APPENDIX B
HISTORY OF THE BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE ARMY DEVELOPMENT

1957
- US Army Armor Policy Conference stated a requirement for an infantry carrier which would permit fighting while mounted.

1958
- Infantry School completed a study which recommended an infantry fighting vehicle that supported mounted and dismounted operations.
	- Firing ports.
	- Antitank capability.
	- Two automatic weapons - 20 mm cannon and 7.62 mm machine gun.
	- Squad size of 5 plus driver.
	- 6 to 8 Tons.
- CONARC requested approval from Chief of R&D on Statement of Requirements, O&O Concept, and Qualitative Material Requirement on IFV.
- Chief, R&D disapproved because expected employment not clear.

1963
- FMC presented several concepts for armored infantry fighting vehicles tthe German Army.
- Germany said it needed an IFV but would not start a coproduction program unless it was adopted by the US Army.
- JCS endorsed the need for an armored infantry fighting vehicle in NATO.
- Combat Developments Command study, Alternatives for a Post-1965 Infantry Carrier Program completed.
	- M113 incompatible with envisioned main battle tank.
	- Three alternatives examined: M113, substantially modified M113, and new armored carrier.
	- Must be more than a "battle taxi."
	- Protection from shell fragments (155mm), small arms fire, antipersonnel mines.
	- Air transportable.
	- Recommended development of new armored personnel carrier.

1964
- US/FRG Nechanized Infantry Doctrine for the 1965-1975 Time Frame study was approved by DA. Recognized mounted infantry doctrine.
- Six prototype vehicles (AIFV-65 or MICV-65) ordered. Vehicles were also referred to as the XM701.
- Vehicles were too big, too slow, and too heavy.

1965
- Contract awarded to Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory to conduct a parametric design/cost effectiveness study.
	- 49 design concepts were examined.
	- Results were the Tentative Operational Characteristics for MICV-70.
	- Single element, full track vehicle preferred.
	- Aluminum armor better protection.
	- Turret better than pedestal-mounted main armament.
	- Stabilized main armament more effective.
	- 12-man crew with 20 mm cannon most cost-effective.
- Cornell Labs also commissioned to examine impact of putting TOW on MICV. Results inconclusive.

1967
- Contract to FMC for two experimental carriers based on the M113. Designated the XM765.
- Cornell Labs contracted to compare three vehicles: the XM765, a conceptual MICV and a conceptual MICV with reduced protection. Conceptual MICV was considered superior.
- Army decided not to pursue the XM765 program.
- FMC continued the development of the MX765 and it is now in service in the Dutch Army.
- Cornell Labs contracted to conduct "Phase III" design study. CSA limited study to single hull, full tracked, diesel powered vehicles.
	- 9-man crew size more effective in the attack.
	- Ballistic protection produced the most significant change in vehicle protection and cost.
	- 20 horsepower per ton was adequate for cross country speed.
	- MICV with TOW alone cost more than the MICV with 25 mm and did not increase effectiveness in the attack.
	- Conclusions were 12-man crew design mounting a 25mm cannon and offering protection against 14.5mm fire would be the least costly. Would weigh about 51,400 pounds.

1968
- Project Manager for the MICV Program was chartered.
- Qualitative Material Requirements (QMR) developed for the MICV and disapproved by VCSA.
	- Frontal protection against 23mm armor piercing ammunition.
	- Side and rear protection against 14.5mm.
	- Overhead protection against 155mm artillery fire.
	- Provide for a 10-man crew.
	- Mount a 25mm cannon and 7.62mm coax machine gun.
	- Swim.
	- Cruising range of 400 miles.
	- Collective NBC protection.
	- Be C5 air transportable.
	- Implied in the CDC proposal was a two-vehicle approach. One that met the QMR for Europe and a less sophisticated one for low intensity conflicts.
- Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle Ad Hoc Study Group formed to study the MICV QMR (Casey Study). The study and new QMR recommended:
	- C141 transportable.
	- 12-man crew.
	- 20-30 mm gun.
	- 2-man turret.
	- 37,000 pounds.
	- Improving the M113 would not satisfy the IFV requirement of keeping up with tanks.
	- Firmly established the need for a single Infantry Fighting Vehicle.

1969
- Commander-in-Chief USAREUR expressed concerns about the protection levels of the MICV.
- MBT-70 came under scrutiny and criticism and so did its companion infantry fighting vehicle (MICV).
- Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle Alternatives Cost Effectiveness Study (MICV ACE) was directed.
	- The MICV meeting the QMR requirements (XM723) was considered superior; Austere MICV was second.
- PM started development of an austere MICV during preparation of MICV ACE.
	- Pedestal mounted 20 mm.
	- Smaller engine.
	- Weight 33,750 pounds.

1970
- MICV ACE and Austere MICV concepts presented to a special cost-effectiveness in-process review.
- Austere MICV deemed more cost-effective.
- QMR was modified to reflect the Austere MICV measures.

1971
- Material Needs (MN) document for the MICV approved.
- MICV Development Concept Paper (DCP) presented at the Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC).

