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===  Intro: Opinions ===
 
“Cats are cute” reports that all patterns of sensation referred to by the word 'cat' belong to another , larger or more abstract pattern of sensation referred to by the word 'cute'. Unlike 'mammal', however, 'cute' is a conditional term. Since 'mammal' always refers to the same set of sensations, its meaning is not conditional on any other fact. Once known, its meaning never changes from one circumstance to another, so long as our “codebook of words” remains unchanged. However, 'cute' refers to the pattern of sensation that we describe as 'what someone thinks is charmingly attractive'.
 
In other words, the meaning of 'cute' will always be conditional on another, ever-variable fact: namely, what a particular _individual_ refers to with the word 'cute'. We can thus know when something is cute to us, but we cannot automatically know whether it will be cute to someone else. We shall call this an 'evaluative' term. So why are 'cute' and other evaluative terms not unconditionally defined in a common lexicon? Because these words refer to values, and different values are often possessed by different individuals. To call something 'cute' is to say something about what _you_ think or feel about the thing being so called – it communicates something not just about the cat, but about _you_.
 
=== Moral Imperatives ===
 
“I shouldn't torture my cat” is another kind of statement with evaluative features, called a “moral imperative” because it is believed to apply to everyone with 'moral force', something much more powerful than a mere demand on opinion. A statement like “you ought not to torture cats” is partly evaluative (like “cats are cute”) and partly factual (like “cats are mammals”). The evaluative part is the implied claim that certain values (like “you don't want to cause pain”) are possessed by _everyone_ to whom the statement is addressed (so, “you ought not” because, if you think about it, you really won't want to).  The factual part is the implied claim that certain actions will probably have effects (like “causing pain”) that fulfill or contradict those values. How all this works out as far as what is really right and wrong and why you should care does not matter for now, since the _meaning_ of moral statements ends up the same no matter what your worldview. For example, “You must adopt our values or go to hell” entails the same twofold meaning: that we do not want to go to hell (the evaluative claim), and that there not only is a hell, but we will actually avoid that hell by adopting the values in question (the factual claim).
 
=== Moral Value ===
 
In the simplest parlance, a value is a latent, ever-present desire, to be distinguished from the fleeting, momentary, or incidental desires. When anyone harbors, in their character an enduring desire for something, that is a value, as the term is understood in the social sciences. The object of this desire is then said to 'have value'. So when _everyone_ ought to hold such a desire for something, that desire produces a normative value, a value that everyone _ought_ to have. Many prominent experts agree with me and argue for the reduction of values to desires. (See Peter Railton and Gerald Gaus)
 
On close analysis, I believe there is only one core value: in agreement with many great philosophers in history (Aristotle, Richard Taylor, Stoicism, Epicureanism, etc.), I find this to be the desire for happiness. I believe that all other values are derived from this, in conjunction with other facts of the universe, and that all normative values are what they are because they must be held and acted upon in order for any human being to have the best chance of achieving a genuine, enduring happiness. When we say “you ought to value X” we mean that, if you do, you will improve your chances of enduring happiness, and if you do not, you will decrease those chances.
 
I believe this core value entails two particular values, which have the highest order of rational importance among the derived values: compassion and integrity, which are essential to a genuinely happy life. The Secular Humanist's moral credo could rightly be stated: cherish integrity in yourself and compassion for all. How people come to have these values ingrained in their character is a different matter from why they ought to ingrain them. The first story involves human psychology, socialization and parenting, and mental development in general, and is a story about becoming a mature, healthy person. The second story involves the logical and factual connection between having those values and achieving happiness.
 
By happiness I do not mean mere momentary pleasure or joy, but an abiding contentment, a persistent, underlying sense of reverie that makes life itself worth living, in the absence of which life becomes shallow, unsatisfying, and ultimately meaningless. As David Myers puts it, real happiness means “fulfillment, well-being, and enduring personal joy”. This happiness is rarely possible, and certainly impeded, amidst loneliness, fear, purposelessness, destruction, misery, insanity, or chronic anxiety or stress, among other things. In contrast, happiness is found, secured, and improved amidst love, good friendships, security, purposefulness, creation, joy sanity, and peace.