this resource:
  59.  
  60.  
  61. The Pahlavi Dynasty (1924–1979)
  62. In the post–Second World War period, Britain moved to consolidate control over Iran during the period from 1918 to 1921. The ensuing period from 1921 to 1925 saw the development of nationalist ideas. Reza Khan (r. 1925–1941), an army officer, undertook the organization of the army on the British model and created the first sizable modern armed force Iran had seen, as noted by Keddie 2006 and Mafinezam and Mehrabi 2008. Reza Shah marginalized the clergy’s influence in society by banning the veil and shutting down religious schools. He played Germany against the Russian and British influences—a foreign policy that came to be known as “third force.” In 1941, he abdicated power under pressure from the British and Russians who feared the Nazis’ rising influence in Iran from 1941 to 1953. Gasiorowsky and Byrne 2004 and Kinzer 2003 examine the circumstances leading up to the 1953 coup that removed Iran’s prime minister. In the aftermath of the Second World War, under diplomatic pressure from the United Kingdom and United States, the Soviets withdrew from northern Iran. During 1951–1953, charismatic Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq challenged the shah’s rule. Mosaddeq nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) of which the British owned 51 percent. The United States and United Kingdom engineered a coup against Mosaddeq and restored the shah to power in 1953. After returning to Iran, and under pressure from the Kennedy administration, Mohammad Reza Shah initiated a land reform program, which proved to be ineffective and inept and causing an unprecedented rural-to-urban migration of former agricultural laborers in search of employment. In 1971 the Shah celebrated the 2,500th anniversary of the Persian monarchy. This extravagant ceremony was performed in the face of a repressive climate that allowed little or no freedom of speech and press and a defanged opposition that had been ruthlessly kept contained if not entirely eliminated. The Pahlavi era was marked not only by an all-encompassing modernization that included the religious and cultural domains but also by corruption and rising inequality. Abrahamian 1982 provides a comprehensive analysis regarding the way in which Iranian society witnessed the emergence of new socioeconomic classes in a country with strong divisions based on ethnicity, religious ideology, and regional particularism. Much of research regarding the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty and the emergence of the Islamic Republic and the ensuing challenges the latter faced has been introduced by Kamrava 1990 (cited under the 1979 Revolution), Debashi 1993, and Keddie 2006, which argue that the rapid and intrusive injection of Western influences and culture into Iran triggered a backlash from traditional segments of Iranian society—a reaction that often took an Islamic form. Opposition to the Shah’s regime was spearheaded by Ayatollah Khomeini, who was exiled by the Shah in 1964. Maloney 2010 argues that Khomeini’s populist and revolutionary messages reflected the religious and ideational nature of the opposition: “Iran’s Islamic Revolution was not about the price of melons.” Khomeini underlined a critical message during his struggles against the Pahlavi dynasty, arguing that Iranians had been robbed of their values, religion, and identity. His anticolonial message had a potent, universal theme to it that transcended Iranian culture.
  63.  
  64. Abrahamian, Ervand. Iran between Two Revolutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982.
  65.  
  66. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  67.  
  68. Abrahamian explores the impact of socioeconomic change on the political structure, especially during the reigns of Reza Shah and Muhammad Reza Shah, and sheds much light on the importance of the Tudeh Party and the failure of the Shah’s regime from 1953 to 1978. This volume draws on archives, newspapers, memoirs, biographies, proceedings, interviews, pamphlets, books, and periodicals in the period between 1953 and 1980.
  69.  
  70. Find this resource:
  71.  
  72.  
  73. Debashi, Hamid. Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundations of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. New York: New York University Press, 1993.
  74.  
  75. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  76.  
  77. Debashi examines the ideological foundations of the Islamic Revolution, with particular attention to the broader, more enduring implications of this revolution for radical Islamic revivalism in the entire Muslim world. The book focuses on revolutionary sentiments and ideas of such figures as Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Ali Sharicati, Morteza Motahhari, Sayyad Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, and finally the Ayatollah Khomeini.
  78.  
  79. Find this resource:
  80.  
  81.  
  82. Gasiorowsky, Mark, and Malcolm Byrne. Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004.
  83.  
  84. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  85.  
  86. Gasiorowsky and Byrne provide one of the most authoritative accounts of the turbulent political climate that led to the overthrow of Mosaddeq, the confrontation between Iran and Britain for control over Iran’s oil, the strategic considerations that led US officials to opt for a coup, and the details of the coup itself. The book provides an in-depth analysis into not only the coup d’état itself but the events that ultimately led up to it.
  87.  
  88. Find this resource:
  89.  
  90.  
  91. Keddie, Nikki R. Modern Iran: Roots and Result of Revolution. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006.
  92.  
  93. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  94.  
  95. Keddie examines historical, socioeconomic, cultural, and political roots of the 1979 revolution. She also provides insightful commentary on Iran’s nuclear and foreign policy, its relations with the United Nations and the United States, increasing conservative and hardline proclivities in the government, and recent developments in the country’s social change, human rights issues, and political dynamics.
  96.  
  97. Find this resource:
  98.  
  99.  
  100. Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. New York: Wiley, 2003.
  101.  
  102. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  103.  
  104. Kinzer brings to light the 1953 CIA coup in Iran that ousted the country’s elected prime minister, Mohamad Mossadeq, led to a quarter-century of the shah’s rule, and paved the way for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and an anti-American revolution in Iran.
  105.  
  106. Find this resource:
  107.  
  108.  
  109. Mafinezam, Alidad, and Aria Mehrabi. Iran and Its Place among Nations. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008.
  110.  
  111. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  112.  
  113. Mafinezam and Mehrabi explain the turbulent history of Iran in the 20th century and analyze the domestic and foreign factors that have played a significant role in promoting (as well as hindering) the country’s development in modern period.
  114.  
  115. Find this resource:
  116.  
  117.  
  118. Maloney, Suzanne. “The Revolutionary Economy.” In The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and US Policy. Edited by Robin Wright, 95–99. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2010.
  119.  
  120. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  121.  
