THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION OF 1951

Source: https://www.jstor.org/stable/442551
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THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION OF 1951

Thomas P. Jenkin
University of California at Los Angeles

On October 25, 1951 Winston Leonard Sepncer Churchill won the first election of his career in which his leadership of the House of Commons was simultaneously established.  His victory continued the rightward trend in British national politics that was discenible in the 1950 election.  Once again the proportionate gain made by the Conservatives was greater than that of Labour, but not only did the Conservative alliance fail to secure an outright majority in the national poll, it also failed to secure as many votes as the Labour party.  Rather, Labour had the distinction of being the party which in all history had received the largest vote - nearly fourteen million ballots being cast in its favor.  Necessarily this failure of popular victory and the narrowness of the parliamentary majority received at once disappointed party supporters and denied pre-election estimates of Tory strength.

Under these circumstances, Conservative claims to a clear mandate have been as unconvincing as similar Labour claims in February, 1950.  Nor have the Conservatives been blatant invictory.  The approaches of the leaders to the great problems of the nation have been serious and generally non-doctrinaire.  Further, relations with Labour and Liberal members have been conciliatory in the main.  Thus, as examples, Mr. Davies was offered a seat in the cabinet; Mr. Churchill pledged that his government would not offer legislation affecting the privileges of trade-unions; and the undertook not to restore University representation during the life of the new Parliament.

Notwithstanding such limitations, the Conservative position in this Parliament appears to be better than that of Labour in the last.  Not only does a greater spread exist between the strengths of the two parties (a plurality of twenty-five as opposed to seventeen in the last Commons), but also the six Liberals can be expected to vote with the Tories on most issues.  The imponderable question is whether discipline can be maintained within the Conservative alliance.



I

Comparisons between the electoral statistics of 1951 and those of 1950 can be more precise than in the case of 1950 and 1945 since certain major factors remained nearly constant in the two more recent contests.  Several of these factors may be emphasized.  First, no major changes in constituency boundaries occurred in the twenty-months interval that separated the two elections.  Under provisions of the basic legislation a few minor changes were made, but the effect on the election was negligible.  Second, the addition of new voters to the electorate was not overwhelming.  Additions to the registers totaled 283,433 voters although 167,154 less votes were cast than in 1950.  A reduction of 1.17 per cent in over-all electoral participation accounts for this small discrepancy and at the same time underlines a further similarity between the two contests.  Thirdly, a large number of the candidates in the 1950 election were again candidates in 1951.  Of the incumbents in Parliament at its dissolution, 593 sought re-election and a lesser but still substantial number of the unsuccessful candidates in 1950 again offered themselves for election in 1951.  Thus both in the rank-and-file and in the leadership of the parties, personnel in the two elections was very similar.  Finally, the stipulations governing the conduct of elections put forth in the Representations of the People Act, 1948,[1] applied in both elections.  The use of money for electoral purposes, postal voting provisions, use of automobiles for transportation to polling places, and various other matters therefore were directed with substantial similarity in the two elections.[2]

Examination of the statistical data of the 1950 and 1951 elections reveals significant increases in the popular support given to both major parties in 1951.  (See Table I.)  In spite of a small reduction in the total vote cast, the Conservatives increased their strength by nearly ten per cent over 1950; and the Labour party registered a gain of approximately five per cent.  It is notable that in spite of the fact that it was the losing party, Labour increased its vote absolutely in 521 of the 618 constituencies in which it offered candidates.  Indeed, Labour increased its numerical strength in each of the twenty-one seats that were captured from the party by the Conservatives.  Put otherwise, more than one and three-fourths million persons who had not done so in 1950 supported one of the two major parties in 1951.  Together these two parties accounted for approximaetly 97 per cent of the vote; in 1950 their combined poll had been slightly under 90 percent of the whole.

Manifestly, the, the minor parties were the real losers in the election.  Liberal party strength declined by more than 70 per cent to approximately 2.5 per cent of the national total.  The Communist party suffered a reduction of 76 per cent, polling only 22,000 votes, less than one-tenth of one per cent of the national total.  The record of other minor parties is mixed.  The Irish Nationalists maintained their strength and (if the Irish Labour vote in Belfast [West] is included within the Labour party) this group and the Liberals were the only minor parties which obtained parliamentary representation.  Scottish and Welsh "national" groupings on the other hand were less in evidence in this election although the political issues that they represent are still of some importance.  Further, schisms within the Labour party which produced several Independent Labour candidates in the past resulted in only one such instance of deviation in 1951 and that occurred in a constituency that had supported Labour in 1951.  The intransigence of the Bevanites did not result in divisions within Labour in the election.  The classification of "others" in 1950 had also included the vote for the Speaker.  The retirement of this officer at the dissolution thus resulted in a further reduction of "minor party" strength which was apparent rather than real.



