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- v.
- CONTENTS
- __________________________________________
- INTRODUCTION. page
- 1 The word "Philosophy" as here employed, 1
- 2 The two main requisitions of philosophy, 2
- 3 Which of them is the more stringent, 2
- 4 The value of systems determined by a reference to these requisitions, 2
- 5 An unreasoned system of no value, because at variance with definition of philosophy, 3
- 6 Because, though true, it cannot be certain, 3
- 7 Because of no use as a mental discipline, 3
- 8 A reasoned system, though not true, has some value as an exercise of reason, 4
- 9 It complies more closely with definition of philosophy than the other, 4
- 10 But a system should be both true and reasoned, 5
- 11 Systems of philosophy are unreasoned hitherto, 6
- 12 The present state of philosophy described, 6
- 13 ''First'', How is this state to be ''explained''? ''Secondly'', How ''remedied''? 7
- 14 First, it is explained (§§ 14-31) by philosophy not being reasoned, 8
- 15 No good can be expected so long as philosophy is not reasoned, 8
- 16 The masks of philosophy, 9
- 17 Its unsatisfactory state further accounted for. The globe of speculation, 11
- 18 Explanation continued. ''First'' principles always come out ''last'', 12
- 19 Illustrations of this from language and grammar, 13
- 20 Illustration continued, 14
- 21 Illustration from logic, 15
- 22 Illustration from law, 15
- 23 Application to philosophy. Here, too, ''first'' principles come out ''last'', 16
- 24 These principles, though operative in philosophy, are unnoticed and unknown, 17
- 25 Hence philosophy is nowhere a scheme reasoned throughout, 18
- 26 The repudiation of necessary truths, a further retarding cause, 19
- 27 What necessary truth is, 20
- 28 Its criterion is "the law of contradiction." Law explained, 21
- 29 Its criterion is ''not'' ready acceptance, 22
- vi. CONTENTS
- 30 Return. Philosophy deals with necessary truths—therefore retarded by their prescription, 23
- 31 How ill the necessary truths hare fared in Germany and in our own country, 24
- 32 ''Secondly'', How is the unsatisfactory state of philosophy to be ''remedied''? Short answer, 26
- 33 A remedial system uniting truth and reason, not impossible, 28
- 34 Single canon for the right use of reason, 28
- 35 This system of Institutes claims both truth and demonstration, but rather demonstration than truth, 29
- 36 It is a body of necessary truth. Its pretensions stated, 30
- 37 An objection to its method stated and obviated, 31
- 38 The polemical character of this system, 31
- 39 Why philosophy must be polemical. She exists only to correct the inadvertencies of ordinary thinking, 32
- 40 This might be abundantly proved by the testimony of philosophers, 33
- 41 The object (or business to do) of philosophy renders her essentially polemical, 33
- 42 The charge of disrespect which might be supposed to attach to philosophy on account of her polemical character, obviated, 34
- 43 This system also adverse to psychology—and why, 34
- 44 ''What'' philosophy has ''to do'', again distinctly stated, 36
- 45 Its positive object still more distinctly stated. Definition of metaphysics 36
- 46 ''Why'' philosophy undertakes this object, 38
- 47 ''How'' philosophy goes to work. Adherence to canon—proposition and counter-proposition 38
- 48 Further explanations as to ''how'' philosophy goes to work, 40
- 49 Advantages of this method, 41
- 50 Disadvantages of not contrasting distinctly the true and the false, 41
- 51 General unintelligibility of systems is due to their neglect to exhibit this contrast, 42
- 52 This system contrasts distinctly the true and the false, 45
- 53 The three sections of this institute. Arrangement explained and proved to be essential (§§ 54-62), 46
- 54 The section called ''ontology'' naturally comes ''first'',—but is truly ''last'' in order, 46
- 55 It must be made to revolve away from us, in order to bring round the epistemology, which, though it naturally comes last, is truly first in order, 47
- 56 ''Epistemology'' and ''ontology'' the two main divisions of philosophy, 49
- 57 The epistemology does of itself afford no entrance to ontology. Why not? 49
- 58 Because "Absolute Existence" may be that which we are ignorant of, 50
- 59 This consideration necessitates a new section of philosophy called the ''agnoiology''. Its business, 50
- 60 Now we can settle the problem of ontology—and how, 51
- 61 Recapitulation of the three sections. 1. Epistemology. 2. Agnoiology. 3. Ontology. This arrangement not arbitrary, but necessary, 52
- 62 The necessity of keeping these divisions perfectly distinct, 52
- 63 The natural oversights of thought are rectified in these three sections, 53
- vii. CONTENTS
- 64 Remarks obviating any objections to the system, on the ground that its conclusions cannot at all times be present to the mind, 54
- 65 Continuation of these remarks, 56
- 66 Remark obviating any objection to this system on the score of presumption, 58
- 67 The indispensable extension of the necessary laws to ''all reason'', 59
- 68 An objection to the system on the score of inconsistency obviated, 60
- 69 Objection retorted. The confusion of philosophers in regard to the conceivable and the inconceivable, 61
- 70 This confusion illustrated, 62
- 71 All other systems make game of the laws of thought, 63
- 72 The inconsistency of philosophers inextricable, 64
- 73 Their laws of thought always turn out, at best, to be mere laws of imagination, 65
- 74 This system does not make game of the laws of thought, 66
- 75 It abridges the grounds of controversy, 66
- 76 Conclusion of introduction explaining how the starting-point of philosophy is reached (§§ 76-85), 67
- 77 How the starting-point is reached, 67
- 78 Plato, in Theætetus, fails to reach the starting-point, 68
- 79 Search for the starting-point, 69
- 80 Why the question—What is knowledge? cannot be the starting-point, 71
- 81 This question resolved into two questions, 72
- 82 Which of them is our question,—and the first in philosophy, 72
- 83 That philosophy has a starting-point proved by the fact that its starting-point has been found, 73
- 84 Starting-point must state the essential of knowledge. Experience may confirm, but reason alone can establish its truth, 74
- 85 Re-statement of the first or proximate question of philosophy, 74
- 86 Its answer is the absolute starting-point, and forms the ''first proposition'' of these Institutes, 75
- SECTION I.
