daily pastebin goal

Anonymous and New York Times E-mail Leak, Part Two #OpNYT

a guest Sep 1st, 2012 1,267 Never
Not a member of Pastebin yet? Sign Up, it unlocks many cool features!
  1. [redacted]: Hey [redacted]
  2. me: yo
  3. 11:21 AM [redacted]: This Israel thing -- was there an op this weekend, or did the websites actually just crash coincidentally?
  4. me: there was a planned attack which was carried out
  5.  I spoke to Israeli TV about it
  6.  can provide recording if you'd like
  7. [redacted]: Would you mind just telling me the same thing you told them?
  8. 11:22 AM Sorry, just easier that way.
  9. me: Some Anons DDOSed Mossad, IDF sites after having put out press release
  10. [redacted]: How many Anons?
  11. me: no idea
  12. [redacted]: Did they bring down the sites?
  13. 11:27 AM me: yes, that's why the Israelis called me
  14. 11:28 AM [redacted]: Indeed. My question is -- we know the sites went down, but do you definitively know the DDOS was responsible?
  15.  Also, can I use this on the record?
  16. me: you may use on the record
  17.  if you agree to listen to the exchange I've had on this issue with Israeli TV
  18. 11:29 AM [redacted]: Sure, send the link.
  19. me: which is brief and will bring you up to speed on necessary side issues
  20. 11:30 AM sending now
  21. [redacted]: Thanks!
  24. 11:35 AM me: No problem. I just need to make sure that any coverage of this takes into account a comprehensive background since this relates to Mossad, others whom we'd prefer to have a clear view of this
  25. 11:37 AM [redacted]: Great, watching now.
  28. 11:47 AM [redacted]: So, essentially, you're saying that it's absurd for the ISraelis to claim the two things aren't linked?
  29. 11:48 AM me: yes
  30. [redacted]: Is it fair for me to say this:
  31. an informal spokesman for Anonymous, said Monday that members of the group had carried out "a planned attack" on the Web sites in question. He called Israeli government's claim of a coincidental hardware failure "absurd," but could not provide specific details of the operation."
  32. 11:50 AM me: except for last phrase. I can note that it was a DDOS attack and was warned about in prior messages
  33. 11:52 AM [redacted]: OK, but what I am trying to say is that you didn't see any IRC activity, or numbers of people involved, or watch the sites go down under DDOS attack.
  34. me: that's a better way to put it
  35. 11:53 AM [redacted]: I can't put it that way, because I'd have to explain every term and it would take 300 words.
  36.  How's this?
  37. an informal spokesman for Anonymous, said Monday that members of the group had carried out "a planned attack" on the Web sites in question. He called Israeli government's claim of a coincidental hardware failure "absurd," but did not have any direct evidence that the attack had brought down the sites."
  38. 11:54 AM me: yep
  39. [redacted]: Great, thanks [redacted]
  42. [Barrett Brown of ProjectPM, informal Anon propagandist in 2011, trying to get NYT to cover Romas/COIN instead of just personalities of people who took the e-mails Romas/COIN comes from]
  44. [redacted]-
  46. At some point over the next few days I'll be releasing details of a classified U.S. military surveillance program that until recently went by the name Romas/COIN and is which is to be replaced this year by a similar program known as Odyssey. This information has been accumulated via a great deal of research into the 71,000 HBGary e-mails as well as the overall probe of the intelligence contracting industry conducted by myself and a number of other parties with whom I've been working for the purpose of bringing scrutiny to this subject.
  48. As my purpose is to ensure that this program receives the attention it merits, I'd like to provide The Times with the document in advance so that you may have a chance to verify that the above is indeed the case; you may, for instance, check the quotes I provide against the HBGary e-mails, which are still available online.