TABLE I [1]
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                                 Poll (in       Percentage        Commons     Percentage of
                                thousands)        of Poll        Seats Won       Seats Won
                                1950   1951     1950   1951     1950   1951     1950   1951
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Conservative Alliance[2] ....  12500  13724    43.45  47.98      298    321[4] 47.68  51.36
Labour Alliance [3] .........  13318  13981    46.29  48.88      315    296    50.40  47.36
Liberal Party ...............   2622    731     9.12   2.55        9      6     1.44    .96
Communist Party .............     92     22      .32    .08        0      0      .00    .00
Others ......................    237    144      .82    .62        3[4]   2      .48    .32
                              ====== ======   ====== ======   ====== ======   ====== ======
Totals ......................  28769  28602   100.0  100.0       625    625   100.0  100.0
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[1] Source: Statistics were taken from the London Times publications, The House of Commons, 1950 and The House of Commones, 1951, but the classification of parties was not taken from this source.  Candidates running with Conservative or Labour party support were included in the appropriate "alliance," except for independent Liberals running with Conservative support in 1951.

[2] Includes Conservative, Conservative and Liberal, Conservative and National Liberal, Conservative and Ulster Unionist, Independent Liberal, Liberal and Conservative (except the borought of Halifax, 1950), Liberal National, National, National Liberal, National Liberal and Conservative, and Ulster Unionist parties.  In 1951 the Liberal National designation was not used.

[3] Includes Labour, Co-operative, and Irish Labour parties.

[4] Includes the Speaker.



It should also be noted here that the votes cast for minor party candidates reveal but a part of the national minor party strength.  The Liberal party entered candidates in slightly more than one-sixth of the constituencies.  Most Liberal party adherents therefore had no opportunity to cast a ballot for a party nominee.  Other potential political followings were similarly thwarted; thus there were only ten Communist nominees in the election.

In achieving its most recent success, the Conservatives alone among the parties had the advantage of being over-represented in the Parliament in terms of their popular vote.  Approximately 48 per cent of the popular vote was cast for the Conservatives, but the party secured over 51 per cent of the parliamentary seats.  In part this situation arises from the heavy concentration of Labour strength in municipalities and is a fixed feature of British elections.  Conversely, Tory strength is more evenly distributed and thus fewer votes are "wasted" in unnecessarily large majorities.

The spokesmen for the British Institute of Public Opinion estimate this consistent party differential in effective party use of the popular vote at approximately two per cent of the gross poll.  Shortly before the election Professor M. G. Kendall and Mr. Alan Stuart of the London School of Economics described the application if the "cube law" which defines this differential relationship for the News Chronicle.  They estimated that popular votes of 48 and 49 per cent for the Conservative and Labour parties respectively would result in a parliamentary plurality of nineteen for the Conservatives.  The final polling figures for the two parties were almost exactly equivalent to those percentages, but the actual Conservative advantage over Labour stood at twenty-five seats in the House of Commons.[3]  It is probably that diversion of Liberal party votes accounts for this latter difference.  Indeed, explanations of Tory parliamentary success are to be found primarily in the nature of Liberal party participation in the election and only secondarily in an increased national Conservative sentiment.[4]

Popular participation in the election raises no major problems of comparisn between the two elections.  Electoral participation declined by slightly more than one per cent. (See Table II.)  Analysis of constituency results seems to indicate that this decline is the resultant of two opposing movements.  On the one hand, participation of Liberals was much lower.  In constituency after constituency which provided a three-party contest in 1950 and a two-party contest in 1951, the gross vote was considerably lower in 1951.  On the other hand, in consistuencies that were contested only by the two major parties in both elections, the polling figures indicate increased participation in instances where the strength of one party or the other was not overwhelming in 1950.  The conclusion is necessarily a rough judgment only, but on the balance participation of major party supporters appears to have increased while that of minor party adherents was sharply reduced.  In particular, it is evident that many Liberals in constituencies for which no Liberal party candidate was offered refused to choose between the Conservative and Labour candidates but instead considered themselves to be virtually disfranchised.



