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  8. U.S. Department of Justice At:t:ef'fle)' Werle Predttet /,' Ma;? CeHtail'l
  9. Material Preteeted UHder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) TABLE OF CONTENTS -VOLUME I
  10. INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I .......................................................
  11. ................................................... 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO
  12. VOLUME 1. ................................................ ,
  13. ............................................. 4 I. THE SPECIAL COUNSEL'S
  14. INVESTIGATION
  15. ......................................................................... ,
  16. ....... 11 II. RUSSIAN "ACTIVE MEASURES" SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN
  17. ..................................................... 14 A. Structure of the
  18. Internet Research Agency
  19. ................................................................. 15 B. Funding
  20. and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin
  21. ................................................. 16 C. The IRA Targets U.S.
  22. Elections ......................................................................
  23. ............ 19 1. The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations As Early As 2014
  24. ....................... , .............. 19 2. U.S. Operations Through IRA-
  25. Controlled Social Media Accounts ..................... 22 3. U.S. Operations
  26. Through Facebook.
  27. ..................................................................... 24 4. U.S.
  28. Operations Through Twitter
  29. ......................................................................... 26 a.
  30. Individualized Accounts ........................................................
  31. ........................... 26 b. IRA Botnet Activities ........................
  32. .............................................................. 28 5. U.S.
  33. Operations Involving Political Rallies
  34. .......................................................... 29 6. Targeting and
  35. Recruitment of U.S. Persons
  36. .......................................................... 31 7. Interactions
  37. and Contacts with the Trump Campaign ...........................................
  38. 33 a. Trump Campaign Promotion ofIRA Political Materials
  39. ................................. 33 b. Contact with Trump Campaign Officials in
  40. Connection to Rallies ................. 35 Ill. RUSSIAN HACKING AND DUMPING
  41. OPERATIONS .....................................................................
  42. 36 A. GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign
  43. ....................................................... 36 1. GRU Units Target
  44. the Clinton Campaign
  45. ............................................................. 36 2. Intrusions
  46. into the DCCC and DNC Networks
  47. ..................................................... 38 a. Initial Access .....
  48. ................................................................................
  49. ............... 3 8 b. Implantation ofMalware on DCCC and DNC Networks
  50. ................................ 38 c. Theft of Documents from DNC and DCCC
  51. Networks .................................... 40 B. Dissemination of the Hacked
  52. Materials ......................................................................
  53. 41 I. DCLeaks ..................................................................
  54. ............................................. 41 2. Guccifer 2.0 ...............
  55. ................................................................................
  56. ............ 42 3. Use of WikiLeaks .................................. :
  57. .............................................................. 44 a. WikiLeaks's
  58. Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaign ............... 44 b.
  59. WikiLeaks's First Contact with Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks
  60. ........................... 45
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  68. U.S. Department of Justice Atterrte~? Werk Predttet // May Cetttairt Material
  69. Preteetee Urteer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME I RUSSIAN
  70. SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN The Internet Research Agency (IRA) carried out the
  71. earliest Russian interference operations identified by the investigation-a
  72. social media campaign designed to provoke and amplify political and social
  73. discord in the United States. The IRA was based in St. Petersburg, Russia, and
  74. received funding from Russian oligarch Y evgeniy Prigozhin and companies he
  75. controlled. Pri ozhin is widel re orted to have ties to Russian President
  76. Vladimir Putin In mid-2014, the IRA sent em lo mission with instructions The IRA
  77. later used social media accounts and interest groups to sow discord in the U.S.
  78. political system through what it termed "information warfare." The campaign
  79. evolved from a generalized program designed in 2014 and 2015 to undermine the
  80. U.S. electoral system, to a targeted operation that by early 2016 favored
  81. candidate Trump and disparaged candidate Clinton. The IRA' s operation also
  82. included the purchase of political advertisements on social media in the names
  83. of U.S. persons and entities, as well as the staging of political rallies inside
  84. the United States. To organize those rallies, IRA employees posed as U.S.
  85. grassroots entities and persons and made contact with Trump supporters and Trump
  86. Campaign officials in the United States. The investigation did not identify
  87. evidence that any U.S. persons conspired or coordinated with the IRA. Section II
  88. of this report details the Office's investigation of the Russian social media
  89. campaign. RUSSIAN HACKING OPERATIONS At the same time that the IRA operation
  90. began to focus ?on supporting candidate Trump in early 2016, the Russian
  91. government employed a second form of interference: cyber intrusions (hacking)
  92. and releases of hacked materials damaging to the Clinton Campaign. The Russian
  93. intelligence service known as the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General
  94. Staff of the Russian Army (GRU) carried out these operations. In March 2016, the
  95. GRU began hacking the email accounts of Clinton Campaign volunteers and
  96. employees, including campaign chairman John Podesta. In April 2016, the GRU
  97. hacked into the computer networks of the Democratic Congressional Campaign
  98. Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic National Committee (DNC). The GRU stole
  99. hundreds of thousands of documents from the compromised email accounts and
  100. networks. Around the time that the DNC announced in mid-June 2016 the Russian
  101. government's role in hacking its network, the GRU began disseminating stolen
  102. materials through the fictitious online personas "DCLeaks" and "Guccifer 2.0."
  103. The GRU later released additional materials through the organization WikiLeaks.
  104. 4
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  112. U.S. Department of Justice AUorttey Work Proattet // Mtt'.)1 Cotttttitt
  113. Mttterittl Prnteetea Uttaer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) II. RUSSIAN "ACTIVE MEASURES"
  114. SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN The first form of Russian election influence came
  115. principally from the Internet Research Agency, LLC (IRA), a Russian organization
  116. funded by Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and companies he controlled, including
  117. Concord Management and Consulting LLC and Concord Catering (collectively
  118. "Concord").2 The IRA conducted social media operations targeted at large U.S.
  119. audiences with the goal of sowing discord in the U.S. political system.3 These
  120. operations constituted "active measures" (aKTMBHbie Meporrprumu1), a term that
  121. typically refers to operations conducted by Russian security services aimed at
  122. influencing the course of international affairs.4 The IRA and its employees
  123. began operations targeting the United States as early as 2014. Using fictitious
  124. U.S. personas, IRA employees operated social media accounts and group pages
  125. designed to attract U.S. audiences. These groups and accounts, which addressed
  126. divisive U.S. political and social issues, falsely claimed to be controlled by
  127. U.S. activists. Over time, these social media accounts became a means to reach
  128. large U.S. audiences. IRA employees travelled to the United States in mid-2014
  129. on an intelligence-gathering mission to obtain information and photographs for
  130. use in their social media posts. IRA employees posted derogatory information
  131. about a number of candidates in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. By early to
  132. mid-2016, IRA operations included supporting the Trump Campaign and disparaging
  133. candidate Hillary Clinton. The IRA made various expenditures to carry out those
  134. activities, including buying political advertisements on social media in the
  135. names of U.S. persons and entities. Some IRA employees, posing as U.S. persons
  136. and without revealing their Russian association, communicated electronically
  137. with individuals associated with the Trump Campaign and with other political
  138. activists to seek to coordinate political activities, including the staging of
  139. political rallies.5 The investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S.
