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- RE: Europe's Libya Intervention: Spain
- Released on 2012-09-02 23:00 GMT
- Email-ID 1739708
- Date 2011-04-05 23:57:09
- From camilo.villarino@maec.es
- To marko.papic@stratfor.com
- The Falklands had also, at that time, only a symbolic value and still were
- the source of a war for internal political reasons, which would play a
- very significant role in the case of Spain were something similar to ever
- happen with Ceuta and Melilla.
- Besides that, you are right about the LNG capacity, which was partially
- developed to diminish our dependence on Algerian gas.
- Best,
- Camilo
- Camilo Villarino-Marzo
- Political Counselor
- Embassy of Spain
- 2375 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
- Washington, DC 20037
- Tel. (202) 728 2351
- Fax (202) 833 5670
- --------------------------------------------------------------------------
- De: Marko Papic [mailto:marko.papic@stratfor.com]
- Enviado el: martes, 05 de abril de 2011 15:51
- Para: Villarino Marzo, Camilo
- Asunto: Re: Europe's Libya Intervention: Spain
- Dear Camilo,
- Interestingly, even if Morocco was to have a regime change and take out
- Ceuta and Meililla -- which by the way, do not fall within NATO's purview
- from what I understand -- it would be only a cosmetic loss for Spain. The
- two are fairly symbolic and are not really strategic anymore.
- Overall the energy issue is a big concern for sure. But Spain does have
- considerable LNG capacity and could replace piped gas with an expansion of
- LNG facilities. Either way, any interruption to Algeria's exports due to
- crises would be temporary as whatever political entity came to power there
- would at the end of the day need to pay its bills one way or another.
- I included the Ceuta/Melilla issue in my analysis, as well as a more
- general issue of increased migration from Morocco due to some Tunisia
- styled instability.
- Cheers,
- Marko
- P.S. No problem about your answer, I thought it was quite thorough! Thank
- you as always
- On 4/5/11 2:43 PM, Villarino Marzo, Camilo wrote:
- Dear Marko,
- You are right that Spain does not face two many conventional threats
- nowadays. Accession to NATO was considered more an instrument for Spanish
- integration in the West (and Armed Forces' transformation), once Franco
- was dead, than an instrument to strengthen our defense interests. Our
- former "enemies" (mainly the French in the XVI and XVII centuries and the
- Brits in the XVIII) are today our allies. Nevertheless, in today's defense
- planning, it could be said that our potential conventional threats come
- basically from the South:
- First, Morocco, in case a future more aggressive regime could try to take
- by force the two Spanish towns which are in the North Africa Mediterranean
- coast: Ceuta and Melilla. These two towns are very difficult to defend
- without a major counterattack on Moroccan soil or defense assets.
- Second, Algeria, if a change of regime could affect our gas supply.
- For the rest, Russia is too far away from us, although our interests would
- be affected if Russia could one day dictate EU foreign policy. So is
- China, unless it interferes with international free trade of energy
- supplies, rare earth materials, food, etc., which I doubt. In any case,
- for all those other risks, our alliance with the US through NATO is the
- cornerstone of our defence posture.
- Best,
- Camilo
- P.S. Sorry for this short answer but I have to rush into a meeting.
- Camilo Villarino-Marzo
- Political Counselor
- Embassy of Spain
- 2375 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
- Washington, DC 20037
- Tel. (202) 728 2351
- Fax (202) 833 5670
- --------------------------------------------------------------------------
- De: Marko Papic [mailto:marko.papic@stratfor.com]
- Enviado el: martes, 05 de abril de 2011 13:46
- Para: Villarino Marzo, Camilo
- Asunto: Re: Europe's Libya Intervention: Spain
- Dear Camilo,
- Thank you very much for your detailed reply. You are very correct that the
- toll, in terms of personal losses, has been relatively small from ETA in
- Spain in comparison to IRA in the U.K. I would just say that my point was
- that the internal security threat in the wider political sense was more
- existential to Spain than to any other West European country. If London
- lost Northern Ireland, what would be the end result? Not much... So in
- terms of the overall impact to the integrity of the state, Basque Land and
- Catalonia are of greater importance to Spain than Northern Ireland is to
- the U.K. The two Spanish regions are economically far more important than
- Northern Ireland is to the U.K. -- in fact, Northern Ireland is a drain on
- resources. Therefore, even though the actual deaths/murders were fewer,
- the importance of keeping the threat contained was greater.
