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                        UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                        SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

                        CASE NO. 16-61511-CIV-ZLOCH

  CAROL WILDING, et al.,

              Plaintiffs,

  vs.                                             FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL

  DNC SERVICES CORP., d/b/a/
  Democratic National Committee
  and DEBORAH WASSERMAN SCHULTZ,

              Defendants.
                                        /

        THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Defendants’ Motion To

  Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (DE 44). The Court has

  carefully reviewed said Motion, the entire court file, and, with

  the benefit of oral argument, is otherwise fully advised in the

  premises.

        In the 2016 presidential election’s Democratic primaries,

  Bernie Sanders and others vied against Hillary Clinton for the

  Party’s nomination. This case, in short, involves allegations that

  the Democratic National Committee1 was in cahoots with the Clinton

  campaign    and   sought   to   tip   the   scales   in   her   favor   in   the

  Democratic primaries, all at the direction of, and under the

  leadership and watchful eye of, its then-chair, Deborah Wasserman

  Schultz, despite the DNC’s and Wasserman Schultz’s promise to



        1
         The Court will refer to Defendant DNC Services Corp. as
  the “DNC.”
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  remain impartial.        Plaintiffs discovered what they believe is

  evidence of     that    bias after     the DNC’s       computer    servers    were

  penetrated by hackers.          Shortly thereafter, they brought this

  putative class action against the DNC and its former chair.

        In evaluating Plaintiffs’ claims at this stage, the Court

  assumes their allegations are true——that the DNC and Wasserman

  Schultz held a palpable bias in favor Clinton and sought to propel

  her ahead of her Democratic opponents.               Plaintiffs assert several

  fraud-type claims.      But they do not allege they ever heard or acted

  upon the DNC’s claims of neutrality. Plaintiffs also assert a tort

  claim on behalf of all registered Democrats, even though the harm

  they allege impacted all Democratic-primary-eligible voters——and

  under their theory, the entire body politic——the same way.                        And

  finally,    Plaintiffs    claim    that     donors    to   the   DNC   are   at    an

  increased risk of identity theft as a result of the computer hack.

  But they do not allege that the DNC regularly keeps the type of

  information necessary to facilitate identity theft or that the

  hackers targeted, much less obtained, that information.                 The Court

  must now decide whether Plaintiffs have suffered a concrete injury

  particularized     to   them,    or   one   certainly      impending,    that      is

  traceable to the DNC and its former chair’s conduct——the keys to

  entering federal court.         The Court holds that they have not, which

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  means the truth of their claims cannot be tested in this Court.

                                          I.

        According to the First Amended Complaint (DE 8), the DNC is

  the formal governing body for the Democratic Party in the United

  States.      Its    role   is   to   coordinate    strategy     in   support    of

  Democratic     Party     candidates    in     local,   state,    and   national

  elections.     With respect to the presidential election, the DNC

  organizes the Democratic National Convention in order to nominate

  and confirm a Democratic candidate for the presidency. At the time

  Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint (DE 8), Deborah

  Wasserman Schultz served as the DNC’s Chairperson and presently

  serves as a member of the United States House of Representatives.

        Through its Charter and Bylaws, the DNC has obliged itself to

  a policy of neutrality among Democratic presidential candidates.

  To that end,         as it pertains to the “Presidential nominating

  process,     the     Chairperson      shall     exercise     impartiality      and

  evenhandedness as between Presidential candidates and campaigns.

  The Chairperson shall be responsible for ensuring that the national

  officers and staff of the Democratic National Committee maintain

  impartiality       and   evenhandedness       during   the   Democratic     Party

  Presidential nominating process.”             DE 8, ¶ 159 (emphasis supplied

  in Complaint).       Wasserman Schultz and other DNC officials touted

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  this policy in public statements during presidential primaries.

  Plaintiffs attribute the following quotes to Wasserman Schultz or

  other DNC staff:

        •     “I count Secretary Clinton and Vice President
              Biden as dear friends, but no matter who
              comprises the field of candidates it’s my job to
              run a neutral primary process and that’s what I
              am committed to doing.”

        •     “the DNC runs an impartial primary process.”

        •     “the DNC    runs   an    impartial     primary   process,
              period.”

        •     “the Democratic National Committee remains
              neutral in this primary, based on our rules.”

        •     “even though Senator Sanders has endorsed my
              opponent, I remain, as I have been from the
              beginning, neutral in the presidential Democratic
              primary.”

  DE 8, ¶ 160.

        Plaintiffs allege that despite the DNC’s Charter and Bylaws,

  and these public statements of neutrality and impartiality, the DNC

  devoted its resources to supporting Hillary Clinton over other

  Democratic    Party    candidates.         The   DNC’s   bias,   according   to

  Plaintiffs, came to light after computer hackers penetrated the

  DNC’s computer network. An individual identified as “Guccifer 2.0"

  took credit for the hack and posted several documents purportedly

  taken from the DNC’s servers on a publically accessible website.