  50. Thanks,
  52. Barrett Brown
  54. For at least two years, the U.S. has been conducting a secretive and immensely sophisticated campaign of mass surveillance and data mining against the Arab world, allowing the intelligence community to monitor the habits, conversations, and activity of millions of individuals at once. And with an upgrade scheduled for later this year, the top contender to win the federal contract and thus take over the program is a team of about a dozen companies which were brought together in large part by Aaron Barr - the same disgraced CEO who resigned from his own firm earlier this year after he was discovered to have planned a full-scale information war against political activists at the behest of corporate clients. The new revelation provides for a disturbing picture, particularly when viewed in a wider context. Unprecedented surveillance capabilities are being produced by an industry that works in secret on applications that are nonetheless funded by the American public – and which in some cases are used against that very same public. Their products are developed on demand for an intelligence community that is not subject to Congressional oversight and which has been repeatedly shown to have misused its existing powers in ways that violate U.S. law as well as American ideals. And with expanded intelligence capabilities by which to monitor Arab populations in ways that would have previously been impossible, those same intelligence agencies now have improved means by which to provide information on dissidents to those regional dictators viewed by the U.S. as strategic allies.
  56. The nature and extent of the operation, which was known as Romas/COIN and which is scheduled for replacement sometime this year by a similar program known as Odyssey, may be determined in part by a close reading of hundreds of e-mails among the 70,000 that were stolen in February from the contracting firm HBGary Federal and its parent company HBGary. Other details may be gleaned by an examination of the various other firms and individuals that are discussed as being potential partners.
  58. Of course, there are many in the U.S. that would prefer that such details not be revealed at all; such people tend to cite the amorphous and much-abused concept of “national security” as sufficient reason for the citizenry to stand idly by as an ever-expanding coalition of government agencies and semi-private corporations gain greater influence over U.S. foreign policy. That the last decade of foreign policy as practiced by such individuals has been an absolute disaster even by the admission of many of those who put it into place will not phase those who nonetheless believe that the citizenry should be prevented from knowing what is being done in its name and with its tax dollars.
  60. To the extent that the actions of a government are divorced from the informed consent of those who pay for such actions, such a government is illegitimate. To the extent that power is concentrated in the hands of small groups of men who wield such power behind the scenes and without being accountable to the citizenry, there is no assurance that such power will be used in a manner that is compatible with the actual interests of that citizenry, or populations elsewhere. The known history of the U.S. intelligence community is comprised in large part of murder, assassinations, disinformation, the topping of democratic governments, the abuse of the rights of U.S. citizens, and a great number of other things that cannot even be defended on “national security” grounds insomuch as that many such actions have quite correctly turned entire populations against the U.S. government. This is not only my opinion, but also the opinion of countless individuals who once served in the intelligence community and have since come to criticize it and even unveil many of its secrets in an effort to alert the citizenry to what has been unleashed against the world in the name of “security.”
  62. Likewise, I will here provide as much information as I can on Romas/COIN and its upcoming replacement.
  64. ***
  66. Although the relatively well-known military contractor Northrop Grumman had long held the contract for Romas/COIN, such contracts are subject to regular recompetes by which other companies, or several working in tandem, can apply to take over. In early February, HBGary Federal CEO Aaron Barr wrote the following e-mail to Al Pisani, an executive at the much larger federal contractor TASC, a company which until recently had been owned by Northrop and which was now looking to compete with it for lucrative contracts:
  68. "I met with [Mantech CEO] Bob Frisbie the other day to catch up. He is looking to expand a capability in IO related to the COIN re-compete but more for DoD. He told me he has a few acquisitions in the works that will increase his capability in this area. So just a thought that it might be worth a phone call to see if there is any synergy and strength between TASC and ManTech in this area. I think forming a team and response to compete against SAIC will be tough but doable." IO in this context stands for “information operations,” while COIN itself, as noted in an NDA attached to one of the e-mails, stands for “counter intelligence. SAIC is a larger intelligence contractor that was expected to pursue the recompete as well.
  70. Pisani agreed to the idea, and in conjunction with Barr and fellow TASC exec John Lovegrove, the growing party spent much of the next year working to create a partnership of firms capable of providing the “client” - a U.S. agency that is never specified in the hundreds of e-mails that follow – with capabilities that would outmatch those being provided by Northrop, SAIC, or other competitors.
