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Debunking studies and talking points (immigration)

maxred Jun 7th, 2019 6,264 Never
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  1. Before reading these responses keep in mind that they were made by other people, i just collected them.
  2.  
  3. Immigration and the Welfare State: Immigrant and Native Use Rates and Benefit Levels for Means-Tested Welfare and Entitlement Programs
  4. https://www.cato.org/publications/immigration-research-policy-brief/immigration-welfare-state-immigrant-native-use-rates
  5. https://archive.fo/bPm28
  6.  
  7. The methodology here is a joke. They said when they looked at a family of 3, with 2 illegals and 1 naturalized child, and when only the child received aid (like SNAP), they'd count that usage towards all 3 people. Of fucking course "immigrants" use less services if you trick around and skew the data like this. And that's not even all they did, that's just the first thing that jumped out at me.
  8.  
  9. If you're too lazy to find the relevant passage in their methodology:
  10.  
  11. >"For benefits delivered at the household level, the CPS data do not allow us to discern the immigration status of the intended recipients for children who live in households containing both citizens and noncitizens. As such, we assume that these benefits are split evenly among all members of each household in order to determine the value of benefits per individual".
  12.  
  13. So no, your claim is absolute bullshit. It's about as useful as saying "illegals use less welfare than natives". No shit, that's because they physically can't. We're talking about the ones than can, and do.
  14. ------------------------------------------------------------
  15. study:
  16.  
  17. Immigrants' and Native Workers: New Analysis on Longitudinal Data
  18. https://www.nber.org/papers/w19315
  19. https://web.archive.org/web/20181124104215/https://www.nber.org/papers/w19315
  20.  
  21. response:
  22.  
  23. https://mobile.twitter.com/heywildrich/status/1066118937451081728/photo/1
  24. https://archive.fo/LXi1J
  25.  
  26. bonus response
  27.  
  28. that study hes talking about examines the years '91 to 2008
  29. thats like nearly a decade before they took in a mass of refugees anyways
  30.  
  31. paper added:
  32. https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/gborjas/publications/working%20papers/BM2016.pdf
  33. https://web.archive.org/web/20181124104856/https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/gborjas/publications/working%20papers/BM2016.pdf
  34.  
  35. ××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××
  36.  
  37. A recent paper that Borjas helped contribute to:
  38.  
  39. “The contribution of foreign migration to local labour market adjustment”
  40.  
  41. By Michael Amior, November 2018
  42. http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1582.pdf
  43.  
  44. Finds a significant crowd out effect and moderately negative impacts on native employment for the US
  45.  
  46. ××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××
  47.  
  48. Also this one uses employer-employee data from denmark for around the same time period and finds negative effects on wages at the most disaggregated level
  49.  
  50. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2012.01720.x
  51. https://web.archive.org/web/20181124105920/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2012.01720.x
  52. ××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××
  53. If anyone brigns up that Peri thing again show them this study
  54. Its for the US and says that
  55. " In contrast to the spatial approach, our results using the same data but employing the occupational approach yield consistently negative net effects of the proportion immigrant on the wages of native workers during the period from 1994 to 2006. “
  56. a: "This occupational approach avoids the bias that is inherent in the spatial approach due to the endogenous nature of immigrants' decisions about where to reside and the economic opportunities of local areas."
  57. the spatial approach is the one that Borjas uses, so even though his work is good the occupation approach is better because
  58. a: "This occupational approach avoids the bias that is inherent in the spatial approach due to the endogenous nature of immigrants' decisions about where to reside and the economic opportunities of local areas.”
  59. and b: " For example, by using occupation as the indicator of skill, Orrenius and Zavodny (2007) bypass the estimation problem created by skills downgrading in more restrictive models.”
  60.  
  61. the last part is from here https://www.nap.edu/read/23550/chapter/9#228
  62. https://web.archive.org/web20181130123032/http://www.nap.edu/read/23550/chapter/9
  63.  
  64. and this is said study
  65.  
  66. Immigration and the Wages of Native Workers: Spatial versus Occupational Approaches
  67. by ChangHwan Kim  & Arthur Sakamoto
  68. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00380237.2013.766834
  69. ------------------------------------------------------------
  70. Response from Matty the slav to Sean Last
  71.  
  72. https://ideasanddata.wordpress.com/2018/08/06/ethnic-diversity-and-social-cohesion-a-critique/
  73. https://archive.fo/ltRCr
  74.  
