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Date: Wed, 8 Oct 2014 07:44:52 -0700
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Subject: [SPAM] Get, a $100 Kohl's giftcard, to use on your next visit, for completing a short survey
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<a target="" href="http://www.uuih.eu/l/lt2J6161DJ146VW/151VC656I9433X11FQ88020466AI1122195418" id="subj"> Get, a $100 Kohl's giftcard, to use on your next visit, for completing a short survey </a>


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<p>follows upon the apprehension of what has happened, in conformity with a rule. Thus only can I be justified in saying, not only of my apprehension,
but of the phenomenon itself, that there exists in it a succession, which is the same as to say that I cannot arrange the apprehension otherwise than </p>
<BR /><BR />
<p>in that very succession. In conformity with this, there must exist in that which always precedes an event the condition of a rule, by which this event follows at all times,
and necessarily; [194] but I cannot go back from the event and determine by apprehension that which precedes. For no phenomenon goes back from the
succeeding to the preceding point of time, though it is related to some preceding point of time, while the progress from a given time to a
determined following time is necessary. Therefore, as there certainly is something that follows, I must necessarily refer it to something else which
precedes, and upon which it follows by rule, that is, by necessity. So that the event, as being [159] conditional, affords a safe indication of some </p>
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<p align="center" style="font: 15px;">kind of condition, while that condition itself determines the event. If we supposed that nothing precedes an event upon which such event must
follow according to rule, all succession of perception would then exist in apprehension only, that is, subjectively; but it would not thereby be
determined objectively, what ought properly to be the antecedent and what the subsequent in perception. We should thus have a mere play of
representations unconnected with any object, that is, no phenomenon would, by our perception, be distinguished in time from any other phenomenon,
because the succession in<b>apprehension would always be uniform, and there would be nothing in the phenomena to determine the succession, so as</b>to
render a certain sequence objectively<U>necessary. I could not say therefore that two states</U>follow each other in a phenomenon, but only that one
apprehension follows [195] another, which is purely subjective, and does not determine any object, and cannot be considered therefore as knowledge </p>
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<p align="center" style="font: 13px;">of anything (even of something purely phenomenal). If therefore experience teaches us that something happens, we always presuppose that something precedes on which it follows by rule. Otherwise I
could not say of the object that it followed, because its following in my apprehension only, without being determined by rule in reference to what
precedes, would not justify us in admitting an objective following.1 It is<i>therefore always</i>with reference to a rule by which phenomena as they
follow, that is as they happen, are determined by an<I>antecedent [160] state, that I can</I>give an objective character to my subjective synthesis </p>
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<p>(of apprehension); nay, it is under this supposition only that an experience of anything<U>that happens becomes possible. It might</U>seem indeed as if this were in contradiction to all that has
always been said on the progress of the human understanding, it having been supposed that only by a perception and comparison of many events, following
in the same manner on preceding phenomena, we were led to the discovery of a rule according to which certain events always follow on certain
phenomena, and that thus only we were enabled to form to ourselves the concept of a cause. If this were so, that concept would be [196] empirical
only, and the rule which it supplies, that everything which happens must have a cause, would be as accidental as experience itself. The universality
and necessity of that rule would then be fictitious only, and devoid of any true and general validity, because not being a priori, but founded on .</p>


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