  140. persons knowingly or intentionally coordinated with the IRA's interference
  141. operation. By the end of the 2016 U.S. election, the IRA had the ability to
  142. reach millions of U.S. persons through their social media accounts. Multiple
  143. IRA-controlled Facebook groups and 2 The Office is aware of reports that other
  144. Russian entities engaged in similar active measw-es operations targeting the
  145. United States. Some evidence collected by the Office corroborates those rep01ts,
  146. and the Office has shared that evidence with other offices in the Department of
  147. Justice and FBI. 3 Harm to Ongoing Matter see also SM-2230634, serial 44
  148. (analysis). The FBI case number cited here, and other FBI case numbers
  149. identified in the report, should be treated as law enforcement sensitive given
  150. the context. The report contains additional law enforcement sensitive
  151. information. 4 As discussed in Part V below, the active measures investigation
  152. has resulted in criminal charges against 13 individual Russian nationals and
  153. three Russian entities, principally for conspiracy to defraud the United States,
  154. in violation of 18 U.S.C. ? 371. See Volume I, Section V.A, infra; Indictment,
  155. United States v. Internet Research Agency, et al., 1 :18-cr-32 (D.D.C. Feb. 16,
  156. 2018), Doc. I ("Internet Research Agency Indictment"). 14
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  163.  
  164. U.S. Department of Justice Att:srAe~? Wark Prsdttet // Mtty CsAta.iA Mttterittl
  165. Prsteetea UAaer Fea. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) Instagram accounts had hundreds of
  166. thousands of U.S. participants. IRA-controlled Twitter accounts separately had
  167. tens of thousands of followers, including multiple U.S. political figures who
  168. retweeted IRA-created content. In November 2017, a Facebook representative
  169. testified that Facebook had identified 470 IRA-controlled Facebook accounts that
  170. collectively made 80,000 posts between January 2015 and August 2017. Facebook
  171. estimated the IRA reached as many as 126 million persons through its Face book
  172. accounts. 6 In January 2018, Twitter announced that it had identified 3,814 IRA-
  173. controlled Twitter accounts and notified approximately 1 .4 million people
  174. Twitter believed may have been in contact with an iRA-controlled account.7 A.
  175. Structure of the Internet Research Agency Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing
  176. Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter I ! " " I I Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing
  177. Matter anization also led to a more detailed or anizational structure. 6 Social
  178. Media Influence in the 2016 US. Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select
  179. Committee on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (11/1/17) (testimony of Colin Stretch,
  180. General Counsel ofFacebook) ("We estimate that roughly 29 million people were
  181. served content in their News Feeds directly from the IRA's 80,000 posts over the
  182. two years. Posts from these Pages were also shared, liked, and followed by
  183. people on Facebook, and, as a result, three times more people may have been
  184. exposed to a story that originated from the Russian operation. Our best estimate
  185. is that approximately 126 million people may have been served content from a
  186. Page associated with the IRA at some point during the two-year period."). The
  187. Facebook representative also testified that Facebook had identified 170
  188. Instagram accounts that posted approximately 120,000 pieces of content during
  189. that time. Facebook did not offer an estimate of the audience reached via
  190. Instagram. 7 Twitter, Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016 US Election (Jan.
  191. 31, 2018). 8 See SM-2230634, serial 92. 9 Harm to Ongoing Matter -10 Harm to
  192. Ongoing Matter 11 See SM-2230634, serial 86 Harm to Ongoing Matter 15
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  199.  
  200. U.S. Department of Justice A?:eme:,? Wefk Pfedttet // Ma:,? Cefl:taifl: Matefial
  201. Pfeteeted Ufl:def Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) . , I . I .. .. . .. .. . -.. .. . . .
  202. Harm to Ongoing Matter aHarm to Ongoing Matter of 2014, the IRA be an to hide
  203. its fundin and activities. I I. ? I ? . I? I ! I I.. ? I Harm to Ongoing Matter
  204. %?to Ongoing Matter B. Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin Until at
  205. least February 2018, Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and two Concord companies
  206. funded the IRA. Prigozhin is a wealthy Russian businessman who served as the
  207. head of Concord. 13 Harm to Ongoing Matter 14 See, e.g., SM-2230634, serials 9,
  208. 113 & 180 -? 15 Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 131 & 204. 17 18
  209. Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 16 Harm to Ongoing Matter
  210.  
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  217. U.S. Department of Justice ,<W:erttey Wer:lc Preettet // Moy Cetttoifl Moteriol
  218. Preteetee Uneer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) ? :6_ a ? ? a a I I. ? I Harm to Ongoing
  219. Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter In May 2016, IRA employees, claiming to be U.S.
  220. social activists and administrators ofFacebook groups, recruited U.S. persons to
  221. hold signs (including one in front of the White House) that read "Happy 55th
  222. Birthda Dear Boss," as an homa e to Pri ozhin whose 55th birthda was on June 1,
  223. 2016 .31 Harr,, ,v '-'' ll::jVI I 'l::I 1v1a,u:;r Harm to Ongoing Matter C. The
  224. IRA Targets U.S. Elections 1. The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations As Early As 2014
  225. ! ... ? ... ? .... " ? Harm to Ongoing Matter I I. ? I " I" : I I subdivided the
  226. Translator Department into different responsibilities, ranging from operations
  227. on different social media platforms to analytics to 29 Investigative Technique
  228. See SM-2230634, serials 131 & 204. 30 See SM-2230634, serial 156. 31 Internet
  229. Research Agency Indictment ,r 12 b; see also 5/26/16 Facebook Messages, ID
  230. 1479936895656747 (United Muslims of America) & 19
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  237.  
  238. U.S. Department of Justice Atterney Werk Predttet // Ma:y CentttiH Mttterittl
  239. Preteeted Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing
  240. Matter 37 IRA employees also traveled to the United States on intelligence-
  241. gathering missions. In June 2014, four IRA employees applied to the U.S.
