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- RESULT: 1
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- U.S. Department of Justice At:t:ef'fle)' Werle Predttet /,' Ma;? CeHtail'l
- Material Preteeted UHder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) TABLE OF CONTENTS -VOLUME I
- INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I .......................................................
- ................................................... 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO
- VOLUME 1. ................................................ ,
- ............................................. 4 I. THE SPECIAL COUNSEL'S
- INVESTIGATION
- ......................................................................... ,
- ....... 11 II. RUSSIAN "ACTIVE MEASURES" SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN
- ..................................................... 14 A. Structure of the
- Internet Research Agency
- ................................................................. 15 B. Funding
- and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin
- ................................................. 16 C. The IRA Targets U.S.
- Elections ......................................................................
- ............ 19 1. The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations As Early As 2014
- ....................... , .............. 19 2. U.S. Operations Through IRA-
- Controlled Social Media Accounts ..................... 22 3. U.S. Operations
- Through Facebook.
- ..................................................................... 24 4. U.S.
- Operations Through Twitter
- ......................................................................... 26 a.
- Individualized Accounts ........................................................
- ........................... 26 b. IRA Botnet Activities ........................
- .............................................................. 28 5. U.S.
- Operations Involving Political Rallies
- .......................................................... 29 6. Targeting and
- Recruitment of U.S. Persons
- .......................................................... 31 7. Interactions
- and Contacts with the Trump Campaign ...........................................
- 33 a. Trump Campaign Promotion ofIRA Political Materials
- ................................. 33 b. Contact with Trump Campaign Officials in
- Connection to Rallies ................. 35 Ill. RUSSIAN HACKING AND DUMPING
- OPERATIONS .....................................................................
- 36 A. GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign
- ....................................................... 36 1. GRU Units Target
- the Clinton Campaign
- ............................................................. 36 2. Intrusions
- into the DCCC and DNC Networks
- ..................................................... 38 a. Initial Access .....
- ................................................................................
- ............... 3 8 b. Implantation ofMalware on DCCC and DNC Networks
- ................................ 38 c. Theft of Documents from DNC and DCCC
- Networks .................................... 40 B. Dissemination of the Hacked
- Materials ......................................................................
- 41 I. DCLeaks ..................................................................
- ............................................. 41 2. Guccifer 2.0 ...............
- ................................................................................
- ............ 42 3. Use of WikiLeaks .................................. :
- .............................................................. 44 a. WikiLeaks's
- Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaign ............... 44 b.
- WikiLeaks's First Contact with Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks
- ........................... 45
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- U.S. Department of Justice Atterrte~? Werk Predttet // May Cetttairt Material
- Preteetee Urteer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME I RUSSIAN
- SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN The Internet Research Agency (IRA) carried out the
- earliest Russian interference operations identified by the investigation-a
- social media campaign designed to provoke and amplify political and social
- discord in the United States. The IRA was based in St. Petersburg, Russia, and
- received funding from Russian oligarch Y evgeniy Prigozhin and companies he
- controlled. Pri ozhin is widel re orted to have ties to Russian President
- Vladimir Putin In mid-2014, the IRA sent em lo mission with instructions The IRA
- later used social media accounts and interest groups to sow discord in the U.S.
- political system through what it termed "information warfare." The campaign
- evolved from a generalized program designed in 2014 and 2015 to undermine the
- U.S. electoral system, to a targeted operation that by early 2016 favored
- candidate Trump and disparaged candidate Clinton. The IRA' s operation also
- included the purchase of political advertisements on social media in the names
- of U.S. persons and entities, as well as the staging of political rallies inside
- the United States. To organize those rallies, IRA employees posed as U.S.
- grassroots entities and persons and made contact with Trump supporters and Trump
- Campaign officials in the United States. The investigation did not identify
- evidence that any U.S. persons conspired or coordinated with the IRA. Section II
- of this report details the Office's investigation of the Russian social media
- campaign. RUSSIAN HACKING OPERATIONS At the same time that the IRA operation
- began to focus ?on supporting candidate Trump in early 2016, the Russian
- government employed a second form of interference: cyber intrusions (hacking)
- and releases of hacked materials damaging to the Clinton Campaign. The Russian
- intelligence service known as the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General
- Staff of the Russian Army (GRU) carried out these operations. In March 2016, the
- GRU began hacking the email accounts of Clinton Campaign volunteers and
- employees, including campaign chairman John Podesta. In April 2016, the GRU
- hacked into the computer networks of the Democratic Congressional Campaign
- Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic National Committee (DNC). The GRU stole
- hundreds of thousands of documents from the compromised email accounts and
- networks. Around the time that the DNC announced in mid-June 2016 the Russian
- government's role in hacking its network, the GRU began disseminating stolen
- materials through the fictitious online personas "DCLeaks" and "Guccifer 2.0."
- The GRU later released additional materials through the organization WikiLeaks.
- 4
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- U.S. Department of Justice AUorttey Work Proattet // Mtt'.)1 Cotttttitt
- Mttterittl Prnteetea Uttaer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) II. RUSSIAN "ACTIVE MEASURES"
- SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN The first form of Russian election influence came
- principally from the Internet Research Agency, LLC (IRA), a Russian organization
- funded by Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and companies he controlled, including
- Concord Management and Consulting LLC and Concord Catering (collectively
- "Concord").2 The IRA conducted social media operations targeted at large U.S.
- audiences with the goal of sowing discord in the U.S. political system.3 These
- operations constituted "active measures" (aKTMBHbie Meporrprumu1), a term that
- typically refers to operations conducted by Russian security services aimed at
- influencing the course of international affairs.4 The IRA and its employees
- began operations targeting the United States as early as 2014. Using fictitious
- U.S. personas, IRA employees operated social media accounts and group pages
- designed to attract U.S. audiences. These groups and accounts, which addressed
- divisive U.S. political and social issues, falsely claimed to be controlled by
- U.S. activists. Over time, these social media accounts became a means to reach
- large U.S. audiences. IRA employees travelled to the United States in mid-2014
- on an intelligence-gathering mission to obtain information and photographs for
- use in their social media posts. IRA employees posted derogatory information
- about a number of candidates in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. By early to
- mid-2016, IRA operations included supporting the Trump Campaign and disparaging
- candidate Hillary Clinton. The IRA made various expenditures to carry out those
- activities, including buying political advertisements on social media in the
- names of U.S. persons and entities. Some IRA employees, posing as U.S. persons
- and without revealing their Russian association, communicated electronically
- with individuals associated with the Trump Campaign and with other political
- activists to seek to coordinate political activities, including the staging of
- political rallies.5 The investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S.