- THE EPISTEMOLOGY, OR THEORY OF KNOWING.
- PROPOSITION I.
- {{sc|The Primary Law or Condition of All Knowledge}}, 79
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 79
- 1 Prop. I. answers the first question of philosophy, 79
- 2 It expresses the most general and essential law of all knowledge, 80
- 3 It declares that self-consciousness is never entirely suspended when the mind knows anything, 81
- 4 Objection that self-consciousness seems at times to be extinct, 81
- 5 Objection obviated. Proposition explained, 81
- 6 Our apparent inattention to self accounted for by the principle of familiarity, 82
- viii. CONTENTS
- 7 Also by the consideration that the ''ego'' is no object of sensible experience 84
- 8 A theory of self-consciousness at variance with Prop. I. refuted, 85
- 9 Importance of Prop. I. as foundation of the whole system, 86
- 10 It is not refuted but rather confirmed by experience, 87
- 11 Its best evidence is reason, which fixes it as a necessary truth or axiom 87
- 12 ''First Counter-proposition'', 89
- 13 It embodies the result of ordinary thinking and of popular psychology, 89
- 14 It is generally the starting-point of psychology, as Prop. I. is the starting-point of metaphysics, 90
- 15 A mark of distinction between the propositions and the counter-propositions, 91
- 16 Prop. I. has some affinity to Pythagorean doctrine of numbers, 92
- 17 Misunderstanding as to Pythagorean doctrine, 93
- 18 Prop. I. a higher generalisation of the Pythagorean law, 94
- 19 Anticipations of Prop. I. by the philosophers of Germany, 94
- PROPOSITION II.
- {{sc|The Object of All Knowledge}}, 97
- {{sc|Demonstration}}
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 98
- 1 Reason for printing "itself-in-union-with-whatever-it-apprehends" as one word, 98
- 2 By the object of knowledge is meant the ''whole'' object of knowledge, 99
- 3 Change which an attention to the ''condition'' of knowledge effects upon the ''object'' of knowledge, 100
- 4 Further illustrated by the speculative, as distinguished from the ordinary mode of enumeration, 100
- 5 ''Second Counter-proposition'', 101
- 6 It is false, because Counter-proposition I. is false, 102
- 7 It expresses the ordinary notion, and also, generally, the psychological opinion as to the object of knowledge, 103
- PROPOSITION III.
- {{sc|The Inseparability of the Objective and the Subjective}}, 105
- {{sc|Demonstration}}
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 106
- 1 Reasons for giving this proposition a prominent place in the system, 106
- 2 What is meant by separability and inseparability in cognition, 107
- 3 A possible misapprehension obviated, 108
- 4 Inseparability in cognition not to be confounded with inseparability in space: the external and the internal, 109
- 5 The unit of cognition explained. How it is determined, 110
- 6 Importance of the words "by itself," or ''per se'', 111
- 7 The unit of cognition further explained, 112
- 8 No essential but only an accidental difference between the ''minimum'' and the ''maximum'' of cognition, 112
- 9 ''Third Counter-proposition'', 113
- ix. CONTENTS
- 10 It embodies an inadvertency of natural thinking, 113
- 11 The psychological position more false and ambiguous than the natural inadvertency, 114
- 12 The psychological error accounted for, 115
- 13 Distinction of science of mind and science of matter characterised, 115
- 14 Invalidity of counter-proposition III. Its origin, §§ 14, 15, 16, 17, 116
- 15 Many things are distinguishable, which are not separable, in cognition, 117
- 16 Illustrations applied to subject and object. 118
- 17 Further illustration, 118
- 18 Short statement of what this proposition contends for, 119
- 19 No opinion offered as to ''existence'', 120
- PROPOSITION IV.