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  Those documents include: excel spreadsheets containing information

  of DNC donors; spreadsheets containing information of donors to

  Hillary Clinton’s campaign; research regarding Hillary Clinton’s

  campaign, including vulnerabilities, attacks, rebuttals, policy

  positions, and opposition research on other Democratic candidates;

  and    various    other     documents       regarding    Hillary     Clinton’s

  presidential campaign.          DE 8, ¶¶ 165 & 169.

        Also included in the documents released by “Guccifer 2.0" was

  a memorandum dated May 26, 2015, addressed to the DNC.                       That

  memorandum provides “a suggested strategy for positioning and

  public messaging around the 2016 Republican presidential field,”

  including use of “specific hits to muddy the waters around ethics,

  transparency and campaign finance attacks on HRC.”                 DE 8-1.    It

  states, “Our goals in the coming months will be to frame the

  Republican field and the eventual nominee early and to provide a

  contrast between the GOP field and HRC.”                Id.   The memorandum

  observes that “the right wing attack machine has been building its

  opposition research on Hillary Clinton for decades.            HRC’s critics

  have been telegraphing they are ready to attack and do so with

  reckless abandon.”        Id.     As a tactical response, the memorandum

  suggests “[w]orking with the DNC and allied groups” to “help pitch

  stories with no fingerprints and utilize reporters to drive a

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  message” and “insert our messaging into [Republican] press.”                          Id.

  The memorandum closes with an invitation for further discussion,

  “to answer the question of who do we want to run against and how

  best to leverage other candidates to maneuver them into the right

  place.”      Id.        Plaintiffs     do       not    allege    who     authored    this

  memorandum, but as of May 26, 2016, the Democratic presidential

  field already included both Clinton and Sanders.

        As a result of the information “Guccifer 2.0" released,

  Plaintiffs conclude that “the DNC was anything but ‘impartial,’

  ‘evenhanded,’      or    ‘neutral’     with           respect    to     the    Democratic

  nominating process.” DE 8, ¶ 171. And all while Wasserman Schultz

  was the DNC’s chair.           Plaintiffs bring six causes of action on

  behalf of three proposed classes. The first class comprises “[a]ll

  people or entities who have contributed to the DNC from January 1,

  2015 through the date of this action (‘DNC Donor Class’).”                          DE 8,

  ¶ 175.    The second, “[a]ll people or entities who have contributed

  to the Bernie Sanders campaign from January 1, 2015 through the

  date of this action (‘Sanders Donor Class’).”                     Id. And the third,

  “[a]ll registered members of the Democratic Party (‘Democratic

  Party Class’).”         Id.    The DNC Donor Class and the Sanders Donor

  Class     each   assert       causes   of       action     for        fraud,    negligent

  misrepresentation, and violation of § 28-3904 of the District of

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  Columbia    Code   (Counts        I,    II,       and    III,     respectively).        The

  Democratic Party Class asserts a cause of action for breach of

  fiduciary duty (Count V).              And the DNC Donor Class also asserts

  causes of action for unjust enrichment and negligence (Counts IV

  and VI, respectively).

        The apparent theories for each of these causes of action merit

  further discussion.         The DNC Donor Class and Sanders Donor Class

  Plaintiffs’ fraud and negligent misrepresentation causes of action

  are premised on the theory that Plaintiffs, as well as putative

  class members, donated either to the DNC or Senator Sanders’s

  campaign in reliance on the DNC’s promise of neutrality in the

  presidential primaries.           According to Plaintiffs, the DNC knew or

  should have known that those promises of neutrality were false and

  intended to induce members of the DNC Donor Class and Sanders Donor

  Class’s    reliance.         The       DNC    Donor      Class     Plaintiffs’        unjust

  enrichment cause of action is largely coextensive with these fraud

  claims.      And   the      DNC    Donor      Class       and     Sanders     Donor    Class

  Plaintiffs’ cause of action for violation of § 28-3904 of the

  District of Columbia Code presents a similar theory: that the DNC

  falsely    claimed     it    would       remain         neutral    in   the    Democratic

  presidential primaries.            The Democratic Party Class Plaintiffs’

  cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty suggests that the DNC

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  owes a fiduciary duty to all registered Democrats to comply with

  the terms of the DNC’s Charter and Bylaws.           By failing to maintain

  impartiality and evenhandedness in the Democratic presidential

  primaries, Plaintiffs believe that the DNC breached this fiduciary

  duty.    Lastly, the DNC Donor Class Plaintiffs’ negligence cause of

  action arises from the DNC’s failure to secure from computer

  hackers Plaintiffs’ personal information.