- And yes, I completely agree that the threat has to a large extent passed
- (we wrote about it a few years ago:
- http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/137576/analysis/20090507_spain_changing_demographics_and_elections_basque_country).
- So the point of the analysis was not that the threat was necessarily
- contemporary, but more in the context of how Spain has perceived threats
- -- internal/external -- since the democratic transition. How it has
- evolved to think of threats.
- And this really brings up an issue that has been to a large extent
- puzzling me for years. What is Spain threatened by? I would say that other
- than the latent internal security issues and potentially Morocco spilling
- over the Straits in some near apocalyptic scenario, there is not much.
- This is why Spain is the only country to have ever held a referendum on
- NATO as a member state (in 1986). This is a luxury that a country with
- very few conventional external threats can have.
- What are your thoughts on that? (As always, completely off the record)
- Cheers,
- Marko
- On 3/30/11 4:45 PM, Villarino Marzo, Camilo wrote:
- Dear Marko,
- I do have a comment, although it does not concern your perception of
- Spanish international position in relation to Libya (to which I could
- basically agree with some minor remarks), but your opinion on the internal
- situation in Spain in relation to the Basque and Catalan nationalist
- movements (see below texts in bold letters and underlined). I am somehow
- surprised to read (it is not the first time I have read it in STRATFOR)
- that you speak about these movements as a "security threat". There is, of
- course, the terrorist group ETA, but even when it was more powerful
- (beginning of the 80's) it never was able to go beyond 80 deaths (murders)
- per year: extremely delicate from a political point of view, yes, no doubt
- about it; source of many internal security problems, indeed, but "an
- internal threat" even bigger than the Irish question in the UK? ETA has
- never been a "guerrilla" force, but a terrorist organization with an
- impact similar to that of the the Brigate Rosse in Italy, although
- prorogued in time due to the support of 15%-20% of the population of the
- Basque Country, a support very much diminished today. The Catalan case is
- a very different, since violence has almost been inexistent there.
- A different case is that of the support that independence may have (or
- does have) in the Basque Country and Catalonia. Although it remains a
- minority position, it is a very relevant one from a political point of
- view. But not a security threat.
- Best regards,
- Camilo
- Camilo Villarino-Marzo
- Political Counselor
- Embassy of Spain
- 2375 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
- Washington, DC 20037
- Tel. (202) 728 2351
- Fax (202) 833 5670
- --------------------------------------------------------------------------
- De: Marko Papic [mailto:marko.papic@stratfor.com]
- Enviado el: miercoles, 30 de marzo de 2011 12:06
- Para: Villarino Marzo, Camilo
- Asunto: Fwd: Europe's Libya Intervention: Spain
- Dear Camilo,
- Would greatly appreciate your criticism and comments if you have any. Your
- email helped me focus in on some key issues for this.
- Feel free to disseminate this one to your colleagues in the Embassy and
- Foreign Ministry.
- Cheers,
- Marko
- -------- Original Message --------
- Subject: Europe's Libya Intervention: Spain
- Date: Wed, 30 Mar 2011 07:36:49 -0500
- From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
- To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
- Stratfor logo
- Europe's Libya Intervention: Spain
- March 30, 2011 | 1218 GMT
- Europe's Libya
- Intervention:
- Germany and
- Russia
- STRATFOR
- Editor's Note: This is the final installment in a five-part series
- examining the motives and mindset behind the current European intervention
- in Libya. We began with an overview and follow with an examination of the
- positions put forth by the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, Russia
- and Spain.
- Spanish Foreign Minister Trinidad Jimenez said March 29 that the option of
- exile is still available to Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi since he has not
- been charged with any crimes. Madrid has therefore backed Rome's position
- that exile should be an option to end the conflict in Libya. Spain is
- participating in the international coalition by providing airbases for
- U.S. AWACS and refueling missions. It also has sent four F-18 fighter jets
- and a refueling aircraft as part of its contribution to enforce the no-fly
- zone, along with an Aegis-capable frigate and a submarine to participate
- in the enforcement of the arms embargo.
