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- THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON
- By Immanuel Kant
- Translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn
- PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION, 1781
- Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider
- questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own
- nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of
- the mind.
- It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins
- with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of
- experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same
- time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in
- obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote
- conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must
- remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present
- themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to
- principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are
- regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion
- and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent
- errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because the principles
- it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested
- by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called
- Metaphysic.
- Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences; and, if we take
- the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the
- high importance of her object-matter, this title of honour. Now, it is
- the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her; and the
- matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba:
- Modo maxima rerum,
- Tot generis, natisque potens...
- Nunc trahor exul, inops.
- --Ovid, Metamorphoses. xiii
- At first, her government, under the administration of the dogmatists,
- was an absolute despotism. But, as the legislative continued to show
- traces of the ancient barbaric rule, her empire gradually broke up, and
- intestine wars introduced the reign of anarchy; while the sceptics,
- like nomadic tribes, who hate a permanent habitation and settled mode
- of living, attacked from time to time those who had organized themselves
- into civil communities. But their number was, very happily, small; and
- thus they could not entirely put a stop to the exertions of those who
- persisted in raising new edifices, although on no settled or uniform
- plan. In recent times the hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes
- settled, and the legitimacy of her claims established by a kind of
- physiology of the human understanding--that of the celebrated Locke. But
- it was found that--although it was affirmed that this so-called queen
- could not refer her descent to any higher source than that of common
- experience, a circumstance which necessarily brought suspicion on
- her claims--as this genealogy was incorrect, she persisted in the
- advancement of her claims to sovereignty. Thus metaphysics necessarily
- fell back into the antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism, and
- again became obnoxious to the contempt from which efforts had been
- made to save it. At present, as all methods, according to the general
- persuasion, have been tried in vain, there reigns nought but weariness
- and complete indifferentism--the mother of chaos and night in the
- scientific world, but at the same time the source of, or at least the
- prelude to, the re-creation and reinstallation of a science, when it has
- fallen into confusion, obscurity, and disuse from ill directed effort.
- For it is in reality vain to profess indifference in regard to such
- inquiries, the object of which cannot be indifferent to humanity.
- Besides, these pretended indifferentists, however much they may try to
- disguise themselves by the assumption of a popular style and by changes
- on the language of the schools, unavoidably fall into metaphysical
- declarations and propositions, which they profess to regard with so much
- contempt. At the same time, this indifference, which has arisen in the
- world of science, and which relates to that kind of knowledge which
- we should wish to see destroyed the last, is a phenomenon that well
- deserves our attention and reflection. It is plainly not the effect of
- the levity, but of the matured judgement* of the age, which refuses to
- be any longer entertained with illusory knowledge, It is, in fact, a
- call to reason, again to undertake the most laborious of all tasks--that
- of self-examination, and to establish a tribunal, which may secure it
- in its well-grounded claims, while it pronounces against all baseless
- assumptions and pretensions, not in an arbitrary manner, but according
- to its own eternal and unchangeable laws. This tribunal is nothing less
- than the critical investigation of pure reason.
- [*Footnote: We very often hear complaints of the shallowness of the
- present age, and of the decay of profound science. But I do not think
- that those which rest upon a secure foundation, such as mathematics,
- physical science, etc., in the least deserve this reproach, but that
- they rather maintain their ancient fame, and in the latter case, indeed,
- far surpass it. The same would be the case with the other kinds of
- cognition, if their principles were but firmly established. In the
- absence of this security, indifference, doubt, and finally, severe
- criticism are rather signs of a profound habit of thought. Our age
- is the age of criticism, to which everything must be subjected. The
- sacredness of religion, and the authority of legislation, are by many
- regarded as grounds of exemption from the examination of this tribunal.
- But, if they on they are exempted, they become the subjects of just
- suspicion, and cannot lay claim to sincere respect, which reason accords
- only to that which has stood the test of a free and public examination.]
- I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but a critical
- inquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to the cognitions
- to which it strives to attain without the aid of experience; in other
- words, the solution of the question regarding the possibility or
- impossibility of metaphysics, and the determination of the origin, as
- well as of the extent and limits of this science. All this must be done
- on the basis of principles.
