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- PROCESS AND REALITY
- AN ESSAY IN COSMOLOGY
- Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University
- of Edinburgh During the Session 1927-28
- BY
- ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD
- F.R.S., ScD. (Cambridge), Hon. D.Sc. (Manchester),
- Hon. LL.D. (St. Andrews), Hon. D.Sc. (Wisconsin),
- Hon. Sc.D. (Harvard and Yale)
- CORRECTED EDITION
- Edited By
- DAVID RAY GRIFFIN
- AND
- DONALD W. SHERBURNE
- THE FREE PRESS
- A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co,, Inc.
- New York
- Copyright © 1978 by The Free Press
- A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.
- Copyright, 1929, by Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.
- Copyright renewed 1957 by Evelyn Whitehead.
- All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced
- or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or
- mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any
- information storage and retrieval system, without permission
- in writing from the Publisher.
- The Free Press
- **A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.
- 866 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022
- Collier Macmillan Canada, Ltd.
- Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 77-90011
- Printed in the United States of America
- printing number
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
- Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
- Whitehead, Alfred North, IB6I-I9V7.
- Process and reality.
- (Gifford lectures ; 1927-28)
- Includes index.
- 1. Cosmology— Addresses, essays, lectures.
- 2. Science— .Philosophy— Addresses, essays, lectures.
- 3. Organism (Philosophy)— Addresses, essays, lectures.
- I. Griffin, David II. Sherburne, Donald W.
- III. Title. IV. Series.
- BD5H.W5 1978 113 77-90011
- ISBN 0-02-93ll580-4 ^
- EDITORS' PREFACE
- Process and Reality, Whitehead's magnum opus, is one of the major
- philosophical works of the modern world, and an extensive body of sec-
- ondary literature has developed around it. Yet surely no significant philo-
- sophical book has appeared in the last two centuries in nearly so deplorable
- a condition as has this one, with its many hundreds of errors and with
- over three hundred discrepancies between the American (Macmillan) and
- the English (Cambridge) editions, which appeared in different formats
- with divergent paginations. The work itself is highly technical and far from
- easy to understand, and in many passages the errors in those editions were
- such as to compound the difficulties. The need for a corrected edition has
- been keenly felt for many decades.
- The principles to be used in deciding what sorts of corrections ought to
- be introduced into a new edition of Process and Reality are not, however,
- immediately obvious. Settling upon these principles requires that one take
- into account the attitude toward book production exhibited by White-
- head, the probable history of the production of this volume, and the two
- original editions of the text as they compare with each other and with
- other books by Whitehead. We will discuss these various factors to provide
- background in terms of which the reader can understand the rationale for
- the editorial decisions we have made.
- Whitehead did not spend much of his own time on the routine tasks
- associated with book production. Professor Raphael Demos was a young
- colleague of Whitehead on the Harvard faculty at the time, 1925, of the
- publication of Science and the Modern World. Demos worked over the
- manuscript editorially, read the proofs, and did the Index for that volume.
- The final sentence of Whitehead's Preface reads: "My most grateful
- thanks are due to my colleague Mr. Raphael Demos for reading the proofs
- and for the suggestion of many improvements in expression." After re-
- tiring from Harvard in the early 1960's, Demos became for four years a
- colleague at Vanderbilt University of Professor Sherburne and shared with
- him his personal observations concerning Whitehead's indifference to the
- production process.
- Bertrand Russell x provides further evidence of Whitehead's sense of
- priorities when he reports that Whitehead, in response to Russell's com-
- 1 Portraits from Memory (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), p. 104.
- vi Editors' Preface
- plaint that he had not answered a letter, "justified himself by saying that
- if he answered letters, he would have no time for original work/' Russell
- found this justification "complete and unanswerable/'
- In 1929, when Process and Reality was in production, the same sense of
- priorities was operative. Whitehead was sixty-eight years old, and he still
- had major projects maturing in his mind: Adventures of Ideas, Modes of
- Thought, and numerous articles and lectures were still to come. "Original
- work," fortunately, continued to take precedence in his life over humdrum
- details and trivia. Unfortunately, however, 1929 found Demos in England
- (working with Russell). As best we can determine at this time, no one
- with both a familiarity with Whitehead's thought and an eye for detail
- undertook to shepherd Process and Reality through the production process
- —Demos, in particular, was never aware that anyone else from the philo-
- sophical community had worked on the manuscript or proofs. Whitehead's
- only personal acknowledgment in the Preface is to "the constant encourage-
- ment and counsel which I owe to my wife."
- An examination of the available evidence, including the discrepancies
- between the two original editions and the types of errors they contained,
- has led us to the following reconstruction of the production process and of
- the origin of some of the types of errors.
- First, to some extent in conjunction with the preparation of his Gifford
- Lectures and to some extent as an expansion and revision of them, 2 White-
- head prepared a hand-written manuscript. Many of the errors in the final
- product, such as incorrect references, misquoted poetry, other faulty quo-
- tations, faulty and inconsistent punctuation, and some of the wrong and
- missing words, surely originated at this stage and were due to Whitehead's
- lack of attention to details. In addition, the inconsistencies in formal mat-
- ters were undoubtedly due in part to the fact that the manuscript was
- quite lengthy and was written over a period of at least a year and a half.
- Second, a typist (possibly at Macmillan) prepared a typed copy for the
- printer. The errors that crept into the manuscript at this stage seem to in-
- clude, besides the usual sorts of typographical errors, misreadings of White-
- head's somewhat difficult hand. 3 For example, the flourish initiating
- Whitehead's capital "H" was sometimes transcribed as a "T," so that
- "His" came out "This," and "Here" came out "There." Also, not only the
- regular mistranscription of "Monadology" as "MonodoZogy," but also
- other mistranscriptions, such as "transmuted" for "transmitted" and
- "goal" for "goad," probably occurred at this stage. (Professor Victor Lowe
- 2 See Victor Lowe, "Whitehead's Gifford Lectures/' The Southern journal of
- Philosophy, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Winter, 1969-70), 329-38.
- 3 For samples of his handwriting, see the letters published in Alfred North
- Whitehead: Essays on His Philosophy, ed. George L. Kline (New York: Pren-
- tice-Hall, 1963), p. 197; and The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, ed.
- Paul Arthur Schilpp, 2nd ed. (New York: Tudor Publishing, 1951), pp. 664-
- 65.
- Editors' Preface vii
- has reported an incident which, whether or not it involved a misreading of
- Whitehead's handwriting, provided— as Lowe says— a bad omen for what
- would happen to the book: "On April 11, 1928, Kemp Smith received this
- cable from Whitehead: title gifford lectures is process and reality
- SYLLOBUS FOLLOWING SHORTLY BY MAIL WHITCHCAD." 4 )
- Third, it appears that Macmillan set type first and that Cambridge set
- its edition a bit later, using either a copy of the typed manuscript or, more
- likely, a copy of Macmillan's proof sheets. There are a large number of
- errors which the two editions had in common, a large number in the Mac-
- millan edition which were not in the Cambridge edition, and some few in
- the latter which were not in the former. Their distribution and their char-
- acter suggest the following observations : Macmillan provided poor proof-
- reading; the Cambridge editor did a much more rigorous job of catching
- typographical errors; the Cambridge editor also initiated certain sorts of
- editorial changes, which primarily involved punctuation, though these were
- not consistently applied throughout the entire text; finally, the types of
- errors unique to the Cambridge edition seem not to be due to carelessness,
- but to deliberate attempts to make the text more intelligible— attempts
- which fell short of their goal because the Cambridge editor did not under-
- stand Whitehead's technical concepts.
- There is independent evidence that Whitehead himself saw proofs.
- Lowe has published a letter from Whitehead to his son, dated August 12,
- 1929, which reads in part: "At last I have got through with my Gifford
- Lectures — final proofs corrected, Index Printed, and the last corrections
- put in/' 5 The deplorable state of the text, plus Whitehead's lack of
- enthusiasm for this sort of work, make it virtually certain that he did not
- do much careful proofreading, Lowe reports 6 that Whitehead, after dis-
- cussions with C. I. Lewis, decided to change the adjectival form of "cate-
- gory" from "categorical" to "categoreal" and made this change throughout
- the galleys. We strongly suspect that Whitehead's work on the proofs was
- limited for the most part to very particular, specific corrections of this sort.
- It would have been useful in the preparation of this corrected edition to
- have had Whitehead's manuscript and/or typescript. Unfortunately, all
- efforts to locate them have been unsuccessful— both are probably no longer
- extant. We do have some corrections, additions, and marginalia which
- Whitehead himself added to his Cambridge and Macmillan copies. In
- addition there is a one-page list entitled "Misprints" (evidently given to
- Whitehead by someone else) with an endorsement in Whitehead's hand-
- writing: "Corrections all inserted." This data was given to us by Lowe,
- who is writing the authorized biography of Whitehead and has been given
- access to family materials, and to whom we express our deep appreciation.
- 4 Lowe, op. cii. y 334, fn. 14.
- *Ibid., 338.
- Q Ibid., fn. 19; as Lowe reports, he received this information from H. N. Lee.
- viii Editors' Preface
- Finally, in 1966 Lowe was allowed by Mrs. Henry Copley Greene to see a
- typescript of Part V, which was inscribed: "Rosalind Greene with his love
- From Alfred Whitehead Oct. 12, 1928." This typescript had some correc-
- tions in Whitehead's hand on it; Lowe reports that, with one exception,
- the published texts contained these corrections (e.g., the capitalization of
- 'Creature' and 'Itself' in the last paragraph).
- It was on the basis of the above evidence and interpretations that we
- arrived at the principles that guided our editorial work in regard to both
- the more trivial and the more significant issues.
- The most difficult and debatable editorial decisions had to be made,
- ironically, concerning relatively trivial matters, especially those involving
- punctuation. We tried to steer a middle course between two unacceptable
- extremes.
- On the one hand, the editors of a "corrected edition" might have intro-
- duced into the text all the changes which they would have suggested to a
- still-living author. The obvious problem with this alternative is that, since
- the author is no longer living, he would have no chance to veto these "im-
- provements" as being inconsistent with his own meaning or stylistic prefer-
- ences.
- On the other hand, to avoid this problem the editors might have decided
- to remove only the most obvious and egregious errors, otherwise leaving
- the text as it was. One problem with this alternative is that this important
- work would again be published without benefit of the kind of careful edi-
- torial work Whitehead had every right to expect— work which the Cam-
- bridge editor began but did not carry out consistently. Another problem is
- that there are over three hundred divergencies between the two original
- editions. In these places it is impossible simply to leave the text as it was—
- a choice must be made. And clearly, in most of these places the Cambridge
- punctuation is preferable and must be followed— it would be totally irre-
- sponsible to revert to Macmillan's punctuation. But once Cambridge's
- punctuation has been followed in these places, the question arises, How
- could one justify accepting Cambridge's improvements in these instances
- and yet not make similar improvements in parallel passages?
- Accordingly, in trying to steer a middle course between these two ex-
- tremes we decided that the most responsible plan of action would be to
- take the changes introduced bv the Cambridge editor (which, of course,
- were made during Whitehead's life-time and could have been vetoed in his
- personal copies) as precedents for the kinds of changes to be carried out
- consistently. A prime example is provided by the fact that Cambridge
- deleted many, but not all, of the commas which often appeared between
- the subject and the verb in Macmillan. However, we left some other ques-
- tionable practices (e.g., the frequent use of a semicolon where grammatical
- rules would call for a comma) as they were, primarily because Cambridge
- did not provide sufficient precedents for changes, even though we would
- Editors' Preface ix
- ourselves have suggested changes to Whitehead had we been editing this
- book in 1929,
- Working within these guidelines, the editors have sought to produce a
- text that is free not only of the hundreds of blatant errors found in the
- original, especially in the Macmillan edition, but also free of many of the
- minor sorts of inconsistencies recognized and addressed to some extent by
- the Cambridge editor.
- It is in the matter of the more significant corrections involving word
- changes that editors must guard against the possibility that interpretative
- bias might lead to textual distortions. There were three factors which
- helped us guard against this possibility. First, we drew heavily upon a sub-
- stantial amount of previous work, coordinated by Sherburne, in which the
- suggested corrigenda lists of six scholars were collated and then circulated
- among eight scholars for opinions and observations. The publication of the
- results of these discussions, 7 plus the lengthy discussions that preceded and
- followed it, have established a consensus view about many items which
- provided guidance. Second, in their own work the two editors approach
- Whitehead's thought from different perspectives and focus their work
- around different sorts of interests. Third, we used the principle that no
- changes would be introduced into the text unless they were endorsed by
- both editors.
- We note, finally, that there can be no purely mechanical guidelines to
- guarantee objectivity and prevent distortion. Ultimately, editors must rely
- upon their own judgment, their knowledge of their texts, and their com-
- mon sense. Recognizing this, we accept full responsibility for the decisions
- we have made.
- Besides the issues discussed above, there were other editorial decisions
- to be made. There were substantial differences of format between the two
- original editions. Cambridge had a detailed Table of Contents at the be-
- ginning of the book, whereas Macmillan had only a brief listing of major
- divisions at the beginning with the detailed materials spread throughout
- the book as "Abstracts" prior to each of the five major Parts of the volume.
- Primarily because it is a nuisance to locate the various sections of this
- analytic Table of Contents in Macmillan, we have followed Cambridge in
- this matter. We have also followed the Cambridge edition in setting off
- some quotations and have let it guide us in regard to the question as to
- which quotations to set off (the Macmillan edition did not even set off
- page-length items).
- Since most of the secondary literature on Process and Reality gives page
- references to the Macmillan edition, we considered very seriously the pos-
- sibility of retaining its pagination in this new edition. For several technical
- 7 Donald W, Sherburne, "Corrigenda for Process and Reality" in Kline, ed.,
- op. cit, pp. 200-207.
- x Editors' Preface
- reasons this proved impractical. Consequently, we have inserted in this
- text, in brackets, the page numbers of the Macmillan edition, except in the
- Table of Contents.
- In regard to certain minor differences between the texts, some of which
- reflect American vs. British conventions, we have followed Macmillan.
- Examples are putting periods and commas inside the quotation marks,
- numbering the footnotes consecutively within each chapter rather than on
- each page, and writing "Section" instead of using the symbol "$."
- Except for those matters, which simply reflect different conventions, we
- have left a record of all of the changes which we have made. That is, in the
- Editors' Notes at the back of the book we have indicated all the diver-
- gencies (or, in a few cases, types of divergencies) from both original edi-
- tions, no matter how trivial, thereby giving interested scholars access to
- both previous readings through this corrected edition. We have indicated
- in the text, by means of single and double obelisks ( f and i ) , the places
- where these divergencies occur. The more exact meaning of these symbols,
- plus that of the single and double asterisks, is explained in the introductory
- statement to the Editors' Notes.
- The original editions had woefully inadequate Indexes. For this volume,
- Griffin has prepared a totally new, enormously expanded Index. Sincere
- thanks are due to Professor Marjorie Suchocki, who correlated the Index
- items to the pagination in this new edition, and to Professor Bernard M.
- Loomer, who many years ago prepared an expanded Index which was made
- available to other scholars.
- One other edition of Process and Reality has appeared which has not yet
- been mentioned. In 1969, The Free Press published a paperback edition.
- It should in no way be confused with the present corrected edition, pub-
- lished by the same company. The 1969 edition did not incorporate the
- corrigenda which had been published by Sherburne; it added some new-
- errors of its own; it introduced yet another pagination without indicating
- the previous standard pagination; and it did not contain a new Index. We
- wish to commend The Free Press for now publishing this corrected edition.
- We acknowledge most gratefully the support of the Vanderbilt Uni-
- versity Research Council, which provided Sherburne with travel funds and
- released time to work on this project. We are also deeply indebted to the
- Center for Process Studies, which has supported this project extensively,
- and in turn to both the Claremont Graduate School and the School of
- Theology at Claremont, which give support to the Center. Finally, we
- express our warm appreciation to Rebecca Parker Beyer, who was a great
- help in comparing texts and reading proofs.
- David Ray Griffin
- Center for Process Studies
- Donald W. Sherburne
- Vanderbilt University
- PREFACE
- [v]* These lectures are based upon a recurrence to that phase of philo-
- sophic thought which began with Descartes and ended with Hume. The
- philosophic scheme which they endeavour to explain is termed the 'Phi-
- losophy of Organism/ There is no doctrine put forward which cannot cite
- in its defence some explicit statement of one of this group of thinkers,
- or of one of the two founders of all Western thought, Plato and Aristotle.
- But the philosophy of organism is apt to emphasize just those elements
- in the writings of these masters which subsequent systematizers have put
- aside. The writer who most fully anticipated the main positions of the
- philosophy of organism is John Locke in his Essay, especially x in its later
- books.
- The lectures are divided into five parts. In the first part, the method is
- explained, and thet scheme of ideas, in terms of which the cosmology is to
- be framed, is stated summarily.
- In the second part,* an endeavour is made to exhibit this scheme as ade-
- quate for the interpretation of the ideas and problems which form the
- complex texture of civilized thought. Apart from such an investigation the
- summary statement of Part I is practically unintelligible. Thus Part II at
- once gives meaning to the verbal phrases of the scheme by their use in
- discussion, and shows the power of the scheme to put the various elements
- of our experience into a consistent relation to each other. In order to ob-
- tain a reasonably complete account of human experience considered in
- relation to the philosophical [vi\ problems which naturally arise, the group
- of philosophers and scientists belonging to the seventeenth and eighteenth
- centuries has been considered, in particular Descartes, Newton, Locke,
- Hume, Kant. Any one of these writers is one-sided in his presentation of
- the groundwork of experience; but as a whole they give a general presenta-
- tion which dominates the development of subsequent philosophy. I started
- the investigation with the expectation of being occupied with the exposi-
- tion of the divergencies from every member of this group. But a careful
- examination of their exact statements disclosed that in the main the
- philosophy of organism is a recurrence to pre-Kantian modes of thought.
- These philosophers were perplexed by the inconsistent presuppositions
- underlying their inherited modes of expression. In so far as they, or their
- 1 Cf. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. IV, Ch. VI, Sect. 11.*
- xi
- xii Preface
- successors, have endeavoured to be rigidly systematic, the tendency has
- been to abandon just those elements in their thought upon which the
- philosophy of organism bases itself. An endeavour has been made to point
- out the exact points of agreement and of disagreement.
- In the second part, the discussions of modern thought have been con-
- fined to the most general notions of physics and biology, with a careful
- avoidance of all detail. Also, it must be one of the motives of a complete
- cosmology to construct a system of ideas which brings t the aesthetic,
- moral, and religious interests into relation with those concepts of the
- world which have their origin in natural science.
- In the third and fourth parts, the cosmological scheme is developed in
- terms of its own categoreal notions, and without much regard to other
- systems of thought. For example, in Part II there is a chapter on the
- 'Extensive Continuum/ which is largely concerned with the notions of
- Descartes and Newton, compared with the way in which the organic phi-
- losophy must interpret this feature of the world. But in Part IV, this ques-
- tion is treated from the point of view of developing the detailed method
- [viz] in which the philosophy of organism establishes the theory of this
- problem. It must be thoroughly understood that the theme of these lec-
- tures is not a detached consideration of various traditional philosophical
- problems which acquire urgency in certain traditional systems of thought.
- The lectures are intended to state a condensed scheme of cosmological
- ideas, to develop their meaning by confrontation with the various topics
- of experience, and finally to elaborate an adequate cosmology in terms of
- which all particular topics find theirt interconnections. Thus the unity
- of treatment is to be looked for in the gradual development of the scheme,
- in meaning and in relevance, and not in the successive treatment of par-
- ticular topics. For example, the doctrines of time, of space, of perception,
- and of causality are recurred to again and again, as the cosmology de-
- velops. In each recurrence, these topics throw some new light on the
- scheme, or receive some new elucidation. At the end, in so far as the enter-
- prise has been successful, there should be no problem of space-time, or
- of epistemology, or of causality, left over for discussion. The scheme should
- have developed all those generic notions adequate for the expression of any
- possible interconnection of things.
- Among the contemporary schools of thought, my obligations to the
- English and American Realists are obvious. In this connection, I should
- like especially to mention Professor T. P. Nunn, of the University of
- London. His anticipations, in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, of
- some of the doctrines of recent Realism, do not appear to be sufficiently
- well known.
- I am also greatly indebted to Bergson, William James, and John Dewey.
- One of my preoccupations has been to rescue their type of thought from
- the charge of anti-intellectualism, which rightly or wrongly has been asso-
- ciated with it. Finally, though throughout the main body of the work I
- Preface xiii
- am in sharp disagreement with Bradley, the final outcome is after all not
- so greatly different. I am particularly indebted to his chapter on the nature
- [viii] of experience, which appears in his Essays on Truth and Reality.
- His insistence on 'feeling' is very consonant with my own conclusions.
- This whole metaphysical position is an implicit repudiation of the doctrine
- of Vacuous actuality/
- The fifth part is concerned with the final interpretation of the ultimate
- way in which the cosmological problem is to be conceived. It answers the
- question, What does it all come to? In this part, the approximation to
- Bradley is evident. Indeed, if this cosmology be deemed successful, it be-
- comes natural at this point to ask whether the type of thought involved
- be not a transformation of some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism onto
- a realistic basis.
- These lectures will be best understood by noting the following list of
- prevalent habits of thought, which are repudiated, in so far as concerns
- their influence on philosophy:
- (i) The distrust of speculative philosophy.
- (ii) The trust in language as an adequate expression of propositions.
- (iii) The mode of philosophical thought which implies, and is implied
- by, the faculty-psychology.
- (iv) The subject-predicate form of expression.
- (v) The sensationalist doctrine of perception.
- (vi) The doctrine of vacuous actuality.
- (vii) The Kantian doctrine of the objective world as a theoretical con-
- struct from purely subjective experience.
- (viii) Arbitrary deductions in ex absurdo arguments.
- (ix) Belief that logical inconsistencies can indicate anything else than
- some antecedent errors.
- By reason of its ready acceptance of some, or all. of these nine myths
- and fallacious procedures, much nineteenth-century philosophy excludes
- itself from relevance to the ordinary stubborn facts of daily life.
- The positive doctrine of these lectures is concerned with the becoming,
- the being, and the relatedness of 'actual entities/ An "actual entity' is a
- res vera in the [ix] Cartesian sense of that term; 2 it is a Cartesian 'sub-
- stance/ and not an Aristotelian 'primary substance/ But Descartes re-
- tained in his metaphysical doctrine the Aristotelian dominance of the
- category of 'quality' over that of 'relatedness/ In these lectures 'relatedness'
- is dominant over 'quality/ All relatedness has its foundation in the re-
- latedness of actualities; and such relatedness is wholly concerned with the
- appropriation of the dead by the living— that is to say, with 'objective im-
- mortality' whereby what is divested of its own living immediacy becomes
- 2 1 derive my comprehension of this element in Descartes' thought from Pro-
- fessor Gilson of the Sorbonne. I believe that he is the first to insist on its im-
- portance. He is, of course, not responsible for the use made of the notion in
- these lectures.
- xiv Preface
- a real component in other living immediacies of becoming. This is the
- doctrine that the creative advance of the world is the becoming, the perish-
- ing, and the objective immortalities of those things which jointly con-
- stitute stubborn fact
- The history of philosophy discloses two cosmologies which at different
- periods have dominated European thought, Plato's Timaeus, 3 and the
- cosmology of the seventeenth century, whose chief authors were Galileo,
- Descartes, Newton, Locke. In attempting an enterprise of the same kind,
- it is wise to follow the clue that perhaps the true solution consists in a
- fusion of the two previous schemes, with modifications demanded by self-
- consistency and the advance of knowledge. The cosmology explained in
- these lectures has been framed in accordance with this reliance on the
- positive value of the philosophical tradition. One test of success is ade-
- quacy in the comprehension of the variety of experience within the limits
- of one scheme of ideas. The endeavour to satisfy this condition is illus-
- trated by comparing Chapters III, VII, and X of Part II, respectively
- entitled The Order of Nature/ The Subjectivist Principle/ and Trocess/
- with Chapter [x] V of Part III, entitled The Higher Phases of Experience/
- and with Chapter V of Part IV, entitled 'Measurement/ and with Chap-
- ter II of Part V. entitled 'God and thet World/ These chapters should
- be recognizable as the legitimate outcome of the one scheme of ideas
- stated in the second chapter of Part I.
- In these lectures I have endeavoured to compress the material derived
- from years of meditation. In putting out these results, four strong impres-
- sions dominate my mind: First, that the movement of historical, and
- philosophical, criticism of detached questions, which on the whole has
- dominated the last two centuries, has done its work, and requires to be
- supplemented by a more sustained effort of constructive thought. Sec-
- ondly, that the true method of philosophical construction is to frame a
- scheme of ideas, the best that one can, and unflinchingly to explore the
- interpretation of experience in terms of that scheme. Thirdly, that all
- constructive thought, on the various special topics of scientific interest, is
- dominated by some such scheme, unacknowledged, but no less influential
- in guiding the imagination. The importance of philosophy lies in its
- sustained effort to make such schemes explicit, and thereby capable of
- criticism and improvement.
- There remains the final reflection, how shallow, puny, and imperfect are
- efforts to sound the depths in the nature of things. In philosophical dis-
- cussion, the merest hint of dogmatic certainty as to finality of statement
- is an exhibition of folly.
- In the expansion of these lectures to the dimensions of the present book,
- 3 1 regret that Professor A. E. Taylor's Commentary on Plato's Timaeus was
- only published after this work was prepared for the press. Thus, with the excep-
- tion of one small reference, no use could be made of it. I am very greatly in-
- debted to Professor Taylor's other writings.
- Preface xv
- I have been greatly indebted to the critical difficulties suggested by the
- members of my Harvard classes. Also this work would never have been
- written without the constant encouragement and counsel which I owe to
- my wife.
- A. N. W.
- Harvard University
- January, 1929
- CONTENTS
- Editors' Preface v
- Preface xi
- PART I
- THE SPECULATIVE SCHEME
- Chapter I. Speculative Philosophy
- SECTION
- I. Speculative Philosophy; Coherent, Logical, Necessary System
- of Ideas; Interpretation of Experience.
- II. Defects of Insight and of Language; Conditions for Observa-
- tion; Rigid Empiricism, Imagination, Generalization; Co-
- herence and Incoherence; Creativity, the Ultimate.
- III. Rationalism and Dogmatism; Scheme as a Matrix, False and
- True Propositions, Use of the Matrix; Experimental Adven-
- ture.
- IV. Philosophy and Science, Grades of Generality; Dogmatic Influ-
- ence of Mathematics; Progress of Philosophy.
- V. Defects of Language; Propositions and Their Background;
- Metaphysical Presupposition; Excessive Trust in Language;
- Metaphysics and Practice; Metaphysics and Linguistic Ex-
- pression.
- VI. Speculative Philosophy and Overambition; Overambition,
- Dogmatism and Progress; Interpretation and Metaphysics;
- The Higher Elements of Experience, Subjectivity and the
- Metaphysical Correction; Morality, Religion, Science, Con-
- nected by Philosophy; Contrast between + Religion and Sci-
- ence; Conclusion.
- Chapter II. The Categoreal Scheme 18
- I. Four Notions, namely, Actual Entity, Prehension, Nexus, the
- Ontological Principle; Descartes and Locke; Philosophy
- Explanatory of Abstraction, Not of Concreteness.
- II. The Four Sets of Categories; The Category of the Ultimate;
- xvii
- xviii Contents
- SECTION
- Conjunction and Disjunction; Creativity, the Principle of
- Novelty, Creative Advance; Togetherness, Concrescence;
- Eight Categories of Existence; Twenty-Seven Categories of
- Explanation.