        The DNC and Wasserman Schultz have moved to dismiss the First

  Amended Complaint (DE 8) on various grounds. The DNC and Wasserman

  Schultz argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to assert their claims,

  that they have insufficiently pled those claims, and that the class

  allegations must be stricken as facially deficient.

                                         II.

        This     Order    does   not   concern   who   should     have   been   the

  Democratic Party’s candidate for the 2016 presidential election; it

  does not concern whether the DNC or Wasserman Schultz generally

  acted unfairly towards Senator Sanders or his supporters; indeed,

  it does not even concern whether the DNC was in fact biased in

  favor of Hillary Clinton in the Democratic primaries.                    At this

  stage,   the    Court    is    required   to   construe   the    First   Amended

  Complaint (DE 8) in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and

  accept its well-pled allegations as true. See Stalley ex rel. U.S.

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  v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232-33

  (11th Cir. 2008).         The Court thus assumes that the DNC and

  Wasserman Schultz preferred Hillary Clinton as the Democratic

  candidate for president over Bernie Sanders or any other Democratic

  candidate.      It assumes that they stockpiled information useful to

  the Clinton campaign. It assumes that they devoted their resources

  to assist Clinton in securing the party’s nomination and opposing

  other Democratic candidates.       And it assumes that they engaged in

  these surreptitious acts while publically proclaiming they were

  completely neutral, fair, and impartial.

        This   Order   therefore    concerns    only    technical   matters    of

  pleading and subject-matter jurisdiction. To the extent Plaintiffs

  wish to air their general grievances with the DNC or its candidate

  selection process, their redress is through the ballot box, the

  DNC’s internal workings, or their right of free speech——not through

  the judiciary.       To the extent Plaintiffs have asserted specific

  causes of action grounded in specific factual allegations, it is

  this Court’s emphatic duty to measure Plaintiffs’ pleadings against

  existing legal standards. Having done so, and for the reasons that

  follow,   the    Court   finds   that   the   named   Plaintiffs    have    not

  presented a case that is cognizable in federal court.

                                      IV.

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         Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing

   “only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen

   v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).                   In

   cases that do not present a federal claim for relief, like this

   one, that power derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1332.                     Section 1332

   authorizes    this    Court   to   exercise        its   jurisdiction    in   two

   circumstances pertinent here.             First, this Court has “original

   jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy

   exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and

   costs, and is between . . . citizens of different states.”                    28

   U.S.C.   §   1332(a).      Section       1332(a)   permits   the   exercise    of

   jurisdiction only where there is complete diversity——that is, no

   plaintiff maintains citizenship in the same state as any defendant.

   See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806); Triggs v.

   John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998).

   Second, except in circumstances not present here, this Court has

   “original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the matter in

   controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of

   interest and costs, and is a class action in which . . . any member

   of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any

   Defendant.”          28   U.S.C.     §    1332(d)(2)      (hereinafter    “CAFA

   jurisdiction”).      As the text makes plain, § 1332(d) requires only

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   minimal diversity——at least one plaintiff must be diverse from one

   defendant.    See Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1163

   (11th Cir. 2006).

         It is readily apparent that this Court lacks jurisdiction

   under § 1332(a), for the Parties are not completely diverse.

   According to the First Amended Complaint (DE 8), two Plaintiffs

   “reside” in the District of Columbia, where the DNC maintains its

   citizenship.     Seven “reside” in Florida, where Wasserman Schultz

   ostensibly     maintains   citizenship.2      But    “[c]itizenship,    not

   residence, is the key fact that must be alleged in the complaint to

   establish diversity for a natural person.”          Taylor v. Appleton, 30

   F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994).        Plaintiffs’ failure to properly

   allege their own citizenship is, in itself, sufficient to preclude

   the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction under 1332(a).            Indeed,

   this pleading failure makes it impossible for the Court to conclude

   that the Parties are even minimally diverse for purposes of its

   CAFA jurisdiction.     See Travaglio v. Am. Exp. Co., 735 F.3d 1266,

   1268 (11th Cir. 2013) (the plaintiff “must allege facts that, if

   true, show federal subject matter jurisdiction over her case

   exists”).    And even if the Court assumed that residence were the



         2
          As with the Plaintiffs, the First Amended Complaint (DE 8)
   does not specifically allege Wasserman Schultz’s citizenship.
   Rather, it alleges that she “resides in and is a Congresswoman
   representing portions of this district.” DE 8, ¶ 1.

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   equivalent of citizenship——an assumption the Court is not permitted

   to make——Plaintiffs would still not be completely diverse from

   Defendants.