- persons knowingly or intentionally coordinated with the IRA's interference
- operation. By the end of the 2016 U.S. election, the IRA had the ability to
- reach millions of U.S. persons through their social media accounts. Multiple
- IRA-controlled Facebook groups and 2 The Office is aware of reports that other
- Russian entities engaged in similar active measw-es operations targeting the
- United States. Some evidence collected by the Office corroborates those rep01ts,
- and the Office has shared that evidence with other offices in the Department of
- Justice and FBI. 3 Harm to Ongoing Matter see also SM-2230634, serial 44
- (analysis). The FBI case number cited here, and other FBI case numbers
- identified in the report, should be treated as law enforcement sensitive given
- the context. The report contains additional law enforcement sensitive
- information. 4 As discussed in Part V below, the active measures investigation
- has resulted in criminal charges against 13 individual Russian nationals and
- three Russian entities, principally for conspiracy to defraud the United States,
- in violation of 18 U.S.C. ? 371. See Volume I, Section V.A, infra; Indictment,
- United States v. Internet Research Agency, et al., 1 :18-cr-32 (D.D.C. Feb. 16,
- 2018), Doc. I ("Internet Research Agency Indictment"). 14
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- U.S. Department of Justice Att:srAe~? Wark Prsdttet // Mtty CsAta.iA Mttterittl
- Prsteetea UAaer Fea. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) Instagram accounts had hundreds of
- thousands of U.S. participants. IRA-controlled Twitter accounts separately had
- tens of thousands of followers, including multiple U.S. political figures who
- retweeted IRA-created content. In November 2017, a Facebook representative
- testified that Facebook had identified 470 IRA-controlled Facebook accounts that
- collectively made 80,000 posts between January 2015 and August 2017. Facebook
- estimated the IRA reached as many as 126 million persons through its Face book
- accounts. 6 In January 2018, Twitter announced that it had identified 3,814 IRA-
- controlled Twitter accounts and notified approximately 1 .4 million people
- Twitter believed may have been in contact with an iRA-controlled account.7 A.
- Structure of the Internet Research Agency Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing
- Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter I ! " " I I Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing
- Matter anization also led to a more detailed or anizational structure. 6 Social
- Media Influence in the 2016 US. Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select
- Committee on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (11/1/17) (testimony of Colin Stretch,
- General Counsel ofFacebook) ("We estimate that roughly 29 million people were
- served content in their News Feeds directly from the IRA's 80,000 posts over the
- two years. Posts from these Pages were also shared, liked, and followed by
- people on Facebook, and, as a result, three times more people may have been
- exposed to a story that originated from the Russian operation. Our best estimate
- is that approximately 126 million people may have been served content from a
- Page associated with the IRA at some point during the two-year period."). The
- Facebook representative also testified that Facebook had identified 170
- Instagram accounts that posted approximately 120,000 pieces of content during
- that time. Facebook did not offer an estimate of the audience reached via
- Instagram. 7 Twitter, Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016 US Election (Jan.
- 31, 2018). 8 See SM-2230634, serial 92. 9 Harm to Ongoing Matter -10 Harm to
- Ongoing Matter 11 See SM-2230634, serial 86 Harm to Ongoing Matter 15
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- U.S. Department of Justice A?:eme:,? Wefk Pfedttet // Ma:,? Cefl:taifl: Matefial
- Pfeteeted Ufl:def Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) . , I . I .. .. . .. .. . -.. .. . . .
- Harm to Ongoing Matter aHarm to Ongoing Matter of 2014, the IRA be an to hide
- its fundin and activities. I I. ? I ? . I? I ! I I.. ? I Harm to Ongoing Matter
- %?to Ongoing Matter B. Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin Until at
- least February 2018, Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and two Concord companies
- funded the IRA. Prigozhin is a wealthy Russian businessman who served as the
- head of Concord. 13 Harm to Ongoing Matter 14 See, e.g., SM-2230634, serials 9,
- 113 & 180 -? 15 Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 131 & 204. 17 18
- Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 16 Harm to Ongoing Matter
- RESULT: 6
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- TEXT:
- U.S. Department of Justice ,<W:erttey Wer:lc Preettet // Moy Cetttoifl Moteriol
- Preteetee Uneer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) ? :6_ a ? ? a a I I. ? I Harm to Ongoing
- Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter In May 2016, IRA employees, claiming to be U.S.
- social activists and administrators ofFacebook groups, recruited U.S. persons to
- hold signs (including one in front of the White House) that read "Happy 55th
- Birthda Dear Boss," as an homa e to Pri ozhin whose 55th birthda was on June 1,
- 2016 .31 Harr,, ,v '-'' ll::jVI I 'l::I 1v1a,u:;r Harm to Ongoing Matter C. The
- IRA Targets U.S. Elections 1. The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations As Early As 2014
- ! ... ? ... ? .... " ? Harm to Ongoing Matter I I. ? I " I" : I I subdivided the
- Translator Department into different responsibilities, ranging from operations
- on different social media platforms to analytics to 29 Investigative Technique
- See SM-2230634, serials 131 & 204. 30 See SM-2230634, serial 156. 31 Internet
- Research Agency Indictment ,r 12 b; see also 5/26/16 Facebook Messages, ID
- 1479936895656747 (United Muslims of America) & 19
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- TEXT:
- U.S. Department of Justice Atterney Werk Predttet // Ma:y CentttiH Mttterittl
- Preteeted Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing
- Matter 37 IRA employees also traveled to the United States on intelligence-
- gathering missions. In June 2014, four IRA employees applied to the U.S.