- III. Nine Categoreal Obligations.
- IV. Preliminary Notes; Complete Abstraction Self-Contradictory;
- Principles of Unrest and of Relativity; Actual Entities never
- Change; Perishing of Occasions and Their Objective Im-
- mortality; Final Causation and Efficient Causation; Mul-
- tiplicities; Substance.
- Chapter III. Some Derivative Notions 31
- I. Primordial Nature of God; Relevance, the Divine Ordering;
- Consequent Nature of God; Creativity and Its Acquirement
- of Character; Creatures, Objective Immortality, Appetition,
- Novelty, Relevance; Appetition and Mentality, Conceptual
- Prehensions, Pure and Impure Prehensions; Synonyms and
- Analogies, namely, t Conceptual Prehension, Appetition, In-
- tuition, Physical Purpose, Vision, Envisagement.
- II. Social Order, Defining Characteristic, Substantial Form; Per-
- sonal Order, Serial Inheritance, Enduring Object; Corpus-
- cular Societies.
- III. Classic Notion of Time, Unique Seriality; Continuity of Be-
- coming, Becoming of Continuity, Zeno; Atomism and Con-
- tinuity; Corpuscular and Wave Theories of Light.
- IV. Consciousness, Thought, Sense-Perception are Unessential Ele-
- ments in an Instance of Experience.
- PART II
- DISCUSSIONS AND APPLICATIONS
- Chapter I. Fact and Form 39
- I. Appeal to Facts, European Tradition; Plato, Aristotle, Des-
- cartes, Locke, Hume, Kant; Intrinsic Reasonableness; Foot-
- notes to Plato; This Cosmology Platonic; Participating
- Forms; Divine Ordering; Ontological Principle; Facts the
- only Reasons; Facts are Process; Prehension, Satisfaction.
- II. Rationalism a Faith, Adventure of Hope; Limits of Theory,
- Givenness,t Professor A. E. Taylor on Plato; Decision, the
- Contents xix
- SECTION
- Ontological Principle; Entities and Process, Actual Entities
- and Decision; Stubborn Fact.
- III. Platonic Form 7 Idea, Essence, Eternal Object; Potentiality and
- Givenness; Exclusiveness of the Given; Subject-Superject,
- Becoming and Being; Evaporation of Indeterrnination in
- Concrescence, Satisfaction Determinate and Exclusive; Con-
- crescence Dipolar; Potentiality, Givenness, Impossibility;
- Subsistence.
- IV. Actual Occasions Internally Determined,! Externally Free;
- Course of History not Necessary, No Perfection; Efficient
- Causation and Final Reaction; God's Primordial Freedom;
- Each Concrescence between Definite Free Initiation and
- Definite Free Conclusion, the Former Macrocosmic, the
- Latter Microcosmic.
- V. Universals and Particulars, Unsuitable Terms with False Im-
- plication; Illustration from Descartes, also Hume; Des-
- cartes' Alternative Doctrine, Realitas Objective, Inspectio,
- Intuitio, Judicium; World not Describable in Terms of Sub-
- ject and Predicate. Substance and Quality, Particular and
- Universal; Universal Relativity.
- VI. Locke's Essay ,t Agreement of Organic Philosophy with It; Sub-
- stitute 'Experience 7 for 'Understanding'; Ideas and Prehen-
- sions; Locke's Two Doctrines of Ideas, Ideas of Particular
- Things; Representative Theory of Perception; Logical Sim-
- plicity and Genetic Priority not to be Identified; Substance,
- Exterior Things, Societies; Solidarity of the Universe.
- VII. Locke's Doctrine of Power, Power and Substance; Causal
- Objectification and Presentational Objectification; Change
- Means Adventures of Eternal Objects; Real Essence,
- Abstract Essence; Doctrine of Organism and Generation of
- Actual Entities.
- Chapter II. The Extensive Continuum 61
- I. Continuum and Real Potentiality, Atomized by Actual Occa-
- sions; How the Continuum is Experienced, Presentational
- Immediacy, Sensa; Real Chair and Chair-Image; Complex
- Ingression of Sensa.
- II. General Potentiality and Pxeal Potentiality; Standpoints of
- Actual Occasions, Determined by Initial Phase of Subjective
- Aim; Extensive Relationships; The Epochal Theory of
- Time, Zeno, William James.
- III. Newton's Scholium,
- xx Contents
- SECTION
- IV. Newton's Scholium, Comparison with Philosophy of Organism
- and with Descartes; 'Withness of the Body/ Status of the
- Body in the Actual World; Ontological Status of Space for
- Newton, Descartes and the Organic Philosophy.
- V. Undifferentiated Endurance and the Passivity of Substance,
- Source of Errors.
- VI. Summary.
- Chapter III. The Order of Nature 83
- I. Order and Givenness Contrasted; The Four Characteristics
- of Order; Attainment of End, Lure of** Feeling; Causa Sui.
- II. 'Society' Defined, Defining Characteristic and Genetic Inher-
- itance; Environment,! Social and Permissive; Cosmic Epoch,
- Social Hierarchy.
- III. Evolution of Societies, Decay, Chaos, the Timaeus, the Schol-
- ium, Milton.
- IV. Societies in this Cosmic Epoch; The Extensive Society, the
- Geometric Society. Electromagnetic Society; Waves. Elec-
- trons, Protons.
- V. Enduring Objects, Corpuscular Societies, Structured Societies.
- VI. Stability, Specialization.
- VII. Problem of Stabilization, Exclusion of Detail, Conceptual Ini-
- tiative, Life.
- VIII. Inorganic Apparatus for Life.
- IX. Life a Reaction against Society, Originality.
- X. Life and Food, Life in Empty Space, Catalytic Agent.
- XL Living Persons, Canalization of Life, Dominant Personality
- only Partial.
- Chapter IV. Organisms and Environment 110
- I. Reaction of Environment on Actual Occasions; Narrowness
- and Width, Dependent on Societies, Orderly Element;
- Chaos, Triviality, Orderliness, Depth; Triviality,! Vagueness,
- Narrowness, Width; Incompatibility, Contrast; Triviality,
- Excess of Differentiation; Vagueness, Excess of Identifica-
- tion; Nexus as One, Vagueness, Narrowness, Depth; Coor-
- dination % of Chaos, Vagueness, Narrowness, Width.
- II. Intensity, Narrowness; Philosophy of Organism, Kant, Locke.
- III. Sensa, Lowest Category of Eternal Objects, Definition; Sensa,
- Contrasts of, Intensity; Contrasts in High and Low Cate-
- gories, Patterns; Eternal Objects, Simplicity, Complexity;
- Sensa Experienced Emotionally.
- Contents xxi
- SECTION
- IV. Transmission, Diverse Routes, Inhibitions, Intensification;
- Vector Character, Form of Energy; Physical Science.
- V. Environmental Data as in Perception; Visual Perception,
- Most Sophisticated Form; Originated by Antecedent State
- of Animal Body, Hume; Animal Body and External Envi-
- ronment, Amplifier.!
- VI. Perception and Animal Body, Causal Efficacy.
- VII. Causal Efficacy, Viscera; Presentational Immediacy, Delusive
- Perceptions, Secondary Qualities, Extension, Withness of
- Body; Hume, Kant.
- VIII. Loci Disclosed by Perception; Contemporary Regions, Causal
- Past, Causal Future; Immediate Present, Unison of Becom-
- ing, Concrescent Unison, Duration; Differentiation between
- Immediate Present and Presented Duration; Presented
- Locus.
- IX. Presented Locus and Unison of Becoming; Presented Locus,
- Systematic Relation to Animal Body, Strains, Independence
- of External Contemporary Happenings, Straight Lines,
- Measurement; Unison of Becoming, Duration.
- X. Summary.
- Chapter V. Locke and Hume 130
- I. Hume, Perceptions, Substance, Principle of Union; Ideas,
- Copies of Impressions, Imaginative Freedom.
- II. Hume and 'Repetition/ Cause and Effect; Memory, Force
- and Vivacity.
- III. Time, Hume, Descartes, Independence of Successive Occa-
- sions; Objective Immortality.
- IV. Influence of Subject-Predicate Notion; Hume, Descartes,
- Locke, Particular Existence.
- V. Hume and Locke, Process and Morphology; False Derivation
- of Emotional Feelings; Sensationalist Doctrine; Santayana.
- Chapter VI. From Descartes to Kant 144
- I. Descartes, Three Kinds of Substance: Extended, Mental,
- God's; Three Kinds of Change, of Accidents, Origination,
- Cessation; Accidental Relations, Representative Ideas; Un-
- essential Experience of External World.
- II. Locke, Empiricism, Adequacy, Inconsistency; Particular Exis-
- tent, Substance, Power; Relativity, Perpetually Perishing.
- III. Analogy and Contrast with Philosophy of Organism.
- IV. Hume and Process, Kant, Santayana.
- V. Contrasted Procedures of Philosophy of Organism and Kant.
- xxii Contents
- Chapter VII. The Subjectivist Principle 157
- SECTION
- I. The Subjectivist Principle and the Sensationalist Principle;
- The Sensationalist Doctrine Combines Both; Locke, Hume,
- Kant; Statement of the Principles; The Three Premises
- for the Subjectivist Principle; Philosophy of Organism
- Denies the Two Principles and the Three Premises; Des-
- cartes; 'That Stone as Grey/ Substance and Quality, Organs
- of Sensation; Descartes' Subjectivist Modification; 'Percep-
- tion of that Stone as Grey'; Failure to Provide Revised
- Categories; Hume.
- II. Knowledge, Its Variations, Vaguenesses; Negative Perception
- the General Case, Consciousness is the Feeling of Negation,
- Novelty; Consciousness a Subjective Form, Only Present in
- Late Derivative Phases of Complex Integrations; Conscious-
- ness only Illuminates the Derivative Types of Objective
- Data, Philosophy Misled by Clearness and Distinctness.
- III. Primitive Type of Physical Experience is Emotional; Vector
- Transmission of Feeling, Pulses of Emotion, Wave-Length;
- Human Emotion is Interpreted Emotion, Not Bare Emo-
- tional Feeling.
- IV. Decision Regulating Ingression of Eternal Objects, Old Meet-
- ing New; The Three Phases of Feeling:! Conformal, Con-
- ceptual, Comparative; Eternal Objects and Subjective
- Forms; Continuity of the Phases; Category of Objective
- Unity.
- V. Reformed Subjectivist Principle is Another Statement of Prin-
- ciple of Relativity; Process is the Becoming of Experience;
- Hume's Principle Accepted, This Method only Errs in
- Detail; 'Law' for 'Causation' no Help; Modern Philosophy
- Uses Wrong Categories; Two Misconceptions:! (i) Vacuous
- Actuality, (ii) Inherence of Quality in Substance.
- Chapter VIII. Symbolic Reference 168
- I. Two Pure Modes of Perception, Symbolic Reference; Com-
- mon Ground, Integration, Originative Freedom, Error;
- Common Ground, Presented Locus, Geometrical Indistinct-
- ness in Mode of Causal Efficacy; Exceptions, Animal Body,
- Withness of Body.
- II. Common Ground, Common Sensa; Modern Empiricism,
- Make-Believe, Hume; Sensa Derived from Efficacy of Body;
- Projection.
- HI. Mistaken Primacy of Presentational Immediacy, Discussion,
- Causal Efficacy Primitive.
- Contents xxiii
- section
- IV, Further Discussion; Causation and Sense-Perception,
- V. Comparison of Modes; Integration in Symbolic Reference.
- VI. Principles of Symbolism, Language.
- Chapter IX. The Propositions? 184
- I. Impure Prehensions by Integration of Pure Conceptual and
- Pure Physical Prehensions; Physical Purposes and Propo-
- sitions Discriminated; Theory, Not Primarily for Judgment,
- Lures for Feeling; Objective Lure; Final Cause; General
- and Singular Propositions; Logical Subjects, Complex Pred-
- icate; Propositions True or False; Lure to Novelty; Felt
- 'Contrary' is Consciousness in Germ; Judgment and Enter-
- tainment; Graded Envisagement.
- II. Truth and Falsehood, Experiential Togetherness of Propo-
- sitions and Fact; Correspondence and Coherence Theory;
- Propositions True or False, Judgments Correct or Incor-
- rect or Suspended; Intuitive and Derivative Judgments;
- Logic Concerned with Derivative Judgments; Error.
- III. Systematic Background Presupposed by Each Proposition; Re-
- lations, Indicative Systems of Relations; Propositions and
- Indicative Systems; Illustration, Inadequacy of Words.
- IV, Metaphysical Propositions; One and One Make Two,
- V. Induction, Probability, Statistical Theory, Ground, Sampling,
- Finite Numbers.
- VI. Suppressed Premises in Induction, Presupposition of Defi-
- nite Type of Actuality Requiring Definite Type of Envi-
- ronment; Wider Inductions Invalid; Statistical Probability
- within Relevant Environment.
- VII. Objectification Samples Environment.*
- VIII. Alternative Non-Statistical Ground; Graduated Appetitions,
- Primordial Nature of God; Secularization of Concept of
- God's Functions.
- Chapter X. Process 208
- I. Fluency and Permanence; Generation and Substance; Spa-
- tialization; Two Kinds of Fluency:! Macroscopic and Micro-
- scopic, from Occasion to Occasion and within Each Occa-
- sion.
- II. Concrescence, Novelty, Actuality; Microscopic Concrescence.
- III. Three Stages of Microscopic Concrescence; Vector Charac-
- ters Indicate Macroscopic Transition; Emotion, and Sub-
- jective Form Generally, is Scalar in Microscopic Origina-
- tion and is the Datum for Macroscopic Transition.
- xxiv Contents
- SECTION
- IV. Higher Phases of Microscopic Concrescence.
- V. Summary.
- PART III
- THE THEORY OF PREHENSIONS
- Chapter I. The Theory of FEELiNGst 219
- I. Genetic and Morphological Analysis; Genetic Consideration
- is Analysis of the Concrescence, the Actual Entity Forma-
- liter; Morphological Analysis is Analysis of the Actual
- Entity as Concrete, Spatialized, Objective A
- II. Finite Truth, Division into Prehensions; Succession of Phases,
- Integral Prehensions in Formation; Five Factors: Subject,
- Initial Data, Elimination, Objective Datum, Subjective
- Form; Feeling is Determinate.
- III. Feeling Cannot be Abstracted from Its Subject; Subject, Aim
- at the Feeler, Final Cause, Causa Sui.
- IV. Categories of Subjective Unity, of Objective Identity, of
- Objective Diversity.
- V. Category of Subjective Unity; The One Subject is the Final
- End Conditioning Each Feeling, Episode in Self-Produc-
- tion; Pre-established Harmony, Self-Consistency of a Prop-
- osition, Subjective Aim; Category of Objective Identity,
- One Thing has one R61e, No Duplicity, One Ground of
- Incompatibility; Category of Objective Diversity, No Di-
- verse Elements with Identity of Function, Another Ground
- of Incompatibility.
- VI. World as a Transmitting Medium; Explanation; Negative
- Prehensions, with Subjective Forms.
- VII. Application of the Categories.
- VIII. Application (continued) A
- IX. Nexus.
- X. Subjective Forms; Classification of Feelings According to Data;
- Simple Physical Feelings, Conceptual Feelings, Transmuted
- Feelings; Subjective Forms not Determined by Data, Con-
- ditioned by Them.
- XL Subjective Form, Qualitative Pattern, Quantitative Pattern; In-
- tensity; Audition of Sound.
- XII. Prehensions not Atomic, Mutual Sensitivity; Indefinite Num-
- ber of Prehensions; Prehensions as Components in the Sat-
- isfaction and Their Genetic Growth; Justification of the
- Contents xxv
- section
- Analysis of the Satisfaction, Eighth and Ninth Categories
- of Explanation.
- Chapter II. The Primary Feelings 236
- I. Simple Physical Feeling, Initial Datum is one Actual Entity,
- Objective Datum is one Feeling Entertained by that one
- Actual Entity; Act of Causation, Objective Datum the
- Cause, Simple Physical Feeling the Effect; Synonymously
- 'Causal Feelings'; Primitive Act of Perception, Initial Datum
- is Actual Entity Perceived, Objective Datum is the Per-
- spective, In General not Conscious Perception; Reason for
- 'Perspective'; Vector Transmission of Feeling, Re-enaction,
- Conformal; Irreversibility of Time; Locke; Eternal Objects
- Relational, Two- Way R61e, Vector-Transference, Reproduc-
- tion, Permanence; Quanta of Feeling Transferred, Quantum-
- Theory in Physics, Physical Memory; Atomism, Continuity,
- Causation, Memory, Perception, Quality, Quantity, Ex-
- tension.
- II. Conceptual Feelings, Positive and Negative Prehensions; Cre-
- ative Urge Dipolar; Datum is an Eternal Object; Exclu-
- siveness of Eternal Objects as Determinants, Definiteness,
- Incompatibility.
- III. Subjective Form of Conceptual Prehension is Valuation; Inte-
- gration Introduces Valuation into Impure Feelings, Inten-
- siveness; Three Characteristics of Valuation: (i) Mutual
- Sensitivity of Subjective Forms, (ii) Determinant of Pro-
- cedure of Integration, (iii) Determinant of Intensive Em-
- phasis.
- IV. Consciousness is Subjective Form; Requires Its Peculiar Da-
- tum; Recollection, Plato, Hume; Conscious Feelings always
- Impure, Requires Integration of Physical and Conceptual
- Feelings; Affirmation and Negative Contrast; Not all Im-
- pure Feelings Conscious.
- Chapter III. The Transmission of Feelings 244
- I. Ontological Principle, Determination of Initiation of Feeling;
- Phases of Concrescence; God, Inexorable Valuation, Sub-
- jective Aim; Self-Determination Imaginative in Origin, Re-
- enaction.
- II. Pure Physical Feelings, Hybrid Physical Feelings; Hybrid Feel-
- ings Transmuted into Pure Physical Feelings; Disastrous
- Separation of Body and Mind Avoided; Hume's Principle,
- Hybrid Feelings with God as Datum.
- xxvi Contents
- section
- III. Application of First Categoreal Obligation: Supplementary
- Phase Arising from Conceptual Origination; Application of
- Fourth and Fifth Categoreal Obligations; Conceptual
- Reversion; Ground of Identity, Aim at Contrast.
- IV. Transmutation; Feeling a Nexus as One, Transmuted Physi-
- cal Feeling; R61e of Impartial Conceptual Feeling in Trans-
- mutation, Category of Transmutation, Further Explana-
- tions; Conceptual Feelings Modifying Physical Feelings;
- Negative Prehensions Important.
- V. Subjective Harmony, the Seventh Categoreal Obligation.
- Chapter IV. Propositions and Feelings 256
- I. Consciousness, Propositional Feelings, Not Necessarily Con-
- scious; Propositional Feeling is Product of Integration of
- Physical Feeling with a Conceptual Feeling; Eternal Objects
- Tell no Tales of Actual Occasions, Propositions are Tales
- That Might be\ Told of Logical Subjects; Proposition, True
- or False, Tells no Tales about Itself, Awaits Reasons; Con-
- ceptual Feeling Provides Predicative Pattern, Physical Feel-
- ing Provides Logical Subjects, Integration; Indication of
- Logical Subjects, Element of Givenness Required for Truth
- and Falsehood.
- II. Proposition not Necessarily Judged, Propositional Feelings not
- Necessarily Conscious; New Propositions Arise; Possible
- Percipient Subjects within the 'Scope of a Proposition/
- III. Origination of Propositional Feeling, Four (or Five) Stages,
- Indicative Feeling, Physical Precognition, Predicative Pat-
- tern (Predicate), Predicative Feeling; Propositional Feeling
- Integral of Indicative and Predicative Feelings.
- IV. Subjective Forms of Propositional Feelings, Dependent on
- Phases of Origination; Case of Identity of Indicative Feel-
- ing with the Physical Recognition, Perceptive Feelings;t
- Case of Diversity, Imaginative Feelings; Distinction not
- Necessarily Sharp-Cut; The Species of Perceptive Feelings:
- Authentic, Direct Authentic, Indirect Authentic, Unau-
- thentic; Tied Imagination.
- V. Imaginative Feelings, Indicative Feeling and Physical Recog-
- nition Diverse, Free Imagination; Subjective Form Depends
- on Origination, Valuation rather than Consciousness; Lure
- to Creative Emergence; Criticism of Physical Feelings,
- Truth, Critical Conditions.
- VI. Language, Its Functionjf Origination of the Necessary Train
- of Feelings.
- Contents xxvii
- Chapter V. The Higher Phases of Experience 266
- section
- I. Comparative Feelings, Conscious Perceptions, Physical Pur-
- poses; Physical Purposes More Primitive than Proposi-
- tional Feelings.
- II. Intellectual Feelings, Integration of Propositional Feeling with
- Physical Feeling of a Nexus Including the Logical Subjects;
- Category of Objective Identity, Affirmation-Negation Con-
- trast; Consciousness is a Subjective Form.
- III. Belief, Certainty, Locke, Immediate Intuition.
- IV. Conscious Perception, Recapitulation of Origin; Direct and
- Indirect Authentic Feelings, Unauthentic Feelings; Trans-
- mutation; Perceptive Error, Novelty; Tests, Force and
- Vivacity, Analysis of Origination; Tests Fallible.
- V. Judgment, Yes-Form, No-Form, Suspense-Form; In Yes-Form
- Identity of Patterns, In No-Form Diversity and Incompati-
- bility, In Suspense-Form t Diversity and Compatibility; In-
- tuitive Judgment, Conscious Perception.
- VI. Affirmative Intuitive Judgment Analogous to Conscious Per-
- ception, Difference Explained; Inferential Judgment; Diver-
- gence from Locke's Nomenclature; Suspended Judgment.
- VII. Physical Purposes, Primitive Type of Physical Feeling; Retain-
- ing Valuation and Purpose, Eliminating Indeterminate-
- ness of Complex Eternal Object; Responsive Re-enaction;
- Decision.
- VIII. Second Species of Physical Purposes, Reversion Involved;
- Eighth Categoreal Obligation, Subjective Intensity; Imme-
- diate Subject, Relevant Future; Balance, Conditions for
- Contrast; Reversion as Condition for Balanced Contrast;
- Rhythm, Vibration; Categoreal Conditions; Physical Pur-
- poses and Propositional Feelings Compared.
- PART IV
- THE THEORY OF EXTENSION
- Chapter I. Coordinate Division 283
- I. Genetic Division is Division of the Concrescence, Coordinate
- Division is Division of the Concrete; Physical Time Arises
- in the Coordinate Analysis of the Satisfaction; Genetic
- Process not the Temporal Succession; Spatial and Temporal
- Elements in the Extensive Quantum; The Quantum is the
- Extensive Region; Coordinate Divisibility; Subjective Unity
- xxviii Contents
- SECTION
- Indivisible; Subjective Forms Arise from Subjective Aim;
- World as a Medium, Extensively Divisible; Indecision as to
- Selected Quantum.
- II. Coordinate Divisions and Feelings; Mental Pole Incurably
- One; Subjective Forms of Coordinate Divisions Depend on
- Mental Pole, Inexplicable Otherwise; A Coordinate Division
- is a Contrast, a Proposition, False, but Useful Matrix.
- III. Coordinate Division, the World as an Indefinite Multiplicity;
- Extensive Order, Routes of Transmission; External Exten-
- sive Relationships, Internal Extensive Division, One Basic
- Scheme; Pseudo Sub-organisms, Pseudo Super-organisms,
- Professor de Laguna's 'Extensive Connection/
- IV. Extensive Connection is the Systematic Scheme Underlying
- Transmission of Feelings and Perspective; Regulative Con-
- ditions; Descartes; Grades of Extensive Conditions, Dimen-
- sions.
- V. Bifurcation of Nature; Publicity and Privacy.
- VI. Classification of Eternal Objects; Mathematical Forms, Sensa.
- VII. Elimination of the Experient Subject, Concrescent Immediacy.
- Chapter II. Extensive Connection 294
- I. Extensive Connection, General Description.
- II. Assumptions, i.e., Postulates, i.e.,* Axioms and Propositions
- for a Deductive System.
- III. Extensive Abstraction. Geometrical Elements, Points, Seg-
- ments.
- IV. Points, Regions, Loci; Irrelevance of Dimensions.
- Chapter III. Flat Loci 302
- I. Euclid's Definition of 'Straight Line/
- II. Weakness of Euclidean Definition; Straight Line as Shortest
- Distance, Dependence on Measurement; New Definition of
- Straight Lines, Ovals.
- III. Definition of Straight Lines, Flat Loci, Dimensions.
- IV. Contiguity.
- V. Recapitulation.
- Chapter IV. Strains 310
- I. Definition of a Strain, Feelings Involving Flat Loci among the
- Forms of Definiteness of Their Objective Data; 'Seat' of a
- Contents xxix
- SECTION
- Strain; Strains and Physical Behaviour; Electromagnetic
- Occasions Involve Strains.
- II. Presentational Immediacy Involves Strains; Withness of the
- Body, Projection, Focal Region; Transmission of Bodily
- Strains, Transmutation, Ultimate Percipient, Emphasis; Pro-
- jection of the Sensa, Causal Efficacy Transmuted in Pre-
- sentational Immediacy; Massive Simplification; Types of
- Energy; Hume; Symbolic Transference, Physical Purpose.
- III. Elimination of Irrelevancies, Massive Attention to Systematic
- Order; Design of Contrasts; Importance of Contemporary
- Independence; Advantage to Enduring Objects.
- IV. Structural Systems, Discarding Individual Variations; Physi-
- cal Matter Involves Strain-Loci.
- V. The Various Loci Involved :t Causal Past, Causal Future, Con-
- temporaries, Durations, Part of a Duration, Future of a
- Duration, Presented Duration, Strain-Locus.
- Chapter V. Measurement 322
- I. Identification of Strain-Loci with Durations only Approximate;
- Definitions Compared; Seat of Strain, Projectors; Strain-
- Loci and Presentational Immediacy.
- II. Strain-Locus Wholly Determined by Experient; Seat and Pro-
- jectors Determine Focal Region; Animal Body Sole Agent
- in the Determination; Vivid Display of Real Potentiality of
- Contemporary World; New Definition of Straight Lines
- Explains this Doctrine; Ways of Speech, Interpretation of
- Direct Observation; Descartes' Inspectio. Realitas Objective,
- Judicium.
- III. Modern Doctrine of Private Psychological Fields; Secondary
- Qualities, Sensa; Abandons Descartes' Realitas Objectiva;
- Difficulties for Scientific Theory, AH Observation in Pri-
- vate Psychological Fields; Illustration, Hume; Conclusion,
- Mathematical Form, Presentational Immediacy in one
- Sense Barren, in Another Sense has Overwhelming Signifi-
- cance.
- IV. Measurement Depends on Counting and on Permanence;
- What Counted, What Permanent; Yard-Measure Perma-
- nent, Straight; Infinitesimals no Explanation; Approximation
- to Straightness, Thus Straightness Presupposed; Inches
- Counted, Non-Coincident; Modern Doctrine is Possibility of
- Coincidence, Doctrine Criticized; Coincidence is Test of
- Congruence, Not Meaning; Use of Instrument Presupposes
- xxx Contents
- section
- Its Self-Congruence: Finally all Measurement Depends on
- Direct Intuition of Permanence of Untested Instrument;
- Theory of Private Psychological Fields Makes Scientific
- Measurement Nonsense.
- V. Meaning of Congruence in Terms of Geometry of Straight
- Lines; Systems of Geometry; Sets of Axioms: Equivalent
- Sets, Incompatible Sets; Three Important Geometries :t El-
- liptic Geometry, Euclidean Geometry, Hyperbolic Geome-
- try; Two Definitions of a Plane; Characteristic Distinction
- between the Three Geometries; Congruence Depends on
- Systematic Geometry.