TABLE II [1]
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                                 Registered Electorate in   Valid Ballots     Percentage of
                                 Contested Constituencies        Cast         Participation
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    1935 ...........................   29,400,476             22,001,831          74.83
    1945 ...........................   33,064,704             24,060,473          72.77
    1950 ...........................   34,269,764             28,769,477          83.95
    1951 ...........................   34,553,197             28,602,323          82.78
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[1] Source: Statistics for 1935, 1950 and 1951 were taken from London Times publications in Table I; those for 1945 were taken from Parliamentary Elections (Proxy and Postal Votes), a response made by Mr. George Oliver (Home Office) on November 20, 1945 to an Address of the House of Commons dated November 19, 1945.  N.B., in 1945, 25,037,107 votes were cast on 24,060,473 ballots, a consequence of plural votes in double-member constituencies.



II

British minor parties suffered catastrophe in the election of 1950 when 460 candidates lost their election deposits.  It would appear, however, that they could gain even less comfort from the 1951 results.  In the October election only 142 minor party candidates, including 109 Liberals, entered contests.  Presumably they selected the scenes of greates earlier strength.  In spite of this greater caution, lack of strength equal to one-eighth of the total constituency poll caused 96 nominees to lose the £150 deposit required by British electoral law.  In summary terms, again including the Liberals, of 142 candidates, 46 succeeded in polling more than one-eighth of the constituency vote, and 8 only were elected to office.

This public disapprobation was meted out to all of the minor parties.  Liberals lost sixty-six deposits; the Communists lost the deposits of all ten of their candidates.  Similarly all four Independent Labour candidates, six out of ten Independents, and six of nine "nationalists" failed to secure the 12.5 per cent minimum.  Of the later nationalist groupings, the Irisn nationalists did enjoy greater success than most, electing two members of Parliament, but even they lost one election deposit, though the lost occurred in the English borough of Bootle.

In spite of these dismal statistics, the activities of the Liberals as the principal minor party did have real significance for the election results.  Paradoxically, the candidates that did not run had more significance than those that did.

The key to this circumstance lay in the distribution of the 1950 Liberal vote to the 1951 nominees of other parties.  Various factors were at work in this distribution.  First, the difference of political opinion which had caused earlier schisms among the Liberals were still operative.  The Liberal party reorganisation of 1935 had been concomitant with the disaffection of the National Liberals and with their attachment to the Conservative alliance.  However, there is a significant division within the remaining independent Liberals which makes it meaningful to speak of "radical" and "national" emphases.  In the context of the political divisions of 1950, this tended to take the form of preference for the Labour or the Conservative parties.  In particular, strong pro-Labour sentiment is one result of the traditional radicalism of Welsh Liberalism.  In other areas, West England for example, Conservative emphases are usually dominant.

It is difficult to estimate these preferences quantitatively.  The BIPO made numerous pre-election attempts to analyse the Liberal "floating vote" but none was conclusive.  The indecisive, qualitative opinion involved defied quantitative formulation.  Examination of the constituency results suggests that the Tory advantage which was predicted was overstated.  Several conclusions seem justifiable, though they cannot be demonstrated with any finality.  Thus it appears that a high percentage of Liberals refused to vote.  This was less true, of course, in constituencies where Labour and Conservative strength was approximately equal and the temptation to participate greater.  It seems clear enough that the over-all decline in electoral participation was largely a result of such abstention.  It may also be concluded that in Wales and in industrial constituencies generally the two major parties received approximately equal benefit from the Liberal vote.  In certain Welsh constituencies Labour secured distinct advantages.  In the rural constituencies, Conservative advantage would appear to have approximated sixty per cent.

Secondly, the decisive defeat suffered by Liberal candidates in 1950 convinced many Liberals of the hopelessness of their cause.  Constituency results in 1951 reveal sharp declines in the Liberal vote even when the same Liberal candidates were present in both the 1950 and 1951 campaigns.

Thirdly, there were enough very close constituency results in 1950 so that small shifts in political allegiance on the part of Liberal voters could cause decisive results.  In referring to this point, Frank Byers, a responsible Liberal spokesman, stipulated that a change of allegiance on the part of 30,000 voters resulted in Conservative gains in twenty constituencies.[5]  Certainly massive shifts were not necessary to affect the results.

