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4chanWittgenstein On Certainty meeting 1

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  1. 10:59 AM <Chadtech> Should we get started then with OC?
  2. 10:59 AM <Timofey> Out of what I looked at .... I think this might be a good entry point to W's thought about Moore's argument: "It's not a matter of Moore's knowing that there's a hand there,
  3. 10:59 AM <Timofey> but rather we should not understand him if he were to say "Of
  4. 10:59 AM <Timofey> course I may be wrong about this". We should ask "whit is it
  5. 10:59 AM <Timofey> like to make such a mistake as that?"--e.g. what's it like to
  6. 10:59 AM <Timofey> discover that it was a mistake?" W's pointing out (I remember him talking about it later) that the only person who does make this kind of mistake is insane.
  7. 11:00 AM <Timofey> I jumped ahead of you, and sorry for the format butchery.
  8. 11:01 AM <Chadtech> Insane, or we just dont understand them?
  9. 11:01 AM <Chadtech> One could live a certain kind of life I dont understand.
  10. 11:01 AM <Ferdia_> I don't know if W says that anywhere explicitly frost-ace but that seems to be a recurring theme
  11. 11:01 AM <Chadtech> Thats not necessarily insane.
  12. 11:01 AM <Chadtech> Its just different.
  13. 11:02 AM <Chadtech> I really liked the passage where Wittgenstein says that 'I' and 'Ludwig' refer to the same person, but are different concepts. And then he went on to say 'believe' and 'know' imply the same state, but are different concepts.
  14. 11:02 AM <Chadtech> I felt like that really set things straight for me.
  15. 11:03 AM <Chadtech> If one believes something, then they have some 'guiding propositions' that they follow.
  16. 11:03 AM <Chadtech> When one says they know, they are just trying to do something different to their conversation partner.
  17. 11:03 AM → thommy joined (3ef36e36@gateway/web/freenode/ip.62.243.110.54)
  18. 11:03 AM <Chadtech> Namely, convey a fact, not a sense, as Wittgenstein puts it.
  19. 11:04 AM <Ferdia_> Hang on can we rewind a bit and "officially" start?
  20. 11:04 AM <Jolssoni> I think the leap "I was mistaken about having a hand after all" necessarily presupposes an external world beyond merely human thought, for a pure idealist coming one day to the conclusion would you look at that, got no hands man would just be a change in the experience without presupposing that his previous experience were somehow "false" or not corresponding to external reality
  21. 11:04 AM <Chadtech> Oh, sorry, yeah Ferdia_
  22. 11:04 AM <Timofey> Yeah.
  23. 11:04 AM <thommy> I'd be down for that. I actually ordered the book and I'll be taking notes in it when I get it, so I'll be better at remembering my points from my reading
  24. 11:05 AM <Jolssoni> Of course it would probably be pretty hard to keep the sensation of "losing your hands" and not thinking you were somehow deceived/insane/high before apart
  25. 11:05 AM <Chadtech> Is there anything we need to do to official begin?
  26. 11:05 AM <frost-ace> If we're going to start over, I have an attempted of the first 100 propostions if anyone is interested. Just the topics of them.
  27. 11:05 AM <Jolssoni> (Ladies and) gentlemen, this is an official announcement yaddah?
  28. 11:05 AM <frost-ace> It was very hard as there is no clear order to W.
  29. 11:06 AM <Ferdia_> It just felt like we were jumping ahead
  30. 11:06 AM <Chadtech> I could count down.
  31. 11:06 AM <Chadtech> Like a race.
  32. 11:06 AM <Ferdia_> But I'd like to talk about no. 10
  33. 11:06 AM <Jolssoni> final countdooooooooooooown
  34. 11:06 AM <Chadtech> 3!
  35. 11:06 AM <Chadtech> 2!
  36. 11:06 AM <Chadtech> 1!
  37. 11:06 AM <Chadtech> GO!
  38. 11:06 AM <thommy> See, that's what we need. We need to have our finger in the text! Good Ferdia
  39. 11:06 AM <Jolssoni> first
  40. 11:06 AM <Ferdia_> lol
  41. 11:06 AM <Chadtech> Im going to look at #10
  42. 11:06 AM <Ferdia_> simmer down boys
  43. 11:06 AM <thommy> >inb4 replies
  44. 11:07 AM <Chadtech> What do you think about 10 Ferdia?
  45. 11:07 AM <Ferdia_> Ok
  46. 11:07 AM <Ferdia_> So
  47. 11:07 AM <Ferdia_> I can understand why "I am here" wouldn't make sense, but not really why "I know there is a sick man lying here" wouldn't
  48. 11:07 AM <Timofey> Oooh! I think I've got that.
  49. 11:07 AM <Timofey> Are you familiar with the idea of preformativity?
  50. 11:08 AM <Ferdia_> Not really
  51. 11:08 AM <Jolssoni> just googled it, I think I know where you're going with this
  52. 11:08 AM <Timofey> The short of it is that there's an element to language other than the denotative and the connotative.
  53. 11:09 AM <Chadtech> Im not really confident on #10, but the immediate question comes to mind, of 'what would it look like should he not know there is a sick man lying there?'
  54. 11:09 AM <thommy> He talks about how you know someone is sick as well in other (earlier) works.
  55. 11:10 AM <Ferdia_> I gathered that he was saying something about how
  56. 11:10 AM <thommy> You don't know, let's say the symptons aren't visible to you at the moment, but this person says he is sick and acts weak or so.
  57. 11:11 AM <Ferdia_> If you were looking at a sick man you wouldn't say "I know he is sick" you'd just say "he is sick", Adding "I know" doesn't add anything
  58. 11:11 AM <Timofey> The preformative. It has to do with what language is doing socially. When you say something, you're also acting. To make it simple, think of "fuck." Fuck means almost nothing denotatively and conotatively, but it's definitely a social gesture. So is saying "this man is sick." Saying it has no real meaning if he's before you. Ferdia got it.
  59. 11:11 AM <frost-ace> Timofey: is this some kind of JL Austin thing you're getting at? He's just stating that there is/is not a sick man for us to investigate?
  60. 11:11 AM <Ferdia_> But "I am here" seems more nonsensical to me than that because it is actually tautological
  61. 11:11 AM <Jolssoni> logos vs praxis?
  62. 11:11 AM <Timofey> Yes! frost-ace
  63. 11:11 AM <Chadtech> The 'I know' in 'I know he is sick' could add something in some context though right?
  64. 11:12 AM <thommy> If someone asks about the certainty, surely.
  65. 11:12 AM <thommy> "Hey W., this man is sick!" "I know he is sick"
  66. 11:12 AM <Chadtech> Yeah.