  242. Department of State to enter the United States, while lying about the purpose of
  243. their trip and claiming to be four friends who had met at a party.38 Ultimately,
  244. two IRA employees-Anna Bogacheva and Aleksandra Krylova-received visas and
  245. entered the United States on June 4, 2014. ??? ". . ? ,,. ,:,!,, . " ..... Harm
  246. to Ongoing Matter -. -. . ? Harm to Ongoing Matter 35 Harm to Ongoing Matter 37
  247. Harm to Ongoing Matter 38 See SM-2230634, serials 150 & 172 Harm to Ongoing
  248. Matter 21
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  256. U.S. Department of Justice Atten1e;? 'Nerk Predttet // Ma;? Cel'lttl:il'I
  257. Material Prnteeted Under Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 2.. U.S. Operations Through IRA-
  258. Controlled Social Media Accounts Dozens of IRA employees were responsible for
  259. operating accounts and personas on different U.S. social media platforms. The
  260. IRA referred to employees assigned to operate the social media accounts as
  261. "specialists."42 Starting as early as 2014, the IRA's U.S. operations included
  262. social media specialists focusing on Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter.43 The IRA
  263. later added specialists who operated on Tumblr and Instagram accounts.44
  264. Initially, the IRA created social media accounts that pretended to be the
  265. personal accounts of U.S. persons.45 By early 2015, the IRA began to create
  266. larger social media groups or public social media pages that claimed (falsely)
  267. to be affiliated with U.S. political and grassroots organizations. In certain
  268. cases, the IRA created accounts that mimicked real U.S. organizations. For
  269. example, one IRA-controlled Twitter account, @TEN_ GOP, purported to be
  270. connected to the Tennessee Republican Party.46 More commonly, the IRA created
  271. accounts in the names of fictitious U.S. organizations and grassroots groups and
  272. used these accounts to pose as immigration groups, Tea Party activists, Black
  273. Lives Matter protestors, and other U.S. social and political activists. Harm to
  274. Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 45 See, e.g.,
  275. Facebook ID 100011390466802 (Alex Anderson); Facebook ID 100009626173204 (Andrea
  276. Hansen); Facebook ID 100009728618427 (Gary Williams); Facebook ID
  277. 100013640043337 (Lakisha Richardson). 46 The account claimed to be the
  278. "Unofficial Twitter of Tennessee Republicans" and made posts that appeared to be
  279. endorsements of the state political party. See, e.g., @TEN_GOP, 4/3/16 Tweet
  280. ("Tennessee GOP backs @rea!DonaldTrump period #makeAmericagreatagain #tngop
  281. #tennessee #gop"). 22
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  289. U.S. Department of Justice A:tterHe~? 'Net"lc Preettet // May CeHtaiH Material
  290. Preteetea Unaer Fea. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing
  291. Matter The focus on the U.S. presidential campaign continued throughout 2016.
  292. Inifll 2016 internal reviewing the IRA-controlled Facebook group "Secured
  293. Borders," the 47 Harm to Ongoing Matter 48 See, e.g., SM-2230634 serial 131 49
  294. The IRA posted content about the Clinton candidacy before Clinton officially
  295. announced her presidential campaign. IRA-controlled social media accounts
  296. criticized Clinton's record as Secretar of State and romoted various criti ues
  297. of her candidac . The IRA also used other techni 50 Harm to Ongoing Matter 23
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  304.  
  305. U.S. Department of Justice At:t:erttey Werk Preettet // May Cetttaitt Material
  306. Preteetee Utteer Fee. R. Cfiffl. P. 6(e) groups (with names such as "Being
  307. Patriotic," "Stop All Immigrants," "Secured Borders," and "Tea Party News"),
  308. purported Black social justice groups ("Black Matters," "Blacktivist," and
  309. "Don't Shoot Us"), LGBTQ groups ("LGBT United"), and religious groups ("United
  310. Muslims of America"). Throughout 2016, IRA accounts published an increasing
  311. number of materials supporting the Trump Campaign and opposing the Clinton
  312. Campaign. For example, on May 31, 2016, the operational account "Matt Skiber"
  313. began to privately message dozens of pro-Trump Facebook groups asking them to
  314. help plan a "pro-Trump rally near Trump Tower."55 To reach larger U.S.
  315. audiences, the IRA purchased advertisements from Facebook that promoted the IRA
  316. groups on the newsfeeds of U.S. audience members. According to Facebook, the IRA
  317. purchased over 3,500 advertisements, and the expenditures totaled approximately
  318. $100,000.56 During the U.S. presidential campaign, many IRA-purchased
  319. advertisements explicitly supported or opposed a presidential candidate or
  320. promoted U.S. rallies organized by the IRA ( discussed below). As early as March
  321. 2016, the IRA purchased advertisements that overtly opposed the Clinton
  322. Campaign. For example, on March 18, 2016, the IRA purchased an advertisement
  323. depicting candidate Clinton and a caption that read in part, "If one day God
  324. lets this liar enter the White House as a president -that day would be a real
  325. national tragedy."57 Similarly, on April 6, 2016, the IRA purchased
  326. advertisements for its account "Black Matters" calling for a "flashmob" of U.S.
  327. persons to "take a photo with #HillaryClintonForPrison2016 or #nohillary2016."58
  328. IRA-purchased advertisements featuring Clinton were, with very few exceptions,
  329. negative.59 IRA-purchased advertisements referencing candidate Trump largely
  330. supported his campaign. The first known IRA advertisement explicitly endorsing
  331. the Trump Campaign was purchased on April 19, 2016. The IRA bought an
  332. advertisement for its Instagram account "Tea Party News" asking U.S. persons to
  333. help them "make a patriotic team of young Trump supporters" by uploading photos
  334. with the hashtag "#KIDS4TRUMP."60 In subsequent months, the IRA purchased dozens
  335. of advertisements supporting the Trump Campaign, predominantly through the
  336. Facebook groups "Being Patriotic," "Stop All Invaders," and "Secured Borders."
  337. 55 5/31/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID 5/31/16
  338. Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID 56 Social Media
  339. Influence in the 2016 US. Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee
  340. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (11/1/17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, General
  341. Counsel of Facebook). 57 3/18/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045505152575. 58
  342. 4/6/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6043740225319. 59 See SM-2230634, serial 213
  343. (documenting politically-oriented advertisements from the larger set provided by
  344. Facebook). 60 4/19/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045151094235. 25
  345.  
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  351.  
  352. U.S. Department of Justice A.tt:on1e'.Y" Work Prodttet // May CoA.taifl Material
  353. Proteeted Uflder Fecl. R. Ct'iffl. P. 6(e) Collectively, the IRA's social media
  354. accounts reached tens of millions of U.S. persons. Individual IRA social media
  355. accounts attracted hundreds of thousands of followers. For example, at the time
  356. they were deactivated by Facebook in mid-2017, the IRA's "United Muslims of
  357. America" Facebook group had over 300,000 followers, the "Don't Shoot Us"
  358. Facebook group had over 250,000 followers, the "Being Patriotic" Facebook group
  359. had over 200,000 followers, and the "Secured Borders" Facebook group had over
  360. 130,000 followers.61 According to Facebook, in total the IRA-controlled accounts
  361. made over 80,000 posts before their deactivation in August 2017, and these posts
  362. reached at least 29 million U.S persons and "may have reached an estimated 126
  363. million people."62 4. U.S. Operations Through Twitter .-.. , -.. --' .... ? ? ?