- This path--the only one now remaining--has been entered upon by me; and
- I flatter myself that I have, in this way, discovered the cause of--and
- consequently the mode of removing--all the errors which have hitherto
- set reason at variance with itself, in the sphere of non-empirical
- thought. I have not returned an evasive answer to the questions of
- reason, by alleging the inability and limitation of the faculties of the
- mind; I have, on the contrary, examined them completely in the light
- of principles, and, after having discovered the cause of the doubts and
- contradictions into which reason fell, have solved them to its perfect
- satisfaction. It is true, these questions have not been solved as
- dogmatism, in its vain fancies and desires, had expected; for it can
- only be satisfied by the exercise of magical arts, and of these I have
- no knowledge. But neither do these come within the compass of our mental
- powers; and it was the duty of philosophy to destroy the illusions which
- had their origin in misconceptions, whatever darling hopes and valued
- expectations may be ruined by its explanations. My chief aim in this
- work has been thoroughness; and I make bold to say that there is not a
- single metaphysical problem that does not find its solution, or at
- least the key to its solution, here. Pure reason is a perfect unity; and
- therefore, if the principle presented by it prove to be insufficient for
- the solution of even a single one of those questions to which the very
- nature of reason gives birth, we must reject it, as we could not be
- perfectly certain of its sufficiency in the case of the others.
- While I say this, I think I see upon the countenance of the reader signs
- of dissatisfaction mingled with contempt, when he hears declarations
- which sound so boastful and extravagant; and yet they are beyond
- comparison more moderate than those advanced by the commonest author of
- the commonest philosophical programme, in which the dogmatist professes
- to demonstrate the simple nature of the soul, or the necessity of a
- primal being. Such a dogmatist promises to extend human knowledge beyond
- the limits of possible experience; while I humbly confess that this
- is completely beyond my power. Instead of any such attempt, I confine
- myself to the examination of reason alone and its pure thought; and I do
- not need to seek far for the sum-total of its cognition, because it
- has its seat in my own mind. Besides, common logic presents me with
- a complete and systematic catalogue of all the simple operations of
- reason; and it is my task to answer the question how far reason can go,
- without the material presented and the aid furnished by experience.
- So much for the completeness and thoroughness necessary in the execution
- of the present task. The aims set before us are not arbitrarily
- proposed, but are imposed upon us by the nature of cognition itself.
- The above remarks relate to the matter of our critical inquiry. As
- regards the form, there are two indispensable conditions, which any one
- who undertakes so difficult a task as that of a critique of pure reason,
- is bound to fulfil. These conditions are certitude and clearness.
- As regards certitude, I have fully convinced myself that, in this sphere
- of thought, opinion is perfectly inadmissible, and that everything which
- bears the least semblance of an hypothesis must be excluded, as of no
- value in such discussions. For it is a necessary condition of every
- cognition that is to be established upon a priori grounds that it shall
- be held to be absolutely necessary; much more is this the case with an
- attempt to determine all pure a priori cognition, and to furnish the
- standard--and consequently an example--of all apodeictic (philosophical)
- certitude. Whether I have succeeded in what I professed to do, it is for
- the reader to determine; it is the author's business merely to adduce
- grounds and reasons, without determining what influence these ought to
- have on the mind of his judges. But, lest anything he may have said may
- become the innocent cause of doubt in their minds, or tend to weaken the
- effect which his arguments might otherwise produce--he may be allowed
- to point out those passages which may occasion mistrust or difficulty,
- although these do not concern the main purpose of the present work. He
- does this solely with the view of removing from the mind of the reader
- any doubts which might affect his judgement of the work as a whole, and
- in regard to its ultimate aim.