- Department of State to enter the United States, while lying about the purpose of
- their trip and claiming to be four friends who had met at a party.38 Ultimately,
- two IRA employees-Anna Bogacheva and Aleksandra Krylova-received visas and
- entered the United States on June 4, 2014. ??? ". . ? ,,. ,:,!,, . " ..... Harm
- to Ongoing Matter -. -. . ? Harm to Ongoing Matter 35 Harm to Ongoing Matter 37
- Harm to Ongoing Matter 38 See SM-2230634, serials 150 & 172 Harm to Ongoing
- Matter 21
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- TEXT:
- U.S. Department of Justice Atten1e;? 'Nerk Predttet // Ma;? Cel'lttl:il'I
- Material Prnteeted Under Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 2.. U.S. Operations Through IRA-
- Controlled Social Media Accounts Dozens of IRA employees were responsible for
- operating accounts and personas on different U.S. social media platforms. The
- IRA referred to employees assigned to operate the social media accounts as
- "specialists."42 Starting as early as 2014, the IRA's U.S. operations included
- social media specialists focusing on Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter.43 The IRA
- later added specialists who operated on Tumblr and Instagram accounts.44
- Initially, the IRA created social media accounts that pretended to be the
- personal accounts of U.S. persons.45 By early 2015, the IRA began to create
- larger social media groups or public social media pages that claimed (falsely)
- to be affiliated with U.S. political and grassroots organizations. In certain
- cases, the IRA created accounts that mimicked real U.S. organizations. For
- example, one IRA-controlled Twitter account, @TEN_ GOP, purported to be
- connected to the Tennessee Republican Party.46 More commonly, the IRA created
- accounts in the names of fictitious U.S. organizations and grassroots groups and
- used these accounts to pose as immigration groups, Tea Party activists, Black
- Lives Matter protestors, and other U.S. social and political activists. Harm to
- Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 45 See, e.g.,
- Facebook ID 100011390466802 (Alex Anderson); Facebook ID 100009626173204 (Andrea
- Hansen); Facebook ID 100009728618427 (Gary Williams); Facebook ID
- 100013640043337 (Lakisha Richardson). 46 The account claimed to be the
- "Unofficial Twitter of Tennessee Republicans" and made posts that appeared to be
- endorsements of the state political party. See, e.g., @TEN_GOP, 4/3/16 Tweet
- ("Tennessee GOP backs @rea!DonaldTrump period #makeAmericagreatagain #tngop
- #tennessee #gop"). 22
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- TEXT:
- U.S. Department of Justice A:tterHe~? 'Net"lc Preettet // May CeHtaiH Material
- Preteetea Unaer Fea. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing
- Matter The focus on the U.S. presidential campaign continued throughout 2016.
- Inifll 2016 internal reviewing the IRA-controlled Facebook group "Secured
- Borders," the 47 Harm to Ongoing Matter 48 See, e.g., SM-2230634 serial 131 49
- The IRA posted content about the Clinton candidacy before Clinton officially
- announced her presidential campaign. IRA-controlled social media accounts
- criticized Clinton's record as Secretar of State and romoted various criti ues
- of her candidac . The IRA also used other techni 50 Harm to Ongoing Matter 23
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- U.S. Department of Justice At:t:erttey Werk Preettet // May Cetttaitt Material
- Preteetee Utteer Fee. R. Cfiffl. P. 6(e) groups (with names such as "Being
- Patriotic," "Stop All Immigrants," "Secured Borders," and "Tea Party News"),
- purported Black social justice groups ("Black Matters," "Blacktivist," and
- "Don't Shoot Us"), LGBTQ groups ("LGBT United"), and religious groups ("United
- Muslims of America"). Throughout 2016, IRA accounts published an increasing
- number of materials supporting the Trump Campaign and opposing the Clinton
- Campaign. For example, on May 31, 2016, the operational account "Matt Skiber"
- began to privately message dozens of pro-Trump Facebook groups asking them to
- help plan a "pro-Trump rally near Trump Tower."55 To reach larger U.S.
- audiences, the IRA purchased advertisements from Facebook that promoted the IRA
- groups on the newsfeeds of U.S. audience members. According to Facebook, the IRA
- purchased over 3,500 advertisements, and the expenditures totaled approximately
- $100,000.56 During the U.S. presidential campaign, many IRA-purchased
- advertisements explicitly supported or opposed a presidential candidate or
- promoted U.S. rallies organized by the IRA ( discussed below). As early as March
- 2016, the IRA purchased advertisements that overtly opposed the Clinton
- Campaign. For example, on March 18, 2016, the IRA purchased an advertisement
- depicting candidate Clinton and a caption that read in part, "If one day God
- lets this liar enter the White House as a president -that day would be a real
- national tragedy."57 Similarly, on April 6, 2016, the IRA purchased
- advertisements for its account "Black Matters" calling for a "flashmob" of U.S.
- persons to "take a photo with #HillaryClintonForPrison2016 or #nohillary2016."58
- IRA-purchased advertisements featuring Clinton were, with very few exceptions,
- negative.59 IRA-purchased advertisements referencing candidate Trump largely
- supported his campaign. The first known IRA advertisement explicitly endorsing
- the Trump Campaign was purchased on April 19, 2016. The IRA bought an
- advertisement for its Instagram account "Tea Party News" asking U.S. persons to
- help them "make a patriotic team of young Trump supporters" by uploading photos
- with the hashtag "#KIDS4TRUMP."60 In subsequent months, the IRA purchased dozens
- of advertisements supporting the Trump Campaign, predominantly through the
- Facebook groups "Being Patriotic," "Stop All Invaders," and "Secured Borders."
- 55 5/31/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID 5/31/16
- Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID 56 Social Media
- Influence in the 2016 US. Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee
- on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (11/1/17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, General
- Counsel of Facebook). 57 3/18/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045505152575. 58
- 4/6/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6043740225319. 59 See SM-2230634, serial 213
- (documenting politically-oriented advertisements from the larger set provided by
- Facebook). 60 4/19/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045151094235. 25
- RESULT: 11
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- TEXT:
- U.S. Department of Justice A.tt:on1e'.Y" Work Prodttet // May CoA.taifl Material
- Proteeted Uflder Fecl. R. Ct'iffl. P. 6(e) Collectively, the IRA's social media
- accounts reached tens of millions of U.S. persons. Individual IRA social media
- accounts attracted hundreds of thousands of followers. For example, at the time
- they were deactivated by Facebook in mid-2017, the IRA's "United Muslims of
- America" Facebook group had over 300,000 followers, the "Don't Shoot Us"
- Facebook group had over 250,000 followers, the "Being Patriotic" Facebook group
- had over 200,000 followers, and the "Secured Borders" Facebook group had over
- 130,000 followers.61 According to Facebook, in total the IRA-controlled accounts
- made over 80,000 posts before their deactivation in August 2017, and these posts
- reached at least 29 million U.S persons and "may have reached an estimated 126
- million people."62 4. U.S. Operations Through Twitter .-.. , -.. --' .... ? ? ?