- VI. Physical Measurement, Least Action, Presupposes Geometrical
- Measurement; Disturbed by Individual Peculiarities; Phys-
- ical Measurement Expressible in Terms of Differential
- Geometry; Summary of Whole Argument.
- PART V
- FINAL INTERPRETATION
- Chapter I. The Ideal Opposites 337
- I. Danger to Philosophy is Narrowness of Selection; Variety of
- Opposites :t Puritan Self-Restraint and Aesthetic Joy, Sor-
- row and Joy; Religious Fervour and Sceptical Criticism,
- Intuition and Reason.
- II. Permanence and Flux, Time and Eternity.
- III. Order as Condition for Excellence, Order as Stifling Excel-
- lence; Tedium, Order Entering upon Novelty is Required;
- Dominant Living Occasion is Organ of Novelty for Animal
- Body.
- IV. Paradox:! Craving for Novelty, Terror at Loss; Final Religious
- Problem; Ultimate Evil is Time as 'Perpetually Perishing';
- Final Opposites :t Joy and Sorrow, Good and Evil, Disjunc-
- tion and Conjunction, Flux and Permanence, Greatness and
- Triviality, Freedom and Necessity, God and the World;
- These Pairs Given in Direct Intuition, except the Last Pair
- Which is Interpretive.
- Chapter II. God and the World 342
- I. Permanence and Fiux, God as Unmoved Mover; Conceptions
- of God:t Imperial Ruler, Moral Energy, Philosophical Prin-
- ciple.
- II. Another Speaker to Hume's Dialogues Concerningf Natural
- Contents xxxi
- SECTION
- Religion; Primordial Nature Deficiently Actual, Neither
- Love nor Hatred for Actualities, Quotation from Aristotle.
- III. God's Nature Dipolar, Conceptual and Physical; This Physical
- Nature Derived from the World; Two Natures Compared.
- IV. God's Consequent Nature, Creative Advance Retaining Uni-
- son of Immediacy, Everlastingness; Further Analysis, Ten-
- derness, Wisdom, Patience; Poet of the World, Vision of
- Truth, Beauty, Goodness.
- V. Permanence and Flux, Relation of God to the World; Group
- of Antitheses: God and the World Each the Instrument of
- Novelty for the Other.
- VI. Universe Attaining Self-Expression of Its Opposites.
- VII. God as the Kingdom of Heaven; Objective Immortality At-
- taining Everlastingness, Reconciliation of Immediacy with
- Objective Immortality.
- Index 353
- Editors 7 Notes 389
- PARTI
- THE SPECULATIVE SCHEME
- CHAPTER I
- SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY
- SECTION I
- [4] This course of lectures is designed as an essay in Speculative Philos-
- ophy. Its first task must be to define 'speculative philosophy/ and to de-
- fend it as a method productive of important knowledge.
- Speculative Philosophy is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical,
- necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our
- experience can be interpreted. By this notion of 'interpretation' I mean
- that everything of which we are conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed,
- or thought, shall have the character of a particular instance of the general
- scheme. Thus the philosophical scheme should be coherent, logical, and,
- in respect to its interpretation, applicable and adequate. Here 'applicable'
- means that some items of experience are thus interpretable, and 'ade-
- quate' means that there are no items incapable of such interpretation.
- [5] 'Coherence,' as here employed, means that the fundamental ideas, in
- terms of which the scheme is developed, presuppose each other so that in
- isolation they are meaningless. This requirement does not mean that they
- are definable in terms of each other; it means that what is indefinable in
- one such notion cannot be abstracted from its relevance to the other
- notions. It is the ideal of speculative philosophy that its fundamental no-
- tions shall not seem capable of abstraction from each other. In other words,
- it is presupposed that no entity can be conceived in complete abstraction
- from the system of the universe, and that it is the business of speculative
- philosophy to exhibit this truth. This character is its coherence.
- The term 'logical' has its ordinary meaning, including 'logical' con-
- sistency, or lack of contradiction, the definition of constructs in logical
- terms, the exemplification of general logical notions in specific instances,
- and the principles of inference. It will be observed that logical notions must
- themselves find their places in the scheme of philosophic notions.
- It will also be noticed that this ideal of speculative philosophy has its
- rational side and its empirical side. The rational side is expressed by the
- terms 'coherent' and 'logical/ The empirical side is expressed by the terms
- 'applicable' and 'adequate.' But the two sides are bound together by
- clearing away an ambiguity which remains in the previous explanation of
- the term 'adequate.' The adequacy of the scheme over every item does not
- mean adequacy over such items as happen to have been considered. It
- 4 The Speculative Scheme
- means that the texture of observed experience, as illustrating the philo-
- sophic scheme, is such that all related experience must exhibit the same
- texture. Thus the philosophic scheme should be 'necessary/ in the sense of
- bearing in itself its own warrant of universality throughout all experience,
- provided that we confine ourselves to that which communicates with im-
- mediate matter of fact. But what does not so communicate is [6] unknow-
- able, and the unknowable is unknown; x and so this universality defined by
- 'communication' can suffice.
- This doctrine of necessity in universality means that there is an essence
- to the universe which forbids relationships beyond itself, as a violation of
- its rationality. Speculative philosophy seeks that essence.
- SECTION II
- Philosophers can never hope finally to formulate these metaphysical
- first principles. Weakness of insight and deficiencies of language stand in
- the way inexorably. Words and phrases must be stretched towards a gen-
- erality foreign to their ordinary usage; and however such elements of lan-
- guage be stabilized as technicalities, they remain metaphors mutely ap-
- pealing for an imaginative leap.
- There is no first principle which is in itself unknowable, not to be cap-
- tured by a flash of insight. But, putting aside the difficulties of language,
- deficiency in imaginative penetration forbids progress in any form other
- that that of an asymptotic approach to a scheme of principles, only de-
- finable in terms of the ideal which they should satisfy.
- The difficulty has its seat in the empirical side of philosophy. Our datum
- is the actual world, including ourselves; and this actual world spreads itself
- for observation in the guise of the topic of our immediate experience. The
- elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification for any
- thought; and the starting-point* for thought is the analytic observation of
- components of this experience. But we are not conscious of any clear-cut
- complete analysis of immediate experience, in terms of the various details
- which comprise its definiteness. We habitually observe by the method of -~
- difference. Sometimes we see an elephant, and sometimes we do not. The
- result is that an elephant, when present, is noticed. [7] Facility of observa-
- tion depends on the fact that the object observed is important when
- present, and sometimes is absent. ^
- The metaphysical first principles can never fail of exemplification. We
- can never catch the actual world taking a holiday from their sway. Thus,
- for the discovery of metaphysics, the method of pinning down thought to
- the strict systematization of detailed discrimination, already effected by
- antecedent observation, breaks down. This collapse of the method of rigid
- empiricism is not confined to metaphysics. It occurs whenever we seek the
- 1 This doctrine is a paradox. Indulging in a species of false modesty, 'cautious'
- philosophers undertake its definition.
- Speculative Philosophy 5
- larger generalities. In natural science this rigid method is the Baconian
- method of induction, a method which, if consistently pursued, would have
- left science where it found it. What Bacon omitted was the play of a
- free imagination, controlled by the requirements of coherence and logic.
- The true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It starts
- from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin air
- of imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed observation
- rendered acute by rational interpretation. The reason for the success of
- this method of imaginative rationalization is that, when the method of
- difference fails, factors which are constantly present may yet be observed
- under the influence of imaginative thought. Such thought supplies the
- differences which the direct observation lacks. It can even play with in-
- consistency; and can thus throw light on the consistent, and persistent,
- elements in experience by comparison with what in imagination is incon-
- sistent with them. The negative judgment is the peak of mentality. But
- the conditions for the success of imaginative construction must be rigidly
- adhered to. In the first place, this construction must have its origin in the
- generalization of particular factors discerned in particular topics of human
- interest; for example, in physics, or in physiology, or in psychology, or in
- aesthetics, or in ethical beliefs, or in sociology, or in languages conceived
- as storehouses of human experience. In [8] this way the prime requisite, that
- anyhow there shall be some important application, is secured. The success
- of the imaginative experiment is always to be tested by the applicability
- of its results beyond the restricted locus from which it originated. In de-
- fault of such extended application, a generalization started from physics,
- for example, remains merely an alternative expression of notions appli-
- cable to physics. The partially successful philosophic generalization will,
- if derived from physics, find applications in fields of experience beyond
- physics. It will enlighten observation in those remote fields, so that gen-
- eral principles can be discerned as in process of illustration, which in
- the absence of the imaginative generalization are obscured by their per-
- sistent exemplification.
- Thus the first requisite is to proceed by the method of generalization
- so that certainly there is some application; and the test of some success
- is application beyond the immediate origin. In other words, some synop-
- tic vision has been gained.
- In this description of philosophic method, the term 'philosophic gen-
- eralization' has meant 'the utilization of specific notions, applying to a
- restricted group of facts, for the divination of the generic notions which
- apply to all facts/
- In its use of this method natural science has shown a curious mixture
- of rationalism and irrationalism. Its prevalent tone of thought has been
- ardently rationalistic within its own borders, and dogmatically irrational
- beyond those borders. In practice such an attitude tends to become a dog-
- matic denial that there are any factors in the world not fully expressible
- 6 The Speculative Scheme
- in terms of its own primary notions devoid of further generalization. Such
- a denial is the self-denial of thought.
- The second condition for the success of imaginative construction is un-
- flinching pursuit of the two rationalistic ideals, coherence and logical per-
- fection.
- Logical perfection does not here require any detailed [9] explanation. An
- example of its importance is afforded by the role of mathematics in the re-
- stricted field of natural science. The history of mathematics exhibits the
- generalization of special notions observed in particular instances. In any
- branches of mathematics, the notions presuppose each other. It is a re-
- markable characteristic of the history of thought that branches of math-
- ematics,! developed under the pure imaginative impulse, thus controlled,
- finally receive their important application. Time may be wanted. Conic
- sections had to wait for eighteen hundred years. In more recent years, the
- theory of probability, the theory of tensors, the theory of matrices are
- cases in point.
- The requirement of coherence is the great preservative of rationalistic
- sanity. But the validity of its criticism is not always admitted. If we con-
- sider philosophical controversies, we shall find that disputants tend to re-
- quire coherence from their adversaries, and to grant dispensations to them-
- selves. It has been remarked that a system of philosophy is never refuted;
- it is only abandoned. The reason is that logical contradictions, except as
- temporary slips of the mind— plentiful, though temporary— are the most
- gratuitous of errors; and usually they are trivial. Thus, after criticism, sys-
- tems do not exhibit mere illogicalities. They suffer from inadequacy and
- incoherence. Failure to include some obvious elements of experience in
- the scope of the system is met by boldly denying the facts. Also while a
- philosophical system retains any charm of novelty, it enjoys a plenary
- indulgence for its failures in coherence. But after a system has acquired
- orthodoxy, and is taught with authority, it receives a sharper criticism.
- Its denials and its incoherences are found intolerable, and a reaction sets
- in.
- Incoherence is the arbitrary disconnection of first principles. In modern
- philosophy Descartes' two kinds of substance, corporeal and mental, illus-
- trate incoherence. There is, in Descartes 7 philosophy, no reason why there
- should not be a one-substance world, only corporeal, or [10] a one-substance
- world, only mental. According to Descartes, a substantial individual 're-
- quires nothing but itself in order to exist/ Thus this system makes a virtue
- of its incoherence. But,t on the other hand, the facts seem connected, while
- Descartes' system does not; for example, in the treatment of the body-
- mind problem. The Cartesian system obviously says something that is
- true. But its notions are too abstract to penetrate into the nature of things.
- t
- The attraction of Spinoza's philosophy lies in its modification of Des-
- cartes' position into greater coherence. He starts with one substance,
- Speculative Philosophy 7
- causa sui, and considers its essential attributes and its individualized modes,
- i.e., the 'affectiones substantial The gap in the system is the arbitrary in-
- troduction of the 'modes/ And yet, a multiplicity of modes is a fixed
- requisite, if the scheme is to retain any direct relevance to the many oc-
- casions in the experienced world.
- The philosophy of organism is closely allied to Spinoza's scheme of
- thought. But it differs by the abandonment of the subject-predicate forms
- of thought, so far as concerns the presupposition that this form is a direct
- embodiment of the most ultimate characterization of fact. The result is
- that the 'substance-quality' concept is avoided; and that morphological
- description is replaced by description of dynamic process. Also Spinoza's
- 'modes' now become the sheer actualities; so that, though analysis of them
- increases our understanding, it does not lead us to the discovery of any
- higher grade of reality. The coherence, which the system seeks to preserve,
- is the discovery that the process, or concrescence, of any one actual entity
- involves the other actual entities among its components. In this way the
- obvious solidarity of the world receives its explanation.
- In all philosophic theory there is an ultimate which is actual in virtue
- of its accidents. It is only then capable of characterization through its
- accidental" embodiments, and apart from these accidents is devoid of [11]
- actuality. In the philosophy of organism this ultimate is termed 'creativity';
- and God is its primordial, non-temporal accident.* In monistic philoso-
- phies, Spinoza's or absolute idealism, this ultimate is God, who is also
- equivalently termed 'The Absolute.' In such monistic schemes, the ulti-
- mate is illegitimately allowed a final, 'eminent' reality, beyond that ascribed
- to any of its accidents. In this general position the philosophy of organ-
- ism seems to approximate more to some strains of Indian, or Chinese,
- thought, than to western Asiatic, or European, thought. One side makes
- process ultimate; the other side makes fact ultimate.
- SECTION Hit
- In its turn every philosophy will suffer a deposition. But the bundle
- of philosophic systems expresses a variety of general truths about the
- universe, awaiting coordination and assignment of their various spheres
- of validity. Such progress in coordination is provided by the advance of
- philosophy; and in this sense philosophy has advanced from Plato onwards.
- According to this account of the achievement of rationalism, the chief
- error in philosophy is overstatement. The aim at generalization is sound,
- but the estimate of success is exaggerated. There are two main forms of
- such overstatement. One form is what I have termed, f elsewhere, 2 the
- 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness. 7 This fallacy consists in neglecting the
- degree of abstraction involved when an actual entity is considered merely
- 2 Cf. Science and the Modem World, Ch. III.
- 8 The Speculative Scheme
- so far as it exemplifies certain categories of thought. There are aspects of
- actualities which are simply ignored so long as we restrict thought to these
- categories. Thus the success of a philosophy is to be measured by its com-
- parative avoidance of this fallacy, when thought is restricted within its
- categories.
- The other form of overstatement consists in a false estimate of logical
- procedure in respect to certainty, and in respect to premises. Philosophy
- has been haunted by the unfortunate notion that its method is dogmati-
- cally to indicate premises which are severally clear, distinct, and [12] cer-
- tain; and to erect upon those premises a deductive system of thought.
- But the accurate expression of the final generalities is the goal of dis-
- — cussion and not its origin. Philosophy has been misled by the example of
- mathematics; and even in mathematics the statement of the ultimate
- logical principles is beset with difficulties, as yet insuperable. 3 The verifi-
- cation of a rationalistic scheme is to be sought in its general success, and
- not in the peculiar certainty, or initial clarity, of its first principles. In
- this connection the misuse of the ex absurdo argument has to be noted;
- much philosophical reasoning is vitiated by it. The only logical conclusion
- to be drawn, when a contradiction issues from a train of reasoning, is that
- at least one of the premises involved in the inference is false. It is rashly
- assumed without further question that the peccant premise can at once
- be located. In mathematics this assumption is often justified, and phi-
- losophers have been thereby misled. But in the absence of a well-defined
- categoreal scheme of entities, issuing in a satisfactory metaphysical system,
- every premise in a philosophical argument is under suspicion.
- Philosophy will not regain its proper status until the gradual elaboration
- of categoreal schemes, definitely stated at each stage of progress, is recog-
- nized as its proper objective. There may be rival schemes, inconsistent
- among themselves; each with its own merits and its own failures. It will
- then be the purpose of research to conciliate the differences. Metaphysical
- categories are not dogmatic statements of the obvious; they are tentative
- formulations of the ultimate generalities.
- If we consider any scheme of philosophic categories as one complex
- assertion, and apply to it the logician's alternative, true or false, the answer
- must be that the scheme is false. The same answer must be given to a like
- ques- [13] tion respecting the existing formulated principles of any science.
- The scheme is true with unformulated qualifications, exceptions, limita-
- tions, and new interpretations in terms of more general notions. We do
- not yet know how to recast the scheme into a logical truth. But the scheme
- is a matrix from which true propositions applicable to particular circum-
- stances can be derived. We can at present only trust our trained instincts
- 3 Cf. Principia Mathematica, by Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead, Vol.
- I, Introduction and Introduction to the Second Edition. These introductory
- discussions are practically due to Russell, and in the second edition wholly so.
- Speculative Philosophy 9
- as to the discrimination of the circumstances in respect to which the
- scheme is valid.
- The use of such a matrix is to argue from it boldly and with rigid logic.
- The scheme should therefore be stated with the utmost precision and
- definiteness, to allow of such argumentation. The conclusion of the argu-
- ment should then be confronted with circumstances to which it should
- apply.
- The primary advantage thus gained is that experience is not interrogated
- with the benumbing repression of common sense. The observation acquires
- an enhanced penetration by reason of the expectation evoked by the con-
- clusion of the argument. The outcome from this procedure takes one of
- three forms: (i) the conclusion may agree with the observed facts; (ii) the
- conclusion may exhibit general agreement, with disagreement in detail;
- (iii) the conclusion may be in complete disagreement witht the facts.
- In the first case, the facts are known with more adequacy and the ap-
- plicability of the system to the world has been elucidated. In the second
- case, criticisms of the observation of the facts and of the details of the
- scheme are both required. The history of thought shows that false inter-
- pretations of observed facts enter into the records of their observation.
- Thus both theory, and received notions as to fact, are in doubt. In the
- third case, a fundamental reorganization of theory is required either by
- way of limiting it to some special province, or by way of entire abandon-
- ment of its main categories of thought.
- [14] After the initial basis of a rational life, with a civilized language, has
- been laid, all productive thought has proceeded either by the poetic insight
- of artists, or by the imaginative elaboration of schemes of thought capable
- of utilization as logical premises. In some measure or other, progress is
- always a transcendence of what is obvious.
- Rationalism never shakes off its status of an experimental adventure.
- The combined influences of mathematics and religion, which have so
- greatly contributed to the rise of philosophy, have also had the unfortunate
- effect of yoking it with static dogmatism. Rationalism is an adventure in
- the clarification of thought, progressive and never final. But it is an ad-
- venture in which even partial success has importance.
- SECTION IV
- The field of a special science is confined to one genus of facts, in the
- sense that no statements are made respecting facts which lie outside that
- genus. The very circumstance that a science has naturally arisen concerning
- a set of facts secures that facts of that type have definite relations among
- themselves which are very obvious to all mankind. The common obvious-
- ness of things arises when their explicit apprehension carries immediate
- importance for purposes of survival, or of enjoyment— that is to say, for
- purposes of 'being' and of 'well-being/ Elements in human experience,
- 10 The Speculative Scheme
- singled out in this way, are those elements concerning which language is
- copious and. within its limits, precise. The special sciences, therefore, deal
- with topics which lie open to easy inspection and are readily expressed by
- words.
- The study of philosophy is a voyage towards the larger generalities.
- For this reason in the infancy of science, when the main stress lay in the
- discovery of the most general ideas usefully applicable to the subject-
- matter in question, philosophy was not sharply distinguished from science.
- To this day, a new science with any substantial novelty in its notions is
- considered to be in some way [15] peculiarly philosophical. In their later
- stages, apart from occasional disturbances, most sciences accept without
- question the general notions in terms of which they develop. The main
- stress is laid on the adjustment and the direct verification of more special
- statements. In such periods scientists repudiate philosophy; Newton, justly
- satisfied with his physical principles, disclaimed metaphysics.
- The fate of Newtonian physics warns us that there is a development in
- scientific first principles, and that their original forms can only be saved
- by interpretations of meaning and limitations of their field of application-
- interpretations and limitations unsuspected during the first period of
- successful employment. One chapter in the history of culture is concerned
- with the growth of generalities. In such a chapter it is seen that the older
- generalities, like the older hills, are worn down and diminished in height,
- surpassed by younger rivals.
- Thus one aim of philosophy is to challenge the half-truths constituting
- the scientific first principles. The systematization of knowledge cannot be
- conducted in watertight compartments. All general truths condition each
- other; and the limits of their application cannot be adequately defined
- apart from their correlation by yet wider generalities. The criticism of
- principles must chiefly take the form of determining the proper meanings
- to be assigned to the fundamental notions of the various sciences, when
- these notions are considered in respect to their status relatively to each
- other. The determination of this status requires a generality transcending
- any special subject-matter.
- If we may trust the Pythagorean tradition, the rise of European philoso-
- phy was largely promoted by the development of mathematics into a
- science of abstract generality. But in its subsequent development the
- method of philosophy has also been vitiated by the example of mathe-
- matics. The primary method of mathematics is deduction; the primary
- method of philosophy is descrip- \16] tive generalization. Under the in-
- fluence of mathematics, deduction has been foisted onto philosophy as its
- standard method, instead of taking its true place as an essential auxiliary
- mode of verification whereby to test the scope of generalities. This mis-
- apprehension of philosophic method has veiled the very considerable suc-
- cess of philosophy in providing generic notions which add lucidity to our
- apprehension of the facts of experience. The depositions of Plato, Aristotle,
- Speculative Philosophy 11
- Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, t Locke, Berkeley, Hume,
- Kant, Hegel, merely mean that ideas which these men introduced into the
- philosophic tradition must be construed with limitations, adaptations, and
- inversions, either unknown to them, or even explicitly repudiated by them.
- A new idea introduces a new alternative; and we are not less indebted to
- a thinker when we adopt the alternative which he discarded. Philosophy
- never reverts to its old position after the shock of a great philosopher.
- SECTION V
- Every science must devise its own instruments. The tool required for
- philosophy is language. Thus philosophy redesigns language in the same
- way that, in a physical science, pre-existing appliances are redesigned. It
- is exactly at this point that the appeal to facts is a difficult operation. This
- appeal is not solely to the expression of the facts in current verbal state-
- ments. The adequacy of such sentences is the main question at issue. It
- is true that the general agreement of mankind as to experienced facts is
- best expressed in language. But the language of literature breaks down
- precisely at the task of expressing in explicit form the larger generalities—
- the very generalities which metaphysics seeks to express.
- The point is that every proposition refers to a universe exhibiting some
- general systematic metaphysical character. Apart from this background,
- the separate entities which go to form the proposition, and the proposition
- as a whole, are without determinate character. Nothing [17] has been de-
- fined, because every definite entity requires a systematic universe to supply
- its requisite status. Thus every proposition proposing a fact* must, in its
- complete analysis, propose the general character of the universe required
- for that fact. There are no self-sustained facts, floating in nonentity. This
- doctrine, of the impossibility of tearing a proposition from its systematic
- context in the actual world, is a direct consequence of the fourth and the
- twentieth of the fundamental categoreal explanations which we shall be
- engaged in expanding and illustrating. A proposition can embody partial
- truth because it only demands a certain type of systematic environment,
- which is presupposed in its meaning. It does not refer to the universe in
- all its detail.
- One practical aim of metaphysics is the accurate analysis of propositions;
- not merely of metaphysical propositions, but of quite ordinary propositions
- such as There is beef for dinner today/ and 'Socrates is mortal/ The one
- genus of facts which constitutes the field of some special science requires
- some common metaphysical presupposition respecting the universe. It is
- merely credulous to accept verbal phrases as adequate statements of
- propositions. The distinction between verbal phrases and complete propo-
- sitions is one of the reasons why the logicians" rigid alternative, 'true or
- false," is so largely irrelevant for the pursuit of knowledge.
- 12 The Speculative Scheme
- The excessive trust in linguistic phrases has been the well-known reason
- vitiating so much of the philosophy and physics among the Greeks and
- among the mediaeval thinkers who continued the Greek traditions. For
- example John Stuart Mill writes:
- They [the Greeks] t had great difficulty in distinguishing between
- things which their language confounded, or in putting mentally to-
- gether things which it distinguished,* and could hardly combine the
- objects in nature into any classes but those which were made for
- them by the popular phrases of their own country; or at least could
- not help fancying those classes to be natural, and all others arbitrary
- and artificial. Ac- [18] cordingly, scientific investigation among the
- Greek schools of speculation and their followers in the Middle Ages,
- was little more than a mere sifting and analysing of the notions at-
- tached to common language. They thought that by determining the
- meaning of words they could become acquainted with facts. 4
- Mill then proceeds to quote from Whewell 5 a paragraph illustrating the
- same weakness of Greek thought.
- But neither Mill, nor Whewell, tracks this difficulty about language
- down to its sources. They both presuppose that language does enunciate
- well-defined propositions. This is quite untrue. Language is thoroughly in-
- determinate, by reason of the fact that every occurrence presupposes some
- systematic type of environment.
- For example, the word 'Socrates/ referring to the philosopher, in one
- sentence may stand for an entity presupposing a more closely defined back-
- ground than the word 'Socrates/ with the same reference, in another sen-
- tence. The word 'mortal' affords an analogous possibility. A precise lan-
- guage must await a completed metaphysical knowledge.
- The technical language of philosophy represents attempts of various
- schools of thought to obtain explicit expression of general ideas pre-
- supposed by the facts of experience. It follows that any novelty in meta-
- physical doctrines exhibits some measure of disagreement with statements
- of the facts to be found in current philosophical literature. The extent of
- disagreement measures the extent of metaphysical divergence. It is, there-
- fore, no valid criticism on one metaphysical school to point out that its
- doctrines do not follow from the verbal expression of the facts accepted
- by another school. The whole contention is that the doctrines in question
- supply a closer approach to fully expressed propositions.
- The truth itself is nothing else than how the composite natures of the
- organic actualities of the world obtain ade- [19] quate representation in the
- divine nature. Such representations compose the 'consequent nature 7 of
- God, which evolves in its relationship to the evolving world without dero-
- * tLogic, Book V, Ch. III.
- 5 Cf. Whewell's History of the Inductive Sciences.
- Speculative Philosophy 13
- gation to the eternal completion of its primordial conceptual nature. In
- this way the 'ontological principle' is maintained— since there can be no
- determinate truth, correlating impartially the partial experiences of many
- actual entities, apart from one actual entity to which it can be referred.
- The reaction of the temporal world on the nature of God is considered
- subsequently in Part V: it is there termed 'the consequent nature of God;
- Whatever is found in 'practice' must lie within the scope of the meta-
- physical description. When the description fails to include the 'practice/
- the metaphysics is inadequate and requires revision. There can be no
- appeal to practice to supplement metaphysics, so long as we remain con-
- tented with our metaphysical doctrines. Metaphysics is nothing but the
- description of the generalities which apply to all the details of practice.
- No metaphysical system can hope entirely to satisfy these pragmatic
- tests. At the best such a system will remain only an approximation to the
- general truths which are sought. In particular, there are no precisely stated
- axiomatic certainties from which to start. There is not even the language
- in which to frame them. The only possible procedure is to start from verbal
- expressions which, when taken by themselves with the current meaning of
- their words, are ill-defined and ambiguous. These are not premises to be
- immediately reasoned from apart from elucidation by further discussion;
- they are endeavours to state general principles which will be exemplified
- in the subsequent description of the facts of experience. This subsequent
- elaboration should elucidate the meanings to be assigned to the words
- and phrases employed. Such meanings are incapable of accurate appre-
- hension apart from a correspondingly accurate apprehension of the meta-
- physical background which the [20] universe provides for them. But no lan-
- guage can be anything but elliptical, requiring a leap of the imagination to
- understand its meaning in its relevance to immediate experience. The posi-
- tion of metaphysics in the development of culture cannot be understood
- without remembering that no verbal statement is the adequate expression
- of a proposition.
