V1 TOC in some textual format.txt

v.
CONTENTS
__________________________________________
INTRODUCTION. 	page

	1	The word "Philosophy" as here employed,	1
	2	The two main requisitions of philosophy,	2
	3	Which of them is the more stringent, 	2
	4	The value of systems determined by a reference to these requisitions,	2
	5	An unreasoned system of no value, because at variance with definition of philosophy,	3
	6	Because, though true, it cannot be certain,	3
	7	Because of no use as a mental discipline,	3
	8	A reasoned system, though not true, has some value as an exercise of reason,	4
	9	It complies more closely with definition of philosophy than the other, 	4
	10	But a system should be both true and reasoned,	5
	11	Systems of philosophy are unreasoned hitherto,	6
	12	The present state of philosophy described,	6
	13	''First'', How is this state to be ''explained''? ''Secondly'', How ''remedied''?	7
	14	First, it is explained (§§ 14-31) by philosophy not being reasoned,	8
	15	No good can be expected so long as philosophy is not reasoned,	8
	16	The masks of philosophy,	9
	17	Its unsatisfactory state further accounted for. The globe of speculation,	11
	18	Explanation continued. ''First'' principles always come out ''last'',	12
	19	Illustrations of this from language and grammar,	13
	20	Illustration continued,	14
	21	Illustration from logic,	15
	22	Illustration from law,	15
	23	Application to philosophy. Here, too, ''first'' principles come out ''last'',	16
	24	These principles, though operative in philosophy, are unnoticed and unknown,	17
	25	Hence philosophy is nowhere a scheme reasoned throughout,	18
	26	The repudiation of necessary truths, a further retarding cause,	19
	27	What necessary truth is,	20
	28	Its criterion is "the law of contradiction." Law explained,	21
	29	Its criterion is ''not'' ready acceptance,	22

vi.	CONTENTS
	30	Return. Philosophy deals with necessary truths—therefore retarded by their prescription,	23
	31	How ill the necessary truths hare fared in Germany and in our own country,	24
	32	''Secondly'', How is the unsatisfactory state of philosophy to be ''remedied''? Short answer,	26
	33	A remedial system uniting truth and reason, not impossible,	28
	34	Single canon for the right use of reason,	28
	35	This system of Institutes claims both truth and demonstration, but rather demonstration than truth,	29
	36	It is a body of necessary truth. Its pretensions stated,	30
	37	An objection to its method stated and obviated,	31
	38	The polemical character of this system,	31
	39	Why philosophy must be polemical. She exists only to correct the inadvertencies of ordinary thinking,	32
	40	This might be abundantly proved by the testimony of philosophers,	33
	41	The object (or business to do) of philosophy renders her essentially polemical,	33
	42	The charge of disrespect which might be supposed to attach to philosophy on account of her polemical character, obviated,	34
	43	This system also adverse to psychology—and why,	34
	44	''What'' philosophy has ''to do'', again distinctly stated,	36
	45	Its positive object still more distinctly stated. Definition of metaphysics	36
	46	''Why'' philosophy undertakes this object,	38
	47	''How'' philosophy goes to work. Adherence to canon—proposition and counter-proposition	38
	48	Further explanations as to ''how'' philosophy goes to work,	40
	49	Advantages of this method,	41
	50	Disadvantages of not contrasting distinctly the true and the false,	41
	51	General unintelligibility of systems is due to their neglect to exhibit this contrast,	42
	52	This system contrasts distinctly the true and the false,	45
	53	The three sections of this institute. Arrangement explained and proved to be essential (§§ 54-62),	46
	54	The section called ''ontology'' naturally comes ''first'',—but is truly ''last'' in order,	46
	55	It must be made to revolve away from us, in order to bring round the epistemology, which, though it naturally comes last, is truly first in order,	47
	56	''Epistemology'' and ''ontology'' the two main divisions of philosophy,	49
	57	The epistemology does of itself afford no entrance to ontology. Why not?	49
	58	Because "Absolute Existence" may be that which we are ignorant of,	50
	59	This consideration necessitates a new section of philosophy called the ''agnoiology''. Its business,	50
	60	Now we can settle the problem of ontology—and how,	51
	61	Recapitulation of the three sections. 1. Epistemology. 2. Agnoiology. 3. Ontology. This arrangement not arbitrary, but necessary,	52
	62	The necessity of keeping these divisions perfectly distinct,	52
	63	The natural oversights of thought are rectified in these three sections,	53

