How significant was the Marshall Plan in the division of Europe?

General Marshall’s Plan was effectively economic input into European economies to create a stimulus for growth after the annihilation of World War II, (Eichengreen 1992 p. 14). The Plan was a significant contributor to the division of Europe, stemming from Truman’s idea that aid should only be given to “free peoples”; something the West perceived that the communist ideology of the East would not support, (Coffey 1985 . 233).

While the Marshall Plan was significant its importance must be in context of other relevant factors. Ideological difference was the most important factor for the division of Europe; if Truman did not oppose communist ideology Marshall Aid could theoretically be given to communist satellite states, (Carr 1953 p. 2).

Furthermore, the Red Army “liberated” many countries in Eastern Europe through Poland up to Berlin; if ideological differences were less severe, then the free and fair elections agreed at Yalta (1945) would have had greater chance to be upheld, (Gurian 1954 p. 119). Had the Eastern front been launched sooner Soviet influence would be more advanced in Western Europe, “boots” was a factor alone for the Soviet Union not controlling Europe entirely (Carr 1953 p. 5). This factor is a part of a more fundamental issue; bipolarity of the globe escalated a struggle for security between West and East, significantly, USA’s nuclear threat created further division of Europe, (Kull 1983 p. 570). On the other hand, arguably Stalin would be prepared to go to war over Poland regardless of the nuclear threat because of the vital importance the buffer state allowed for hegemonic dominance in the East. The fact the majority of eastern European countries were “liberated” by the Red Army is a more significant divider of Europe than the Marshall Plan as if the Red Army had not liberated Eastern Europe then there would be far less controversy over where the Marshall Aid would be distributed. Empirical rather than International Relations theories arguments are the foundation to this essay, measuring the relative importance of different factors for the division of Europe.

Greece in 1947 was at threat of communist dominion due to Britain not being able to afford soldiers in the region against the KKE, (Coffey 1985 p. 237). Truman having a containment strategy declared America was willing to help “support free peoples”, or in other words not help communists, (Coffey 1985 p. 233). This is significant in the division of Europe as from a Western perspective it highlights the emergence of a Western block. The Marshall Plan effectively put Truman’s idea in practise, providing military, financial, raw materials and fuel to countries with liberal democratic principles such as in Greece to help combat communism, (Eichengreen 1992 p. 13). Countries all across Europe including established liberal democracies such as France were so poor that Marshall feared they could convert to communism, (Eichengreen 1992 p. 30). This significantly increased the division across Europe as in essence the Marshall Plan conflicted with the very spreading nature of communism; communism is an ideology which spreads – “workers of the world unite”, (Marx 1848).

Stalin initially tried to attain Marshall Aid at the Paris Conference (1947) however after the practicalities of this came to light all the Cominform countries were forced to leave the talks, (Yerofeyev Date: N/A). Practically this sealed the division of Germany and Europe as the two dominant powers in the world were unwilling to cooperate. Theoretically Stalin still wanted access to western Germany due to the Ruhr and Rhineland offering rich resources for the Soviet rebuilding process; however the practicality was that the rejection of Marshall Aid meant other solutions would have to be found, (Eichengreen 1992 p. 25).

Tensions between America and the Soviet Union go far back as 1918 after Lenin signed the Treaty of Brest Litovsk after promising “peace, land, bread”, (Gurian 1954 p. 118). The factor that that the two main powers were historically opposed to the alternative ideology highlights how Stalin’s initial pursuit of Marshall Aid was practically naïve from the outset. Therefore, while Marshall Aid was a combat of communism, this factor is less significant than the ideological difference for the division of Europe. If the ideological tensions were less significant, American assistance to help the Soviet recover from World War II could have far greater practicality. If the two states were willing to cooperate the division of Europe could theoretically not have occurred.