         Putting aside these pleading deficiencies, it is also apparent

   that Plaintiffs lack standing to assert each of the causes of

   action raised in this putative class action. In order to maintain

   a class action lawsuit, the class representatives——as distinct from

   the putative class members——must establish their standing to sue,

   as measured by the standard of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504

   U.S. 555 (1992).        See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984)

   (applying standing inquiry to a class action); Carter v. West Pub.

   Co., 225 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2003). The standing requirement

   stems from Article III of the Constitution, which limits federal

   courts’ jurisdiction to certain “Cases” and “Controversies.”           U.S.

   Const. Art. III; see Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S.Ct. 1138,

   1146 (2013). The Supreme Court has made clear that “[n]o principle

   is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of

   government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court

   jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.”           DaimlerChrysler

   Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (internal marks omitted).

   To effectuate this limitation, Lujan laid out three basic elements

   of Article III standing: “First, the plaintiff must have suffered

   an ‘injury in fact’——an invasion of a legally protected interest

   which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) ‘actual or



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   imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’’” Lujan, 504 U.S. at

   560   (citations       omitted).      “Second,      there      must    be    a    causal

   connection between the injury and the conduct complained of . . .

   .”    Id.        “Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely

   ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable

   decision.’” Id.        The class representatives must meet each of these

   elements to pursue not only their own claims, but the class

   members’ claims as well.           See Prado-Steiman ex re. Prado v. Bush,

   221 F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir. 2000).

                                             a.

         As    to   the   fraud-type     claims     Counts   I,    II,    III       and   IV,

   Plaintiffs fail to allege any causal connection between their

   injuries and Defendants’ statements. The Plaintiffs asserting each

   of these causes of action specifically allege that they donated to

   the DNC or to Bernie Sanders’s campaign.             See DE 8, ¶¶ 2-109.               But

   not one of them alleges that they ever read the DNC’s charter or

   heard the statements they now claim are false before making their

   donations.       And not one of them alleges that they took action in

   reliance on the DNC’s charter or the statements identified in the

   First Amended Complaint (DE 8).                Absent such allegations, these

   Plaintiffs lack standing.          See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.              To be sure,

   two paragraphs         of   the   First   Amended Complaint           (DE    8)   assert

   generally that the “DNC Donor Class Plaintiffs, the Sanders Donor

   Class Plaintiffs, and members of the DNC Donor Class and the



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   Sanders Donor Class, relied on Defendants’ false statements and

   omissions to their injury.”         DE 8, ¶¶ 188 & 195.3         But this

   boilerplate recitation, absent factual content to support it, does

   not permit the Court to “determine that at least one named class

   representative has Article III standing to raise each class claim.”

   Prado-Steiman, 221 F.3d at 1279; cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

   662, 678 (2009) (“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’

   or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

   will not do.’”).

         Nor do these Plaintiffs’ donations to the DNC or to Bernie

   Sanders’s campaign create standing.         The act of donating to an

   organization does not, of itself, create a legally protected

   interest in the organization’s operations.           Pearson v. Garrett-

   Evangelical Theological Seminary, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 759, 763

   (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“donating money to a charitable fund does not

   confer standing to challenge the administration of that fund”);

   Orient v. Linus Pauling Inst. of Sci. and Med., 936 F. Supp. 704,

   707 (D. Ariz. 1996) (“Funding research does not automatically

   confer a legally protected interest in that organization’s assets

   on a donor”); cf. Leonard v. Campbell, 189 So. 839, 840 (Fla. 1939)

   (observing that delivery of a gift “divest[s] the donor of all

   present control and dominion over [the gift], absolutely and

   irrevocably”).     Just as donating to Sanders’s campaign would not

         3
          Paragraph 195 alleges “justifiable reliance” but is
   otherwise the same as paragraph 188.

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   entitle the donor to dictate the campaign’s platform, donating to

   the DNC or to Bernie Sanders’s campaign does not entitle Plaintiffs

   to challenge the manner in which the DNC has conducted its affairs.

   A donor may suffer a cognizable injury from the violation of an

   independent duty, such as if the donation was procured by fraud.

   But, for the reasons just explained, Plaintiffs do not allege the

   causal connection between their donations and the DNC’s statements

   necessary to give them standing to assert that type of claim.

                                          b.

         The Plaintiffs who assert the breach of fiduciary duty cause

   of action in Count V of the First Amended Complaint (DE 8) are

   simply alleged to be “registered Democrat[s],” residing in nineteen

   states.    Ostensibly this means that they are registered voters who

   have publically declared allegiance with their state’s Democratic

   Party, which in turn follows guidelines established by the DNC.