vii.	CONTENTS
 	64	Remarks obviating any objections to the system, on the ground that its conclusions cannot at all times be present to the mind,	54
	65	Continuation of these remarks,	56
	66	Remark obviating any objection to this system on the score of presumption,	58
	67	The indispensable extension of the necessary laws to ''all reason'',	59
	68	An objection to the system on the score of inconsistency obviated,	60
	69	Objection retorted. The confusion of philosophers in regard to the conceivable and the inconceivable,	61
	70	This confusion illustrated,	62
	71	All other systems make game of the laws of thought,	63
	72	The inconsistency of philosophers inextricable,	64
	73	Their laws of thought always turn out, at best, to be mere laws of imagination,	65
	74	This system does not make game of the laws of thought,	66
	75	It abridges the grounds of controversy,	66
	76	Conclusion of introduction explaining how the starting-point of philosophy is reached (§§ 76-85),	67
	77	How the starting-point is reached,	67
	78	Plato, in Theætetus, fails to reach the starting-point,	68
	79	Search for the starting-point,	69
	80	Why the question—What is knowledge? cannot be the starting-point,	71
	81	This question resolved into two questions,	72
	82	Which of them is our question,—and the first in philosophy,	72
	83	That philosophy has a starting-point proved by the fact that its starting-point has been found,	73
	84	Starting-point must state the essential of knowledge. Experience may confirm, but reason alone can establish its truth,	74
	85	Re-statement of the first or proximate question of philosophy,	74
	86	Its answer is the absolute starting-point, and forms the ''first proposition'' of these Institutes,	75
SECTION I.
THE EPISTEMOLOGY, OR THEORY OF KNOWING.

PROPOSITION I.
	{{sc|The Primary Law or Condition of All Knowledge}},  	79
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	79
	1	Prop. I. answers the first question of philosophy,	79
	2	It expresses the most general and essential law of all knowledge,	80
	3	It declares that self-consciousness is never entirely suspended when the mind knows anything,	81
	4	Objection that self-consciousness seems at times to be extinct,	81
	5	Objection obviated. Proposition explained,	81
	6	Our apparent inattention to self accounted for by the principle of familiarity,	82

viii.	CONTENTS

 	7	Also by the consideration that the ''ego'' is no object of sensible experience	84
	8	A theory of self-consciousness at variance with Prop. I. refuted,	85
	9	Importance of Prop. I. as foundation of the whole system,	86
	10	It is not refuted but rather confirmed by experience,	87
	11	Its best evidence is reason, which fixes it as a necessary truth or axiom	87
	12	''First Counter-proposition'',	89
	13	It embodies the result of ordinary thinking and of popular psychology,	89
	14	It is generally the starting-point of psychology, as Prop. I. is the starting-point of metaphysics,	90
	15	A mark of distinction between the propositions and the counter-propositions,	91
	16	Prop. I. has some affinity to Pythagorean doctrine of numbers,	92
	17	Misunderstanding as to Pythagorean doctrine,	93
	18	Prop. I. a higher generalisation of the Pythagorean law,	94
	19	Anticipations of Prop. I. by the philosophers of Germany,	94

PROPOSITION II.
	{{sc|The Object of All Knowledge}}, 	97
	{{sc|Demonstration}}
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	98
	1	Reason for printing "itself-in-union-with-whatever-it-apprehends" as one word,	98
	2	By the object of knowledge is meant the ''whole'' object of knowledge,	99
	3	Change which an attention to the ''condition'' of knowledge effects upon the ''object'' of knowledge,	100
	4	Further illustrated by the speculative, as distinguished from the ordinary mode of enumeration,	100
	5	''Second Counter-proposition'',	101
	6	It is false, because Counter-proposition I. is false,	102
	7	It expresses the ordinary notion, and also, generally, the psychological opinion as to the object of knowledge,	103

PROPOSITION III.
	{{sc|The Inseparability of the Objective and the Subjective}}, 	105
	{{sc|Demonstration}}
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	106
	1	Reasons for giving this proposition a prominent place in the system,	106
	2	What is meant by separability and inseparability in cognition,	107
	3	A possible misapprehension obviated,	108
	4	Inseparability in cognition not to be confounded with inseparability in space: the external and the internal,	109
	5	The unit of cognition explained. How it is determined,	110
	6	Importance of the words "by itself," or ''per se'',	111
	7	The unit of cognition further explained,	112
	8	No essential but only an accidental difference between the ''minimum'' and the ''maximum'' of cognition,	112
	9	''Third Counter-proposition'',	113
ix.	CONTENTS
	10	It embodies an inadvertency of natural thinking,	113
	11	The psychological position more false and ambiguous than the natural inadvertency,	114
	12	The psychological error accounted for,	115
	13	Distinction of science of mind and science of matter characterised,	115
	14	Invalidity of counter-proposition III. Its origin, §§ 14, 15, 16, 17,	116
	15	Many things are distinguishable, which are not separable, in cognition,	117
	16	Illustrations applied to subject and object.	118
	17	Further illustration,	118
	18	Short statement of what this proposition contends for,	119
	19	No opinion offered as to ''existence'',	120