  364. ??? Harm to Ongoing Matter ti ?.?? ?"!" ?? ?. ?????? , . , . ? . Harm to Ongoing
  365. Matter Separately, the IRA operated a network of automated Twitter accounts (
  366. commonly referred to as a bot network) that enabled the IRA to amplify existing
  367. content on Twitter. a. Individualized Accounts Harm to Ongoing Matter ? Harm to
  368. Ongoing Matter 61 See Facebook ID 1479936895656747 (United Muslims of America);
  369. Facebook ID l 157233400960126 (Don't Shoot); Facebook ID 1601685693432389 Bein
  370. Patriotic; Facebook ID 757183957716200 Secured Borders). Harm to Ongoing Matter
  371. 62 Social Media Influence in the 2016 US Election, Hearing Before the Senate
  372. Select Committee on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (11/1/17) (testimony of Colin
  373. Stretch, General Counsel ofFacebook). 63 Harm to Ongoing Matter 64 Harm to
  374. Ongoing Matter 65 Harm to Ongoing Matter 26
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  381.  
  382. U.S. Department of Justice A-Ftat=Ae~? Werk Predttet// Mtty Coruttifl Mttterittl
  383. Proteet:ed UAder Fed. R. Criffi. P. 6(e) Harm to Ongoing Matter 66 The IRA
  384. operated individualized Twitter accounts similar to the operation of its
  385. Facebook accounts, by continuously posting original content to the accounts
  386. while also communicating with U.S. Twitter users directly (through public
  387. tweeting or Twitter's private messaging). The IRA used many of these accounts to
  388. attempt to influence U.S. audiences on the election. Individualized accounts
  389. used to influence the U.S. presidential election included @TEN_ GOP ( described
  390. above); @jenn _ abrams ( claiming to be a Virginian Trump supporter with 70,000
  391. followers); @Pamela_Moore13 (claiming to be a Texan Trump supporter with 70,000
  392. followers); and @America:__Ist_ (an anti-immigration persona with 24,000
  393. followers).67 In May 2016, the IRA created the Twitter account @march_for_trump,
  394. which promoted IRA-organized rallies in support of the Trump Campaign (described
  395. below).68 Using these accounts and others, the IRA provoked reactions from users
  396. and the media. Multiple IRA-posted tweets gained popularity.70 U.S. media
  397. outlets also quoted tweets from IRA-controlled accounts and attributed them to
  398. the reactions of real U.S. persons.71 Similarly, numerous high-66 Harm to
  399. Ongoing Matter 67 Other individualized accounts included @MissouriNewsUS (an
  400. account with 3,800 followers that posted pro-Sanders and anti-Clinton material).
  401. 68 See @march_for_trump, 5/30/16 Tweet (first post from account). 7? For
  402. example, one IRA account tweeted, "To those people, who hate the Confederate
  403. flag. Did you know that the flag and the war wasn't about slavery, it was all
  404. about money." The tweet received over 40,000 responses. @Jenn_Abrams 4/24/17
  405. (2:37 p.m.) Tweet. 71 Josephine Lukito & Chris Wells, Most Major Outlets Have
  406. Used Russian Tweets as Sources for Partisan Opinion: Study, Columbia Journalism
  407. Review (Mar. 8, 2018); see also Twitter Steps Up to Explain #NewYorkValues to
  408. Ted Cruz, Washington Post (Jan. 15, 2016) (citing IRA tweet); People Are
  409. Slamming the CIA/or Claiming Russia Tried to Help Donald Trump, U.S. News &
  410. World Report (Dec. 12, 2016). 27
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  417.  
  418. U.S. Department of Justice AU:erHe'.Y' Werk Prea1:1et // Moy CeHtoiH Material
  419. Pretcctea UHaer Fea. R. Criffl. P. 6(c) profile U.S. persons, including former
  420. Ambassador Michael McFaul,72 Roger Stone,73 Sean Hannity,74 and Michael Flynn
  421. Jr.,75 retweetcd or responded to tweets posted to these controlled accounts.
  422. Multiple individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign also promoted IRA tweets
  423. (discussed below). b. IRA Botnet Activities In January 2018, Twitter publicly
  424. identified 3,814 Twitter accounts associated with the IRA.79 According to
  425. Twitter, in the ten weeks before the 2016 U.S. presidential election, these
  426. accounts posted approximately 175,993 tweets, "approximately 8.4% of which were
  427. election-? 72 @Mcfaul 4/30/16 Tweet (responding to tweet by @Jenn_Abrams). 73
  428. @RogerJStoneJr 5/30/16 Tweet (retweeting @Pamela_Moorel3); @RogerJStoneJr
  429. 4/26/16 Tweet (same). 74 @seanhannity 6/21/17 Tweet (retweeting @Pamela_ Moore
  430. 13). 75 @mflynnJR 6/22/17 Tweet ("RT@Jenn_Abrams: This is what happens when you
  431. add the voice over of an old documentary about mental illness onto video of SJWs
  432. ... "). 76 A botnet refers to a network of private computers or accounts
  433. controlled as a group to send specific automated messages. On the Twitter
  434. network, botnets can be used to promote and republish ("retweet") specific
  435. tweets or hashtags in order for them to gain larger audiences. 77 Harm to
  436. Ongoing Matter 78 Harm to Ongoing Matter 79 Eli Rosenberg, Twitter to Tell
  437. 677,000 Users they Were Had by the Russians. Some Signs Show the Problem
  438. Continues, Washington Post (Jan. 19, 2019). 28
  439.  
  440. RESULT: 14
  441.  
  442. PAGE: 36
  443.  
  444. TEXT:
  445.  
  446. U.S. Department of Justice A4teffle)' \llel'k Pt'edttet // May Cetttail'l
  447. Matet'ial Pt'eteeted U!'lder Fed. R. Ct'im. P. 6(e) related."80 Twitter also
  448. announced that it had notified approximately 1.4 million people who Twitter
  449. believed may have been in contact with an IRA-controlled account.81 5. U.S.
  450. Operations Involving Political Rallies The IRA organized and promoted political
  451. rallies inside the United States while posing as U.S. grassroots activists.
  452. First, the IRA used one of its preexisting social media personas (Facebook
  453. groups and Twitter accounts, for example) to announce and promote the event. The
  454. IRA then sent a large number of direct messages to followers of its social media
  455. account asking them to attend the event. From those who responded with interest
  456. in attending, the IRA then sought a U.S. person to serve as the event's
  457. coordinator. In most cases, the IRA account operator would tell the U.S. person
  458. that they personally could not attend the event due to some preexisting conflict
  459. or because they were somewhere else in the United States.82 The IRA then further
  460. promoted the event by contacting U.S. media about the event and directing them
  461. to speak with the coordinator.83 After the event, the IRA posted videos and
  462. photographs of the event to the IRA's social media accounts. 84 The Office
  463. identified dozens of U.S. rallies organized by the IRA. The earliest evidence of
  464. a rally was a "confederate rally" in November 2015. 85 The IRA continued to
  465. organize rallies even after the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The attendance
  466. at rallies varied. Some rallies appear to have drawn few (if any) pa1tici2ants
  467. while others drew hundreds The reach and success of these Harm to Ongoing Matter
  468. 80 Twitter, "Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016 US Election" (updated Jan.
