The Rubber Hand Illusion and Preaching to the Unconverted

Related Posts: The Apologist and the Revolutionary

I'll begin by saying that I haven't finished (in fact, I've hardly begun) reading the Sequences or any of the previously published material that covers similar ground, and that I only began evaluating LW in earnest a few days ago. I do intend to read the Sequences. I'm registering and taking the risk of posting this because I'd rather make a fool of myself and be downvoted into oblivion than keep this to myself for the entire (presumably extremely long) time that it takes to read and intimately understand the Sequences or the related material. I sincerely apologize if I'm sending my regards from the Valley of Bad Rationality. I also apologize if I'm regurgitating existing ideas. It goes without saying that I'm open to any and all criticisms. If this post sucks (in fact, probably, whether or not it sucks), I won't post until I (at least) finish the Sequences.

I may not be up to date as a brand new user, but it seems that the CFAR workshops so far have been dedicated to people who have preconceptions pretty close in ideaspace to the sorts of ideas proposed on LW and by the institutions related to it. This is not a criticism; it's easier to start out this way: as has been said, in a different context and perhaps not in so many words, we should focus on precision before tractability. We're not going to learn a thing about the effectiveness of rationality training from people who won't even listen to what we have to say. It's clear that convincing the unconvinced (or 'not even partially convinced') is an open and hard problem, especially because of the existence of things like the thread for rationalist origin stories. From what I've read, it seems that a lot of people who arrive at LW and are convinced by the arguments here for rationality subsequently relate that the arguments herein 'shocked' them into changing their beliefs. Alternatively, I propose that it can be said that they observed something with two important properties: (1) internal consistency, and (2) an utter inconsistency with preexisting beliefs.
We run into a problem when those who arrive here are able to somehow perceive the ideas here as consistent with their preexisting beliefs. (Hopefully obviously, that does not mean that they perceive them as right.) Like: "Arrogant people are usually too concerned about their own interests to come to correct conclusions (especially those that conflict with their interests), and Eliezer Yudkowsky seems like an egotistical ass to me, so that dickhead's probably wrong. Why listen to anything he has to say in the first place?"

Truth is independent of people's beliefs, but (so far) only people can care about truth. Truth is, but it doesn't value itself: people do. Arguments have always been related to the people that make them. So, I propose that the key is to divorce the person from the argument. If there is no person, then there is no social status to evaluate, nor character nor emotions to which to appeal.

I propose that we achieve this not through demonstrating flaws in cognition, but through demonstrating flaws in perception.Enter: the rubber hand illusion.

In case you're unfamiliar with this illusion, to demonstrate the rubber hand illusion, a subject sits at a table, a rubber hand is placed in front of them, oriented relative to their body as a natural hand would be, and a partition is placed between the rubber hand and their 'real' hand such that they are unable to see the 'real' hand. Then, the experimenter simultaneously 'stimulates' both hands at random intervals (usually by stroking each hand with a paintbrush). Then, the experimenter overextends the tips of a finger on each hand, the rubber hand about 90 degrees, and the 'real' hand about 20 degrees (it's not really overextension, and it wouldn't cause pain outside of the experiment's conditions). Measurements of skin conductance response indicate that subjects anticipate pain when this is done, and a very small selection of subjects even report actually experiencing pain. Also, (just for kicks) when subjects are questioned about the degree to which they believe their 'real' finger was bent, they overestimate, by an average of about 20 degrees.

As hypothesis-generator extraordinaire Dr. Vilayanur Ramachandran has demonstrated (credit to Yvain for that characterization), the rubber hand illusion isn't the most general example of this sort of illusion: the mind can even interpret the surface of a table as a part of the human body. (In fact, there is evidence that the mind's evaluation of what is and is not part of the human body isn't even dependent upon distance; Dr. Ramachandran has also tried this with rubber hands attached to unnaturally long rubber arms.)

I think that there are also three beneficial side effects to this exercise. (1) Inconsistencies in perception universally (I would argue) instill a feeling of self-doubt and incredulity which is necessary (or maybe just sufficient, I don't know) to change one's mind. (You might ask how an 'argument for' (demonstration of) inconsistencies in perception can be 'internally consistent.' They're not, but they are to naïve realists, which almost everyone is implicitly, especially all of the people that we can't convince in the first place. To them, perception is. It makes them think the very best thing that you could possibly want them to think if you think that you're right and they're wrong: “I don't understand it, but it must be true.”) (2) It grants social status to the demonstrator in the eyes of the subject: "This person showed me something that I consider extremely significant and that I didn't know about, therefore, they must be important." I would say that this was a large component, if not the entire reason (as if I explicitly would know), of what convinced me to keep reading. (3) We are trying to convince people that Bayesian inference is a useful way to form beliefs, and this illusion demonstrates that every human mind already unconsciously uses Bayesian inference all of the time (namely, to infer what is and isn't part of the human body).

To further demonstrate the part about Bayesian inference, I would suggest that subjects also subsequently be shown how the illusion does not occur when the 'stimulations' aren't simultaneous.

Lastly, I thought of this another way. Maybe the illusion isn't effective because it's internally consistent but inconsistent with their preexisting beliefs; maybe it's effective because it's actually completely consistent with their preexisting beliefs: "I don't understand everything, but I believe that my mind is doing the right thing anyway, and (now) evidently, this is what it's doing, so I should start doing this on purpose." They 'weren't wrong,' they just 'didn't understand how they were right,' and that's subjectively conceivable within their existing belief system, so they don't have to take a status hit. I wonder if there always has to be some kind of 'bridge' between belief systems like this.

(A few things while this is in discussion: I'm considering changing the title to "Show, Don't Tell," just because I'm not sure how I feel about all of the religious analogies in the titles of many posts on LW. I suspect that this has been justified in a post that I have yet to read. If there is one, then I'd appreciate it if someone could point me to it. If there isn't one, then I'd also appreciate it if someone attempted to provide an original justification. If it's just masturbatory humor, then I think that it should stop, because it's probably harmful towards our efforts to convince theists.

If there are things in here that are coincidentally related to the Sequences, then please tell me, because I would rather come back in a long time and rewrite this as it relates to the Sequences than leave it as it is. If you believe that there are any other posts that should be listed as related posts that I don't know about, then please inform me. Also, please point out any typos.

Specifically to Eliezer, in response to "But I'm especially interested in what it takes to get the transition started - crossing the first divide.  This would be very valuable knowledge if it can be generalized.  If that did happen at OB, please try to specify what was the crucial "Aha!" insight (down to the specific post if possible)." from this thread: I don't think that there is a single "Aha!" insight. I think that a post has to be compelling enough for one to doubt oneself and to continue reading, and that if the subsequently read posts are compelling enough, then doubt about LW evaporates. I wondered why I (and seemingly no one else) could remember the "Aha!" post, and I think that this is why. I also considered that if most people don't already believe in the ideas that are espoused here when they arrive, then they will necessarily forget them.)