PROPOSITION IV.
	{{sc|Matter ''per se''}},		121
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	121
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	122
	1	Idealism and materialism have their roots here,	122
	2	''Fourth Counter-proposition'',	122
	3	It expresses common opinion as to our knowledge of matter ''per se'',	122
	4	Oversight of self only apparent—not real and total,	123
	5	Psychological opinion as to our knowledge of matter ''per se'',	123
	6	Psychological materialism as founded on the four counter-propositions,	124
	7	Fallacy of materialism. Possibility of idealism as founded on the four propositions,	125
	8	A preliminary question prejudged by materialist and by idealist,	126
	9	Cause of this precipitate judgment. Its evil consequences,	127
	10	How Prop. IV. decides this preliminary question. How Counter-proposition IV. decides it,	128
	11	Symbols illustrative of the position maintained by the Institutes,	128
	12	The same symbols as illustrative of the psychological position,	129
	13	Different conclusions from the two positions,	130
	14	Difference farther explained,	131
	15	Another point of difference between this system and psychology,	132
	16	Matter ''per se'' reduced to the contradictory,	134
	17	This contradiction attaches not only to our knowledge of matter ''per se'',	136
	18	But to matter ''per se'' itself,	137
	19	Advantage of this reduction. New light on the problem of philosophy,	139
	20	Importance of finding the contradictory,	140
	21	In what sense the contradictory is conceivable,	141
	22	Matter ''per se'' is not a nonentity,	142

PROPOSITION V.
	{{sc|Matter and its Qualities ''per se''}},	144
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	144
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	144
	1	Why Proposition V. is introduced,	144

x.	CONTENTS

	2	''Fifth Counter-proposition'', 	145
	3	Distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities of matter,	146
	4	Character of the secondary qualities,	146
	5	Character of the primary qualities,	148
	6	Defects of this distinction,	149
	7	It runs into a contradiction,	151
	8	Psychological conception of idealism,	151
	9	Psychological refutation of idealism,	152
	10	This refutation, if logically conclusive, is founded on a contradiction and therefore cannot be accepted,	154
	11	The distinction of the primary and secondary qualities should be abandoned as useless, or worse,	155

PROPOSITION VI.
	{{sc|The Universal and the Particular in Cognition}},	156
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	157
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	157
	1	Explanation of words,	158
	2	In what sense the contingent element is necessary, and in what sense it is contingent,	158
	3	Why this proposition is introduced,	160
	4	Question concerning the particular and the universal instead of being made a question of Knowing,	161
	5	Was made a question of being by the early philosophers. Thales,	163
	6	Parmenides. What change he effected on the question,	163
	7	It still related to Being—not to Knowing,	164
	8	Indecision of Greek speculation. The three crises of philosophy,	165
	9	Plato appeared during the second crisis. His aim,	167
	10	The coincidence of the known and the existent must be proved, not guessed at,	168
	11	Plato's deficiencies,	168
	12	His merits. The question respecting the particular and the universal demands an entire reconsideration,	169
	13	A preliminary ambiguity,	170
	14	Further statement of ambiguity,	171
	15	Illustration of the ambiguity,	171
	16	Is the Platonic analysis of cognition and existence a division into ''elements'' or into ''kinds''?	173
	17	Rightly interpreted, it is a division into elements,	174
	18	It has been generally mistaken for a division into kinds,	176
	19	Explanation of this charge,	177
	20	''Sixth Counter-proposition'',	179
	21	This counter-proposition is itself a proof of the charge here made against philosophers,	180
	22	Review of our position,	181
	23	Misinterpretation of the Platonic analysis traced into its consequences,	182
	24	Perplexity as to general existences,	183
	25	Realism,		183
	26	Realism is superseded by Conceptualism,	184

xi.	CONTENTS
	27	Conceptualism is destroyed by Nominalism,	185
	28	Evasion by which conceptualism endeavours to recover her ground, and to conciliate nominalism. Its failure,	186
	29	Nominalism,	190
	30	Nominalism is annihilated by Proposition VI.	191
	31	The summing up,	192
	32	The abstract and the concrete,	193

PROPOSITION VII.
	{{sc|What the Universal and the Particular in Cognition are}},	196
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	196
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	197
	1	Why this Proposition is introduced,	197
	2	The ego is coextensive with the universal, matter is not coextensive with the particular, element,	198
	3	Another reason for introducing this proposition,	199
	4	Remarkable that this proposition should not have been propounded long ago,	199
	5	The oversight accounted for. Effect of familiarity,	200
	6	We study the strange rather than the familiar, hence truth escapes us,	202
	7	Hence neglect of this proposition,	204
	8	Another circumstance which may have caused the neglect of this proposition,	206
	9	The ego is the ''summum genus'' of cognition. Ontological generalisation,	206
	10	Epistemological generalisation is very different,	207
	11	The ego not a ''mere'' generalisation from experience,	209
	12	Shortcoming of the Platonic ideas,	210
	13	Perhaps the ego is the ''summum genus'' of existence as well as of cognition,	212
	14	The second clause of proposition has had a standing in philosophy from the earliest times,	213
	15	A ground of perplexity,	213
	16	Demur as to matter being the fluctuating in existence,	214
	17	It is certainly the fluctuating in cognition,	215
	18	The old philosophers held it to be both,	215
	19	More attention should have been paid to their assertion that it was the fluctuating in cognition,	216
	20	Matter as the fluctuating in cognition: explained.	217
	21	This is the fluctuation which epistemology attends to,	217
	22	A hint as to its fluctuation in existence,	218
	23	The ego as the non-fluctuating in cognition: explained,	219
	24	''Seventh Counter-proposition'',	219
	25	Expresses the contradictory inadvertency of ordinary thinking: illustration,	220
	26	Corrective illustration,	221
	27	Psychology adopts Counter-proposition VII.,	222
	28	And thereby loses hold of the only argument for immateriality,	223

