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  1. * Michael is working on the slow vanishing of matter in modern philosophy
  2. * I’d like to share some thoughts on the dissertation
  3. * It’s on the concept of the notion of matter and its vicissitudes in history. The vanishing of matter I early modern history
  4. * This is a difficult problem because the notion of matter is so ingrained in our notions of matter of talking and thinking. It resists your attempts to historicizing… to appreciate its strangeness we might have to get rid of ourintutiions
  5. * Concrete––what do we mean by this?
  6. * We mean that both plan and evidence purport to be real or realizable. Tnagible
  7. * We do this, in order to convey this meaning, we use the participle of concreso to fuse together
  8. * So we pay analogy to a mark of being which has as its mark the ability to join togehter
  9. * Part of an arsenal of concepts brought into latin by the tranlsatinon of the physical treatises by aristotle
  10. * The second part is between mathematicaians and philosophers
  11. * iT stigmatizes matter as an agent of uncertainty. That which resists our knowledge of the world
  12. * 3 is on Francis Bacon and early Descartes and an natural history of abstract items
  13. * Chapter 4 is a full long chapter on Descartes and his idea of a natural philosophy of the abstract
  14. * 1640s
  15. * And finally Leibniz. The re appropriation of these hylomorphic metaphysics with a twist back through Leibniz
  16. * To a student of the 12th-13th c the aristotle was the writer of the categories along with the porphyry and bioethics they formed the trivium. Grammar dialectic and rhetoric
  17. * This leads to the quadrivium, the four abstract sciences. Geometry arithmetic music astronomy
  18. * Higher disciplines are medicine law and theology
  19. * So the liberal arts were designed as purely formal. They were not appropriated with specific sensible matter and this made them all the more congenial to the mind. All the more congenial to its education.
  20. * In order for the mind to synthesize concepts out of uvniersal terms it was thought it had to be exempt of matter
  21. * With matter it could not rise above the instance of an act of thinking.
  22. * You could construct a natural history of circles observed. But you can’t observe the essence of circularity
  23. * The real mark of the mental there is the intention of universality. IT’s not merely universality. It’s the intent of universality applied to our presnetations
  24. * Only after our tranlsatiou of the metaphysics and de anima y Aristotle did the original scope of this become apparent in all its explanatory latitude
  25. * There arose an expectation that beings cold be studied insofar as they are themselves. Not just as vestiges or emblems for some meaning that is extrinsic to them
  26. * Medieval tradition. Moral typology is exhibited by animals in the concrete world. Whatever age them meaning as concrete beings what
  27. * To bring the concrete as such in the language of Epislon maetaphysics
  28. * Being could be studied not as being but only as changeable beings. Beings that are growing and dying things could e studied from within their own disciplines. They were intelligible enough to eventually be studiedd in their own disciplines. There are necessary correlations to be found among them.
  29. * It would be worthy of our attention basically
  30. * One could make an object of science out of thhe perpetual replenishing of an individual. By the vegetative powers of the soul
  31. * And the perpetual certain of an animal species from individual to individual. INfoar as you have a science of the beatific revolution of the heavenly bodies
  32. * We are told that these are lal different ways of emulating the divine and the eternal
  33. * These go a long way to motivating a natural theology.
  34. * The goodness and truthfulness the world is coming into vogue.
  35. * An issue motivating Albert’s and Thomas’ mission to legitimize natural philosophy was the fact that sensible matter had to be apologized for against the Neo-Gnostic sentiments billing their roots, especially in Longdocue and the caathars
  36. * The effect that these works have on students and masters alike cannot be estimated
  37. * University of Paris bans aristotle and Toulouse tries to prep it
  38. * Later they start teaching aristotle again. They proscribe the masters of the arts to include them in the readings
  39. * When this mentality enshrines itself in the European universities and natural philosophy becomes open to demonstrative reason the primacy of the concrete subject becomes venerated. Surprisingly, despite many iterations —the doctrine of matter, and prime matter, will be passed on to the renaissance relatively unchagned
  40. * So how does matter work from the aristotle of the categories to the Aristotle of the physics and metaphysics
  41. * We all know that the categories is about
  42. * Substantial and insubstantial
  43. * Socrates is the category of primary substancec
  44. * We have non substantial accidental categories
  45. * Ubi
  46. * quando
  47. * Habitus
  48. * Dispositio
  49. * Leaetio
  50. * Acto
  51. * Passio
  52. * Marion:
  53. * You have ousia in secondary and primary substance
  54. * The primary substance is essentia in translatin
  55. * So in this the university of ousia is already gone
  56. *
  57. * So insofar as the categories are concerned wthe mark of the substance here has todo with the logical insistence. We cannot impose Socrates as incipient.