- I know no investigations more necessary for a full insight into the
- nature of the faculty which we call understanding, and at the same time
- for the determination of the rules and limits of its use, than those
- undertaken in the second chapter of the "Transcendental Analytic," under
- the title of "Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding";
- and they have also cost me by far the greatest labour--labour which, I
- hope, will not remain uncompensated. The view there taken, which goes
- somewhat deeply into the subject, has two sides, The one relates to the
- objects of the pure understanding, and is intended to demonstrate and
- to render comprehensible the objective validity of its a priori
- conceptions; and it forms for this reason an essential part of the
- Critique. The other considers the pure understanding itself, its
- possibility and its powers of cognition--that is, from a subjective
- point of view; and, although this exposition is of great importance, it
- does not belong essentially to the main purpose of the work, because the
- grand question is what and how much can reason and understanding, apart
- from experience, cognize, and not, how is the faculty of thought itself
- possible? As the latter is an inquiry into the cause of a given effect,
- and has thus in it some semblance of an hypothesis (although, as I shall
- show on another occasion, this is really not the fact), it would seem
- that, in the present instance, I had allowed myself to enounce a mere
- opinion, and that the reader must therefore be at liberty to hold
- a different opinion. But I beg to remind him that, if my subjective
- deduction does not produce in his mind the conviction of its certitude
- at which I aimed, the objective deduction, with which alone the present
- work is properly concerned, is in every respect satisfactory.
- As regards clearness, the reader has a right to demand, in the first
- place, discursive or logical clearness, that is, on the basis of
- conceptions, and, secondly, intuitive or aesthetic clearness, by means
- of intuitions, that is, by examples or other modes of illustration
- in concreto. I have done what I could for the first kind of
- intelligibility. This was essential to my purpose; and it thus became
- the accidental cause of my inability to do complete justice to the
- second requirement. I have been almost always at a loss, during the
- progress of this work, how to settle this question. Examples and
- illustrations always appeared to me necessary, and, in the first sketch
- of the Critique, naturally fell into their proper places. But I very
- soon became aware of the magnitude of my task, and the numerous problems
- with which I should be engaged; and, as I perceived that this critical
- investigation would, even if delivered in the driest scholastic manner,
- be far from being brief, I found it unadvisable to enlarge it still more
- with examples and explanations, which are necessary only from a popular
- point of view. I was induced to take this course from the consideration
- also that the present work is not intended for popular use, that those
- devoted to science do not require such helps, although they are always
- acceptable, and that they would have materially interfered with my
- present purpose. Abbe Terrasson remarks with great justice that, if we
- estimate the size of a work, not from the number of its pages, but from
- the time which we require to make ourselves master of it, it may be said
- of many a book that it would be much shorter, if it were not so short.
- On the other hand, as regards the comprehensibility of a system of
- speculative cognition, connected under a single principle, we may say
- with equal justice: many a book would have been much clearer, if it had
- not been intended to be so very clear. For explanations and examples,
- and other helps to intelligibility, aid us in the comprehension of
- parts, but they distract the attention, dissipate the mental power of
- the reader, and stand in the way of his forming a clear conception of
- the whole; as he cannot attain soon enough to a survey of the system,
- and the colouring and embellishments bestowed upon it prevent his
- observing its articulation or organization--which is the most important
- consideration with him, when he comes to judge of its unity and
- stability.
- The reader must naturally have a strong inducement to co-operate
- with the present author, if he has formed the intention of erecting a
- complete and solid edifice of metaphysical science, according to the
- plan now laid before him. Metaphysics, as here represented, is the only
- science which admits of completion--and with little labour, if it
- is united, in a short time; so that nothing will be left to
- future generations except the task of illustrating and applying it
- didactically. For this science is nothing more than the inventory of all
- that is given us by pure reason, systematically arranged. Nothing can
- escape our notice; for what reason produces from itself cannot lie
- concealed, but must be brought to the light by reason itself, so soon
- as we have discovered the common principle of the ideas we seek. The
- perfect unity of this kind of cognitions, which are based upon pure
- conceptions, and uninfluenced by any empirical element, or any peculiar
- intuition leading to determinate experience, renders this completeness
- not only practicable, but also necessary.
- Tecum habita, et noris quam sit tibi curta supellex.
- --Persius. Satirae iv. 52.