PROPOSITION VIII.
	{{sc|The Ego in Cognition}},	224
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	224
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	226


xii.	CONTENTS
	1	A ''caveat'',	226
	2	Important law of knowledge,	226
	3	Materiality and immateriality. ''Eighth Counter-proposition'',	227
	4	Eighth counter-proposition the common property of materialist and spiritualist,	228
	5	Early conception of mind as material. Ghosts, ''clairvoyance'', spirit rapping,	229
	6	Conception of mind as material substance dismissed,	231
	7	Conception of mind as result of organisation: phrenology,	231
	8	The spiritualist's conception of mind is as null as the materialist's,	232
	9	Both parties hold mind to be ''particular'',	233
	10	It is known only as the universal,	234
	11	The materialist's error consists in his holding mind to be ''particular'',	235
	12	The spiritualist's error consists in his holding mind to be ''particular'',	236
	13	The two errors summed up,	238
	14	Recapitulation of the institutional proof of immateriality,	238

PROPOSITION IX.
	{{sc|The Ego ''per se''}},		241
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	241
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	242
	1	Purport of this proposition in relation to Proposition I.,	242
	2	An objection started,	242
	3	Objection obviated,	243
	4	Another objection obviated,	244
	5	David Hume outgoes this proposition,	245
	6	What this proposition contends for,	246
	7	The mind must always know itself in, but not as, some determinate condition,	246
	8	''Ninth Counter-proposition'',	248
	9	Its twofold error,	248
	10	History of word "essence." Its meaning reversed by moderns,	249
	11	Consequences of this reversal—injustice to the old philosophers,	250
	12	Confusion and error to which the reversal has led,	251
	13	This proposition reduces the ego ''per se'' to a contradiction,	252
	14	Why the word ego is used in these discussions,	253
	15	The individual or monad,	253
	16	An objection obviated,	254
	17	Another objection obviated,	255

PROPOSITION X.
	{{sc|Sense and Intellect}},	257
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	257
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	258
	1	Comment on ''data'' of proof of this proposition,	258
	2	''Tenth Counter-proposition'',	259
	3	The Leibnitzian restriction of counter-proposition,	259
	4	Comment on the translation here given of the counter-proposition,	260

xiii. 	CONTENTS

	5	The counter-proposition is equally contradictory, whether accepted without, or with, a restriction,	261
	6	The counter-proposition is the foundation of "sensualism"—character of sensualism	261
	7	The anti-sensual psychology merely restricts the counter-proposition—leaves the contradiction uncorrected,	263
	8	The root of the mischief. History of distinction between sense and intellect,	264
	9	Aim and procedure of Greek metaphysics,	264
	10	A rule for the historian of philosophy,	266
	11	This rule observed in these Institutes,	266
	12	Return to history of distinction between sense and intellect,	267
	13	Illustration of early Greek doctrine,	269
	14	The old philosophers were right in their problem—in their way of working it, and in fixing sense as the faculty of nonsense,	270
	15	A reason why the truth of this doctrine is not obvious,	271
	16	Difficulty and difference of opinion as to intellectual element,	272
	17	Ambiguities of the old philosophers,	273
	18	Three misconceptions arising out of these ambiguities,	273
	19	Comment on first misconception,	275
	20	Comment on second misconception,	276
	21	Key to the Greek philosophy,	277
	22	Key to the Greek philosophy,	279
	23	Return to counter-proposition. It is founded on a confusion of the distinction between sense and intellect,	281
	24	The Lockian and the Kantian psychology in limiting the counter-proposition effect no subversion of sensualism,	282
	25	Kant's doctrine impotent against sensualism,	283
	26	The statement in par. 4, and the charge in par. 7, are borne out by the foregoing remarks,	286
	27	Kant sometimes nearly right. He errs through a neglect of necessary truth,	287
	28	The true compromise between Sense and Intellect,	288