- ??? Harm to Ongoing Matter ti ?.?? ?"!" ?? ?. ?????? , . , . ? . Harm to Ongoing
- Matter Separately, the IRA operated a network of automated Twitter accounts (
- commonly referred to as a bot network) that enabled the IRA to amplify existing
- content on Twitter. a. Individualized Accounts Harm to Ongoing Matter ? Harm to
- Ongoing Matter 61 See Facebook ID 1479936895656747 (United Muslims of America);
- Facebook ID l 157233400960126 (Don't Shoot); Facebook ID 1601685693432389 Bein
- Patriotic; Facebook ID 757183957716200 Secured Borders). Harm to Ongoing Matter
- 62 Social Media Influence in the 2016 US Election, Hearing Before the Senate
- Select Committee on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (11/1/17) (testimony of Colin
- Stretch, General Counsel ofFacebook). 63 Harm to Ongoing Matter 64 Harm to
- Ongoing Matter 65 Harm to Ongoing Matter 26
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- TEXT:
- U.S. Department of Justice A-Ftat=Ae~? Werk Predttet// Mtty Coruttifl Mttterittl
- Proteet:ed UAder Fed. R. Criffi. P. 6(e) Harm to Ongoing Matter 66 The IRA
- operated individualized Twitter accounts similar to the operation of its
- Facebook accounts, by continuously posting original content to the accounts
- while also communicating with U.S. Twitter users directly (through public
- tweeting or Twitter's private messaging). The IRA used many of these accounts to
- attempt to influence U.S. audiences on the election. Individualized accounts
- used to influence the U.S. presidential election included @TEN_ GOP ( described
- above); @jenn _ abrams ( claiming to be a Virginian Trump supporter with 70,000
- followers); @Pamela_Moore13 (claiming to be a Texan Trump supporter with 70,000
- followers); and @America:__Ist_ (an anti-immigration persona with 24,000
- followers).67 In May 2016, the IRA created the Twitter account @march_for_trump,
- which promoted IRA-organized rallies in support of the Trump Campaign (described
- below).68 Using these accounts and others, the IRA provoked reactions from users
- and the media. Multiple IRA-posted tweets gained popularity.70 U.S. media
- outlets also quoted tweets from IRA-controlled accounts and attributed them to
- the reactions of real U.S. persons.71 Similarly, numerous high-66 Harm to
- Ongoing Matter 67 Other individualized accounts included @MissouriNewsUS (an
- account with 3,800 followers that posted pro-Sanders and anti-Clinton material).
- 68 See @march_for_trump, 5/30/16 Tweet (first post from account). 7? For
- example, one IRA account tweeted, "To those people, who hate the Confederate
- flag. Did you know that the flag and the war wasn't about slavery, it was all
- about money." The tweet received over 40,000 responses. @Jenn_Abrams 4/24/17
- (2:37 p.m.) Tweet. 71 Josephine Lukito & Chris Wells, Most Major Outlets Have
- Used Russian Tweets as Sources for Partisan Opinion: Study, Columbia Journalism
- Review (Mar. 8, 2018); see also Twitter Steps Up to Explain #NewYorkValues to
- Ted Cruz, Washington Post (Jan. 15, 2016) (citing IRA tweet); People Are
- Slamming the CIA/or Claiming Russia Tried to Help Donald Trump, U.S. News &
- World Report (Dec. 12, 2016). 27
- RESULT: 13
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- TEXT:
- U.S. Department of Justice AU:erHe'.Y' Werk Prea1:1et // Moy CeHtoiH Material
- Pretcctea UHaer Fea. R. Criffl. P. 6(c) profile U.S. persons, including former
- Ambassador Michael McFaul,72 Roger Stone,73 Sean Hannity,74 and Michael Flynn
- Jr.,75 retweetcd or responded to tweets posted to these controlled accounts.
- Multiple individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign also promoted IRA tweets
- (discussed below). b. IRA Botnet Activities In January 2018, Twitter publicly
- identified 3,814 Twitter accounts associated with the IRA.79 According to
- Twitter, in the ten weeks before the 2016 U.S. presidential election, these
- accounts posted approximately 175,993 tweets, "approximately 8.4% of which were
- election-? 72 @Mcfaul 4/30/16 Tweet (responding to tweet by @Jenn_Abrams). 73
- @RogerJStoneJr 5/30/16 Tweet (retweeting @Pamela_Moorel3); @RogerJStoneJr
- 4/26/16 Tweet (same). 74 @seanhannity 6/21/17 Tweet (retweeting @Pamela_ Moore
- 13). 75 @mflynnJR 6/22/17 Tweet ("RT@Jenn_Abrams: This is what happens when you
- add the voice over of an old documentary about mental illness onto video of SJWs
- ... "). 76 A botnet refers to a network of private computers or accounts
- controlled as a group to send specific automated messages. On the Twitter
- network, botnets can be used to promote and republish ("retweet") specific
- tweets or hashtags in order for them to gain larger audiences. 77 Harm to
- Ongoing Matter 78 Harm to Ongoing Matter 79 Eli Rosenberg, Twitter to Tell
- 677,000 Users they Were Had by the Russians. Some Signs Show the Problem
- Continues, Washington Post (Jan. 19, 2019). 28
- RESULT: 14
- PAGE: 36
- TEXT:
- U.S. Department of Justice A4teffle)' \llel'k Pt'edttet // May Cetttail'l
- Matet'ial Pt'eteeted U!'lder Fed. R. Ct'im. P. 6(e) related."80 Twitter also
- announced that it had notified approximately 1.4 million people who Twitter
- believed may have been in contact with an IRA-controlled account.81 5. U.S.
- Operations Involving Political Rallies The IRA organized and promoted political
- rallies inside the United States while posing as U.S. grassroots activists.