- Such a system of pure speculative reason I hope to be able to publish
- under the title of Metaphysic of Nature*. The content of this work
- (which will not be half so long) will be very much richer than that
- of the present Critique, which has to discover the sources of this
- cognition and expose the conditions of its possibility, and at the same
- time to clear and level a fit foundation for the scientific edifice. In
- the present work, I look for the patient hearing and the impartiality
- of a judge; in the other, for the good-will and assistance of a
- co-labourer. For, however complete the list of principles for this
- system may be in the Critique, the correctness of the system requires
- that no deduced conceptions should be absent. These cannot be presented
- a priori, but must be gradually discovered; and, while the synthesis of
- conceptions has been fully exhausted in the Critique, it is necessary
- that, in the proposed work, the same should be the case with their
- analysis. But this will be rather an amusement than a labour.
- [*Footnote: In contradistinction to the Metaphysic of
- Ethics. This work was never published.]
- PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION, 1787
- Whether the treatment of that portion of our knowledge which lies within
- the province of pure reason advances with that undeviating certainty
- which characterizes the progress of science, we shall be at no loss to
- determine. If we find those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits,
- unable to come to an understanding as to the method which they ought
- to follow; if we find them, after the most elaborate preparations,
- invariably brought to a stand before the goal is reached, and compelled
- to retrace their steps and strike into fresh paths, we may then feel
- quite sure that they are far from having attained to the certainty of
- scientific progress and may rather be said to be merely groping about in
- the dark. In these circumstances we shall render an important service to
- reason if we succeed in simply indicating the path along which it must
- travel, in order to arrive at any results--even if it should be found
- necessary to abandon many of those aims which, without reflection, have
- been proposed for its attainment.
- That logic has advanced in this sure course, even from the earliest
- times, is apparent from the fact that, since Aristotle, it has been
- unable to advance a step and, thus, to all appearance has reached its
- completion. For, if some of the moderns have thought to enlarge its
- domain by introducing psychological discussions on the mental faculties,
- such as imagination and wit, metaphysical, discussions on the origin
- of knowledge and the different kinds of certitude, according to
- the difference of the objects (idealism, scepticism, and so on), or
- anthropological discussions on prejudices, their causes and remedies:
- this attempt, on the part of these authors, only shows their ignorance
- of the peculiar nature of logical science. We do not enlarge but
- disfigure the sciences when we lose sight of their respective limits and
- allow them to run into one another. Now logic is enclosed within limits
- which admit of perfectly clear definition; it is a science which has for
- its object nothing but the exposition and proof of the formal laws of
- all thought, whether it be a priori or empirical, whatever be its
- origin or its object, and whatever the difficulties--natural or
- accidental--which it encounters in the human mind.
- The early success of logic must be attributed exclusively to the
- narrowness of its field, in which abstraction may, or rather must,
- be made of all the objects of cognition with their characteristic
- distinctions, and in which the understanding has only to deal with
- itself and with its own forms. It is, obviously, a much more difficult
- task for reason to strike into the sure path of science, where it has to
- deal not simply with itself, but with objects external to itself. Hence,
- logic is properly only a propaedeutic--forms, as it were, the vestibule
- of the sciences; and while it is necessary to enable us to form a
- correct judgement with regard to the various branches of knowledge,
- still the acquisition of real, substantive knowledge is to be sought
- only in the sciences properly so called, that is, in the objective
- sciences.
- Now these sciences, if they can be termed rational at all, must contain
- elements of a priori cognition, and this cognition may stand in a
- twofold relation to its object. Either it may have to determine the
- conception of the object--which must be supplied extraneously, or it
- may have to establish its reality. The former is theoretical, the latter
- practical, rational cognition. In both, the pure or a priori element
- must be treated first, and must be carefully distinguished from that
- which is supplied from other sources. Any other method can only lead to
- irremediable confusion.
- Mathematics and physics are the two theoretical sciences which have to
- determine their objects a priori. The former is purely a priori, the
- latter is partially so, but is also dependent on other sources of
- cognition.