PROPOSITION XI.
	{{sc|Presentation and Representation}},	290
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	290
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	291
	1	Why this proposition is introduced,	291
	2	Distinction between knowing and thinking,	292
	3	This proposition the foundation of a true philosophy of experience,	293
	4	Representation—its two insuperable restrictions,	293
	5	First restriction by way of addition. ''Second'' by way of subtraction	294
	6	The latter restriction unrecognised by philosophers. ''Eleventh Counter-proposition'',	295
	7	Its invalidity shown,	296
	8	The ''minimum cogitable'' equates with the ''minimum scibile'',	296
	9	Dr Reid's mistake in his assault on representationism,	297
	10	The truth and the error of representationism,	299

xiv.	CONTENTS

PROPOSITION XII.
	{{sc|Matter ''per se'' again}},	300
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	300
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	300
	1	Why this proposition is introduced,	301
	2	On what condition matter ''per se'' might be thought of,	302
	3	In attempting to think it, we must leave out an element essential to its cognition, and therefore it cannot be thought of,	303
	4	How the imagination leads us astray,	303
	5	Illustration,	304
	6	Self must be represented just as much as it must be presented,	305
	7	''Twelfth Counter-proposition'',	305
	8	Its character and downfall,	306
	9	Matter ''per se'' has no chance of being thought of,	306
	10	It cannot be reached by the way of inference,	307
	11	Why the discussion respecting matter ''per se'' is important,	307

PROPOSITION XIII.
	{{sc|The Independent Universe in Thought}},	310
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	310
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	311
	1	This proposition speaks only of what can be conceived, not of what exists,	311
	2	It answers the question—what independent universe can be thought of?	311
	3	Why we do not think of things as amorphous when they are absent from us,	312
	4	An objection stated,	313
	5	Objection obviated. We have a single type—can suppose it repeated,	314
	6	Why we cannot cogitate matter ''per se''—no single type,	315
	7	We have a single type of objects + subject—can conceive other cases of this	315
	8	Further explanation of how one self can conceive another self,	316
	9	A word on Belief,	318
	10	Another difficulty obviated,	318
	11	''Thirteenth Counter-proposition'',	320

PROPOSITION XIV.
	{{sc|The Phenomenal in Cognition}},	321
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	321
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}}	321
	1	''Fourteenth Counter-proposition'',	321
	2	A good rule for reaching truth on metaphysical topics,	322
	3	The psychological trifling with truth ought to be put a stop to,	322
	4	The main object of this and three following propositions,	323

PROPOSITION XV.
	What the Phenomenal in Cognition is,	324
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	324

xv.	CONTENTS

	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	325
	1	A peculiarity in the counter-proposition,	325
	2	''Fifteenth Counter -proposition'',	326
	3	The counter-proposition involves a contradiction,	326

PROPOSITION XVI.
	{{sc|The Substantial in Cognition}},	328
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	328
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	329
	1	This proposition proves nothing as to ''existing'' substance,	329
	2	Neither does it declare the nature of known substance,	329
	3	Reasons for introducing this proposition,	330
	4	The position of natural thinking in regard to this proposition,	331
	5	''Sixteenth Counter-proposition'',	332
	6	Its downfall,	333
	7	Defence of definition of known substance,	333
	8	This definition is due to Spinoza,	334

PROPOSITION XVII.
	{{sc|What the Substantial in Cognition is}},	335
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	335
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	336
	1	''Seventeenth Counter-proposition'',	336
	2	Conglomerate character of the counter-proposition,	337
	3	Elimination of its ontological surplusage,	337
	4	Its contradictory character exposed in so far as it is psychological,	339
	5	The counter-proposition considered in so far as it is the product of natural thinking	340
	6	The exact point in the counter-proposition which natural thinking opposes to the proposition,	341
	7	Contradiction in the counter-proposition, in so far as it is the product of natural thinking,	341
	8	Psychological opinion as to ''existing'' substance,	342
	9	First, It does not answer its purpose,	342
	10	Secondly, It places before us the mere phenomenal,	343
	11	The institutional conception of known substance,	344
	12	History of distinction between substance and phenomenon—its terms have been reversed,	345
	13	Errors caused by this reversal,	346
	14	Substance and phenomenon originally bore the signification assigned to them here,	347
	15	The known phenomenal according to the older systems,	348
	16	The known substantial according to the older systems,	348
	17	A word upon ''existing'' substance and phenomenon,	349
	18	Two main ambiguities in the old systems,	350
	19	These ambiguities accounted for,	351
	20	And cleared up by a reference to the Institutional doctrine,	352
	21	Coincidence of the old speculations with the Institutes,	353
	22	An objection obviated,	354

xvi. 	CONTENTS
	23	Mistakes of the historians of philosophy as to substance,	355
	24	A traditional dogma about disdaining the senses,	356
	25	The true meaning of turning the mind away from the senses,	357
	26	What the ancient philosophers meant by this dogma,	359
	27	Contrast between speculation and psychology in their views of substance and phenomenon,	360
	28	Speculation proved to be right even by a reference to experience,	361