- {{sc|Matter ''per se''}}, 121
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 121
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 122
- 1 Idealism and materialism have their roots here, 122
- 2 ''Fourth Counter-proposition'', 122
- 3 It expresses common opinion as to our knowledge of matter ''per se'', 122
- 4 Oversight of self only apparent—not real and total, 123
- 5 Psychological opinion as to our knowledge of matter ''per se'', 123
- 6 Psychological materialism as founded on the four counter-propositions, 124
- 7 Fallacy of materialism. Possibility of idealism as founded on the four propositions, 125
- 8 A preliminary question prejudged by materialist and by idealist, 126
- 9 Cause of this precipitate judgment. Its evil consequences, 127
- 10 How Prop. IV. decides this preliminary question. How Counter-proposition IV. decides it, 128
- 11 Symbols illustrative of the position maintained by the Institutes, 128
- 12 The same symbols as illustrative of the psychological position, 129
- 13 Different conclusions from the two positions, 130
- 14 Difference farther explained, 131
- 15 Another point of difference between this system and psychology, 132
- 16 Matter ''per se'' reduced to the contradictory, 134
- 17 This contradiction attaches not only to our knowledge of matter ''per se'', 136
- 18 But to matter ''per se'' itself, 137
- 19 Advantage of this reduction. New light on the problem of philosophy, 139
- 20 Importance of finding the contradictory, 140
- 21 In what sense the contradictory is conceivable, 141
- 22 Matter ''per se'' is not a nonentity, 142
- PROPOSITION V.
- {{sc|Matter and its Qualities ''per se''}}, 144
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 144
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 144
- 1 Why Proposition V. is introduced, 144
- x. CONTENTS
- 2 ''Fifth Counter-proposition'', 145
- 3 Distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities of matter, 146
- 4 Character of the secondary qualities, 146
- 5 Character of the primary qualities, 148
- 6 Defects of this distinction, 149
- 7 It runs into a contradiction, 151
- 8 Psychological conception of idealism, 151
- 9 Psychological refutation of idealism, 152
- 10 This refutation, if logically conclusive, is founded on a contradiction and therefore cannot be accepted, 154
- 11 The distinction of the primary and secondary qualities should be abandoned as useless, or worse, 155
- PROPOSITION VI.
- {{sc|The Universal and the Particular in Cognition}}, 156
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 157
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 157
- 1 Explanation of words, 158
- 2 In what sense the contingent element is necessary, and in what sense it is contingent, 158
- 3 Why this proposition is introduced, 160
- 4 Question concerning the particular and the universal instead of being made a question of Knowing, 161
- 5 Was made a question of being by the early philosophers. Thales, 163
- 6 Parmenides. What change he effected on the question, 163
- 7 It still related to Being—not to Knowing, 164
- 8 Indecision of Greek speculation. The three crises of philosophy, 165
- 9 Plato appeared during the second crisis. His aim, 167
- 10 The coincidence of the known and the existent must be proved, not guessed at, 168
- 11 Plato's deficiencies, 168
- 12 His merits. The question respecting the particular and the universal demands an entire reconsideration, 169
- 13 A preliminary ambiguity, 170
- 14 Further statement of ambiguity, 171
- 15 Illustration of the ambiguity, 171
- 16 Is the Platonic analysis of cognition and existence a division into ''elements'' or into ''kinds''? 173
- 17 Rightly interpreted, it is a division into elements, 174
- 18 It has been generally mistaken for a division into kinds, 176
- 19 Explanation of this charge, 177
- 20 ''Sixth Counter-proposition'', 179
- 21 This counter-proposition is itself a proof of the charge here made against philosophers, 180
- 22 Review of our position, 181
- 23 Misinterpretation of the Platonic analysis traced into its consequences, 182
- 24 Perplexity as to general existences, 183
- 25 Realism, 183
- 26 Realism is superseded by Conceptualism, 184
- xi. CONTENTS
- 27 Conceptualism is destroyed by Nominalism, 185
- 28 Evasion by which conceptualism endeavours to recover her ground, and to conciliate nominalism. Its failure, 186
- 29 Nominalism, 190
- 30 Nominalism is annihilated by Proposition VI. 191
- 31 The summing up, 192
- 32 The abstract and the concrete, 193
- PROPOSITION VII.
- {{sc|What the Universal and the Particular in Cognition are}}, 196
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 196
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 197
- 1 Why this Proposition is introduced, 197
- 2 The ego is coextensive with the universal, matter is not coextensive with the particular, element, 198
- 3 Another reason for introducing this proposition, 199
- 4 Remarkable that this proposition should not have been propounded long ago, 199
- 5 The oversight accounted for. Effect of familiarity, 200
- 6 We study the strange rather than the familiar, hence truth escapes us, 202
- 7 Hence neglect of this proposition, 204
- 8 Another circumstance which may have caused the neglect of this proposition, 206
- 9 The ego is the ''summum genus'' of cognition. Ontological generalisation, 206
- 10 Epistemological generalisation is very different, 207
- 11 The ego not a ''mere'' generalisation from experience, 209
- 12 Shortcoming of the Platonic ideas, 210
- 13 Perhaps the ego is the ''summum genus'' of existence as well as of cognition, 212
- 14 The second clause of proposition has had a standing in philosophy from the earliest times, 213
- 15 A ground of perplexity, 213
- 16 Demur as to matter being the fluctuating in existence, 214
- 17 It is certainly the fluctuating in cognition, 215
- 18 The old philosophers held it to be both, 215
- 19 More attention should have been paid to their assertion that it was the fluctuating in cognition, 216
- 20 Matter as the fluctuating in cognition: explained. 217
- 21 This is the fluctuation which epistemology attends to, 217
- 22 A hint as to its fluctuation in existence, 218
- 23 The ego as the non-fluctuating in cognition: explained, 219
- 24 ''Seventh Counter-proposition'', 219
- 25 Expresses the contradictory inadvertency of ordinary thinking: illustration, 220
- 26 Corrective illustration, 221
- 27 Psychology adopts Counter-proposition VII., 222
- 28 And thereby loses hold of the only argument for immateriality, 223
- PROPOSITION VIII.