  67. 11:13 AM <thommy> But what does denotatively and conotatively mean in this sense? I'm sorry I'm not used to reading about this in English
  68. 11:13 AM <frost-ace> Only if you want to dispel ideas of possible doubt. Like thommy's post. "No need to state that again, we're working based on his sickness."
  69. 11:14 AM <Chadtech> So, if you say 'I know he is sick', it is implied that whether or not I, or my listener, really understands the fact (has an intimacy with the fact), is in question.
  70. 11:14 AM <thommy> If you are stating that he is sick to a person that has no idea that he is sick or that there is something wrong with him, it doesn't add anything.
  71. 11:16 AM <thommy> Also, how do you know a person is sick? What does it mean to know this, in order for you to say "This man is sick", subsequently, you could be wrong in very obvious ways. E.g. "Oh, his red eyes and runny nose is just the chili he ate"
  72. 11:16 AM <frost-ace> "I know" is not used to describe properties (of either myself or the topic at hand (heh)). We're not attributing anything to anything. Denotation and connotation add or attach words to objects (in a really reduced sense I guess). Please anyone correct, or fully explain this. I feel like I explained it wrongly.
  73. 11:17 AM <thommy> That's kind of what I got from the words themselves but there could be more to it.
  74. 11:18 AM <Chadtech> Thats kind of a practical question though? Like, if I were to tell you ways you might know if someone is sick, its like I am teaching you to be a doctor. But more importantly, the words only instruct the student doctor, they dont necessarily bear a correspondence with good doctoring, or sickness.
  75. 11:18 AM <Chadtech> How one might know if someone is sick, is kind of a non-verbal thing.
  76. 11:18 AM <Jolssoni> I think what W is getting at here is that "I know p" doesn't state anything about the "world" as such but merely describes your mental state, if you're both acting with the presupposition that the man is sick, THEN telling that you know it is redundant
  77. 11:18 AM <Jolssoni> or something, dunno this passage was a bit odd tbh
  78. 11:18 AM <Chadtech> But still some of us know that, and to convey that we know that (in contrast to what someone else might know) we say so. But when we all understand the proposition, that I have a relationship with the fact is not important.
  79. 11:18 AM <Timofey> I think the contextual passages are helpful.
  80. 11:19 AM <thommy> That's good Jolssoni.
  81. 11:19 AM <Timofey> The numerals give the illusion of these all being stand alone when W. develops across them. Check 11, 12, and 13.
  82. 11:20 AM <Timofey> 12 basically says what Jolssoni says.
  83. 11:20 AM <Ferdia_> So there's no difference between the following assertions: "X" and "I know X" - strictly speaking. Is that right?
  84. 11:21 AM <Ferdia_> But of course, depending on the situation you may say either
  85. 11:21 AM <thommy> I know the way of knowing if people are sick are non verbal, but I thought about how he mentions "I thought I knew...", this would also be related to how you (much) you know "This man is sick", surely some cases have higher truth-values than others. I'ts not p / non p
  86. 11:21 AM → mgrabovsky joined (~mgrabovsk@mediawiki/Mat--j-Grabovsk--)
  87. 11:21 AM <frost-ace> The idea that it describes a mental state seems a bit odd to me in light of 21. Can you clarify.
  88. 11:21 AM <thommy> But at these graduations you would specify, and it would be unrelated. Nevermind.
  89. 11:22 AM <Chadtech> I dont understand what you mean about higher and lower truth values.
  90. 11:22 AM <Ferdia_> Yeah I'm not sure that's what he's getting at
  91. 11:23 AM <Jolssoni> I think he means how probable something is in the light of all things considered
  92. 11:24 AM <Jolssoni> which you could think about as truth values in fuzzy logic, don't know if that's what you were getting at thommy ?
  93. 11:24 AM <thommy> Uhm.
  94. 11:24 AM <thommy> I can try to explain, but keep in mind, I'm a newb in this.
  95. 11:24 AM <Chadtech> Im not sure about this mental state business either. I think knowledge of P qualifies as a state of affairs as much as P. It therefore is a part of the world (though it being a part of the world isnt meaningful).
  96. 11:26 AM <Jolssoni> what I meant that from "I know that p" which could be translated to "I'm almost absolutely certain that p with only a small chance of me being wrong" you can't necessarily infer p.
  97. 11:26 AM <thommy> For example, "This statement is a lie" or "You can't know anything 100%" are contradictory. This used to mean something pre-wittgenstein. After him though, we can talk about meta linguistics and how this kind of 'lie' or 'knowing' have different truth values. I heard someone mentioned it like they are predicates on a meta-linguistic frame with individual truth values. I.e. they are concepts in different language games, that
  98. 11:27 AM <Timofey> frost-ace , in twenty one he says "a mistake in the assertion must also be impossible too," and I think he's showing it's possible in 11, 12, and 13, because you can be mistaken; statements that begin "I know" are the kind that be later negated by "I thought I knew." The point comes back to " I know this is my hand " could be mistaken, but the cond
  99. 11:27 AM <Timofey> itions (the "rule") under which it could be mistaken are very, very broad, so they give the (language based) illusion of certainty.
  100. 11:27 AM <Chadtech> Is certainty a gradient? I would have thought no. As in, if something is a matter of probability, that an event is likely makes it a kind of knowledge within some scope. There is certainty regarding events that might not happen.
  101. 11:27 AM <thommy> For example, there must be difference in a doctor seeing a patient and knowing that he is sick in different ways or with different kinds of certainty, i.e. he could be wrong in totally different ways. Either that he is sick in some different way, less sick, more sick or not sick at all.
  102. 11:30 AM <thommy> It's interesting though, how people can be wrong, e.g. with the hand. You could not have a hand and say "this is my hand", in a state of bliss or intoxicated, and be wrong because you were out of yourself. You can also believe have bandages and so on, as W. mentions
  103. 11:30 AM <frost-ace> Okay, thanks Timofey. I think I've got some intuitive grasp to how you explained it. I just need to let it sink in a bit more.
  104. 11:31 AM <Jolssoni> dont really know what to add, should we move on :D
  105. 11:31 AM <Chadtech> Sure.
  106. 11:31 AM <Chadtech> Im thinking about passage 21. I like it, but I am not sure what to yes.
  107. 11:31 AM <Chadtech> what to add**
  108. 11:31 AM <Chadtech> Yes, its true. Sometimes one cannot be mistaken regarding knowledge.
  109. 11:32 AM <Chadtech> I liked passage 69.
  110. 11:32 AM <Chadtech> I remember I took notes on that one.
