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Federal Ministry of Transport and digital infrastructure • 11030 Berlin
President of the German Bundestag
Prof. Dr. Norbert Lammert, MP
- Parliament Secretariat -
Platz der Republik 1
11011 Berlin
Katherina Reiche, MP
Parliamentary Secretary
the Federal Minister of Transport
and digital infrastructure
HOUSE ADDRESS
Invalidenstraße 44
10115 Berlin
POSTAL ADDRESS
11030 Berlin
Date: Berlin, 14.072014
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TEL
+49 (0) 30 18-300-2100
FAX
+49 (0) 30 18-300-2119
psts-r@bmvi.bund.de
www.bmvi.de
44
1
Federal Ministry
s,
of Transport and
digital infrastructure
Inquiry by the House of Representatives Andrej Hunko, Christian Buchholz,
Wolfgang Gehrcke, other MPs and the fraction
THE LEFT on
"Possible faults air traffic control by military
Maneuver "
- Printed Matter 18/1925
Plants: response of the federal government called on the above
Small request (with four more prints)
Dear Mr. President,
as I enclose the response of the Federal Government to the
above-referenced Small request. More impressions of this letter
with the installations for the parties in the German Bundestag
attached.
With best regards
Katherina Reiche
nr
Certificate Gelt xoo9
aude benfunrlfamille)
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Plant
for writing
from 14.07.2014
Reply
the Federal Government
to the question by the deputies Andrei Hunko, Christian Buchholz, Wolfgang
Gehrcke, other MPs and DIE LINKE concerning
"Possible faults air traffic control through military maneuvers"
- Printed Matter 18/1925
Question 1:
To what extent it is true knowledge of the Federal Government that Fliegererkennungssyste-
me were blocked in Bratislava, Prague, Vienna, Munich and Karlsruhe temporarily
(Spiegel Online, June 13, 2014)?
Answer:
On 5 and 10 June 2014 came in some European countries - such as Poland, Austria,
Czech Republic, Germany, and also in Slovakia - at times to spatially limited disturbance
ments of the secondary radar detection FTIR air traffic control.
Question 2:
Which own findings, the federal government has to disturbances in the Euro-
European, and especially in German airspace during the relevant period?
Answer:
In the DFS German Air Navigation Services (DFS), it came to those two days
A disturbance in the secondary radar detection - due partly to lack of transponder signals
individual aircraft - to information deficits in the air situation display. Principally
this occurred in the eastern and south-eastern area of Germany towards the border with
The Czech Republic and Austria. There were missing this information, such as displaying the
Altitude.
The DFS primary radar detection of aircraft was not disturbed, and all in place.
Thus, the flight tracks could indeed still be displayed, but had to because of the
lack of information, in particular the altitude, for safety reasons, the capacity
the affected air spaces are reduced. Also, the DFS secondary radar systems worked
error free, but were due to the partial lack of transponder response signals of the air-
vehicles do not provide information.
After fault occurrence and reporting were by the competent authority in Brussels
(EUROCONTROL Network Manager) introduced control measures after the end of the
Disorder were gradually reduced again.
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Question 3:
Which disorder were each reported accurately?
a) What communications have been made ​​for this purpose by the German Air Traffic Control?
b) What communications have been made ​​by the German military air traffic control?
c) What communications have been made ​​to the knowledge of the Federal Government of the Aus-
Austrian civil and military air traffic control?
d) What communications have been made ​​to the knowledge of the Federal Government of the Czech
between civil and military air traffic control?
e) What communications have been made ​​to the knowledge of the Federal Government of the Slovak
between civil and military air traffic control?
ß What communications have been made ​​to the knowledge of the Federal Government of the Euro-
between air traffic control Euro Control and the European Aviation Safety Agency-
Safety (EASA)?