  469. 31, 2018). Twitter also reported identifying 50,258 automated accounts connected
  470. to the Russian government, which tweeted more than a million times in the ten
  471. weeks before the election. 81 Twitter, "Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016
  472. US Election" (updated Jan. 31, 2018). ... 82 8/20/16 Facebook Message, ID
  473. 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID ; 7/21/16 Email, 83 See, e.g.,
  474. 7/21/16~gmail.com to joshmilton024@gmail.com to-84 @march_for_trump 6/25/16
  475. Tweet (posting photos from rally outside Trump Tower). 85 Instagram ID
  476. 2228012168 (Stand For Freedom) 11/3/15 Post ("Good evening buds! Well I am
  477. planning to organize a confederate rally[ ... ] in Houston on the 14 of November
  478. and I want more people to attend."). 29
  479.  
  480. RESULT: 15
  481.  
  482. PAGE: 38
  483.  
  484. TEXT:
  485.  
  486. U.S. Department of Justice Atleiffle)1 Werk Preidttet // May Cmttail'l Material
  487. Preiteeted UF1der Fed. R. Cril'l'l:. P. 6Ee) \ -\. .., ... MINERS FOR TRUMP
  488. BRING BACK OUR JOBS From June 2016 until the end of the presidential campaign,
  489. almost all of the U.S. rallies organized by the IRA focused on the U.S.
  490. election, often promoting the Trump Campaign and opposing the Clinton Campaign.
  491. Pro-Trump rallies included three in New York; a series of pro-Trump rallies in
  492. Florida in August 2016; and a series of pro-Trump rallies in October 2016 in
  493. Pennsylvania. The Florida rallies drew the attention of the Trump Campaign,
  494. which posted about the Miami rally on candidate Trump's Facebook account (as
  495. discussed below).86 HELP MR. TRUMP FIX IT! . . .. . . . . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??
  496. WHEN WHERE IIC!llelli: Iii :Tf.1 t I , , t ? : 11111? 11/1, ,?111:,11111,1;H
  497. Harm to Ongoing Matter \l1\l:l:llfl\' l'I ;\/A 1'11111 ?/ /I IHll~\l'l'IN!:I:
  498. 1111, IRA Poster for Pennsylvania Rallies organized by the IRA 6. Targeting and
  499. Recruitment of U.S. Persons Investigative Technique IRA employees frequently
  500. used Twitter, Facebook, and lnstagram to contact and recruit U.S. persons who
  501. followed the group. The IRA recruited U.S. ersons from across the olitical s
  502. ectrum. For example, the IRA targeted the family and a number of black social
  503. justice activists 86 The pro-Trump rallies were organized through multiple
  504. Facebook, Twitter, and email accounts. See, e.g., Facebook ID 100009922908461
  505. (Matt Skiber); Facebook ID 1601685693432389 (Being Patriotic); Twitter Account
  506. @march_for_trump; beingpatriotic@gmail.com. (Rallies were organized in New York
  507. on June 25, 2016; Florida on August 20, 2016; and Pennsylvania on October 2,
  508. 2016.) 87 Harm to Ongoing Matter 88 Harm to Ongoing Matter 31
  509.  
  510. RESULT: 16
  511.  
  512. PAGE: 39
  513.  
  514. TEXT:
  515.  
  516. U.S. Department of Justice At1:aft'le~? Wafk Pfadttet // May CaAtaiA Material
  517. Prateetetl Under Fetl. R. Crim. P. 6(e) while posing as a grassroots group
  518. called "Black Matters US."89 In February 2017, the persona "Black Fist"
  519. (purporting to want to teach African-Americans to protect themselves when
  520. contacted by law enforcement) hired a self-defense instructor in New York to
  521. offer classes sponsored by Black Fist. The IRA also recruited moderators of
  522. conservative social media groups to promote IRA-generated content,90 as well as
  523. recruited individuals to perform political acts (such as walking around New York
  524. City dressed up as Santa Claus with a Trump mask).91 Harm to Ongoing Matter
  525. aHarm to Ongoing Matter aHarm to Ongoing Matter as the IRA's online audience
  526. became larger, the IRA tracked U.S. persons with whom they communicated and had
  527. successfully tasked with tasks ran in from or anizin rallies to takin ictures
  528. with certain olitical messa es . 89 3/11/16 Facebook Advertisement ID
  529. 6045078289928, 5/6/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6051652423528, 10/26/16 Facebook
  530. Advertisement ID 6055238604687; 10/27/16 Facebook Message, ID & ID
  531. 100011698576461 (Taylor Brooks). 90 8/19/16 Face book Message, ID
  532. 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID 91 12/8/16 Email, robot@craigslist.org to
  533. beingpatriotic@gmail.com (confirming Craigslist advertisement). 92 8/18-19/16
  534. Twitter DMs, @march_for_trump & ID 100011698576461 (Taylor Brooks) & (arranging
  535. to pay for plane tickets and for a Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt
  536. Skiber) & (discussing payment for rally supplies); 8/18/16 Twitter DM,
  537. (discussing payment for construction materials). 32
  538.  
  539. RESULT: 17
  540.  
  541. PAGE: 40
  542.  
  543. TEXT:
  544.  
  545. U.S. Department of Justice Atterfle)" Werk Predttet // Mfl-)1 Cefltftit'I.
  546. Material Preteeted Under Fed. R. Ct?im. P. 6(e) 7. Interactions and Contacts
  547. with the Trump Campaign The investigation identified two different forms of
  548. connections between the IRA and . members of the Trump Campaign. (The
  549. investigation identified no similar connections between the IRA and the Clinton
  550. Campaign.) First, on multiple occasions, members and surrogates of the Trump
  551. Campaign promoted-typically by linking, retweeting, or similar methods of
  552. repostingpro-Trump or anti-Clinton content published by the IRA through IRA-
  553. controlled social media accounts. Additionally, in a few instances, IRA
  554. employees represented themselves as U.S. persons to communicate with members of
  555. the Trump Campaign in an effort to seek assistance and coordination on IRA-
  556. organized political rallies inside the United States. a. Trump Campaign
  557. Promotion of IRA Political Materials Among the U.S. "leaders of public opinion"
  558. targeted by the IRA were various members and surrogates of the Trump Campaign.