  58. * This is a logical criterion that when we move to the physics and the metaphysics we enter the inner life of the substances
  59. * Another problem with the category is that they are things that are named. They’re just designated––they are ontologically flat
  60. * The only way to account for a unity of Socrates is statements.We can only predicate him of things. But it’s just an ame… there is no formal univeristy
  61. * The sum of all these statements… the remarkable life of socrates is accounted through this unremarkable repetition of propositions
  62. * The other problem is that the only way to perceive members over a category as not being able to be predicted any further is by virtue of a feature that can be predicted further
  63. * The only way we can predicate them as under the category of under communicable things is by a communicable feature
  64. * So the ousia here is a secondary intention. It’s a concept about conceptsSo we need to bridge the gap between names, pure names, and the concepts of concepts
  65. * [maybe here philosophy of lagged
  66. * We switch hre
  67. * We’re not asking quis ousia to quid set ousia Socrates
  68. * So we have socrates and then a partitive gentitive. We aks… what is the ousia of socrates. The is a particular analysis insofar as… what do you consist in… it means that you do not really consist in what you are. It presupposes an agent of alienation. Something that prevents you from being what you are.
  69. * So what are the real markers of the substance when we move to the physics/metaphysics
  70. * Hoc liquid?Tode ti
  71. * It moves to the seperatible/koriston. Logical independence. Something Amy exist without supporting it.
  72. * So we’re talking about pronouns. It’s about an indexical attitude towards an environment. As in the ego. When I say hoc it’s sensitive to the attitude that I’m in. If I say ego it changes what I’m in
  73. * So the reference has to do with the immediate environment of the performer of the ego or the hoc
  74. * Alll of these criteria need a material access that we don’t have in the categories.
  75. * So… it requires an an access to a different order than the being can provide
  76. * Socrates is then a combination of the quid erat esse and the subiectu
  77. * Rational sol––it is the actus labor.
  78. * It is the actualization of an organic body.
  79. * Identifies as the substance of Socrates.
  80. * Accounts for unity over and across matter. We can account for this in the formal unity of souls.
  81. * Already the limits of discursive thought. To describe a unity we here use two terms. We use two terms to do so. So the trick was to use the logoi/rationes. The interpersonal of Socrates… but again this is the beginning of the end. This is how we break the unity of being by using two principles.
  82. * We have Physics book 1.7-9
  83. * Every change has a necessary substratum of change
  84. * Aristotle allows the necessary subsisting of matter in MP Eta 4
  85. * Body, tissues, mixtures, etc…
  86. * How far down… you know Leibniz answer. There’s an actual infinity of units of being. As many monads as there are levels of organization that are more than just a mere aggregate. But not so for aristotle
  87. * For Aristotle we need to have al limit. Otherwise the whole structure collapse. In the same way motion is disbanded without a prime over
  88. * We have a primove mover at the vanishing point of all motion. We have a prime matter at the vanishing point of all inherence.
  89. * Thomas Aquinas tells us that if it weren’t for prime matter nothing would stop our forms from being predicated further and further
  90. * In a sense this was Spinoza’s idea. That whales and mountains are predicates of as a prime substance. The same way that the fleeting moments are to socrates
  91. * In MP Zeta 4
  92. * We would have to admit prime matter as the ousia to Socrates. To think of it as such… the ultimate subject of predication that cannot be predicated any further. A level of predication of more substantial to the degree that it is said of other things. This would lead us here.
  93. * SO I’m just putting this out here to say that…. What denies the prime matter’s claim to substantiality are these criterion in a radically different way.