Conservative party headquarters fully recognized the crucial character of the Liberal vote and acted to capture as much of it as possible.  Their political action in this respect too three forms.  First, there was an attempt to convince Liberals of the identity of Liberal and Conservative interests.  This program had begun, of course, long before the 1951 campaign; but the Conservatives were markedly conciliatory during the pre-election period.  It was estimated that there was a Liberal "flowing vote" of approximately two million in the 497 constituencies in which there were two-party contests between Conservative alliance and Labour candidates.  Wooing these voters thus became the principal object of Conservative cordiality to the Liberal party.  The essential if undeclared purpose of the other forms of Conservative policy was also to convince the orphaned Liberal of the seriousness and friendliness of Conservative leadership.

Secondly, as a quid pro quo, certain Liberal candidates were given the official support of the Conservative machine.  Of the eight constituencies that the Conservatives did not contest, the Liberals were given Tory help in seven.[6]  In the eighth case aid was given to an Independent.  In three of the seven cases Liberal incumbents were aided and Conservative help at most increased the winning plurality.  It is certain in two cases and probably in the third that the Liberal cause would have been won without Tory help.  In a fourth case, in Carmarthen, the Liberal incumbent wone with a plurality of onlu 467 votes.  Certainly his success was conditional in Conservative support.  In Bolton (West) Conservative magnanimity was more definite.  This constituency was won by Labour in 1950.  In that election the Liberals stood third, polling eight thousand votes less than the Tories.  In 1951, Conservative support of the Liberal candidate gained the seat for the Liberals.  In two further constituencies Conservative aid was not sufficient to upset the Labour incumbent.  In Dundee (West), Mr. Strachey was strongly entrenced.  In the seventh constituency, Colne Valley, Conservative support for Lady Violet Bonham Carter was given with striking showmanship.  Defying all precedent, Mr. Churchill himself appeared on the Liberal platform to urge the election of the Liberal candidate.  However, the resulting increase in Liberal strength still was not sufficient for victory.

One point that the Conservatives sought to make in all this was underscored by the parliamentary results of the election.  Of the six Liberals elected to the House of Commons, five had secured their seats in contests from which the Conservatives had abstained.  There was more than a broad hint in campaign literature that union with the Conservative party would permit the Liberals to share in victory, but that alone they would be lost.

The third form taken by Conservative policy relative to the Liberals was chastisement of those who had supported the Labour government before the dissolution.  Lady Megan Lloyd-George in Anglesey and Emrys Roberts in Merioneth were the two victims of this effective, punitive Tory action.  In both constituencies Conservative strength stood a poor third in 1950; in both, intensive Conservative efforts were sufficient to unseat the incumbent Liberal in 1951; in both, the Liberals lost a constituency to Labour which had been held by them for years.  Indeed, these two were the only seats gained by the regular Labour party organisation in the election.

On the other side of the picture, support by Liberal voters secured great advantage to the Conservative party.  The Conservative alliance gained twenty-one seats from Labour in the 1951 election.  Of these, a total of seventeen seats were gained because Liberal candidates did not stand in the 1951 election.  The further fact that in each of these constituencies Labour secured a greater vote than it did in 1950 adds emphasis to the debt owed by the Conservative party to electors who formerly voted for Liberals.  Conversely, the effect of Liberal abstention in 1951 on the results of the election tends to confirm speculations about the contribution that Liberal activity in 475 constituencies made to the Labour cause in 1950.[7]  In a very real sense the Liberal party has provided an imbalance of power in recent elections.  Certainly Liberal electoral activity tends to promote political views which are not subscribed to by the major part of Liberal party supporters.

The distribution of party voting in still other constituencies also suggests that further advantage may accrue to the major parties from the decline of organized Liberalism.  On the balance, the Conservatives have more to hope for than the Labour party.  The fact that Liberal candidates polled a vote greater than the winnint major party plurality in thirty-five constituencies is a rough measure of this potential effect.  In twenty-two constituencies the Liberal poll exceeded a Conservative plurality; in thirteen constituencies a Labour plurality was exceeded.  In seven instances (in Wales and London), the Labour party might expect to secure as much advantage as the Tories in the event of Liberal withdrawal.  However, the traditional strength of the Liberals in Wales makes it probably that Liberal candidates will stand in these districts in many future elections.  In Anglesey and Merioneth particularly the Liberal party has been dominant for more than a century and Labour victories in 1951 in these two districts is related to Tory spleen rather than exceptional Labour strength.