  559. In total, Trump Campaign affiliates promoted dozens of tweets, posts, and other
  560. political content created by the IRA. Posts from the IRA-controlled Twitter
  561. account @TEN_GOP were cited or retweeted by multiple Trump Campaign officials
  562. and surrogates, including Donald J. Trump Jr.,96 Eric 96 See, e.g,
  563. @DonaldJTrumpJr 10/26/16 Tweet ("RT @TEN_GOP: BREAKING Thousands of names
  564. changed on voter rolls in Indiana. Police investigating #Voterfraud.
  565. #DrainTheSwamp."); @DonaldJTrumpJr 11/2/16 Tweet ("RT @TEN_GOP: BREAKING:
  566. #VoterFraud by counting tens of thousands of ineligible mail in Hillary votes
  567. being reported in Broward County, Florida."); @DonaldJTrumpJr 11/8/16 Tweet ("RT
  568. @TEN_GOP: This vet passed away last month before he could vote for Trump. Here
  569. he is in his #MAGA hat. #voted #ElectionDay."). Trump Jr. retweeted additional
  570. @TEN_ GOP content subsequent to the election. 33
  571.  
  572. RESULT: 18
  573.  
  574. PAGE: 41
  575.  
  576. TEXT:
  577.  
  578. U.S. Department of Justice AtterHe'.')'? 'Nerlc PFOtittet // Mey CeHtaiH
  579. Material Preteeteti UHtier Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6Ee) Trump,97 Kellyanne Conway,98
  580. Brad Parscale,99 and Michael T. Flynn. 100 These posts included allegations of
  581. voter fraud, 101 as well as allegations that Secretary Clinton had mishandled
  582. classified information.102 -A November 7, 2016 post from the IRA-controlled
  583. Twitter account @Pamela_ Moore 13 was retweeted by Donald J. Trump Jr.103 THANK
  584. YOU for your support Miami! My learn jusl sha1ed pholos lrom YQU1 TRUMP SIGN
  585. WAVING DAY. yes1e1da.y! I bve you -and lhere is no question ? TOGETHER, WE WILL
  586. MAKE AMEAICA GREAT AGAIN! On September 19, 2017, President Trump's personal ..
  587. account @realDonaldTrump responded to a tweet from the IRA-controlled account
  588. @l0_gop (the backup account of @TEN_ GOP, which had already been deactivated by
  589. Twitter). The tweet read: "We love you, Mr. President!"104 IRA employees
  590. monitored the reaction of the Trump Campaign and, later, Trump Administration
  591. officials to their tweets. For example, on August 23, 2016, the controlled
  592. persona "Matt Skiber" Facebook account sent a message to a U.S. Tea Party
  593. activist, writin.g that "Mr. Trump posted about our event in Miami! This is
  594. great!"105 The IRA employee included a screenshot of candidate Trump's Facebook
  595. account, which included a post about the August 20, 2016 political rallies
  596. organized by the IRA. Screenshot of Trump Facebook Account (from Matt Skibe,) 97
  597. @EricTrump 10/20/16 Tweet ("RT @TEN_GOP: BREAKING Hillary shuts down press
  598. conference when asked about DNC Operatives corruption & #VoterFraud #debatenight
  599. #TrumpB"). 98 @KellyannePolls 11/6/16 Tweet ("RT @TEN_ GOP: Mother of jailed
  600. sailor: 'Hold Hillary to same standards as my son on Classified info'
  601. #hillarysemail #WeinerGate."). 99 @parscale 10/15/16 Tweet ("Thousands of
  602. deplorables chanting to the media: 'Tell The Truth!' RT if you are also done w/
  603. biased Media! #Friday Feeling"). 100 @GenFlynn 11/7/16 (retweeting @TEN_GOP post
  604. that included in part "@rea!DonaldTrump & @mike_pence will be our next POTUS &
  605. VPOTUS."). 101 @TEN_GOP 10/11/16 Tweet ("North Carolina finds 2,214 voters over
  606. the age of 110!!"). 102 @TEN_GOP 11/6/16 Tweet ("Mother of jailed sailor: 'Hold
  607. Hillary to same standards as my son on classified info #hillaryemail
  608. #WeinerGate."'). 103 @DonaldJTrumpJr 11 /7 /16 Tweet ("RT @Pamela _Moore 13:
  609. Detroit residents speak out against the failed policies of Obama, Hillary &
  610. democrats .... "). 104 @rea!DonaldTrump 9/19/17 (7 :33 p.m.) Tweet ("THANK YOU
  611. for your support Miami! My team just shared photos from your TRUMP SIGN WA YING
  612. DAY, yesterday! I love you-and there is no question -TOGETHER, WE WILL MAKE
  613. AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!"). 105 8/23/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt
  614. Skiber) to ID 34
  615.  
  616. RESULT: 19
  617.  
  618. PAGE: 42
  619.  
  620. TEXT:
  621.  
  622. U.S. Department of Justice Atten1.e,? Werk Prea1:1et // May CeHtttiH Material
  623. Preteetea UHaer Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Harm to Ongoing Matter I? b. Contact with
  624. Trump Campaign Officials in Connection to Rallies Starting in June 2016, the IRA
  625. contacted different U.S. persons affiliated with the Trump Campaign in an effort
  626. to coordinate pro-Trump IRA-organized rallies inside the United States. In all
  627. cases, the IRA contacted the Campaign while claiming to be U.S. political
  628. activists working on behalf of a conservative grassroots organization. The IRA's
  629. contacts included requests for signs and other materials to use at rallies, 107
  630. as well as requests to promote the rallies and help coordinate Iogistics.108
  631. While certain campaign volunteers agreed to provide the requested support (for
  632. example, agreeing to set aside a number of signs), the investigation has not
  633. identified evidence that any Trump Campaign official understood the requests
  634. were coming from foreign nationals. * * * In sum, the investigation established
  635. that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election through the "active
  636. measures" social media campaign carried out by the IRA, an organization funded
  637. by Prigozhin and companies that he controlled. As explained further in Volume I,
  638. Section V.A, infra, the Office concluded (and a grand jury has alleged) that
  639. Prigozhin, his companies, and IRA employees violated U.S. law through these
  640. operations, principally by undermining through deceptive acts the work of
  641. federal agencies charged with regulating foreign influence in U.S. elections.
  642. 107 See, e.g., 8/16/16 Email, joshmilton024@gmail.com to -@donaldtrump.com
  643. (asking for ~Pence signs for Florida rally); 8/18/16 Email,
  644. joshmilton024@gmail.com to -@donaldtrump.com (a-kin for Trump/Pence signs for
  645. Florida rally); 8/12/16 Email, joshmilton024@gmail.com to @donaldtrump.com
  646. (asking for "contact phone numbers for Trump Campaign affiliates" in various
  647. Florida cities and signs). 108 8/15/16 Email, to joshmilton024 locations to the
  648. "Florida Goes Trump," list); 8/16/16 Email, to joshmi1ton024@gmail.com
  649. (volunteering to send an email blast to followers). 35
  650.  