PROPOSITION XVIII.
	{{sc|The Relative in Cognition}},	363
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	363
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	363
	1	The same error is continually reappearing under new forms—must be unmasked under all its disguises,	364
	2	Hence the necessity of Props. XVIII., XIX., XX., XXI.,	365
	3	''Eighteenth Counter-proposition'',	366
	4	It is shown to be contradictory,	366

PROPOSITION XIX.
	{{sc|What the Relative in Cognition is}},	367
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	367
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	368
	1	Why the items mentioned in the proposition can be known only as the relative,	368
	2	''Nineteenth Counter-proposition'',	368
	3	Its fallacy shown,	369

PROPOSITION XX.
	{{sc|The Absolute in Cognition}},	370
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	370
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	371
	1	Nothing is affirmed as to the existing Absolute,	371
	2	Comment on definition of the known Absolute,	371
	3	''Twentieth Counter-proposition'',	372
	4	This counter-proposition is a reiteration of Counter-proposition XVI.,	372

PROPOSITION XXI.
	{{sc|What the Absolute in Cognition is}},	373
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	373
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	374
	1	Comment on demonstration of Proposition XXI.,	374
	2	''Twenty-first Counter-proposition'',	374
	3	Fruitlessness of the controversy respecting the Absolute and the Relative. The philosophical temper,	375
	4	The causes of confusion in this controversy,	377

xvii.	CONTENTS

	5	All men are equally cognisant of the absolute,	378
	6	A reminder,	379
	7	Confusion might have been obviated had it been shown that all men are equally cognisant of the absolute,	379
	8	The difficulty is, not to know it, but to know that we know it	380
	9	Refutation of the relationist doctrine,	380
	10	Kant on the Absolute,	381
	11	The relation of non-contradictories and the relation of contradictories,	383

PROPOSITION XXII.
	{{sc|The Contingent Conditons of Knowledge}},	384
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	384
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	385
	1	This proposition takes us out of necessary into contingent truth,	385
	2	It is introduced in order that the necessary may be separated from the contingent laws,	386
	3	Why this analysis is indispensable,	387
	4	What is required in setting about this analysis,	388
	5	The analysis illustrated,	388
	6	The analysis illustrated,	390
	7	It is unnecessary to carry the analysis into greater detail,	391
	8	How these remarks qualify the doctrine of the absolute given in Proposition XXI.,	392
	9	The absolute, however, is still object + subject. The main result of the epistemology,	393
	10	''Twenty-second Counter-proposition'',	393
	11	The chief point to be attended to in it,	394
	12	The cause of the errors of representation ism pointed out.	394
	13	The same subject continued,	396
	14	The cause of Berkeley's errors pointed out,	397
	15	The main result of the epistemology,	399
	16	The importance of this result,	401

SECTION II.

THE AGNOIOLOGY, OR THEORY OF IGNORANCE.

PROPOSITION I.
	{{sc|What Ignorance is}},	405
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	405
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	405
	1	Why this proposition is introduced,	405
	2	Novelty of the agnoiology,	406
	3	The agnoiology is indispensable,	406
	4	The plea of our ignorance a bar to ontology,	407
	5	This obstacle can be removed only by an inquiry into the nature of ignorance,	408
	6	''First Counter-proposition'',	408

xviii.	CONTENTS

PROPOSITION II.
	{{sc|Ignorance remediable}},	410
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	410
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	410
	1	All that this proposition proves,	410
	2	''Second Counter-proposition'',	411

PROPOSITION III.
	{{sc|The Law of all Ignorance}},	412
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	412
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	412
	1	Importance of this proposition,	413
	2	Symbols illustrative of the law of ignorance,	413
	3	Distinction between ignorance and a nescience of the opposites of necessary truth,	414
	4	There can be no ignorance of the opposites of the geometrical axioms.	414
	5	There can be no ignorance of the contradictory,	415
	6	''Third Counter-proposition'',	416

PROPOSITION IV.
	{{sc|Ignorance of Objects ''per se''}},	417
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	417
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	417
	1	The truths now pour down fast,	417
	2	''Fourth Counter-proposition''—is swept away,	418

PROPOSITION V.
	{{sc|Ignorance of Matter ''per se''}},	419
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	419
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	419
	1	The main business of the agnoiology,	420
	2	The disadvantage of not studying necessary truth,	420
	3	The doctrine of ignorance entertained by psychology and common opinion,	421
	4	The advantage of studying necessary truth,	421
	5	The agnoiology carries out the work of the epistemology,	422
	6	''Fifth Counter-proposition'',	423
	7	Psychological conclusion as to our ignorance of matter ''per se'',	423
	8	It rests on a contradictory assumption,	424
	9	The psychological conclusion, therefore, is contradictory,	425
	10	The origin of the psychological mistake pointed out,	425
	11	No ontology is possible if we can be ignorant of matter ''per se'',	426