- In the earliest times of which history affords us any record,
- mathematics had already entered on the sure course of science, among
- that wonderful nation, the Greeks. Still it is not to be supposed that
- it was as easy for this science to strike into, or rather to construct
- for itself, that royal road, as it was for logic, in which reason has
- only to deal with itself. On the contrary, I believe that it must
- have remained long--chiefly among the Egyptians--in the stage of
- blind groping after its true aims and destination, and that it was
- revolutionized by the happy idea of one man, who struck out and
- determined for all time the path which this science must follow,
- and which admits of an indefinite advancement. The history of this
- intellectual revolution--much more important in its results than the
- discovery of the passage round the celebrated Cape of Good Hope--and of
- its author, has not been preserved. But Diogenes Laertius, in naming
- the supposed discoverer of some of the simplest elements of geometrical
- demonstration--elements which, according to the ordinary opinion, do not
- even require to be proved--makes it apparent that the change introduced
- by the first indication of this new path, must have seemed of the utmost
- importance to the mathematicians of that age, and it has thus been
- secured against the chance of oblivion. A new light must have flashed on
- the mind of the first man (Thales, or whatever may have been his name)
- who demonstrated the properties of the isosceles triangle. For he found
- that it was not sufficient to meditate on the figure, as it lay before
- his eyes, or the conception of it, as it existed in his mind, and thus
- endeavour to get at the knowledge of its properties, but that it was
- necessary to produce these properties, as it were, by a positive a
- priori construction; and that, in order to arrive with certainty at
- a priori cognition, he must not attribute to the object any other
- properties than those which necessarily followed from that which he had
- himself, in accordance with his conception, placed in the object.
- A much longer period elapsed before physics entered on the highway of
- science. For it is only about a century and a half since the wise Bacon
- gave a new direction to physical studies, or rather--as others were
- already on the right track--imparted fresh vigour to the pursuit of
- this new direction. Here, too, as in the case of mathematics, we find
- evidence of a rapid intellectual revolution. In the remarks which follow
- I shall confine myself to the empirical side of natural science.
- When Galilei experimented with balls of a definite weight on the
- inclined plane, when Torricelli caused the air to sustain a weight which
- he had calculated beforehand to be equal to that of a definite column of
- water, or when Stahl, at a later period, converted metals into lime, and
- reconverted lime into metal, by the addition and subtraction of certain
- elements; [Footnote: I do not here follow with exactness the history of
- the experimental method, of which, indeed, the first steps are involved
- in some obscurity.] a light broke upon all natural philosophers. They
- learned that reason only perceives that which it produces after its
- own design; that it must not be content to follow, as it were, in the
- leading-strings of nature, but must proceed in advance with principles
- of judgement according to unvarying laws, and compel nature to reply
- its questions. For accidental observations, made according to no
- preconceived plan, cannot be united under a necessary law. But it is
- this that reason seeks for and requires. It is only the principles of
- reason which can give to concordant phenomena the validity of laws, and
- it is only when experiment is directed by these rational principles that
- it can have any real utility. Reason must approach nature with the view,
- indeed, of receiving information from it, not, however, in the character
- of a pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him,
- but in that of a judge, who compels the witnesses to reply to those
- questions which he himself thinks fit to propose. To this single idea
- must the revolution be ascribed, by which, after groping in the dark for
- so many centuries, natural science was at length conducted into the path
- of certain progress.
- We come now to metaphysics, a purely speculative science, which occupies
- a completely isolated position and is entirely independent of the
- teachings of experience. It deals with mere conceptions--not, like
- mathematics, with conceptions applied to intuition--and in it, reason is
- the pupil of itself alone. It is the oldest of the sciences, and would
- still survive, even if all the rest were swallowed up in the abyss of
- an all-destroying barbarism. But it has not yet had the good fortune to
- attain to the sure scientific method. This will be apparent; if we
- apply the tests which we proposed at the outset. We find that reason
- perpetually comes to a stand, when it attempts to gain a priori the
- perception even of those laws which the most common experience confirms.