  111. 11:33 AM <Jolssoni> I think this is just the praxis angle revisited, we all collectively sweep the Cartesian doubt under the rug and go on about our business
  112. 11:34 AM <frost-ace> Exactly. If we doubt everything, then we must doubt our doubt.
  113. 11:34 AM <Chadtech> What do you mean? You dont think he had a valid point, but was making the point for the practical reason of 'I need to admit this to move on in my life'?
  114. 11:34 AM <Jolssoni> if we allow the possibility of error to what we consider the most certain and infallible propositions then we allow it to every single one
  115. 11:35 AM <Chadtech> But you cant doubt everything. I got the sense that Wittgenstein spoke of our ability to doubt as factual. We arent taking the easy way out by not doubting. In some situations its impossible.
  116. 11:36 AM <Timofey> Yeah, I got the sense of that too.
  117. 11:36 AM <Timofey> He talks about conditions under which you can doubt later on.
  118. 11:36 AM <frost-ace> In that case though, wouldn't it only make sense to doubt if it led to consequences?
  119. 11:37 AM <frost-ace> The man doubting his address yet successfuly living in the correct house is pointless.
  120. 11:38 AM <Jolssoni> I was doubting a novel but that's pretty much it
  121. 11:38 AM <Chadtech> I dont understand Jolsonni. 'Certainty' and 'Cant doubt' are analytically identical. Yeah if we doubt something, we cant be certain of it. Its not a matter of allowance. What we can or cannot doubt is beyond our deciding. Or do I not understand you?
  122. 11:38 AM <Jolssoni> there's practical doubt and the purely cartesian full on specticism
  123. 11:38 AM ⇐ mgrabovsky quit (~mgrabovsk@mediawiki/Mat--j-Grabovsk--) Quit: Carpe diem
  124. 11:38 AM <Jolssoni> I guess that means I'm not 100% certain of anything, I allow a margin of error even to the claim that I exist and but I can never really act accordingly
  125. 11:39 AM <Jolssoni> whereas I can doubt climate change and can manifest this doubt by driving an SUV and such
  126. 11:39 AM <Jolssoni> and not giving two fucks
  127. 11:40 AM <Jolssoni> in order to be 100% certain of something we not only need to show that p is the case and but that not-p is not the case and can't ever be
  128. 11:40 AM <Chadtech> By driving an SUV, you must be certain of something. Perhaps not the falsity of climate change directly, but some complex proposition. Practical reasoning is a state of affairs.
  129. 11:42 AM <Jolssoni> that's where I draw the line between purely cartesian and actual practical doubt, I can doubt everything but still nonetheless I get up every monday and drive to work, eat food and such
  130. 11:43 AM <thommy> Yes, there is importance in the use of the word doubt, you can use it in different ways, and whatever way you do is critical, it's not just --- DOUBT ----
  131. 11:43 AM <thommy> 'In the practical way. I guess.
  132. 11:43 AM <Jolssoni> if we think of our experiences as a linear set of propositions, we only get like a, then b then c and so on, we don't get "a and not-a can't be the case in this instance, stop doubting a immediately" - I'm probably phrasing this like shit but whatever
  133. 11:44 AM <frost-ace> That makes perfect sense to me. We only get "what is the case" not "what is not the case"
  134. 11:45 AM <Jolssoni> or perhaps I can't doubt that I'm/was experiencing *something* at different times but I can doubt the correlation between external reality/objective world whatever you want to call it and my experiences
  135. 11:45 AM <Chadtech> I dont think I understand. To comment on a seperate point, thommy, I think Wittgenstein describes doubt as something exercisable.
  136. 11:46 AM <Timofey> I think we need to remember W. account's for language's meaning, too. A lot of the uses of "doubt" by philosophers are quite weird when you consider how the word gets its meaning in non-philosophical use. We're used to using "doubt" this way, but we're all people W. would be telling to get a trade or would be repulsed by.
  137. 11:46 AM <Chadtech> The exercise of doubt is perhaps variable, but 'doubt' always refers to this exercise. Still though, I think the exercise must have some property, or play some specifc role.
  138. 11:47 AM <Timofey> *accounts
  139. 11:47 AM ⇐ thommy, Ferdia_ and frost-ace quit
  140. 11:47 AM <Jolssoni> boom
  141. 11:47 AM <Jolssoni> what's k-lining
  142. 11:48 AM <Timofey> No idea.
  143. 11:49 AM <Chadtech> Hey..
  144. 11:49 AM → Ferdia_ joined (4e10540b@gateway/web/freenode/ip.78.16.84.11)
  145. 11:49 AM <Chadtech> I dont think Wittgenstein would be repulsed by me.
  146. 11:49 AM <Chadtech> ANYWAY..
  147. 11:49 AM → jack-frost joined (6ccb8ae5@gateway/web/freenode/ip.108.203.138.229)
  148. 11:49 AM <Ferdia_> If I may refer us back to the text .....
  149. 11:49 AM <Chadtech> Haha.. yes.
  150. 11:49 AM <Timofey> Always, F.
  151. 11:50 AM <jack-frost> frost-ace coming back. For some reason I got banned out of nowhere? I needed to make a new name.
  152. 11:50 AM <Ferdia_> I think 23 and 24 are primarily about how doubting the existence of, say, your hand, and doubting the existence of an external reality are PROFOUNDLY different
  153. 11:50 AM <Timofey> According to google, a K-line is a ban.
  154. 11:50 AM <Ferdia_> You can't just throw "doubt" around
  155. 11:50 AM <Chadtech> Oh. Weird. I didnt ban you. Names need to be registered and IRC will take issue with trying to use a name already in use.
  156. 11:50 AM <Ferdia_> Same jack-frost
  157. 11:50 AM → Thomas____ joined (3ef36e36@gateway/web/freenode/ip.62.243.110.54)
  158. 11:52 AM <Chadtech> Really Ferdia?
  159. 11:52 AM <Chadtech> Why do you say they are profoundly different?
  160. 11:53 AM <jack-frost> Doubting can only "work" if you can investigate the doubt. Have a metric to measure it. Doubting the external world can't be investigated with anything. Doubting a man is hiding in the bushes can be checked. I think that's what he's getting at.
  161. 11:54 AM <Timofey> That's what I was getting at when I said we need to remember that if we accept W's account of language, we derive doubt's meaning from life....W. Gets at this from like 50 - > 70 I think. To the effect of what jack-frost's saying.