Truman in 1947 declared that America was willing to help “free peoples”, inexplicitly referring to the lack of humanitarianism from the USSR, (Coffey 1985 p. 233). This was a significant contributor to the division of Europe; practically the statement reinforced the establishment of a Western liberal democratic bloc. This factor is more a more significant contributor to the division of Europe than the Marshall Plan due to the ideological underpinning of the statement. While the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine are intricately linked whether the Marshall Aid would have happened without Truman is questionable. The important distinction to make is that the Truman Doctrine is ideological, and ideological opposition to communism was the most significant divider of Europe, (Coffey 1985 p. 232). Where as, the Marshall Plan, while ideological in the sense that it combated communism, was a long term economic strategy, (Eichengreen 1992 p. 15). Congress initially did not want to provide money for Marshall Aid; this was until communists took power in Czechoslovakia in 1948, (Eichengreen 1992 p. 16). This example highlights how ideological fear of communism spreading was a more important divider than the Marshall Plan for the division of Europe. If the ideological tensions did not exist then Aid would not have been a necessity to fight the communist spread from Eastern Europe. The Truman Doctrine was a more significant divider of Europe based on the fact it was a more ideological notion rather than economic.

Another significant factor for division was the control the Red Army and Western Front armies had over European states. Had a Second Front in the West been launched sooner than 1944 then potentially the western sphere of influence could reach as far as Poland, not just western Germany, (Coffey 1985 p. 234). Having greater territorial gain would leave Europe less divided geographically; therefore the factor the two armies met in central Germany is a significant. The Red Army was able to “liberate” Poland in the summer of 1944, effectively giving political control of Poland to the USSR, (Wettig 1994 p. 413). On the other hand the factor the Red Army did not “liberate” Tito’s Yugoslavia meant Stalin was not able to gain control over some eastern European states.

The order in which the “liberation” occurred is a more significant factor for the division of Europe than the Marshall Plan. Marshall Aid was given to countries based upon the threat of communism and political position, (Eichengreen 1992 p. 13). Had the Second Front been launched sooner, countries such as Hungary and eastern Germany could have been influenced by western principles of democracy and pluralism. Therefore on the basis which Marshall Aid was given, had western control over the “satellite-states” been established sooner, the unwillingness to provide these states with Aid could theoretically not exist. Reinforcing this point, Stalin made all of the Cominform states forfeit the Paris Conference in 1947 after Aid from America became an unviable for Soviet economic recovery, (Yerofeyev Date: N/A).

“Liberation” links with a more fundamental divider of Europe – ideology. If the ideological differences were put aside, which ever army liberated more of Europe first would become an irrelevance. Illustrating this point, at the Yalta Conference in 1945 the “big three” agreed for free and fair elections on the principle of self determination, (Coffey 1985 p. 235). Yet, in 1947 the Polish elections were rigged in favour of the communist oriented Party, (Carr 1953 p. 5). Had ideology not been an issue, an emergence of an eastern and western bloc would be significantly less likely. Reinforcing this point, two of the “big three” leaders changing since Yalta to Potsdam (1945) only complicated the division process, (Coffey 1985 pp. 236-237). Truman was arguably seen as a more hard line Democrat than Roosevelt which would only help increase the ideological tension, (Coffey 1985 p. 233).

At Potsdam (1945) Truman agreed to let the Soviet Union aid America with the war against Japan after the European battle was over, (Coffey 1985 p. 240). However weeks after Potsdam this was clearly a fabrication of the truth after the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1945) lead to US victory. The nuclear monopoly America had in 1945 was a significant factor for Europe’s division. The Soviet Union would seek to balance military power through acquiring nuclear arms for security in the eastern sphere, (Kull 1983 p. 576). Essentially this lead to a nuclear arms race between the two main powers, not helping any hope for meaningful cooperation, (Kull 1983 p. 577).

Nuclear threats between the Soviet Union and America, while theoretically could happen, were practically very unlikely between 1945-1949 (1949 is the first time the USSR had a successful atomic test), (Kull 1983 p. 580). The Marshall Plan was a more significant divider of Europe than the nuclear threat. If either America or the Soviet Union were to bomb the other then the cost of retaliation would arguably significantly outweigh any possible benefit, (Eichengreen 1992 p. 53). On the other hand Marshall Aid inexplicitly stopped communism spreading without any clear political motivation on the surface, (Eichengreen 1992 p. 13). Therefore, the Marshall Plan stopped communism spreading from Eastern Europe whereas the nuclear threat was an unpractical deterrent for stopping communist forces. However it must be noted that the nuclear threat was still a significant contributor to the division of Europe. Theoretically the psychology impact of another Hiroshima or Nagasaki would make the politicians think carefully about which Cold War strategy to adopt, (Kull 1983 p. 578).