   See DE 8, ¶¶ 156-57.     They contend that the DNC owes (and Wasserman

   Schultz owed) all registered Democrats a fiduciary duty to comply

   with the     DNC’s   charter,   which   the   DNC and   Wasserman     Schultz

   breached    by   favoring    Hillary    Clinton   during    the    Democratic

   primaries.    Other than labeling their claim as a common-law tort,

   these Plaintiffs have done little to make out a concrete injury,

   particularized to them.       See DE 48, 7-8.     For their part, the DNC

   and Wasserman Schultz have characterized the DNC charter’s promise

   of   “impartiality     and   evenhandedness”      as    a   mere   political



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   promise——political rhetoric that is not enforceable in federal

   courts. The Court does not accept this trivialization of the DNC’s

   governing principles.         While it may be true in the abstract that

   the DNC has the right to have its delegates “go into back rooms

   like they used to and smoke cigars and pick the candidate that

   way,” DE 54, at 36:22-24, the DNC, through its charter, has

   committed itself to a higher principle.                Nevertheless, it is

   apparent that these Plaintiffs cannot satisfy Lujan’s test, and

   therefore lack standing to assert Count V of the First Amended

   Complaint (DE 8).

         The Supreme Court has long made clear that “when the asserted

   harm is a ‘generalized grievance’ shared in substantially equal

   measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone

   normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.”                     Warth v.

   Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists

   to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 1974)).              To that end, courts have

   routinely concluded “that a voter fails to present an injury-in-

   fact when the alleged harm is abstract and widely shared or is only

   derivative of a harm experienced by a candidate.”             Crist v. Comm’n

   on Presidential Debates, 262 F.3d 193, 195 (2d Cir. 2001); see also

   Gottlieb   v.   Fed.     Election     Comm’n,   (concluding       that    voters’

   “supposed injury to their ‘ability to influence the political

   process’” was “too vague to constitute an injury-in-fact”).                   For

   example, in     Crist,    a   voter   sued   the   sponsor   of    presidential



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   debates, the Commission on Presidential Debates (“CPD”), contending

   that the CPD’s policy of limiting participation in its debates to

   candidates with demonstrated popularity violated the voter’s First

   Amendment Rights.      Crist, 262 F.3d at 194.         The Second Circuit held

   that the voter’s claimed injury was too abstract and generalized to

   invoke the court’s jurisdiction. Id. at 195. Similarly, in Becker

   v. Fed. Election Comm’n, several supporters of Ralph Nader sued the

   Federal Election Commission (“FEC”), claiming that FEC regulations

   permitting corporate sponsorship of presidential debates corrupted

   the political process.        230 F.3d 381, 383-84 (1st Cir. 2000).                Just

   as in Crist, the Becker Court held that the Nader supporters’

   alleged harm was not sufficiently concrete or personalized to

   establish standing.         Id. at 389-90.

         The    Plaintiffs     asserting     Count    V   of    the    First    Amended

   Complaint (DE 8) suffer an analogous standing deficiency.                      Their

   association with the DNC is voluntary and their relationship to it

   indirect.     The harm they suffered from the DNC’s alleged bias is,

   as their claim makes explicit, undifferentiated from all other

   registered Democrats.        But it also sweeps more broadly.               In states

   with open primaries, where voters unaffiliated with a political

   party may vote in the Democratic presidential primary, the harm as

   between unaffiliated voters and those affiliated with their state’s

   Democratic     party   is    undifferentiated.         And   under      Plaintiffs’

   theory,     “the   Democratic    Party    is   a   custodian       of   a   fair   and

   impartial election process.”             DE 54, at 63:15-17.            If the DNC

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   failed to take proper care of the election process, as Plaintiffs’

   theory goes, then their injury is also undifferentiated from the

   voting public at large.       Labeling this type of injury as a common-

   law   tort   does   nothing    to   alter    the   generalized   nature   of

   Plaintiffs’ grievance.     For, if the tort harm is failure to act as

   a proper “custodian of this country’s democracy,” DE 54, at 18:8-9,

   then the measure of Plaintiffs’ damages must be the extent to which

   the DNC’s actions corrupted the election process.          But just like a

   voter’s interest in diverse political discourse (Crist), or in

   untainted presidential debates (Becker), “the harm done to the

   general public by corruption of the political process is not a

   sufficiently concrete, personalized injury to establish standing.”

   Becker, 230 F.3d at 389.

         The Court also entertains serious doubts about whether it

   could redress the harm asserted in Count V.               In addition to

   damages, Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief that

   would bind the DNC to the present iteration of its charter.          But “a

   political party’s determination of the structure which best allows

   it to pursue its political goals is protected by the Constitution.”

   Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 229 (1989)

   (internal marks omitted) (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of

   Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 224 (1986)).           So, the choice——and attendant

   consequences——between “impartiality and evenhandedness” and Tammany

   Hall politics lies in the province of the DNC, not the judiciary.

