I sense the need to provide a refutation of Rand's ethics. There is a reason Rand is rarely taught in philosophy classes; and there is *so* much more philosophical work out there, I find it very difficult to sympathize with your (and others' *cough* Dream and James Steele *cough*) enthusiasm for Rand's work. Certainly, her books are inspiring, but don't for a minute think that they are the end-all-be-all of philosophy. So, here goes:

(Page numbers reference: Rand, Ayn, and Nathaniel Branden. _The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism._ New York: Signet, 1964. Print.)

On page 15, Rand discusses utilitarianism, the idea that what is good is that which increases the greatest happiness for the greatest number. In trying to refute this argument, Rand contorts the utilitarian position by claiming that utilitarians posit society "above any principles of ethics, since *it* is the source, standard and criterion of ethics." This is not the classical utilitarian position; rather, the utilitarian will say that we should make choices according to what increases the well-being (i.e., the classical Greek conception of happiness, *eudaimonia*) of everyone in our community. After all, none of us lives alone; we are de facto thrust into an ongoing social project.

In fact, an easy refute of classical utilitarianism is simply to say that the utilitarian calculation necessary to determine whether a given action will increase well-being for the greatest number is simply impossible. Some have tried to formalize it, but none convincingly.

Rand then uses this strawman as a basis for the claim that contemporary ethics is irrational, and that most philosophers agree that it is irrational. This is also false. It is true that, since Hume's moral sentimentalism, ethicists have struggled with the emotivism, the idea that ethical propositions are just emotional expressions. However, that doesn't mean they are irrational, nor does it mean that philosophers agree that ethics en toto is irrational. Far from it. Singer, for example, uses rigorous rationality in his formulation of preference utilitarianism.

Page 16: Rand defines "value" to be "that which one acts to gain and/or keep." She then justifies this on page 17 by stating that all of an organism's actions are "generated by the organism itself and directed to a single goal: the maintenance of the organisms *life.*" The obvious issue here is that she is committing the naturalistic fallacy: you can't ground ethical statements in natural phenomenon. Second, I would say that I have no control over a great many of my actions, such as cell metabolism etc. Third, I find it hard to agree that the singular goal of an organism's action is to *maintain* the organism's life. Genetics would rather say that the purpose is to procreate, pass on the genes and keep the species alive, which won't lead us anywhere we want to go philosophically.

Page 18: She actually tries to overcome Hume's Guillotine: "The fact that a living entity is determines what it ought to do." No, it doesn't. When talking in is-language, you are making claims and giving reasons. This is descriptive language, okay great. When you move to ought-language, however, you are now being proscriptive, which will require wholly new reasons than those you provided in your descriptions. I can say that "college kids *do* party/drink because they have too much free time," but I'd need to provide a better reason than "college kids *should* party/drink because they have too much free time."

She then talks for a few pages about how Man is the highest of all animals. How is that measured? By consciousness. So if an alien comes that has "higher" consciousness, can they basically enslave us, since they are now a "higher" being? I certainly hope not, and I wouldn't call that ethical.