  651. RESULT: 20
  652.  
  653. PAGE: 90
  654.  
  655. TEXT:
  656.  
  657. U.S. Department of Justice Mterttey '.\'erk Preeittet // May Cetttaitt Material
  658. Preteeteel Ul'l:eler Feel. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) to Rome, Italy, as part of his
  659. duties with LCILP.411 The purpose of the trip was to meet officials affiliated
  660. with Link Campus University, a for-profit institution headed by a former Italian
  661. government official.412 During the visit, Papadopoulos was introduced to Joseph
  662. Mifsud. Mifsud is a Maltese national who worked as a professor at the London
  663. Academy of Diplomacy in London, England.413 Although Mifsud worked out of London
  664. and was also affiliated with LCILP, the encounter in Rome was the first time
  665. that Papadopoulos met him.414 Mifsud maintained various Russian contacts while
  666. living in London, as described further below. Among his contacts was ,415 a one-
  667. time employee of the IRA, the entity that carried out the Russian social media
  668. campaign (see Volume I Section II, supra). In January and February 2016, Mifsud
  669. and -discussed possibly meeting in Russia. The investigation did not~ meeting.
  670. Later, in the spring of 2016, -was also in contact -that was linked to an
  671. employee of the Russian Ministry of Defense, and that account had overlapping
  672. contacts with a group of Russian controlled Facebook accounts that included
  673. accounts used to promote the DCLeaks releases in the course of the GRU's hack-
  674. and-release operations (see Volume I, Section III.B.1, supra). According to
  675. Papadopoulos, Mifsud at first seemed uninterested in Papadopoulos when they met
  676. in Rome.416 After Papadopoulos informed Mifsud about his role in the Trump
  677. Campaign, however, Mifsud appeared to take greater interest in Papadopoulos.417
  678. The two discussed Mifsud's European and Russian contacts and had a general
  679. discussion about Russia; Mifsud also offered to introduce Papadopoulos to
  680. European leaders and others with contacts to the Russian government.418
  681. Papadopoulos told the Office that Mifsud's claim of substantial connections with
  682. Russian government officials interested Papadopoulos, who thought that such
  683. connections could increase his importance as a policy advisor to the Trump
  684. Campaign.419 411 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2-3; Papadopoulos Statement of
  685. Offense ,r 5. 412 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2-3; Stephanie Kirchgaessner et
  686. al., Joseph Mifsud: more questions than answers about mystery professor linked
  687. to Russia, The Guardian (Oct. 31, 2017) ("Link Campus University ... is headed
  688. by a former Italian interior minister named Vincenzo Scotti."). 413 Papadopoulos
  689. Statement of Offense ,r 5. 414 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3. , , , ?
  690. Investigative Technique 1Harm to Ongoing Matter 416 Papadopoulos Statement of
  691. Offense ,r 5. 417 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,r 5. 418 Papadopoulos
  692. 8/10/17 302, at 3; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 2. 419 Papadopoulos Statement of
  693. Offense ,r 5. 83
  694.  
  695. RESULT: 21
  696.  
  697. PAGE: 181
  698.  
  699. TEXT:
  700.  
  701. U.S. Department of Justice Atlerl'le)' '.?erk Predttet // May CmttaiH .Material
  702. Preteeted UHEler Feel. R. Crim. P. 6(e) V. PROSECUTION AND DECLINATION DECISIONS
  703. The Appointment Order authorized the Special Counsel's Office "to prosecute
  704. federal crimes arising from [its] investigation" of the matters assigned to it.
  705. In deciding whether to exercise this prosecutorial authority, the Office has
  706. been guided by the Principles of Federal Prosecution set forth in the Justice
  707. (formerly U.S. Attorney's) Manual. In particular, the Office has evaluated
  708. whether the conduct of the individuals considered for prosecution constituted a
  709. federal offense and whether admissible evidence would probably be sufficient to
  710. obtain and sustain a conviction for such an offense. Justice Manual ? 9-27.220
  711. (2018). Where the answer to those questions was yes, the Office further
  712. considered whether the prosecution would serve a substantial federal interest,
  713. the individuals were subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction,
  714. and there existed an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution. Id. As
  715. explained below, those considerations led the Office to seek charges against two
  716. sets of Russian nationals for their roles in er etratin the active-measures
  717. social media cam ai n and similarly determined that the contacts between
  718. Campaign officials and Russia-linked individuals either did not involve the
  719. commission of a federal crime or, in the case of campaign-finance offenses, that
  720. our evidence was not sufficient to obtain and sustain a criminal conviction. At
  721. the same time, the Office concluded that the Principles of Federal Prosecution
  722. supported charging certain individuals connected to the Campaign with making
  723. false statements or otherwise obstructing this investigation or parallel
  724. congressional investigations. A. Russian "Active Measures" Social Media Campaign
  725. On February 16, 2018, a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia returned
  726. an indictment charging 13 Russian nationals and three Russian entities-including
  727. the Internet Research Agency (IRA) and Concord Management and Consulting LLC
  728. (Concord)-with violating U.S. criminal laws in order to interfere with U.S.
  729. elections and political processes.1276 The indictment charges all of the
  730. defendants with conspiracy to defraud the United States (Count One), three
  731. defendants with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and ?bank fraud (Count Two), and
  732. five defendants with aggravated identity theft (Counts Three through Eight).
  733. Internet Research Agency Indictment. Concord, which is one of the entities
  734. charged in the Count One conspiracy, entered an appearance through U.S. counsel
  735. and moved to dismiss the charge on multiple grounds. In orders and memorandum
  736. opinions issued on August 13 and November 15, 2018, the district court denied
  737. Concord's motions to dismiss. United States v. Concord Management & Consulting
  738. LLC, 347 F. Supp. 3d 38 (D.D.C. 2018). United States v. Concord Management &
  739. Consulting LLC, 317 F. Supp. 3d 598 (D.D.C. 2018). As of this writing, the
  740. prosecution of Concord remains ongoing before the U.S. District Court for the
  741. District of Columbia. The other defendants remain at large. 1276 A more detailed
  742. explanation of the charging decision in this case is set forth in a separate
  743. memorandum provided to the Acting Attorney General before the indictment. 174
  744.  
  745. RESULT: 22
  746.  
  747. PAGE: 182
  748.  
  749. TEXT:
  750.  