  75. “Let's presume that diversity only marginally affects cohesion once you tease out SES. This still doesn't dismiss the optimality of an ethnostate. If you optimized all of the variables in these models (ones which have decent r^2 at least) but treated diversity as trivial, then you'd still be missing out on that marginal increase in cohesion that homogeneity predicts. That's sort of what the model tells us. So your obsession with SES being greater than diversity in increasing cohesion is absurd, as no ethnocentrist has ever suggested diversity trumps all other factors, just that it has an effect. Rather, these designs don't control for genetic diversity directly, rather implicitly. This study does: http://www.nber.org/papers/w21079 What you'll find in this study is that the models' r^2 are consistently 10-80%, depending on the model design. What is found on Table 12, for instance, is that an increase of genetic diversity, after controlling for a variety of geographic variables, predicts a decrease in interpersonal trust. All the other tables tell the exact same story: genetic Diversity causes civil conflict and ethnic conflict even after controlling for a variety of geographic, ethno-social, and institutional factors. As for the mechanism behind this, they actually bring up sociobiology as a potential explanation (though they don't cite anything on genetic similarity theory, [See: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2005.00216.x] which is the lens that I see these results through, it's still consistent with genetic Similarity theory.) As to how this all relates to prescriptions, it's clear that encouraging people to be around those who are more genetically similar to themselves, on the societal and individual level, will mitigate the frequency and severity of both civil conflict and interethnic conflict.
  76. Even if we dismiss trust or cohesion as bases for our prescriptions, we can still use conflict-laden bases to argue for the ethnostate. I'd appreciate critiques on this. I really want to create a strong basis for ethnocentrism.
  77.  
  78. Edit: I scoured the literature on this niche study of diversity and found a replication of my study published 4 months ago. It basically confirms Everything from the 2015 paper with more sophisticated methods. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=http://ftp.iza.org/dp11487.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwjc9LHKuY7dAhVH2IMKHa6xDnUQFjAHegQIIBAB&usg=AOvVaw0dltqL7YvYeYhjvmb_cTv5 SEAN, you're wrong on this buddy. Diversity does not tell you that increased interethnic interaction has occurred. Segregation is real. Atomization is mediating this. How the fuck do you not put this into context.”
  79.  
  80. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ohYRRiWvre0&feature=youtu.be
  81.  
  82. response to video:
  83. “I noticed you made an error in your analysis of the 2007 study by Robert Putnam, “E Pluribus Unum” You makes the comment that because a value shown was about 0.04, the size of the effect of social capital due to diversity was about 0.04. There were two data points shown that were 0.04 - S.E. and Beta. If you were referring to S.E or standard error, this would be a large misinterpretation of what standard error is. Standard error only tells us how far away the effect on a sample may be when applied to the whole population, ergo if you want to show something is a significant value, you want the standard error to be very low. So, what the standard error of 0.04 tells us it that the correlation of diversity on social cohesion within this sample is very applicable to the rest of the population. The other number is the beta value, which you would also be misinterpreting. The beta value in a regression analysis tells us the probability of accepting the null hypothesis or the un-relatedness of something. Like the standard error, lower is better, and therefore we expect this study to very much reject the idea these two things aren’t related. The more important number we’re looking for is the r2 value which is 0.26, meaning about 26% of the variation in social capital can be attributed to diversity. You stated this later on, but I thought this was an important thing to point out.”
  84.  
  85. Another response to one of the video
  86.  
  87. “I wasn't very impressed with the solidity of the numbers and then I noticed this: 5:34 Dincer 2011 Ethnic Diversity and Trust I hear Sean say: "...with trust peaking when diversity was at .34..." I read on screen: '...trust is minimized when the [diversity index] is equal to .34.' A peak is the opposite of a minimum. So I looked up the study: www [dot] laserwords [dot] co [dot] in/offprint/coep_29-2/coep_215_web [dot] pdf Dincer made a graph (figure 2, page 290) with trust displayed against diversity in the form of the Fractionalization Index, which basically means the chance 2 random people have the same ethnicity. Based on the assumption that mono-ethnic societies have high trust, but also that a society with every member having a different ethnicity (=100% ethnic atomisation) having high trust (?), a U-shaped graph is expected by the writer.
  88. When we look at figure 2 we see first the regression line going down, indicating that trust decreases with diversity. This is supported with a shitload of data. The slope decreases until a plateau forms at about .40 diversity on the x-axis. Again: Supported by a lot of data. This roughly means trust is reaching a minimum when only 60% of the people in society is of your race. When there is only 41% of the native population left, there is 1 data point in the right hand data-starved area of figure 2 that pulls the regression line up to suggest trust is increasing with high levels of diversity. This is what is supposed to confirm the U-shaped graph theory. I went through the text and I can't find where Dincer got the minimum at 0.34 which—in my interpretation of figure 2—should be at ~0.50. But then again, I'm not accustomed to humanities statistical protocols. I am merely a hard sciences guy. However, looking at the data in this article, I see overwhelming confirmation of the general thesis of Putnam up to around the 50% diversity area.”
