considerations may carry greater weight. In the case of Jamaica (2011 UKUT00483) the Upper Tribunal stated:
"We agree with Mr Saunders that there was no statutory duty on the ECO to take account of or apply statutory guidance issued under Section 55(3) because the scope of the duty under Section 55(1) is clearly and unambiguously restricted to children in the United Kingdom and because the guidance itself accurately reflects the duty in explaining that there is no such duty in respect of children abroad. The spirit of Section 55 would apply where the EGO had reason to suspect that the child was in need of protection, and it appears from the decision letter that the EGO did not include that was the case. Whether the ECO was right or wrong to reach that conclusion depends on a resolution of disputed issues of fact rather than a remittal back to the EGO for compliance with an unspecific policy that neither imposes a duty nor directs a particular response to this application. We should further add that the function of judges in the Immigration and Asylum Chambers is to decide appeals, rather than supervise the exercise of public law functions by general judicial review jurisdictions. When judges determine appeals they can decide what the material facts are, and proceed from those factual findings to reach conclusions on the statutory grounds set out in Section 82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
It is for the Judge to decide on all the relevant evidence what the best interests of the child are in the particular circumstances of the case, whether they are compelling circumstances requiring admission, and whether if the case falls under the Immigration Rules, there remains a lack of respect for family life under Article 8 (1)."
-' (ii)The United Kingdom sponsor is the natural mother of three of the appellants. Her three children were born on 4 December 1993, 15 July 1996 and 19 May 1995. At the date of 1 application they were all under the age of 18, with the youngest child being aged 14 at the time of the application. I accept that the remaining two appellants, the sponsor's nephew and niece, stand on the same footing as her natural children. Up until the time the sponsor left Somalia in 2004, she had been caring for her nephew and niece, and regarded them as her natural children. The sponsor has a maternal bond with all of five appellants. I accept that in the 8 years that she has resided in the United Kingdom, the sponsor has maintained regular contact with the appellants, and has provided them with significant financial support. In these circumstances the decision to exclude the appellants from joining thesponsOrirr-the- United-Kirrg-tiOnTis-one-tffartre—a-Operaligand the-§i5OI-Car. would find distressirifriaMTthe appellants too, is at an age when the emotional support an ally contact wit t eir parent is not only desirable but in their interests. I cannot therefore understate the strong emotional need that all the appellants have to reunite with their parent.
(iii) I accept that the appellants' quality of life in the United Kingdom would be considerably enhancecilaccest that they are living_unctercriffin Addis Ababa without the same level of ame 'es and edupatign„,t at they would be able to enjoy in the United I. Kingdom. They re ho ver in ,tie same position as thous s of other Somalis. The ( sponsor has_the choice, o eith r returning o live with the or f remaining in the United Kingdom and vis trig the► inEthiopia as s e has crone in t Q re, ent past. In either event , 1 - ---- ---s\ ------ ----/- N. __,,