   Cf. O’Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, (1972) (“It has been understood

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   since our national political parties first came into being as

   voluntary associations of individuals that the convention itself is

   the proper forum for determining intra-party disputes as to which

   delegates shall be seated.”).        Grave questions regarding the DNC’s

   right of association would undoubtedly arise if this Court were to

   enjoin the DNC to a particular manner of governance.              And those

   same concerns would arise with respect to any award of damages,

   which would impose liability for the DNC’s alleged decision to

   associate   with   a    particular    standard-bearer   in   a   manner   not

   otherwise prohibited by law.

                                          c.

         Finally, with respect to their negligence claim in Count VI of

   the First Amended Complaint (DE 8), the six named DNC Donor Class

   Plaintiffs claim they suffered an injury-in-fact from the data

   breach of the DNC’s servers.         Two of them, Cridde and Berners-Lee,

   donated to the DNC “by check.”          DE 8, ¶¶ 108 & 109.      Two others,

   Lynch and Young, allege they contributed to the DNC “online,” but

   do not specify where.      DE 8, ¶¶ 105 & 106.    Davis donated money to

   the DNC in “various ways, including online at www.democrats.org.”

   DE 8, at ¶ 107.        And Cork gave to the DNC but does not specify

   where or how.      Their cause of action is premised on a security

   breach of the DNC’s computer servers, which Plaintiffs allege was

   perpetrated by two Russian hacking groups having “a long history of

   successfully targeting sensitive government and industry computer

   networks in both the United States and other countries, often using

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   ‘sophisticated phishing attacks.’” DE 8, ¶ 164. A computer hacker

   known as “Guccifer 2.0" claimed credit for the security breach and

   posted several documents from the DNC’s servers online.                  Those

   documents include “Excel spreadsheets containing the names and

   personal information of donors to the Democratic Party” and other

   “spreadsheets of donors to the DNC . . . containing personal

   information such as names, email addresses, and phone numbers.” DE

   8,   ¶¶   164,   165    &   170.     Although   these      Plaintiffs   do   not

   specifically so allege, their theory is that this security breach

   of the DNC’s servers places them at a heightened risk of identity

   theft.    According to these Plaintiffs, “data breaches engender

   injury sufficient to confer Article III standing based solely on

   increased risk of identity theft in the future.”              DE 48, at 8.

         Although the Eleventh Circuit has held that a party who has

   actually suffered identity theft as a result of a data breach has

   standing, it has expressly left open the question whether the mere

   threat of future identity theft creates Article III standing.

   See Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1323 n.1 (11th Cir.

   2012).    The Supreme Court requires that a “threatened injury must

   be certainly impeding to constitute an injury in fact, and that

   allegations      of    possible    future   injury   are    not   sufficient.”

   Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S.

   149, 158 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).               Theories of

   standing that “rel[y] on a highly attenuated chain of possibilities

   do[] not satisfy the requirement that threatened injury must be

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   certainly impending.”      Id.   To some measure, three circuits have

   held that a risk of future identity theft can constitute an injury

   in fact.     Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384,

   387-89 (6th Cir. 2016); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139,

   1142-43 (9th Cir. 2010); Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d

   629, 632-34 (7th Cir. 2007).       Three others have held that it does

   not.   Beck v McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274-76 (4th Cir. 2017); Katz

   v. Pershing, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012); Reilly v. Ceridian

   Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40 (3d Cir. 2011).       The cases on both sides of

   this apparent circuit split are largely reconcilable, and each

   proves instructive here.

          In Krottner, current and former Starbucks employees brought

   suit after a laptop containing the names, addresses, and Social

   Security numbers of 97,000 Starbucks employees was stolen from

   Starbucks.     628 F.3d at 1140.      Following the theft, one of the

   employees alleged that someone tried to open a bank account in his

   name, but his bank closed the account before he suffered any loss.

   Id. at 1142.     The Ninth Circuit held that the employees faced “a

   credible threat of harm” from the theft of the laptop containing

   their personal information, constituting an injury-in-fact for

   purposes of Article III.      Id. at 1343.

          In Pisciotta, the defendant operated an online marketing

   service though which individuals could complete applications for

   banking services.       499 F.3d at 631.        Upon completion of the

   applications, the defendant was privy to the individuals’ name,

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   address, Social Security number, driver’s license number, date of

   birth, mother’s maiden name, and credit card and other financial

   account numbers.        Id.   The plaintiffs had provided this type of

   personal information to the defendant and brought suit after the

   defendant’s online hosting facility suffered a “sophisticated,

   intentional and malicious” security breach.              Id. at 631-32.      The

   plaintiffs did not allege “any completed direct financial loss to

   their accounts” or “that they or any other member of the putative

   class already had been the victim of identity theft as a result of

   the breach.”      Id. (emphasis in original).        But the Seventh Circuit

   nevertheless concluded that the plaintiffs had standing, reasoning

   that “the injury-in-fact requirement can be satisfied by a threat

   of future harm or by an act which harms the plaintiff only by

   increasing the risk of future harm that the plaintiff would have

   otherwise faced, absent the defendant’s actions.”              Id. at 634.