Conservative expectations of marginal additions to their own strength in some of the rest of the seats for which Liberal candidates contested in 1951 are firmer, though still speculative.  In particular, these include eighteen seats in which the Tory plurality was less than the Liberal vote and in which Liberal abstention could be expected to bolster small Tory majorities.  Ten further constituencies declared for Labour with pluralities smaller than the Liberal vote.  In these there might well be a prognosis of Conservative gains if Liberal candidates do not run.  Certainly in the constituencies involved the margin of victory for either major party is small enough to make such marginal factors pertinent; and recent parliamentary majorities in turn make the capture or loss of a few seats highly significant.



III

The Conservative attack on the Labour record largely defined the issues of the 1951 campaign and assigned priorities to them.  The election occurred during a critical period in Britain's postwar international relations.  Difficulties with Iran over petroleum resources and the crisis brought on by the Egyptian denunciation of the 1936 treaty with Great Britain were set against the complexities of the increasingly unfavorable balance-of-trade that troubled the final half of 1951.  There is evidence, indeed, that the Labour government chose an early election to avoid responsibility for the probably domestic sequelae of these circumstances.  In spite of these serious international problems, however, the main issues of the 1951 election were domestic, especially the increasing cost of living.  Very apparent inflation and higher taxes made this national condition, serious in 1950, even more acute in 1951.  From the outset of the campaign, the Conservatives chose to stress these domestic rather than international issues.  In general, the Labour party appeared willing to accept these Conservative stipulations.

Four main issues, in descending order of importance, may be discerned in the election addresses and pamphlets of the Conservative party.  The high cost of living as related to the allegedly restrictive economic policy of the Labour government and to the unfavorable balance-of-trade was given primary attention.  Britain's international position and problems under a Labour government was given secondary emphasis.  Thirdly, attention was given to the social services and programs of nationalization.  Finally, the apparent divisions of authority within the Labour party which were occasioned by the Bevanite schism claimed Conservative attention.  The initial plans of the Labour party appeared to call for a general defense of the social program developed by the Labour government.  However, Labour candidates were obliged to give serious consideration to Tory charges and analyses and as a result this schedule of issues also applies to the Labour campaign.

The debate on domestic issues began with living costs.  The Conservative attack remained simple in its elements: In spite of contrary promises, in spite of great expenditures of public money to maintain an artificial economy, prices demonstrated a great and continuous advance under the Attlee governments.  Moreover, tampering with the monetary system bu Labour was at once a clear index to Britain's economic plight and a factor which worsened the situation.  For its part, Labour defended the record in several ways. First, it asserted that the inflationary trend was an inescapable worldwide development, but that Labour policies had minmized its impact at hom.  Secondly, Labour asserted that minimum prices had been maintained with respect to the essentials of life, basic foods and housing.  Thirdly, the party underscored the level of employment that had been maintained.  Since the period of the depression the question of employment has been major in British electoral campaigns and, implicitly at least, Labour emphasis on this point suggests that Conservative economic policies carry with them the threat of mass unemployment.

Housing was also a domestic economic issue of consequence.  The Tories continued their 1950 criticism of Labour's slowness in fulfilling promises with respect to housing and again proposed their target of 300,000 new dwelling units per year.  Currently some 200,000 units are being built annually.  The Conservatives emphasized the desirability of supplementing governmental building programs with a broad utilization of all available private resources.  The issue is a vital one in current Britain since present building scarcely keeps abreast of current population growth, and a great pent-up need for housing is thus continued.  The principal Labour reaction on this point took the form of scorn for Conservative promiese.  Labour spokesmen asserted that in fact the building program adopted by the governments of the past two Parliaments had strained the resources of the nation to the limit.

The issue of nationalization was of minimum importance in the campaign.  As in 1950, the Labour party deliberately avoided the issue.  The Labour party Handbook for 1951 and its supplement indeed defended the accomplishments of the industries that had been nationalized by Labour and met specific Conservative charges, but it placed no emphasis on nationalization nor on its extension in Britain.  The Conservative attack took two principal forms.  First, the Conservatives underlined their intention to denationalize steel, both in the platform and in election addresses.  Secondly, a Conservative program of decentralization in the administration of the transportation and mining industries was articulated.  On the whole, though, the electorate appear relatively disinterested in this issue.