  89. ------------------------------------------------------------
  90. Response to Cathy Young’s tweet
  91. https://mobile.twitter.com/CathyYoung63/status/1090162779183566848
  92. http://archive.is/R5L79
  93.  
  94. Cute. How about instead of arguing theory you look at reality which shows a completely different picture  https://www.nber.org/papers/w23153.pdf  
  95. https://web.archive.org/web/20190129103113/https://www.nber.org/papers/w23153.pdf
  96. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2006.09.006  https://doi.org/10.1080/00380237.2013.766834
  97.  
  98. “Lmao assuming that their demand always offsets the shock to labor supply is ignorant
  99. Especially when you're importing millions of low income, uneducated people who fundamentally consume less $ value goods than natives”
  100.  
  101. “I'm also sick of these dweebs who cite that Card study and refuse to acknowledge  that long run analyses always bias the wage effect to zero
  102. Like no shit there's no long run effect you fucking moron that result is a by-product of a mathematical assumption used to construct a model of what the labor market might look like in 10 - 20 years
  103. It has nothing to do with the data”
  104. ------------------------------------------------------------
  105. Response to this study
  106.  
  107. Macroeconomic evidence suggests that asylum seekers are not a “burden” for Western European countries
  108. http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/6/eaaq0883
  109. https://archive.fo/NDoWD
  110.  
  111. "study that says asylum seekers are not burden to Europe" bullshit.
  112.  
  113. 1.    "economic and fiscal effects 1985 to 2015"
  114.  
  115. Why only till 2015. The Study been published 10 days ago, they would have been able to gather all economical data for 2016, if not 2017, as it been already published by the OECD and others.
  116.  
  117. 2.    „ displaced persons“ (…) „more than 1 million asylum applications“
  118.  
  119. Conflating definitions. A general theme, that everyone is a displaced person, refugee and not a migrant.
  120.  
  121. Conflating legal definitions. In Germany only around 0,7% of asylum seekers got in 2015 the refugee status respect. the entitlement to be refugee, especially because of “safe third country rule” written into the German constitution Art §16a GG. Only the enhanced “asylum law” § 3 Abs. 1 AsylG rewrote and ascribed refugee attributions (48,5% in 2015), which do not make them entitled asylum seekers respec. refugee.  Even in germany there are four different categories, as well as +20 different legal statues respec. residence permit.
  122.  
  123. http://magaimg.net/img/6zo5.png
  124. http://archive.ph/3vhPH
  125.  
  126. 3. "Eastern European countries"
  127.  
  128. Before reading the whole studies, i know already that the premises will fall because of the east european countries. They did not have mostly any  refugees and the macroeconomical outlook was also positive without refugees.
  129.  
  130. 4. "only applicants who obtain refugee status are allowed to settle long-term in their host countries"
  131.  
  132. No. In Germany by law, it is mostly impossible to deport someone - even serious criminals, it can take years. After several year living illegally in Germany, illegals can apply for a permanent resident permit... BTW not only asylum seekers can claim social benefits, but also people with a rejected asylum application as well as people who should be deported!
  133.  
  134. 5. "we use real GDP per capita and unemployment rate to assess macroeconomic performance"
  135.  
  136. Conflating the meaning of GDP, it describes the productivity  oft the "working class" respec. everyone contributing to a productive output. Especially Asylum seekers in at least the first 6 years are mostly in all cases not productive, as illiteracy, cognitive disabilities, no basic education etc. is prevalent.  In unemployment statistics - especially in Germany - they are not COUNTED at all, as they are not employable. And the european unemployment statistics of the last 40 years been very much tampered with respec. manipulated.
  137.  
  138. 6. "Keynesian"
  139.  
  140.  
  141. 7. the data and figures
  142.  
  143. Are simply put shit no value.
  144.  
  145.  
  146. Why I discuss this shit article?
  147.  
  148. The authors of that shit study did not mention. the FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY GAP, which describes the burden for the state and in consequence the tax payers! In Germany there been several prominent, publicly, politically acknowledged studies, which discus in detail the "burden" of migrants and refugees.
  149.  
  150. Bonin, Holger (2014): Der Beitrag von Ausländern und künftiger Zuwanderung zum deutschen Staatshaushalt (in english "The contribution of foreigners and future immigration to the German state budget")
  151. https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/publications/publication/did/der-beitrag-von-auslaendern-und-kuenftiger-zuwanderung-zum-deutschen-staatshaushalt/
  152. https://archive.fo/xdMmN
  153.  
  154. Native germans over their life cost the state, 3.100 €
  155. Migrants over their life in Germany cost the state: 79.100 €
  156.  