- An old established metaphysical system gains a false air of adequate
- precision from the fact that its words and phrases have passed into current
- literature. Thus propositions expressed in its language are more easily
- correlated to our flitting intuitions into metaphysical truth. When we trust
- these verbal statements and argue as though they adequately analysed
- meaning, we are led into difficulties which take the shape of negations of
- what in practice is presupposed. But when they are proposed as first prin-
- ciples they assume an unmerited air of sober obviousness. Their defect is
- that the true propositions which they do express lose their fundamental
- character when subjected to adequate expression. For example consider
- the type of propositions such as The grass is green/ and 'The whale is
- big/ This subject-predicate form of statement seems so simple, leading
- straight to a metaphysical first principle; and yet in these examples it con-
- ceals such complex, diverse meanings.
- 14 The Speculative Scheme
- SECTION VI
- It has been an objection to speculative philosophy that it is over-
- ambitious. Rationalism, it is admitted, is the method by which advance
- is made within the limits of particular sciences. It is, however, held that
- this limited success must not encourage attempts to frame ambitious
- schemes expressive of the general nature of things.
- One alleged justification of this criticism is ill-success: European thought
- is represented as littered with metaphysical systems, abandoned and un-
- reconciled.
- Such an assertion tacitly fastens upon philosophy the old dogmatic test.
- The same criterion would fasten ill- [21] success upon science. We no more
- retain the physics of the seventeenth century than we do the Cartesian
- philosophy of that century. Yet within limits, both systems express im-
- portant truths. Also we are beginning to understand the wider categories
- which define their limits of correct application. Of course, in that century,
- dogmatic views held sway; so that the validity both of the physical notions,
- and of the Cartesian notions, was misconceived. Mankind never quite
- knows what it is after. When we survey the history of thought, and like-
- wise the history of practice, we find that one idea after another is tried out,
- its limitations defined, and its core of truth elicited. In application to the
- instinct for the intellectual adventures demanded by particular epochs,
- there is much truth in Augustine's rhetorical phrase, Securus judicat orbis
- terrarum. At the very least, men do what they can in the way of system-
- atization, and in the event achieve something. The proper test is not that
- of finality, but of progress.
- But the main objection, dating from the sixteenth century and receiving
- final expression from Francis Bacon, is the uselessness of philosophic spec-
- ulation. The position taken by this objection is that we ought to describe
- detailed matter of fact, and elicit the laws with a generality strictly limited
- to the systcmatization of these described details. General interpretation,
- it is held, has no bearing upon this procedure; and thus any system of gen-
- eral interpretation, be it true or false, remains intrinsically barren. Un-
- fortunately for this objection, there are no brute, self-contained matters of
- fact, capable of being understood apart from interpretation as an element
- in a system. Whenever we attempt to express the matter of immediate ex-
- perience, we find that its understanding leads us beyond itself, to its con-
- temporaries, to its past, to its future, and to the universals in terms of
- which its definiteness is exhibited. But such universals, by their very charac-
- ter of universality, embody the potentiality of other facts with variant
- types of definiteness. Thus [22] the understanding of the immediate brute
- fact requires its metaphysical interpretation as an item in a world with some
- systematic relation to it. When thought comes upon the scene, it finds
- the interpretations as matters of practice. Philosophy does not initiate
- interpretations. Its search for a rationalistic scheme is the search for more
- Speculative Philosophy 15
- adequate criticism, and for more adequate justification, of the interpre-
- tations which we perforce employ. Our habitual experience is a complex
- of failure and success in the enterprise of interpretation. If we desire a
- record of uninterpreted experience, we must ask a stone to record its auto-
- biography. Every scientific memoir in its record of the 'facts' is shot
- through and through with interpretation. The methodology of rational
- interpretation is the product of the fitful vagueness of consciousness. Ele-
- ments which shine with immediate distinctness, in some circumstances,
- retire into penumbral shadow in other circumstances, and into black dark-
- ness on other occasions. And yet all occasions proclaim themselves as ac-
- tualities within the flux of a solid world, demanding a unity of interpre-
- tation.
- Philosophy is the self-correction by consciousness of its own initial ex-
- cess of subjectivity. Each actual occasion contributes to the circumstances
- of its origin additional formative elements deepening its own peculiar
- individuality. Consciousness is only the last and greatest of such elements
- by which the selective character of the individual obscures the external
- totality from which it originates and which it embodies. An actual in-
- dividual, of such higher grade, has truck with the totality of things by
- reason of its sheer actuality; but it has attained its individual depth of being
- by a selective emphasis limited to its own purposes. The task of philosophy
- is to recover the totality obscured by the selection. It replaces in rational
- experience what has been submerged in the higher sensitive experience
- and has been sunk yet deeper by the initial operations of consciousness
- itself. The selectiveness of individual experience is moral so far as it con-
- [23] forms to the balance of importance disclosed in the rational vision; and
- conversely the conversion of the intellectual insight into an emotional force
- corrects the sensitive experience in the direction of morality. The correc-
- tion is in proportion to the rationality of the insight.
- Morality of outlook is inseparably conjoined with generality of outlook.
- The antithesis between the general good and the individual interest can be
- abolished only when the individual is such that its interest is the general
- good, thus exemplifying the loss of the minor intensities in order to find
- them again with finer composition in a wider sweep of interest.
- Philosophy frees itself from the taint of ineffectiveness by its close rela-
- tions with religion and with science, natural and sociological. It attains its
- chief importance by fusing the two, namely, religion and science, into one
- rational scheme of thought. Religion should connect the rational gen-
- erality of philosophy with the emotions and purposes springing out of
- existence in a particular society, in a particular epoch, and conditioned by
- particular antecedents. Religion is the translation of general ideas into
- particular thoughts, particular emotions, and particular purposes; it is di-
- rected to the end of stretching individual interest beyond its self-defeating
- particularity. Philosophy finds religion, and modifies it; and conversely
- religion is among the data of experience which philosophy must weave into
- 16 The Speculative Scheme
- its own scheme. Religion is an ultimate craving to infuse into the insistent
- particularity of emotion that non-temporal generality which primarily be-
- longs to conceptual thought alone. In the higher organisms the differences
- of tempo between the mere emotions and the conceptual experiences pro-
- duce a life-tedium, unless this supreme fusion has been effected. The two
- sides of the organism require a reconciliation in which emotional experi-
- ences illustrate a conceptual justification, and conceptual experiences find
- an emotional illustration.
- [24] This demand for an intellectual justification of brute experience has
- also been the motive power in the advance of European science. In this
- sense scientific interest is only a variant form of religious interest. Any sur-
- vey of the scientific devotion to 'truth/ as an ideal, will confirm this state-
- ment. There is, however, a grave divergence between science and religion
- in respect to the phases of individual experience with which they are con-
- cerned. Religion is centered upon the harmony of rational thought with
- the sensitive reaction to the percepta from which experience originates.
- Science is concerned with the harmony of rational thought with the per-
- cepta themselves. When science deals with emotions, the emotions in
- question are percepta and not immediate passions— other people's emotion
- and not our own: at least our own in recollection, and not in immediacy.
- Religion deals with the formation of the experiencing subject; whereas
- science deals with the objects, which are the data forming the primary
- phase in this experience. The subject originates from, and amid, given
- conditions; science conciliates thought with this primary matter of fact;
- and religion conciliates the thought involved in the process with the sensi-
- tive reaction involved in that same process. The process is nothing else
- than the experiencing subject itself. In this explanation it is presumed that
- an experiencing subject is one occasion of sensitive reaction to an actual
- world. Science finds religious experiences among its percepta; and religion
- finds scientific concepts among the conceptual experiences to be fused with
- particular sensitive reactions.
- The conclusion of this discussion is, first, the assertion of the old doctrine
- that breadth of thought reacting with intensity of sensitive experience
- stands out as an ultimate claim of existence; secondly, the assertion that
- empirically the development of self-justifying thoughts has been achieved
- by the complex process of generalizing! from particular topics, of imagi-
- natively schematizing the generalizations, and finally by renewed compari-
- son [25] of the imagined scheme with the direct experience to which it
- should apply.
- There is no justification for checking generalization at any particular
- stage. Each phase of generalization exhibits its own peculiar simplicities
- which stand out just at that stage, and at no other stage. There are sim-
- plicities connected with the motion of a bar of steel which are obscured
- if we refuse to abstract from the individual molecules; and there are certain
- simplicities concerning the behaviour of men which are obscured if we
- Speculative Philosophy 17
- refuse to abstract from the individual peculiarities of particular specimens.
- In the same way. there are certain general truths, about the actual things
- in the common world of activity, which will be obscured when attention
- is confined to some particular detailed mode of considering them. These
- general truths, involved in the meaning of every particular notion respect-
- ing the actions of things, are the subject-matter* for speculative philosophy.
- Philosophy destroys its usefulness when it indulges in brilliant feats of
- explaining away. It is then trespassing with the wrong equipment upon
- the field of particular sciences. Its ultimate appeal is to the general con-
- sciousness of what in practice we experience. Whatever thread of presup-
- position characterizes social expression throughout the various epochs of
- rational societyt must find its place in philosophic theory. Speculative bold-
- ness must be balanced by complete humility before logic, and before fact.
- It is a disease of philosophy when it is neither bold nor humble, but
- merely a reflection of the temperamental presuppositions of exceptional
- personalities.
- Analogously, we do not trust any recasting of scientific theory depend-
- ing upon a single performance of an aberrant experiment, unrepeated. The
- ultimate test is always widespread, recurrent experience; and the more
- general the rationalistic scheme, the more important is this final appeal.
- The useful function of philosophy is to promote the [26] most general
- systematization of civilized thought. There is a constant reaction between
- specialism and common sense. It is the part of the special sciences to
- modify common sense. Philosophy is the welding of imagination and com-
- mon sense into a restraint upon specialists, and also into an enlargement
- of their imaginations. By providing the generic notions philosophy should
- make it easier to conceive the infinite variety of specific instances which
- rest unrealized in the womb of nature.
- CHAPTER II
- THE CATEGOREAL SCHEME i
- SECTION I
- [27] This chapter contains an anticipatory sketch of the primary notions
- which constitute the philosophy of organism. The whole of the subsequent
- discussion in these lectures has the purpose of rendering this summary
- intelligible, and of showing that it embodies generic notions inevitably
- presupposed in our reflective experience— presupposed, but rarely expressed
- in explicit distinction. Four notions may be singled out from this sum-
- mary, by reason of the fact that they involve some divergence from
- antecedent philosophical thought. These notions are, that of an 'actual
- entity/ that of a 'prehension,' that of a 'nexus/ and that of the 'ontological
- principle/ Philosophical thought has made for itself difficulties by dealing
- exclusively in very abstract notions, such as those of mere awareness, mere
- private sensation, mere emotion, mere purpose, mere appearance, mere
- causation. These are the ghosts of the old 'faculties/ banished from
- psychology, but still haunting metaphysics. There can be no 'mere' to-
- getherness of such abstractions. The result is that philosophical discussion
- is enmeshed in the fallacy of 'misplaced concreteness.' x In the three no-
- tions—actual entity, prehension, nexus— an endeavour has been made to
- base philosophical thought upon the most concrete elements in our ex-
- perience.
- 'Actual entities'- also termed 'actual occasions'— are the final real things -
- of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities
- to find anything \28] more real. They differ among themselves: God is an
- actual entity, and so is the most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty
- space. But, though there are gradations of importance, and diversities of
- function, yet in the principles which actuality exemplifies all are on the
- same level. The final facts are, all alike, actual entities; and these actual
- entities are drops of experience, coi iplex and interdependent.
- In its recurrence to the notion oi a plurality of actual entities the phi-
- losophy of organism is through and through Cartesian. t The 'ontological
- principle' broadens and extends a general principle laid down by John
- Locke in his Essay (Bk. II, Ch. XXIII, Sect. 7),t when he asserts that
- "power" is "c? great part of our complex ideas of substances "\ The notion
- 1 Cf. my Science and the Modern World, Ch. III.
- 18
- The Categoreal Scheme 19
- of 'substance' is transformed into that of 'actual entity'; and the notion
- of 'power' is transformed into the principle that the reasons for things are
- always to be found in the composite nature of definite actual entities—
- in the nature of God for reasons of the highest absoluteness, and in the
- nature of definite temporal actual entities for reasons which refer to a
- particular environment. The ontological principle can be summarized as:
- no actual entity, then no reason.
- Each actual entity is analysable in an indefinite number of ways. In
- some modes of analysis the component elements are more abstract than
- in other modes of analysis. The analysis of an actual entity into 'pre-
- hensions' is that mode of analysis which exhibits the most concrete ele-
- ments in the nature of actual entities. This mode of analysis will be termed
- the 'division' of the actual entity in question. Each actual entity is 'divis-
- ible' in an indefinite number of ways, and each way of 'division' yields its
- definite quota of prehensions. A prehension reproduces in itself the general
- characteristics of an actual entitv: it is referent to an external world, and
- in this sense will be said to have a 'vector character'; it involves emotion,
- and purpose, and valuation, and causation. In fact, any characteristic of
- an actual entity is reproduced [29] in a prehension. It might have been a
- complete actuality; but, by reason of a certain incomplete partiality, a pre-
- hension is only a subordinate element in an actual entity. A reference to
- the complete actuality is required to give the reason why such a prehension
- is what it is in respect to its subjective form. This subjective form is
- determined by the subjective aim at further integration, so as to obtain
- the 'satisfaction' of the completed subject. In other words, final causation
- and atomism are interconnected philosophical principles.
- With the purpose of obtaining a one-substance cosmology, 'prehensions'
- are a generalization from Descartes' mental 'cogitations,' and from
- Locke's 'ideas,' to express the most concrete mode of analysis applicable
- to every grade of individual actuality. Descartes and Locke maintained a
- two-substance ontology— Descartes explicitly, Locke by implication. Des-
- cartes, the mathematical physicist, emphasized his account of corporeal
- substance; and Locke, the physician and the sociologist, confined himself
- to an account of mental substance. The philosophy of organism, in its
- scheme for one type of actual entities, adopts the view that Locke's ac-
- count of mental substance embodies, in a very special form, a more pene-
- trating philosophic description than does Descartes' account of corporeal
- substance. Nevertheless, Descartes' account must find its place in the
- philosophic scheme. On the whole, this is the moral to be drawn from
- the Monadologyt of Leibniz. His monads are best conceived as generaliza-
- tions of contemporary notions of mentality. The contemporary notions
- of physical bodies only enter into his philosophv subordinately and deriv-
- atively. The philosophy of organism endeavours to hold the balance more
- evenly. But it does start with a generalization of Locke's account of mental
- operations.
- 20 The Speculative Scheme
- Actual entities involve each other by reason of their prehensions of each
- other. There are thus real individual facts of the togetherness of actual
- entities, which are real, individual, and particular, in the same sense in
- [30] which actual entities and the prehensions are real, individual, and par-
- ticular. Any such particular fact of togetherness among actual entities is
- called a *nexus ? (plural form is written 'nexus'). The ultimate facts of im-
- mediate actual experience are actual entities, prehensions, and nexus. All
- else is, for our experience, derivative abstraction.
- The explanatory purpose of philosophy is often misunderstood. Its
- business is to explain the emergence of the more abstract things from the
- more concrete things. It is a complete mistake to ask how concrete par-
- ticular fact can be built up out of universals. The answer is, In no way/
- The true philosophic question 2 is, How can concrete fact exhibit entities
- abstract from itself and yet participated in by its own nature?
- In other words, philosophy is explanatory of abstraction, and not of
- concreteness. It is by reason of their instinctive grasp of this ultimate truth
- that, in spite of much association with arbitrary fancifulness and atavistic
- mysticism, types of Platonic philosophy retain their abiding appeal; they
- seek the forms in the facts. Each fact is more than its forms, and each
- form 'participates' throughout the world of facts. The definiteness of fact
- is due to its forms; but the individual fact is a creature, and creativity is
- the ultimate behind all forms, inexplicable by forms, and conditioned by
- its creatures.
- SECTION II
- The Categories
- , I. The Category of the Ultimate.
- II. Categories of Existence.
- III. Categories of Explanation.
- IV. Categoreal Obligations.
- It is the purpose of the discussion in these lectures to make clear the
- meaning of these categories, their appli- [31] cability, and their adequacy.
- The course of the discussion will disclose how very far they are from
- satisfying this ideal.
- Every entity should be a specific instance of one category of existence,
- every explanation should be a specific instance of categories of explanation,
- and every obligation should be a specific instance of categoreal obliga-
- 2 In this connection I may refer to the second chapter of my book The Princi-
- ple of Relativity, Cambridge University Press, t 1922.
- The Categoreal Scheme 21
- tions. The Category^ of the Ultimate expresses the general principle pre-
- supposed in the three more special categories.
- The Category of the Ultimate
- 'Creativity/ 'many/ 'one' are the ultimate notions involved in the mean-
- ing of the synonymous terms 'thing/ 'being/ 'entity/ These three notions
- complete the Category of the Ultimate and are presupposed in all the
- more special categories.
- The term "'one* does not stand for 'the integral number one/ which is
- a complex special notion. It stands for the general idea underlying alike
- the indefinite article 'a or an/ and the definite article 'the/ and the demon-
- stratives 'this or that/ and the relatives 'which or what or how. 7 It stands
- for the singularity of an entity. The term 'many' presupposes the term
- 'one/ and the term 'one' presupposes the term 'many/ The term 'many'
- conveys the notion of 'disjunctive diversity'; this notion is an essential*
- element in the concept of 'being/ There are many 'beings' in disjunctive
- diversity.
- 'Creativity* is the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter
- of fact. It is that ultimate principle by which the many, which are the*
- universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the uni-
- verse conjunctively. It lies in the nature of things that the many enter
- into complex unity.
- 'Creativity' is the principle of novelty. An actual occasion is a novel
- entity diverse from any entity in the 'many' which it unifies. Thus 'creativ-
- ity' introduces novelty into the content of the many, which are the [32]
- universe disjunctively. The 'creative advance' is the application of this ul-
- timate principle of creativity to each novel situation which it originates.
- 'Together' is a generic term covering the various special ways in which
- various sorts of entities are 'together' in any one actual occasion. Thus
- 'together' presupposes the notions 'creativity/ 'many/ 'one/ 'identity' and
- 'diversity/ The ultimate metaphysical principle is the advance from dis-
- junction to conjunction, creating a novel entity other than the entities
- given in disjunction. The novel entity is at once the togetherness of the
- 'many' which it finds, and also it is one among the disjunctive 'many'
- which it leaves; it is a novel entity, disjunctively among the many entities
- which it synthesizes. The many become one, and are increased by one.
- In their natures, entities are disjunctively 'many' in process of passage into
- conjunctive unity. This Category of the Ultimate replaces Aristotle's
- category of 'primary substance/
- Thus the 'production of novel togetherness' is the ultimate notion em-
- bodied in the term 'concrescence/ These ultimate notions of 'production
- of novelty' and of 'concrete togetherness' are inexplicable either in terms of
- higher universals or in terms of the components participating in the con-
- 22 The Speculative Scheme
- crescence. The analysis of the components abstracts from the concrescence.
- The sole appeal is to intuition.
- The Categories of Existence
- There are eight Categories of Existence:
- (i) Actual Entities (also termed Actual Occasions), or Final Realities,
- or Res Verae.
- (ii) Prehensions, or Concrete Facts of Relatedness.
- (iii) Nexus (plural of Nexus), or Public Matters of Fact.
- (iv) Subjective Forms, or Private Matters of Fact.
- (v) Eternal Objects, or Pure Potentials for the Specific Determination
- of Fact, or Forms of Definiteness.
- (vi) Propositions, or Matters of Fact in Potential [33] Determination, or
- Impure Potentials for the Specific Determination of Matters of Fact, or
- Theories.
- (vii) Multiplicities, or Pure Disjunctions of Diverse Entities.
- (viii) Contrasts, or Modes of Synthesis of Entities in one Prehension,
- or Patterned Entities. t
- Among these eight categories of existence, actual entities and eternal
- objects stand out with a certain extreme finality. The other types of exis-
- tence have a certain intermediate character. The eighth category includes
- an indefinite progression of categories, as we proceed from 'contrasts' to
- 'contrasts of contrasts/ and on indefinitely to higher grades of contrasts.
- The Categories of Explanation
- There are twenty-seven Categories of Explanation:
- (i) That the actual world is a process, and that the process is the be-
- coming of actual entities. Thus actual entities are creatures; they are also
- termed 'actual occasions/
- (ii) That in the becoming of an actual entity, the potential unity of
- many entities in disjunctive diversity*— actual and non-actual— acquires
- the real unity of the one actual entity; so that the actual entity is the real
- concrescence of many potentials.
- (iii) That in the becoming of an actual entity, novel prehensions, nexus,
- subjective forms, propositions, multiplicities, and contrasts, also become;
- but there are no novel eternal objects.
- (iv) That the potentiality for being an element in a real concrescence*
- of many entities into one actuality! is the one general metaphysical char-
- acter attaching to all entities, actual and non-actual; and that every item
- in its universe is involved in each concrescence. In other words, it belongs
- to the nature of a 'being' that it is a potential for every 'becoming/ This
- is the 'principle of relativity/
- (v) That no two actual entities originate from an iden- \34] tical uni-
- verse; though the difference between the two universes only consists in
- The Categoreal Scheme 23
- some actual entities, included in one and not in the other, and in the sub-
- ordinate entities which each actual entity introduces into the world. The
- eternal objects are the same for all actual entities. The nexus of actual
- entities in the universe correlate to a concrescencef is termed 'the actual
- world' correlate to that concrescence.
- (vi) That each entity in the universe of a given concrescence can, so far
- as its own nature is concerned, be implicated in that concrescence in one
- or other of many modes; but in fact it is implicated only in one mode:
- that the particular mode of implication is only rendered fully determinate
- by that concrescence, though it is conditioned by the correlate universe.
- This indetermination, rendered determinate in the real concrescence, is
- the meaning of 'potentiality.' It is a conditioned indetermination, and is
- therefore called a 'real potentiality/
- (vii) That an eternal object can be described only in terms of its poten-
- tiality for 'ingression' into the becoming of actual entities; and that its
- analysis only discloses other eternal objects. It is a pure potential. The
- term 'ingression' refers to the particular mode in which the potentiality of
- an eternal object is realized in a particular actual entity, contributing to
- the definiteness of that actual entity.
- (viii) That two descriptions are required for an actual entity: (a) one
- which is analytical of its potentiality for 'objectiflcation' in the becoming
- of other actual entities, and (b) another which is analytical of the process
- which constitutes its own becoming.
- The term 'objectification' refers to the particular mode in which the
- potentiality of one actual entity is realized in another actual entity.
- (ix) That how an actual entity becomes constitutes what that actual
- entity is;t so that the two descriptions of an actual entity are not inde-
- pendent. Its 'being' is [35] constituted by its 'becoming; This is the 'prin-
- ciple of process/
- (x) That the first analysis of an actual entity, into its most concrete
- elements, discloses it to be a concrescence of prehensions, which have
- originated in its process of becoming. All further analysis is an analysis
- of prehensions. Analysis in terms of prehensions is termed 'division/
- (xi) That every prehension consists of three factors: (a) the 'subject'
- which is prehending, namely, the actual entity in which that prehension-
- is a concrete element; (b) the 'datum' which is prehended; (c) the 'sub-
- jective form' which is how that subject prehends that datum.
- Prehensions of actual entities— i.e., prehensions whose data involve
- actual entities — are termed 'physical prehensions'; and prehensions of
- eternal objects are termed 'conceptual prehensions/ Consciousness is not
- necessarily involved in the subjective forms of either type of prehension.
- (xii) That there are two species of prehensions: (a) 'positive prehen-
- sions' which are termed 'feelings,' and (b) 'negative prehensions' which
- are said to 'eliminate from feeling.' Negative prehensions also have sub-
- jective forms. A negative prehension holds its datum as inoperative in the
- 24 The Speculative Scheme
- progressive concrescence of prehensions constituting the unity of the
- subject,
- (xiii) That there are many species of subjective forms, such as emotions,
- valuations, purposes, adversions, aversions, consciousness, etc.
- (xiv) That a nexus is a set of actual entities in the unity of the related-
- ness constituted by their prehensions of each other, or— what is the same
- thing conversely expressed— constituted by their objectifications in each
- other.
- (xv) That a proposition is the unity of. certain actual entities in their
- potentiality for forming a nexus, with its potential relatedness partially
- defined by certain eternal objects which have the unity of one complex
- eternal [36] object. The actual entities involved are termed the 'logical sub-
- jects/ the complex eternal object is the 'predicate/
- (xvi) That a multiplicity consists of many entities, and its unity is con-
- stituted by the fact that all its constituent entities severally satisfy at least
- one condition which no other entity satisfies.
- Every statement about a particular multiplicity can be expressed as a
- statement referent either (a) to all its members severally, or (b) to an
- indefinite some of its members severally, or (c) as a denial of one of these
- statements. Any statement, incapable of being expressed in this form, is
- not a statement about a multiplicity, though it may be a statement about
- an entity closely allied to some multiplicity, i.e., systematically allied to
- each member of some multiplicity.
- (xvii) That whatever is a datum for a feeling has a unity as felt Thus
- the many components of a complex datum have a unity: this unity is a
- 'contrast' of entities. In a sense this means that there are an endless num-
- ber of categories of existence, since the synthesis of entities into a contrast
- in general produces a new existential type. For example, a proposition is,
- in a sense, a 'contrast/ For the practical purposes of 'human understand-
- ing/ it is sufficient to consider a few basic types of existence, and to lump
- the more derivative types together under the heading of 'contrasts/ The
- most important of such 'contrasts' is the 'affirmation-negation' contrast
- in which a proposition and a nexus obtain synthesis in one datum, the
- members of the nexus being the 'logical subjects' of the proposition.
- (xviii) That every condition to which the process of becoming conforms
- in any particular instance! has its reason either in the character of some
- actual entity in the actual world of that concrescence, or in the character
- of the subject which is in process of concrescence. This category of ex-
- planation is termed the 'ontological principle.' It could also be termed the
- 'principle of efficient, [37] and final, causation/ This ontological principle
- means that actual entities are the only reasons; so that to search for a
- reason is to search for one or more actual entities. It follows that any
- condition to be satisfied by one actual entity in its process expresses a fact
- either about the 'real internal constitutions' of some other actual entities,
- or about the 'subjective aim' conditioning that process.
- The Categoreal Scheme 25
- The phrase 'real internal constitution' is to be found in Locke's Essay
- Concerning Human Understanding (III, III, 15): "And thus the real
- internal (but generally in substances unknown) constitution of things,
- whereon their discoverable qualities depend, may be called their 'es-
- sence/ " Also the terms 'prehension' and 'feeling' are to be compared with
- the various significations of Locke's term 'idea.' But they are adopted as
- more general and more neutral terms than 'idea' as used by Locke, who
- seems to restrict them to conscious mentality. Also the ordinary logical
- account of 'propositions' expresses only a restricted aspect of their role in
- the universe, namely, when they are the data of feelings whose subjective
- forms are those of judgments. It is an essential doctrine in the philosophy
- of organism that the primary function of a proposition is to be relevant as
- a lure for feeling. For example, some propositions are the data of feelings
- with subjective forms such as to constitute those feelings to be the enjoy-
- ment of a joke. Other propositions are felt with feelings whose subjective
- forms are horror, disgust, or indignation. The 'subjective aim,' which con-
- trols the becoming of a subject, is that subject feeling a proposition with
- the subjective form of purpose to realize it in that process of self-creation.