  122. Maloney argues that Iran’s revolutionaries inherited an economy in the midst of massive change and growth. Under the Pahlavi rule, Iran had been transformed from a small, predominantly agricultural economy controlled by a fading tribal dynasty into a modern centralized state with a booming manufacturing sector and a central role in international oil markets.
  123.  
  124. Find this resource:
  125.  
  126.  
  127. The 1979 Revolution
  128. Arjomand 1988, Kamrava 1990, and Axworthy 2013 provide a rich analysis for the 1979 Iranian Revolution and why it was a unique, popular, spontaneous uprising beyond the expectations of all experts in academia and policy circles. The groundbreaking Keddie 2006 (cited under the Pahlavi Dynasty (1924–1979)) led to the exploration of the causes of a popular revolution by Nomani and Behdad 2006, which focused on the political and social factors contributing to the structural breakdown of the Pahlavi dynasty. Subsequently the works of Axworthy 2013 and Buchan 2013 provided a narrative of change and continuity in terms of the lingering rivalry between varying political visions and social forces.
  129.  
  130. Arjomand, Said Amir. The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
  131.  
  132. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  133.  
  134. Arjomand examines both the structure of authority in Shi’ism and the impact of the modern state on Iranian society, both of which are crucial to understanding the Islamic Revolution of 1979. This in-depth analysis explains how the infusion of petrodollars into the economy and the endemic political corruption led to the emergence of theocracy and the consolidation of religious rule in Iran.
  135.  
  136. Find this resource:
  137.  
  138.  
  139. Axworthy, Michael. Revolutionary Iran: A History of Islamic Republic. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
  140.  
  141. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  142.  
  143. Axworthy provides an account of both a pre-revolution and post-revolution Iran, while exploring causes behind the driving force for change in Iran’s Green Movement in the disputed 2009 presidential elections. The book considers Iran’s Green Movement as a prelude to the ensuing Arab uprisings.
  144.  
  145. Find this resource:
  146.  
  147.  
  148. Buchan, James. Days of God: The Revolution in Iran and the Consequences. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013.
  149.  
  150. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  151.  
  152. Buchan debunks myths surrounding the 1979 Iranian Revolution by providing a historical account of the powerful social forces that led to this colossal transformation. This transformation has been sharply influenced by material and ideational divisions within the society.
  153.  
  154. Find this resource:
  155.  
  156.  
  157. Kamrava, Mehran. Revolution in Iran: The Roots of Turmoil. London: Routledge, 1990.
  158.  
  159. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  160.  
  161. Kamrava presents a wide array of political and social factors contributing to the structural breakdown of the Pahlavi dynasty. The author conducts valuable personal interviews with former revolutionary leaders, cabinet ministers, and diplomats in an attempt to provide a legitimate and fresh account of the 1979 revolution.
  162.  
  163. Find this resource:
  164.  
  165.  
  166. Nomani, Farhad, and Sohrab Behdad. Class and Labor in Iran: Did the Revolution Matter? Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2006.
  167.  
  168. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  169.  
  170. Nomani and Behdad provide an incisive analysis of the dynamics of change and class configuration in Iranian society. Using a theoretical framework, they map the trajectory of class changes over time, specifically noting the movements between pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary Iran. The authors pay special attention to the changes in the pattern of employment of women in the post-revolutionary period.
  171.  
  172. Find this resource:
  173.  
  174.  
  175. Us-Iran Relations
  176. Historically, US-Iran relations can be traced back to the 1830s when Americans traveled to Iran as missionaries. During the Naseredin Shah period (1848–1896), direct contact with Americans helped to create a naval force for Persia in the Bushehr port. Later in the 1870s a group of American physicians helped establish Urmia University’s College of Medicine. By the early 20th century, relations between the two countries became a major force for Iranians to modernize their economy and liberate it from British and Russian influences. During the Persian Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911), American William Morgan Shuster was appointed treasury general of Persia by the Iranian Parliament (Majles) to counter Russian and British interests in Iran. Under pressure from both Russia and Great Britain, Shuster resigned. The British proved instrumental in carrying out the 1921 coup that brought Reza Pahlavi to power. The Second World War and the emergence of the United States as the dominant player on the global scene marginalized the British role in Iran. The abdication of Reza Shah and his son’s ascension to power in the early 1940s heralded a new era in US-Iran relations, one that was marked by fast-paced modernization.
  177.  
  178. Oil Nationalization and Strategic Alliance
  179. The proliferation of the literature on oil nationalization in Iran in the early 1950s is highlighted by Cottam 1979 and Kinzer 2006: these stand out as the two most important contributions to a critical assessment of how, during the early 1950s, democratically elected nationalist prime minister Mohammad Mossadeq’s rise to power and parliament’s approval of nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) thrilled Iranians but outraged British leaders. These works have also focused on the 1953 CIA-engineered coup (known as Operation Ajax) that removed Mosaddeq from power. The coup ended Iran’s fledgling attempts at democracy, giving rise to a modernizing, royal dictatorship that, a quarter of a century later, set off an anti-American revolution that brought militant Islamic groups to power. The shah restored his absolute power by eliminating all constitutional obstacles in his way. He repressed opposition newspapers, political parties, trade unions, and civil groups. Bill 1988, Rajaee 2007, and Monshipouri 1998 examine the real tragedy of US-Iranian relations: the Shah’s aggressive modernization and Westernization projects alienated cultural and religious elites in a country where religious values held a tight grip on cultural traditions. Moreover, modernization under the Shah was intimately linked to economic growth and industrialization. Meanwhile, the agricultural sector faced many setbacks as a result of the Shah’s program of industrialization at any cost.
  180.  
  181. Bill, James. The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988.
  182.  
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  184.  
  185. Bill presents an in-depth analysis of the tragic failure of US-Iran relations, arguing that this failure stemmed from the fact that the United States policymakers depended solely upon the shah’s views and overlooked blatant signs of popular disenchantment and unrest, which ultimately led to the rise of the Islamic Republic.
  186.  
  187. Find this resource:
  188.  
  189.  
  190. Cottam, Richard. Nationalism in Iran. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979.
  191.  