  162. 11:55 AM <Jolssoni> my interpretation: in order for the doubt of something to be fruitful the state of affairs the doubt implies have to something you can experience
  163. 11:56 AM <Jolssoni> so if you doubt the existence of someone's hands then everything else remains the same minus the hands, you can't doubt the external world in the same sense since there's really no difference between living in "Matrix" and in the real world
  164. 11:57 AM <jack-frost> In regards to 50 though, is a mathematical formula a state of affairs? Or is the marks on the paper a state of affairs and we check the mark's correctness?
  165. 11:58 AM <jack-frost> Just seems counter-intuitive to me that marks would imply a state affairs. I get that the paper is changed through the writing, but I'm not fully following it.
  166. 11:58 AM <Jolssoni> I think when a calculation is corrent it corresponds to our notions of what is correct, how the symbols should be arranged (axioms)
  167. 11:58 AM <Jolssoni> so the state of affairs would be the right relations between the scribblings
  168. 11:59 AM <Chadtech> But there is a difference between living in the 'matrix' and living in the real world. I think I basically agree, its not a matter of the world being fake, but that we dont have a practice of revealing delusions in that way.
  169. 11:59 AM <jack-frost> I see. Maintaining the proper relations between the signs. The relation becomes the state of affairs.
  170. 11:59 AM <Chadtech> Jack-frost, I think there is something factual behind a written formula. Its not the writing that is where the mathematical facticity lies.
  171. 11:59 AM <Ferdia_> How about this
  172. 12:00 PM <Ferdia_> we can doubt that we do not have a brain because we can imagine our heads opening and nothing being there
  173. 12:00 PM <Timofey> I loved that passage.
  174. 12:00 PM <Ferdia_> but we can't really doubt the external world because .... how would you imagine it to be if it wasnt ther
  175. 12:00 PM <Chadtech> Which passage was the brain one?
  176. 12:01 PM <jack-frost> So I can move the relation from between the signs to how the signs represent the external.
  177. 12:01 PM <Ferdia_> pretty early
  178. 12:01 PM <jack-frost> prop 4
  179. 12:01 PM <Ferdia_> w/r/t mathematics: I know W's mathematics is a big rigmarole
  180. 12:01 PM <Jolssoni> I think the cartesian aspect comes into play when someone does open your head and you see your brain and you start doubting your eyes
  181. 12:02 PM <Chadtech> But you cant doubt that you have a brain, no?
  182. 12:02 PM <Pooka> depends what you mean by brain
  183. 12:02 PM <Chadtech> I mean the physical organ in my skull.
  184. 12:03 PM <Chadtech> What else could be meant by 'brain'?
  185. 12:03 PM <Timofey> W's saying in 4 you have no reason to doubt it - "grounds for doubt are lacking" - but you can.
  186. 12:03 PM <Jolssoni> again, I can't ever act accordingly (guys, I totally dont have a brain" but we can only have experiences of seeing our brain, we can always doubt the correlation between reality and what we experience
  187. 12:03 PM <Ferdia_> In 4 he says our grounds for doubting our brain is severely lacking but nevertheless we can imagine our heads being empty
  188. 12:03 PM <Pooka> well, there is brain as in 'a thing i think with' or 'a squishy grey/pink thing in my head'
  189. 12:03 PM <Pooka> (or both)
  190. 12:03 PM <Chadtech> Then that we could imagine an empty skull, means we could doubt it? I dont read that, but its interesting.
  191. 12:03 PM <Pooka> i might think i do all my thinking with my toes
  192. 12:04 PM <Pooka> and thus my head is empty
  193. 12:04 PM <Chadtech> That we can know something, and have the capacity to doubt it, throws my understanding of OC on its head.
  194. 12:04 PM <Ferdia_> I don't think W means to make any conclusions in that passage. He's just exploring
  195. 12:04 PM <Pooka> not directly comparable -- but consider greek medicine/anatomy, they thought all sorts of odd things about what part of the body did what
  196. 12:04 PM <jack-frost> It's not a good doubt, but it's a possible doubt. It can be checked against the facts.
  197. 12:05 PM <Pooka> i agree with ferdia, it is just speculative as opening argument
  198. 12:05 PM <Ferdia_> The fact remains: there's nothing to support our doubt of the existence of our brain, but we can still imagine that we don't have one. This is what he wishes to explore
  199. 12:06 PM <Pooka> interesting thing about brain as an example specifically is you never see your own
  200. 12:06 PM <Pooka> well minus modern medicine
  201. 12:06 PM <Pooka> you only think you have one because you might see other people do
  202. 12:06 PM <Pooka> with a hand i can check if i have one
  203. 12:06 PM <Timofey> I think what we were getting at with W's analysis of "I know" chadtech is that there's a distinction between certainty and knowledge despite their interchangeable use by Moore. Look at 8.
  204. 12:06 PM <Pooka> with a brain … who knows if *my* head has one?
  205. 12:06 PM <Chadtech> Yeah! I like that way of expressing it Ferdia.
  206. 12:07 PM <Chadtech> That is a form of incapacity to doubt : no compulsion to do so.
  207. 12:07 PM <Ferdia_> I think, frustratingly, in what we've read so far W makes very little conclusive statements
  208. 12:08 PM <jack-frost> That's kind of w's thing, though haha
  209. 12:08 PM <Timofey> W. cares about the nuance of language, so he's going to qualify and digress for this whole thing.
  210. 12:08 PM <Jolssoni> a modal realist could say that in some possible world you actually do exist without a brain since the whole scenario is comprehensible, maybe the only things we really can't doubt even in a purely speculative manner are definitions and logical necessities
  211. 12:08 PM <Chadtech> Yeah, what jack-frost said.
  212. 12:09 PM <jack-frost> What about rule following? Isn't that part of definitions and logic?
  213. 12:09 PM <jack-frost> Every move could be made in accordance with a rule (PI 201)
  214. 12:09 PM <Ferdia_> Rules are super controversial with W. haha
  215. 12:10 PM <Chadtech> Sorry guys, I need to step out
  216. 12:10 PM <Chadtech> brb
  217. 12:10 PM <Ferdia_> I still don't really understand yet if he's saying that "KNOW" can only exist where a mistake is impossible or necessarily possible
  218. 12:11 PM <Ferdia_> Because in PI, the private language argument, he says you can't say that you KNOW you are in pain because you are not in a position to doubt it
  219. 12:11 PM <Ferdia_> That's contrary to what most philosophers and people think the word KNOW means
  220. 12:11 PM <Timofey> I think what he's saying her is consistent with that.
  221. 12:11 PM <Ferdia_> As in: a situation where you cannot be wrong
  222. 12:11 PM <Ferdia_> Yeah
  223. 12:12 PM <Timofey> Also W. doesn't use philosophical discourse, he's trying to use common language -- from what I grasp of him from Ray Monk and this.