  72. Several e-mails in particular provide a great deal of material by which to determine the scope and intent of Romas/COIN. One that Barr wrote to his own e-mail account, likely for the purpose of adding to other documents later, is entitled “Notes on COIN.” It begins with a list of entries for various facets of the program, all of which are blank and were presumably filled out later: “ISP, Operations, Language/Culture, Media Development, Marketing and Advertising, Security, MOE.” Afterwards, another list consists of the following: “Capabilities, Mobile Development, Challenges, MOE, Infrastructure, Security.” Finally, a list of the following websites is composed, many of which represent various small companies that provide niche marketing services pursuant to mobile phones.
  74. More helpful is a later e-mail from Lovegrove to Barr and some of his colleagues at TASC in which he announces the following:
  76. Our team consists of:
  78. - TASC (PMO, creative services)
  79. - HB Gary (Strategy, planning, PMO)
  80. - Akamai (infrastructure)
  81. - Archimedes Global (Specialized linguistics, strategy, planning)
  82. - Acclaim Technical Services (specialized linguistics)
  83. - Mission Essential Personnel (linguistic services)
  84. - Cipher (strategy, planning operations)
  85. - PointAbout (rapid mobile application development, list of strategic
  86. partners)
  87. - Google (strategy, mobile application and platform development - long
  88. list of strategic partners)
  89. - Apple (mobile and desktop platform, application assistance -long list
  90. of strategic partners)
  92. We are trying to schedule an interview with ATT plus some other small app developers.
  94. From these and dozens of other clues and references, the following may be determined about the nature of Romas/COIN:
  97.         Mobile phone software and applications constitute a major component     of the program.
  99.     There's     discussion of bringing in a “gaming developer,” apparently at     the behest of Barr, who mentions that the team could make good use     of “a social gaming company maybe like zynga, gameloft, etc.”     Lovegrove elsewhere notes: “I know a couple of small     gaming companies at MIT that might fit the bill.”
  101.     Apple and Google were active team     partners, and AT&T may have been as well. The latter is known to     have provided the NSA free reign over customer communications (and     was in turn protected by a bill granting them retroactive immunity     from lawsuits). Google itself is the only company to have received a     “Hostile to Privacy” rating from Privacy International. Apple is     currently being investigated by Congress after the iPhone was     revealed to compile user location data in a way that differs from     other mobile phones; the company has claimed this to have been a     “bug.”
  103.     The     program makes use of several providers of “linguistic     services.” At one point, the team discusses hiring a     military-trained Arabic linguist. Elsewhere, Barr writes: “I feel     confident I can get you a ringer for Farsi if they are still     interested in Farsi (we need to find that out). These linguists are     not only going to be developing new content but also meeting with     folks, so they have to have native or near native proficiency and     have to have the cultural relevance as well.”
  105.     Alterion     and SocialEyez are listed as “businesses to contact.” The former     specializes in “social media monitoring tools.” The latter uses     “sophisticated natural language processing methodology” in order     to “process tens of millions of multi-lingual conversations daily”     while also employing “researchers and media analysts on the     ground;” its website also notes that “Millions of     people around the globe are now networked as never before -     exchanging information and ideas, forming opinions, and speaking     their minds about everything from politics to products.”
  107.     At     one point, TASC exec Chris Clair asks Aaron and others,     “Can we name COIN Saif? Saif is the sword an Arab executioner uses     when they decapitate criminals. I can think of a few cool brands for     this.”
  109.     A diagram attached to one of     Barr's e-mails to the group     (http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images/7/pmo.png/) depicts Magpii as     interacting in some unspecified manner with “Foreign Mobile” and     “Foreign Web.” Magpii is a project of Barr's own creation which     stands for “Magnify Personal Identifying Information,” involves     social networking, and is designed for the purpose of storing     personal information on users. Although details are difficult to     determine from references in Barr's e-mails, he discusses the     project almost exclusively with members of military intelligence to     which he was pitching the idea.    
  111.     There are sporadic references such     things as “semantic analysis,” “Latent Semantic Indexing,”     “specialized linguistics,” and OPS, a programming language     designed for solving problems using expert systems.
  113.     Barr asks the team's partner at     Apple, Andy Kemp (whose signature lists him as being from the     company's Homeland Defense/National Programs division), to provide     him “a contact at Pixar/Disney.”