The Liberal party interjected two further domestic issues.  These were minor, but the crucial importance of the Liberal vote to the Conservative party gave some importance to them.  One of these issues had to do with political devolution.  The Liberal party proposes a considerable degree of regional autonomy for Wales and Scotland, including the establishement of subordinate parliaments for those areas; the Conservatives with their strong unionist tradition and unionist allies do not.  Secondly, the Liberals, in their obvious self-interest, stress the need for electoral reform, which would establish some type of proportional representation.  Mr. Churchill indicated willingness to have an expert examination of the problem made; but his own views hardly correspond with those of the Liberals.

Problems of labor organization and of industrial relations constituted serious campaign issues though the were of importance chiefly to electors whose votes were already committed, the trade-union members.  Two major problems were discernible: the fears of the trade-unions that the privileges which had been established by Labour legislation would be reduced under a Tory government; and the Bevanite schism within the Labour party.

The dual position of the trade-unions as major economic groupings in the nation and as the major political force in the Labour party had secured for them a stronger political position than prior to 1945.  The Conservative party was officially on record as opposing three features of their strengthened position.  In the first instance, the Tories opposed the right of any organized group of civil servants to hold office or power in party organizations or to indulge in party activities.  Since large groups of workers in the nationalized industries have become civil servants, this Conservative position was of considerable importance to the trade-unions.  Secondly, the Conservatives opposed the British equivalent of the closed shop.  Finally, the Conservative party opposed the system of "contracting out."  Under this system, union dues - and therefore political dues - are automatically collected at the payroll source for all employees save those who have specifically "contracted out" or have taken the initiative to exempt themselves from the levy.  During the election Mr. Churchill announced revised party policy on these points and pledged that, if elected, the Conservative party would not introduce legislation that would affect trade-union privileges.

Labour's internal problems also provided an issue of some seriousness.  The intransigence of Aneurin Bevan and his parliamentary followers[8] which had been successfully smothered in 1950 flared once again and more strongly in 1951.  For Labour this constituted a challenge to Attlee leadership and a danger that the radicalism of Bevan would alienate the "floating vote."  The challenge to party leadership was made explicit during the annual Labour Party Conference held at Scarborough in early October.  During the Conference the Bevan group secured the first, second, third and sixth positions in the elections of members to the national Labour Party Executive, thus seating four out of twenty-three members on the Executive.  Three anti-Bevan leaders of long standing were displaced, including one Labour minister, Mr. Emanuel Shinwell.[9]

These divisions were increased by the Bevanite pamphlets One Way Only and Going Our Way which defined the rebel position for the country at large.  The second of these, published shortly after the annoincement of the election, attacked trade-union membership on the Labour Executive, and created the impression of serious Labour disharmony.  However, during the election campaign these differences were discounted by party leaders, and the Bevanites also were more conciliatory.

In their own constituencies the Bevanites were fully successful.  Most of them increased the pluralities by which they were elected, as indeed, most Labour candidates did generally.  It does not appear that the schism affected the voting of Labour adherents.  What effect, if any, it had on the "floating vote" is incalculable.

Britain's problems in foreign affairs constituted a second major source of campaign issues.  In particular, the Conservatives alleged that Labour conduct of international relations had resulted in diminishment of British prestige abroad, in increased fiscal problems at home, and, with respect to the Iranian situation, in the reduction of potential British military power.  The Conservatives charged further that these circumstances were tributary to Labour ineptness in the management of foreign affairs and to an improper definition of Britain's national interest by the Labour ministry.  The internation crises which plagued Great Britain in 1951 were interpreted as instances in a prolonged history of Labour mismanagement.  Conversely, the Conservatives stressed the demonstrated diplomatic capacity of Mr. Eden and other Tory leaders and insisted that the election of a Conservative ministry would decrease the seriousness of Britain's international problems by improving her international reputation.

Mr. Morrison spoke in direct defense of Labour's foreign affairs policy, but his defense was not very effective.  The crisis character of the negotiations that he was obliged to conduct during the campaign with respect to Iran and Eqypt necessarily restricted his public electoral discussion of these immediate proglems.  At the same time, the evident existence of these problems vitiated claims that Labour's international policy was fill satisfactory.  Indeed, serious, candid discussion of the issue of foreign relations generally was avoided by Labour candidates.