  224. 12:12 PM <Ferdia_> Yeah hence his use of real-world examples
  225. 12:12 PM <Ferdia_> And I think he contrasting them to "philosophical" examples
  226. 12:13 PM <Ferdia_> E.g. doubting your hands, and doubting an external world
  227. 12:13 PM <Ferdia_> They are very different
  228. 12:13 PM <Ferdia_> Well I guess doubting your hands isn't that real-world but you know what I mean, it could have been cut off or whatever
  229. 12:13 PM <Ferdia_> and so on ....
  230. 12:13 PM <Ferdia_> brb
  231. 12:13 PM <Timofey> I get you.
  232. 12:13 PM <Jolssoni> I gotta admit that private language argument goes 100% against my intuition
  233. 12:14 PM <Timofey> It goes 100% with mine.
  234. 12:14 PM <jack-frost> I always took the private language thing to be you can't be both subject and object which knowing requires. But for OC and "know" it serves as a function to show where we are in terms of the context. "You're being superfluous, that is the starting point we have, let's move on"
  235. 12:15 PM <Jolssoni> my head hurts :D
  236. 12:15 PM <Ferdia_> Private language argument is meant to go against intuition, that;s why it's so famous :P
  237. 12:16 PM <Jolssoni> I mean it can't really turn out that you weren't in pain after all, then ofc I know that I am/was in pain
  238. 12:16 PM <Jolssoni> the experience was what it was and now is in the past with no possibility to change it anymore
  239. 12:17 PM <Chadtech> Back
  240. 12:17 PM <Jolssoni> wb
  241. 12:17 PM <Chadtech> Ferdia says that its 'different' to doubt your hands, and doubt the world. I would say its simply impossible to doubt the world.
  242. 12:17 PM <Ferdia_> I'm rusty on PI but, I remember that he says that saying "I know I am in pain" is no different to saying "OUCH", or whatever
  243. 12:18 PM <Chadtech> Its not like scholars have an esoteric life, they just dont have one. They reason independently of logic in its natural environment.
  244. 12:18 PM <Ferdia_> Oh Chad, it may very well be impossible
  245. 12:19 PM <Jolssoni> I think it depends on how one defines world - an external "jar" where we are independent of our mind/thoughts or just the the totality of our experiences
  246. 12:19 PM <Jolssoni> you can doubt the former, that's why idealism is a thing
  247. 12:20 PM <Chadtech> Ferdia, perhaps that was a poor expression of my point.
  248. 12:21 PM <Chadtech> I havent understood much of where Jolssoni is coming from.
  249. 12:21 PM <jack-frost> Take a look at 37. "...a miss firing attempt to express what can't be expressed." It is impossible. A misuse of language is all it can be.
  250. 12:21 PM <Chadtech> Just sayin.
  251. 12:22 PM <Jolssoni> :D
  252. 12:22 PM <Ferdia_> Jolssoni, you can't say you know you are in pain because it's within a context where you can't possibly doubt it, strictly speaking it's nonsensical
  253. 12:23 PM <Ferdia_> That's what W argues in PI, though it's a reasoning that hails from TLP imo
  254. 12:23 PM <Pooka> the misfire works both ways though
  255. 12:23 PM <Timofey> W. would probably go after the language on that, Jolssoni. What's meant by "the world" is really something like "the sum total of my sense perceptions that aren't directly a part of my will." You can't really imagine living life as a mind without your sight, smell, hearing, taste, and touch though you can imagine them independently, and an extensio
  256. 12:23 PM <Timofey> n of the language you use for that causes the confusion of thinking you can doubt the whole, as jack-frost just pointed out.
  257. 12:23 PM <Pooka> it works to the realist and the skeptic, neither of them can say for certain
  258. 12:23 PM <Ferdia_> Then in OC he says somewhere in passing, something to the effect of "we seem to think that the words 'I know' can exist where a doubt is impossible"
  259. 12:23 PM <Ferdia_> He doesn't say that's wrong but he seems to imply it
  260. 12:24 PM <Jolssoni> I'm coming from a naturalist/realist standpoint so there's that
  261. 12:24 PM <Jolssoni> it could turn out that there isn't an external world (doubt) but it couldn't possibly turn out that something didn't take place for me phenomenally after all
  262. 12:25 PM <Timofey> *imagine not having them indipendently
  263. 12:25 PM <Chadtech> Maybe I am just speaking for myself (and not necessarily inconsistently with Wittgenstein) then, when I say the conditions that preclude doubt are extremely diverse, and maintain that certainty cannot be with the possibility of doubt.
  264. 12:26 PM <Ferdia_> And that's precisely why he says it doesn't make sense to say you KNOW it
  265. 12:26 PM <Chadtech> Maybe its an abuse on my part to consider such a broad range of conditions that preclude doubt.
  266. 12:26 PM <Timofey> I think the difference between "there isn't an external world" and "something didn't take place for me phenomenally" is non existent for W.
  267. 12:27 PM <Timofey> Wait, no, strike that. There's some stuff going on in the second part of that I overlooked....
  268. 12:27 PM <Ferdia_> All I'm trying to say is, I really don't think W. is saying that knowledge is something that you cannot be wrong about - strictly speaking
  269. 12:27 PM <Timofey> Also, chad, I think W. would be with you on that. W's super conditional. What are "rules?"
  270. 12:28 PM <jack-frost> Ferdia, are you saying that the realist/idealist could turn to W and say that he is misusing language to suggest that the doubts are wrong?
  271. 12:28 PM <Jolssoni> thats where he and I differ, for me to know is to be without the possibility of error
  272. 12:28 PM <Jolssoni> so all our every day claims about stuff are conjectures in the popperian sens
  273. 12:28 PM <Jolssoni> e
  274. 12:28 PM <Chadtech> Two points timofey: (0) I think 'the world' is a technical term in analytic philosophy. Its the totality of facts. (1) I remember Wittgenstein criticizing his peers for talking about sense datum. There is no sense in putting a middle man between the object and ourseelves.
  275. 12:29 PM <Chadtech> I dont know.
  276. 12:29 PM <Pooka> I think §32 is relevant here, in terms of know (sorry if you have covered already)
  277. 12:30 PM <Ferdia_> Philosophers, and most "normal" people, have always taken for granted that "knowledge" means something that you cannot be possibly wrong about, and I think W. is saying that our use of the word proves that not to be the case
  278. 12:30 PM <Pooka> 'It's not a matter of Moore's knowing that there's a hand there,
  279. 12:30 PM <Pooka> but rather we should not understand him if he were to say "Of
  280. 12:30 PM <Pooka> course I may be wrong about this".
  281. 12:30 PM <Ferdia_> That's all I'm saying.