  94. * So of course prime matte decaying. Countless iterations… substratum of generative strange. This is where socrates comes form as a substance and where he goes back
  95. * But the question nis… why not admit a substratum of particles? Or corpuscles? That has this featurelesss substratum create so many problems
  96. * The problem with Aquinas. He was a Unitarianism. One form per unity/bieng
  97. * The form extends its reach down into the laments and this was supposed to be the necessity to not fragment the unity
  98. * Duns Scotus has 2 forms
  99. * Random renaissance asks… why not an infinity. Leibniz actually presupposes an infinity of them
  100. * Either we keep this featureless substratum and maintain this formal unity of substance or have something that’s more actualized. Something that’s intelligible in itself and risk breaking up the substance into two
  101. * Something that is merely unified… a unity is not an unum.
  102. * And of course… this is the beginning of the end. It has started from the idea of quantifier prime matter. From Averroes to Jean of Jean Dunne . To toilets. To Suarez and to Descartes. So we have a tendency of actualizing prime matter. And this is what we mean by the vanishing of matter. The problem being the analysis of the fragmentation of being
  103. * By the end of metaphysics zeta… all that within a substance is intelligible as relegated form. Al that is not is matter.
  104. * In a theory that conflates being with essence, as in aristotle. Matter prevents composite things from being what they are
  105. * Agent of self alienation. There is something to our complete selves that makes us less than our essence.
  106. * And if both principle mental processes in philosophy are both form observing and matter removing. In this case matter is just unintelligible in and of itself no matter what the power of your intellect is. It’s constitutionally unintelliglbe
  107. * So there’s something more… matter prevents me from being myself no less than it prevents me from being known as myself. There’s an epistemological side and ontological side of prime matter
  108. * So… in a doctrine of matter… Aristotle claims we can only know the potential matter as such through analogy. IT’s describe
  109. * Pedro Franseca. Renaissance philosopher
  110. * We know formlessness by ignoring it and we ignore it by knowing it.
  111. * Aquinas
  112. * In the end the rejection of prime matter is associated with the beginning of new and rationalist ways of thinking. Because the champions in reason see in prime matter something sceitnfiicmlly meaningless. It cannot be enacted in thought. Descartes rejects it in the chapter VI.
  113. * It’s one of the suspicious ideas… like the idea of gold or darkness or rest, that can be materially false. That is––it might even present a non thing as sa thing. They’re so indistinct and so unclear that they can even be about non things
  114. * We reach Francis Bacon:
  115. * Certainly that the spoil and passive matter seems to be nothing more than a figment. As afar as the human intellect is ocncnered those things have most reality which the intellect take in most readily
  116. * So forms have more reality than matter just because matter is hidden. IT’s here that the reign of forms seems to have originated. Form a kind of fantasy matter.
  117. * Hylomorphic metaphysics is part of epistemic adolescent for Bacon
  118. * Forms for all things known and am after for everything else
  119. * Lmit on otherwise unlimited entitlement to human power…
  120. * The unknown substrate would
  121. * Matter
  122. * To be subsumed from the unknown to the known
  123. * Thomas
  124. * Wants to reconcile the self involvement of the Aristotelian mind and a plan of providence that reaches down to the individual
  125. * So to do so he objectifies in the mind of God all the elements that make up the concrete world in their utter particularity.
  126. * Make sup for the radical intelligibility of the entirety.
  127. * This is a alevle of analysis aristotle never reached or meant t oreach
  128. * Tomas spritiaulizes here or materializes matter
  129. * No matter in plato and matter for both P and A was a principle in itself
  130. * Matter is a creature for Thomas first. This is his development
  131. * This is a new level of analysis.
  132. * Form/m=a.e/f
  133. * If there is a being whose essence is existnece as an artificer asserts being in creation all conform to the unity of a preexisting plan and also are multiple .As many beings as there are acts of creationn
  134. * Based in an intelligible plan but in one that is extrinsic to its existence.
  135. * So… that element that was thought to alienate feasible beings is more more. They are no longer alienated from what they are because their being consists in the personalities
  136. * No longer do we have an alienated factor. Socrates exists as a person. What they are alienated from in various degrees along the scale of being is from essential existence.
  137. * Only consists entirely in the fact
  138. * The unit of creation consists entirely in the fact that it exists. IT’s not the pure fact of existence. TI needs to exist as something.
  139. * It needs to exist as something.
  140. * Maroin
  141. * There is no such thing as existence in this case. For thomas
  142. * Excuse… it does not exist. It is the actus essendi
  143. * I would like to insist on how crucial this question is. It would be funny to have this as the title of the book to come. Does Matter matter?
