war for oil

war for oil: the nazi quest for an oil empire
by dietrich eichholtz

ch 1: thirst for oil

germany imported most of its oil from what were to become its enemies. even synthetic oil production from coal, which was invented in germany, covered very little of its yearly demand. german military planners acted as if the had reliable fuel supplies when they didnt, and after actions in spain and ethiopia the estimates of what a modern army would need in the field had to be dramatically raised. none of this really impacted the planning for war.

ch 2: booty in austria: spoils of 'blitzkreig'

the austrian anschluss would eventually provide the germans with 1.2 million tons of oil a year by 1944. it was a dramatic expansion of the germans internal oil capacity. at first, internal squabbling between german oil companies delayed increases in output. new conglomerates with carefully balanced ownership percentages had to be established to get everyone to collaborate effectively. the nazis always preferred to run things in a private manner using pre-existing corporations like ig farben, and only coordinate and restrict competition at the level of the whole industry.

when germany seized france and belgium it also seized the investments and shares that citizens in those countries owned in foreign oil interests, and the stocks of petroleum and refineries that those countries used. these stocks were turned to the war effort and some of the refineries and pipelines were dismantled to be used elsewhere in the nazi empire.

poland's oil fields were seized and ruthlessly exploited

ch 3: seizure of 'enemy property' in romania

romania had the largest oilfields that the nazis seized before barbarossa. and romania would be a crucial supply of fuel until the end of the war. by combining pressure on the government and a promise to rearm romania's decrepit military, the nazis managed to take over most foreign-owned oil interest in the country. fake sales and forced purchases, as well as thinly disguised shareholder fraud, were the 'legal' means of this. foreign managers and skilled workers who had fled after the bucharest government moved closer to the nazis made it difficult to restart production, but it was done.

the romanians also exerted control over oil enterprises with their own fascist 'commissioners' who would demand the dismissal of jewish employees and make other claims on the firms.

ch 4: the resistable decision: barbarossa

only in late 1940 did hitler decide on a two front war by starting plans for barbarossa. actions in the mediterranean and north africa drained a significant amount of fuel and materiel from the more important theaters, and the battle for britain was lost. germany's attempts to take over iraq were easily batted aside and the british maintained control over the rest of the middle east, with the exception of vichy syria which was pro nazi. all of germany's war plans now rested on the ussr falling quickly and the oil near grozny and maikop being tapped rapidly.

ch 5: 'kontinental ol AG': germanys aims in the middle east

bentz and fischer knew that romanian oil wasnt going to last, and that some other source had to be found. they also recognized that the ad-hoc, uncoordinated (even competing) state of german oil interests in romania and elsewhere was undesireable, and that a single powerful organization was necessary to really ramp up oil production and assimilate new oilfields. for them the caucasus oil fields weren't even going to be enough, since the soviets barely managed to cover their own demand. their solution was the middle east. and the organization they formed to take control of the effort was konti ol AG.

there was a debate in german ruling class circles over where to get the oil, and a lot of the more thoughtful leaders wanted to work with the ussr or at least stay neutral, knock britain out and secure britain's oil in the middle east. others, including hitler, wanted to secure the caspian/caucasus oil with what they presumed would be a quick campaign (three months).

ch 6: the raid on iraq

franz von papen was responsible for germanys activities in the middle east from ankara. he met with arab nationalists and anti-british forces in the region and advocated a middle-eastern focused strategy for attacking britain. even to the point of coordinating with the ussr.

the plan that gradually developed was to support uprisings against the british in the middle east, seizq iraqi oil and threaten egypt. the refinery at abadan, near basra, was the largest in the world at the time and supplied millions of tons of oil to the british.

but things moved faster than expected. a nationalist (and german friendly?) premier, ali kilani, took over as premier and great britain landed 14000 troops and sent tons of aircraft and ships to secure iraqi oil and crush the rebellion. they did so despite a hastily-assembled german military mission that was defeated rapidly. there was no time to damage oil facilities in the north near mosul before the military mission had to flee the country.