          In Galaria, an insurance company maintained sensitive personal

   information of current customers, as well as prospective customers

   who had applied for quotes on insurance products.             663 F. App’x at

   386.   The information retained by the insurance company, including

   names,    dates    of   birth,   marital       status,   gender,   occupation,

   employer, Social Security numbers, and driver’s license numbers,

   was stolen by computer hackers.          Id.     Two plaintiffs brought suit

   as a result of the breach.        Id.        The Sixth Circuit held that the

   plaintiffs had standing because they alleged that “their data has

   already been stolen and is now in the hands of ill-intentioned

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   criminals.” According to the Sixth Circuit, “[w]here a data breach

   targets personal information, a reasonable inference can be drawn

   that the hackers will use the victims’ data for the fraudulent

   purposes alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaints.”                  Id. at 389.

          In Beck, a Veterans Affairs Medical Center lost two sets of

   patient data.    848 F.3d at 266-67.            The first data set, stored on

   a laptop that was misplaced or stolen, held the names, dates of

   birth, partial Social Security numbers, and physical descriptions

   of 7,400 patients.        Id. at 267.     The second, kept in four storage

   boxes that were misplaced or stolen, contained the names, Social

   Security numbers, and medical diagnoses of 2,000 patients.                    Id. at

   268.    Three patients whose personal information was kept on the

   laptop or in the storage boxes sued as a result of the Medical

   Center’s mishandling        of   their    data.         But   the   Fourth   Circuit

   rejected as “too speculative” the patients’ argument that their

   risk of future harm constituted an injury-in-fact.                       Id. at 274.

   The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the patients’ theory of standing

   relied on an “attenuated chain of possibilities”: that the thief

   targeted the stolen items for the information they contained;

   selected,    from    thousands      of        others,     the    three     patients’

   information; and attempted successfully to use that information to

   steal the patients’ identities.           Id. at 275.           The Fourth Circuit

   also concluded that the patients had not established a “substantial

   risk” of harm.      Id.

          In Reilly, a payroll processing firm’s systems were penetrated

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   by    a    computer      hacker,     potentially      exposing   the   personal   and

   financial information of 27,000 employees from 1,900 different

   companies.           664 F.3d at 40.     The nature of the payroll processing

   firm’s business meant that it held information regarding its

   customers’ employees, including their names, addresses, Social

   Security numbers, dates of birth, and bank account information.

   Id.       Two employees whose employers utilized the payroll processing

   firm’s services sued the payroll processing firm based on their

   belief that they were at an increased risk of identity theft.                     Id.

   The Third Circuit held that the employees lacked standing to sue

   because they           failed   to   allege    an    injury   that   was   “certainly

   impending.”           Id. at 42.     Like in Beck, the Third Circuit reasoned

   that the employees’ theory of standing rested on a speculative

   chain of “ifs”——“that the hacker: (1) read, copied, and understood

   their personal information; (2) intends to commit future criminal

   acts by misusing the information; and (3) is able to use such

   information to the detriment of Appellants by making unauthorized

   transactions in Appellants’ names.”                  Id.

             And   in    Katz,   the    defendant      sold   various   finance-related

   products and services to investment advisers and broker-dealers,

   who in turn traded securities on behalf of their clients. 672 F.3d

   at 69. One of the defendant’s services was an online platform that

   allowed the advisers and broker-dealers to obtain research and

   manage brokerage accounts.              Id.    If authorized, end users of that

   platform were able to view the clients’ private information,

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   including Social Security and taxpayer identification numbers. Id.

   at 69-70.      Some of the defendant’s employees also had access to

   that information. Id. at 70. The plaintiff maintained a brokerage

   account with a firm that used the defendant’s platform.                 She sued,

   concerned      that   the     defendant’s     platform    left    her    private

   information vulnerable to abuse. Id. The plaintiff did not allege

   that any specific data breach occurred; only that many must have

   occurred.     Id. at 79.     The First Circuit concluded that this claim

   fell short of establishing an injury-in fact.               Id.    Because the

   plaintiff did not allege that her information had actually been

   accessed, the court reasoned that “[h]er cause of action rests

   entirely on the hypothesis that at some point an unauthorized, as-

   yet unidentified, third party might access her data and attempt to

   purloin her identity.”         Id.