- We find it compelled to retrace its steps in innumerable instances, and
- to abandon the path on which it had entered, because this does not
- lead to the desired result. We find, too, that those who are engaged in
- metaphysical pursuits are far from being able to agree among themselves,
- but that, on the contrary, this science appears to furnish an arena
- specially adapted for the display of skill or the exercise of strength
- in mock-contests--a field in which no combatant ever yet succeeded in
- gaining an inch of ground, in which, at least, no victory was ever yet
- crowned with permanent possession.
- This leads us to inquire why it is that, in metaphysics, the sure path
- of science has not hitherto been found. Shall we suppose that it is
- impossible to discover it? Why then should nature have visited our
- reason with restless aspirations after it, as if it were one of our
- weightiest concerns? Nay, more, how little cause should we have to place
- confidence in our reason, if it abandons us in a matter about which,
- most of all, we desire to know the truth--and not only so, but even
- allures us to the pursuit of vain phantoms, only to betray us in the
- end? Or, if the path has only hitherto been missed, what indications do
- we possess to guide us in a renewed investigation, and to enable us to
- hope for greater success than has fallen to the lot of our predecessors?
- It appears to me that the examples of mathematics and natural
- philosophy, which, as we have seen, were brought into their present
- condition by a sudden revolution, are sufficiently remarkable to fix our
- attention on the essential circumstances of the change which has proved
- so advantageous to them, and to induce us to make the experiment of
- imitating them, so far as the analogy which, as rational sciences, they
- bear to metaphysics may permit. It has hitherto been assumed that our
- cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to ascertain
- anything about these objects a priori, by means of conceptions, and thus
- to extend the range of our knowledge, have been rendered abortive by
- this assumption. Let us then make the experiment whether we may not
- be more successful in metaphysics, if we assume that the objects must
- conform to our cognition. This appears, at all events, to accord better
- with the possibility of our gaining the end we have in view, that is to
- say, of arriving at the cognition of objects a priori, of determining
- something with respect to these objects, before they are given to us. We
- here propose to do just what Copernicus did in attempting to explain
- the celestial movements. When he found that he could make no progress by
- assuming that all the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator,
- he reversed the process, and tried the experiment of assuming that the
- spectator revolved, while the stars remained at rest. We may make
- the same experiment with regard to the intuition of objects. If the
- intuition must conform to the nature of the objects, I do not see how
- we can know anything of them a priori. If, on the other hand, the object
- conforms to the nature of our faculty of intuition, I can then easily
- conceive the possibility of such an a priori knowledge. Now as I cannot
- rest in the mere intuitions, but--if they are to become cognitions--must
- refer them, as representations, to something, as object, and must
- determine the latter by means of the former, here again there are two
- courses open to me. Either, first, I may assume that the conceptions,
- by which I effect this determination, conform to the object--and in this
- case I am reduced to the same perplexity as before; or secondly, I may
- assume that the objects, or, which is the same thing, that experience,
- in which alone as given objects they are cognized, conform to my
- conceptions--and then I am at no loss how to proceed. For experience
- itself is a mode of cognition which requires understanding. Before
- objects, are given to me, that is, a priori, I must presuppose in myself
- laws of the understanding which are expressed in conceptions a
- priori. To these conceptions, then, all the objects of experience must
- necessarily conform. Now there are objects which reason thinks, and
- that necessarily, but which cannot be given in experience, or, at least,
- cannot be given so as reason thinks them. The attempt to think these
- objects will hereafter furnish an excellent test of the new method of
- thought which we have adopted, and which is based on the principle that
- we only cognize in things a priori that which we ourselves place in
- them.*
- [*Footnote: This method, accordingly, which we have borrowed
- from the natural philosopher, consists in seeking for the
- elements of pure reason in that which admits of confirmation
- or refutation by experiment. Now the propositions of pure
- reason, especially when they transcend the limits of
- possible experience, do not admit of our making any
- experiment with their objects, as in natural science. Hence,
- with regard to those conceptions and principles which we
- assume a priori, our only course ill be to view them from
- two different sides. We must regard one and the same
- conception, on the one hand, in relation to experience as an
- object of the senses and of the understanding, on the other
- hand, in relation to reason, isolated and transcending the
- limits of experience, as an object of mere thought. Now if
- we find that, when we regard things from this double point
- of view, the result is in harmony with the principle of pure
- reason, but that, when we regard them from a single point of
- view, reason is involved in self-contradiction, then the
- experiment will establish the correctness of this
- distinction.]