- (xix) That the fundamental types of entities are actual entities, and
- eternal objects; and that the other types of entities only express how all
- entities of the two fundamental types are in community with each other,
- in the actual world.
- [38] (xx) That to 'function' means to contribute determination to the
- actual entities in the nexus of some actual world. Thus the determinaie-
- ness and self-identity of one entity cannot be abstracted from the com-
- munity of the diverse functionings of all entities. 'Determination' is an-
- alysable into 'definiteness' and 'position,' where 'definiteness't is the illus-
- tration of select eternal objects, and 'position' is relative status in a nexus
- of actual entities.
- (xxi) An entity is actual, when it has significance for itself. By this it is
- meant that an actual entity functions in respect to its own determination.
- Thus an actual entity combines self-identity with self-diversity.
- (xxii) That an actual entity by functioning in respect to itself plays
- diverse roles in self-formation without losing its self-identity. It is self-
- creative: and in its process of creation transforms its diversity of roles into
- one coherent role. Thus 'becoming' is the transformation of incoherence
- into coherence, and in each particular instance ceases with this attainment.
- (xxiii) That this self-functioning is the real internal constitution of an
- actual entity. It is the 'immediacy' of the actual entity. An actual entity
- is called the 'subject' of its own immediacy.
- (xxiv) The functioning of one actual entity in the self-creation of an-
- other actual entity is the 'objectification' of the former for the latter actual
- entity. The functioning of an eternal object in the self-creation of an ac-
- tual entity is the 'ingression' of the eternal object in the actual entity.
- (xxv) The final phase in the process of concrescence, constituting an
- 26 The Speculative Scheme
- actual entity, is one complex, fully determinate feeling. This final phase
- is termed the 'satisfaction/ It is fully determinate (a) as to its genesis,
- (b) as to its objective character for the transcendent creativity, and (c) as
- to its prehension— positive or negative— of every item in its universe.
- (xxvi) Each element in the genetic process of an actual [39] entity has
- one self-consistent function, however complex, in the final satisfaction.
- (xxvii) In a process of concrescence, there is a succession of phases in
- which new prehensions arise by integration of prehensions in antecedent
- phases. In these integrations 'feelings' contribute their 'subjective forms 7
- and their 'data' to the formation of novel integral prehensions; but 'nega-
- tive prehensions' contribute only their 'subjective forms/ The process con-
- tinues till all prehensions are components in the one determinate integral
- satisfaction.
- SECTION III
- There are nine Categoreal Obligations:
- (i) The Category of Subjective Unity, The many feelings which belong
- to an incomplete phase in the process of an actual entity, though unin-
- tegrated by reason of the incompleteness of the phase, are compatible for
- integration by reason of the unity of their subject.
- (ii) The Category of Objective Identity. There can be no duplica-
- tion of any element in the objective datum of the 'satisfaction' of an actual
- entity, so far as concerns the function of that element in the 'satisfaction/
- Here, as always, the term 'satisfaction' means the one complex fully
- determinate feeling which is the completed phase in the process. This
- category expresses that each element has one self-consistent function, how-
- ever complex. Logic is the general analysis of self-consistency.
- (iii) The Category of Objective Diversity. There can be no 'coalescence'
- of diverse elements in the objective datum of an actual entity, so far as
- concerns the functions of those elements in that satisfaction.
- 'Coalescence' here means the notion of diverse elements exercising an
- absolute identity of function, devoid of the contrasts inherent in their
- diversities.
- (iv) The Category of Conceptual Valuation. From each physical feel-
- ing there is the derivation of a purely [40] conceptual feeling whose datum
- is the eternal object determinant of the defmiteness of the actual entity, or
- of the nexus, physically felt.
- *(v) The Category of Conceptual Reversion. There is secondary orig-
- ination of conceptual feelings with data which are partially identical with,
- and partially diverse from, the eternal objects forming the data in the first
- phase of the mental pole. The diversity is a relevant diversity determined
- by the subjective aim.
- Note that category (iv) concerns conceptual reproduction of physical
- feeling, and category (v) concerns conceptual diversity from physical
- feeling.
- The Categoreal Scheme 27
- (vi) The Category of Transmutation. When (in accordance with cate-
- gory [iv], or with categories [iv] and [v])t one and the same conceptual
- feeling is derived impartially by a prehending subject from its analogous
- simplet physical feelings of various actual entities in its actual world, then,
- in a subsequent phase of integration of these simple physical feelings to-
- gether with the derivate conceptual feeling, the prehending subject may-
- transmute the datum of this conceptual feeling into a characteristic of
- some nexus containing those prehended actual entities among its mem-
- bers, or of some part of that nexus. In this way the nexus (or its part),
- thus characterized, is the objective datum of a feeling entertained by this
- prehending subject.
- It is evident that the complete datum of the transmuted feeling is a
- contrast, namely ? 'the nexus, as one, in contrast with the eternal object/
- This type of contrast is one of the meanings of the notion 'qualification
- of physical substance by quality/
- This category is the way in which the philosophy of organism, which is
- an atomic theory of actuality, meets a perplexity which is inherent in all
- monadic cosmologies. Leibniz in his Monadology meets the same diffi-
- culty by a theory of 'confused' perception. But he fails to make clear how
- 'confusion' originates.
- (vii) The Category of Subjective Harmony. The val- [41] uations of con-
- ceptual feelings are mutually determined by the adaptation of those feel-
- ings to be contrasted elements congruent with the subjective aim.
- Category (i) and category (vii) jointly express a pre-established harmony
- in the process of concrescence of any one subject. Category (i) has to do
- with data felt, and category (vii) with the subjective forms of the con-
- ceptual feelings. This pre-established harmony is an outcome of the fact
- that no prehension can be considered in abstraction from its subject, al-
- though it originates in the process creative of its subject.
- (viii) The Category of Subjective Intensity. The subjective aim, whereby
- there is origination of conceptual feeling, is at* intensity of feeling (a) in
- the immediate subject, and (/?) in the relevant future.
- This double aim— at the immediate present and the relevant future-
- is less divided than appears on the surface. For the determination of the
- relevant future, and the anticipatory feeling respecting provision for its
- grade of intensity, are elements affecting the immediate complex of feel-
- ing. The greater part of morality hinges on the determination of relevance
- in the future. The relevant future consists of those elements in the an-
- ticipated future which are felt with effective intensity by the present sub-
- ject by reason of the real potentiality for them to be derived from itself.
- (ix) The Category of Freedom and Determination. The concrescence of
- each individual actual entity is internally determined and is externally
- free.
- This category can be condensed into the formula, that in each con-
- crescence whatever is determinable is determined, but that there is always
- 28 The Speculative Scheme
- a remainder for the decision of the subject-superject of that concrescence.
- This subject-superject is the universe in that synthesis, and beyond it there
- is nonentity. This final decision is the reaction of the unity of the whole
- to its own internal determination. This reaction is the final modification
- of emotion, appreciation, and purpose. But the decision [42] of the whole
- arises out of the determination of the parts, so as to be strictly relevant
- to it.
- SECTION IV
- The whole of thet discussion in the subsequent parts either leads up
- to these categories (of the four types) or is explanatory of them, or is
- considering our experience of the world in the light of these categories.
- But a few preliminary notes may be useful.
- It follows from the fourth category of explanation that the notion of
- 'complete abstraction' is self-contradictory. For you cannot abstract the
- universe from any entity, actual or non-actual, so as to consider that entity
- in complete isolation. Whenever we think of some entity, we are asking,
- What is it fit for here? In a sense, every entity pervades the whole world;
- for this question has a definite answer for each entity in respect to any
- actual entity or any nexus of actual entities.
- It follows from the first category of explanation that 'becoming' is a
- creative advance into novelty. It is for this reason that the meaning of the
- phrase 'the actual world' is relative to the becoming of a definite actual
- entity which is both novel and actual, relatively to that meaning, and to
- no other meaning of that phrase. Thus, conversely, each actual entity
- corresponds to a meaning of 'the actual world' peculiar to itself. This point
- is dealt with more generally in categories of explanation (iii) and (v). An
- actual world is a nexus; and the actual world of one actual entity sinks
- to the level of a subordinate nexus in actual worlds beyond that actual
- entity.
- Trie first, the fourth, the eighteenth, and twenty-seventh categories state
- different aspects of one and the same general metaphysical truth. The first
- category states the doctrine in a general way: that every ultimate actuality
- embodies in its own essence what Alexander 3 \43] terms 'a principle of un-
- rest,' namely, its becoming. The fourth category applies this doctrine to the
- very notion of an 'entity.' It asserts that the notion of an 'entity' means
- 'an element contributory to the process of becoming.' We have in this
- category the utmost generalization of the notion of 'relativity.' The eigh-
- teenth category asserts that the obligations imposed on the becoming of
- any particular actual entity arise from the constitutions of other actual
- entities.
- The four categories of explanation, (x) to (xiii), constitute the repudia-
- 3 Cf. "Artistic Creation and Cosmic Creation," Proc. Brit. Acad., 1927 \ Vol.
- XIII.
- The Categoreal Scheme 29
- tion of the notion of vacuous actuality, which haunts realistic philosophy.
- The term Vacuous actuality' here means the notion of a res vera devoid of
- subjective immediacy. This repudiation is fundamental for the organic
- philosophy (cf. Part II, Ch. VII, 'The Subjectivist Principle'). The notion
- of Vacuous actuality' is very closely allied to the notion of the 'inherence
- of quality in substance/ Both notions— in their misapplication as funda-
- mental metaphysical categories— find their chief support in a misunder-
- standing of the true analysis of 'presentational immediacy' (cf. Part II,
- Ch. II, Sects. I and V).
- It is fundamental to the metaphysical doctrine of the philosophy of
- organism, that the notion of an actual entity as the unchanging subject
- of change is completely abandoned. An actual entity is at once the subject
- experiencing and the superject of its experiences. It is subject-superject,
- and neither half of this description can for a moment be lost sight of.
- The term 'subject' will be mostly employed when the actual entity is
- considered in respect to its own real internal constitution. But 'subject'
- is always to be construed as an abbreviation of 'subject-super ject.'*
- The ancient doctrine that 'no one crosses the same river twice' is ex-
- tended. No thinker thinks twice; and, to put the matter more generally, no
- subject experiences twice. This is what Locke ought to have meant by his
- doctrine of time as a 'perpetual perishing.'
- [44] This repudiation directly contradicts Kant's 'First Analogy of Expe-
- rience' in either of its ways of phrasing (1st or 2ndt edition). In the phi-
- losophy of organism it is not 'substance' which is permanent, but 'form.'
- Forms suffer changing relations; actual entities 'perpetually perish' sub-
- jectively, but are immortal objectively. Actuality in perishing acquires
- objectivity, while it loses subjective immediacy. It loses the final causation
- which is its internal principle of unrest, and it acquires efficient causation
- whereby it is a ground of obligation characterizing the creativity.
- Actual occasions in their 'formal' constitutions are devoid of all in-
- determination. Potentiality has passed into realization. They are complete
- and determinate matter of fact, devoid of all indecision. They form the
- ground of obligation. But eternal objects, and propositions, and some more
- complex sorts of contrasts, involve in their own natures indecision. They
- are, like all entities, potentials for the process of becoming. Their ingres-
- sion expresses the definiteness of the actuality in question. But their own
- natures do not in themselves disclose in what actual entities this poten-
- tiality of ingression is realized. Thus they involve indetermination in a
- sense more complete than do the former set.
- A multiplicity merely enters into process through its individual mem-
- bers. The only statements to be made about a multiplicity express how
- its individual members enter into the process of the actual world. Any
- entity which enters into process in this way belongs to the multiplicity, and
- no other entities do belong to it. It can be treated as a unity for this pur-
- pose, and this purpose only. For example, each of the six kinds of entities
- 30 The Speculative Scheme
- just mentioned is a multiplicity t (i.e., not the individual entities of the
- kinds, but the collective kinds of the entities). A multiplicity has solely
- a disjunctive relationship to the actual world. The 'universe' comprising
- the absolutely initial data for an actual entity is a multiplicity. The treat-
- ment of a multiplicity as though it [45] had the unity belonging to an en-
- tity of any one of the other six kinds produces logical errors. Whenever the
- word 'entity' is used, it is to be assumed, unless otherwise stated, that it
- refers to an entity of one of the six kinds, and not to a multiplicity.
- There is no emergent evolution concerned with a multiplicity, so that
- every statement about a multiplicity is a disjunctive statement about its
- individual members. Entities of any of the first six kinds, and generic con-
- trasts, will be called 'proper entities/
- In its development the subsequent discussion of the philosophy of or-
- ganism is governed by the belief that the subject-predicate form of propo-
- sition is concerned with high abstractions, except in its application to sub-
- jective forms. This sort of abstraction, apart from this exception, is rarely
- relevant to metaphysical description. The dominance of Aristotelian logic
- from the late classical period onwards has imposed on metaphysical
- thought the categories naturally derivative from its phraseology. This dom-
- inance of his logic does not seem to have been characteristic of Aristotle's
- own metaphysical speculations. The divergencies, such as they are, in these
- lectures from other philosophical doctrines mostly depend upon the fact
- that many philosophers, who in their explicit statements criticize the
- Aristotelian notion of 'substance/ yet implicitly throughout their discus-
- sions presuppose that the 'subject-predicate' form of proposition embodies
- the finally adequate mode of statement about the actual world. The evil
- produced by the Aristotelian 'primary substance' is exactly this habit of
- metaphysical emphasis upon the 'subject-predicate 7 form of proposition.
- CHAPTER III
- SOME DERIVATIVE NOTIONS
- SECTION I
- [46] The primordial created fact is the unconditioned conceptual valua-
- tion of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects. This is the 'primordial
- nature' of God. By reason of this complete valuation, the objectification of
- God in each derivate actual entity results in a graduation of the relevance
- of eternal objects to the concrescent phases of that derivate occasion. There
- will be additional ground of relevance for select eternal objects by reason
- of their ingression into derivate actual entities belonging to the actual
- world of the concrescent occasion in question. But whether or no this be
- the case, there is always the definite relevance derived from God. Apart
- from God. eternal objects unrealized in the actual world would be rela-
- tively non-existent for the concrescence in question. For effective relevance
- requires agency of comparison, and agency belongs exclusively to actual
- occasions.** This divine ordering is itself matter of fact, thereby condition-
- ing creativity. Thus possibility which transcends realized temporal matter
- of fact has a real relevance to the creative advance. God is the primordial
- creature; but the description of his nature is not exhausted by this concep-
- tual side of it. His 'consequent nature' results from his physical prehen-
- sions of the derivative actual entities (cf. Part V).
- 'Creativity' is another rendering of the Aristotelian 'matter/ and of the
- modern 'neutral stuff/ But it is divested of the notion of passive recep-
- tivity, either of 'form/ or of external relations; it is the pure notion of the
- activity conditioned by the objective immortality of [47] the actual world—
- a world which is never the same twice, though always with the stable ele-
- ment of divine ordering. Creativity is without a character of its own in
- exactly the same sense in which the Aristotelian 'matter' is without a char-
- acter of its own. It is that ultimate notion of the highest generality at *
- the base of actuality. It cannot be characterized, because all characters are
- more special than itself. But creativity is always found under conditions,
- and described as conditioned. The non-temporal act of all-inclusive un-
- fettered valuation is at once a creature of creativity and a condition for
- creativity. It shares this double character with all creatures. By reason of
- its character as a creature, always in concrescence and never in the past, it
- receives a reaction from the world; this reaction is its consequent nature.
- It is here termed 'God'; because the contemplation of our natures, as
- 31
- 32 The Speculative Scheme
- enjoying real feelings derived from the timeless source of all order, acquires
- that 'subjective form' of refreshment and companionship at which reli-
- gions aim.
- This function of creatures, that they constitute the shifting character of
- creativity, is here termed the 'objective immortality' of actual entities.
- Thus God has objective immortality in respect to his primordial nature
- and his consequent nature. The objective immortality of his consequent
- nature is considered later (cf. Part V); we are now concerned with his
- primordial nature.
- God's immanence in the world in respect to his primordial nature is an
- urge towards the future based upon an appetite in the present. Appetition
- is at once the conceptual valuation of an immediate physical feeling com-
- bined with the urge towards realization of the datum conceptually pre-
- hended. For example, t 'thirst* is an immediate physical feeling integrated
- with the conceptual prehension of its quenching.
- Appetition x is immediate matter of fact including in itself a principle of
- unrest, involving realization of what [48] is not and may be. The imme-
- diate occasion thereby conditions creativity so as to procure, in the future,
- physical realization of its mental pole, according to the various valuations
- inherent in its various conceptual prehensions. All physical experience is
- accompanied by an appetite for, or against, its continuance: an example is
- the appetition of self-preservation. But the origination of the novel con-
- ceptual prehension has, more especially, to be accounted for. Thirst is an
- appetite towards a difference— towards something relevant, something
- largely identical, but something with a definite novelty. This is an example
- at a low level which shows the germ of a free imagination.
- In what sense can unrealized abstract form be relevant? What is its basis
- of relevance? 'Relevance' must express some real fact of togetherness
- among forms. The ontological principle can be expressed as: All real to-
- getherness is togetherness in the formal constitution of an actuality. So if
- there be a relevance of what in the temporal world is unrealized, the rele-
- vance must express a fact of togetherness in the formal constitution of a
- non-temporal actuality. But by the principle of relativity there can only be
- one non-derivative actuality, unbounded by its prehensions of an actual
- world. Such a primordial superject of creativity achieves, in its unity of
- satisfaction, the complete conceptual valuation of all eternal objects. This
- is the ultimate, basic adjustment of the togetherness of eternal objects on
- which creative order depends. It is the conceptual adjustment of all ap-
- petites in the form of aversions and adversions. It constitutes the meaning
- of relevance. Its status as an actual efficient fact is recognized by terming
- it the 'primordial nature of God/
- The word 'appetition' illustrates a danger which lurks in technical terms.
- This same danger is also illustrated in the psychology derived from Freud.
- 1 Cf . Leibniz's Monadology.
- Some Derivative Notions 33
- The mental poles of actualities contribute various grades of complex feel-
- ings to the actualities including them as factors. The [49] basic operations
- of mentality are 'conceptual prehensions.' These are the only operations of
- 'pure' mentality. All other mental operations are 'impure/ in the sense
- that they involve integrations of conceptual prehensions with the physical
- prehensions of the physical pole. Since 'impurity* in prehension refers to
- the prehension arising out of the integration of 'pure' physical prehensions
- with 'pure' mental prehensions, it follows that an 'impure' t mental pre-
- hension is also an 'impure' physical prehension and conversely. Thus the
- term 'impure' applied to a prehension has a perfectly definite meaning;
- and does not require the terms 'mental' or 'physical/ except for the direc-
- tion of attention in the discussion concerned.
- The technical term 'conceptual prehension' is entirely neutral, devoid
- of all suggestiveness. But such terms present great difficulties to the under-
- standing, by reason of the fact that they suggest no particular exemplifica-
- tions. Accordingly, we seek equivalent terms which have about them the
- suggestiveness of familiar fact. We have chosen the term 'appetition/
- which suggests exemplifications in our own experience, also in lower forms
- of life such as insects and vegetables. But even in human experience 'ap-
- petition' suggests a degrading notion of this basic activity in its more in-
- tense operations. We are closely concerned with what Bergson calls 'intui-
- tion'— with some differences however. Bergson's 'intuition' t is an 'impure'
- operation; it is an integral feeling derived from the synthesis of the con-
- ceptual prehension with the physical prehension from which it has been
- derived according to the 'Category of Conceptual Reproduction' (Cate-
- goreal Obligation! IV). It seems that Bergson's term 'intuition' has the
- same meaning as 'physical purpose' in Part III of these lectures. Also
- Bergson's 'intuition' seems to abstract from the subjective form of emotion
- and purpose. This subjective form is an essential element in the notion of
- 'conceptual prehension,' as indeed in that of any prehension. It is an essen-
- tial element in 'physical purpose' (cf. Part III), If we con- [SO] sider these
- 'pure' mental operations in their most intense operations, we should choose
- the term 'vision.' A conceptual prehension is a direct vision of some possi-
- bility of good or oft evil— of some possibility as to how actualities may be
- definite. There is no reference to particular actualities, or to any par-
- ticular actual world. The phrase 'of good or of evil' has been added to in-
- clude a reference to the subjective form; the mere word 'vision' abstracts
- from this factor in a conceptual prehension. If we say that God's primor-
- dial nature is a completeness of 'appetition,' f we give due weight to the
- subjective form— at a cost. If we say that God's primordial nature is 'in-
- tuition/ we suggest mentality which is 'impure' by reason of synthesis with
- physical prehension. If we say that God's primordial nature is 'vision,' we
- suggest a maimed view of the subjective form, divesting it of yearning
- after concrete fact— no particular facts, but after some actuality. There is
- deficiency in God's primordial nature which the term 'vision' obscures.
- 34 The Speculative Scheme
- One advantage of the term Vision' is that it connects this doctrine of God
- more closely with philosophical tradition. 'Envisagement' is perhaps a safer
- term than Vision/ To sum up: God's primordial nature' is abstracted from
- his commerce with 'particulars/ and is therefore devoid of those 'impure'
- intellectual cogitations which involve propositions (cf. Part III). It is God
- in abstraction, alone with himself. As such it is a mere factor in God, de-
- ficient in actuality.
- SECTION II
- The notions of 'social order' and of 'personal order' cannot be omitted
- from this preliminary sketch. A 'society/ in the sense in which that term
- is here used, is a nexus with social order; and an 'enduring object/ or 'en-
- during creature/ is a society whose social order has taken the special form
- of 'personal order.'
- A nexus enjoys 'social order' where (i) there is a common element of
- form illustrated in the definiteness [Si] of each of its included actual en-
- tities, and (ii) this common element of form arises in each member of the
- nexus by reason of the conditions imposed upon it by its prehensions of
- some other members of the nexus, and (iii) these prehensions impose that
- condition of reproduction by reason of their inclusion of positive feelings
- of that* common form. Such a nexus is called a 'society/ and the common
- form is the 'defining characteristic' of the society. The notion f of 'defining
- characteristic' is allied to the Aristotelian notion oft 'substantial form/
- The common element of form is simply a complex eternal object ex-
- emplified in each member of the nexus. But the social order of the nexus
- is not the mere fact of this common form exhibited by all its members. The
- reproduction of the common form throughout the nexus is due to the
- genetic relations of the members of the nexus among each other, and to
- the additional fact that genetic relations include feelings of the common
- form. Thus the defining characteristic is inherited throughout the nexus,
- each member deriving it from those other members of the nexus which
- are antecedent to its own concrescence.
- A nexus enjoys 'personal order' when (a) it is a 'society/ and (/?) when
- the genetic relatedness of its members orders these members 'serially/
- By this 'serial ordering' arising from the genetic relatedness, it is meant
- that any member of the nexus— excluding the first and the last, if there be
- such— constitutes a 'cut' in the nexus, so that (a) this member inherits
- from all members on one side of the cut, and from no members on the
- other side of the cut, and (b) if A and B are two members of the nexus
- and B inherits from A, then the side of B's+ cut, inheriting from B, forms
- part of the side of A's cut, inheriting from A, and the side of A's cut from
- which A inherits forms part of the side of B's cut from which B inherits.
- Thus the nexus forms a single line of inheritance of its defining character-
- istic. Such a nexus is called an 'enduring object/ It might have been
- Some Derivative Notions 35
- termed a 'person/ in the legal sense [52] of that term. But unfortunately
- 'person' suggests the notion of consciousness, so that its use would lead to
- misunderstanding. The nexus 'sustains a character/ and this is one of the
- meanings of the Latin word persona. But an 'enduring object/ qua 'per-
- son/ does more than sustain a character. For this sustenance arises out of
- the special genetic relations among the members of the nexus. An ordinary
- physical object, which has temporal endurance, is a society. In the ideally
- simple case, it has personal order and is an 'enduring object. 7 A society may
- (or may not) be analysable into many strands of 'enduring objects/ This
- will be the case for most ordinary physical objects. These enduring objects
- and 'societies/ analysable into strands of enduring objects, are the per-
- manent entities which enjoy adventures of change throughout time and
- space. For example, they form the subject-matter of the science of dy-
- namics. Actual entities perish, but do not change; they are what they are.
- A nexus which (i) enjoys social order, and (ii) is analysable into strands
- of enduring objects may be termed a 'corpuscular society/ A society may
- be more or less corpuscular, according to the relative importance of the
- defining characteristics of the various enduring objects compared to that
- of the defining characteristic of the whole corpuscular nexus.
- SECTION III
- There is a prevalent misconception that 'becoming' involves the notion
- of a unique seriality for its advance into novelty. This is the classic notion
- of 'time/ which philosophy took over from common sense. Mankind made
- an unfortunate generalization from its experience of enduring objects. Re-
- cently physical science has abandoned this notion. Accordingly we should
- now purge cosmology of a point of view which it ought never to have
- adopted as an ultimate metaphysical principle. In these lectures the term
- 'creative advance' is not to be construed in the sense of a uniquely serial
- advance.
- [S3] Finally, the extensive continuity of the physical universe has usually
- been construed to mean that there is a continuity of becoming. But if we
- admit that 'something becomes/ it is easy, by employing Zeno's method, to
- prove that there can be no continuity of becoming. 2 There is a becoming
- of continuity, but no continuity of becoming. The actual occasions are the
- creatures which become, and they constitute a continuously extensive
- world. In other words, extensiveness becomes, but 'becoming' is not itself
- extensive.
- Thus the ultimate metaphysical truth is atomism. The creatures are
- atomic. In the present cosmic epoch there is a creation of continuity. Per-
- haps such creation is an ultimate metaphysical truth holding of all cosmic
- 2 Cf. Part II, Ch. II, Sect. II; and also my Science and the Modern World,
- Ch. VII, for a discussion of this argument.
- 36 The Speculative Scheme
- epochs; but this does not* seem to be a necessary conclusion. The more
- likely opinion is that extensive continuity is a special condition arising
- from the society of creatures which constitute our immediate epoch. But
- atomism does not exclude complexityt and universal relativity. Each atom
- is a system of all things.
- The proper balance between atomism and continuity is of importance to
- physical science. For example, the doctrine, here explained, conciliates
- Newton's corpuscular theory of light with the wave theory. For both a
- corpuscle, and an advancing element of at wave front, are merely a per-
- manent form propagated from atomic creature to atomic creature. A cor-
- puscle is in fact an 'enduring object.' The notion of an 'enduring object'
- is, however, capable of more or less completeness of realization. Thus, in
- different stages of its career, a wave of light may be more or less corpuscu-
- lar. A train of such waves at all stages of its career involves social order;
- but in the earlier stages this social order takes the more special form of
- loosely related strands of personal order. This dominant personal order
- gradually vanishes as the time advances. Its defining characteristics become
- less and [54] less important, as their various features peter out. The waves
- then become a nexus with important social order, but with no strands of
- personal order. Thus the train of waves starts as a corpuscular society, and
- ends as a society which is not corpuscular.
- SECTION IV
- Finally, in the cdsmological scheme here outlined one implicit assump-
- tion of the philosophical tradition is repudiated. The assumption is that
- the basic elements of experience are to be described in terms of one, or
- all, of the three ingredients, consciousness, thought, sense-perception. The
- last term is used in the sense of 'conscious perception in the mode of pre-
- sentational immediacy/ Also in practice sense-perception is narrowed
- down to visual perception. According to the philosophy of organism these
- three components are unessential elements in experience, either physical
- or mental. Any instance of experience is dipolar, whether that instance
- be God or an actual occasion of the world. The origination of God is from
- the mental pole, the origination of an actual occasion is from the physical
- pole; but in either case these elements, consciousness, thought, sense-per-
- ception, belong to the derivative 'impure 7 phases of the concrescence, if in
- any effective sense they enter at all.