Ideology was a more significant contributor towards dividing Europe than the nuclear threat. Historical tension between the America and the USSR goes as far back as 1918 where Russia signed the Treaty of Brest Litovsk, (Carr 1953 p. 2). If another World War was to occur the global view was that it would be between the USSR and America. Illustrating this point Albert Einstein famously said “I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones”. Theoretically if another global War did happen then it would be due to the ideological tensions between America and USSR. The factor that nuclear weapons would be the tool of war is irrelevant as the basis of the conflict is ideology.

On the other hand arguably “liberation” was a more significant factor for the division of Europe than the nuclear threat. Stalin was arguably prepared to go to War over control of Poland, (Coffey 1985 p. 246). This argument contradicts the initial cost outweighing any benefit argument of war between the two dominant powers, (Eichengreen 1953 p. 53). However, a distinction must be noted that the benefits for the Soviet Union upholding interests in Poland is a security factor, not in economic terms like mentioned before. Nazi invasion via Poland in 1941 left the Soviet Union on the verge of collapse, (Gurian 1954 p. 119). German military forces were significantly stronger than the USSR; yet the one thing the Red Army did not lack was men. Millions upon millions of men were slaughtered by the Nazi onslaught; yet due to sheer numbers were able to hold off Nazi advances. (Gurian 1954 p.120). Therefore Stalin would arguably be prepared to go to War over Poland to stop any future threat of a German or European attack; Poland acted as the perfect buffer state. This reinforces the significance of “liberation” in the division of Europe; Stalin was not prepared to lose his grip over buffer territory in Eastern Europe, (Wettig 1994 p. 415).

Even after Germany was divided, Stalin in 1952 proposed to the three Western powers for a restoration of a German state, (Wettig 1994 p. 411). Initially this appears as a potential case for cooperation with the West; however ulterior motives are more convincing.  Soviet reconstruction was one of Stalin’s main aims, the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany) had the majority of natural resources such as in the Rhineland. Therefore while a united Germany would appear to weaken European division, the factor that it was for Soviet reconstruction suggests this was merely power politics, (Wetting 1994 p. 411). Furthermore communism by nature wishes to spread; Stalin wished to maintain communist power in central Europe, (Wetting 1994 p. 411).

Marshall Aid was a more significant contributor to the division of Europe than Soviet strategy for reconstruction. If Stalin had allowed free and fair elections in Eastern Europe agreed at Yalta then Marshall Aid would have had a greater chance of being provided for countries such as Poland due to Truman’s Doctrine of America willing to help “free peoples”, (Coffey 1985 p. 233). Emphasizing this point, the rejection of Marshall Aid at the Paris Conference in 1947 signalled that Stalin needed an alternative strategy for economic growth. This reinforces the initial point that Stalin would be prepared to go to War over Poland due to security reasons, however not prepared to go to War over economic issues. While the two are linked, the territorial advantage Poland offered the USSR, was more beneficial than faster economic recovery at the expense of liberal principles. This reiterates the significance of ideology as a factor for the division of Europe. Soviet strategies for reconstruction would not be compromised at the expense of appearing weak to the Western powers, notably America, (Yerofeyev Date: N/A). Furthermore, Marshall Aid, as a restriction of communist expansion through economic means, emphasizes Western preference for a Western bloc following Truman’s “containment” strategy, (Coffey 1985 p. 235).

Carr raises an interesting notion that the division of Europe was a satisfactory solution to the Soviets due to “boots”, (Carr 1953 p. 6). In other words, Europe being divided was favourable to the Soviets simply because the Red Army did not have enough men to control Europe completely. Soviet losses in World War II are estimated as high as thirty million, to control Europe completely would require significantly more than existing Soviet forces, (Carr 1953 p. 6).

“Boots” is a weaker argument for the relevance to the division of Europe than the Marshall Plan. The Red Army still had enough military force after World War II to Aid the KKE in Greece (1947), yet due to Marshall Aid communism was defeated in Greece, (Coffe 1985 p. 252). This shows Marshall Aid effectively combating communism in the eastern sphere of influence. Arguably Greece was not a significant priority to Stalin like Poland, however the Red Army still had millions of men that could make a difference if needed.