  117. Altogether, then, a successful bid for the relevant contract was seen to require the combined capabilities of perhaps a dozen firms – capabilities whereby millions of conversations can be monitored and automatically analyzed, whereby a wide range of personal data can be obtained and stored in secret, and whereby some unknown degree of information can be released to a given population through a variety of means and without any hint that the actual source is U.S. military intelligence. All this is merely in addition to whichever additional capabilities are not evident from the limited description available, with the program as a whole presumably being operated in conjunction with other surveillance and propaganda assets controlled by the U.S. and its partners.
  119. Whatever the exact nature and scope of COIN, the firms that had been assembled for the purpose by Barr and TASC never got a chance to bid on the program's recompete. In late September, Lovegrove noted to Barr and others that he'd spoken to the “CO [contracting officer] for COIN.” “The current procurement approach is cancelled [sic], she cited changed requirements,” he reported. “They will be coming out with some documents in a month or two, most likely an updated RFI [request for information]. There will be a procurement following soon after. We are on the list to receive all information." On January 18th of next year, Lovegrove provided an update: “I just spoke to the group chief on the contracts side (Doug K). COIN has been replaced by a procurement called Odyssey. He says that it is in the formative stages and that something should be released this year. The contracting officer is Kim R. He believes that Jason is the COTR [contracting officer's technical representative].” Another clue is provided in the ensuing discussion when a TASC executive asks, “Does Odyssey combine the Technology and Content pieces of the work?”
  121. The unexpected change-up didn't seem to phase the corporate partnership, which was still a top contender to compete for the upcoming Odyssey procurement. Later e-mails indicate a meeting between key members of the group and the contracting officer for Odyssey at a location noted as “HQ,” apparently for a briefing on requirements for the new program, on February 3rd of 2011. But two days after that meeting, the servers of HBGary and HBGary Federal were hacked by a small team of Anonymous operatives in retaliation for Barr's boasts to Financial Times that he had identified the movement's “leadership;” 70,000 e-mails were thereafter released onto the internet. Barr resigned a few weeks later.
  123. Along with clues as to the nature of COIN and its scheduled replacement, a close study of the HBGary e-mails also provide reasons to be concerned with the fact that such things are being developed and deployed in the way that they are. In addition to being the driving force behind the COIN recompete, Barr was also at the center of a series of conspiracies by which his own company and two others hired out their collective capabilities for use by corporations that sought to destroy their political enemies by clandestine and dishonest means, some of which appear to be illegal. None of the companies involved have been investigated; a proposed Congressional inquiry was denied by the committee chair, noting that it was the Justice Department's decision as to whether to investigate, even though it was the Justice Department itself that made the initial introductions. Those in the intelligence contracting industry who believe themselves above the law are entirely correct.
  125. That such firms will continue to target the public with advanced information warfare capabilities on behalf of major corporations is by itself an extraordinary danger to mankind as a whole, particularly insomuch as that such capabilities are becoming more effective while remaining largely unknown outside of the intelligence industry. But a far greater danger is posed by the practice of arming small and unaccountable groups of state and military personnel with a set of tools by which to achieve better and better “situational awareness” on entire populations while also being able to manipulate the information flow in such a way as to deceive those same populations. The idea that such power can be wielded without being misused is contradicted by even a brief review of history.
  127. History also demonstrates that the state will claim such powers as a necessity in fighting some considerable threat; the U.S. has defended its recent expansion of powers by claiming they will only be deployed to fight terrorism and will never be used against Ameerican civilians. This is cold comfort for those in the Arab world who are aware of the long history of U.S. material support for regimes they find convenient, including those of Saddam Hussein, Hosni Mubarak, and the House of Saud. Nor should Americans be comforted by such promises from a government that has no way of ensuring that they will be kept; it was just a few months ago that a U.S. general in Afghanistan ordered a military intelligence unit to use pysops on visiting senators in an effort to secure increased funding for the war; only a few days prior, CENTCOM spokesmen were confidently telling the public that such other psychological capabilities as persona management would never be used on Americans as that would be illegal. The fact is that such laws have been routinely broken by the military and intelligence community, who are now been joined in this practice by segments of the federal contracting industry.