Answer:
a) The DFS informed the Federal Supervisory Authority for Air Navigation Services (BAF) and the Federal
Ministry of Transport and digital infrastructure (BMVI) about the disorder and in the aftermath
on present knowledge.
b) For the discharge of air traffic control tasks for the non-local military
Air transport is within the scope of civil-military integration of air traffic control in German-
country, DFS German Air Navigation Services responsible. The interference in question
exclusively occurred in the area of DFS German Air Navigation Services, military
generic air traffic control facilities at the airports of the Bundeswehr were not affected
fen. Consequently carried from there also no messages.
c) The control centers in Warsaw, Prague and Vienna have the DFS control center in
Karlsruhe informed about similar problems. This information was also part of the
Message to the BAF.
d) See answer to 3c).
e) In addition to the information on the EUROCONTROL Agency there are no other Detects-
Nisse.
f) The relevant EUROCONTROL Report is "NetworkManager preliminary report on
radar interference on June 5th and le, 2014 "; Final Version, issued on
29 June 2014.
Question 4:
What exactly were the disturbances which regions were affected, held as long
this, and what the consequences resulting from this work for the civil and military
Air traffic control?
Answer:
Of the disorders were aircraft in the air spaces of the DFS control centers Munich
tion and Karlsruhe affected. The disturbances lasted on 5 June from 13:55 bis 16:05 clock
CEST and on 10 June from 13:22 bis 14:40 clock CEST. The disturbances were primarily
to the mid-range radar systems Auersberg (Erzgebirge) and Great Hager Forest (near
Munich) perceived. This track gaps individual aircraft were in the eastern
and southeastern detection range especially in upper level areas found.
When the disturbance on June 10, 2014 more traffic flow management measures were
(VFRM) is introduced, which is the number of transit flights through the airspace concerned
up to
50% discount. Overall caused by these VFRM delays in the amount of
about 2,500 minutes.
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An error in the radar equipment is excluded as the cause. The findings to date
suggest that the track gaps were caused by an external source of interference.
Asking the Federal Ministry of Defence (Defence Ministry) and the Air Force revealed
that during the relevant period in Germany no exercise with potential disturbance
was carried out by the armed forces or NATO forces.
The German military air traffic at the airports was the army of
the fault
ments
not affected.
Question 5:
How many planes disappeared knowledge of the Federal Government accordingly by
Radar screen of civil and military air traffic control?
Answer:
The DFS primary radar detection of aircraft was not disturbed. Thus disappeared no
single aircraft from radar screens of air traffic control: It had to due to error-
calendar of important information, in particular the altitude, for safety reasons, the Ka-
reduced capacity of the affected airspace.
Affected by the disturbances were on June 5, a total of 17 aircraft in the detection
area of said radar installations and on June 10 a total of 37 aircraft.
In addition, reference is also made ​​to the answer to question 4.
Fraoe 6:
How were knowledge of the Federal Government in the European and in particular
re affected in German airspace and military aircraft, and what types
acted it involved?
Answer:
After consultation with DFS German Air Navigation Services were no military air
vehicles in German airspace concerned.
Question 7:
Which altitude, course and speed had disappeared from the radar civilian
and military aircraft, to the knowledge of the federal government?
Answer:
In German airspace was no plane disappeared from the radar screen. Affected by
Disorders of the secondary radar were in German airspace mainly aircraft in large-
must heights (approx. 10 km), at the limits and outside the German area of responsibility
also aircraft in about 7 km altitude. Affected all courses and speeds. We-
let the transponders still in use from the affected aircraft types from the
be reliable conclusions can be drawn. In addition to the answer to question 6 ver-
reported.
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Question 8:
If no or less military aircraft were affected, the reasons are
this within NATO or the German military air traffic control maßgeb-
Lich?
Answer:
Reference is made ​​to the answer to question 6. Any further knowledge are the
Federal government does not ago.
Question 9:
When, by whom, and with what content the national leadership position in the center was
Udem contacted in Germany, to the knowledge of the federal government, and what measures
measures have been taken as a result?
Answer:
Both June 5, 2014 and on June 10, 2014 took the responsible head of the guard
affected air traffic control units DFS German Air Navigation Services Contact the
National situation and command center security in Uedem in the airspace.
In each transponder goal losses were at the time of the disturbances in question
reported.