- First, the IRA used one of its preexisting social media personas (Facebook
- groups and Twitter accounts, for example) to announce and promote the event. The
- IRA then sent a large number of direct messages to followers of its social media
- account asking them to attend the event. From those who responded with interest
- in attending, the IRA then sought a U.S. person to serve as the event's
- coordinator. In most cases, the IRA account operator would tell the U.S. person
- that they personally could not attend the event due to some preexisting conflict
- or because they were somewhere else in the United States.82 The IRA then further
- promoted the event by contacting U.S. media about the event and directing them
- to speak with the coordinator.83 After the event, the IRA posted videos and
- photographs of the event to the IRA's social media accounts. 84 The Office
- identified dozens of U.S. rallies organized by the IRA. The earliest evidence of
- a rally was a "confederate rally" in November 2015. 85 The IRA continued to
- organize rallies even after the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The attendance
- at rallies varied. Some rallies appear to have drawn few (if any) pa1tici2ants
- while others drew hundreds The reach and success of these Harm to Ongoing Matter
- 80 Twitter, "Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016 US Election" (updated Jan.
- 31, 2018). Twitter also reported identifying 50,258 automated accounts connected
- to the Russian government, which tweeted more than a million times in the ten
- weeks before the election. 81 Twitter, "Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016
- US Election" (updated Jan. 31, 2018). ... 82 8/20/16 Facebook Message, ID
- 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID ; 7/21/16 Email, 83 See, e.g.,
- 7/21/16~gmail.com to joshmilton024@gmail.com to-84 @march_for_trump 6/25/16
- Tweet (posting photos from rally outside Trump Tower). 85 Instagram ID
- 2228012168 (Stand For Freedom) 11/3/15 Post ("Good evening buds! Well I am
- planning to organize a confederate rally[ ... ] in Houston on the 14 of November
- and I want more people to attend."). 29
- RESULT: 15
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- TEXT:
- U.S. Department of Justice Atleiffle)1 Werk Preidttet // May Cmttail'l Material
- Preiteeted UF1der Fed. R. Cril'l'l:. P. 6Ee) \ -\. .., ... MINERS FOR TRUMP
- BRING BACK OUR JOBS From June 2016 until the end of the presidential campaign,
- almost all of the U.S. rallies organized by the IRA focused on the U.S.
- election, often promoting the Trump Campaign and opposing the Clinton Campaign.
- Pro-Trump rallies included three in New York; a series of pro-Trump rallies in
- Florida in August 2016; and a series of pro-Trump rallies in October 2016 in
- Pennsylvania. The Florida rallies drew the attention of the Trump Campaign,
- which posted about the Miami rally on candidate Trump's Facebook account (as
- discussed below).86 HELP MR. TRUMP FIX IT! . . .. . . . . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??
- WHEN WHERE IIC!llelli: Iii :Tf.1 t I , , t ? : 11111? 11/1, ,?111:,11111,1;H
- Harm to Ongoing Matter \l1\l:l:llfl\' l'I ;\/A 1'11111 ?/ /I IHll~\l'l'IN!:I:
- 1111, IRA Poster for Pennsylvania Rallies organized by the IRA 6. Targeting and
- Recruitment of U.S. Persons Investigative Technique IRA employees frequently
- used Twitter, Facebook, and lnstagram to contact and recruit U.S. persons who
- followed the group. The IRA recruited U.S. ersons from across the olitical s
- ectrum. For example, the IRA targeted the family and a number of black social
- justice activists 86 The pro-Trump rallies were organized through multiple
- Facebook, Twitter, and email accounts. See, e.g., Facebook ID 100009922908461
- (Matt Skiber); Facebook ID 1601685693432389 (Being Patriotic); Twitter Account
- @march_for_trump; beingpatriotic@gmail.com. (Rallies were organized in New York
- on June 25, 2016; Florida on August 20, 2016; and Pennsylvania on October 2,
- 2016.) 87 Harm to Ongoing Matter 88 Harm to Ongoing Matter 31
- RESULT: 16
- PAGE: 39
- TEXT:
- U.S. Department of Justice At1:aft'le~? Wafk Pfadttet // May CaAtaiA Material
- Prateetetl Under Fetl. R. Crim. P. 6(e) while posing as a grassroots group
- called "Black Matters US."89 In February 2017, the persona "Black Fist"
- (purporting to want to teach African-Americans to protect themselves when
- contacted by law enforcement) hired a self-defense instructor in New York to
- offer classes sponsored by Black Fist. The IRA also recruited moderators of
- conservative social media groups to promote IRA-generated content,90 as well as
- recruited individuals to perform political acts (such as walking around New York
- City dressed up as Santa Claus with a Trump mask).91 Harm to Ongoing Matter
- aHarm to Ongoing Matter aHarm to Ongoing Matter as the IRA's online audience
- became larger, the IRA tracked U.S. persons with whom they communicated and had
- successfully tasked with tasks ran in from or anizin rallies to takin ictures
- with certain olitical messa es . 89 3/11/16 Facebook Advertisement ID
- 6045078289928, 5/6/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6051652423528, 10/26/16 Facebook
- Advertisement ID 6055238604687; 10/27/16 Facebook Message, ID & ID
- 100011698576461 (Taylor Brooks). 90 8/19/16 Face book Message, ID
- 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID 91 12/8/16 Email, robot@craigslist.org to
- beingpatriotic@gmail.com (confirming Craigslist advertisement). 92 8/18-19/16
- Twitter DMs, @march_for_trump & ID 100011698576461 (Taylor Brooks) & (arranging
- to pay for plane tickets and for a Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt
- Skiber) & (discussing payment for rally supplies); 8/18/16 Twitter DM,
- (discussing payment for construction materials). 32
- RESULT: 17
- PAGE: 40
- TEXT:
- U.S. Department of Justice Atterfle)" Werk Predttet // Mfl-)1 Cefltftit'I.
- Material Preteeted Under Fed. R. Ct?im. P. 6(e) 7. Interactions and Contacts
- with the Trump Campaign The investigation identified two different forms of
- connections between the IRA and . members of the Trump Campaign. (The
- investigation identified no similar connections between the IRA and the Clinton
- Campaign.) First, on multiple occasions, members and surrogates of the Trump
- Campaign promoted-typically by linking, retweeting, or similar methods of
- repostingpro-Trump or anti-Clinton content published by the IRA through IRA-
- controlled social media accounts. Additionally, in a few instances, IRA
- employees represented themselves as U.S. persons to communicate with members of
- the Trump Campaign in an effort to seek assistance and coordination on IRA-
- organized political rallies inside the United States. a. Trump Campaign
- Promotion of IRA Political Materials Among the U.S. "leaders of public opinion"
- targeted by the IRA were various members and surrogates of the Trump Campaign.