  192. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  193.  
  194. Cottam analyzes the complex religious, national, and social factors at work within Iran and examines, more broadly, the rise and complexities of nationalism in the developing world and its baffling problems for US foreign policy.
  195.  
  196. Find this resource:
  197.  
  198.  
  199. Kinzer, Stephen. Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq. New York: Times, 2006.
  200.  
  201. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  202.  
  203. Kinzer tells the stories of the audacious politicians, intelligence agents, military commanders, and business executives who in several countries, such as Iran, Guatemala, South Vietnam, and Chile, deposed monarchs, presidents, and prime ministers as the instruments of American intervention.
  204.  
  205. Find this resource:
  206.  
  207.  
  208. Monshipouri, Mahmood. Islamism, Secularism, and Human Rights in the Middle East. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998.
  209.  
  210. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  211.  
  212. Monshipouri offers a wide-ranging discussion of Islamism, secular politics, and democracy. Turning to the politics of reform in Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran, the author explores the tension between pressures to define human rights within the context of contemporary political Islam and countervailing forces calling for a move toward more “Western” norms.
  213.  
  214. Find this resource:
  215.  
  216.  
  217. Rajaee, Farhang. Islamism and Modernism: The Changing Discourse in Iran. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007.
  218.  
  219. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  220.  
  221. Rajaee provides a thorough analysis of the voices fueling contemporary Islamic thinking in Iran, reflecting on religious thinkers such as Ha’eri, Burujerdi, Bazargan, and Shari’ati, along with contemporaries such as Kadivar, Soroush, and Shabestari. A comprehensive study of these interlinked aspects of politics, religion, society and identity, Islamism, and modernism and their implications on Islamic discourse in modern Iran.
  222.  
  223. Find this resource:
  224.  
  225.  
  226. The Geopolitics of the Persian Gulf
  227. As views on the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf region gained currency in the 1960s and 1970s, it was generally accepted that US presence in the region was all but certain. Ramazani 1979 provides an informative historical survey regarding the Persian Gulf and how this region has gradually but surely factored into US foreign policy. Roshandel 2008 has argued that US-Iranian relations were premised largely on maintaining stability in the Persian Gulf. The shah received unconditional US support as a pillar of US foreign policy in the region. President Nixon developed a strategy of cooperation with dictators such as the shah to be the guarantors of US interests in the Persian Gulf region. Despite putting the pressure on the shah to open up the country’s political space, President Carter’s administration viewed the shah as an ally and thus a source of stability that had to be shored up by US foreign policy. Two major conflicts (the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s and Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990) have further drawn the United States toward the region. Without having a clear-cut winner, the costly Iran-Iraq War broke out in 1980 with an Iraqi invasion of Iran. Adib-Moghadam 2008 provides a systematic account of the war—which lasted for over seven years and ended on 20 August 1988, following Iran’s adoption of the UNSCR Resolution 598 on 20 July 1987. In terms of human losses and scope of physical destruction, the Iran-Iraq War was the most devastating war in the modern history of western Asia. It is estimated that 370,000 people were killed on both sides during the war, with approximately 700,000 people maimed and injured. The war caused $440 billion in direct losses to the Iranian economy, with another $490 billion categorized as indirect losses. Other estimates indicate that the aggregated direct and indirect costs amounted to $627 billion for Iran and $561 billion for Iraq. Faced with regional tensions as a result of the Iran-Iraq War, the Arab sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981. The GCC was designed to fulfill several tasks, but none more important than collectively addressing their security challenges. The initial objective was to curb the threat posed by the Iran-Iraq War as well as to protect themselves from the Iranian-inspired revolutionary movements in the region. Over the years, the GCC has failed to overcome some major divisiveness among its members, both political and economic.
  228.  
  229. Adib-Moghadam, Afshin. “Iran-Iraq War.” In Iran Today: An Encyclopedia of Life in the Islamic Republic. Vol. 1. Edited by Mehran Kamrava and Manochehr Dorraj, 250–258. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2008.
  230.  
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  232.  
  233. Adib-Moghadam explains that the Iran-Iraq War was precipitated by the Islamic Revolution in Iran and cannot be fully discussed in isolation of this event.
  234.  
  235. Find this resource:
  236.  
  237.  
  238. Ramazani, Rouhollah K. International Straits of the World: The Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Alphen aan den Rijin, The Netherlands: Sijihoff & Noordhoff, 1979.
  239.  
  240. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  241.  
  242. Ramazani describes the setting of the Strait of Hormuz within the broader context of the economic and strategic interests of the Western world and the Soviet bloc in the Persian Gulf, focusing on the domestic and foreign relations of the littoral states such as Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.
  243.  
  244. Find this resource:
  245.  
  246.  
  247. Roshandel, Jalil. “Persian Gulf.” In Iran Today, An Encyclopedia of Life in the Islamic Republic. Vol. 2. Edited by Mehran Kamrava and Manochehr Dorraj, 369–376. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2008.
  248.  
  249. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  250.  
  251. Roshandel shows that the Persian Gulf houses a variety of religious and ethnic cultures that contribute to the social context while at the same time compete for regional and international power and political influence.
  252.  
  253. Find this resource:
  254.  
  255.  
  256. The Khomeini Era (1979–1989)
  257. In the late 1970s, confusion on the part of the US foreign policymaking establishment was flagrantly obvious. The shah left Iran on 16 January 1979 and went to Europe and then on to Egypt. He arrived in the United States for medical treatment in the fall of 1979. That visit triggered a hostage crisis in Tehran on 4 November 1979, a crisis that lasted for 444 days and proved to be a big strategic blunder on the part of the Iranian revolutionary regime that ended with no benefit. Potter and Sick 2004 provides a detailed study of the US involvement in the Persian Gulf. Adib-Moghadam 2008 explains the rise of Shi’a movement in Iraq and the rest of the region. Ramazani 1986 and Fayazmanesh 2008 provide a thorough account of the challenges that revolutionary Iran posed in the Persian Gulf—a change that became a central preoccupation of US foreign policy and led to the imposition of sanctions on both Iran and Iraq.