- {{sc|The Ego in Cognition}}, 224
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 224
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 226
- xii. CONTENTS
- 1 A ''caveat'', 226
- 2 Important law of knowledge, 226
- 3 Materiality and immateriality. ''Eighth Counter-proposition'', 227
- 4 Eighth counter-proposition the common property of materialist and spiritualist, 228
- 5 Early conception of mind as material. Ghosts, ''clairvoyance'', spirit rapping, 229
- 6 Conception of mind as material substance dismissed, 231
- 7 Conception of mind as result of organisation: phrenology, 231
- 8 The spiritualist's conception of mind is as null as the materialist's, 232
- 9 Both parties hold mind to be ''particular'', 233
- 10 It is known only as the universal, 234
- 11 The materialist's error consists in his holding mind to be ''particular'', 235
- 12 The spiritualist's error consists in his holding mind to be ''particular'', 236
- 13 The two errors summed up, 238
- 14 Recapitulation of the institutional proof of immateriality, 238
- PROPOSITION IX.
- {{sc|The Ego ''per se''}}, 241
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 241
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 242
- 1 Purport of this proposition in relation to Proposition I., 242
- 2 An objection started, 242
- 3 Objection obviated, 243
- 4 Another objection obviated, 244
- 5 David Hume outgoes this proposition, 245
- 6 What this proposition contends for, 246
- 7 The mind must always know itself in, but not as, some determinate condition, 246
- 8 ''Ninth Counter-proposition'', 248
- 9 Its twofold error, 248
- 10 History of word "essence." Its meaning reversed by moderns, 249
- 11 Consequences of this reversal—injustice to the old philosophers, 250
- 12 Confusion and error to which the reversal has led, 251
- 13 This proposition reduces the ego ''per se'' to a contradiction, 252
- 14 Why the word ego is used in these discussions, 253
- 15 The individual or monad, 253
- 16 An objection obviated, 254
- 17 Another objection obviated, 255
- PROPOSITION X.
- {{sc|Sense and Intellect}}, 257
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 257
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 258
- 1 Comment on ''data'' of proof of this proposition, 258
- 2 ''Tenth Counter-proposition'', 259
- 3 The Leibnitzian restriction of counter-proposition, 259
- 4 Comment on the translation here given of the counter-proposition, 260
- xiii. CONTENTS
- 5 The counter-proposition is equally contradictory, whether accepted without, or with, a restriction, 261
- 6 The counter-proposition is the foundation of "sensualism"—character of sensualism 261
- 7 The anti-sensual psychology merely restricts the counter-proposition—leaves the contradiction uncorrected, 263
- 8 The root of the mischief. History of distinction between sense and intellect, 264
- 9 Aim and procedure of Greek metaphysics, 264
- 10 A rule for the historian of philosophy, 266
- 11 This rule observed in these Institutes, 266
- 12 Return to history of distinction between sense and intellect, 267
- 13 Illustration of early Greek doctrine, 269
- 14 The old philosophers were right in their problem—in their way of working it, and in fixing sense as the faculty of nonsense, 270
- 15 A reason why the truth of this doctrine is not obvious, 271
- 16 Difficulty and difference of opinion as to intellectual element, 272
- 17 Ambiguities of the old philosophers, 273
- 18 Three misconceptions arising out of these ambiguities, 273
- 19 Comment on first misconception, 275
- 20 Comment on second misconception, 276
- 21 Key to the Greek philosophy, 277
- 22 Key to the Greek philosophy, 279
- 23 Return to counter-proposition. It is founded on a confusion of the distinction between sense and intellect, 281
- 24 The Lockian and the Kantian psychology in limiting the counter-proposition effect no subversion of sensualism, 282
- 25 Kant's doctrine impotent against sensualism, 283
- 26 The statement in par. 4, and the charge in par. 7, are borne out by the foregoing remarks, 286
- 27 Kant sometimes nearly right. He errs through a neglect of necessary truth, 287
- 28 The true compromise between Sense and Intellect, 288
- PROPOSITION XI.