- In total, Trump Campaign affiliates promoted dozens of tweets, posts, and other
- political content created by the IRA. Posts from the IRA-controlled Twitter
- account @TEN_GOP were cited or retweeted by multiple Trump Campaign officials
- and surrogates, including Donald J. Trump Jr.,96 Eric 96 See, e.g,
- @DonaldJTrumpJr 10/26/16 Tweet ("RT @TEN_GOP: BREAKING Thousands of names
- changed on voter rolls in Indiana. Police investigating #Voterfraud.
- #DrainTheSwamp."); @DonaldJTrumpJr 11/2/16 Tweet ("RT @TEN_GOP: BREAKING:
- #VoterFraud by counting tens of thousands of ineligible mail in Hillary votes
- being reported in Broward County, Florida."); @DonaldJTrumpJr 11/8/16 Tweet ("RT
- @TEN_GOP: This vet passed away last month before he could vote for Trump. Here
- he is in his #MAGA hat. #voted #ElectionDay."). Trump Jr. retweeted additional
- @TEN_ GOP content subsequent to the election. 33
- RESULT: 18
- PAGE: 41
- TEXT:
- U.S. Department of Justice AtterHe'.')'? 'Nerlc PFOtittet // Mey CeHtaiH
- Material Preteeteti UHtier Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6Ee) Trump,97 Kellyanne Conway,98
- Brad Parscale,99 and Michael T. Flynn. 100 These posts included allegations of
- voter fraud, 101 as well as allegations that Secretary Clinton had mishandled
- classified information.102 -A November 7, 2016 post from the IRA-controlled
- Twitter account @Pamela_ Moore 13 was retweeted by Donald J. Trump Jr.103 THANK
- YOU for your support Miami! My learn jusl sha1ed pholos lrom YQU1 TRUMP SIGN
- WAVING DAY. yes1e1da.y! I bve you -and lhere is no question ? TOGETHER, WE WILL
- MAKE AMEAICA GREAT AGAIN! On September 19, 2017, President Trump's personal ..
- account @realDonaldTrump responded to a tweet from the IRA-controlled account
- @l0_gop (the backup account of @TEN_ GOP, which had already been deactivated by
- Twitter). The tweet read: "We love you, Mr. President!"104 IRA employees
- monitored the reaction of the Trump Campaign and, later, Trump Administration
- officials to their tweets. For example, on August 23, 2016, the controlled
- persona "Matt Skiber" Facebook account sent a message to a U.S. Tea Party
- activist, writin.g that "Mr. Trump posted about our event in Miami! This is
- great!"105 The IRA employee included a screenshot of candidate Trump's Facebook
- account, which included a post about the August 20, 2016 political rallies
- organized by the IRA. Screenshot of Trump Facebook Account (from Matt Skibe,) 97
- @EricTrump 10/20/16 Tweet ("RT @TEN_GOP: BREAKING Hillary shuts down press
- conference when asked about DNC Operatives corruption & #VoterFraud #debatenight
- #TrumpB"). 98 @KellyannePolls 11/6/16 Tweet ("RT @TEN_ GOP: Mother of jailed
- sailor: 'Hold Hillary to same standards as my son on Classified info'
- #hillarysemail #WeinerGate."). 99 @parscale 10/15/16 Tweet ("Thousands of
- deplorables chanting to the media: 'Tell The Truth!' RT if you are also done w/
- biased Media! #Friday Feeling"). 100 @GenFlynn 11/7/16 (retweeting @TEN_GOP post
- that included in part "@rea!DonaldTrump & @mike_pence will be our next POTUS &
- VPOTUS."). 101 @TEN_GOP 10/11/16 Tweet ("North Carolina finds 2,214 voters over
- the age of 110!!"). 102 @TEN_GOP 11/6/16 Tweet ("Mother of jailed sailor: 'Hold
- Hillary to same standards as my son on classified info #hillaryemail
- #WeinerGate."'). 103 @DonaldJTrumpJr 11 /7 /16 Tweet ("RT @Pamela _Moore 13:
- Detroit residents speak out against the failed policies of Obama, Hillary &
- democrats .... "). 104 @rea!DonaldTrump 9/19/17 (7 :33 p.m.) Tweet ("THANK YOU
- for your support Miami! My team just shared photos from your TRUMP SIGN WA YING
- DAY, yesterday! I love you-and there is no question -TOGETHER, WE WILL MAKE
- AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!"). 105 8/23/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt
- Skiber) to ID 34
- RESULT: 19
- PAGE: 42
- TEXT:
- U.S. Department of Justice Atten1.e,? Werk Prea1:1et // May CeHtttiH Material
- Preteetea UHaer Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(e) Harm to Ongoing Matter I? b. Contact with
- Trump Campaign Officials in Connection to Rallies Starting in June 2016, the IRA
- contacted different U.S. persons affiliated with the Trump Campaign in an effort
- to coordinate pro-Trump IRA-organized rallies inside the United States. In all
- cases, the IRA contacted the Campaign while claiming to be U.S. political
- activists working on behalf of a conservative grassroots organization. The IRA's
- contacts included requests for signs and other materials to use at rallies, 107
- as well as requests to promote the rallies and help coordinate Iogistics.108
- While certain campaign volunteers agreed to provide the requested support (for
- example, agreeing to set aside a number of signs), the investigation has not
- identified evidence that any Trump Campaign official understood the requests
- were coming from foreign nationals. * * * In sum, the investigation established
- that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election through the "active
- measures" social media campaign carried out by the IRA, an organization funded
- by Prigozhin and companies that he controlled. As explained further in Volume I,
- Section V.A, infra, the Office concluded (and a grand jury has alleged) that
- Prigozhin, his companies, and IRA employees violated U.S. law through these
- operations, principally by undermining through deceptive acts the work of
- federal agencies charged with regulating foreign influence in U.S. elections.