  144. * That is exactly the point. The paradox is that… if you ask people in this university are we de facto aware of thinking. Are we materialists? Yes we are in fact should be. The more we are materialist the more we are scietnific
  145. * But really we have no concept of matter left. To know for us is to build up an object. The characteristic of this object is that it is as far as possible abstract from matter
  146. * Numerization––this is the achievement of modernization––amounts to suppressing what cannot be reduced to a quantity and therefore what cannot be made a form.
  147. * Stiegler
  148. * It is worse with the Data. The data in the world… it is the worse
  149. * Marion
  150. * The data world is to transform anything into an information
  151. * IT means that as long as there is subsisting matter the job is not done.
  152. * So we are in a very unmaterialistic and indeed idealistic moment of civilization. Against all odds
  153. * So the question is… is this only the symptom of the final catastrophe… perhaps… or is this there euslt of a story. And I really think it is the result of a story
  154. * So there are different steps in that. One of the most interesting steps was written by this great underestimated and badly understood philosopher Linden.
  155. * Vladimir Lych wrote in 1905 one year after the theory from Meaning in 1904
  156. * Oh by the way we are today January 21
  157. * What does that mean? It is the anniversary of three great moments
  158. * 2027 Louis XIV
  159. * 1917 years ago Lenin died
  160. * In 2010 I achieved the Academy Francaise
  161. * Vladimir Lych has written Materialism and Empiro-Criticism. It is a great book… it is so naive and it is so beautiful that you can consider it ias a non marx
  162. * Argument is this
  163. * There are some bourgeois sciences
  164. * Like Averroes and Ernst Mach
  165. * They had in common to have said that we have no need or concept of substance in sciences and have no need of it. To resist a revisionist view of Marxism Lenin makes clear that materialism as a doctrine is all the more stronger that we have no concept of matter left. There is no objection on the side of Averroes and Mach. The fact that Marxism is a serious and straightforward materialism… because it is has no need of any concept of matter .And in fact the modern views in ideological debates and materialism do not refer to any notion of matter
  166. * Lenin spills the beans with his naivete but there is something there
  167. * Matter plays no role but as a notion of phenomenon as by Kant… matter was simply denied by Berkeley.
  168. * Another text by Diderot. This is where he develops a materialist interpretation of nature. And to do so he has an account to attribute to matter some properties of the mind. That is––imagination, sensitivity, and indeed motion. What is matter for Diderot? It is self-motion, sensitivity, production of images.
  169. * So you seee… it is either there is nothing to say about matter or under the name of matter you understand the psyche.
  170. * And Berkeley indeed… he does not deny matter. He says it is unintelligible and useless
  171. * KRistof
  172. * And because of this it has no meaning of us for thinking beings… so it might as well not exist. It is not even important to decid
  173. * And Berkeley is not joking. He is very serious
  174. * The people who have criticized Berkeley as an immaterialist are stupid. He is in the position of Kant and clearly of the position of Descartes
  175. * Descartes has no traditional polemic. The murder was committed before Descartes.
  176. * It is very important what you try to do
  177. * Marion
  178. * There is perhaps a point you should emmphasize more.
  179. * In the second part of the Middle Ages the denigration of matter was enforced by the multiplication of the forms. Each matter should have its form. And this concern of the form is a good symptom that matter itself is disappearing.
  180. * What is assumed there is that there is no access to matter.
  181. * The point is why until Aquinas that matter could not be known remains tolerable
  182. * In Dinos for instance. You cannot say anything about matter. Why this was accepted?
  183. * It is because matter remains only provisional. For Aristotle it is clear that the protoeulai is agnostic. But in the real act of knowledge the prote hyle disappears into the form
  184. * What does that mean? For the people in the time of Franseca or Scotus the form was already a figua. That is a concept imposed by the mind to the matter to be known. And it is the way of Descartes… when Descartes speaks about the figura he doesn’t speak of forma. That’s aristotle
  185. * The point with the figura is that the figura is an invention of the mind. That’s why the figura grows in geometry.
  186. * In geometry you invent figurae in order to trace motions to make visible quantities and establish the relation between quantities
  187. * So the figura is mental
  188. * The forma… in greek you have the same difference.