- {{sc|Presentation and Representation}}, 290
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 290
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 291
- 1 Why this proposition is introduced, 291
- 2 Distinction between knowing and thinking, 292
- 3 This proposition the foundation of a true philosophy of experience, 293
- 4 Representation—its two insuperable restrictions, 293
- 5 First restriction by way of addition. ''Second'' by way of subtraction 294
- 6 The latter restriction unrecognised by philosophers. ''Eleventh Counter-proposition'', 295
- 7 Its invalidity shown, 296
- 8 The ''minimum cogitable'' equates with the ''minimum scibile'', 296
- 9 Dr Reid's mistake in his assault on representationism, 297
- 10 The truth and the error of representationism, 299
- xiv. CONTENTS
- PROPOSITION XII.
- {{sc|Matter ''per se'' again}}, 300
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 300
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 300
- 1 Why this proposition is introduced, 301
- 2 On what condition matter ''per se'' might be thought of, 302
- 3 In attempting to think it, we must leave out an element essential to its cognition, and therefore it cannot be thought of, 303
- 4 How the imagination leads us astray, 303
- 5 Illustration, 304
- 6 Self must be represented just as much as it must be presented, 305
- 7 ''Twelfth Counter-proposition'', 305
- 8 Its character and downfall, 306
- 9 Matter ''per se'' has no chance of being thought of, 306
- 10 It cannot be reached by the way of inference, 307
- 11 Why the discussion respecting matter ''per se'' is important, 307
- PROPOSITION XIII.
- {{sc|The Independent Universe in Thought}}, 310
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 310
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 311
- 1 This proposition speaks only of what can be conceived, not of what exists, 311
- 2 It answers the question—what independent universe can be thought of? 311
- 3 Why we do not think of things as amorphous when they are absent from us, 312
- 4 An objection stated, 313
- 5 Objection obviated. We have a single type—can suppose it repeated, 314
- 6 Why we cannot cogitate matter ''per se''—no single type, 315
- 7 We have a single type of objects + subject—can conceive other cases of this 315
- 8 Further explanation of how one self can conceive another self, 316
- 9 A word on Belief, 318
- 10 Another difficulty obviated, 318
- 11 ''Thirteenth Counter-proposition'', 320
- PROPOSITION XIV.
- {{sc|The Phenomenal in Cognition}}, 321
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 321
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 321
- 1 ''Fourteenth Counter-proposition'', 321
- 2 A good rule for reaching truth on metaphysical topics, 322
- 3 The psychological trifling with truth ought to be put a stop to, 322
- 4 The main object of this and three following propositions, 323
- PROPOSITION XV.
- What the Phenomenal in Cognition is, 324
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 324
- xv. CONTENTS
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 325
- 1 A peculiarity in the counter-proposition, 325
- 2 ''Fifteenth Counter -proposition'', 326
- 3 The counter-proposition involves a contradiction, 326
- PROPOSITION XVI.
- {{sc|The Substantial in Cognition}}, 328
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 328
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 329
- 1 This proposition proves nothing as to ''existing'' substance, 329
- 2 Neither does it declare the nature of known substance, 329
- 3 Reasons for introducing this proposition, 330
- 4 The position of natural thinking in regard to this proposition, 331
- 5 ''Sixteenth Counter-proposition'', 332
- 6 Its downfall, 333
- 7 Defence of definition of known substance, 333
- 8 This definition is due to Spinoza, 334
- PROPOSITION XVII.
- {{sc|What the Substantial in Cognition is}}, 335
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 335
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 336
- 1 ''Seventeenth Counter-proposition'', 336
- 2 Conglomerate character of the counter-proposition, 337
- 3 Elimination of its ontological surplusage, 337
- 4 Its contradictory character exposed in so far as it is psychological, 339
- 5 The counter-proposition considered in so far as it is the product of natural thinking 340
- 6 The exact point in the counter-proposition which natural thinking opposes to the proposition, 341
- 7 Contradiction in the counter-proposition, in so far as it is the product of natural thinking, 341
- 8 Psychological opinion as to ''existing'' substance, 342
- 9 First, It does not answer its purpose, 342
- 10 Secondly, It places before us the mere phenomenal, 343
- 11 The institutional conception of known substance, 344
- 12 History of distinction between substance and phenomenon—its terms have been reversed, 345
- 13 Errors caused by this reversal, 346
- 14 Substance and phenomenon originally bore the signification assigned to them here, 347
- 15 The known phenomenal according to the older systems, 348
- 16 The known substantial according to the older systems, 348
- 17 A word upon ''existing'' substance and phenomenon, 349
- 18 Two main ambiguities in the old systems, 350
- 19 These ambiguities accounted for, 351
- 20 And cleared up by a reference to the Institutional doctrine, 352
- 21 Coincidence of the old speculations with the Institutes, 353
- 22 An objection obviated, 354
- xvi. CONTENTS
- 23 Mistakes of the historians of philosophy as to substance, 355
- 24 A traditional dogma about disdaining the senses, 356
- 25 The true meaning of turning the mind away from the senses, 357
- 26 What the ancient philosophers meant by this dogma, 359
- 27 Contrast between speculation and psychology in their views of substance and phenomenon, 360
- 28 Speculation proved to be right even by a reference to experience, 361
- PROPOSITION XVIII.