  258.  
  259. Adib-Moghadam, Afshin. “Iran-Iraq War.” In Iran Today: An Encyclopedia of Life in the Islamic Republic. Vol. 1. Edited by Mehran Kamrava and Manochehr Dorraj, 250–258. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2008.
  260.  
  261. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  262.  
  263. Adib-Moghadam describes the relationship between the Shi’a movement in Iraq and on a larger scale the networks between Iran and Iraq as strong, spanning Qom and Mashad in Iran to Karbala and Najaf in Iraq.
  264.  
  265. Find this resource:
  266.  
  267.  
  268. Fayazmanesh, Sasan. The United States and Iran: Sanctions, Wars, and the Policy of Dual Containment. New York: Routledge, 2008.
  269.  
  270. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  271.  
  272. Fayazmanesh provides a systematic study of how the policy of dual containment of Iran and Iraq originated during the Carter administration, but it was not until the Clinton administration that the expression of this policy became popular.
  273.  
  274. Find this resource:
  275.  
  276.  
  277. Potter, Larry, and Gary Sick, eds. Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War. London: Palgrave, 2004.
  278.  
  279. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  280.  
  281. Potter and Sick show how US attacks on Iranian oil platforms during the so-called tanker war and the accidental downing of an Iranian Air Bus aircraft by the USS Vincennes, which killed 290 civilians, led to the a change of mind on the part of the Iranian leaders who finally agreed to a cease-fire and adopted UNSCR Resolution 598 in 1987.
  282.  
  283. Find this resource:
  284.  
  285.  
  286. Ramazani, Rouhollah K. Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
  287.  
  288. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  289.  
  290. Ramazani provides a thorough account of the challenge that revolutionary Iran posed in the Persian Gulf—a change that became a central preoccupation of US foreign policy. According to Ramazani several factors contributed to the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the early 1980s: the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, superpower competition, and the threat of spillover violence from the Iraq-Iran War.
  291.  
  292. Find this resource:
  293.  
  294.  
  295. Pragmatists and Reformists
  296. With the passing of Khomeini from the Iranian political scene, interfactional disputes and the primacy of the economy over Islamic ideology came to characterize Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s two-term presidency (1989–1997). Reform of foreign trade and correction of the exchange rate were crucial elements of Rafsanjani’s liberalization programs. Vakil 2008 and Pesaran 2011 examine Iran’s move toward economic liberalization, Esfandiari 2001, Arjomand 2009, and Monshipouri 2003 provide up-to-date perspectives on economic and political reform in the post-Khomeini era. Menashri 2001 provides a contrasting view, arguing that despite the rise of reformists to power, restrictions on individual liberty, rampant corruption, and soaring unemployment further increased the gap between the clerical ruling elite and the emerging civil society. Monshipouri 2003 and Kamrava 2013 provide a positive outlook of change and reform in Iran. After the Khatami took office in 1997, the Clinton administration approached the normalization talks with a two-track strategy. On the one hand, it continued to insist that if the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) was to be suspended, Iran must end its efforts to gain access to nuclear weapons, terminate its support for terrorism, and forgo denouncing the Middle East Peace Process. On the other hand, it repeatedly expressed its readiness to enter into state-to-state talks with Iran. For its part, Iran responded with demands such as ending the US military presence in the Persian Gulf, releasing the Iranian assets the United States had frozen from the time of the revolution, repaying Iran money under dispute at the Hague, and stopping attempts to overthrow its Islamic regime. These issues, along with the lack of political determination and commitment on either side to address genuinely how the barriers to normal diplomatic ties between the two countries could be overcome, have hindered any further progress toward normalization.
  297.  
  298. Arjomand, Said Amir. After Khomeini: Iran under His Successors. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
  299.  
  300. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  301.  
  302. Arjomand offers a persuasive narrative of the dramatic social and political opening during Khatami’s presidency, demonstrating the increase in the number of political associations and the expansion of civil society organizations by 2001.
  303.  
  304. Find this resource:
  305.  
  306.  
  307. Esfandiari, Haleh. “The Politics of the ‘Women’s Question’ in the Islamic Republic, 1979–1999.” In Iran at the Crossroads. Edited by John L. Esposito and R. K. Ramazani, 75–92. New York: Palgrave, 2001.
  308.  
  309. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  310.  
  311. Esfandiari shows how women embraced social openings during the Khatami era and explains how the atmosphere changed with the election of the reformist president Khatami: Iranian women and men dared to demand more freedom and discuss their problems openly.
  312.  
  313. Find this resource:
  314.  
  315.  
  316. Kamrava, Mehran. “Iran and Its Persian Gulf Neighbors.” In Iranian Foreign Policy Since 2001: Alone in the World. Edited by Thomas Juneau and Sam Razavi, 104–119. New York: Routledge, 2013.
  317.  
  318. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  319.  
  320. Kamrava describes Khatami foreign policy as one aimed at pursuing a regional détente and greatly reducing tensions between Iran and its Arab neighbors, despite the fact that several areas of friction and deeply rooted mistrust continued to characterize Iran’s relations with other states of the Persian Gulf.
  321.  
  322. Find this resource:
  323.  
  324.  
  325. Menashri, David. Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society, and Power. London: Frank Cass, 2001.
  326.  
  327. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  328.  
  329. Menashri demonstrates that despite the rise of reformists to power, restrictions on individual liberty, rampant corruption, and soaring unemployment has further increased the gap between the clerical ruling elite and the emerging civil society since the late 1990s.
  330.  
  331. Find this resource:
  332.  
  333.  
  334. Monshipouri, Mahmood. “The Politics of Culture and Human Rights in Iran: Globalizing and Localizing Dynamics.” In Constructing Human Rights in the Age of Globalization. Edited by Mahmood Monshipouri, Neil Englehart, Andrew J. Nathan, and Kavita Philip, 113–144. Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 2003.
  335.  
  336. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  337.  
  338. Monshipouri provides a discussion of how US-Iran relations entered a relaxed phase when US Secretary of State Madeline Albright apologized for past US actions in Iran and opened the door for rapprochement, even as Khatami could not have initiated a rapprochement with the United States.