The foreign affairs issue was nonetheless used by Labour with some success.  This was done through a whispering campaign which was unusual for a British election.  This whispering campaign sought to identify the Conservative party with a war program and to equate Labour policies and peace.  In particular, the charge of warmongering was brought against the Conservative party and its leadership.  The official literature of the Labour poarty gave no support to these attacks, but by suggestion and indirection they were pressed on many Labour platforms and in various Labour journals.  Indeed, they became sufficiently general so that Conservative leaders, including Mr. Churchill, felt compelled to take notice of them and to make a defense.



IV

Two further matters may be considered briefly: the use of communication media in the campaign; and the indices and analyses of electoral activity, especiallly the public opinion polls.

The British Broadcasting Corporation continued its general policy with respect to the allocation of radio time to political parties.  Thirteen broadcasts were permitted, the Labour and Conservative parties each being given five, the Liberal party three.  The Communists, who had been granted a fifteen minute period in 1950, were excluded from the list because of the sharp reduction in the number of nominations that the party made.  Labour spokesment included Miss M. Herbison, Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, who began the BBC schedule, James Griffiths, R. R. Stokes, Herbert Morrison, and Prime Minister Attlee who concluded the political series.  Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, Dr. Charles Hill, Miss P. Hornsby-Smith, and Lord Woolton spoke for the Conservatives.  Frank Byers, Dingle Foot and Joseph Grimond broadcast for the Liberal party.

The BBC made its television facilities available to the parties for the first time.  One program each was provided for the three top parties.  Reports indicate a cautious use of the new medium by the party groups.  Mr. Eden's presentation for the Conservative party was probably the most effective program given.  Sir Harley Shawcross and Christopher Mayhew appeared for Labour.  Lord Samuel, who opened the series, represented the Liberal party.

The BBC made its television facilities available to the parties for the first time.  One program each was provided for the three top parties.  Reports indicate a cautious use of the new medium by the party groups.  Mr. Eden's presentation for the Conservative party was probably the most effective program given.  Sir Hartley Shawcross and Christopher Mayhew appeared for Labour.  Lord Samuel, who opened the series, represented the Liberal party.

The role of the press in urging party action appears to have undergone no discernible changes either in terms of the party preferences of the various journals or of the degree of service rendered.  The Times endorsed the Conservative party, a step it had not seen fit to take in 1950; but its treatment of election news and opinion was little different than that offered the public in the earlier election.  The Manchester Guardian continued as spokesman for Liberalism, but its tone in dealing with the Conservatives was friendly.  Editorially the Times asserted, "Time for a change."  The same phrase was used with a terminal question mark in the Guardian.  The two articles so titled, moreover, presented quite similar materials.[10]

The most useful general materials for the student of the 1951 election were provided by the Times and the Manchester Guardian.  Each surveys both the national and the constituency scenes and provides accurate and responsible reports.  However, neither emplys a statistical analysis and marginal constituencies are simple recognized as such, a circumstance which restricts the usefulness of their pre-election data for the close analysis of party activity.  In 1951, hoever, the more easily comparable data of the 1950 campaign made their political reporting more precise than was true for the previous election.  The election data was conveniently assembled by the Times in a bound volume entitled The House of Commons, 1951, a publication parallel to other volumes which have followed recent elections.  The partisan part positions are mose usefully represented for the analyst by the Daily Telegraph (Conservative), the Daily Herald (Labour) and the News Chronicle (Liberal).

Election data are also provided by the several public opinion polls.  The results of three of these were published during the campaign, but those publised by the Daily Express and the Daily Graphic were neither illuminating enough nor accurate enough to be useful for more than circulation purposes.  Both made pretensions to scientific methods, but neither the form of presentation nor the partisan use made of the results suggests that such methods were primarily characteristic of the analyses.

In effect, then, the Gallup Poll conducted by the British Institute of Public Opinion and publised in the News Chronicle remained the principal source of data based on scientific sampling techniques.  Six weekly surveys were conducted in the period immediately before the election.  The results of these polls described a continuously lessening Conservative advantage.  The final poll, held three days before the election, found that the Tory plurality had dwindled to the equivalent of 2.5 per cent of the electorate: Conservative strenght was estimated at 49.5 per cent, Labour strength at 47 per cent.  These figures had been weighted to accommodate the "don't know" opinion.  In the actual event, of course, Labour's popular strength exceeded that of the Conservative party by approximately one per cent.