  282. 12:30 PM <jack-frost> Oh gotchas
  283. 12:30 PM <jack-frost> gotcha*
  284. 12:31 PM <Chadtech> Thats interesting Ferdia. Yeah Im not sure what to think on that topic.
  285. 12:31 PM <Chadtech> brb
  286. 12:31 PM ⇐ Pooka quit (~Pooka@cpc1-rdng20-2-0-cust219.15-3.cable.virginm.net) Remote host closed the connection
  287. 12:32 PM → Pooka joined (~Pooka@cpc1-rdng20-2-0-cust219.15-3.cable.virginm.net)
  288. 12:33 PM <Jolssoni> it's basically knowing either in the sense of a) shorthand for it's very probable that p in the light of everything considered (I know that my phone's on the table) or b) being wrong not conceivably possible (I know that I exist) as far as I can make out
  289. 12:33 PM <jack-frost> So basically for 32 we can't think of a way to think of how he's wrong. We grant him the knowledge only if he can make us understand what it means to be wrong.
  290. 12:34 PM <Chadtech> back
  291. 12:34 PM <Timofey> "We should ask "whit is it
  292. 12:34 PM <Timofey> like to make such a mistake as that?"--e.g. what's it like to
  293. 12:34 PM <Timofey> discover that it was a mistake?"
  294. 12:34 PM <Timofey> Fucking pasta man.
  295. 12:34 PM <Pooka> --> unrelated, can someone dump all the chat onot paste bin or something? just lost it on disconnect and want to read through the discussion before i got here later
  296. 12:34 PM <Timofey> *Paste
  297. 12:35 PM <Ferdia_> I think Chad will have to do that. A few of us got kicked earlier for no reason too
  298. 12:35 PM <Jolssoni> sec
  299. 12:35 PM <Timofey> It'd be very hard to me to imagine waking up one day to discover that the world hadn't actually existed -- " I thought I knew it did."
  300. 12:36 PM <Chadtech> Should I dump it in a paste bin after this meeting, or right now?
  301. 12:36 PM <Chadtech> Yeah I was thinking about saving this.
  302. 12:36 PM <Jolssoni> http://pastebin.com/mUqZvBLY
  303. 12:36 PM <Ferdia_> The fact that the phrase "I thought I knew" exists, and makes sense, means that knowledge cannot mean something where it's impossible to be wrong - in support of what I was saying earlier
  304. 12:36 PM <jack-frost> At the end makes more sense. That way you only have to do it once.
  305. 12:36 PM <Pooka> ty Jol!
  306. 12:37 PM <Chadtech> Yeah, I feel quite comfortable with all this now.
  307. 12:37 PM <jack-frost> Dude Ferdia, that helps me a lot. I was kind of stuck with that phrase for some reason.
  308. 12:37 PM <Pooka> (now set my irc cleint to auto-log chat, so that won't happen again ^^)
  309. 12:37 PM <Chadtech> Yes, you can know P and P turn out to be false.
  310. 12:37 PM <Jolssoni> but the phrase "I know I exists" also makes perfect sense, how do we resolve this?
  311. 12:38 PM <Jolssoni> exist*
  312. 12:38 PM <Ferdia_> How do you do that Pooka?
  313. 12:38 PM <Jolssoni> cant remember what Kripke wrote about this in Troubles vol 1
  314. 12:38 PM <Pooka> i went to preferences, transcripts, and set it to auto log chat transcripts
  315. 12:39 PM <Timofey> Jolssoni, look to 10
  316. 12:39 PM <Timofey> Can we think of "I am here" as "I exist?"
  317. 12:39 PM <Ferdia_> Where is preferences? D:
  318. 12:39 PM <Ferdia_> Never used IRC lol
  319. 12:40 PM <Jolssoni> I get what W is saying but I just can't bring myself to agree
  320. 12:40 PM <Ferdia_> Yeah Timofey, both a tautological/nonsensical
  321. 12:40 PM <Jolssoni> as redundant and tautological as a phrase such "I exist" or "I am here" is, it still makes perfect sense and has a truth bearer
  322. 12:40 PM <Jolssoni> even thought it can't turn out that the phrase was wrong all along
  323. 12:41 PM <Chadtech> Say there is a doctor, and he knows a patient is sick.
  324. 12:41 PM <Chadtech> Of course the patient doesnt know this. He doesnt have the skill of being a doctor.
  325. 12:42 PM <Chadtech> Then Ferdia, there is a sense in the doctor asserting some medical knowledge to the patient?
  326. 12:42 PM <Chadtech> What gives knowledge statements a sense?
  327. 12:42 PM <Chadtech> What is that sense?
  328. 12:42 PM <Ferdia_> "Sense", W. argues in TLP, is that is pictures a possible state of affairs
  329. 12:43 PM <Ferdia_> "I am here" is tautological, so never false, and so doesn't picture anything possible in the world
  330. 12:43 PM <Ferdia_> its not possible because its always true
  331. 12:43 PM <Ferdia_> And so, has no sense
  332. 12:44 PM <Ferdia_> I think what W. might be saying (though im probably wrong) is that, strictly speaking, adding "I know" to a proposition doesnt affect its sense
  333. 12:44 PM <Ferdia_> though there are situations in which it actually does have value as a phrase
  334. 12:44 PM <jack-frost> Does that still apply to this era of W? I'm not sure how he deals with sense in his later work, but meaning takes precedence over it all. So I think we're still left with "I am here" in the language since we can use it.
  335. 12:44 PM <Ferdia_> So even though "I am here" is nonsensical, we still say it often
  336. 12:45 PM <Ferdia_> Yeah
  337. 12:45 PM <Pooka> i agree Ferdia_ , within the context of end of §10 at least
  338. 12:45 PM <Ferdia_> It seems, to me, that W. is playing between the two
  339. 12:46 PM <Jolssoni> p = I exist // possible that p = not necessary that not-p, "I don't exist" is not necessary therefore "I exist" is possible and has a sense
  340. 12:46 PM <Ferdia_> The difference between early and late W. is that early W. would have said that if it's nonsense, it's rubbish. For late W. "nonsense" is just a descriptive term but doesnt means its rubbish
  341. 12:48 PM <Chadtech> This is kind of a different topic, but I remember reading Anscombe say in her introduction to the Tractatus, that there is a difference between being nonsense and being senseless.
  342. 12:48 PM <Timofey> I think "I am here" has preformative value. You might, say, in a dark room, want to inform your spouse you've arrived.