  157. Unfortunately this is the study! which been used to start politically the mass migration in 2015! The study argued there is a need for consolidation to change the demographic effects of the debt/GDP-ratio with mass migration.
  158.  
  159. Debt/GDP-ratio in Germany is today at 64,1%, thx to south europe, EZB, and the working people
  160.  
  161. Translation of table 5
  162.  
  163. http://magaimg.net/img/6zo6.png
  164. http://archive.ph/LaAvc
  165.  
  166. if there is no migration a Debt/GDP-ratio would be 146,6%
  167. if there is a migration of 300.000 people a year a Debt/GDP-ratio would be 234,3%
  168.  
  169. But if the mass migration is controlled - Table 7, everything would be fine.
  170.  
  171. http://magaimg.net/img/6zo7.png
  172. http://archive.ph/3cyLl
  173.  
  174. Costs of refugees?
  175.  
  176. Bahnsen, Lewe Christoph; Manthei, Gerrit; Raffelhüschen, Bernd (2016): Ehrbarer Staat? Die Generationenbilanz. Update 2016: Zur fiskalischen Dividende der Zuwanderung https://freidok.uni-freiburg.de/data/13394
  177. https://perma.cc/MG2T-GFY2
  178.  
  179. Same method as Bonin, with 6 scenarios for refugees.
  180.  
  181. Best case scenario (integration as normal migrants do within 6 years and work): Refugees over their life in Germany cost the state: 450.000 €
  182. Worst case scenario: Refugees over their life in Germany cost the state: 900.000 €
  183.  
  184. These are "burdens"...
  185.  
  186. problem is, the studies are only in german, and the FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY GAP is a very important indicator
  187. ------------------------------------------------------------
  188. Article:
  189.  
  190. The Benefits of Immigration: Addressing Key Myths
  191. https://www.mercatus.org/publications/benefits-of-immigration-key-myths
  192. https://web.archive.org/web/20190223172008/https://www.mercatus.org/publications/benefits-of-immigration-key-myths
  193.  
  194. "The timing is odd since immigration into the United States has slowed sharply."
  195.  
  196. I guess it depends what your timeline is. Looking at US history as a whole, these are very high levels of immigration. There was almost none 1923-1965.
  197.  
  198. "When immigrants enter the labor force, they increase the productive capacity of the economy and raise GDP."
  199.  
  200. This is an argument used by people who don't understand per capita. All population growth raises the GDP. China and India have high GDPs because they have high populations. That doesn't mean they're nice places to live.
  201.  
  202. "Their incomes rise, but so do those of natives. "
  203.  
  204. This is technically correct, but only sounds good when you don't differentiate between sectors. Immigrants tend to be concentrated in certain sectors, which drives up the supply of labor in those sectors, lowering wages, while increasing wages for workers that don't have to compete. What ends up happening is that the losses are concentrated among regular workers, while the benefits are concentrated among management. It's more of a wealth transfer.
  205.  
  206. "while a small share of additional GDP accrues to natives — typically 0.2 to 0.4 percent — it still amounts to $36 to $72 billion per year."
  207.  
  208. The absolute dollar value is irrelevant when it's, as they admit, such a small amount on the national level. And this small boost is concentrated among management and owners of capital, while the workers competing with immigrants get lower wages.
  209.  
  210. "immigrants grease the wheels of the labor market by flowing into industries and areas where there is a relative need for workers "
  211.  
  212. In other words, industries where corporations want to pay lower wages.
  213.  
  214. "During and after World War II, Mexican immigrants were instrumental in alleviating shortages arising from the war effort."
  215.  
  216. Incredibly misleading. 1923-1965 saw historic lows of immigration. I guess there were a few, but this is a very odd time period to pick when you're trying to brag about the benefits of immigration.
  217.  
  218. "the rise in high-skilled immigration, a pronounced trend since the 1990s, has been linked to innovation, specifically to higher patenting rates among immigrants"
  219.  
  220. Making a lot of patents says nothing about the quality of the products.
  221.  
  222. "Forty-four percent of medical scientists are foreign born, for example, as are 42 percent of computer software developers."
  223.  
  224. Sounds like an excuse not to invest in education for Americans. There's no incentive when we can just import unlimited amounts of professionals.
  225.  
  226. "International migration is not much different than domestic migration, at least not in terms of economics. "
  227.  
  228. This is... a really disingenuous argument. Internal migration isn't driven by the same economic disparities. People moving from Texas to California aren't desperately flooding in from third world living conditions looking for any job they can get.
  229.  
  230. “Immigration significantly increases GDP per capita in advanced economies.”
  231.  