  339.  
  340. Find this resource:
  341.  
  342.  
  343. Pesaran, Evaleila. Iran’s Struggle for Economic Independence: Reform and Counter-reform in the Post-revolutionary Era. New York: Routledge, 2011.
  344.  
  345. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  346.  
  347. Pesaran provides a compelling account of why the outside world’s encouragement of Iran for the expansion of the private sector and economic liberalization failed in large part because Iran’s mercantile elites were themselves part of the country’s semi-authoritarian state, and they shied away from the creation of an industrialized economy with close ties to the outside world.
  348.  
  349. Find this resource:
  350.  
  351.  
  352. Vakil, Sanam. “Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi.” In Iran Today: An Encyclopedia of Life in the Islamic Republic. Vol. 2. Edited by Mehran Kamrava and Manochehr Dorraj, 417–422. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2008.
  353.  
  354. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  355.  
  356. Vakil shows that it was the Rafsanjani administration that began to open the door to moderation toward the United States. Rafsanjani believed that US-Iran relations would improve only if the United States would release frozen Iranian assets as a gesture of goodwill.
  357.  
  358. Find this resource:
  359.  
  360.  
  361. Reaction to the 9/11 Attacks
  362. The tragic events of 11 September 2001 significantly altered US foreign policy toward the region. In retaliation for the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US forces invaded Afghanistan and subsequently Iraq. The latter invasion has placed Iranian rulers in a far better position to bargain with the United States. The toppling of the Taliban regime with assistance from Iran and other regional countries, including Pakistan, raised the possibility of an opening in US-Iran relations. Much of the research in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks shows some degree of the cooperation between Iran and the United States. Milani 2001 is a typical study. Beeman 2002 and Ehteshami 2014 criticize the Bush administration for labeling Iran as a member of the “axis of evil” and invading Iraq. Boroujerdi 2014 echoes a similar sentiment. A somewhat (if not starkly) different view is offered by Mausner, et al. 2014, which argues that Iran’s strategic interests in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein have substantially differed from those of the United States. Iran seeks to ensure that Iraq does not serve as a base for the United States. Sharing a long and porous border with Iraq, Iran is thus keen on creating a stable and flexible ally, not a regional competitor. It seeks to rid the country of US military and political presence. To achieve these goals, Iran has aggressively utilized its networks, patronage, economic ties, religious ties, foreign aid, and military support to various factions in Iraq.
  363.  
  364. Beeman, William. “Bush’s targeting of Iran is an inept foreign policy move.” Brown University News Service, 22 February 2002.
  365.  
  366. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  367.  
  368. Beeman provides a unique expert opinion of the Bush’s rhetoric against Iran, showing how this type of rhetoric clearly undercut Khatami and his reformist camp and gave unintended support to the hardliners.
  369.  
  370. Find this resource:
  371.  
  372.  
  373. Boroujerdi, Mehrzad. “Iran.” In The Middle East. 13th ed. Edited by Ellen Lust, 478–506. Los Angeles: SAGE, 2014.
  374.  
  375. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  376.  
  377. Boroujerdi provides a compelling narrative as to why Iran’s regional power was boosted by the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, arguing that the US invasion of Iraq on 19 March 2003 was considered a mixed blessing for Iran.
  378.  
  379. Find this resource:
  380.  
  381.  
  382. Ehteshami, Anoushiravan. “The Foreign Policy of Iran.” In The Foreign Policies of Middle East States. Edited by Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, 261–288, 274–275. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2014.
  383.  
  384. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  385.  
  386. Ehteshami finds that although the US invasion of Iraq ultimately led to the unseating of the Iraqi dictator, a result that Iranians viewed as a positive development, it presented a new threat to Iran, as the US military had become its neighbor in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Given that Iran had been labeled as part of the “Axis of Evil,” Iranian leadership felt threatened.
  387.  
  388. Find this resource:
  389.  
  390.  
  391. Mausner, Adam, Sam Khazai, Anthony H. Cordesman, Peter Alsis, and Charles Loi. “The Outcome of Invasion: US and Iranian Strategic Competition in Iraq.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2014.
  392.  
  393. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  394.  
  395. Argues that Iran’s strategic interests in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein have substantially differed from those of the United States. Iran seeks to ensure that Iraq does not serve as a base for the United States. Sharing an extensive and porous border with Iraq, Iran is keen on creating a stable ally and not a regional competitor.
  396.  
  397. Find this resource:
  398.  
  399.  
  400. Milani, Mohsen. “The Iran Primer: Iran and Afghanistan.” US Institute of Peace. 2001.
  401.  
  402. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  403.  
  404. Milani argues that after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, Iran, and US military forces cooperated in order to remove the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and attack al-Qaeda bases there. Tehran even offered to give sanctuary to distressed US military personnel inside its territory in addition to allowing the United States to transport humanitarian goods to Afghanistan through Iranian territory.
  405.  
  406. Find this resource:
  407.  
  408.  
  409. The Return of Islamic Populism
  410. In the 2005 presidential elections, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Tehran’s former mayor, became Iran’s new president. Iran’s Islamic hardliners swept into power after thousands of pro-reform candidates were barred from running in recent disputed parliamentary elections. Pesaran 2011 underlined the respect for revolutionary goals, including the idea of national independence, while at the same time recognizing the need for some integration with the global economy. Others, such as Chubin 2006, saw the central problem and challenge facing Iran as Tehran’s foreign policy as a revolutionary state, with nuclear ambitions that collided with the interests of its neighbors and the West.
  411.  
  412. Chubin, Shahram. Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006.
  413.  
  414. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  415.  
  416. Chubin’s account rested on the premise that no dramatic breakthroughs in US-Iran relations seemed likely unless US policymakers viewed the new regional security structure as imperative in preventing Iraq from descending into chaos and partition.
  417.  
  418. Find this resource:
  419.  
  420.  
  421. Pesaran, Evaleila. Iran’s Struggle for Economic Independence: Reform and Counter-reform in the post-revolutionary Era. New York: Routledge, 2011.
