Lex69 May 25th, 2019 115 Never
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- So VID stands for virtual ID, and I'm assuming you read about it in my other comment which really is as much as I know. The engineers described it as a "computer cookie" that was (at least when I was working with it daily between 2009-2014) was impossible to get rid of, change or spoof. They said it was part of their proprietary algorithm, and could not share more. I've always had my suspicions that what they were actually doing was spreading lore and folk-tales among the employees knowing it'd leak.There was never anything solid to back up this hunch though.
- So here's a rundown of what I used to look at from their side. Their Admin Panel (it was called something else that's not relevant, but I also am aware of at least a small group that works as 'spies' on forums. This site was never mentioned -paypalsucks.com was their mortal enemy - but everything is compartmentalized so I would have never known unless it was my job to know), anyway admin had all the tabs and tools you'd expect and different departments unlocked different access and took away others - for example, if a suspicious activity report is filed against you no one (even executive escalations can SEE that it was filed but the compliance department - and they don't do phones or customers. This is to avoid "tipping off" suspects where a SAR was filed in good faith. Fuck, now I'm just rambling...
- So in fraud, compliance etc, the investigatory depts you get their fraud stuff. That shows columns for every category you are imagining and then some. It then ranks it through cross referencing and the strength of the match (exe, phone is considered a weak match but in conjunction with, say, a SSN, it adds priority).
- What the analyst ends up seeing is a list of all the strongest matches for accounts. BUT this sounds a lot scarier than it is in practice. Inevitably these also create a ridiculous amount of 'false positives'. So many that actually the good majority of an agent's day is spent simply dismissing false positives and moving on. This in turn creates yet another problem of false false positives where legitimate links are dismissed due to weak links, agent error, yadda yadda. So typically (I don't know if this is still the case) either a more senior agent, or QA would take a test sample of the false positives and recheck them to create that redundancy required by their internal compliance.
- On top of all that, if you're still with me, there are also the aggregates. So this means that if they KNOW you are fucking around but you haven't hit the aggregates required by reporting, you're dismissed. However they can accumulate this if it falls with in a certain time period (which I forget, but it's a few-ish years, then use old stuff to build a new case - so it follows you, but to a degree. So the aggregates never changed during the whole time I was there, but it was always possible. I believe the information can also be accessed through FinCEN. The North American aggregate (CA and MX are only included for simplicity) is $2000, in the UK I believe it is 1000$ USD, but we were always instructed to file on everything including a UK suspect since the BoE has more stringent requirements that they didn't want to confuse us with.
- Ok, and so last bit is this, FinCen's investigatory threshold is not 2k, they just want it in their database at that number so created the external compliance requiring it. They accumulate as well, and again this number is fuzzy but I think it was either 10 or 20k with a longer time frame. Once the number is hit, they do what we did, investigate, accumulate, compile and send, only this time (we were told) is when it finally went to local jurisdictions for possible arrests and so on.
- Fuck, I lost myself with that one... Did I answer your question tho? If not, I'll try again. But hope it helps.
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