  129. It is inevitable, then, that such capabilities as form the backbone of Romas/COIN and its replacement Odyssey will be deployed against a growing segment of the world's population. The powerful institutions that wield them will grow all the more powerful as they are provided better and better methods by which to monitor, deceive, and manipulate. The informed electorate upon which liberty depends will be increasingly misinformed. No tactical advantage conferred by the use of these programs can outweigh the damage that will be done to mankind in the process of creating them.
  131. Hello [redacted], hope you're well. This is potentially very interesting.
  132. Do you have any official documentation -- like government tenders, contracts, emails from DoD, State or intel agencies -- you can send across? Likewise anything from Apple or Google.
  134. ...
  136. No, I have no government documents of any sort, but there are additional details within the HBGary e-mails that may be relevant. I do have two recorded conversations with TASC execs John Lovegrove and Chris Clair in which they refuse to discuss the program, though.
  137. Also, The Guardian will be running my announcement tomorrow on their website, and I'll be linking to a copy of what I gave you, which will appear on my group's wiki, here: http://wiki.echelon2.org/wiki/Main_Page
  139. ...
  141. What's the announcement? If it's different from what you sent me earlier, can you send that too?
  144. The announcement is merely an explanation of why this is significant; it will not contain any additional information about the subject.
  146. Also, note that the NYT may verify and expand upon the info I'll be providing by searching the HBGary e-mails by keyword: http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/
  149. Thanks!
  153. Here's that announcement: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jun/22/hacking-anonymous
  156. Hey [redacted] -- I was about to email you, actually. Can you send me your number? I'd like to call for a quick chat.
  160. [redacted]
  163. First off, here are a sampling of the e-mails upon which I've drawn. You can log onto our Gmail account where the entirety of Barr's e-mails are located and search by keyword to verify and to see others. Just go to Gmail and use the following login info:
  165. Login: Aaron.Barr
  166. Password: hbgemail
  168. Note that phone numbers for John Lovegrove and other people involved may be found in some of the e-mails I've pasted below.
  170. I have also attached phone conversations I made to Chris Clair, one of the TASC execs involved in the discussions, as well as John Lovegrove, another TASC executive.
  172. ***
  174. from    Aaron Barr aaron@hbgary.com
  175. to    "Lovegrove, John (TASC)" <John.Lovegrove@tasc.com>
  176. cc    "Chris (TASC) Clair" <CHRISTOPHER.CLAIR@tasc.com>
  177. date    Wed, Mar 17, 2010 at 10:56 AM
  178. subject    Re: Antacid
  179. mailed-by    hbgary.com
  181. hide details 3/17/10
  184. I feel confident I can get you a ringer for Farsi if they are still interested in Farsi (we need to find that out).
  186. I don't know anything about Centra.  Thing is with these organizations they like who they know.  I never heard of Centra.  What type of linguists do they have?  Another tac might be to have a few stars on your side and don't claim a deep bench of linguists (most of which are probably DoD trained and not at all native).  You can ghost this talking about most linguists available are not native or digitally knowledgeable, but we have some stars and we are teaming with (someone like Gartner or Lincoln or Leoni) to bring some of the on the ground cultural relevance.  These linguists are not only going to be developing new content but also meeting with folks, so they have to have native or near native proficiency and have to have the cultural relevance as well.
  188. If Centra has this then I say grab them, if its just to fit a qual I think we could tell a different story and ghost the approach most will take to check the box.  Gartner has an amazing presence overseas, they can help out with on the ground MOEs as well.  Lincoln and Leoni have been working in those regions for quite some time linguistically and culturally.