1972
- OSD approved DCP. OSD said proposed development schedule was tolong.
- Army issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for MICV development.
- FMC received the contract. Schedule called for a low rate initial production to begin in 1976 with the first operationally equipped unit occurring in 1978.

1973
- Army started taking deliveries of the XM723 MICV prototype.

1974
- Army stopped the development of the Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle program and combined it with the MICV program.
- Because of technical problems, PM realigned the MICV engineering development program.
- GAO issued a report critical of the cost-effectiveness of the MICV and said the MICV ACE was outdated.
- Because of continued concern over cost of the MICV and a less than impressive Bushmaster COEA, the Army directed a MICV Special Study Group be brought together.

1975
- MICV Speical Study Group report issued:
	- Confirmed the requirement of a fighting vehicle.
	- Antitank capability for MICV desirable.
	- Swim capability must be retained.
	- Need for firing port weapons confirmed.
	- Needed a turret-mounted long range cannon.
	- Stabilized turret.
	- Integral day-night weapons' sight.
	- Dual feed capability for main armament.
- The MICV still having problems with its transmission and the Bushmaster development was behind that of the MICV.
- Hughes Helicopter given a 25-month contract tdevelop the 25mm chain gun. Shoot off competition scheduled for 1978 with first weapons scheduled for delivery in 1981.

1976
- A special general officer review of the MICV operational issues (Larkin Study):
	- Common chassis, turret, and upper hull for MICV be developed for the infantry and scout roles.
	- Include a TOW capability.
	- MICV be developed with a 2-man turret.
	- Mechanized infantry battalions be equipped with 4 MICV per platoon, 13 per company and 41 per battalion.
- Finding of the Larking Study approved by Secretary of the Army, MICV program restructured.

1977
- VCSA approved the renaming of the vehicle tthe Infantry Fighting Vehicle (XM2) and the Cavalry Fighting Vehicle (XM3)
- Phase II development contract given to FMC.
	- Continue development of a two-man turret,
	- Upgrade MICV to IFV configuration.
- IFV/CFV COEA directed as Phase II of the MICV Special Study Group effort.
- Congress directed a study of a follow-on vehicle to the IFV. The IFV Task Force was formed (Crizer Study).
	- Reconfirmed the requirement for an infantry fighting vehicle.
	- Design review of the IFV indicated it was capable of performing its assigned mission.
	- Conceptual follow-on vehicles with heavy armor were more effective but were offset by high investment costs, unacceptable delays in increased force readiness and medium to high

technical risks.
	- Recommended continued development of the IFV/CFV.
- Army notified that all funding (procurement and R&D) for the IFV/CFV program had been deleted from the budget submit (22 Dec 1977).

1978
- OSD agreed to continue R&D on the IFV but directed a study of less costly alternatives.
- IFV/CFV Speical Study Group formed at Fort Leavenworth (Mahaffey Study).
- Congress restored funding for long lead items for the IFV/CFV program.
- IFV/CFV COEA completed:
	- IFV/CFV with TBAT II turret was the most operationally effective.
	- IFV equipped force was the only alternative which showed a possibility of mission success.
- Mahaffey Study complete:
	- Continue IFV/CFV development.
	- Do not develop M113 derivatives as future fighting vehicles.
	- Do not commit development funds to IFV derivatives as an ITV replacement at that time.
	- Adding TOW on the IFV was a cost-effective means of adding antitank capabilities to the force structure.
- Two prototype turrets delivered tthe Army. TOW and gun system firings began.
- First engineering developed vehicle delivered to the Army - Dec 1978.
- Contractor testing started.

1979
- By February, eight IFV/CFV pilot vehicles had been completed.
- Government testing began in July.
- Update COEA conducted.
	- Results of previous studies remain valid.
	- Threat improvements have not degraded effectiveness of IFV/CFV.
	- The IFV/CFV remains the most cost-effective alternative.
- ASARC III held on 20 December 1979:
	- IFV/CFV approved for production.
	- Production rate be increased to 90 vehicles per month as soon as possible.

1980
- DSARC III held on 22 January 1980:
	- IFV/CFV approved for production.
	- Production rate to be increased from 50 vehicles per month to 90 per month by 1985.
	- NFY 81 production funds would be released until a September Program review.
- September Program Review to report on:
	- Acceleration of the cost reduction program.
	- Reevaluation of the Army survivability test plan.
	- Correct the deficiencies in the Integrated Sight Unit.
	- Examine a program to develop a long rod penetrator ammunition.
	- Initiate a high priority effort to execute a competition production program.
- September IFV program review held 16 October 1980.
- OSD released FY 81 funds by Memorandum on 30 October 1980.
- Vulnerability testing began - consisted of vaporifics and ballistics tests.

1981
- First vehicle off the production line - May 1981.

1983
- March - start of unit handoff.
- December - Initial operational capability (IOC) unit.

1984
- Additional vaporifics tests conducted.

1985
- March - Vulnerability testing against overmatching weapons began.
- May - M2A1/M3A1 production decision made.
- December - Phase I vulnerability test report submitted to Congress.