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- UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05794498 Date: 11/30/2015
- RELEASE IN FULL
- The best way to help Israel deal with Iran's growing nuclear capability is to help the people of
- Syria overthrow the regime of Bashar Assad.
- Negotiations to limit Iran's nuclear program will not solve Israel's security dilemma. Nor will
- they stop Iran from improving the crucial part of any nuclear weapons program — the capability
- to enrich uranium. At best, the talks between the world's major powers and Iran that began in
- Istanbul this April and will continue in Baghdad in May will enable Israel to postpone by a few
- months a decision whether to launch an attack on Iran that could provoke a major Mideast war.
- Iran's nuclear program and Syria's civil war may seem unconnected, but they are. For Israeli
- leaders, the real threat from a nuclear-armed Iran is not the prospect of an insane Iranian leader
- launching an unprovoked Iranian nuclear attack on Israel that would lead to the annihilation of
- both countries. What Israeli military leaders really worry about -- but cannot talk about -- is
- losing their nuclear monopoly. An Iranian nuclear weapons capability would not only end that
- nuclear monopoly but could also prompt other adversaries, like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to go
- nuclear as well. The result would be a precarious nuclear balance in which Israel could not
- respond to provocations with conventional military strikes on Syria and Lebanon, as it can today.
- If Iran were to reach the threshold of a nuclear weapons state, Tehran would find it much easier
- to call on its allies in Syria and Hezbollah to strike Israel, knowing that its nuclear weapons
- would serve as a deterrent to Israel responding against Iran itself.
- Back to Syria. It is the strategic relationship between Iran and the regime of Bashar Assad in
- Syria that makes it possible for Iran to undermine Israel's security — not through a direct attack,
- which in the thirty years of hostility between Iran and Israel has never occurred, but through its
- proxies in Lebanon, like Hezbollah, that are sustained, armed and trained by Iran via Syria. The
- end of the Assad regime would end this dangerous alliance. Israel's leadership understands well
- why defeating Assad is now in its interests. Speaking on CNN's Amanpour show last week,
- Defense Minister Ehud Barak argued that "the toppling down of Assad will be a major blow to
- the radical axis, major blow to Iran.... It's the only kind of outpost of the Iranian influence in the
- Arab world...and it will weaken dramatically both Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas and Islamic
- Jihad in Gaza."
- Bringing down Assad would not only be a massive boon to Israel's security, it would also ease
- Israel's understandable fear of losing its nuclear monopoly. Then, Israel and the United States
- might be able to develop a common view of when the Iranian program is so dangerous that
- military action could be warranted. Right now, it is the combination of Iran's strategic alliance
- with Syria and the steady progress in Iran's nuclear enrichment program that has led Israeli
- leaders to contemplate a surprise attack — if necessary over the objections of Washington. With
- Assad gone, and Iran no longer able to threaten Israel through its, proxies, it is possible that the
- United States and Israel can agree on red lines for when Iran's program has crossed an
- unacceptable threshold. In short, the White House can ease the tension that has developed with
- Israel over Iran by doing the right thing in Syria.
- The rebellion in Syria has now lasted more than a year. The opposition is not going away, nor is
- the regime going to accept a diplomatic solution from the outside. With his life and his family at
- risk, only the threat or use of force will change the Syrian dictator Bashar Assad's mind.
- UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05794498 Date: 11/30/2015
- The Obama administration has been understandably wary of engaging in an air operation in
- Syria like the one conducted in Libya for three main reasons. Unlike the Libyan opposition
- forces, the Syrian rebels are not unified and do not hold territory. The Arab League has not
- called for outside military intervention as it did in Libya. And the Russians are opposed.
- Libya was an easier case. But other than the laudable purpose of saving Libyan civilians from
- likely attacks by Qaddafi's regime, the Libyan operation had no long-lasting consequences for
- the region. Syria is harder. But success in Syria would be a transformative event for the Middle
- East. Not only would another ruthless dictator succumb to mass opposition on the streets, but the
- region would be changed for the better as Iran would no longer have a foothold in the Middle
- East from which to threaten Israel and undermine stability in the region.
- Unlike in Libya, a successful intervention in Syria would require substantial diplomatic and
- military leadership from the United States. Washington should start by expressing its
- willingness to work with regional allies like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar to organize, train
- and arm Syrian rebel forces. The announcement of such a decision would, by itself, likely cause
- substantial defections from the Syrian military. Then, using territory in Turkey and possibly
- Jordan, U.S. diplomats and Pentagon officials can start strengthening the opposition. It will take
- time. But the rebellion is going to go on for a long time, with or without U.S. involvement.
- The second step is to develop international support for a coalition air operation. Russia will
- never support such a mission, so there is no point operating through the UN Security Council.
- Some argue that U.S. involvement risks a wider war with Russia. But the Kosovo example
- shows otherwise. In that case, Russia had genuine ethnic and political ties to the Serbs, which
- don't exist between Russia and Syria, and even then Russia did little more than complain.
- Russian officials have already acknowledged they won't stand in the way if intervention comes.
- Arming the Syrian rebels and using western air power to ground Syrian helicopters and
- airplanes is a low-cost high payoff approach. As long as Washington's political leaders stay firm
- that no U.S. ground troops will be deployed, as they did in both Kosovo and Libya, the costs to
- the United States will be limited. Victory may not come quickly or easily, but it will come. And
- the payoff will be substantial. Iran would be strategically isolated, unable to exert its influence
- in the Middle East. The resulting regime in Syria will see the United States as a friend, not an
- enemy. Washington would gain substantial recognition as fighting for the people in the Arab
- world, not the corrupt regimes. For Israel, the rationale for a bolt from the blue attack on Iran's
- nuclear facilities would be eased. And a new Syrian regime might well be open to early action
- on the frozen peace talks with Israel. Hezbollah in Lebanon would be cut off from its Iranian
- sponsor since Syria would no longer be a transit point for Iranian training, assistance and
- missiles. All these strategic benefits and the prospect of saving thousands of civilians from
- murder at the hands of the Assad regime (10,000 have already been killed in this first year of
- civil war).
- With the veil of fear lifted from the Syrian people, they seem determine to fight for their
- freedom. America can and should help them — and by doing so help Israel and help reduce the
- risk of a wider war.
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