- Related Special Topic Page
- The Libyan War: Full Coverage
- Special Series: Europe's Libya Intervention
- The Spanish decision to intervene in Libya has not garnered much attention
- in the global press. However, it stands out as Spanish Prime Minister Jose
- Luis Rodriguez Zapatero's most notable foreign policy decision, one made
- only weeks after being elected, involved pulling Spanish troops out of
- Iraq in April 2004. The Iraq pullout strained Madrid's relations with
- Washington, as the U.S. perceived it as hasty and pandering to public
- opinion panicked by the Madrid train bombings, which took place
- immediately before March 2004 general elections. In reality, Rodriguez
- Zapatero had campaigned throughout 2004 on an anti-Iraq War platform and
- thus used the Madrid attack merely as a trigger for a decision he probably
- would have made regardless.
- The decision to intervene in Libya can thus be seen as a way to revitalize
- Spain's image as a country capable of international activism when the need
- arises - especially in the Mediterranean, its area of national interest -
- but also as a last-ditch effort by an unpopular government to raise its
- profile ahead of elections in early 2012.
- Europe's Libya
- Intervention:
- Spain
- (click here to enlarge image)
- The Luxury of Isolation
- Spain has often stayed aloof from European geopolitical entanglements.
- Geography makes this choice possible. Essentially, Spain dominates the
- Iberian Peninsula. The Pyrenees leave it geographically isolated from core
- Europe. Its colonial linguistic and cultural links to this day provide it
- access to a large and lucrative Latin American market where its goods and
- services (especially financial) can out-compete its European rivals,
- giving it easier markets than the rough competition in Europe proper.
- Throughout its last century, Spain has been more self-absorbed than most
- large European nations. Catalan and Basque agitation for autonomy and
- independence, Madrid often has had no choice but to focus solely on
- internal threats - giving it fewer resources with which to address foreign
- issues.
- This geographic and political aloofness combined with uniquely strenuously
- internal security requirements for a major European power (even greater
- than those imposed on the United Kingdom by the Irish question!) have made
- Madrid's place in the Trans-Atlantic security establishment one of the
- most ambivalent. Rodriguez Zapatero's about-face on Iraq from the stance
- of his predecessor, Jose Maria Aznar Lopez, is therefore unsurprising.
- Because of its isolation and because the Trans-Atlantic alliance matters
- less for Madrid than for others in Europe, Spain is probably the only
- major country in Europe that has the luxury of pursuing such dramatically
- opposed policies purely on the domestic political calculus of its leaders.
- For Spain, the security benefits of NATO membership therefore never really
- have been clear. Focused on internal security - for which NATO membership
- is of little use - Madrid's only true international concerns have been its
- proximity to North Africa and the subsequent ill effects of organized
- crime and smuggling. NATO's security guarantees do not apply to the
- Spanish exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, across the Strait of Gibraltar from
- Spain and surrounded by Morocco, which claims the territories. One could
- still argue that Spain's NATO membership certainly would be at least a
- psychological reason for Morocco to reconsider plans to seize the two
- territories.
- Europe's Libya
- Intervention:
- Spain
- (click here to enlarge image)
- Therefore, Spanish NATO membership ultimately is about being accepted into
- the club of Western European states, which was still in serious doubt in
- the immediate years following the Franco dictatorship when Madrid joined
- the alliance in 1982. Joining the alliance at the time was a simple way to
- reassure Madrid's European allies that Spain would not renege on its
- commitment to democracy and that it would use NATO membership to begin
- reforming its military leadership. Madrid joined the European Union four
- years later in 1986. Spain has used its membership in NATO and often-close
- alliance with the United States to balance against the France- and
- Germany-dominated European Union. Spain often feels sidelined by the
- Franco-German leadership duo and has never been able to form a counter to
- it by allying with the United Kingdom or Italy. Spain's relationship with
- the United States has therefore proven useful in keeping Berlin and Paris
- on notice that Madrid's acquiescence to all things agreed upon by
- Continental powers is not a given.
- Precisely because Spain's NATO membership was more about international
- assurances and the balancing of its U.S. and European commitments - and
- not about its core security interests - Madrid has had the luxury of
- ambivalence, as indicated by the extreme change of policy between Aznar
- and Zapatero on Iraq. This ambivalence was further exemplified by the 1986
- referendum, organized by a Socialist government, to see Spain withdraw
- from NATO, the first and only such referendum by a NATO member. The
- referendum was handily defeated by a popular vote, but the very act of
- holding it illustrated Spain's attitude toward the alliance: A country
- truly threatened by adverse geopolitical conditions and therefore truly in
- need of a security alliance would not seek to depart such an alliance.