Relative to the other important factors significant to the division of Europe “boots is the weakest”. Theoretically if the Red Army did have enough men to cover Europe completely America’s nuclear threat would be an effective deterrent for any unorthodox military action, (Kull 1983 p. 576). Emphasizing this point, Stalin wanted to access to the rich industrial resources in the FRG; however due to the three Western powers liberating western Germany this meant that this was unfeasible. Therefore while European dominance would garunteed faster Soviet reconstruction the practicalities of this were impossible, (Wetting 1994 p. 413). The ideological tension between liberal America and communist Soviet Union meant the division of Europe was inevitable as a metaphorical wall to each sphere of interest. Churchill best described this as the “iron curtain” in 1946.

To conclude, the Marshall Plan was a very significant factor for the division of Europe, however relative to other factors had intermediate significance. The most significant contributor to the division of Europe was ideology. This was more important than the Marshall Plan as if the ideological tensions did not exist then there would be no dispute over where Marshall Aid could be sent, as communism would not be perceived as a threat. A western bloc would not have been necessary based on the assumption that meaningful cooperation would be possible between East and West. Furthermore the Truman Doctrine is a more significant divider of Europe based on the ideological implications. Helping “free peoples” was fundamental to the Marshall Plan; without Truman’s input the Marshall Plan may not have come to fruition, (Coffey 1985 p.233). Additionally, “liberation” was a more significant factor than the Marshall Plan. Had the Red Army “liberated” Greece it would be highly unlikely that Marshall Aid would be provided for this country. The factor that the two fronts met in central Europe reinforced the establishment of two separate blocs. On the other hand the Marshall Plan was a more significant divider of Europe than the atomic threat from both America and the USSR. The economic cost of atomic war would outweigh any possible benefit; therefore the nuclear deterrent was unrealistic. On the other hand the Marshall Plan effectively stopped one of communisms fundamental features – spreading, “workers of the world unite”; providing aid to countries under threat of communism, (Marx 1848). Stalin’s goal of reconstruction was less significant than the Marshall Plan for the division of Europe. Stalin rejected Marshall Aid at the Paris Conference, however still wanted access to Western Germany for the industrial resources. The Marshall Plan successfully prevented Stalin’s aims of gaining access to any resources in Western Europe. Finally, the Marshall Plan was a more significant factor than “boots”, (Carr 1953 p. 5). The Red Army still had millions of men at Stalin’s disposal after the losses at World War II. However, Marshall Aid was able to combat communist forces in Greece, in the Soviet sphere of influence.




Bibliography

Carr, E. H. (1953) Stalin, Soviet Studies 1(5) pp. 1-7, Taylor & Francis, Ltd.

Coffey, J. W. (1985 The Statesmanship of Harry S. Truman, The Review of Politics 2(47) pp. 231-252, Cambridge University Press

Eichengreen, B. et al. (1992) The Marshall Plan: Economic Effects and Implications for Eastern Europe and the Former USSR, Economic Policy 14(7) pp. 13-75, Blackwell Publishing

Engels, F. & Marx, K. (1848) The Communist Manifesto: Chapter IV. Position of the Communists in Relation to the Various Existing Opposition Parties, available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch04.htm accessed (14/5/2012)

Gurian, W. (1954) Soviet Foreign Policy, The Review of Politics 1(16) pp. 118-120, Cambridge University Press

Kull, S. (1983) Nuclear Arms and the Desire for World Destruction, Political psychology 3(4) pp. 563-591, International Society of Political Psychology

Wetting, G. (1994) Stalin and German Reunification: Archival evidence of Soviet Foreign Policy in Spring 1952, The Historical Journal 2(37) pp. 411-419, Cambridge University Press

Yerofeyev, V. (Date: N/A) Why Stalin rejected Marshall Aid an Insider’s Statement, available at http://www.johndclare.net/cold_war8_Stalinreaction.htm accessed on 14/5/2012 accessed (14/5/2012)

Word count: 2959