  190. Clair, Chris (TASC) CHRISTOPHER.CLAIR@tasc.com
  191. to    "Lovegrove, John (TASC)" <John.Lovegrove@tasc.com>,
  192. "Garcia, Kathy (TASC)" <KATHERINE.GARCIA@tasc.com>,
  193. Aaron Barr <aaron@hbgary.com>,
  194. "Brunst Jr, Gerald R (TASC)" <GERALD.BRUNSTJR@tasc.com>,
  195. "Newbern, David W (TASC)" <DAVID.NEWBERN@tasc.com>,
  196. mgeldner@google.com
  197. date    Fri, Jul 2, 2010 at 12:58 PM
  198. subject    Google Meeting
  199. mailed-by    tasc.com
  201. hide details 7/2/10
  203. Title:    Google Meeting
  204. When:    Wed Jul 14 1pm – 2pm (CDT)
  205. Where:    WF3 3D
  206. Who:    david.newbern@tasc.com, gerald.brunstjr@tasc.com, john.lovegrove@tasc.com, katherine.garcia@tasc.com...
  208. Sign up for calendar »
  210. Your Agenda for Wed Jul 14, 2010
  211.          No earlier events
  212.     1pm    Google Meeting
  213.          No later events
  214. view my calendar »
  216. When: Wednesday, July 14, 2010 2:00 PM-3:00 PM (GMT-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).
  218. Where: WF3 3D
  220. Note: The GMT offset above does not reflect daylight saving time adjustments.
  222. *~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*
  224. Meeting with Mike Geldner from Google.
  226. Mike,
  228. Our address is
  230. TASC Inc.
  232. 4801 Stonecroft Blvd. , Chantilly, VA 20151
  234. My contact number is 703-449-3964.
  236. We will talk about Google Enterprise Partners and other things Google that are important to the COIN proposal.
  238. Thanks,
  239.      Chris Clair
  240. ______________________________
  241. ____________________
  243.     from    Aaron Barr aaron@hbgary.com
  244. to    Andy Kemp <akemp@apple.com>
  245. date    Tue, Sep 14, 2010 at 2:04 PM
  246. subject    Proposal
  247. mailed-by    hbgary.com
  249. hide details 9/14/10
  251. Hi Andy,
  253. Still waiting on the COIN/Romas proposal.... any day.
  255. Do you have a contact at Pixar/Disney I could talk with?
  257. from    andy kemp akemp@apple.com
  258. to    Aaron Barr <aaron@hbgary.com>
  259. date    Tue, Sep 14, 2010 at 2:26 PM
  260. subject    Re: Proposal
  261. mailed-by    apple.com
  263. hide details 9/14/10
  265. good good
  267. i'll get a contact
  268. - Show quoted text -
  269. Andy Kemp
  270. Homeland Defense / National Programs
  272. Apple Inc.
  273. 11921 Freedom Drive
  274. Suite 600
  275. Reston, Virginia
  276. 20194
  278. akemp@apple.com
  279. 240-988-3476
  282. Clair, Chris (TASC) CHRISTOPHER.CLAIR@tasc.com
  283. to    "Pisani, Albert A. (TASC)" <albert.pisani@tasc.com>,
  284. Aaron Barr <aaron@hbgary.com>
  285. cc    "Heider, Raymond A (TASC)" <raymond.heider@tasc.com>,
  286. "Lovegrove, John (TASC)" <John.Lovegrove@tasc.com>,
  287. "Garcia, Kathy (TASC)" <KATHERINE.GARCIA@tasc.com>
  288. date    Mon, Jul 19, 2010 at 1:00 PM
  289. subject    RE: EXTERNAL:
  290. mailed-by    tasc.com
  292. hide details 7/19/10
  294. Hi Al,
  296. We are currently working on defining the positions for key folks we want
  297. on COIN.  We expect to get the reqs posted by end of the month.
  299. By the way, Aaron and I thought it a good idea for you to visit the
  300. customer who has the COIN mission.  What are your availabilities for the
  301. next week or two?  Additionally, who else do you think should attend?
  303. Since Aaron has communications with the customer, I defer to him to
  304. arrange the meeting.  He also wants to pre-brief you on some of the
  305. mission intricacies.
  307. We spoke to Google and Apple last week.  They both agreed to be on our
  308. team!  I love this kind of innovation.