- {{sc|The Relative in Cognition}}, 363
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 363
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 363
- 1 The same error is continually reappearing under new forms—must be unmasked under all its disguises, 364
- 2 Hence the necessity of Props. XVIII., XIX., XX., XXI., 365
- 3 ''Eighteenth Counter-proposition'', 366
- 4 It is shown to be contradictory, 366
- PROPOSITION XIX.
- {{sc|What the Relative in Cognition is}}, 367
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 367
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 368
- 1 Why the items mentioned in the proposition can be known only as the relative, 368
- 2 ''Nineteenth Counter-proposition'', 368
- 3 Its fallacy shown, 369
- PROPOSITION XX.
- {{sc|The Absolute in Cognition}}, 370
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 370
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 371
- 1 Nothing is affirmed as to the existing Absolute, 371
- 2 Comment on definition of the known Absolute, 371
- 3 ''Twentieth Counter-proposition'', 372
- 4 This counter-proposition is a reiteration of Counter-proposition XVI., 372
- PROPOSITION XXI.
- {{sc|What the Absolute in Cognition is}}, 373
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 373
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 374
- 1 Comment on demonstration of Proposition XXI., 374
- 2 ''Twenty-first Counter-proposition'', 374
- 3 Fruitlessness of the controversy respecting the Absolute and the Relative. The philosophical temper, 375
- 4 The causes of confusion in this controversy, 377
- xvii. CONTENTS
- 5 All men are equally cognisant of the absolute, 378
- 6 A reminder, 379
- 7 Confusion might have been obviated had it been shown that all men are equally cognisant of the absolute, 379
- 8 The difficulty is, not to know it, but to know that we know it 380
- 9 Refutation of the relationist doctrine, 380
- 10 Kant on the Absolute, 381
- 11 The relation of non-contradictories and the relation of contradictories, 383
- PROPOSITION XXII.
- {{sc|The Contingent Conditons of Knowledge}}, 384
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 384
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 385
- 1 This proposition takes us out of necessary into contingent truth, 385
- 2 It is introduced in order that the necessary may be separated from the contingent laws, 386
- 3 Why this analysis is indispensable, 387
- 4 What is required in setting about this analysis, 388
- 5 The analysis illustrated, 388
- 6 The analysis illustrated, 390
- 7 It is unnecessary to carry the analysis into greater detail, 391
- 8 How these remarks qualify the doctrine of the absolute given in Proposition XXI., 392
- 9 The absolute, however, is still object + subject. The main result of the epistemology, 393
- 10 ''Twenty-second Counter-proposition'', 393
- 11 The chief point to be attended to in it, 394
- 12 The cause of the errors of representation ism pointed out. 394
- 13 The same subject continued, 396
- 14 The cause of Berkeley's errors pointed out, 397
- 15 The main result of the epistemology, 399
- 16 The importance of this result, 401
- SECTION II.
- THE AGNOIOLOGY, OR THEORY OF IGNORANCE.
- PROPOSITION I.
- {{sc|What Ignorance is}}, 405
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 405
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 405
- 1 Why this proposition is introduced, 405
- 2 Novelty of the agnoiology, 406
- 3 The agnoiology is indispensable, 406
- 4 The plea of our ignorance a bar to ontology, 407
- 5 This obstacle can be removed only by an inquiry into the nature of ignorance, 408
- 6 ''First Counter-proposition'', 408
- xviii. CONTENTS
- PROPOSITION II.
- {{sc|Ignorance remediable}}, 410
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 410
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 410
- 1 All that this proposition proves, 410
- 2 ''Second Counter-proposition'', 411
- PROPOSITION III.
- {{sc|The Law of all Ignorance}}, 412
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 412
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 412
- 1 Importance of this proposition, 413
- 2 Symbols illustrative of the law of ignorance, 413
- 3 Distinction between ignorance and a nescience of the opposites of necessary truth, 414
- 4 There can be no ignorance of the opposites of the geometrical axioms. 414
- 5 There can be no ignorance of the contradictory, 415
- 6 ''Third Counter-proposition'', 416
- PROPOSITION IV.
- {{sc|Ignorance of Objects ''per se''}}, 417
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 417
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 417
- 1 The truths now pour down fast, 417
- 2 ''Fourth Counter-proposition''—is swept away, 418
- PROPOSITION V.
- {{sc|Ignorance of Matter ''per se''}}, 419
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 419
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 419
- 1 The main business of the agnoiology, 420
- 2 The disadvantage of not studying necessary truth, 420
- 3 The doctrine of ignorance entertained by psychology and common opinion, 421
- 4 The advantage of studying necessary truth, 421
- 5 The agnoiology carries out the work of the epistemology, 422
- 6 ''Fifth Counter-proposition'', 423
- 7 Psychological conclusion as to our ignorance of matter ''per se'', 423
- 8 It rests on a contradictory assumption, 424
- 9 The psychological conclusion, therefore, is contradictory, 425
- 10 The origin of the psychological mistake pointed out, 425
- 11 No ontology is possible if we can be ignorant of matter ''per se'', 426
- PROPOSITION VI.