  232. Does it? This literally contradicts the last article you posted, which said immigration only increases it by a small amount. In either case, it's ignoring the distribution of wealth. See previous post for how GDP per capita could theoretically increase while harming many workers and mostly benefiting managers and owners of capital.
  233.  
  234. "Immigrants are more likely to start a business than native-born Americans, whether it’s a corner shop or high-tech startup."
  235.  
  236. Meaningless. This tells me nothing about the quality of the business. Obviously immigrants are more likely to be self employed, someone has to run those little Mexican groceries that only other immigrants shop at.
  237.  
  238. "Among startup companies that were valued at more than $1 billion in 2016, half were founded by immigrants. "
  239.  
  240. Okay and how many startups actually survive long term? Why did they measure only startup companies for this statistic?
  241.  
  242. "Among Fortune 500 companies, 40 percent were founded by immigrants or their children."
  243.  
  244. They don't actually provide a citation, but if they're talking about the study that I'm thinking of, it actually measured for "founders or co-founders". Big companies will often have, like, 6 co-founders, so this is meaningless.
  245.  
  246. “More than half of the high-skilled technology workers and entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley are foreign born.”
  247.  
  248. This is just a way of avoiding solving our own problems. There is never going to be any incentive to educate Americans if we just keep importing people.
  249.  
  250. "Immigrants extend the sustainability of federal retirement programs by slowing the rise in the ratio of retirees to workers."
  251.  
  252. If you didn't have enough kids to help you during retirement, this is 100% your fault.
  253.  
  254. "The most cost-effective policy for reducing illegal immigration remains the expansion of opportunities for legal entry and work."
  255.  
  256. This is like saying "we can reduce speeding by increasing the speed limit". I guess it's technically true, but it's missing the point.
  257.  
  258. "The rate of US immigration today is well below its historical average and below that of many other advanced nations."
  259.  
  260. I don't know if this is actually true, but, in either case, it's irrelevant. All it means is that the US has had a high historical average.
  261.  
  262. "There is no evidence that immigrants cause higher unemployment among Americans or depress average wages."
  263.  
  264. Notice the careful wording. AVERAGE wages. Yes, because management and owners of capital benefit from immigration and drag up the average at the expense of workers that actually have to compete with them.
  265.  
  266. "For more than 90 percent of American workers, immigration either raises wages or has no impact."
  267.  
  268. How many does it actually raise it for? If it raises it for 10% that are in management and already making good money, has no impact for 80%, and lowers it for 10%, that's still a negative impact. In either case, I'm doubtful this statistic is accurate, because there's no way they measured the impact on every American worker accounting for every variable.
  269.  
  270. " Immigrants are less likely to commit crimes or to be incarcerated than native-born Americans."
  271.  
  272. This is a fun one. Immigrants have lower crime rates because the ones who do commit serious crimes end up getting deported. The reason they have lower crime rates is BECAUSE we have immigration laws. Obviously they're not going to be counted in the incarceration rates if they're gone.
  273.  
  274. "Most immigrants pay more in taxes over their lifetimes than they consume in government benefits."
  275.  
  276. Notice the careful wording. This is another one of those statements that's technically correct, but doesn't mean what you think it does. It doesn't say that immigrants pay more than they consume, it just says that they pay more than they consume in "government benefits", which is a very narrow category. People have much more costs than just "government benefits". All that infrastructure that needs to be built to accommodate more people costs a lot of money. Schools cost money. There's a lot more costs than just welfare.
  277. ------------------------------------------------------------
  278.  
  279. Study:
  280. Rethinking the Effects of Immigration on Wages
  281. http://www.nber.org/papers/w12497
  282. http://archive.is/sOvqW
  283.  
  284. by
  285. Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano
  286. Giovanni Peri
  287.  
  288. “I hope you know that the sole reason Peri gets this estimate of a very slight positive increase in wages is because he assumes a large complementary effect between immigrants and natives, the only problem is that a Peri co-author Ethan Lewis has found that this complementary effect is very modest i.e. no where near as strong as Peri thinks it is.
  289.  
  290. (Footnote 7 he says it's very modest)  https://www.dartmouth.edu/~ethang/w18310.pdf
  291.  
  292. https://web.archive.org/web/20160408120614/https://www.dartmouth.edu/~ethang/w18310.pdf
  293.  
  294. Peri also groups kids still in high school with high school dropouts which is really fucking stupid, when you realize how retarded it is the effect is completely gone:
  295. http://www.nber.org/papers/w13887”
  296. http://archive.is/cGOdr
  297.  
  298. ------------------------------------------------------------
  299. Regarding Borjas study where he used small sample size
  300.  
  301. study: http://www.nber.org/papers/w21588.pdf
  302.  