  422.  
  423. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  424.  
  425. Pesaran provides a comprehensive account of why the Ahmadinejad administration marked the rise of the counter-reformists—that is, those who blocked the foreign investments contracts that President Khatami was keen to enter: Turkcell and TAV.
  426.  
  427. Find this resource:
  428.  
  429.  
  430. Nuclear Issues in the Context of Russia-Iran Relations
  431. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreed to cooperate in the fields of nuclear reactor technology and fuel cycle technology. The IAEA, however, was forced to terminate the program under US pressure. It is worth noting that prior to the revolution Iran had contracts with Germany, France, and the United States for a total of six nuclear power reactors and agreements to receive low-enriched uranium and nuclear training. After the revolution, Western countries cancelled these nuclear agreements. The Bushehr reactors, which were not fully operational, were damaged by several Iraqi air strikes during the 1980s war with Iraq. With the end of the war with Iraq, Iran turned to Russia for assistance in completing the Bushehr projects. In 1995 Iran and Russia signed a contract to that end. Similarly, the US sanctions on Iran failed to prevent China from providing Tehran with a conversion plan and gas needed to test the uranium enrichment process. Iran was also invited to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an observer as well as the planned Caspian Sea security organization. Tehran and Moscow also increased their planning for a North–South transportation corridor through Azerbaijan. Russia also launched a satellite for Iran and discussed the possibility of the sale of submarine-launched missiles with a range of two hundred kilometers. Cordesman 2006 points particularly to Iran’s increasing reliance on arms deals with Russia, which was understandable given that Iran has not had access to upgrades and modernization programs since the fall of the shah in 1979. The IAEA deferred a final decision on this situation pending further European diplomatic negotiations with Iran. With Iranians insisting on their right to enrich uranium and Europeans convinced that Iran should forgo this process, diplomatic contacts produced no mutually agreed results. With the failure of the EU-3 (Great Britain, Germany, and France) diplomatic initiatives, the UN Security Council demanded Iran suspend its enrichment and reprocessing related activities. Having secured no concessions from Iran, the UN threatened further sanctions on Iran. Two rounds of UN sanctions were subsequently imposed on Iran during 2006–2007, with increasing unwillingness on the part of China, Russia, and the EU to push Iran beyond these sanctions by imposing more intrusive measures.
  432.  
  433. Cordesman, Anthony H. Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006.
  434.  
  435. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  436.  
  437. Cordesman provides an in-depth analysis of why Iran continued to purchase arms from Russia since the 1979 revolution. Russia’s reluctance to impose further sanctions on Iran served to underline Moscow’s independence from the United States. But it also exposed the extent to which the US diplomatic attempts to isolate Iran have failed. The EU, Russia, and China resumed trade and commercial ties with Iran.
  438.  
  439. Find this resource:
  440.  
  441.  
  442. The Sanctions Policy
  443. The proliferation of the literature on the sanctions policy reflects diversity of opinions. Ansari 2006 illustrates the challenges confronting the Western world in dealing with Iran and how Iran’s history has led to its deep mistrust of the West. Monshipouri 2013 writes that with conservative forces in control of the Iranian parliament (Majles) and presidency, Iran’s leaders seemed to have equated promoting their nuclear program with the country’s national security. After a long period of negotiation with the EU-3, Iran chose to restart enriching uranium in 2007. For all practical purposes and intents, the EU-3 negotiations were forestalled. The Iranian government claimed that it had suspended its activities on a voluntary basis and that it had a legal right to develop its nuclear program for peaceful purposes according to Article 4 of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). Entessar 2013 echoes a similar sentiment, arguing that US and Israeli accusations in this regard were based on Tehran’s presumed intentions as opposed to its actual capabilities. Iran’s Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 missiles, with a range of 1,300–1,500 kilometers, are the only weapons in Iran’s arsenal that can be regarded as nuclear-capable delivery vehicles. Regardless, according to Fayazmanesh 2013, the United States and Israel did achieve what they had worked for slowly and meticulously, namely, “the imposition of UN sanctions against Iran.” Iran became the new target of containment policy. The Bush administration supported a media propaganda campaign aimed at vilifying Iran under the assumption that Iran was trying to become a nuclear power. Ansari 2006 demonstrates that the pervasive attitude in Washington toward Iran, along with the consequences of the 2004 parliamentary and the 2005 presidential elections that introduced a new era of hardliner politics to post-revolutionary Iran, goes to show the extent to which perceptions and realities of nuclear politics have shaped Iranian-US relations over the years. Monshipouri 2013 and Kinzer 2006 point to the flaws of US military intervention in Iran and its complications for seeking diplomatic solutions with Iran. Fayazmanesh 2013 argues that the Obama administration, by contrast, relied on sanctions rather than military threats.
  444.  
  445. Ansari, Ali M. Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Next Great Crisis in the Middle East. New York: Basic Books, 2006.
  446.  
  447. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  448.  
  449. Ansari provides a detailed and incisive analysis of Iranian-US relations in the shadow of 9/11, while underscoring the consequences of the policy of disengagement during Khatami’s second term, as the Bush administration continued to display similar signs of enmity and suspicion toward Iran after the tragedy of 9/11.
  450.  
  451. Find this resource:
  452.  
  453.  
  454. Entessar, Nader. “Iran’s Nuclear Program and Foreign Policy.” In Iranian Foreign Policy Since 2001: Alone in the World. Edited by Thomas Juneau and Sam Razavi, 70–86. New York: Routledge, 2013.
  455.  
  456. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  457.  
  458. Entessar demonstrates that Iran’s strategic isolation and the history of US-Iran relations since 1979 teaches us that the path to normalization of the relations between the two countries is complicated and fraught with varying obstacles on both sides. Entessar argues that these difficulties, if not properly managed, will continue to undermine the prospects for rapprochement.
  459.  
  460. Find this resource:
  461.  
  462.  
  463. Fayazmanesh, Sasan. Containing Iran: Obama’s Policy of Tough Diplomacy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Scholarly, 2013.