Two aspects of these polling data may be called to attention as partially explanatory of the deviations.  First, the unattached Liberals presented a major difficulty.  Although these voters still identified themselves as Liberals when interviewed, in most constituencies they were forced to make the difficult choice between casting a major party vote and failing to vote.  Eventually most Liberals chose the former alternative and increased the major parties' poll.  These Liberals had largely been included in the "don't know" category of the BIPO poll, a category that measured from 10 to 12 per cent during the six polls.  Even when pressed with a battery of supplementary questions in the final poll, 3.5 per cent of the sample refused to specify a preference.  Secondly, the opinion poll continues to underrepresent Labour opinion in Britain.  This has been a phenomenon common to surveys confuced during the past several elections.  Apparently a considerable number of consistent Labour supporters represent themselves to interviewees as undecided.  Lack of information about the nature and purpose of the polls and doubts among the labor group about their confidential character are probable reasons.  Of course, additional factors may also be at work, e.g., difficulties in preparing an adequate sample.  For whatever reasons, there has been a persistent overrepresentation of Conservative strength.

By-election results have also been held to be something of an index to national political trends.  In the twenty months between elections there were sixteen by-elections.  In no instance did a constituency change party hands as a result of a by-election.  However, there was some tendency to increased Conservative pluralities.  These facts might be interpreted as pointing to a marginal Conservative victory: indeed, they were.  However, such interpretation is much easier and clearer after the general election.

In general, then, the immediate fact of Conservative victory appears to confirm and extend a rightward trend in British electoral opinion.  Closer inspection reveals that in some part the change rests on the conviction of a portion of the independent vote that the Conservative program is best for Britain.  However, it also reveals that most of the apparent rightward shift occurred within the body of the Liberal party adherents.  The bulk of the "floating vote" in the 1951 election appears to have been floating because of the absence of Liberal candidates rather than because persons whose political attitudes were not conditioned by party loyalty were converted to Conservatism.  Put differently, there is no significant evidence that voters were converted from Labour party convictions.  The generally dispirited character of the last months of Labour government and Labour's recent internal disharmony emphasize this circumstance inasmuch as ample reasons for discontent among party supporters would seem to be present.  Indeed, the election result suggests an increasing rigidiy in party followings, and especially in the Labour party, rather than a disposition to political change.


The Western Political Quarterly (c) 1952 University of Utah
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[1] 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 15.

[2] A study which parallels the present article was published as "The British General Election of 1950," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. III, pp. 179-189 (June, 1950).  The legal provisions governing conduct of elections were treated there and the description is not repeated here.  The earlier article also considered the general election of 1945 for comparative purposes and this material is also omitted from the present study.

[3] News Chronicle (London), October 22, 1951.  On the basis of the BIPO poll of that date which found electoral strength of the parties to be 50 per cent (Conservatives) and 47 per cent (Labour), Kendall and Stuart predicted a Tory plurality of 93 seats.  Professor Samuel J. Eldersveld describes the "cube law" in the following words: "The Cube Ration Theory was a simple rule of thumb propounded first in 1910 before the Royal Commission on Systems of Election.  In simple terms it states that the ration of the seats won by the parties should be the cube of the ratio between the popular vote cast for them.  If the ratio of the vote is A:B then the ration of seats is A^3:B^3.  See James K. Pollock et al., "Polling Results and Prediction Techniques in the British Election of 1950," British Election Studies, 1950 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Wahr Publishing Co., 1951), p. 75.  The effectiveness of the approximation provided by the "cube law" depends on the smallness of the minor party vote.  Since the major parties shared 97 per cent of the vote in 1951 the "law" worked rather better than usual.

[4] See below, section II.

[5] Letter to the Editor of the Times (London), November 20, 1951.

[6] Bolton (West); Huddersfield (West); Colne Valley; Cardigan; Carmarthenshire (Carmarthen); Montgomery; Dundee (West)

[7] Cf. Lionel H. Laing, "The So-called 'Wasted' Liberal Vote," in James K. Pollock, et al., op. cit., p. 114.

[8] Mrs. Barbara Castle, T. E. N. Dreiberg, Michael Foot, John Freeman, Miss Jennie Lee, Ian Mikardo and Harold Wilson.

[9] See Times (London), October 3, 1951, for a general account.

[10] See articles on the press and communication media in the 1950 campaign by S. J. Eldersveld and T. P. Jenkin in Pollock, et al., op. cit.  See also H. G. Nicholas, The British General Election of 1950 (London: Macmillan & Co., 1951), ch. VII.