- 107 See, e.g., 8/16/16 Email, joshmilton024@gmail.com to -@donaldtrump.com
- (asking for ~Pence signs for Florida rally); 8/18/16 Email,
- joshmilton024@gmail.com to -@donaldtrump.com (a-kin for Trump/Pence signs for
- Florida rally); 8/12/16 Email, joshmilton024@gmail.com to @donaldtrump.com
- (asking for "contact phone numbers for Trump Campaign affiliates" in various
- Florida cities and signs). 108 8/15/16 Email, to joshmilton024 locations to the
- "Florida Goes Trump," list); 8/16/16 Email, to joshmi1ton024@gmail.com
- (volunteering to send an email blast to followers). 35
- RESULT: 20
- PAGE: 90
- TEXT:
- U.S. Department of Justice Mterttey '.\'erk Preeittet // May Cetttaitt Material
- Preteeteel Ul'l:eler Feel. R. Criffl. P. 6(e) to Rome, Italy, as part of his
- duties with LCILP.411 The purpose of the trip was to meet officials affiliated
- with Link Campus University, a for-profit institution headed by a former Italian
- government official.412 During the visit, Papadopoulos was introduced to Joseph
- Mifsud. Mifsud is a Maltese national who worked as a professor at the London
- Academy of Diplomacy in London, England.413 Although Mifsud worked out of London
- and was also affiliated with LCILP, the encounter in Rome was the first time
- that Papadopoulos met him.414 Mifsud maintained various Russian contacts while
- living in London, as described further below. Among his contacts was ,415 a one-
- time employee of the IRA, the entity that carried out the Russian social media
- campaign (see Volume I Section II, supra). In January and February 2016, Mifsud
- and -discussed possibly meeting in Russia. The investigation did not~ meeting.
- Later, in the spring of 2016, -was also in contact -that was linked to an
- employee of the Russian Ministry of Defense, and that account had overlapping
- contacts with a group of Russian controlled Facebook accounts that included
- accounts used to promote the DCLeaks releases in the course of the GRU's hack-
- and-release operations (see Volume I, Section III.B.1, supra). According to
- Papadopoulos, Mifsud at first seemed uninterested in Papadopoulos when they met
- in Rome.416 After Papadopoulos informed Mifsud about his role in the Trump
- Campaign, however, Mifsud appeared to take greater interest in Papadopoulos.417
- The two discussed Mifsud's European and Russian contacts and had a general
- discussion about Russia; Mifsud also offered to introduce Papadopoulos to
- European leaders and others with contacts to the Russian government.418
- Papadopoulos told the Office that Mifsud's claim of substantial connections with
- Russian government officials interested Papadopoulos, who thought that such
- connections could increase his importance as a policy advisor to the Trump
- Campaign.419 411 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2-3; Papadopoulos Statement of
- Offense ,r 5. 412 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2-3; Stephanie Kirchgaessner et
- al., Joseph Mifsud: more questions than answers about mystery professor linked
- to Russia, The Guardian (Oct. 31, 2017) ("Link Campus University ... is headed
- by a former Italian interior minister named Vincenzo Scotti."). 413 Papadopoulos
- Statement of Offense ,r 5. 414 Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3. , , , ?
- Investigative Technique 1Harm to Ongoing Matter 416 Papadopoulos Statement of
- Offense ,r 5. 417 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,r 5. 418 Papadopoulos
- 8/10/17 302, at 3; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 2. 419 Papadopoulos Statement of
- Offense ,r 5. 83
- RESULT: 21
- PAGE: 181
- TEXT:
- U.S. Department of Justice Atlerl'le)' '.?erk Predttet // May CmttaiH .Material
- Preteeted UHEler Feel. R. Crim. P. 6(e) V. PROSECUTION AND DECLINATION DECISIONS
- The Appointment Order authorized the Special Counsel's Office "to prosecute
- federal crimes arising from [its] investigation" of the matters assigned to it.
- In deciding whether to exercise this prosecutorial authority, the Office has
- been guided by the Principles of Federal Prosecution set forth in the Justice
- (formerly U.S. Attorney's) Manual. In particular, the Office has evaluated
- whether the conduct of the individuals considered for prosecution constituted a
- federal offense and whether admissible evidence would probably be sufficient to
- obtain and sustain a conviction for such an offense. Justice Manual ? 9-27.220
- (2018). Where the answer to those questions was yes, the Office further
- considered whether the prosecution would serve a substantial federal interest,
- the individuals were subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction,
- and there existed an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution. Id. As
- explained below, those considerations led the Office to seek charges against two
- sets of Russian nationals for their roles in er etratin the active-measures
- social media cam ai n and similarly determined that the contacts between
- Campaign officials and Russia-linked individuals either did not involve the
- commission of a federal crime or, in the case of campaign-finance offenses, that
- our evidence was not sufficient to obtain and sustain a criminal conviction. At
- the same time, the Office concluded that the Principles of Federal Prosecution
- supported charging certain individuals connected to the Campaign with making
- false statements or otherwise obstructing this investigation or parallel
- congressional investigations. A. Russian "Active Measures" Social Media Campaign
- On February 16, 2018, a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia returned
- an indictment charging 13 Russian nationals and three Russian entities-including
- the Internet Research Agency (IRA) and Concord Management and Consulting LLC
- (Concord)-with violating U.S. criminal laws in order to interfere with U.S.
- elections and political processes.1276 The indictment charges all of the
- defendants with conspiracy to defraud the United States (Count One), three
- defendants with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and ?bank fraud (Count Two), and
- five defendants with aggravated identity theft (Counts Three through Eight).