  343. 12:48 PM <Jolssoni> yeah there's that as well
  344. 12:48 PM <Ferdia_> Yes - to both of you
  345. 12:48 PM <Jolssoni> it almost comes down to interpretation, doesn't it? :D
  346. 12:48 PM <Jolssoni> almost always
  347. 12:49 PM <Chadtech> So the word 'sense' is really interesting, and I am pretty sure Wittgenstein changes how he uses it over his career.
  348. 12:49 PM <jack-frost> Was just about to say something to that effect timofey. In 10 he mentions unsuitable situations. I think that's what it boils down to. With Moore's doubting stuff being almost always unsuitable.
  349. 12:49 PM <Jolssoni> didn't frege write about "sense" a whole lot?
  350. 12:49 PM <Jolssoni> I thought I read Russell referring to him in basic writings
  351. 12:50 PM <jack-frost> "On Sense and Reference" is a whole discussion of it from Frege.
  352. 12:50 PM <Jolssoni> yeh thats it
  353. 12:50 PM <Jolssoni> might check that out
  354. 12:50 PM <Chadtech> Yeah, so Frege and Wittgenstein had some disagreements about sense, and Russell didnt even think 'sense' mattered.
  355. 12:50 PM <Chadtech> And then Wittgenstein in a way comes around back to Frege's original use of 'sense'.
  356. 12:50 PM <Chadtech> Are you guys interested in this? I could elaborate.
  357. 12:51 PM <Pooka> i read sense and reference but it was two years ago
  358. 12:51 PM <jack-frost> Yeah. I understand what Frege means by sense but I've always been confused to how W's use of it differs.
  359. 12:52 PM <Timofey> I'm interested.
  360. 12:52 PM <Chadtech> So, Frege thinks of it like, sense is something for psychologists to worry about. Frege thought that a proposition could have a sense, but not a true or false value.
  361. 12:52 PM <Jolssoni> intuitive enough
  362. 12:53 PM <Chadtech> Wittgenstein disagreed in the tractatus. To him, if it can be true or false, it must have a sense. Or, specifically, its sense IS that it can be true or false.
  363. 12:53 PM <Timofey> As in, this is rational given this sense data, personality, what have you?
  364. 12:53 PM <Chadtech> So sentence, sense, referent right? The sense is the glue between a sentence and its fact.
  365. 12:53 PM <jack-frost> Sense for Frege is the representational form a proposition takes, if that's what you're asking Timofey.
  366. 12:54 PM <Chadtech> Russell basically ignored the topic of sense. To him words can simply reference. He just took 'sense' out of the logical trillema.
  367. 12:54 PM <Jolssoni> I gotta go, early wake up and all, will leave the chat open, night people, was interesting reading your thoughts <3
  368. 12:55 PM <Ferdia_> On the difference between nonsense and the senseless: tautologies and contradictions are nonsense. Everything else lacks sense is senseless. I might have it the wrong way around but that's it
  369. 12:55 PM <Chadtech> Seeya Jolssoni, nice talking to you!
  370. 12:55 PM <Timofey> Seeya
  371. 12:55 PM <Ferdia_> cya jolssoni
  372. 12:55 PM <jack-frost> Later Jolssoni
  373. 12:55 PM <Chadtech> So Wittgenstein changed his use of 'sense' over time I think.
  374. 12:55 PM <Ferdia_> I'm not sure if he changed it Chad but he definitely changed how he felt toward it
  375. 12:56 PM <Chadtech> So I am less confident on this. 'Sense' in later Wittgenstein is like 'What kind of fact this is pointing at'.
  376. 12:56 PM <Chadtech> Because Analytic philosophers prior to him tried to condense every proposition into this overly scientific and real sense.
  377. 12:57 PM <Timofey> I'm fuzzy on the meaning of sense, at least for Frege; I think Chastech's right about W.
  378. 12:57 PM <Timofey> Can somebody define for me?
  379. 12:58 PM <Ferdia_> It's annoying because before he had a strict definition of nonsense but later he seems to use it in lots of different situations
  380. 12:58 PM <Ferdia_> But maybe it just seems that way because I can't tell if a prop. has sense as well as him
  381. 12:59 PM <jack-frost> The sense of dog is "dog" in English, "perro" in Spanish. It's what bridges the gap between our thought and the object. It's how we manifest the object into words. HOpefully the two language example illustrates this.
  382. 12:59 PM <Ferdia_> "sense", for W., at least in TLP, is when a prop. pictures a possible state of affairs, then it has sense
  383. 12:59 PM <Ferdia_> Ooooh yes, that's what Frege thought right jack?
  384. 1:00 PM <Pooka> sense is like the offset of the referent: morning star, evening star, both mean venus but with a different sense
  385. 1:00 PM <Timofey> I got it.
  386. 1:00 PM <jack-frost> Yeah, that's Frege
  387. 1:00 PM <Ferdia_> Sense is the relationship between the word and you, where the referent was the relationship between the word and the object
  388. 1:00 PM <Chadtech> Well, dogs, the animal, dont have senses. But propositions do.
  389. 1:00 PM <Pooka> (er, scratch referent, not helpful when the thing does not have a referent)
  390. 1:01 PM <Chadtech> So I find that Jack-frost is putting quotes in bizarre places.
  391. 1:01 PM <Ferdia_> That's Frege though, W. is different
  392. 1:01 PM <jack-frost> I just wanted to delineate between the object dog and the word dog.
  393. 1:01 PM <Chadtech> I dont think words have a sense. Or at least, I am not confident in that claim.
  394. 1:02 PM <Ferdia_> Words have sense for Frege. For W., only propositions can have sense
  395. 1:02 PM <Chadtech> Okay.
  396. 1:02 PM <jack-frost> Words are the sense of an object.
  397. 1:02 PM <Pooka> 'dog' and 'canines' are two different senses both used to relate to the same denotation for F.
  398. 1:02 PM <Chadtech> Words arent senses jack-frost
  399. 1:03 PM <Chadtech> Words have sense (as Ferdia says).
  400. 1:03 PM <jack-frost> Woops.
  401. 1:03 PM <Chadtech> No no no, 'dog' and 'canines' have two senses. But the problem still here, is to think that each word has a sense.
  402. 1:03 PM <Chadtech> And not that it has a different sense in each use.
  403. 1:03 PM <Ferdia_> This illustrates the difference between W. and Frege and Russell. F and R focused too much on single objects whereas W. focused on the relationship between objects: propositions
  404. 1:03 PM <Chadtech> 'Napolean' can have different senses, if I am talking to my friend named Napolean, or if I am remarking that someone is behaving like Napolean.
  405. 1:04 PM <Chadtech> I liked when Wittgenstein said that 'propositions are a concatenation of names'.