  464.  
  465. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  466.  
  467. Fayazmanesh provides the evidence that the US policy of diplomacy has been designed mostly by those associated with Israeli lobby groups in the United States. These groups have intended to give an ultimatum to Iran, offering the option of either accepting US-Israeli demands or facing aggression, all the while creating the illusion of engaging Iran in order to gain international support for aggressive actions.
  468.  
  469. Find this resource:
  470.  
  471.  
  472. Kinzer, Stephen. “Diplomacy is the Best Option for American-Iranian Revolution.” In Is Iran a Threat to Global Security? Edited by Julia Bauder, 46–57. New York: Greenhaven, 2006.
  473.  
  474. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  475.  
  476. Kinzer shows that the US military debacle in Iraq has awakened some policymakers in the Bush administration to the fact that a military stance toward Iran would have been questionable at best and perilous at worst, especially at a time when the United States was largely preoccupied with reconstructing Iraq and Afghanistan.
  477.  
  478. Find this resource:
  479.  
  480.  
  481. Monshipouri, Mahmood. “Iran’s Foreign Policy and Islamic Ideology.” In Iranian Foreign Policy Since 2001: Alone in the World. Edited by Thomas Juneau and Sam Razavi, 56–69. New York: Routledge, 2013.
  482.  
  483. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  484.  
  485. Monshipouri describes a pragmatic shift in Iran’s foreign policy in certain circumstances indicating that Iran’s foreign policy is not always influenced or shaped solely by its Islamic identity.
  486.  
  487. Find this resource:
  488.  
  489.  
  490. Reactions to the Arab Uprisings
  491. As the rest of the Arab world viewed the turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region with hope and apprehension, many ruling elites in the Middle East were wary of the domino effects of these developments, seriously contemplating counterrevolutionary tactics and strategies. Despite the initial optimism regarding these uprisings, many authors including Ayoob 2014 and Marashi and Parsi 2013 have raised legitimate concerns about the future trends. Ayoob 2014 has argued that the 2013 coup in Egypt in which the nation’s first popularly elected president, Mohamed Morsi, was removed from power through a bloodless coup signaled that instability and civil strife of a high order will prevail in the region in the coming years. The Arab Spring has demonstrated that it is easier to subvert old orders than to put new ones in their place. Iranian officials and state-run media depict the antigovernment uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya as the rejection of secular and corrupt pro-American regimes in the region. For the Islamic Republic of Iran, according to Marashi and Parsi 2013, any changes emerging from this regional unrest would be noticeably preferable to the status quo. Peterson’s “Iran’s Khamenei Praises Egyptian Protesters, Declares ‘Islamic Awakening,’” (The Christian Science Monitor, February 4, 2011) argues that Iranian officials have embraced the popular protests bursting across the Arab world as epitomizing the popular revolt that ushered in the Islamic Republic nearly three decades ago. Despite such posturing, however, it is important to recognize that these uprisings were hardly, if ever, sectarian or religious in nature. Rather, they are part of concrete social struggles for liberation, led by disenchanted young men and women who seek human dignity and a decent life—free from torture, hunger, discrimination, and other violations of due process of law. Similarly, uprisings in Bahrain seem to indicate secular motivations on the part of the majority Shi’a protesters there. Nasr 2006 has demonstrated that Shi’a revivalism has been on the upsurge since the overthrow of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in 2003, but now it has returned to Bahrain’s political scene with a vengeance, albeit with a different face. The recent popular Shi’a expressions of discontent with the al-Khalifa family pose a major challenge to their rule. These tensions have broader regional implications, intensifying the existing Shia-Sunni divide. With the Shia comprising approximately 10 percent of the Saudi population in the eastern provinces, the unrest in Bahrain is seen by many Arab states of the Persian Gulf—especially the Saudis—as having the potential to pose a serious menace to the region’s stability. Thus far, according to Hashemi and Postel 2010, they have chosen to treat their local opposition (“Green Movement”) with heavy-handed and repressive measures. This political opportunity will be both recklessly and irreversibly squandered if Iran’s leaders defend democracy and civil liberties for “others” while denying their local opposition the very same freedoms that their Arab counterparts have so painstakingly won—and this is exactly what they have done so far.
  492.  
  493. Ayoob, Mohammed. Will the Middle East Implode? London: Polity, 2014.
  494.  
  495. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  496.  
  497. Ayoob finds that the 2013 coup in Egypt in which the nation’s first popularly elected president, Mohamed Morsi, was removed from power through a bloodless coup signaled that instability and civil strife of a high order will prevail in the region in the coming years
  498.  
  499. Find this resource:
  500.  
  501.  
  502. Hashemi, Nader, and Danny Postel, eds. The People Reloaded: The Green Movement and the Struggle for Iran’s Future. New York: Melville House, 2010.
  503.  
  504. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  505.  
  506. This book is a collection of essays and documents on the movement behind Iran’s mass protests in reaction to the disputed 2009 presidential elections in Iran. The Islamic Republic of Iran has seen the most dramatic political upheaval in its three decades of rule. What began as a series of mass protests over the official results of a presidential election led to the emergence of a nation-wide protest known as the “Green Movement.”
  507.  
  508. Find this resource:
  509.  
  510.  
  511. Lynch, Marc. The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East. New York: Public Affairs, 2012.
  512.  
  513. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  514.  
  515. Lynch provides an historical overview of the Arab Cold War of the 1950s and 1960s, and of the futile democratization attempts of the late 1980s and early 1990s. After having described developments toward the latest uprisings, the author analyzes the events in 2010 and 2011 in Tunisia and Egypt, respectively, that culminated in the beginning of a new wave of protests.
  516.  
  517. Find this resource:
  518.  
  519.  
  520. Marashi, Reza, and Trita Parsi. “The Gift and the Curse: Iran and the Arab Spring.” In The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East. Edited by Mark L. Haas and David W. Lesch, 133–151. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2013.
  521.  
  522. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  523.  