- Internet Research Agency Indictment. Concord, which is one of the entities
- charged in the Count One conspiracy, entered an appearance through U.S. counsel
- and moved to dismiss the charge on multiple grounds. In orders and memorandum
- opinions issued on August 13 and November 15, 2018, the district court denied
- Concord's motions to dismiss. United States v. Concord Management & Consulting
- LLC, 347 F. Supp. 3d 38 (D.D.C. 2018). United States v. Concord Management &
- Consulting LLC, 317 F. Supp. 3d 598 (D.D.C. 2018). As of this writing, the
- prosecution of Concord remains ongoing before the U.S. District Court for the
- District of Columbia. The other defendants remain at large. 1276 A more detailed
- explanation of the charging decision in this case is set forth in a separate
- memorandum provided to the Acting Attorney General before the indictment. 174
- RESULT: 22
- PAGE: 182
- TEXT:
- U.S. Department of Justice Atterfl:ey Werk Preettet // Moy Cefltoifl Material
- Preteetee Ufl:eef Pee. R. Criffl. P. 6Ee) Although members of the IRA had
- contact with individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign, the indictment does
- not charge any Trump Campaign official or any other U.S. person with
- participating in the conspiracy. That is because the investigation did not
- identify evidence that any U.S. person who coordinated or communicated with the
- IRA knew that he or she was speaking with Russian nationals engaged in the
- criminal conspiracy. The Office therefore determined that such persons did not
- have the knowledge or criminal purpose required to charge them in the conspiracy
- to defraud the United States (Count One) or in the separate count alleging a
- wire-and bank-fraud conspiracy involving the IRA and two individual Russian
- nationals (Count Two). The Office did, however, charge one U.S. national for his
- role in supplying false or stolen bank account numbers that allowed the IRA
- conspirators to access U.S. online payment systems by circumventing those
- systems' security features. On February 12, 2018, Richard Pinedo pleaded guilty,
- pursuant to a single-count information, to identity fraud, in violation of 18 U
- .S.C. ? 1028(a)(7) and (b)(l)(D). Plea Agreement, United States v. Richard
- Pinedo, No. 1:18-cr-24 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 2018), Doc. 10. The investigation did
- not establish that Pinedo was aware of the identity of the IRA members who
- purchased bank account numbers from him. Pinedo's sales of account numbers
- enabled the IRA members to anonymously access a financial network through which
- they transacted with U.S. persons and companies. See Gov't Sent. Mem. at 3,
- United States v. Richard Pinedo, No. 1:18-cr-24 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2018), Doc.
- 24. On October 10, 2018, Pinedo was sentenced to six months of imprisonment, to
- be followed by six months of home confinement, and was ordered to complete 100
- hours of community service. B. Russian Hacking and Dumping Operations 1. Section
- 1030 Computer-Intrusion Conspiracy a. Background On July 13, 2018, a federal
- grand jury in the District of Columbia returned an indictment charging Russian
- military intelligence officers from the GRU with conspiring to hack into various
- U.S. computers used by the Clinton Campaign, DNC, DCCC, and other U.S. persons,
- in violation of 18 U.S.C. ?? 1030 and 371 (Count One); committing identity theft
- and conspiring to commit money laundering in furtherance of that hacking
- conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. ?? I 028A and l 956(h) (Counts Two through
- Ten); and a separate conspiracy to hack into the computers of U.S. persons and
- entities responsible for the administration of the 2016 U.S. election, in
- violation of18U.S.C. ?? 1030and371 (CountEleven). Netyksholndictment.1277
- Asofthiswriting,all 12 defendants remain at large. The Netyksho indictment
- alleges that the defendants conspired with one another and with others to hack
- into the computers of U.S. persons and entities involved in the 2016 U.S.
- presidential election, steal documents from those computers, and stage releases
- of the stolen documents to interfere in the election. Netyksho Indictment ,r 2.
- The indictment also describes how, in staging 1277 The Office provided a more
- detailed explanation of the charging decision in this case in meetings with the
- Office of the Acting Attorney General before the indictment. 175
- RESULT: 23
- PAGE: 411
- TEXT:
- U.S. Department of Justice Attorne)" Wol'lt Predttet // Mey Cofltttifl Meteriel
- Proteeted U1~der Fed. R. Criffi. P. 6(e) Guccifer 2.0 I.C. Expert Investment
- Company Internet Research Agency (IRA) KLS Research LLC Kremlin LetterOne Link
- Campus University London Centre of International Law Practice (LCILP) Main
- Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) New Economic School in
- Moscow (NES) Opposition Bloc Party of Regions Pericles Emerging Market Partners
- LLP Prevezon Holdings Ltd. Roscongress Foundation Rosneft Russian Direct
- Investment Fund Fictitious online persona operated by the GRU that released
- stolen documents during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign period. Russian
- real-estate and development corporation that signed a letter of intent with a
- Trump Organization subsidiary to develop a Trump Moscow property. Russian entity
- based in Saint Petersburg and funded by Concord that engaged in an "active
- measures" social media campaign to interfere in the 20 I 6 V,S. presidential
- election. Business established by an associate of and at the direction of Peter
- Smith to further Smith's search for Hillary Clinton emails. Official residence
- of the president of the Russian Federation; it is used colloquially to refer to
- the office of the president or the Russian government. Company that includes
- Petr Aven and Richard Burt as board members. During a board meeting in December
- 2016, Aven asked for Burt's help to make contact with the Presidential
- Transition Team. University in Rome, Italy, where George Papadopoulos was
- introduced to Joseph Mifsud. International law advisory organization in London
- that employed Joseph Mifsud and George Papadopoulos. Russian Federation's
- military intelligence agency. Moscow-based school that invited Carter Page to
- speak at its July 2016 commencement ceremony. Ukrainian political party that
- incorporated members of the defunct Party of Regions. Ukrainian political party
- of former President Yanukovych. It was generally understood to align with
- Russian policies. Company registered in the Cayman Islands by Paul Manafort and
- his business partner Rick Davis. Oleg Deripaska invested in the fund. Russian
- company that was a defendant in a U.S. civil action alleging the laundering of
- proceeds from fraud exposed by Sergei Magnitsky. Russian entity that organized
- the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. Russian state-owned oil and
- energy company. Sovereign wealth fund established by the Russian Government in
- 2011 and headed by Kirill Dmitriev. B-12
- RESULT: 24
- PAGE: 413
- TEXT:
- U.S. Department of Justice Attorne)' 'Norlc Prodttet // May Cm1taifl Material
- Proteeted URder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) CNI DCCC DNC FBI FSB GEC GRU HPSCI HRC IRA
- LCILP NATO NES NSA ODNI PTT RDIF RIAC SBOE sco SJC SSCI TAG VEB Index of
- Acronyms Center for the National Interest Democratic Congressional Campaign
- Committee Democratic National Committee Federal Bureau oflnvestigation Russian
- Federal Security Service Global Energy Capital, LLC Russian Federation's Main
- Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff U.S. House of Representatives
- Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Hillary Rodham Clinton Internet
- Research Agency London Centre of International Law Practice North Atlantic
- Treaty Organization New Economic School National Security Agency Office of the
- Director of National Intelligence Presidential Transition Team Russian Direct
- Investment Fund Russian International Affairs Council State boards of elections
- Special Counsel's Office U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee U.S. Senate Select
- Committee on Intelligence Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism
- Vnesheconombank B-14
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