  406. 1:04 PM <Ferdia_> There they would have different referents
  407. 1:05 PM <Pooka> napoleon is not the right sort of example there, that's not a similar case
  408. 1:05 PM <Chadtech> Yeah, sure, but its the same word.
  409. 1:05 PM <Ferdia_> Yeah, so the same sense
  410. 1:05 PM <Chadtech> No.
  411. 1:06 PM <Ferdia_> The relationship between the word and the person is the same by virtue of them being the same word
  412. 1:06 PM <Chadtech> I am not saying I think Frege was right, but clearly using 'Napolean' in the two cases has a different sense. In one way I could say it has a different use, or another it has a different connotation.
  413. 1:06 PM <Pooka> oooh sorry
  414. 1:06 PM <Pooka> yes, ok, agreed
  415. 1:07 PM <Chadtech> First of all, I think its dangerous to say 'The' relationship. Because you could formulate as many relationships as you want.
  416. 1:07 PM <Ferdia_> Wait wait
  417. 1:08 PM <Ferdia_> "different use", is this by virtue of the phrase of acting like Napolean, or whatever?
  418. 1:08 PM <Pooka> in Chad's Nap example there are different denotations in each
  419. 1:08 PM <Pooka> so the sense is different, even for the same word
  420. 1:09 PM <Chadtech> Well, no, I mean. I think referring is an example of a word use.
  421. 1:09 PM <Timofey> Alright guys, I've got to run. Chad, if I email you, will you send me a log and our next meeting/assignment?
  422. 1:09 PM <Ferdia_> But imagine a person didn't know who Napolean was, and didn't know that phrase, but they knew your friend named Napolean
  423. 1:09 PM <Ferdia_> They wouldn't detect any difference
  424. 1:10 PM <Ferdia_> cya Timofey
  425. 1:10 PM <jack-frost> Bye Timofey
  426. 1:10 PM <Chadtech> If I merely want Napoleans attention and I call out to him, I have done something different than remarking that someone has the characteristics famously attributed to Napolean. But I will admit that both uses refer. I dont however, think Frege took a strong stance on this kind of thing. I think he left it off for the non-logicians to worry about (but I
  427. 1:10 PM <Chadtech> could be wrong).
  428. 1:10 PM <Chadtech> Seeya Timofy
  429. 1:10 PM <Chadtech> Yeah Ill email you a log.
  430. 1:10 PM <Chadtech> OH.
  431. 1:10 PM <Chadtech> Right out next assignment!
  432. 1:11 PM <Chadtech> How about 101 - 250, does that sound good?
  433. 1:11 PM <Ferdia_> Yeah Chad
  434. 1:11 PM <Pooka> 101-250 sounds fine
  435. 1:11 PM <Timofey> Works for me. See you guys.
  436. 1:11 PM <jack-frost> Good to me
  437. 1:11 PM <Chadtech> Seeya Timofey!
  438. 1:11 PM <Ferdia_> I'm not necessarily agree with you, I'm saying that I don't think that's what Frege would say
  439. 1:11 PM <Pooka> i don't disagree chad, but from what i remember of F. that is not in the course of his argument
  440. 1:11 PM ⇐ Timofey quit (6377fef1@gateway/web/cgi-irc/kiwiirc.com/ip.99.119.254.241) Quit: http://www.kiwiirc.com/ - A hand crafted IRC client
  441. 1:11 PM <Chadtech> Regarding senses?
  442. 1:11 PM <Chadtech> Okay, fair enough.
  443. 1:11 PM <jack-frost> Should we just meet same time next week?
  444. 1:11 PM <Chadtech> Yeah.
  445. 1:12 PM <Chadtech> Lets do that.
  446. 1:12 PM <Ferdia_> That was a good Frege talk, but very irrelevant haha
  447. 1:12 PM <Chadtech> Haha, yeah.
  448. 1:12 PM <Pooka> i dont think he used examples of the same 'word' with two different denotations at the end. i recall it being two different senses with the same denotation. so you might get to your stance from F., but im not sure F says it that way himself
  449. 1:13 PM <Pooka> (but I have not read it for ages, so i may well be wrong, ((i *know* -- but i might be wrong, what would that be like!?))
  450. 1:13 PM <Pooka> )
  451. 1:13 PM <Chadtech> Maybe I should re-read it too.
  452. 1:14 PM <jack-frost> Optional assignment: On Sense and Reference!
  453. 1:14 PM <Pooka> i think most of the examples are like 'a' and 'b' both relate to 1. not 'a' relates to '1' and '2'. if that makes sense
  454. 1:14 PM <Pooka> well on denoting is good as well
  455. 1:14 PM <Pooka> for F
  456. 1:14 PM <Ferdia_> Is there any point in reading Frege if not for contrasting with TLP? As in, is Frege still taken seriously after Wittgenstein?
  457. 1:14 PM <Pooka> but im not sure how relevant it is to keeping on the OC track
  458. 1:15 PM <Chadtech> Yeah, okay, I think sense still means 'has true or false conditions', or 'is true or false' in later Wittgenstein.
  459. 1:15 PM <Ferdia_> Yeah
  460. 1:15 PM <Chadtech> That was bothering me. I think to consider it otherwise, such as the original Fregean idea, would confuse sense with meaning.
  461. 1:15 PM <Pooka> ah well that is part of the debate, no?
  462. 1:15 PM <Chadtech> What do you mean?
  463. 1:16 PM <Pooka> like where russell and witt criticise and work off Frege for argument
  464. 1:16 PM <Ferdia_> I think this is why Witt. says that "I am here" is nonsense but still has meaning, sometimes
  465. 1:16 PM <Pooka> i will have to dig out my notes for on denoting and sense/ref
  466. 1:17 PM <Ferdia_> Anyway lads
  467. 1:17 PM Chadtech set the topic: 4chan Wittgenstein Reading Group. Email chadtech0@gmail.com to stay Involved. First meeting was splendid. Next Meeting is Sept 14th 6pm GMT. Please read sections 101 - 250 sections of On Certainty. Optional reading is 'On Sense and Reference' by Gottlob Frege.
  468. 1:17 PM <Ferdia_> I best be off. Can't wait for next time :)
  469. 1:17 PM <jack-frost> Bye Ferdia
  470. 1:18 PM <Pooka> cya
  471. 1:18 PM <Chadtech> Seeya Ferdia
  472. 1:18 PM <jack-frost> Should we call this meeting over? People are starting to leave, plus we completely left On Certainty behind for a bit haha
  473. 1:18 PM <Pooka> have you guys covered the end of this weeks reading yet? the riverbed stuff
  474. 1:18 PM <Chadtech> Yeah, its over. MEETING FINISH.
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