ch 7: the 'caucasus pincers' (1)

operation barbarossa was supposed to completely destroy the soviet union in four to five months. the oilfields of the caucasus were not mentioned in the initial war plans, and the general objective was vague as well. some officers were worried about what a distraction barbarossa was. war plans became more dramatic and less realistic as barbarossa approached. the attack against the british empire in the middle east was now supposed to be carried out by the afrika corps plus a pincer coming down from the transcaucasus region and into iran. a motorized corps was supposed to cross turkey and seize iraq too, after the soviets were defeated.

the 'economic organization east' was established to coordinate the pillage of the soviet union. special units were formed to seize soviet productive assets and manage them for the war economy. the most important of these units targeted oilfields, and marched in practically right behind advancing troops. the entire military was supposed to steal as much food and petroleum as possible from the soviet union during the invasion. goring's 'green folder' laid this out in detail.

the first oil resource seized was eastern galicia, which produced 400k tons of oil a year. a special 'petroleum unit' seized it to be operated by konti ol. estonian shale oil fields were exploited by a similr unit. a 6 thousand man 'technical petroleum brigade' was assembled from civilian experts and workers and told to study the caucasus oil fields as they marched there, but the army group south offensive collapsed and they retreated.

ig farben occupied key positions in the konti ol conglomerate, the nazi four year plan office, and the reich economics ministry. german capital worked closely with the party and the military in the organized pillage of conquered areas.

miltary plans drawn up after the soviets had held out longer than five months included conquering the caucasus region with panzer groups, and a competing plan to capture moscow and destroy the arms manufacturing plants there. all of those plans were moot owing to soviet resistance, partisan operations, and the degraded state of the panzer groups (50 percent strength for some of them). none of these plans could be implementd, regardless of which one was 'right.' but hitler and his staff still discussed reaching the oil fields and invading into iraq even as army group south was being kicked out.

ch 8: the 'caucasus pincers' (2)

following the failure of barbarossa to seize oil, thomas predicted that the wehrmacht would become increasingly paralyzed by lack of fuel. this was in late 1941. the navy thought that a mideast strategy through suez and basra was still viable, if done in cooperation with japan, which was completely insane and impossible.

another thing very few people in the nazi war machine understood was that the caucasus oil fields were extremely productive and in some cases self-flowing, and near refining sites. oil in the mideast typically had to be piped to refining sites through low-capacity lines that would take years to upgrade.

case blue, the effort to seize the oilfields, was the nazis last chance to seize a useful supply of oil, in the summer of 1942. it failed, in part because of drastic underestimation of the soviets. many military leaders warned well before the operation that it wouldnt succeed, and that it would be the final offensive possible on the eastern front. they were right.

the germans planned to seize the suez canal and its oilfields and refineries befre rommel was stopped at el alamein, but it didnt pan out. they started scouring france for people who owned shares of the suez company so they could forcibly purchase them and set up a fake buyout of the company that would give them an excuse to close it to british shipping.

the technical petroleum brigade, previously mentioned, was formed to take the little drilling equipment the nazis had and move it to the oil fields that were presumably about to be conquered.

ch 9: beginning and end of the oil operation in the caucasus

from august 1942 to january 1943 the wehrmacht tried to take the caucasus, and was thrown back. the destruction of the sixth army at stalingrad and the threat of being cut off by the soviets at rostov caused the germans to pull back. the end of rommels offensive in north africa ended the second half of the pincer movement.

when the TPB (german acronym TBM) arrived in maykop, the only oil field the nazis seized in this area, they found that the soviets had completely ruined the wells, pipes and refineries. and they were offering very stiff resistance in the mountains around the city still. the brigade had to repair rail lines, remove mines and start drilling under fire from soviet artillery. they only expected oil production to occur a year later. dismantled french refinery equipment had to be shipped across the continent to set up production.

the soviets also installed purpose-designed plugs in wells that made them impossible to restart. enormous toggle plugs or something.

the much larger and more produtive oil fields near grozny were never reached, and even the maykop area had to be abandoned after producing only a few thousand tons of oil, most of which was burned unrefined in truck engines. as the soviets closed in all the specialized equipment the nazis had hauled across the continent had to be blown up. the nazi effort to secure enough oil to operate had failed.