In the context of a situation comparisons with the neighboring Austrian airspace surveillance
central were comparable transponder goal losses in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia
confirmed.
Question 10:
What dangers are passed through the incidents, to the knowledge of the Federal Government for
the population, and how these have been averted?
Answer:
There is no evidence that the effect of the secondary radar systems on
Had 5 and June 10, 2014 immediately security incidents result.
Frace 11:
In what ways are known to the federal government which national and wel-
che EU authorities entrusted with investigations. what is purpose of the study and
how were third involved in the investigation?
Answer:
After knowledge of the federal government are the incidents in Germany, Austria, A-
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia examined by the competent national authorities. Dar-
beyond studies carried out by NATO, Eurocontrol and EASA. These sub-
investigations are not yet complete.
Question 12:
Which intermediate results can the federal government for their own studies with-
share, and when to present final results?
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Answer:
See answers to question 2 and questions 4:11.
Until the identification of
Source of interference, it may by the DFS no further investigations
give.
At a time of the presence of the final results, no statement can be made.
Question 13:
What NATO exercises in which the "electronic warfare or the
Jamming transponders was practiced found knowledge of the Federal Government in
Spring and summer rather than in Europe?
Answer:
During the NATO exercise "NEWFIP 2014" found in the first half
d
J.
six similar
several days
Exercises held in various European regions.
Question 14:
What it was, to the knowledge of the Federal Government in the reported NATO
Exercise in Hungary when this took place, and who took part in it?
Knowledge of the Federal Government What were today's exercise plans
the exercise?
Answer:
Methods of electronic warfare practiced with the exercise "NEWFIP". The
Exercise "NEWFIP 2014" took place in the period from June 2 to June 6 2014 held in room Keeskern &.
It took part in the 59th air base Szentgyörgyi Dezsö, the 12th air defense missile
Arrabona regiment, the air management and management center (CRC) and the 54th regiment Radar
Veszpr & n in part.
About today's exercise plans exercise are the federal government has no knowledge
in front.
Question
15:
What it was, to the knowledge of the Federal Government in the reported NATO
Practice in Italy, when found this place, and. Those who took part in it?
Knowledge of the Federal Government What were today's exercise plans
the exercise?
Answer:
To the knowledge of the federal government, it was a further share of the NATO
Participation Exercise "NEWFIP 2014", which until June 20, 2014 took place in Italy in the period June 9.
were elements of the air forces of Italy and Slovenia.
About today's exercise plans exercise are the federal government has no knowledge
in front.
Question 16:
To what extent free the statement from a reported level military analysis for the
Austrian Federal Government and the Federal President on German condi-
Nisse to when
the incidents are described as "catastrophic event"?
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Reply
Reported to the military analysis for the Austrian government may lack
Intimate knowledge of the reference be made ​​no statement.
The disturbance on 5 and 10 June 2014, not for the competence of the DFS as "cata-
strophales event "rate.
Please also refer to the answer to question 4.
Military radar systems were not affected.
Question 17:
To what extent and in what technical way NATO is the knowledge of the
Federal government ever be able to large-scale disruptions of air traffic pre-
to increase?
The extent of this satellite are used, and which Member States have by
Knowledge of the Federal Government about this?
Answer:
For this there are the federal government have no knowledge.
Question 18:
In what way the incidents, to the knowledge of the Federal Government to NATO are
examined, and who is involved in it (please also relevant working groups or sub-
call departments)?
Answer:
After knowledge of the Federal Government, the NATO Headquarters Allied Air Command in
Ramstein is concerned with the investigation of incidents.
Question 19:
What air use rods NATO are involved in the matter?
Answer:
To the answer to question 18 is referenced.
Question 20:
About what lessons the federal government has to be another, similar, elec-
between disturbances in Europe and especially in German airspace in the years
ren 2013 and 2014, and the cause is this known or is suspected?
Answer:
In the past, in Germany (in 2014) several times and exercises to the electro-
tronic warfare carried out. On the part of air traffic control are thus no interference
known impact of aviation.