  311. Our team consists of:
  313. - TASC (PMO, creative services)
  314. - HB Gary (Strategy, planning, PMO)
  315. - Akamai (infrastructure)
  316. - Archimedes Global (Specialized linguistics, strategy, planning)
  317. - Acclaim Technical Services (specialized linguistics)
  318. - Mission Essential Personnel (linguistic services)
  319. - Cipher (strategy, planning operations)
  320. - PointAbout (rapid mobile application development, list of strategic
  321. partners)
  322. - Google (strategy, mobile application and platform development - long
  323. list of strategic partners)
  324. - Apple (mobile and desktop platform, application assistance -long list
  325. of strategic partners)
  327. We are trying to schedule an interview with ATT plus some other small
  328. app developers.
  331. We, truly have the team to beat on this!
  333. Let me know if you need more info.
  335. Thanks,
  337. Chris Clair
  339. Aaron Barr aaron@hbgary.com
  340. to    "Clair, Chris (TASC)" <CHRISTOPHER.CLAIR@tasc.com>
  341. date    Mon, Jul 19, 2010 at 1:19 PM
  342. subject    Re: EXTERNAL:
  343. mailed-by    hbgary.com
  345. hide details 7/19/10
  347. Chris,
  349. Probably a good time to talk about what role I would like to play once we win.  I know it is impossible until we really see the RFP to determine any concise workshare but probably a good idea for you and I to have a high level discussion on the topic so we aren't surprising each other with a perspective that doesn't match.  I definitely want to use this contract to rebuild an IO development capability as well as provide some of the strategy, planning and security services.  Again we don't know size of contract yet but on the low side I would like 5 FTEs and on the high side I would like 10 FTEs (depending on size of contract) mostly doing mobile and social media development.  Overall I would like 25% of the overall contract value.  So lets set up a time to talk I would like to hear your thoughts.
  351. Aaron
  353. Hi Aaron,
  355. Does this look right?  Call me at 703-403-0326 if you can shed any light on this.
  357. Chris
  358. From: Lovegrove, John (TASC)
  359. Sent: Tuesday, January 18, 2011 1:41 PM
  360. To: Heider, Raymond A (TASC); Clair, Chris (TASC)
  361. Cc: Bane, Christopher J (TASC)
  362. Subject: RE: COIN/ROMAS
  364. Don’t know Ray.  I just talked to Kim and she is sending me information on the high side.  The market survey went to NG.  She is going to add us to the bidders list.  I’ll let you know as soon as I see the documents.
  368. From: Heider, Raymond A (TASC)
  369. Sent: Tuesday, January 18, 2011 1:35 PM
  370. To: Lovegrove, John (TASC); Clair, Chris (TASC)
  371. Cc: Bane, Christopher J (TASC)
  372. Subject: RE: COIN/ROMAS
  377. Does Odyssey combine the Technology and Content pieces of the work?
  379. Ray
  387. From: Lovegrove, John (TASC)
  388. Sent: Tuesday, January 18, 2011 1:16 PM
  389. To: Clair, Chris (TASC)
  390. Cc: Heider, Raymond A (TASC)
  391. Subject: COIN/ROMAS
  395. Chris,
  399. I just spoke to the group chief on the contracts side (Doug K).  COIN has been replaced by a procurement called Odyssey.  He says that it is in the formative stages and that something should be released this year.  The contracting officer is Kim R.  He believes that Jason is the COTR.
  403. Kim will be getting in touch with me to bring me up to speed, I will also give her your name as a POC.
  407. We should talk to Aaron and see how this tracks with his information.
  411. WR,
  413. John
  416. spoke to the CO for COIN yesterday.  The current procurement approach is cancelled, she cited changed requirements.  They will be coming out with some documents in a month or two, most likely an updated RFI.   There will be a procurement following soon after.  We are on the list to receive all information.
  420. My speculation is that the four separate contracts approach was justifiably shot down and they are re-grouping.
  424. John Lovegrove
  426. Director
  428. Office: (703) 449-3812
  430. Cell: (571) 294-5154
  434. cid:image001.jpg@01CA87AD.92FBD4F0
  439. This e-mail, including attachments, is intended for the exclusive use of the person or entity to whom it is addressed and may contain confidential or privileged information. If the reader of this e-mail is not the intended recipient or his or her authorized agent, the reader is hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this e-mail is prohibited. If you think that you have received this e-mail in error, please advise the sender by reply e-mail of the error and then delete this e-mail immediately.