  303. https://web.archive.org/web/20180602092700/http://www.nber.org/papers/w21588.pdf
  304.  
  305. THE WAGE IMPACT OF THE MARIELITOS:
  306. A REAPPRAISAL
  307.  
  308. by George J. Borjas
  309.  
  310. response:
  311.  
  312. You obviously don't understand how measuring labor market impacts works. Borjas used a small sample size because the ACS data used only contains small amounts of individuals who had qualifications that would quantify them as being "competing workers" with immigrants. If you want a study of his with a large sample size then here it is; analysis using 40 years of data finds significant negative impacts on wages
  313.  
  314. THE LABOR DEMAND CURVE IS DOWNWARD SLOPING:
  315. REEXAMINING THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON THE
  316. LABOR MARKET*
  317. GEORGE J. BORJAS
  318. https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/gborjas/publications/journal/QJE2003.pdf
  319.  
  320. https://web.archive.org/web/20180710004616/https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/gborjas/publications/journal/QJE2003.pdf
  321. ××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××
  322. But hell, you don't even need Borjas. Here's some more
  323.  
  324. "We found consistent with previous research by Card and Lewis (2005), that Mexican immigrants have a significant (negative) impact on wages for natives in occupations with high school level education requirements."
  325.  
  326. The Impact of Mexican Immigrants on
  327. U.S. Wage Structure  2007
  328. Maude Toussaint-Comeau
  329. http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/working_papers/2007/wp2007_24.pdf
  330.  
  331. https://web.archive.org/web/20100615230629/http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/working_papers/2007/wp2007_24.pdf
  332. ××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××
  333. The impact of EU and Non-EU immigration
  334. on British wages 2017
  335. Stephen Nickell and Jumana Saleheen
  336.  
  337. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1186%2Fs40176-017-0096-0.pdf
  338. ××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××
  339. Latinos, Blacks, and the Competition for Low-Skill Jobs: Examining Regional Variations in the Effect of Immigration on Homicide in the U.S. 2014
  340. Raymond E. Barranco
  341. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02732173.2014.895636
  342. ××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××
  343. Get out of your neoliberal hugbox, chubby idiots like Noah Smith have literally no idea what they're talking about.
  344.  
  345. Start on page 3 https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/03-16-16%20Borjas%20Testimony.pdf
  346.  
  347. (Testimony Before the    Senate    Committee    on the    Judiciary Subcommittee on    Immigration and the National    Interest
  348. March 16, 2016
  349.  
  350. https://web.archive.org/web/20160510105311/https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/03-16-16%20Borjas%20Testimony.pdf)
  351.  
  352. "The main criticism of my analysis is that it is based on a small sample of workers , a fact that I explicitly acknowledge in my paper. There are only around 20 or so workers per year in my sample, which is why Figure 1 shows a 3-year moving average of the data, so that each data point is based on a sample of around 60 observations. But there is an alternative andvery convincing way of showing that something did indeed happen in Miami even when the sample is larger. Let’s pool the data for the years between 1976 and 1979, and call itthe “before” period. Similarly, let’s pool the data for the  years between 1981 and 1986, and call it the “after” period. How does the before - after wage drop experienced by Miami’s low-skill workers compare to the wage change experienced by comparable workers in other cities at  that time?  Figure 2 shows the  distribution of wage changes across all cities. The wage drop experienced by Miami’s low-skill workers was the largest drop seen in any local labor market in the United States."
  353. ------------------------------------------------------------
  354. A response to study:
  355.  
  356. Immigration and National Wages: Clarifying the Theory and the Empirics
  357. Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano, Giovanni Peri
  358.  
  359. http://www.nber.org/papers/w14188
  360. http://archive.is/pMcmX
  361.  
  362. "I'm not even sure you read the study you linked,  but Peri and his butt buddies even admit that for the most accurate and observable estimates (short run) the wage effect is still negative, and significantly negative for previous immigrants.
  363.  
  364. You keep citing Peri so I'll cite some based Borjas. Borjas estimated the wage impact for a similar time frame using a carbon copy complementary effect and still found a significant negative effect on wages for high school dropouts.  (We wanted workers Table 7.2)
  365.  
  366. All of that's being generous, if Peri and Co. had used more established statistical methods then his complementary effect would entirely disappear
  367. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e341/70d5120f099230fe07632ef0c38c3fbb6af7.pdf
  368.  
  369. https://web.archive.org/web/20180825065130/https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e341/70d5120f099230fe07632ef0c38c3fbb6af7.pdf
  370. ------------------------------------------------------------
  371. A response to article by Emily Moon AUG 22, 2018
  372.  