- This repudiation is the reason why, in relation to the topic under discus-
- sion, the status of presentational immediacy is a recurrent theme through-
- out the subsequent Partst of these lectures.
- PART II
- DISCUSSIONS AND APPLICATIONS
- CHAPTER I
- FACT AND FORM
- SECTION I
- [62] All human discourse which bases its claim to consideration on the
- truth of its statements must appeal to the facts. In none of its branches
- can philosophy claim immunity to this rule. But in the case of philosophy
- the difficulty arises that the record of the facts is in part dispersed vaguely
- through the various linguistic expressions of civilized language and of
- literature, and is in part expressed more precisely under the influence of
- schemes of thought prevalent in the traditions of science and philosophy.
- In this second part of these lectures, the scheme of [63] thought which is
- the basis of the philosophy of organism is confronted with various interpre-
- tations of the facts widely accepted in thet European tradition, literary,
- philosophic, and scientific. So far as concerns philosophy only a selected
- group can be explicitly mentioned. There is no point in endeavouring to
- force the interpretations of divergent philosophers into a vague agreement.
- What is important is that the scheme of interpretation here adopted can
- claim for each of its main positions the express authority of one, or the
- other, of some supreme master of thought—Plato, Aristotle, Descartes,
- Locke, Hume, Kant. But ultimately nothing rests on authority; the final
- court of appeal is intrinsic reasonableness.
- The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradi-
- tion is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. I do not mean the
- systematic scheme of thought which scholars have doubtfully extracted
- from his writings. I allude to the wealth of general ideas scattered through
- them. His personal endowments, his wide opportunities for experience at
- a great period of civilization, his inheritance of an intellectual tradition
- not yet stiffened by excessive systematization, have made his writings t an
- inexhaustible mine of suggestion. Thus in one sense by stating my belief
- that the train of thought in these lectures is Platonic, I am doing no more
- than expressing the hope that it falls within the European tradition. But I
- do mean more: I mean that if we had to render Plato's general point of
- view with the least changes made necessary by the intervening two thou-
- sand years of human experience in social organization, in aesthetic attain-
- ments, in science, and in religion, we should have to set about the con-
- struction of a philosophy of organism. In such a philosophy the actualities
- constituting the process of the world are conceived as exemplifying the
- 39
- 40 Discussions and Applications
- ingression (or 'participation') of other things which constitute the poten-
- tialities of definiteness for any actual existence. The things which are tem-
- poral arise by their participation in the things which are eternal. The
- [64] two sets are mediated by a thing which combines the actuality of what
- is temporal with the timelessness of what is potential. This final entity is
- the divine element in the world, by which the barren inefficient disjunction
- of abstract potentialities obtains primordially the efficient conjunction of
- ideal realization. This ideal realization of potentialities in a primordial
- actual entity constitutes the metaphysical stability whereby the actual
- process exemplifies general principles of metaphysics, and attains the ends
- proper to specific types of emergent order. By reason of the actuality of this
- primordial valuation of pure potentials, each eternal object has a definite,
- effective relevance to each concrescent process. Apart from such orderings,**
- there would be a complete disjunction of eternal objects unrealized in the
- temporal world. Novelty would be meaningless, and inconceivable. We are
- here extending and rigidly applying Hume's principle, that ideas of reflec-
- tion are derived from actual facts.
- By this recognition of the divine element the general Aristotelian princi-
- ple is maintained that, apart from things that are actual, there is nothing
- —nothing either in fact or in efficacy. This is the true general principle
- which also underlies Descartes' dictum: "For this reason, when we per-
- ceive any attribute, we therefore conclude that some existing thing or
- substance to which it may be attributed, is necessarily present." *■ And
- again: "for every clear and distinct conception (perceptio) is without
- doubt something, and hence cannot derive its origin from what is
- nought, . . ." 2 This general principle will be termed the 'ontological prin-
- ciple. 7 It is the principle that everything is positively somewhere in ac-
- tuality, and in potency everywhere. In one of its applications this principle
- issues in the doctrine of 'conceptualising Thus [65] the search for a reason
- is always the search for an actual fact which is the vehicle of the reason. The
- ontological principle, as here defined, constitutes the first step in the de-
- scription of the universe as a solidarity 3 of many actual entities. Each
- actual entity is conceived as an act of experience arising out of data. It is
- a process of 'feeling' the many data, so as to absorb them into the unity of
- one individual 'satisfaction/ Here 'feeling' is the term used for the basic
- generic operation of passing from the objectivity of the data to the sub-
- jectivity of the actual entity in question. Feelings are variously specialized
- 1 Principles of Philosophy, Part I, 52; translation by Haldane and Ross. All
- quotations from Descartes are from this translation.*
- 2 Meditation IV, towards the end.
- 3 The word 'solidarity' has been borrowed from Professor Wildon Carr's Presi-
- dential Address to the Aristotelian Society, Session 1917-1918. The address —
- 'The Interaction of Body and Mind" — develops the fundamental principle sug-
- gested by this word.
- Fact and Form 41
- operations, effecting a transition into subjectivity. They replace the 'neu-
- tral stuff' of certain realistic philosophers. An actual entity is a process,
- and is not describable in terms of the morphology of a 'stuff/ This use of
- the term 'feeling' has a close analogy to Alexander's 4 use of the term
- 'enjoyment'; and has also some kinship with Bergson's use of the term
- 'intuition; A near analogy is Locke's use of the term 'idea/ including 'ideas
- of particular things' (cf. his Essay, III, III, 2, 6, and 7). But the word
- 'feeling/ as used in these lectures, is even more reminiscent of Descartes.
- For example: "Let it be so; still it is at least quite certain that it seems to
- me that I see light, that I hear noise and that I feel heat. That cannot be
- false; properly speaking it is what is in me called feeling (sentire); and
- used in this precise sense that is no other thing than thinking." 5
- In Cartesian language, the essence of an actual entity consists solely in
- the fact that it is a prehending thing (i.e., a substance whose whole essence
- or nature is to prehend). 6 A 'feeling' belongs to the positive species [66] of
- 'prehensions.' There are two species of prehensions, the 'positive species' and
- the 'negative species.' An actual entity has a perfectly definite bond with
- each item in the universe. This determinate bond is its prehension of that
- item. A negative prehension is the definite exclusion of that item from
- positive contribution to the subject's own real internal constitution. This
- doctrine involves the position that a negative prehension expresses a
- bond. A positive prehension is the definite inclusion of that item into posi-
- tive contribution to the subject's own real internal constitution. This
- positive inclusion is called its 'feeling' of that item. Other entities are re-
- quired to express how any one item is felt. All actual entities in the actual
- world, relatively to a given actual entity as 'subject,' are necessarily 'felt'
- by that subject, though in general vaguely. An actual entity as felt is said
- to be 'objectified' for that subject. Only a selection of eternal objects are
- 'felt' by a given subject, and these eternal objects are then said to have
- 'ingression' in that subject. But those eternal objects which are not felt are
- not therefore negligible. For each negative prehension has its own sub-
- jective form, however trivial and faint. It adds to the emotional complex,
- though not to the objective data. The emotional complex is the subjective
- form of the final 'satisfaction.' The importance of negative prehensions
- arises from the fact, that (i) actual entities form a system, in the sense of
- entering into each other's constitutions, (ii) that by the ontological
- principle every entity is felt by some actual entity, (iii) that, as a conse-
- quence of (i) and (ii), every entity in the actual world of a concrescent
- actuality has some gradation of real relevance to that concrescence, (iv)
- that, in consequence of (iii), the negative prehension of an entity is a
- 4 Cf. his Space, Time and Deity, passim.
- 5 Meditation II, Haldane and Ross translation.
- 6 For the analogue to this sentence cf. Meditation VI; substitute 'Ens pre-
- hendens" fort 'Ens cogitans. 7
- 42 Discussions and Applications
- positive fact with its emotional subjective form,t (v) there is a mutual
- sensitivity of the subjective forms of prehensions, so that they are not in-
- different to each other, (vi) the concrescence issues in one concrete feel-
- ing, the satisfaction.
- SECTION II
- [67] That we fail to find in experience any elements intrinsically incapa-
- ble of exhibition as examples of general theoryt is the hope of rationalism.
- This hope is not a metaphysical premise. It is the faith which forms the
- motive for the pursuit of all sciences alike, including metaphysics.
- In so far as metaphysics enables us to apprehend the rationality of
- things, the claim is justified. It is always open to us, having regard to the
- imperfections of all metaphysical systems, to lose hope at the exact point
- where we find ourselves. The preservation of such faith must depend on an
- ultimate moral intuition into the nature of intellectual action— that it
- should embody the adventure of hope. Such an intuition marks the point
- where metaphysics— and indeed every science— gains assurance from reli-
- gion and passes over into religion. But in itself the faith does not embody a
- premise from which the theory starts: it is an ideal which is seeking satis-
- faction. In so far as we believe that doctrine, we are rationalists.
- There must, however, be limits to the claim that all the elements in
- the universe are explicable by 'theory/ For 'theory' itself requires that there
- be given' elements so as to form the material for theorizing. Plato himself
- recognizes this limitation: I quote from Professor A. E. Taylor's summary
- of the Timaeus:
- In the real world there is always, over and above "law," a factor of
- the "simply given" or "brute fact," not accounted for and to be ac-
- cepted simply as given. It is the business of science never to acquiesce
- in the merely given, to seek to "explain" it as the consequence, in virtue
- of rational law, of some simpler initial "given." But, however far sci-
- ence may carry this procedure, it is always forced to retain some ele-
- ment of brute fact, the merely given, in its account of things. It is the
- presence in nature of this element of the given, this surd or irrational
- as it has [68] sometimes been called, which Timaeus appears to be per-
- sonifying in his language about Necessity. 7
- So far as the interpretation of Plato is concerned, I rely upon the au-
- thority of Professor Taylor. But, apart from this historical question, a clear
- understanding of the 'given' elements in the world is essential for any form
- of Platonic realism.
- For rationalistic thought, the notion of 'givenness' carries with it a
- reference beyond the mere data in question. It refers to a 'decision'
- whereby what is 'given' is separated off from what for that occasion is 'not
- 7 Plato, The Man and His Work, Lincoln MacVeagh, New York, 1927.*
- Fact and Form 43
- given/ This element of 'givenness' in things implies some activity pro-
- curing limitation. The word 'decision' does not here imply conscious judg-
- ment, though in some 'decisions' consciousness will be a factor. The word
- is used in its root sense of a 'cutting off/ The ontological principle declares
- that every decision is referable to one or more actual entities, because in
- separation from actual entities there is nothing, merely nonentity— 'The
- rest is silence/
- The ontological principle asserts the relativity of decision; whereby every
- decision expresses the relation of the actual thing, for which a decision is
- made, to an actual thing by which that decision is made. But 'decision'
- cannot be construed as a casual adjunct of an actual entity. It constitutes
- the very meaning of actuality. An actual entity arises from decisions for it,
- and by its very existence provides decisions for other actual entities which
- supersede it. Thus the ontological principle is the first stage in constituting
- a theory embracing the notions of 'actual entity/ 'givenness,' and 'process/
- Just as 'potentiality for process' is the meaning of the more general term
- 'entity/ or 'thing; so 'decision' is the additional meaning imported by the
- word 'actual' into the phrase 'actual entity/ 'Actuality' is the decision
- amid 'potentiality/ It represents stubborn fact which cannot be evaded.
- The real internal constitution of an actual [69] entity progressively consti-
- tutes a decision conditioning the creativity which transcends that actuality.
- The Castle Rock at Edinburgh exists from moment to moment, and from
- century to century, by reason of the decision** effected by its own historic
- route of antecedent occasions. And if, in some vast upheaval of nature, it
- were shattered into fragments, that convulsion would still be conditioned
- by the fact that it was the destruction of that rock. The point to be empha-
- sized is the insistent particularity of things experienced and of the act of
- experiencing. Bradley's doctrine 8 — Wolf-eating-Lamb as a universal quali-
- fying the absolute— is a travesty of the evidence. That wolf eat* that lamb
- at that spot at that time: the wolf knew it; the lamb knew it; and the
- carrion birds knew it. Explicitly in the verbal sentence, or implicitly in the
- understanding of the subject entertaining it, every expression of a proposi-
- tion includes demonstrative elements. In fact each word, and each sym-
- bolic phrase, is such an element, exciting the conscious prehension of some
- entity belonging to one of the categories of existence.
- SECTION III
- Converselv. where there is no decision involving exclusion, there is no
- givenness. For example, the total multiplicity of Platonic forms is not
- 'given/ But in respect of each actual entity, there is givenness of such
- forms . The determinate definiteness of each actuality is an expression of a
- selection from these forms. It grades them in a diversity of relevance. This
- 8 Cf. Logic, Bk. I, Ch. II, Sect. 42.
- 44 Discussions and Applications
- ordering of relevance starts from those forms which are, in the fullest
- sense, exemplified, and passes through grades of relevance down to those
- forms which in some faint sense are proximately relevant by reason of
- contrast with actual fact. This whole gamut of relevance is 'given/ and
- must be referred to the decision of actuality.
- The term 'Platonic form' has here been used as the [70] briefest way of
- indicating the entities in question. But these lectures are not an exegesis of
- Plato's writings; the entities in question are not necessarily restricted to
- those which he would recognize as 'forms/ Also the term 'idea' has a sub-
- jective suggestion in modern philosophy, which is very misleading for my
- present purposes; and in any case it has been used in many senses and has
- become ambiguous. The term 'essence/ as used by the Critical Realists,
- also suggests their use of it, which diverges from what I intend. Accord-
- ingly, by way of employing a term devoid of misleading suggestions, I use
- the phrase 'eternal object' for what in the preceding paragraph of this
- section I have termed a 'Platonic form/ Any entity whose conceptual rec-
- ognition does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual en-
- tities of the temporal world is called an 'eternal object/
- In this definition the 'conceptual recognition' must of course be an
- operation constituting a real feeling belonging to some actual entity. The
- point is that the actual subject which is merely conceiving the eternal ob-
- ject is not thereby in direct relationship to some other actual entity, apart
- from any other peculiarity in the composition of that conceiving subject.
- This doctrine applies also to thef primordial nature of God, which is his
- complete envisagement of eternal objects; he+ is not thereby directly related
- to the given course of history. The given course of history presupposes his
- primordial nature, but his primordial nature does not presuppose it.
- An eternal object is always a potentiality for actual entities; but in itself,
- as conceptually felt, it is neutral as to the fact of its physical ingression in
- any particular actual entity of the temporal world. 'Potentiality' is the cor-
- relative of 'givenness/ The meaning of 'givenness' is that what is 'given'
- * might not have been 'given'; and that what is not 'given' might have been
- 'given.'
- Further, in the complete particular 'givenness' for an actual entity there
- is an element of exclusiveness. The [71] various primary data and the con-
- crescent feelings do not form a mere multiplicity. Their synthesis in the
- final unity of one actual entity is another fact of 'givenness.' The actual en-
- tity terminates its becoming in one complex feeling involving a completely
- determinate bond with every item in the universe, the bond being either a*
- positive or a negative prehension. This termination is the 'satisfaction' of
- the actual entity. Thus the addition of another component alters this
- synthetic 'givenness.' Any additional component is therefore contrary to
- this integral 'givenness' of the original. This principle may be illustrated by
- our visual perception of a picture. The pattern of colours is 'given' for us.
- Fact and Form 45
- But an extra patch of red does not constitute a mere addition; it alters the
- whole balance. Thus in an actual entity the balanced unity of the total
- 'givenness' excludes anything that is not given.
- This is the doctrine of the emergent unity of the superject. An actual
- entity is to be conceived both as a subject presiding over its own immediacy
- of becoming, and a superject which is the atomic creature exercising its
- function of objective immortality. It has become a 'being'; and it belongs to
- the nature of every 'being' that it is a potential for every 'becoming.'
- This doctrine, that the final 'satisfaction' of an actual entity is intolerant
- of any addition, expresses the fact that every actual entity— since it is
- what it is— is finally its own reason for what it omits. In the real internal
- constitution of an actual entity there is always some element which is con-
- trary to an omitted element. Here 'contrary' means the impossibility of
- joint entry in the same sense. In other words, indetermination has evap-
- orated from 'satisfaction/ so that there is a complete determination of
- 'feeling/ or of 'negation of feeling/ respecting the universe. This evapora-
- tion of indetermination is merely another way of considering the process
- whereby the actual entity arises from its data. Thus, in another sense, each
- actual entity includes the uni- \72] verse, by reason of its determinate atti-
- tude towards every element in the universe.
- Thus the process of becoming is dipolar, (i) by reason of its qualification
- by the determinateness of the actual world, and (ii) by its conceptual pre-
- hensions of the indeterminateness of eternal objects. The process is con-
- stituted by the influx of eternal objects into a novel determinateness of
- feeling which absorbs the actual world into a novel actuality.
- The 'formal' constitution of an actual entity is a process of transition
- from indetermination towards terminal determination. But the indetermi-
- nation is referent to determinate data. The 'objective 7 constitution of an*
- actual entity is its terminal determination, considered as a complex of com-
- ponent determinates by reason of which the actual entity is a datum for
- the creative advance. The actual entity on its physical side is composed of
- its determinate feelings of its actual world, and on its mental side is
- originated by its conceptual appetitions.
- Returning to the correlation of 'givenness' and 'potentiality/ we see that
- 'givenness' refers to 'potentiality/ and 'potentiality' to 'givenness'; also we
- see that the completion of 'givenness' in actual fact converts the 'not-given'
- for that fact into 'impossibility' for that fact. The individuality of an actual
- entity involves an exclusive limitation. This element of 'exclusive limita-
- tion' is the definiteness essential for the synthetic unity of an actual entity.
- This synthetic unity forbids the notion of mere addition to the included
- elements.
- It is evident that 'givenness' and 'potentiality' are both meaningless apart
- from a multiplicity of potential entities. These potentialities are the
- 'eternal objects.' Apart from 'potentiality' and 'givenness/ there can be no
- 46 Discussions and Applications
- nexus of actual things in process of supersession by novel actual things.
- The alternative is a static monistic universe, without unrealized poten-
- tialities; since 'potentiality* is then a meaningless term.
- [73] The scope of the ontological principle is not exhausted by the corol-
- lary that 'decision 7 must be referable to an actual entity. Everything must
- be somewhere; and here "somewhere' means 'some actual entity/ Accord-
- ingly the general potentiality of the universe must be somewhere; since it
- retains its proximate relevance to actual entities for which it is unrealized.
- This 'proximate relevance' reappears in subsequent concrescence as final
- causation regulative of the emergence of novelty. This 'somewhere' is the
- non- temporal actual entity. Thus 'proximate relevance' means 'relevance
- as in the primordial mind of God.'t
- It is a contradiction in terms to assume that some explanatory fact can
- float into the actual world out of nonentity. Nonentity is nothingness.
- Every explanatory fact refers to the decision and to the efficacy* of an
- actual thing. The notion of 'subsistence' is merely the notion of how eternal
- objects can be components of the primordial nature of God. This is a
- question for subsequent discussion (cf. Part V). But eternal objects, as in
- God's primordial nature, constitute the Platonic world of ideas.
- There is not, however, one entity which is merely the class of all eternal
- objects. For if we conceive any class of eternal objects, there are additional
- eternal objects which presuppose that class but do not belong to it. For this
- reason, at the beginning of this section, the phrase 'the multiplicity of
- Platonic forms' was used, instead of the more natural phrase 'thet class of
- Platonic forms.' A multiplicity is a type of complex thing which has the
- unity derivative from some qualification which participates in each of its
- components severally; but a multiplicity has no unity derivative merely
- from its various components.
- SECTION IV
- The doctrine just stated— that every explanatory fact refers to the deci-
- sion and to the efficacy of an actual [74} thing— requires discussion in ref-
- erence to the ninth Categoreal Obligation. This category states that 'The
- concrescence of each individual actual entity is internally determined and
- is externally free.'
- The peculiarity of the course of history illustrates the joint relevance of
- the 'ontological principle' and of this categoreal obligation. The evolution
- of history can be rationalized by the consideration of the determination
- of successors by antecedents. But, on the other hand, the evolution of his-
- tory is incapable of rationalization because it exhibits a selected flux of
- participating forms. No reason, internal to history, can be assigned why
- that flux of forms, rather than another flux, should have been illustrated.
- It is true that any flux must exhibit the character of internal determina-
- tion. So much follows from the ontological principle. But every instance of
- Fact and Form 47
- internal determination assumes that flux up to that point. There is no
- reason why there could be no alternative flux exhibiting that principle of
- internal determination. The actual flux presents itself with the character
- of being merely 'given. 7 It does not disclose any peculiar character of 'per-
- fection. 7 On the contrary, the imperfection of the world is the theme of
- every religion which offers a way of escape, and of every sceptic who de-
- plores the prevailing superstition. The Leibnizian theory of the 'best of
- possible worlds 7 is an audacious fudge produced in order to save the face
- of a Creator constructed by contemporary, and antecedent, theologians.
- Further, in the case of those actualities whose immediate experience is
- most completely open to us, namely, human beings, the final decision of
- the immediate subject-superject, constituting the ultimate modification of
- subjective aim, is the foundation of our experience of responsibility, of ap-
- probation or of disapprobation, of self-approval or of self-reproach, of free-
- dom, of emphasis. This element in experience is too large to be put aside
- merely as misconstruction. It governs the whole tone of human life. It can
- be illustrated+ by striking [75] instances from fact or from fiction. But
- these instances are only conspicuous illustrations of human experience
- during each hour and each minute. The ultimate freedom of things, lying
- beyond all determinations, was whispered by Galileo— E pur si muove—
- freedom for the inquisitors to think wrongly, for Galileo to think rightly,
- and for the world to move in despite of Galileo and inquisitors.
- The doctrine of the philosophy of organism is that, however far the
- sphere of efficient causation be pushed in the determination of components
- of a concrescence— its data, its emotions, its appreciations, its purposes, its
- phases of subjective aim— beyond the determination of these components
- there always remains the final reaction of the self-creative unity of the
- universe. This final reaction completes the self-creative act by putting the
- decisive stamp of creative emphasis upon the determinations of efficient
- cause. Each occasion exhibits its measure of creative emphasis in propor-
- tion to its measure of subjective intensity. The absolute standard of such
- intensity is that of the primordial nature of God, which is neither great
- nor small because it arises out of no actual world. It has within it no com-
- ponents which are standards of comparison. But in the temporal world for
- occasions of relatively slight experient intensity, their decisions of creative
- emphasis are individually negligible compared to the determined com-
- ponents which they receive and transmit. But the final accumulation of all
- such decisions— the decision of God's nature and the decisions of all occa-
- sions—constitutes that special element in the flux of forms in history, which
- is given 7 and incapable of rationalization beyond the fact that within it
- every component which is determinable is internally determined.
- The doctrine is, that each concrescence is to be referred to a definite free
- initiation and a definite free conclusion. The initial fact is macrocosmic, in
- the sense of having equal relevance to all occasions; the final fact is micro-
- 48 Discussions and Applications
- [76] cosmic, in the sense of being peculiar to that occasion. Neither fact is
- capable of rationalization, in the sense of tracing the antecedents which
- determine it. The initial fact is the primordial appetition, and the final fact
- is the decision of emphasis, finally creative of the 'satisfaction/
- SECTION V
- The antithetical terms 'universals 7 and 'particulars' are the usual words
- employed to denote respectively entities which nearly, though not quite, 9
- correspond to the entities here termed 'eternal objects/ and 'actual en-
- tities. 7 These terms, 'universals 7 and 'particulars/ both in the suggestive-
- ness of the two words and in their current philosophical use, are somewhat
- misleading. The ontological principle, and the wider doctrine of universal
- relativity, on which the present metaphysical discussion is founded, blur
- the sharp distinction between what is universal and what is particular. The
- notion of a universal is of that which can enter into the description of many
- particulars; whereas the notion of a particular is that it is described by uni-
- versal, and does not itself enter into the description of any other particu-
- lar. According to the doctrine of relativity which is the basis of the meta-
- physical system of the present lectures, both these notions involve a mis-
- conception. An actual entity cannot be described, even inadequately, by
- universals; because other actual entities do enter into the description of
- any one actual entity. Thus every so-called 'universal 7 is particular in the
- sense of being just what it is, diverse from everything else; and every so-
- called 'particular 7 is universal in the sense of entering into the constitu-
- tions of other actual entities. The contrary opinion led to the collapse of
- Descartes 7 many substances into Spinoza's one substance; to Leibniz's
- windowless monads with their pre-established harmony; to the sceptical
- reduction of Hume's philosophy— a reduction first effected by Hume him-
- self, \77] and reissued with the most beautiful exposition by Santayana in
- his Scepticism and Animal Faith.
- The point is that the current view of universals and particulars inevitably
- leads to the epistemological position stated by Descartes:
- From this I should conclude that I knew the wax by means of vision
- and not simply by the intuition of the mind; unless by chance I re-
- member that, when looking from a window and saying I see men who
- pass in the street, I really do not see them, but infer that what I see
- is men, just as I say that I see wax. And yet what do I see from the
- window but hats and coats which may cover automatic machines?
- Yet I judge these to be men. And similarly solely by the faculty of
- judgment [judicandi] which rests in my mind, I comprehend that
- which I believed I saw with my eyes. 10
- 9 For example, prehensions and subjective forms are also 'particulars.'
- 10 Meditation II.
- Fact and Form 49
- In this passage it is assumed 1X that Descartes— the Ego in question— is a
- particular, characterized only by universals. Thus his impressions— to use
- Hume's word— are characterizations by universals. Thus there is no percep-
- tion of a particular actual entity. He arrives at the belief in the actual
- entity by 'the faculty of judgment. 7 But on this theory he has absolutely
- no analogy upon which to found any such inference with the faintest
- shred of probability. Hume, accepting Descartes' account of perception (in
- this passage), which also belongs to Locke in some sections of his Essay ;
- easily draws the sceptical conclusion. Santayana irrefutably exposes the
- full extent to which this scepticism must be carried. The philosophy of
- organism recurs to Descartes 7 alternative theory of 'realties objectiva,' and
- endeavours to interpret it in terms of a consistent ontology. Descartes en-
- deavoured to combine the two theories; but his unquestioned acceptance
- of the subject-predicate dogma forced him [78] into a representative theory
- of perception, involving a 'judicium 7 validated by our assurance of the
- power and the goodness of God. The philosophy of organism in its account
- of prehension takes its stand upon the Cartesian terms 'realitas objectiva, 7
- 'inspection and Hntuitio. 7 The two latter terms are transformed into the
- notion of a 'positive prehension, 7 and into operations described in the
- various categories of physical and conceptual origination. A recurrence to
- the notion of 'God 7 is still necessary to mediate between physical and con-
- ceptual prehensions, but not in the crude form of giving a limited letter
- of credit to a 'judicium.'
- Hume, in effect, agrees that 'mind 7 is a process of concrescence arising
- from primary data. In his account, these data are 'impressions of sensa-
- tion 7 ; and in such impressions no elements other than universals are dis-
- coverable. For the philosophy of organism, the primary data are always
- actual entities absorbed into feeling in virtue of certain universals shared
- alike by the objectified actuality and the experient subject (cf. Part III).