- In the Libya intervention, Madrid accordingly seeks to illustrate its
- solidarity with the United States and the other main European powers. For
- Rodriguez Zapatero in particular, the intervention is a way to illustrate
- that Madrid does not shy from international military action, especially as
- Spain already participates in international efforts in Afghanistan -
- thereby absolving Spain of its departure from Iraq. Also important for
- Rodriguez Zapatero is proving that despite its considerable economic
- crisis - and fears that Spain could be the next eurozone economy after
- Portugal to require a bailout - Madrid can still play an important foreign
- policy role.?
- The Domestic Component, Energy and Morocco
- There is also an important domestic political component in terms of how
- Madrid is pursuing the intervention. The center-right People's Party (PP)
- remains firmly ahead of the governing Socialist Party in national polls,
- having enjoyed a steady 13-point lead for the past six months. Rodriguez
- Zapatero is worried that government's austerity measures - imposed to curb
- Spain's budget deficit and comply with demands from Berlin - are losing
- him the support of his base among the center-left in Spain. Due to the
- legacy of the Franco years, the left in Spain tends to be generally
- anti-interventionist, with as much as 91 percent opposed to the country's
- participation in Iraq. Therefore, while the Socialist government is trying
- to raise Madrid's profile internationally, it must do so quietly, without
- much fanfare at home to avoid further erosion of its support from its
- base. That said, the intervention is thus far popular due to its
- multilateral nature. The danger for Rodriguez Zapatero, however - as it is
- for other European governments that have entangled themselves in the
- Libyan intervention - is that public support for a humanitarian
- intervention will not distract from economic austerity too long,
- especially if the intervention starts looking drawn out and inconclusive.
- Europe's Libya
- Intervention:
- Spain
- (click here to enlarge image)
- On top of all this, Spain does have strategic interests in Libya, albeit
- not as great as Italy's. Spanish energy company Repsol YPF extracted 8.3
- percent of its overall oil production from Libya in 2009, not an
- insignificant amount and comparable to the 10.7 percent that Italian
- energy giant ENI extracted. Spanish imports of oil from Libya are
- comparable to those of France, with 9 percent of total Spanish consumption
- coming from Libya, nowhere close to the almost 25 percent of its
- requirements that Italy imports. French firm Total does extract more oil
- from Libya, but as a larger company than Repsol, Libya is smaller as a
- share of the French company's total. As such, Repsol was not necessarily
- dissatisfied with the Gadhafi status quo in Libya and probably will look
- askance at the French and British moves.
- Europe's Libya
- Intervention:
- Spain
- Finally, as a Mediterranean country in close proximity to the 32 million
- people of Morocco, Madrid must consider what Libyan instability means for
- the region. Protests have occurred in Morocco, although the situation is
- thus far still under control and violence has been sporadic. Madrid cannot
- oppose the international intervention in Libya because it does not want to
- set a precedent that it may need to reverse shortly. Regime change in
- Morocco, for example, could place Madrid's North African exclaves in an
- untenable situation or could produce an exodus of migrants that Spain will
- have to counter with aggressive naval force interdiction - as Italy is
- threatening to begin doing with migrants streaming from Tunisia and Libya.
- That said, Morocco is nowhere near the point of Libyan instability or even
- Tunisian/Egyptian-style unrest.
- Madrid definitely has an interest in joining in the intervention if for no
- other reason than to have a say in the post-intervention diplomatic
- resolution - when Paris and London may seek to use their patronage of the
- eastern Libyan rebels to enhance their respective positions. Madrid is
- wary of the French and British activism and is becoming far more aligned
- with Rome on the intervention than with Paris and London. This became
- clear in a meeting of European, American, African and Arab leaders in
- London on March 29, with Spain, Germany and Italy favoring an option of
- exile for Gadhafi to facilitate a conclusion to the intervention while
- France and the United Kingdom continued their strong demands for regime
- change.
- Give us your thoughts Read comments on
- on this report other reports
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- (c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
- --
- Marko Papic
- Analyst - Europe
- STRATFOR
- + 1-512-744-4094 (O)
- 221 W. 6th St, Ste. 400
- Austin, TX 78701 - USA
- --
- Marko Papic
- Analyst - Europe
- STRATFOR
- + 1-512-744-4094 (O)
- 221 W. 6th St, Ste. 400
- Austin, TX 78701 - USA
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