- This attempt succeeds as well as we could desire, and promises to
- metaphysics, in its first part--that is, where it is occupied with
- conceptions a priori, of which the corresponding objects may be given in
- experience--the certain course of science. For by this new method we are
- enabled perfectly to explain the possibility of a priori cognition, and,
- what is more, to demonstrate satisfactorily the laws which lie a
- priori at the foundation of nature, as the sum of the objects of
- experience--neither of which was possible according to the procedure
- hitherto followed. But from this deduction of the faculty of a priori
- cognition in the first part of metaphysics, we derive a surprising
- result, and one which, to all appearance, militates against the great
- end of metaphysics, as treated in the second part. For we come to the
- conclusion that our faculty of cognition is unable to transcend the
- limits of possible experience; and yet this is precisely the most
- essential object of this science. The estimate of our rational cognition
- a priori at which we arrive is that it has only to do with phenomena,
- and that things in themselves, while possessing a real existence,
- lie beyond its sphere. Here we are enabled to put the justice of this
- estimate to the test. For that which of necessity impels us to transcend
- the limits of experience and of all phenomena is the unconditioned,
- which reason absolutely requires in things as they are in themselves,
- in order to complete the series of conditions. Now, if it appears that
- when, on the one hand, we assume that our cognition conforms to its
- objects as things in themselves, the unconditioned cannot be thought
- without contradiction, and that when, on the other hand, we assume that
- our representation of things as they are given to us, does not conform
- to these things as they are in themselves, but that these objects, as
- phenomena, conform to our mode of representation, the contradiction
- disappears: we shall then be convinced of the truth of that which we
- began by assuming for the sake of experiment; we may look upon it as
- established that the unconditioned does not lie in things as we
- know them, or as they are given to us, but in things as they are in
- themselves, beyond the range of our cognition.*
- [*Footnote: This experiment of pure reason has a great
- similarity to that of the chemists, which they term the
- experiment of reduction, or, more usually, the synthetic
- process. The analysis of the metaphysician separates pure
- cognition a priori into two heterogeneous elements, viz.,
- the cognition of things as phenomena, and of things in
- themselves. Dialectic combines these again into harmony with
- the necessary rational idea of the unconditioned, and finds
- that this harmony never results except through the above
- distinction, which is, therefore, concluded to be just.]
- But, after we have thus denied the power of speculative reason to make
- any progress in the sphere of the supersensible, it still remains for
- our consideration whether data do not exist in practical cognition
- which may enable us to determine the transcendent conception of the
- unconditioned, to rise beyond the limits of all possible experience
- from a practical point of view, and thus to satisfy the great ends of
- metaphysics. Speculative reason has thus, at least, made room for such
- an extension of our knowledge: and, if it must leave this space vacant,
- still it does not rob us of the liberty to fill it up, if we can,
- by means of practical data--nay, it even challenges us to make the
- attempt.*
- [*Footnote: So the central laws of the movements of the
- heavenly bodies established the truth of that which
- Copernicus, first, assumed only as a hypothesis, and, at the
- same time, brought to light that invisible force (Newtonian
- attraction) which holds the universe together. The latter
- would have remained forever undiscovered, if Copernicus had
- not ventured on the experiment--contrary to the senses but
- still just--of looking for the observed movements not in the
- heavenly bodies, but in the spectator. In this Preface I
- treat the new metaphysical method as a hypothesis with the
- view of rendering apparent the first attempts at such a
- change of method, which are always hypothetical. But in the
- Critique itself it will be demonstrated, not hypothetically,
- but apodeictically, from the nature of our representations
- of space and time, and from the elementary conceptions of
- the understanding.]
- This attempt to introduce a complete revolution in the procedure
- of metaphysics, after the example of the geometricians and natural
- philosophers, constitutes the aim of the Critique of Pure Speculative
- Reason. It is a treatise on the method to be followed, not a system of
- the science itself. But, at the same time, it marks out and defines both
- the external boundaries and the internal structure of this science.