PROPOSITION VI.
	{{sc|Ignorance of the Universal and Particular}},	428
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	428
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	428
	1	Effect of this proposition,	429
	2	''Sixth Counter-proposition'',	429
	3	The error which it involves,	429

xix.	CONTENTS

PROPOSITION VII.
	{{sc|Ignorance of the Ego ''per se''}},	430
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	430
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	430
	1	Design and effect of this proposition,	430
	2	''Seventh Counter-proposition'',	431
	3	What the agnoiology does next,	431

PROPOSITION VIII.
	{{sc|The Object of All Ignorance}},	432
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	432
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	433
	1	Relation of this proposition to Proposition II. of the epistemology,	433
	2	The object of ignorance is neither nothing nor the contradictory,	434
	3	It is believed that this doctrine is new,	435
	4	What has caused this doctrine to be missed,	436
	5	Another circumstance which has caused it to be missed,	437
	6	In fixing the object of ignorance this proposition does not deny its magnitude,	438
	7	How far the object of ignorance is definable, and how far it is not definable,	439
	8	The advantage of discriminating the necessary from the contingent laws of knowledge,	440
	9	This system is more humble in its pretensions than other systems,	442
	10	''Eighth Counter-proposition'',	443
	11	The grounds on which it rests are false,	443
	12	Illustration of the difference between the speculative and the ordinary view in regard to the object of ignorance,	444
	13	The substantial and absolute in ignorance,	446
	14	The main result of the agnoiology shortly stated,	446
	15	Concluding remark,	447

SECTION III.

THE ONTOLOGY, OR THEORY OF BEING.

PROPOSITION I.
	{{sc|The Three Alternatives as to Absolute Existence}},	453
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	453
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	454
	1	The problem of ontology stated,	454
	2	Its three alternatives are exhaustive,	454
	3	The third alternative has to be eliminated,	455
	4	''First Counter-proposition'',	456

xx.	CONTENTS

	5	In what respect this counter-proposition is right,	456
	6	In what respect it is wrong,	457
	7	The law of excluded middle stated,	457
	8	How this law must be qualified,	457
	9	Origin of the mistake in regard to this law,	458
	10	The want of a clear doctrine of the contradictory has been the cause of much error in philosophy,	459
	11	Distinction between the singly and the doubly contradictory.	460

PROPOSITION II.
	{{sc|A Premiss by which the Third Alternative is Eliminated}}.	461
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	461
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	462
	1	Why this proposition is introduced,	462
	2	''Second Counter-proposition'',	462
	3	To what extent it is true,	462

PROPOSITION III.
	{{sc|A Premiss by which the Third Alternative is Eliminated}}. 	464
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	464
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	464
	1	The truth of this proposition is presupposed by the very nature of the inquiry,	465
	2	''Third Counter-proposition''. Why there is none,	466

PROPOSITION IV.
	{{sc|Eliminates the Third Alternative}},	467
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	467
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	467
	1	What this proposition effects,	467
	2	''Fourth Counter-proposition''. Why there is none,	468
	3	The previous propositions are preliminary. Proposition V. is the starting-point,	468

PROPOSITION V.
	{{sc|The remaining Alternatives}},	469
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	469
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	469
	1	This proposition secures the key of the ontology,	470
	2	''Fifth Counter-proposition''. Why there is none,	471

PROPOSITION VI.
	{{sc|What Absolute Existence is not}},	472
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	472
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	473

xxi.	CONTENTS

	1	''Sixth Counter-proposition'',	473
	2	Is approved by ordinary thinking, and by psychology,	473
	3	In what sense material things exist,	473

PROPOSITION VII.
	{{sc|What Absolute Existence is not}},	475
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	475
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	476
	1	''Seventh Counter-proposition'',	476

PROPOSITION VIII.
		1	''Sixth Counter-proposition'',	473
	2	Is approved by ordinary thinking, and by psychology,	473
	3	In what sense material things exist,	473

PROPOSITION VII.
	{{sc|What Absolute Existence is not}},	475
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	475
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	476
	1	''Seventh Counter-proposition'',	476

PROPOSITION VIII.
{{sc|What Absolute Existence is not}},	477
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	477
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	477
	1	''Eighth Counter-proposition'',	478
	2	Importance of the ego as a constituent of Absolute Existence,	478
	3	Why the reduction of the ego ''per se'' to a contradiction is important,	478