- Descartes takes an intermediate position. He explains perception in Hu-
- mian terms, but adds an apprehension of particular actual entities in virtue
- of an Hnspectio 7 and a 'judicium 7 effected by the mind (Meditations II and
- IJJ).t Here he is paving the way for Kant, and for the degradation of the
- world into 'mere appearance.'
- AH modern philosophy hinges round the difficulty of describing the
- world in terms of subject and predicate, substance and quality, particular
- and universal. The result always does violence to that immediate experi-
- ence which we express in our actions, our hopes, our sympathies, our pur-
- poses, and which we enjoy in spite of our lack of phrases for its verbal
- 11 Perhaps inconsistently with what Descartes says elsewhere: in other passages
- the mental activity involved seems to be analysis which discovers 'realitas ob-
- jectiva 7 as a component element of the idea in question. There is thus Hnspectio'
- rather than 'judicium. 7
- 50 Discussions and Applications
- analysis. We find ourselves in a buzzing 12 world, amid a democracy of
- fellow creatures; whereas, under some disguise or other orthodox philoso-
- phy can only introduce us to solitary substances, each enjoying an illusory
- experience: "O Bottom, thou [79] art changed! what do I see on thee?' 7 *
- The endeavour to interpret experience in accordance with the overpowering
- deliverance of common senset must bring us back to some restatement of
- Platonic realism, modified so as to avoid the pitfalls which the philosophi-
- cal investigations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries have dis-
- closed.
- The true point of divergence is the false notion suggested by the contrast
- between the natural meanings of the words 'particular' and 'universal/ The
- 'particular 7 is thus conceived as being just its individual self with no neces-
- sary relevance to any other particular. It answers to Descartes 7 definition
- of substance: "And when we conceive of substance, we merely conceive an
- existent thing which requires nothing but itself in order to exist. 77 13 This
- definition is a true derivative from Aristotle's definition: A primary sub-
- stance is "neither asserted of a subject nor present in a subject. 77 14 We
- must add the title phrase of Descartes 7 The Second Meditation: "Of the
- Nature of the Human Mind; and that it is more easily known than the
- Body,' 7 together with his two statements: "... thought constitutes the
- nature of thinking substance,' 7 and "everything that we find in mind is
- but so many diverse forms of thinking. 77 15 This sequence of quotations
- exemplifies the set of presuppositions which led to Locke's empiricism and
- to Kant's critical philosophy— the two dominant influences from which
- modern thought is derived. This is the side of seventeenth-century philoso-
- phy which is here discarded.
- The principle of universal relativity directly traverses Aristotle's dictum,
- 'A substancet is not present in a subject.' On the contrary, according to
- this principle an actual entity is present in other actual entities. In fact if
- we allow for degrees of relevance, and for negligible relevance, we must
- say that every actual entity is present in every other actual entity. The
- philosophy of organism [80] is mainly devoted to the task of making clear
- the notion of 'being present in another entity.' This phrase is here borrowed
- from Aristotle: it is not a fortunate phrase, and in subsequent discussion
- it will be replaced by the term 'objectification.' The Aristotelian phrase
- suggests the crude notion that one actual entity is added to another sim-
- pliciter. This is not what is meant. One role of the eternal objects is that
- they are those elements which express how any one actual entity is con-
- stituted by its synthesis of other actual entities, and how that actual entity
- develops from the primary dative phase into its own individual actual
- 12 This epithet is, of course, borrowed from William James.
- 13 Principles of Philosophy, Part I, 51.*
- 14 Aristotle by W. D. Ross, Ch. II.
- 15 Principles of Philosophy , Part I, 53.
- Fact and Form 51
- existence, involving its individual enjoyments and appetitions. An actual
- entity is concrete because it is such a particular concrescence of the
- universe.
- SECTION VI
- A short examination of Locke's Essay Concerning^ Human Under-
- standing will throw light on the presuppositions from which the philosophy
- of organism originates. These citations from Locke are valuable as clear
- statements of the obvious deliverances of common sense, expressed with
- their natural limitations. They cannot be bettered in their character of pre-
- sentations of facts which have to be accepted by any satisfactory system of
- philosophy.
- The first point to notice is that in some of his statements Locke comes
- very near to the explicit formulation of an organic philosophy of the type
- being developed here. It was only his failure to notice that his problem
- required a more drastic revision of traditional categories than that which
- he actually effected, that led to a vagueness of statement, and the intru-
- sion of inconsistent elements. It was this conservative, other side of Locke
- which led to his sceptical overthrow by Hume. In his turn. Hume (despite
- his explicit repudiation in his Treatise, Part I, Sect. VI) was a thorough
- conservative, and in his explanation of mentality and its content never
- moved away from the subject-predicate habits of thought [81] which had
- been impressed on the European mind by the overemphasis on Aristotle's
- logic during the long mediaeval period. In reference to this twist of mind,
- probably Aristotle was not an Aristotelian. But Hume's sceptical reduction
- of knowledge entirely depends (for its arguments) on the tacit presupposi-
- tion of the mind as subject and of its contents as predicates— a presuppo-
- sition which explicitly he repudiates.
- The merit of Locke's Essay Concerning^ Human Understanding is its
- adequacy, and not its consistency. He gives the most dispassionate descrip-
- tions of those various elements in experience which common sense never
- lets slip. Unfortunately he is hampered by inappropriate metaphysical
- categories which he never criticized. He should have widened the title
- of his book into 'An Essay Concerningt Experience/ His true topic is the
- analysis of the types of experience enjoyed by an actual entity. But this
- complete experience is nothing other than what the actual entity is in it-
- self, for itself. I will adopt the pre-Kantian phraseology, and say that the
- experience enjoyed by an actual entity is that entity formaliter. By this I
- mean that the entity, when considered 'formally,' is being described in re-
- spect to those forms of its constitution whereby it is that individual entity
- with its own measure of absolute self-realization. Its 'ideas of things' are
- what other things are for it. In the phraseology of these lectures, they are
- its 'feelings.' The actual entity is composite and analysable; and its 'ideas'
- express how, and in what sense, other things are components in its own
- 52 Discussions and Applications
- constitution. Thus the form of its constitution is to be found by an analy-
- sis of the Lockian ideas. Locke talks of 'understanding 7 and 'perception/
- He should have started with a more general neutral term to express the
- synthetic concrescence whereby the many things of the universe become
- the one actual entity. Accordingly I have adopted the term 'prehension/
- to express the activity whereby an actual entity effects its own concretion
- of other things.
- [82] The 'prehension 7 of one actual entity by another actual entity is the
- complete transaction, analysable into the objectification of the former
- entity as one of the data for the latter, and into the fully clothed feeling
- whereby the datum is absorbed into the subjective satisfaction— 'clothed 7
- with the various elements of its 'subjective form. 7 But this definition can be
- stated more generally so as to include the case of the prehension of an
- eternal object by an actual entity; namely, The 'positive prehension 7 of an
- entity by an actual entity is the complete transaction analysable into the
- ingression, or objectification, of that entity as a datum for feeling, and
- into the feeling whereby this datum is absorbed into the subjective satis-
- faction. I also discard Locke's term 'idea. 7 Instead of that term, the other
- things, in their limited r61es as elements for the actual entity in question,
- are called 'objects 7 for that thing. There are four main types of objects,
- namely, 'eternal objects, 7 'propositions, 7 'objectified 7 actual entities and
- nexus. These 'eternal objects 7 are Locke's ideas as explained in his Essay
- (II, I, l),t where he writes:
- Idea is the object of thinking. — Every man being conscious to himself
- that he thinks, and that which his mind is applied about, whilst think-
- ing, being the ideas that are there, it is past doubt that men have in
- their mind several ideas, such as aret those expressed by the words,
- "whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army,
- drunkenness, 77 and others.
- But latert (III, III, 2), when discussing general terms (and subcon-
- sciously, earlier in his discussion of 'substance 7 in II, XXIII), he adds par-
- enthetically another type of ideas which are practically what I term 'ob-
- jectified actual entities' and 'nexus. 7 He calls them 'ideas of particular
- things 7 ; and he explains why, in general, such ideas cannot have their
- separate names. The reason is simple and undeniable: there are too many
- actual entities. He writes: "But it is beyond the power of human capacity
- to frame and retain distinct ideas of all the particular things we meet with:
- every bird and beast men saw, [83] every tree and plant that affected the
- senses, could not find a place in the most capacious understanding. 77 The
- context shows that it is not the impossibility of an 'idea 7 of any particular
- thing which is the seat of the difficulty; it is solely their number. This no-
- tion of a direct 'idea' (or 'feeling') of an actual entity is a presupposition of
- all common sense; Santayana ascribes it to 'animal faith. 7 But it accords
- very ill with the sensationalist theory of knowledge which can be derived
- Fact and Form 53
- from other parts of Locke's writings. Both Locke and Descartes wrestle
- with exactly the same difficulty.
- The principle that I am adopting is that consciousness presupposes ex-
- perience, and not experience consciousness. It is a special element in the
- subjective forms of some feelings. Thus an actual entity may, or may not,
- be conscious of some part of its experience. Its experience is its complete
- formal constitution, including its consciousness, if any. Thus, in Locke's
- phraseology, its 'ideas of particular things' are those other things exercising
- their function as felt components of its constitution. Locke would only term
- them 'ideas' when these objectifications belong to that region of experience
- lit up by consciousness. In Section 4t of the same chapter, he definitely
- makes all knowledge to be "founded in particular things. 77 He writes:
- ". . . yet a distinct name for every particular thing would not be of any
- great use for the improvement of knowledge: which, though founded in
- particular things, 1 * enlarges itself by general views; to which things reduced
- into sortst under general names, are properly subservient/ 7 Thus for Locke,
- in this passage, there are not first the qualities and then the conjectural
- particular things; but conversely. Also he illustrates his meaning of a 'par-
- ticular thing' by a leaf/ a 'crow, 7 a 'sheep, 7 a 'grain of sand. 7 So he is not
- thinking of a particular patch of colour, or other sense-datum. 17 For ex-
- ample, [84] in Section 7 of the same chapter, in reference to children he
- writes: "The ideas of the nurse and the mother are well framed in their
- minds; and, like pictures of them there, represent only those individuals. 77
- This doctrine of Locke's must be compared with Descartes' doctrine of
- 'realitas objectiva. 7 Locke inherited the dualistic separation of mind from
- body. If he had started with the one fundamental notion of an actual en-
- tity, '.he complex of ideas disclosed in consciousness would have at once
- turned into the complex constitution of the actual entity disclosed in its
- own consciousness, so far as it is conscious— fitfully, partially, or not at all.
- Locke definitely states how ideas become general. In Section 6 of the
- chapter he writes: ". . . and ideas become general by separating from
- them the circumstances of time, and place, and any other ideas that may
- determine them to this or that particular existence." Thus for Locke the
- abstract idea is preceded by the 'idea of a particular existent'; "[children]
- frame an idea which they find those many particulars do partake in. 7 ' This
- statement of Locke's should be compared with the Category of Con-
- ceptual Valuation, which is the fourth categoreal obligation.
- Locke discusses the constitution of actual things under the term 'real
- essences.' He writes (Section 15,t same chapter): "And thus the real in-
- 16 My italics.
- 17 As he is in I, II, 1 5, where he writes, "The senses at first let in particular
- ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet; . . ." Note the distinction between
- 'particular ideas' and 'ideas of particular things/
- 54 Discussions and Applications
- ternal (but generally in substances unknown) constitution of things,
- whereon their discoverable qualities depend, may be called their 'essence/ "
- The point is that Locke entirely endorses the doctrine that an actual entity
- arises out of a complex constitution involving other entities, though, t by
- his unfortunate use of such terms as 'cabinet/ he puts less emphasis on the
- notion of 'process 7 than does Hume.
- Locke has in fact stated in his work one main problem for the philosophy
- of organism. He discovers that the mind is a unity arising out of the active
- prehension of ideas into one concrete thing. Unfortunately, he presup-
- poses both the Cartesian dualism whereby minds are one kind of par-
- ticulars, and natural entities are another kind [85] of particulars, and also
- the subject-predicate dogma. He is thus, in company with Descartes, driven
- to a theory of representative perception. For example, in one of the quota-
- tions already cited,t he writes: "and, like pictures of them there, represent
- only those individuals. 77 This doctrine obviously creates an insoluble prob-
- lem for epistemology, only to be solved either by some sturdy make-believe
- of 'animal faith, 7 with Santayana, or by some doctrine of illusorinesst—
- some doctrine of mere appearance, inconsistent if taken as real — with
- Bradley. Anyhow 'representative perception 7 can never, within its own
- metaphysical doctrines, produce the title deeds to guarantee the validity of
- the representation of fact by idea.
- Locke and the philosophers of his epoch— the seventeenth and eigh-
- teenth centuries— are misled by one fundamental misconception. It is the
- assumption, unconscious and uncriticized, that logical simplicity can be
- identified with priority in the process constituting an experient occasion.
- Locke founded the first two books of his Essay on this presupposition, with
- thet exception of his early sections on 'substance, 7 which are quoted imme-
- diately below. In the third and fourth books of the Essay he abandons this
- presupposition, again unconsciously as it seems.
- This identification of priority in logic with priority in practice has
- vitiated thought and procedure from the first discovery of mathematics and
- logic by the Greeks. For example, some of the worst defects in educational
- procedure have been due to it. Locke's nearest approach to the philosophy
- of organism, and— from the point of view of that doctrine— his main over-
- sight, are best exemplified by the first section of his chapter, 'Of our Com-
- plex Ideas of Substances 7 (II, XXIII, 1). He writes:
- The mind, being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number
- of the simple ideas conveyed in by the senses, as they are found in
- exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice,
- also, that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly to-
- gether; [86] which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words
- being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dis-
- patch, are called, so united in one subject, by one name; which, by in-
- advertency, we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one simple
- idea, which indeed is a complication of many ideas together: because,
- Fact and Form 55
- as I have said, not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by
- themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum
- wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result; which there-
- fore we call "substance/'
- In this section, Locke's first statement, which is the basis of the re-
- mainder of the section, is exactly the primary assumption of the philosophy
- of organism: "The mind, being . . . furnished with a great number of the
- simple ideas conveyed in by the senses, as they are found in exterior
- things, . . ." Here the last phrase, 'as they are found in exterior things/
- asserted what later I shall call the vector character of the primary feelings.
- The universals involved obtain that status by reason of the fact that 'they
- are found in exterior things' This is Locke's assertion and it is the assertion
- of the philosophy of organism. It can also be conceived as a development
- of Descartes' doctrine of 'realitas objectiva. 7 The universals are the only
- elements in the data describable by concepts, because concepts are merely
- the analytic functioning of universals. But the 'exterior things/ although
- they are not expressible by concepts in respect to their individual particu-
- larity, are no less data for feeling; so that the concrescent actuality arises
- from feeling their status of individual particularity; and thus that particu-
- larity is included as an element from which feelings originate, and which
- they concern.
- The sentence later proceeds with, "a certain number of these simple
- ideas go constantly together." This can only mean that in the immediate
- perception 'a certain number of these simple ideas' are found together in an
- exterior thing, and that the recollection of antecedent moments of experi-
- ence discloses that the same fact, of [87] togetherness in an exterior thing,
- holds for the same set of simple ideas. Again, the philosophy of organism
- agrees that this description is true for moments of immediate experience.
- But Locke, owing to the fact that he veils his second premise under the
- phrase 'go constantly together,' omits to consider the question whether the
- 'exterior things' of the successive moments are to be identified.
- The answer of the philosophy of organism is that, in the sense in which
- Locke is here speaking, the exterior things of successive moments are not
- to be identified with each other. Each exterior thing is either one actual
- entity, or (more frequently) is a nexus of actual entities with imme-
- diacies mutually contemporary. For the sake of simplicity we will speak
- only of the simpler case where the 'exterior thing' means one actual entity
- at the moment in question. But what Locke is explicitly concerned with is
- the notion of the self-identity of the one enduring physical body which lasts
- for years, or for seconds, or for ages. He is considering the current philo-
- sophical notion of an individualized particular substance (in the Aristot-
- elian sense) which undergoes adventures of change, retaining its substantial
- form amid transition oft accidents. Throughout his Essay, he in effect re-
- tains this notion while rightly insisting on its vagueness and obscurity. The
- philosophy of organism agrees with Locke and Hume, that the non-in-
- 56 Discussions and Applications
- dividualized substantial form is nothing else than the collectiqn of uni-
- versal— or ? more accurately, the one complex universal— common to the
- succession of 'exterior things' at successive moments respectively. In other
- words, an 'exterior thing' is either one 'actual entity/ or is a 'society' with a
- 'defining characteristic' For the organic philosophy, these 'exterior things'
- (in the former sense) are the final concrete actualities. The individualized
- substance (of Locke) must be construed to be the historic route constituted
- by some society of fundamental 'exterior things,' stretching from the first
- 'thing' to the last 'thing/
- [88] But Locke, throughout his Essay, rightly insists that the chief ingre-
- dient in the notion of 'substance' is the notion of 'power/ The philosophy
- of organism holds that,t in order to understand 'power/ we must have a
- correct notion of how each individual actual entity contributes to the
- datum from which its successors arise and to which they must conform.
- The reason why the doctrine of power is peculiarly relevant to the en-
- during things, which the philosophy of Locke's day conceived as individual-
- ized substances, is that any likeness between the successive occasions of
- at historic route procures a corresponding identity between their contribu-
- tions to the datum of any subsequent actual entity; and it therefore secures
- a corresponding intensification in the imposition of conformity. The princi-
- ple is the same as that which holds for the more sporadic occasions in
- empty space; but the uniformity along the historic route increases the de-
- gree of conformity which that route exacts from the future. In particular
- each historic route of like occasions tends to prolong itself, by reason of the
- weight of uniform inheritance derivable from its members. The philosophy
- of organism abolishes the detached mind. Mental activity is one of the
- modes of feeling belonging to all actual entities in some degree, but only
- amounting to conscious intellectuality in some actual entities. This higher
- grade of mental activity is the intellectual self analysis of the entity in an
- earlier stage of incompletion, effected by intellectual feelings produced in
- a later stage of concrescence. 18
- The perceptive constitution of the actual entity presents the problem,
- How can the other actual entities, each with its own formal existence, also
- enter objectively into the perceptive constitution of the actual entity in
- question? This is the problem of the solidarity of the universe. The classical
- doctrines of universals and particulars, of subject and predicate, of individ-
- ual substances not present in other individual substances, of [89] the exter-
- nality of relations, alike render this problem incapable of solution. The
- answer given by the organic philosophy is the doctrine of prehensions, in-
- volved in concrescent integrations, and terminating in a definite, complex
- unity of feeling. To be actual must mean that all actual things are alike ob-
- jects, enjoying objective immortality in fashioning creative actions; and
- that all actual things are subjects, each prehending the universe from which
- 18 Cf. Part III, Ch. V.
- Fact and Form 57
- it arises. The creative action is the universe always becoming one in a par-
- ticular unity of self-experience, and thereby adding to the multiplicity
- which is the universe as many. This insistent concrescence into unity is
- the outcome of the ultimate self-identity of each entity. No entity— be it
- 'universal' or 'particular'— can play disjoined roles. Self-identity requires
- that every entity have one conjoined, self-consistent function, whatever be
- the complexity of that function.
- SECTION VII
- There is another side of Locke, which is his doctrine of power/ This
- doctrine is a better illustration of his admirable adequacy than of his con-
- sistency; there is no escape from Hume's demonstration that no such doc-
- trine is compatible with a purely sensationalist philosophy. The establish-
- ment of such a philosophy, though derivative from Locke, was not his
- explicit purpose. Every philosophical school in the course of its history
- requires two presiding philosophers. One of them under the influence of
- the main doctrines of the school should survey experience with some ade-
- quacy, but inconsistently. The other philosopher should reduce the doc-
- trines of the school to a rigid consistency; he will thereby effect a reductio
- ad absurdum. No school of thought has performed its full service to
- philosophy until these men have appeared. In this way the school of sensa-
- tionalist empiricism derives its importance from Locke and Hume.
- Locke introduces his doctrine of 'power' as follows (II, XXI, L3t)*
- This idea how got.— The mind being [90] every day informed, by
- the senses, of the alteration of those simple ideas it observes in things
- without, and taking notice how one comes to an end and ceases to
- be, and another begins to exist which was not before; reflecting also on
- what passes within itself, and observing a constant change of its ideas,
- sometimes by the impression of outward objects on the senses, and
- sometimes by the determination of its own choice; and concluding,
- from what it has so constantly observed to have been, that the like
- changes will for the future be made in the same things! by like agents,
- and by the like ways; considers in one thing the possibility of having
- any of its simple ideas changed, and in another the possibility of
- making that change; and so comes by that idea which we call "power."
- Thus we say, fire has a power to melt gold; . . . and gold has a power
- to be melted: ... In which and thet like cases, the power we con-
- sider is in reference to the change of perceivable ideas: for we cannot
- observe any alteration to be made in, or operation upon, any thing,
- but by the observable change of its sensible ideas; nor conceive any
- alteration to be made, but by conceiving a change of some of its
- ideas. . . .* Power thus considered is twofold; viz. as able to make, or
- able to receive, any change: the one may be called "active," and the
- other "passive," power. . . .* I confess power includes in it some kind
- 58 Discussions and Applications
- of relation,— a relation to action or change; as, indeed, which of our
- ideas, of what kind soever, when attentively considered, does not?
- For our ideas of extension, duration, and number, do they not all
- contain in them a secret relation of the parts? Figure and motion have
- something relative in them much more visibly. And sensible qualities,
- as colours and smells, etc., what are they but the powers of different
- bodies in relation to our perception? . . . Our idea therefore of power,
- I think, may well have a place amongst other simple ideas, and be
- considered as one of them, being one of those that make a principal
- ingredient in our complex ideas of substances, as we shall hereafter
- have occasion to observe.
- [91] In this important passage, Locke enunciates the main doctrines of
- the philosophy of organism, namely: the principle of relativity; the rela-
- tional character of eternal objects, whereby they constitute the forms of
- the objectifications of actual entities for each other; the composite char-
- acter of an actual entity (i.e., a substance); the notion of 'power' as making
- a principal ingredient in that of actual entity (substance). In this latter
- notion, Locke adumbrates both the ontological principle, and also the
- principle that the 'power' of one actual entity on the other is simply how
- the former is objectified in the constitution of the other. Thus the prob-
- lem of perception and the problem of power are one and the same, at least
- so far as perception is reduced to mere prehension of actual entities. Per-
- ception, in the sense of consciousness of such prehension, requires the ad-
- ditional factor of the conceptual prehension of eternal objects, and a pro-
- cess of integration of the two factors (cf. Part III).
- Locke's doctrine of 'power' is reproduced in the philosophy of organism
- by the doctrine of the two types of objectification, namely, (a) 'causal
- objectification,' and (p) 'presentational objectification.'
- In 'causal objectification' what is felt subjectively by the objectified ac-
- tual entity is transmitted objectively to the concrescent actualities which
- supersede it. In Locke's phraseology the objectified actual entity is then
- exerting 'power.' In this type of objectification the eternal objects, rela-
- tional between object and subject, express the formal constitution of the
- objectified actual entity.
- In 'presentational objectification' the relational eternal objects fall into
- two sets, one set contributed by the 'extensive' perspective of the perceived
- from the position of the perceiver, and the other set by the antecedent con-
- crescent phases of the perceiver. What is ordinarily termed 'perception' is
- consciousness of presentational objectification. But according to the phi-
- losophy of organism there can be consciousness of both types of objectifi-
- cation. There can be such consciousness of both [92] types because, ac-
- cording to this philosophy, the knowable is the complete nature of the
- knower, at least such phases of it as are antecedent to that operation of
- knowing.
- Locke misses one essential doctrine, namely, that the doctrine of interna 1
- Fact and Form 59
- relations makes it impossible to attribute 'change 7 to any actual entity.
- Every actual entity is what it is, and is with its definite status in the
- universe, determined by its internal relations to other actual entities.
- 'Change' is the description of the adventures of eternal objects in the
- evolving universe of actual things.
- The doctrine of internal relations introduces another consideration
- which cannot be overlooked without error. Locke considers the 'real es-
- sence' and the 'nominal essence' of things. But on the theory of the gen-
- eral relativity of actual things between each other, and of the internality of
- these relations, there are two distinct notions hidden under the term 'real
- essence/ both of importance. Locke writes (III, III, 15) :
- Essence may be taken for the being of any thing, whereby it is what it
- is. And thus the real internal (but generally in substances unknown)
- constitution of things, whereon their discoverable qualities depend,
- may be called their "essence/ 7 ... It is true, there is ordinarily supposed
- a real constitution of the sorts of things: and it is past doubt there
- must be some real constitution, on which any collection of simple
- ideas co-existing must depend. But it being evident that things are
- ranked under names into sorts or species only as they agree to certain
- abstract ideas to which we have annexed those t names, the essence of
- each genus or sort comes to be nothing but that abstract idea, which
- the general or "sortal" (if I may have leave so to call it from "sort," as I
- do "general" from genus) name stands for. And thist we shall find to
- be that which the word "essence" imparts in its mostt familiar use.
- These two sorts of essences, I suppose, may not unfitly be termed, the
- one the "real," the other the "nominal," essence.
- [93] The fundamental notion of the philosophy of organism is expressed
- in Locke's phrase, "it is past doubt there must be some real constitution,
- on which any collection of simple ideas co-existing must depend." Locke
- makes it plain (cf. II, II, 1) that by a 'simple idea' he means the ingression
- in the actual entity (illustrated by 'a piece of wax/ 'a piece of ice/ 'a rose')
- of some abstract quality which is not complex (illustrated by 'softness/
- 'warmth/ 'whiteness') . For Locke such simple ideas, coexisting^ in an actual
- entity, require a real constitution for that entity. Now in the philosophy of
- organism, passing beyond Locke's explicit statement, the notion of a real
- constitution is taken to mean that the eternal objects function by intro-
- ducing the multiplicity of actual entities as constitutive of the actual en-
- tity in question. Thus the constitution is 'real' because it assigns its status
- in the real world to the actual entity. In other words the actual entity, in
- virtue of being what it is, is also where it is. It is somewhere because it is
- some actual thing with its correlated actual world. This is the direct denial
- of the Cartesian doctrine, ". . . an existent thing which requires nothing
- but itself in order to exist." It is also inconsistent with Aristotle's phrase,
- "neither asserted of a subject nor present in a subject."
- I am certainly not maintaining that Locke grasped explicitly the impli-
- 60 Discussions and Applications
- cations of his words as thus developed for the philosophy of organism.
- But it is a short step from a careless phrase to a flash of insight; nor is it un-
- believable that Locke saw further into metaphysical problems than some
- of his followers. But abandoning the question of what Locke had in his
- own mind, the 'organic doctrine' demands a 'real essence 7 in the sense of a
- complete analysis of the relations, and inter-relations of the actual entities
- which are formative of the actual entity in question, and an 'abstract es-
- sence' in which the specified actual entities are replaced by the notions of
- unspecified entities in such a combination: this is the notion of an un-
- specified actual entity. Thus the real [94] essence involves real objectifica-
- tions of specified actual entities; the abstract essence is a complex eternal
- object. There is nothing self-contradictory in the thought of many actual
- entities with the same abstract essence; but there can only be one actual
- entity with the same real essence. For the real essence indicates 'where'
- the entity is, that is to say, its status in the real world; the abstract essence
- omits the particularity of the status.
- The philosophy of organism in its appeal to the facts can thus support
- itself by an appeal to the insight of John Locke, who in British philosophy
- is the analogue to Plato, in the epoch of his life, in personal endowments,
- in width of experience, and in dispassionate statement of conflicting
- intuitions.