- {{sc|Ignorance of the Universal and Particular}}, 428
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 428
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 428
- 1 Effect of this proposition, 429
- 2 ''Sixth Counter-proposition'', 429
- 3 The error which it involves, 429
- xix. CONTENTS
- PROPOSITION VII.
- {{sc|Ignorance of the Ego ''per se''}}, 430
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 430
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 430
- 1 Design and effect of this proposition, 430
- 2 ''Seventh Counter-proposition'', 431
- 3 What the agnoiology does next, 431
- PROPOSITION VIII.
- {{sc|The Object of All Ignorance}}, 432
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 432
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 433
- 1 Relation of this proposition to Proposition II. of the epistemology, 433
- 2 The object of ignorance is neither nothing nor the contradictory, 434
- 3 It is believed that this doctrine is new, 435
- 4 What has caused this doctrine to be missed, 436
- 5 Another circumstance which has caused it to be missed, 437
- 6 In fixing the object of ignorance this proposition does not deny its magnitude, 438
- 7 How far the object of ignorance is definable, and how far it is not definable, 439
- 8 The advantage of discriminating the necessary from the contingent laws of knowledge, 440
- 9 This system is more humble in its pretensions than other systems, 442
- 10 ''Eighth Counter-proposition'', 443
- 11 The grounds on which it rests are false, 443
- 12 Illustration of the difference between the speculative and the ordinary view in regard to the object of ignorance, 444
- 13 The substantial and absolute in ignorance, 446
- 14 The main result of the agnoiology shortly stated, 446
- 15 Concluding remark, 447
- SECTION III.
- THE ONTOLOGY, OR THEORY OF BEING.
- PROPOSITION I.
- {{sc|The Three Alternatives as to Absolute Existence}}, 453
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 453
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 454
- 1 The problem of ontology stated, 454
- 2 Its three alternatives are exhaustive, 454
- 3 The third alternative has to be eliminated, 455
- 4 ''First Counter-proposition'', 456
- xx. CONTENTS
- 5 In what respect this counter-proposition is right, 456
- 6 In what respect it is wrong, 457
- 7 The law of excluded middle stated, 457
- 8 How this law must be qualified, 457
- 9 Origin of the mistake in regard to this law, 458
- 10 The want of a clear doctrine of the contradictory has been the cause of much error in philosophy, 459
- 11 Distinction between the singly and the doubly contradictory. 460
- PROPOSITION II.
- {{sc|A Premiss by which the Third Alternative is Eliminated}}. 461
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 461
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 462
- 1 Why this proposition is introduced, 462
- 2 ''Second Counter-proposition'', 462
- 3 To what extent it is true, 462
- PROPOSITION III.
- {{sc|A Premiss by which the Third Alternative is Eliminated}}. 464
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 464
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 464
- 1 The truth of this proposition is presupposed by the very nature of the inquiry, 465
- 2 ''Third Counter-proposition''. Why there is none, 466
- PROPOSITION IV.
- {{sc|Eliminates the Third Alternative}}, 467
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 467
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 467
- 1 What this proposition effects, 467
- 2 ''Fourth Counter-proposition''. Why there is none, 468
- 3 The previous propositions are preliminary. Proposition V. is the starting-point, 468
- PROPOSITION V.
- {{sc|The remaining Alternatives}}, 469
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 469
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 469
- 1 This proposition secures the key of the ontology, 470
- 2 ''Fifth Counter-proposition''. Why there is none, 471
- PROPOSITION VI.
- {{sc|What Absolute Existence is not}}, 472
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 472
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 473
- xxi. CONTENTS
- 1 ''Sixth Counter-proposition'', 473
- 2 Is approved by ordinary thinking, and by psychology, 473
- 3 In what sense material things exist, 473
- PROPOSITION VII.
- {{sc|What Absolute Existence is not}}, 475
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 475
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 476
- 1 ''Seventh Counter-proposition'', 476
- PROPOSITION VIII.
- 1 ''Sixth Counter-proposition'', 473
- 2 Is approved by ordinary thinking, and by psychology, 473
- 3 In what sense material things exist, 473
- PROPOSITION VII.
- {{sc|What Absolute Existence is not}}, 475
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 475
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 476
- 1 ''Seventh Counter-proposition'', 476
- PROPOSITION VIII.
- {{sc|What Absolute Existence is not}}, 477
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 477
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 477
- 1 ''Eighth Counter-proposition'', 478
- 2 Importance of the ego as a constituent of Absolute Existence, 478
- 3 Why the reduction of the ego ''per se'' to a contradiction is important, 478
- PROPOSITION IX.