PROPOSITION IX.
	{{sc|The Origin of Knowledge}},	479
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	479
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	479
	1	Question as to the origin of knowledge—has been erroneously treated,	480
	2	The assumption which vitiates the discussion,	480
	3	First consequence of the assumption. ''Ninth Counter-proposition'',	481
	4	Second consequence. The doctrine of representationism,	481
	5	The earliest form of representationism. Physical Influx,	482
	6	Correction of this doctrine by Des Cartes,	483
	7	Consequences of the Cartesian correction,	484
	8	Scepticism and idealism arise,	484
	9	The Cartesian salvo—hypothesis of "Occasional Causes." Its insufficiency,	486
	10	Mallebranche: his "Vision of all things in God,"	487
	11	Leibnitz: his "Pre-established Harmony,"	488
	12	Character of these hypotheses,	488
	13	Locke's explanation	489
	14	Berkeley: his doctrine of intuitive perception,	490
	15	His fundamental defect,	491
	16	Reid: his misunderstanding of Berkeley,	492
	17	Reid failed to establish a doctrine of intuitive perception,	493
	18	His character as a philosopher,	494
	19	He mistook the vocation of philosophy,	496
	20	Kant. "Innate Ideas,"	497
	21	Right interpretation of this doctrine,	497
	22	The circumstance to be particularly attended to in considering this doctrine,	499
	23	The misconception to be particularly guarded against,	499


xxii.	CONTENTS

	24	This misconception has never been guarded against by any philosopher	500
	25	Hence the ineptitude of the controversy,	500
	26	In this controversy Kant is as much at fault as his predecessors,	502
	27	How this system of Institutes avoids these errors,	504
	28	''First'': it starts from no hypothesis,	504
	29	''Secondly'': it finds that all cognition consists of two elements,	505
	30	''Thirdly'': it finds that each element is no cognition, but only a ''half'' or part-cognition,	505
	31	''Fourthly'': it finds that matter is only a ''half'' cognition,	506
	32	''Fifthly'': it establishes "intuitive," and overthrows "representative" perception,	506
	33	''Sixthly'': it steers clear of materialism,	506
	34	''Seventhly'': it steers clear of spurious idealism,	507
	35	''Eighthly'': it is under no obligation to explain the origin of knowledge, because knowledge itself is ''the Beginning'',	509
	36	The synthesis of ego and non-ego is original, and not factitious or secondary,	510

PROPOSITION X.
	{{sc|What Absolute Existence is}},	511
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	511
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	512
	1	This proposition solves the problem of ontology,	512
	2	It answers the question; What is Truth?	513
	3	All Existence is the synthesis of the universal and the particular,	514
	4	Thus the equation of the Known and the Existent has been proved,	515
	5	The coincidence of the Absolute in Existence with the Absolute in Cognition has also been proved,	516
	6	Attention called to restriction in foregoing paragraph	517
	7	Illustration of restriction—What the ontology gives out as alone Absolute Existence,	517
	8	This paragraph qualifies a previous assertion,	518
	9	In what sense we know, and in what sense we are ignorant of, Absolute Existence,	519
	10	''Tenth Counter-proposition'',	521

PROPOSITION XI.
	{{sc|What Absolute Existence is Necessary}},	522
	{{sc|Demonstration}}	522
	{{sc|Observations and Explanations}} 	523
	1	Distinction taken in this proposition. Ontological proof of Deity,	523
	2	The system is ''forced'' to this conclusion,	525
	3	''Eleventh Counter-proposition'',	525

{{sc|Summary and Conclusion}},	526
	1	The main question is—How has the system redeemed its pledges?	526
	2	It is submitted that the system is both reasoned and true,	527
	3	The chief consideration to be looked to in estimating the system,	527

xxiii.	CONTENTS

	4	Its negative character is to be attended to principally,	528
	5	The first step which the system takes in its negative or polemical character,	528
	6	The next step which the system takes in its negative or polemical character,	529
	7	The capital contradiction which the epistemology brings to light and corrects,	529
	8	The second contradiction which it corrects,	530
	9	The third contradiction which it corrects,	531
	10	The fourth and fifth contradictions which it corrects,	531
	11	The propositions and counter-propositions fall into groups,	531
	12	The sixth contradiction which the epistemology corrects,	532
	13	The seventh contradiction which it corrects,	533
	14	The eighth contradiction which it corrects,	533
	15	The ninth contradiction which it corrects,	534
	16	The tenth contradiction which it corrects.	534
	17	The eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth contradictions which it corrects,	535
	18	The remaining contradictions which it corrects.	535
	19	The leading contradiction which the agnoiology corrects,	536
	20	The derivative contradictions which it corrects,	537
	21	The concluding contradiction which it corrects,	537
	22	The opinions entertained by natural thinking, and to some extent by psychology, on the subject of "Being,"	538
	23	How the ontology goes to work in exposing the contradictions involved in these opinions,	538
	24	Exposure and refutation of these contradictions,	539
	25	The ninth contradiction which the ontology corrects,	539
	26	The tenth contradiction which the ontology corrects,	540
	27	The eleventh contradiction which the ontology corrects,	540
	28	By the correction of these contradictions, the system has redeemed its pledge,	541
	29	The utility of philosophical study,	541
	30	As a discipline of necessary and demonstrated truth,	542