  373. “RESEARCH TELLS US THAT IMMIGRATION DOES NOT LEAD TO HIGHER CRIME RATES”
  374. https://psmag.com/.amp/social-justice/research-tells-us-that-immigration-does-not-lead-to-higher-crime-rates?__twitter_impression=true
  375. https://archive.fo/f14cv
  376.  
  377. The first study
  378.  
  379.  
  380. DOES UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION INCREASE VIOLENT CRIME?*
  381. by MICHAEL T. LIGHT and TY MILLER
  382. First published: 25 March 2018
  383. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1745-9125.12175
  384.  
  385. >analyzed population-level crime rates from all 50 states from 1990 to 2014 and found that the relationship between immigration and crime is "generally negative."
  386.  
  387. So they admit that it can cause crime in some cases, epic.
  388.  
  389. >"Increases in the undocumented immigrant population within states are associated with significant decreases in the prevalence of violence,"
  390.  
  391. That's because most of the time undocumented immigrants settle in  already established immigrant areas, or enclaves. A homogeneous enclave provides a protection effect that deters crime. Even if undocumented immigrants dont settle in established areas research has shown that immigration induces a strong "native flight" from these areas, thus turning those areas into immigrant enclaves over time.
  392. Native Out-Migration and Neighborhood Immigration in New Destinations
  393. Matthew Hall and Kyle Crowder
  394. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13524-014-0350-5
  395. https://archive.fo/PSevS
  396. ××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××
  397. The second study
  398.  
  399. The Criminalization of Immigration in the United States
  400. By
  401. Walter Ewing, Ph.D., Daniel E. Martínez, Ph.D. and Rubén G. Rumbaut, Ph.D. 2015
  402. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/criminalization-immigration-united-states
  403. https://archive.fo/mUUkC
  404.  
  405. >A 2015 study found that, in the same period, the immigration population more than tripled in the United States; from 1990 to 2013, the violent crime rate decreased by 48 percent, according to Federal Bureau of Investigation data.
  406.  
  407. Correlation doesn't equal causation. Study below shows it's bullshit
  408.  
  409. >both overall and black homicide declined the least in areas with the highest levels of immigration; and (4) we find no evidence that immigration indirectly lowered non‐immigrant crime rates by revitalizing communities. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings.
  410.  
  411. Reconsidering the Unusual Suspect: Immigration and the 1990s Crime Decline
  412. By Raymond E. Barranco  Edward S. Shihadeh David Allan Evans
  413. 31 July 2017
  414. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/soin.12195
  415. http://archive.is/4YyXN
  416. ××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××
  417. Third study
  418.  
  419. Criminal Immigrants in Texas
  420. https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/irpb-4-updated.pdf
  421. https://web.archive.org/web/20180822235718/https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/irpb-4-updated.pdf
  422.  
  423. >A 2018 study from the Cato Institute found that immigrants have far lower arrest and criminal conviction rates than native-born Americans—a pattern that study author Alex Nowrasteh says holds for all crimes.
  424.  
  425. The trend doesn't hold true for all immigrants. European and Asian immigrants are much less likely to commit crimes than Hispanic immigrants. This holds true for illegal immigrants as well.
  426.  
  427. one thing I would say here is that it would be pretty stupid to just compare "native" crimes to illegals (most of which are hispanic)
  428. all crime statistics should be broken down by race. Of course, they don't do this for a variety of reasons (some legitimate)
  429.  
  430. You'll see the homicide rate is literally twice the rate of legal immigrants and only 0.5% less than natives
  431. thats still a fuckton of murders
  432. preventable ones
  433.  
  434. Not to mention that the data is expressed "Per 100,000 population", which is ridiculously dishonest. Crimes should be expressed compared to the size of that particular group e.g. what proportion of illegal immigrants commit homicide, etc. compared to natives/legal immigrants.
  435.  
  436. Nowrasteh's Texas study didn't include a breakdwon by ethnicity because apparently the Texas DOJ didn't  have any data breaking it down like that. But it's evident that the homicide rate for illegal aliens is significantly higher than legal immigrants.
  437. ××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××
  438. Fourth study
  439.  
  440.  
  441. Criminal Immigrants: Their Numbers, Demographics, and Countries of Origin
  442. https://www.cato.org/publications/immigration-reform-bulletin/criminal-immigrants-their-numbers-demographics-countries#full
  443. https://web.archive.org/web/20180104072252/https://www.cato.org/publications/immigration-reform-bulletin/criminal-immigrants-their-numbers-demographics-countries
  444.  
  445. http://magaimg.net/img/60av.png
  446. http://archive.is/B7g5b
  447.  