- {{sc|The Origin of Knowledge}}, 479
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 479
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 479
- 1 Question as to the origin of knowledge—has been erroneously treated, 480
- 2 The assumption which vitiates the discussion, 480
- 3 First consequence of the assumption. ''Ninth Counter-proposition'', 481
- 4 Second consequence. The doctrine of representationism, 481
- 5 The earliest form of representationism. Physical Influx, 482
- 6 Correction of this doctrine by Des Cartes, 483
- 7 Consequences of the Cartesian correction, 484
- 8 Scepticism and idealism arise, 484
- 9 The Cartesian salvo—hypothesis of "Occasional Causes." Its insufficiency, 486
- 10 Mallebranche: his "Vision of all things in God," 487
- 11 Leibnitz: his "Pre-established Harmony," 488
- 12 Character of these hypotheses, 488
- 13 Locke's explanation 489
- 14 Berkeley: his doctrine of intuitive perception, 490
- 15 His fundamental defect, 491
- 16 Reid: his misunderstanding of Berkeley, 492
- 17 Reid failed to establish a doctrine of intuitive perception, 493
- 18 His character as a philosopher, 494
- 19 He mistook the vocation of philosophy, 496
- 20 Kant. "Innate Ideas," 497
- 21 Right interpretation of this doctrine, 497
- 22 The circumstance to be particularly attended to in considering this doctrine, 499
- 23 The misconception to be particularly guarded against, 499
- xxii. CONTENTS
- 24 This misconception has never been guarded against by any philosopher 500
- 25 Hence the ineptitude of the controversy, 500
- 26 In this controversy Kant is as much at fault as his predecessors, 502
- 27 How this system of Institutes avoids these errors, 504
- 28 ''First'': it starts from no hypothesis, 504
- 29 ''Secondly'': it finds that all cognition consists of two elements, 505
- 30 ''Thirdly'': it finds that each element is no cognition, but only a ''half'' or part-cognition, 505
- 31 ''Fourthly'': it finds that matter is only a ''half'' cognition, 506
- 32 ''Fifthly'': it establishes "intuitive," and overthrows "representative" perception, 506
- 33 ''Sixthly'': it steers clear of materialism, 506
- 34 ''Seventhly'': it steers clear of spurious idealism, 507
- 35 ''Eighthly'': it is under no obligation to explain the origin of knowledge, because knowledge itself is ''the Beginning'', 509
- 36 The synthesis of ego and non-ego is original, and not factitious or secondary, 510
- PROPOSITION X.
- {{sc|What Absolute Existence is}}, 511
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 511
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 512
- 1 This proposition solves the problem of ontology, 512
- 2 It answers the question; What is Truth? 513
- 3 All Existence is the synthesis of the universal and the particular, 514
- 4 Thus the equation of the Known and the Existent has been proved, 515
- 5 The coincidence of the Absolute in Existence with the Absolute in Cognition has also been proved, 516
- 6 Attention called to restriction in foregoing paragraph 517
- 7 Illustration of restriction—What the ontology gives out as alone Absolute Existence, 517
- 8 This paragraph qualifies a previous assertion, 518
- 9 In what sense we know, and in what sense we are ignorant of, Absolute Existence, 519
- 10 ''Tenth Counter-proposition'', 521
- PROPOSITION XI.
- {{sc|What Absolute Existence is Necessary}}, 522
- {{sc|Demonstration}} 522
- {{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 523
- 1 Distinction taken in this proposition. Ontological proof of Deity, 523
- 2 The system is ''forced'' to this conclusion, 525
- 3 ''Eleventh Counter-proposition'', 525
- {{sc|Summary and Conclusion}}, 526
- 1 The main question is—How has the system redeemed its pledges? 526
- 2 It is submitted that the system is both reasoned and true, 527
- 3 The chief consideration to be looked to in estimating the system, 527
- xxiii. CONTENTS
- 4 Its negative character is to be attended to principally, 528
- 5 The first step which the system takes in its negative or polemical character, 528
- 6 The next step which the system takes in its negative or polemical character, 529
- 7 The capital contradiction which the epistemology brings to light and corrects, 529
- 8 The second contradiction which it corrects, 530
- 9 The third contradiction which it corrects, 531
- 10 The fourth and fifth contradictions which it corrects, 531
- 11 The propositions and counter-propositions fall into groups, 531
- 12 The sixth contradiction which the epistemology corrects, 532
- 13 The seventh contradiction which it corrects, 533
- 14 The eighth contradiction which it corrects, 533
- 15 The ninth contradiction which it corrects, 534
- 16 The tenth contradiction which it corrects. 534
- 17 The eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth contradictions which it corrects, 535
- 18 The remaining contradictions which it corrects. 535
- 19 The leading contradiction which the agnoiology corrects, 536
- 20 The derivative contradictions which it corrects, 537
- 21 The concluding contradiction which it corrects, 537
- 22 The opinions entertained by natural thinking, and to some extent by psychology, on the subject of "Being," 538
- 23 How the ontology goes to work in exposing the contradictions involved in these opinions, 538
- 24 Exposure and refutation of these contradictions, 539
- 25 The ninth contradiction which the ontology corrects, 539
- 26 The tenth contradiction which the ontology corrects, 540
- 27 The eleventh contradiction which the ontology corrects, 540
- 28 By the correction of these contradictions, the system has redeemed its pledge, 541
- 29 The utility of philosophical study, 541
- 30 As a discipline of necessary and demonstrated truth, 542
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