  189. * Figura in aristotle is schema. The schemata is the classification of the categories
  190. * So the figure of predication, under the side against the figure schema you have the forma/eidos
  191. * The edits is a property of the thing itself. The aspect, the geschischt. Stiegler: face
  192. * For the Greeks… we never see matter. We aren’t supposed to see matter. When we see something it is already the face of the thing .And this fusion of matter into and by the eidos it is what Aristotle has called he enregeia. The energies entelecheia is that moment of reduction
  193. * And as Book 3 of the de anima says… there is only one energies for what is known and the act of knowing.
  194. * This means that… in fact the unification between both achieves the unity of the thing. Which is now encapsulated in its edits. And… the act of understanding. And there is only one act.
  195. * Clearly… as soon as an attempt was made to understand directly the matter as such you had to substitute for the matter a form. And had make the matter not only unknown but useless.
  196. * So it is very very important to keep going.
  197. * But why maintain the unknowable?
  198. * We have seen that for us to know is to know with certitude. To now something which can be made into an object. And the Aristotelian way to know is to see the thing as it appears from itself in a moment but never for ever.
  199. * And the object remains what it is forever. Even if the object is not actually there… we know it
  200. * So for us we cannot allow the object to appear and disappear. To have a genesis and a death of its own.
  201. * He has to be at end even when it is not here. Because we have the plans and we keep the plans. We can reproduce it at any moment because we can produce it
  202. * The paradox is that the object… we have to produce the object because actually empirically we need to reproduce it epistemologically first.
  203. * The object should stay. Be reproducible at any moment. This reproduction is definitely sealed when we can reproduce physically. There is a paradox to some extent when we materialize the concept into an object
  204. * Bachler. Science is the materialization of a concept into an object.
  205. * Apparently it is very smart but rather superficial
  206. * What does it mean to materialize? IT is not matter in the Aristotelian meaning. It is precisely to dematerialize… and… in the Note Conference on Descartes. That modernity, modern times, is the moment when we have created matter. That is––we produce our matter. In the old times… when you are using wood. You could do a lot of things with wood but not everything. Because of its dimensions, rigidity. Same thing with stones. You can do something but not everything. So we have invented concrete.
  207. * With concrete you can do everything. Or steel. The difference between steel and woods that there is a larger range than wood. And we could add now that plastic… plastic is the most valuable material because it can accept any shape, any charac3tistic
  208. * So in fact plastic is no way matter. It is in fact a form. Concrete, steel, and plastic are the immaterializations off the material itself.
  209. * Dissertationer
  210. * IT’s almost like a chemical quest. Plastic is the dream of the alchemist.
  211. * Marion
  212. * SO the question of matter.
  213. * Who said that… yes.. there is a quotation by Marx.
  214. * Marx says once in a letter to Engels that the Christians in general, and the Catholic in particular, are terrible people because they are so materialist in their use of religion.
  215. * And time is coming where the last materialist will be the believer.
  216. * And… here we are. Close.
  217. * Disserter
  218. * Boyle is particularly interesting because he thinks that there is a preservation of matter. It’s the preservation of a different kind of unity. It has a definite quant.y A corpuscularian from Bacon to Descartes to Boyle to Spinoza… they Ould all consider the ultimate subject of predication as something which is essentially quantitative. It seems indefinite enough to substance under accidents that take the shape of the world we live in. IF you see the history of the concept… even that much of the quantity would have been detrimental to the unity of the form
  219. * So that as long as you admit anything in your first subjectivities.t You have to admit that forms come and go like fleeting things… Spinoza at the other end. In a philosophically accurate grammar for Spinoza we should have used adjectives to refer to beings like us instead of nouns. This bit of space is Scoratic here.
  220. * So I think that Corpuscularianism even from Galileo is an important step to what we’re describing as vanishing
  221. * The scope of the project was supposed to be just early modern philosophy but I had to set some terms first to make them intelligible. They’re engrained in a way I couldn’t help. I think the project took off when I clarified the premoderns
  222. * IT is crucial to re-read Aristotle’s physics to understand… modernity in epistemology is the evolution of genesis and stoa. What is known should remain exactly what it is
  223. * Nietzsche is very clear in this.
  224. * There is two boos that we cannot wait to read
  225. * Tomorrow we could perhaps start at four.
  226. *
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