- For pure speculative reason has this peculiarity, that, in choosing the
- various objects of thought, it is able to define the limits of its own
- faculties, and even to give a complete enumeration of the possible
- modes of proposing problems to itself, and thus to sketch out the entire
- system of metaphysics. For, on the one hand, in cognition a priori,
- nothing must be attributed to the objects but what the thinking subject
- derives from itself; and, on the other hand, reason is, in regard to
- the principles of cognition, a perfectly distinct, independent unity, in
- which, as in an organized body, every member exists for the sake of
- the others, and all for the sake of each, so that no principle can be
- viewed, with safety, in one relationship, unless it is, at the same
- time, viewed in relation to the total use of pure reason. Hence, too,
- metaphysics has this singular advantage--an advantage which falls to the
- lot of no other science which has to do with objects--that, if once it
- is conducted into the sure path of science, by means of this criticism,
- it can then take in the whole sphere of its cognitions, and can thus
- complete its work, and leave it for the use of posterity, as a capital
- which can never receive fresh accessions. For metaphysics has to deal
- only with principles and with the limitations of its own employment as
- determined by these principles. To this perfection it is, therefore,
- bound, as the fundamental science, to attain, and to it the maxim may
- justly be applied:
- Nil actum reputans, si quid superesset agendum.
- But, it will be asked, what kind of a treasure is this that we propose
- to bequeath to posterity? What is the real value of this system of
- metaphysics, purified by criticism, and thereby reduced to a permanent
- condition? A cursory view of the present work will lead to the
- supposition that its use is merely negative, that it only serves to
- warn us against venturing, with speculative reason, beyond the limits
- of experience. This is, in fact, its primary use. But this, at once,
- assumes a positive value, when we observe that the principles with which
- speculative reason endeavours to transcend its limits lead inevitably,
- not to the extension, but to the contraction of the use of reason,
- inasmuch as they threaten to extend the limits of sensibility, which
- is their proper sphere, over the entire realm of thought and, thus,
- to supplant the pure (practical) use of reason. So far, then, as this
- criticism is occupied in confining speculative reason within its proper
- bounds, it is only negative; but, inasmuch as it thereby, at the same
- time, removes an obstacle which impedes and even threatens to destroy
- the use of practical reason, it possesses a positive and very important
- value. In order to admit this, we have only to be convinced that there
- is an absolutely necessary use of pure reason--the moral use--in which
- it inevitably transcends the limits of sensibility, without the aid
- of speculation, requiring only to be insured against the effects of a
- speculation which would involve it in contradiction with itself. To deny
- the positive advantage of the service which this criticism renders
- us would be as absurd as to maintain that the system of police is
- productive of no positive benefit, since its main business is to prevent
- the violence which citizen has to apprehend from citizen, that so each
- may pursue his vocation in peace and security. That space and time are
- only forms of sensible intuition, and hence are only conditions of the
- existence of things as phenomena; that, moreover, we have no conceptions
- of the understanding, and, consequently, no elements for the cognition
- of things, except in so far as a corresponding intuition can be given
- to these conceptions; that, accordingly, we can have no cognition of
- an object, as a thing in itself, but only as an object of sensible
- intuition, that is, as phenomenon--all this is proved in the analytical
- part of the Critique; and from this the limitation of all possible
- speculative cognition to the mere objects of experience, follows as a
- necessary result. At the same time, it must be carefully borne in mind
- that, while we surrender the power of cognizing, we still reserve the
- power of thinking objects, as things in themselves.* For, otherwise,
- we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without
- something that appears--which would be absurd. Now let us suppose, for a
- moment, that we had not undertaken this criticism and, accordingly,
- had not drawn the necessary distinction between things as objects
- of experience and things as they are in themselves. The principle of
- causality, and, by consequence, the mechanism of nature as determined by
- causality, would then have absolute validity in relation to all things
- as efficient causes. I should then be unable to assert, with regard to
- one and the same being, e.g., the human soul, that its will is free, and
- yet, at the same time, subject to natural necessity, that is,
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