  524. Marashi and Parsi consider the changes emerging from the Arab uprisings a definitive sign against the status quo. Although the emerging regimes are unlikely to follow Iran’s theocratic model, they may look for ways to engage Iran, if for no other reason than to gain access to Iran’s lucrative energy and trade contracts.
  525.  
  526. Find this resource:
  527.  
  528.  
  529. Nasr, Vali. The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future. New York: Norton, 2006.
  530.  
  531. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  532.  
  533. Nasr offers an account of Shi’a revivalism that has been on the upsurge since the overthrow of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in 2003, but now it has returned to Bahrain’s political scene with a vengeance, albeit with a different face. The recent popular Shi’a expressions of discontent with the al-Khalifa family pose a major challenge to their rule.
  534.  
  535. Find this resource:
  536.  
  537.  
  538. The Victory of Moderates and Diplomacy
  539. Hassan Rouhani’s stunning victory in Iran’s 14 June 2013 presidential election was a clear protest vote against the Ahmadinejad administration’s management of Iran’s relations with the Western world, including the nuclear issue (see also Entessar 2013, cited under the Sanctions Policy). Rouhani’s support for broader social freedoms, his criticism of the securitization of the Iranian society, and his strong advocacy for women’s rights rendered him a favorite candidate for change. Monshipouri 2013 has emphasized Rouhani’s platform to end the sanctions. Monshipouri and Dorraj 2013 sees a strategic opportunity for Iran and the United States to negotiate with each other and engage regional issues. Some experts, such as Kroenig 2014 insist that a successful US air strike would halt Iran’s nuclear program for at least five years. Others, such as Mattair 2008, have long questioned this view, suggesting that a nuclear deal with Iran could alleviate Iranian security concerns, prompt Iranian recognition of the rights and interests of Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf region, and eventually promote a gradual political evolution in Iran. A contrasting view is offered by Hafezian 2008, which argues that as long as the United States keeps sanctions against Iran in place, preservation of the status quo remains a big economic and diplomatic boost for the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, especially the United Arab Emirates. While political and economic crises in the region are not welcomed, a weakened Iran serves the interests of the Persian Gulf states. Milani 2013 sees an opportunity for rapprochement between Iran and the United States, while asserting that given that anti-Americanism has been a key part of the identity of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy since 1979, such unprecedented open discussion in Iranian society regarding reaching a deal with the US demonstrates that we may be on the verge of a shift in Iran’s strategic thinking. There is a need to chart a fresh approach informed by newly emerging US national security interests. Absent such an approach, this unique opportunity will be squandered. Moreover, the challenge of degrading and ultimately defeating the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has raised the stakes and has had the unexpected effect of injecting common sense into diplomacy with Iran. Parsi 2014 provides an optimist outlook, providing a hopeful prospect for rapprochement if not full normalization of the relations between the two countries in coming years.
  540.  
  541. Hafezian, Mohammad Hossein. “Relations with the Arab World.” In Iran Today: An Encyclopedia of Life in the Islamic Republic. Vol. 2. Edited by Mehran Kamrava and Manochehr Dorraj, 435–441. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2008.
  542.  
  543. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  544.  
  545. Hafezian argues that as long as the United States keeps sanctions against Iran in place, preservation of the status quo remains a big economic and diplomatic boost for the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, especially the United Arab Emirates. While political and economic crises in the region are not welcomed, a weakened Iran serves the interests of the Persian Gulf states.
  546.  
  547. Find this resource:
  548.  
  549.  
  550. Kroenig, Matthew. A Time to Attack: the Looming Iranian Nuclear Threat. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
  551.  
  552. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  553.  
  554. Kroenig that a successful US air strike would halt Iran’s nuclear program for at least five years remains questionable.
  555.  
  556. Find this resource:
  557.  
  558.  
  559. Mattair, Thomas R. Global Security Watch—Iran: A Reference Handbook. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008.
  560.  
  561. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  562.  
  563. Mattair suggests that a nuclear deal with Iran could alleviate Iranian security concerns, prompt Iranian recognition of the rights and interests of Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf region, and eventually promote a gradual political evolution in Iran.
  564.  
  565. Find this resource:
  566.  
  567.  
  568. Milani, Mohsen. “Is US-Iran Détente Possible?” Current History 12.758 (December 2013): 345–348.
  569.  
  570. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  571.  
  572. Milani sees an opportunity for rapprochement between Iran and the United States. He also asserts that given that anti-Americanism has been a key part of the identity of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy since 1979, such unprecedented open discussion in Iranian society regarding reaching a deal with the US demonstrates that we may be on the verge of a shift in Iran’s strategic thinking.
  573.  
  574. Find this resource:
  575.  
  576.  
  577. Monshipouri, Mahmood. “Rouhani’s Election: Promise of Change or More of the Same?” Insight Turkey 15.3 (Summer 2013): 45–50.
  578.  
  579. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  580.  
  581. Monshipouri notes that economic insecurity—largely caused by the imposition of economic sanctions by the West in reaction to Iran’s nuclear program—was a central factor in his victory. The public discontent is rooted in Iran’s broken economy.
  582.  
  583. Find this resource:
  584.  
  585.  
  586. Monshipouri, Mahmood, and Manochehr Dorraj. “Iran’s Foreign Policy: A Shifting Strategic Landscape.” Middle East Policy 20.4 (Winter 2013): 133–147.
  587.  
  588. DOI: 10.1111/mepo.12052Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  589.  
  590. Monshipouri and Dorraj argue that with the Syrian crisis deepening, and NATO forces preparing to withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014, Iranian leadership can be engaged and its role could be acknowledged.
  591.  
  592. Find this resource:
  593.  
  594.  
  595. Parsi, Trita. “Why Did Iran Diplomacy Work this Time Around?” Insight Turkey 16.3 (summer 2014): 47–54.
  596.  
  597. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  598.  
  599. Parsi provides an optimist outlook, noting that the odds of resolving the nuclear standoff is now much more favorable than in the past and that resolving this issue is far more feasible compared to a whole host of intractable problems that the MENA region faces. If the parties can reach a nuclear accord, this will certainly be a “game-changer” in the region.
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