             One common thread runs through each of these cases that is

   not present here.            The defendant in each had a practice of

   retaining the plaintiffs’ sensitive personal information, for one

   reason or another.       In Krottner and Reilly, it was for purposes of

   employment; in Pisciotta and Katz for financial services; and in

   Galaria and Beck for insurance or medical purposes.                There is no

   allegation here that the DNC retains private information of its

   donors that is not mandated to be disclosed to the Federal Election

   Commission     and    thus   publically     available.4    That    is,    unlike


         4
          Federal law mandates that political parties report any
   donation over $200.00 to the Federal Election Commission, as well
   as the donor’s name, mailing address, occupation, name of

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   Krottner, Pisciotta, Galaria, Beck, Reilly, and Katz, Plaintiffs do

   not allege that the DNC has access to and stores information from

   its donors, such as their Social Security or credit card numbers.

   Without such an allegation, the DNC donor Plaintiffs’ claimed

   threat of injury is too speculative to support an Article III

   injury-in-fact.     Plaintiffs Young, Lynch, and Davis’ threat of

   injury rests on speculation that the DNC, rather than some third

   party not before the Court, processed and stored information from

   their   online   donations.      Plaintiffs    Cork,   Berners-Lee,     and

   Criddle’s threat of injury is even more attenuated.           For Criddle

   and Berners-Lee, the Court must speculate that the DNC copied and

   stored the account and routing numbers from their checks onto the

   servers that were attacked. And for Cork, the Court must speculate

   she provided sensitive personal information to the DNC and that it

   was stored on the compromised servers. These “what ifs” push their

   alleged injury near sheer conjecture.

         And even if the Court assumed that the DNC did store the named

   DNC Donor Class Plaintiffs’ sensitive personal information on the

   hacked servers, Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (DE 8) still

   would not make out an injury that is “certainly impending.” Lujan,

   504 U.S. at 565.     If Krottner, Pisciotta, Galaria, Beck, Reilly,

   and Katz represent a sliding scale——arranged from least speculative

   harm to most——this case falls far closer to Katz than it does


   employer, and the date of contribution. 11 C.F.R. § 104.8.             The
   Federal Election Commission in turn makes that information
   available for public consumption.

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   Krottner.     Unlike Krottner, none of the DNC donor Plaintiffs have

   suggested they were the victim of a failed identity theft attempt.

   And unlike Pisciotta and Galaria, these Plaintiffs do not allege

   that their personal information was targeted for the purpose of

   future criminal misuse. The First Amended Complaint (DE 8) instead

   paints a picture that hackers were generally rummaging the DNC’s

   files for information pertinent to the presidential election.                  The

   named DNC Donor Plaintiffs do not allege that hackers targeted

   their information, took it, or would be able to make use of it to

   inflict some harm in the future.              See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150

   (observing courts’ “usual reluctance to endorse standing theories

   that   rest   on    speculation      about    the     decisions   of   independent

   actors.”).         As a result, this case mirrors Reilly and Beck, in

   which the Third and Fourth Circuits held that the plaintiffs’

   claimed   injury      lacked   the    degree     of    immediacy   necessary    to

   establish an injury-in-fact.          Thus, absent an “actual or imminent”

   injury, the named DNC Donor Class Plaintiffs lack standing, and

   this Court lacks jurisdiction over their claim in Count VI of the

   First Amended Complaint (DE 8).              Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.

                                   V. Conclusion

          “Federal Courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over cases where

   the parties lack standing.”            Florida Wildlife Fed’n, Inc. v. S.

   Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 647 F.3d 1296, 1302 (11th Cir. 2012).

   Because Plaintiffs do not allege a causal link between their

   donations and the DNC’s statements, they lack standing to assert


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   the fraud-type claims in Counts I, II, III, and IV of the First

   Amended Complaint (DE 8).      Their breach of fiduciary duty claim in

   Count V relies on a harm far too diffuse to constitute an injury-

   in-fact in federal court.      And their negligence claim in Count VI

   is buffered by too many layers of speculation and conjecture to

   create the immediacy of harm necessary to unlock this Court’s

   jurisdiction.     That being so, Plaintiffs have not “present[ed] a

   live case or controversy,” and the Court “must dismiss the case for

   lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”        Id.

         Accordingly, after due consideration, it is

         ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

         1. Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended

   Complaint (DE 44) be and the same is hereby GRANTED; and

         2. The above-styled cause be and the same is hereby DISMISSED

   without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

         DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward

   County, Florida, this         25th         day of August, 2017.




                                        WILLIAM J. ZLOCH
                                        Sr. United States District Judge

   Copies furnished:

   All Counsel of Record




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