  442. Reply
  444. Reply to all
  446. Forward
  449. Reply
  450. Heider, Raymond A (TASC) to John, aaron, Chris, Rick, Brunst, Albert
  452. show details 9/24/10
  454. What was the logic of the 4 contract approach??
  456. From: Lovegrove, John (TASC)
  457. Sent: Friday, September 24, 2010 02:55 PM
  458. To: Aaron Barr <aaron@hbgary.com>; Clair, Chris (TASC); Wagner, Rick (TASC); Brunst Jr, Gerald R (TASC); Heider, Raymond A (TASC); Pisani, Albert A. (TASC)
  459. Subject: COIN/ROMAS status
  461. - Show quoted text -
  462. Reply
  464. Reply to all
  466. Forward
  469. Reply
  470. Clair, Chris (TASC) to Raymond, John, aaron, Rick, Brunst, Albert
  472. show details 9/24/10
  475. All,
  477. From what we heard the split is a negotiation between the COTR and the OPS officer.  Seems that the incumbent team proposed a sole source contract.  The incoming COTR approved it.  The OPS boss (John) and his boss (Marybeth) disputed the decision and opted out.  The negotiation was to split up the RFP into 4 parts and bid them separately to keep the customer team together.  We did not get any information beyond that but it was disputed later in the week.  I hope the RFI means they are serious this time.
  479. If you need more info, we can talk Monday.  Let me know if you want me to set it up.
  481. Chris
  484. -----Original Message-----
  485. From: Heider, Raymond A (TASC)
  486. Sent: Fri 9/24/2010 5:20 PM
  487. To: Lovegrove, John (TASC); 'aaron@hbgary.com'; Clair, Chris (TASC); Wagner, Rick (TASC); Brunst Jr, Gerald R (TASC); Pisani, Albert A. (TASC)
  488. Subject: Re: COIN/ROMAS status
  490. What was the logic of the 4 contract approach??
  493. From: Lovegrove, John (TASC)
  494. Sent: Friday, September 24, 2010 02:55 PM
  495. To: Aaron Barr <aaron@hbgary.com>; Clair, Chris (TASC); Wagner, Rick (TASC); Brunst Jr, Gerald R (TASC); Heider, Raymond A (TASC); Pisani, Albert A. (TASC)
  496. Subject: COIN/ROMAS status
  500. I spoke to the CO for COIN yesterday.  The current procurement approach is cancelled, she cited changed requirements.  They will be coming out with some documents in a month or two, most likely an updated RFI.   There will be a procurement following soon after.  We are on the list to receive all information.
  504. My speculation is that the four separate contracts approach was justifiably shot down and they are re-grouping.
  508. John Lovegrove
  510. Director
  512. Office: (703) 449-3812
  514. Cell: (571) 294-5154
  519. Also, I'm afraid that the pastebin in which the logs with Ryan [Cleary] were stored seems to be unavailable.
  521. ...
  524. Much appreciated, thanks.
  526. ...
  528. [Journalist again]
  530. Hmmmm. Is there any other way of getting them back?
  532. ...
  534. Not that I know of
  537. ...
  540. [Later]
  543. Thanks [redacted]! Have you heard anything about why LulzSec disbanded?
  545. ...
  548. No, I don't pay much attention to all of that.
  551. ...
  554. [one month later]
  556. [redacted]-
  558. I wanted to check in to see if anyone at the Times has looked into Romas/COIN yet. In addition to the materials I've already brought to your attention, I now have a recorded phone conversation with HBGary CEO Greg Hoglund confirming its existence and claiming its intent is to "fight terrorists;" he called me last week while somewhat drunk in order, I suppose, to justify himself in general. Meanwhile, Der Spiegel has run a piece on the subject. Please let me know if there's anything else the Times would need in order to pursue this story, assuming your editors consider it to be newsworthy.
  560. [no response since, even about what guys in Lulzsec are really like deep down]
  563. [Final round of e-mails will drop tomorrow, Sunday 9/2/2012. These will be followed by releases from certain other outlets out of fairness, over time, as more Anons turn in any such correspondence]
  567. #OpNYT
  569. Don't wait. Retaliate.
RAW Paste Data