  448. You can clearly see that African americans offset the native incarceration rate by a lot, for whatever reason.
  449. Some immigrants commit less crime than others, same with natives, the only difference is that we can choose which immigrants we bring into America. We can't do that for natives. Illegal immigrants have significantly higher incarceration rates than legal immigrants, and hispanic illegals (which make up the majority of illegal immigrants) have a significantly higher incarceration rate than white and asian natives
  450. ××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××××
  451. Fifth study
  452.  
  453. Comparing Patterns and Predictors of Immigrant Offending Among a Sample of Adjudicated Youth
  454. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10964-013-0045-z
  455. http://archive.is/udbRC
  456.  
  457. >A 2014 study of juvenile offenders in the Journal of Youth and Justice found recent immigrants have "significantly lower" rates of violent or property crime, although second-generation immigrants commit crimes at a level more similar to their native-born peers.
  458.  
  459. Well it seems that the effect of less crime goes away in the second generation and regresses back to the mean. I guess this offsets the less crime meme
  460.  
  461. It's good to remember that the negative association between immigration and crime is very weak
  462.  
  463. Immigration and Crime: Assessing a Contentious Issue
  464. Graham C. Ousey and Charis E. Kubrin
  465. https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-criminol-032317-092026
  466. ------------------------------------------------------------
  467. comment mentions that illegal immigrants only responsable for 1% of illegal and property crimes, also mentions Mariel
  468.  
  469. reply:
  470.  
  471. And yet that 1% of preventable crime is responsible for the deaths of over 32,000 Americans
  472. https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/693162.pdf (page 26 + 32)
  473.  
  474. I don't know where youre getting your bullshit numbers about the Mariel, but even assuming you're right the wages of the most vulnerable groups, low skill minorities, saw a significant negative decline.
  475. https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/gborjas/publications/journal/ILRR2017.pdf (p. 1082)
  476.  
  477. https://web.archive.org/web/20190325201314/https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/gborjas/publications/journal/ILRR2017.pdf
  478.  
  479. The Mariel was just one natural experiment, if you want to look at the whole impact of immigration on wages you'll find significant wage losses for the groups who need wage raises the most
  480. https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/gborjas/publications/journal/QJE2003.pdf
  481.  
  482. https://web.archive.org/web/20190325201350/https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/gborjas/publications/journal/QJE2003.pdf
  483.  
  484. Get out of your neoliberal hugbox, the fact you still parrot outdated talking points on immigration shows how insulated you are from opposing arguments
  485. ------------------------------------------------------------
  486. Another comment mentioning benefits of immigration including inovation
  487.  
  488. reply:
  489.  
  490. Okay at this point you're spamming lolbertard articles and I'm not going to sit here and read through every single one to satisfy you
  491.  
  492. High skilled immigrants are responsible for technology and innovation. Foreign born hispanics have some of the lowest skill selectivity out of any immigrant group (https://medium.com/@NoahCarl/immigrant-groups-that-are-more-skill-selected-have-higher-average-incomes-b97f09b2bbe2,
  493. http://archive.is/3XjSl) and are virtually non-existent  in terms of representation regarding innovation (http://www2.itif.org/2016-demographics-of-innovation.pdf, page 25, https://web.archive.org/web/20190325202021/http://www2.itif.org/2016-demographics-of-innovation.pdf).
  494.  
  495. Massive unskilled immigration isn't sending America into the future. It's holding us back, immigrants from the third world have intensive welfare usage rates (http://ftp.iza.org/dp4659.pdf, p. 11, https://web.archive.org/web/20190325202120/http://ftp.iza.org/dp4659.pdf)  and are a net negative  on the budget (Table 2 and page 3 https://www.dallasfed.org/en/research/papers/2017/~/media/documents/research/papers/2017/wp1704.pdf, https://web.archive.org/web/20190325202200/https://www.dallasfed.org/en/research/papers/2017/~/media/documents/research/papers/2017/wp1704.pdf)
  496.  
  497. You can keep hiding in your libertarian bubble and ignoring the laws of supply and demand, that's fine with me, but people have been seriously affected by Immigration. Particularly minorities in the US which you're willing to throw under the bus for the sake of muh GDP
  498.  
  499. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02732173.2014.895636
  500. http://archive.is/v5pHY
  501.  
  502. http://www.nber.org/papers/w12518.pdf
  503. https://web.archive.org/web/20190325205518/https://www.nber.org/papers/w12518.pdf
  504.  
  505. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236795101_Latino_Employment_and_Black_Violence_The_Unintended_Consequence_of_US_Immigration_Policy
  506. https://web.archive.org/web/20190325205822/https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236795101_Latino_Employment_and_Black_Violence_The_Unintended_Consequence_of_US_Immigration_Policy
  507.  
  508. http://www.nber.org/papers/w23330
  509. http://archive.is/K9iEU
  510. ------------------------------------------------------------
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