  751. U.S. Department of Justice Atterfl:ey Werk Preettet // Moy Cefltoifl Material
  752. Preteetee Ufl:eef Pee. R. Criffl. P. 6Ee) Although members of the IRA had
  753. contact with individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign, the indictment does
  754. not charge any Trump Campaign official or any other U.S. person with
  755. participating in the conspiracy. That is because the investigation did not
  756. identify evidence that any U.S. person who coordinated or communicated with the
  757. IRA knew that he or she was speaking with Russian nationals engaged in the
  758. criminal conspiracy. The Office therefore determined that such persons did not
  759. have the knowledge or criminal purpose required to charge them in the conspiracy
  760. to defraud the United States (Count One) or in the separate count alleging a
  761. wire-and bank-fraud conspiracy involving the IRA and two individual Russian
  762. nationals (Count Two). The Office did, however, charge one U.S. national for his
  763. role in supplying false or stolen bank account numbers that allowed the IRA
  764. conspirators to access U.S. online payment systems by circumventing those
  765. systems' security features. On February 12, 2018, Richard Pinedo pleaded guilty,
  766. pursuant to a single-count information, to identity fraud, in violation of 18 U
  767. .S.C. ? 1028(a)(7) and (b)(l)(D). Plea Agreement, United States v. Richard
  768. Pinedo, No. 1:18-cr-24 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 2018), Doc. 10. The investigation did
  769. not establish that Pinedo was aware of the identity of the IRA members who
  770. purchased bank account numbers from him. Pinedo's sales of account numbers
  771. enabled the IRA members to anonymously access a financial network through which
  772. they transacted with U.S. persons and companies. See Gov't Sent. Mem. at 3,
  773. United States v. Richard Pinedo, No. 1:18-cr-24 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2018), Doc.
  774. 24. On October 10, 2018, Pinedo was sentenced to six months of imprisonment, to
  775. be followed by six months of home confinement, and was ordered to complete 100
  776. hours of community service. B. Russian Hacking and Dumping Operations 1. Section
  777. 1030 Computer-Intrusion Conspiracy a. Background On July 13, 2018, a federal
  778. grand jury in the District of Columbia returned an indictment charging Russian
  779. military intelligence officers from the GRU with conspiring to hack into various
  780. U.S. computers used by the Clinton Campaign, DNC, DCCC, and other U.S. persons,
  781. in violation of 18 U.S.C. ?? 1030 and 371 (Count One); committing identity theft
  782. and conspiring to commit money laundering in furtherance of that hacking
  783. conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. ?? I 028A and l 956(h) (Counts Two through
  784. Ten); and a separate conspiracy to hack into the computers of U.S. persons and
  785. entities responsible for the administration of the 2016 U.S. election, in
  786. violation of18U.S.C. ?? 1030and371 (CountEleven). Netyksholndictment.1277
  787. Asofthiswriting,all 12 defendants remain at large. The Netyksho indictment
  788. alleges that the defendants conspired with one another and with others to hack
  789. into the computers of U.S. persons and entities involved in the 2016 U.S.
  790. presidential election, steal documents from those computers, and stage releases
  791. of the stolen documents to interfere in the election. Netyksho Indictment ,r 2.
  792. The indictment also describes how, in staging 1277 The Office provided a more
  793. detailed explanation of the charging decision in this case in meetings with the
  794. Office of the Acting Attorney General before the indictment. 175
  795.  
  796. RESULT: 23
  797.  
  798. PAGE: 411
  799.  
  800. TEXT:
  801.  
  802. U.S. Department of Justice Attorne)" Wol'lt Predttet // Mey Cofltttifl Meteriel
  803. Proteeted U1~der Fed. R. Criffi. P. 6(e) Guccifer 2.0 I.C. Expert Investment
  804. Company Internet Research Agency (IRA) KLS Research LLC Kremlin LetterOne Link
  805. Campus University London Centre of International Law Practice (LCILP) Main
  806. Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) New Economic School in
  807. Moscow (NES) Opposition Bloc Party of Regions Pericles Emerging Market Partners
  808. LLP Prevezon Holdings Ltd. Roscongress Foundation Rosneft Russian Direct
  809. Investment Fund Fictitious online persona operated by the GRU that released
  810. stolen documents during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign period. Russian
  811. real-estate and development corporation that signed a letter of intent with a
  812. Trump Organization subsidiary to develop a Trump Moscow property. Russian entity
  813. based in Saint Petersburg and funded by Concord that engaged in an "active
  814. measures" social media campaign to interfere in the 20 I 6 V,S. presidential
  815. election. Business established by an associate of and at the direction of Peter
  816. Smith to further Smith's search for Hillary Clinton emails. Official residence
  817. of the president of the Russian Federation; it is used colloquially to refer to
  818. the office of the president or the Russian government. Company that includes
  819. Petr Aven and Richard Burt as board members. During a board meeting in December
  820. 2016, Aven asked for Burt's help to make contact with the Presidential
  821. Transition Team. University in Rome, Italy, where George Papadopoulos was
  822. introduced to Joseph Mifsud. International law advisory organization in London
  823. that employed Joseph Mifsud and George Papadopoulos. Russian Federation's
  824. military intelligence agency. Moscow-based school that invited Carter Page to
  825. speak at its July 2016 commencement ceremony. Ukrainian political party that
  826. incorporated members of the defunct Party of Regions. Ukrainian political party
  827. of former President Yanukovych. It was generally understood to align with
  828. Russian policies. Company registered in the Cayman Islands by Paul Manafort and
  829. his business partner Rick Davis. Oleg Deripaska invested in the fund. Russian
  830. company that was a defendant in a U.S. civil action alleging the laundering of
  831. proceeds from fraud exposed by Sergei Magnitsky. Russian entity that organized
  832. the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. Russian state-owned oil and
  833. energy company. Sovereign wealth fund established by the Russian Government in
  834. 2011 and headed by Kirill Dmitriev. B-12
  835.  
  836. RESULT: 24
  837.  
  838. PAGE: 413
  839.  
  840. TEXT:
  841.  
  842. U.S. Department of Justice Attorne)' 'Norlc Prodttet // May Cm1taifl Material
  843. Proteeted URder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) CNI DCCC DNC FBI FSB GEC GRU HPSCI HRC IRA
  844. LCILP NATO NES NSA ODNI PTT RDIF RIAC SBOE sco SJC SSCI TAG VEB Index of
  845. Acronyms Center for the National Interest Democratic Congressional Campaign
  846. Committee Democratic National Committee Federal Bureau oflnvestigation Russian
  847. Federal Security Service Global Energy Capital, LLC Russian Federation's Main
  848. Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff U.S. House of Representatives
  849. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Hillary Rodham Clinton Internet
  850. Research Agency London Centre of International Law Practice North Atlantic
  851. Treaty Organization New Economic School National Security Agency Office of the
  852. Director of National Intelligence Presidential Transition Team Russian Direct
  853. Investment Fund Russian International Affairs Council State boards of elections
  854. Special Counsel's Office U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee U.S. Senate Select
  855. Committee on Intelligence Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism
  856. Vnesheconombank B-14
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