- This doctrine of organism is the attempt to describe the world as a
- process of generation of individual actual entities, each with its own ab-
- solute self-attainment. This concrete finality of the individual is nothing
- else than a decision referent beyond itself. The 'perpetual perishing' (cf.
- Locke, II, XIV, It) of individual absoluteness is thus foredoomed. But the
- 'perishing' of absoluteness is the attainment of 'objective immortality.'
- This last conception expresses the further element in the doctrine of or-
- ganism—that the process of generation is to be described in terms of actual
- entities.
- CHAPTER II
- THE EXTENSIVE CONTINUUM
- SECTION I
- [95] We must first consider the perceptive mode in which there is clear,
- distinct consciousness of the 'extensive' relations of the world. These rela-
- tions include the 'extensiveness' of space and the 'extensiveness' of time.
- Undoubtedly, this clarity, at least in regard to space, is obtained only in
- ordinary perception through the senses. This mode of perception is here
- termed 'presentational immediacy/ In this 'mode' the contemporary world
- is consciously prehended as a continuum of extensive relations.
- It cannot be too clearly understood that some chief notions of European
- thought were framed under the influence of a misapprehension, only par-
- tially corrected by the scientific progress of the last century. This mistake
- consists in the confusion of mere potentiality with actuality. Continuity
- concerns what is potential; whereas actuality is incurably atomic.
- This misapprehension is promoted by the neglect of the principle that,
- so far as physicalt relations are concerned, contemporary events happen in
- causal independence of each other. 1 This principle will have to be ex-
- plained later, in connection with an examination of process and of time. It
- receives an exemplification in the character of our perception of the world
- of contemporary actual entities. That contemporary world is objectified
- [96] for us as 'realitas objectiva, 7 illustrating bare extension with its various
- parts discriminated by differences of sense-data, t These qualities, such as
- colours, sounds, bodily feelings, tastes, smells, together with the perspec-
- tives introduced by extensive relationships, are the relational eternal ob-
- jects whereby the contemporary actual entities are elements in our consti-
- tution. This is the type of objectification which (in Sect. VII of the
- previous chapter) has been termed 'presentational objectification.'
- In this way, by reason of the principle of contemporary independence,
- the contemporary world is objectified for us under the aspect of passive
- potentiality. The very sense-data by which its parts are differentiated are
- supplied by antecedent states of our own bodies, and so is their distribution
- in contemporary space. Our direct perception of the contemporary world
- is thus reduced to extension, defining (i) our own geometrical perspectives,
- and (ii) possibilities of mutual perspectives for other contemporary entities
- 1 This principle lies on the surface of the fundamental Einsteinian formula for
- the physical continuum.
- 61
- 62 Discussions and Applications
- inter se, and (iii) possibilities of division. These possibilities of division con-
- stitute the external world a continuum. For a continuum is divisible; so
- far as the contemporary world is divided by actual entities, it is not a con-
- tinuum, but is atomic. Thus the contemporary world is perceived with its
- potentiality for extensive division, and not in its actual atomic division.
- The contemporary world as perceived by the senses is the datum for
- contemporary actuality, and is therefore continuous— divisible but not
- divided. The contemporary world is in fact divided and atomic, being a
- multiplicity of definite actual entities. These contemporary actual entities
- are divided from each other, and are not themselves divisible into other
- contemporary actual entities. This antithesis will have to be discussed later
- (cf. Part IV). But it is necessary to adumbrate it here.
- This limitation of the way in which the contemporary actual entities are
- relevant to the 'formal' existence of the subject in question is the first
- example of the general [97] principle, that objectification relegates into ir-
- relevance, or into a subordinate relevance, the full constitution of the ob-
- jectified entity. Some real component in the objectified entity assumes the
- r61e of being how that particular entity is a datum in the experience of the
- subject. In this case, the objectified contemporaries are only directly rele-
- vant to the subject in their character of arising from a datum which is an
- extensive continuum. They do, in fact, atomize this continuum; but the
- aboriginal potentiality, which they include and realize, is what they con-
- tribute as the relevant factor in their objectifications. They thus exhibit the
- community of contemporary actualities as a common world with mathe-
- matical relations— where the term 'mathematical' is used in the sense in
- which it would have been understood by Plato, Euclid, and Descartes,
- before the modern discovery of the true definition of pure mathematics.
- The bare mathematical potentialities of the extensive continuum re-
- quire an additional content in order to assume the role of real objects for
- the subject. This content is supplied by the eternal objects t termed sense-
- data. These objects are 'given' for the experience of the subject. Their
- givenness does not arise from the 'decision' of the contemporary entities
- which are thus objectified. It arises from the functioning of the antecedent
- physical body of the subject; and this functioning can in its turn be ana-
- lysed as representing the influence of the more remote past, a past com-
- mon alike to the subject and to its contemporary actual entities. Thus
- these sense-data are eternal objects playing a complex relational role;
- they connect the actual entities of the past with the actual entities of the
- contemporary world, and thereby effect objectifications of the contem-
- porary things and of the past things. For instance, we see the contemporary
- chair, but we see it with our eyes; and we touch the contemporary chair,
- but we touch it with our hands. Thus colours objectify the chair in one
- way, and objectify the eyes in another way, as elements in the experience
- of the subject. [95] Also touch objectifies the chair in one way, and ob-
- The Extensive Continuum 63
- jectifies the hands in another way, as elements in the experience of the
- subject. But the eyes and the hands are in the past (the almost immediate
- past) and the chair is in the present The chair, thus objectified, is the
- objectification of a contemporary nexus of actual entities in its unity as one
- nexus. This nexus is illustrated as to its constitution by the spatial region,
- with its perspective relations. This region is, in fact, atomized by the mem-
- bers of the nexus. By the operation of the Category of Transmutation (cf.
- Parts III and IV), in the objectification an abstraction is made from the
- multiplicity of members and from all components of their formal consti-
- tutions, except the occupation of this region. This prehension, in the
- particular example considered, will be termed the prehension of a 'chair-
- image/ Also the intervention of the past is not confined to antecedent eyes
- and hands. There is a more remote past throughout nature external to the
- body. The direct relevance of this remote past, relevant by reason of its
- direct objectification in the immediate subject, is practically negligible, so
- far as concerns prehensions of a strictly physical type.
- But external nature has an indirect relevance by the transmission
- through it of analogous prehensions. In this way there are in it various
- historical routes of intermediate objectifications. Such relevant historical
- routes lead up to various parts of the animal body, and transmit into it
- prehensions which form the physical influence of the external environment
- on the animal body. But this external environment which is in the past of
- the concrescent subject is also, with negligible exceptions, in the past of
- the nexus which is the objectified chair-image. If there be a 'real chair/
- there will be another historical route of objectifications from nexus to
- nexus in this environment. The members of each nexus will be mutually
- contemporaries. Also the historical route will lead up to the nexus which
- is the chair-image. The complete nexus, composed of this historical route
- and the [99] chair-image, will form a 'corpuscular' society. This society is
- the 'real chair/
- The prehensions of the concrescent subject and the formal constitutions
- of the members of the contemporary nexus which is the chair-image are
- thus conditioned by the properties of the same environment in the past.
- The animal body is so constructed that, with rough accuracy and in
- normal conditions, important emphasis is thus laid upon those regions in
- the contemporary world which are particularly relevant for the future
- existence of the enduring object of which the immediate percipient is one
- occasion.
- A reference to the Category of Transmutation will show that perception
- of contemporary 'images 7 in the mode of 'presentational immediacy' is an
- 'impure' prehension. The subsidiary 'pure 7 physical prehensions are the
- components which provide some definite information as to the physical
- world; the subsidiary 'pure 7 mental prehensions are the components by
- reason of which the theory of 'secondary qualities 7 was introduced into the
- 64 Discussions and Applications
- theory of perception. The account here given traces back these secondary
- qualities to their root in physical prehensions expressed by the 'wiihness of
- the body/
- If the familiar correlations between physical paths and the life-histories
- of a chair and of the animal body are not satisfied, we are apt to say that
- our perceptions are delusive. The word 'delusive'" is all very well as a tech-
- nical term; but it must not be misconstrued to mean that what we have
- directly perceived, we have not directly perceived. Our direct perception,
- via our senses, of an immediate extensive shape, in a certain geometrical
- perspective to ourselves, and in certain general geometrical relations to the
- contemporary world, remains an ultimate fact. Our inferences are at fault.
- In Cartesian phraseology, it is a final 'inspectio' (also termed Hntuitio')
- which, when purged of all 'judicium— i.e., of 'inference — is final for belief.
- This whole question of 'delusive' perception must be considered later (cf.
- Part III, Chs. Ill to V) in more [100] detail. We can, however, see at once
- that there are grades of 'delusiveness.' There is the non-delusive case, when
- we see a chair-image and there is a chair. There is the partially delusive case
- when we have been looking in a mirror; in this case, the chair-image we
- see is not the culmination of the corpuscular society of entities which we
- call the real chair. Finally, we may have been taking drugs, so that the
- chair-image we see has no familiar counterpart in any historical route of a
- corpuscular society. Also there are other delusive grades where the lapse of
- time is the main element. These cases are illustrated by our perceptions of
- the heavenly bodies. In delusive cases we are apt, in a confusing way, to
- say that the societies of entities which we did not see but correctly inferred
- are the things that we 'really' saw.
- The conclusion of this discussion is that the ingression of the eternal
- objects termed 'sense-data' t into the experience of a subject cannot be
- construed as the simple objectification of the actual entity to which, in-
- ordinary speech, we ascribe that sense-datum as a quality. The ingression
- involves a complex relationship, whereby the sense-datum emerges as the
- 'given' eternal object by which some past entities are objectified (for ex-
- ample, colour seen with the eyes and bad temper inherited from the
- viscera) and whereby the sense-datum also enters into the objectification
- of a society of actual entities in the contemporary world. Thus a sense-
- datum has ingression into experience by reason of its forming the what of
- a very complex multiple integration of prehensions within that occasion.
- For example, the ingression of a visual sense-datum involves the causal
- objectification of various antecedent bodily organs and the presentational
- objectification of the shape seen, this shape being a nexus of contemporary
- actual entities. In this account of the ingression of sense-data, the animal
- body is nothing more than the most intimately relevant part of the ante-
- cedent settled world. To sum up this account: When we perceive a con-
- temporary extended shape which we term a 'chair/ the sense- [101} data in-
- volved are not necessarily elements in the 'real internal constitution' of this
- The Extensive Continuum 65
- chair-image: they are elements— in some way of feeling— in the 'real in-
- ternal constitutions' of those antecedent organs of the human body with
- which we perceive the 'chair/ The direct recognition of such antecedent
- actual entities, with which we perceive contemporaries, is hindered and,
- apart from exceptional circumstances, rendered impossible by the spatial
- and temporal vagueness which infect such data. Later (cf. Part III, Chs.
- Ill to V) the whole question of this perception of a nexus vaguely, that is
- to say, without distinction of the actual entities composing it, is discussed
- in terms of the theory of prehensions, and in relation to the Category of
- Transmutation.
- SECTION II
- This account of 'presentational immediacy' presupposes two metaphysi-
- cal assumptions:
- (i) That the actual world, in so far as it is a community of entities
- which are settled, actual, and already become, conditions and limits the
- potentiality for creativeness beyond itself. This 'given' world provides de-
- terminate data in the form of those objectifications of themselves which
- the characters of its actual entities can provide. This is a limitation laid
- upon the general potentiality provided by eternal objects, considered
- merely in respect to the generality of their natures. Thus, relatively to any
- actual entity, there is a 'giver/ world of settled actual entities and a 'real'
- potentiality, which is the datum for creativeness beyond that standpoint.
- This datum, which is the primary phase in the process constituting an
- actual entity, is nothing else than the actual world itself in its character
- of a possibility for the process of being felt. This exemplifies the meta-
- physical principle that every 'being' is a potential for a 'becoming/ The
- actual world is the 'objective content' of each new creation.
- Thus we have always to consider two meanings of [102] potentiality: (a)
- the 'general' potentiality, which is the bundle of possibilities, mutually con-
- sistent or alternative, provided by the multiplicity of eternal objects, and
- (b) the 'real' potentiality, which is conditioned by the data provided by
- the actual world. General potentiality is absolute, and real potentiality is
- relative to some actual entity, taken as a standpoint whereby the actual
- world is denned. It must be remembered that the phrase 'actual world' is
- like 'yesterday' and 'tomorrow/ in that it alters its meaning according to
- standpoint. The actual world must always mean the community of all
- actual entities, including the primordial actual entity called 'God' and
- the temporal actual entities.
- Curiously enough, even at this early stage of metaphysical discussion,
- the influence of the 'relativity theory' of modern physics is important.
- According to the classical 'uniquely serial' view of time, two contemporary
- actual entities define the same actual world. According to the modern view
- 66 Discussions and Applications
- no two actual entities define the same actual world. Actual entities are
- called 'contemporary' when neither belongs to the given* actual world de-
- fined by the other.
- The differences between the actual worlds of a pair of contemporary
- entities, which are in a certain sense 'neighbours/ are negligible for most
- human purposes. Thus the difference between the 'classical' and the 'rela-
- tivity' view of time only rarely has any important relevance. I shall always
- adopt the relativity view; for one reason, because it seems better to accord
- with the general philosophical doctrine of relativity which is presupposed
- in the philosophy of organism; and for another reason, because with rare
- exceptions the classical doctrine can be looked on as a special case of the
- relativity doctrine— a case which does not seem to accord with experimental
- evidence. In other words, the classical view seems to limit a general
- philosophical doctrine; it is the larger assumption; and its consequences,
- taken in conjunction with other scientific principles, seem to be false.
- [J 03] (ii) The second metaphysical assumption is that the real poten-
- tialities relative to all standpoints are coordinated as diverse determinations
- of one extensive continuum. This extensive continuum is one relational
- complex in which all potential objectifications find their niche. It underlies
- the whole world, past, present, and future. Considered in its full generality,
- apart from the additional conditions proper only to the cosmic epoch of
- electrons, protons, molecules, and star-systems, the properties of this con-
- tinuum are very few and do not include the relationships of metrical
- geometry. An extensive continuum is a complex of entities united by the
- various allied relationships of whole to part, and of overlapping so as to
- possess common parts, and of contact, and of other relationships derived
- from these primary relationships. The notion of a 'continuum' involves
- both the property of indefinite divisibility and the property of unbounded
- extension. There are always entities beyond entities, because nonentity is
- no boundary. This extensive continuum expresses the solidarity of all pos-
- sible standpoints throughout the whole process of the world. It is not a fact
- prior to the world; it is the first determination of order— that is, of real
- potentiality— arising out of the general character of the world. In its full
- generality beyond the present epoch, it does not involve shapes, dimen-
- sions, or measurability; these are additional determinations of real po-
- tentiality arising from our cosmic epoch.
- This extensive continuum is 'real/ because it expresses a fact derived
- from the actual world and concerning the contemporary actual world. All
- actual entities are related according to the determinations of this con-
- tinuum; and all possible actual entities in the future must exemplify these
- determinations in their relations with the already actual world. The reality
- of the future is bound up with the reality of this continuum. It is the
- reality of what is potential, in its character of a real component of what is
- actual. Such a real component must be interpreted in \104] terms of the
- The Extensive Continuum 67
- relatedness of prehensions. This task will be undertaken in Chapter V of
- Part IV of these lectures.
- Actual entities atomize the extensive continuum. This continuum is in
- itself merely the potentiality for division; an actual entity effects this
- division. The objectification of the contemporary world merely expresses
- that world in terms of its potentiality for subdivision and in terms of the
- mutual perspectives which any such subdivision will bring into real ef-
- fectiveness. These are the primary governing data for any actual entity;
- for they express how all actual entities are in the solidarity of one world.
- With the becoming of any actual entity what was previously potential in
- the space-time continuum is now the primary real phase in something ac-
- tual. For each process of concrescence a regional standpoint in the world,
- defining a limited potentiality for objectifications, has been adopted. In
- the mere extensive continuum there is no principle to determine what
- regional quanta shall be atomized, so as to form the real perspective stand-
- point for the primary data constituting the basic phase in the concrescence
- of an actual entity. The factors in the actual world whereby this de-
- termination is effected will be discussed at a later stage of this investiga-
- tion. They constitute the initial phase of the 'subjective aim/ This initial
- phase is a direct derivate from God's primordial nature. In this function,
- as in every other, God is the organ of novelty, aiming at intensification.
- In the mere continuum there are contrary potentialities; in the actual
- world there are definite atomic actualities determining one coherent sys-
- tem of real divisions throughout the region of actuality. Every actual entity
- in its relationship to other actual entities is in this sense somewhere in
- the continuum, and arises out of the data provided by this standpoint.
- But in another sense it is everywhere throughout the continuum; for its
- constitution includes the objectifications of the actual world and thereby
- includes the continuum; also the [105] potential objectifications of itself
- contribute to the real potentialities whose solidarity the continuum ex-
- presses. Thus the continuum is present in each actual entity, and each
- actual entity pervades the continuum.
- This conclusion can be stated otherwise. Extension, apart from its
- spatialization and temporalization, is that general scheme of relationships
- providing the capacity that many objects can be welded into the real unity
- of one experience. Thus, an act of experience has an objective scheme of
- extensive order by reason of the double fact that its own perspective stand-
- point has extensive content, and that the other actual entities are objecti-
- fied with the retention of their extensive relationships. These extensive
- relationships are more fundamental than their more special spatial and
- temporal relationships. Extension is the most general scheme of real po-
- tentiality, providing the background for all other organic relations. The
- potential scheme does not determine its own atomization by actual en-
- tities. It is divisible; but its real division by actual entities depends upon
- 68 Discussions and Applications
- more particular characteristics of the actual entities constituting the ante-
- cedent environment. In respect to time, this atomization takes the special
- form 2 of the 'epochal theory of time/ In respect to space, it means that
- every actual entity in the temporal world is to be credited with a spatial
- volume for its perspective standpoint. These conclusions are required by
- the consideration 3 of Zeno's arguments, in connection with the presump-
- tion that an actual entity is an act of experience. The authority of Wil-
- liam James can be quoted in support of this conclusion. He writes: "Either
- your experience is of no content, of no change, or it is of a perceptible
- amount of content or change. Your acquaintance with reality grows liter-
- ally by buds or drops of perception. Intellectually and on reflection you
- can divide these into components, but as immediately given, [106] they
- come totally or not at all." 4 James also refers to Zeno. In substance I agree
- with his argument from Zeno; though I do not think that he allows suf-
- ficiently for those elements in Zeno's paradoxes which are the product of
- inadequate mathematical knowledge. But I agree that a valid argument
- remains after the removal of the invalid parts.
- The argument, so far as it is valid, elicits a contradiction from the two
- premises: (i) that in a becoming something (res vera) becomes, and (ii)
- that every act of becoming is divisible into earlier and later sections which
- are themselves acts of becoming. Consider, for example, an act of becom-
- ing during one second. The act is divisible into two acts, one during the
- earlier half of the second, the other during the later half of the second.
- Thus that which becomes during the whole second presupposes that
- which becomes during the first half-second. Analogously, that which be-
- comes during the first half-second presupposes that which becomes dur-
- ing the first quarter-second, and so on indefinitely. Thus if we consider
- the process of becoming up to the beginning of the second in question,
- and ask what then becomes, no answer can be given. For, whatever creature
- we indicate presupposes an earlier creature which became after the be-
- ginning of the second and antecedently to the indicated t creature. There-
- fore there is nothing which becomes, so as to effect a transition into the
- second in question.
- The difficulty is not evaded by assuming that something becomes at
- each non-extensive instant of time. For at the beginning of the second of
- time there is no next instant at which something can become.
- Zeno in his 'Arrow in Its Flight' seems to have had an obscure grasp of
- this argument. But the introduction of motion brings in irrelevant details.
- The true difficulty is to understand how the arrow survives the lapse of
- 2 Cf. my Science and the Modern World, Ch. VII.
- 3 Cf. loc. cit.; and Part IV of the present work.
- 4 Some Problems of Philosophy, Ch X; my attention was drawn to this pas-
- sage by its quotation in Religion in thef Philosophy of William James, by Pro-
- fessor J. S. Bixler.
- The Extensive Continuum 69
- time. [107] Unfortunately Descartes' treatment of 'endurance' is very
- superficial, and subsequent philosophers have followed his example.
- In his 'Achilles and the Tortoise' Zeno produces an invalid argument
- depending on ignorance of the theory of infinite convergent numerical
- series. Eliminating the irrelevant details of the race and of motion— de-
- tails which have endeared the paradox to the literature of all ages— con-
- sider the first half-second as one act of becoming, the next quarter-second
- as another such act, the next eighth-second as yet another, and so on in-
- definitely. Zeno then illegitimately assumes this infinite series of acts of
- becoming can never be exhausted. But there is no need to assume that an
- infinite series of acts of becoming, with a first act, and each act with an
- immediate successor,! is inexhaustible in the process of becoming. Simple
- arithmetic assures us that the series just indicated will be exhausted in the
- period of one second. The way is then open for the intervention of a new
- act of becoming which lies beyond the whole series. Thus this paradox of
- Zeno is based upon a mathematical fallacy.
- The modification of the *' Arrow' paradox, stated above, brings out the
- principle that every act of becoming must have an immediate successor, if
- we admit that something becomes. For otherwise we cannot point out
- what creature becomes as we enter upon the second in question. But we
- cannot, in the absence of some additional premise, infer that every act of
- becoming must have had an immediate predecessor.
- The conclusion is that in every act of becoming there is the becoming of
- something with temporal extension; but that the act itself is not extensive,
- in the sense that it is divisible into earlier and later acts of becoming which
- correspond to the extensive divisibility of what has become.
- In this section, the doctrine is enunciated that the creature is extensive,
- but that its act of becoming is not extensive. This topic is resumed in Part
- IV. How- [108] ever, some anticipation of Parts III and IV is now required.
- The res vera, in its character of concrete satisfaction, is divisible into
- prehensions which concern its first temporal half and into prehensions
- which concern its second temporal half. This divisibility is what constitutes
- its extensiveness. But this concern with a temporal and spatial sub-region
- means that the datum of the prehension in question is the actual world,
- objectified with the perspective due to that sub-region. A prehension, how-
- ever, acquires subjective form, and this subjective form is only rendered
- fully determinate by integration with conceptual prehensions belonging to
- the mental pole of the res vera. The concrescence is dominated by a sub-
- jective aim which essentially concerns the creature as a final superject. This
- subjective aim is this subject itself determining its own self-creation as one
- creature. Thus the subjective aim does not share in this divisibility. If we
- confine attention to prehensions concerned with the earlier half, their sub-
- jective forms have arisen from nothing. For the subjective aim which be-
- longs to the whole is now excluded. Thus the evolution of subjective form
- could not be referred to any actuality. The ontological principle has been
- 70 Discussions and Applications
- violated. Something has floated into the world from nowhere.
- The summary statement of this discussion is, that the mental pole de-
- termines the subjective forms and that this pole is inseparable from the
- total res vera.
- SECTION III
- The discussion of the previous sections has merely given a modern
- o>hape to the oldest of European philosophic doctrines. But as a doctrine
- of common sense, it is older still— as old as consciousness itself. The most
- general notions underlying the words 'space' and 'time' are those which
- this discussion has aimed at expressing in their true connection with the
- actual world. The alternative doctrine, which is the Newtonian cosmology,
- emphasized the [109] 'receptacle' theory of space-time, and minimized the
- factor of potentiality. Thus bits of space and time were conceived as being
- as actual as anything else, and as being 'occupied' by other actualities
- which were the bits of matter. This is the Newtonian absolute' theory of
- space-time, which philosophers have never accepted, though at times some
- have acquiesced. Newton's famous Scholium 5 to his first eight definitions
- in his Principia expresses this point of view with entire clearness:
- Hitherto I have laid down the definitions of such words as are less
- known, and explained the sense in which I would have them to be
- understood in the following discourse. I do not define time, space,
- place, and motion, as being well known to all. Only I must observe,
- that the vulgar conceive those quantities under no other notions but
- from the relation they bear to sensible objects. And thence arise cer-
- tain prejudices, for the removing of which, it will be convenient to dis-
- tinguish them into absolute and relative, true and apparent, mathe-
- matical and common.
- I. Absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself, and from its
- own nature, flows equably without regard to anything external, and
- by another name is called duration: relative, apparent, and common
- time, is some sensible and external (whether accurate or unequable)
- measure of duration by thet means of motion, which is commonly
- used instead of true time; such as an hour, a day, a month, a year.
- II. Absolute space, in its own nature, and without regard to any-
- thing external, remains always similar and immovable. Relative space
- is some movable dimension or measure of the absolute spaces; which
- our senses determine by its position to bodies, and which is vulgarly
- taken for immovable space; . . . Absolute and relative space are the
- same in figure and magnitude; but they do not remain always nu-
- merically the same. . . .
- IV. ... As the order of the parts of time is [110] immutable, so
- also is the order of the parts of space. Suppose those parts to be
- 5 Andrew Motte's translation; new edition revised, London, 1803.
- The Extensive Continuum 71
- moved out of their places, and they will be moved (if the expression
- may be allowed) out of themselves. For times and spaces are, as it
- were, the places as well of themselves as of all other things. All things
- are placed in time as to order of succession; and in space as to order oft
- situation. It is from their essence or nature that they are places; and
- that the primary places of things should be movable, is absurd. These
- are, therefore, the absolute places; and translations out of those places
- are the only absolute motions. . . . Now no other places are im-
- movable but those that, from infinity to infinity, do all retain the
- same given positions one to another; and upon this account must
- ever remain unmoved; and do thereby constitute, what I call, im-
- movable space. The causes by which true and relative motions are
- distinguished, one from the other, are the forces impressed upon
- bodies to generate motion. True motion is neither generated nor
- altered, but by some force impressed upon the body moved: but
- relative motion may be generated or altered without any force im-
- pressed upon the body. For it is sufficient only to impress some force
- on other bodies with which the former is compared, that by their
- giving way, that relation may be changed, in which the relative rest
- or motion of this other body did consist. . . . The effects which dis-
- tinguish absolute from relative motion are, the forces of receding
- from the axis of circular motion. For there are no such forces in a cir-
- cular motion purely relative, but, in a true and absolute circular mo-
- tion, they are greater or less, according to the quantity of motion. . . .
- Wherefore relative quantities are not the quantities themselves,
- whose names they bear, but those sensible measures of them (either
- accurate or inaccurate) which are commonly used instead of the mea-
- sured quantities themselves. . . .
- I have quoted at such length from Newton's Scholium because this
- document constitutes the clearest, most definite, and most influential
- statement among the cos- [111] mological speculations of mankind, specu-
- lations of a type which first assume scientific importance with the Py-
- thagorean school preceding and inspiring Plato. Newton is presupposing
- four types of entities which he does not discriminate in respect to their
- actuality: for him minds are actual things, bodies are actual things, ab-
- solute durations of time are actual things, and absolute places are actual
- things. He does not use the word 'actual'; but he is speaking of matter
- of fact, and he puts them all on the same level in that respect. The result
- is to land him in a clearly expressed but complex and arbitrary scheme of
- relationships between spaces inter se; between durations inter se; and be-
- tween minds, bodies, times and places, for the conjunction of them all into
- the solidarity of the one universe. For the purposes of science it was an
- extraordinarily clarifying statement, that is to say, for all the purposes of
- science within the next two hundred years, and for most of its purposes
- since that period. But, as a fundamental statement, it lies completely open
- 72 Discussions and Applications
- to sceptical attack; and also, as Newton himself admits, diverges from
- common sense— "the vulgar conceive those quantities under no other
- notions but from the relation they bear to sensible objects/' Kant only
- saved it by reducing it to the description of a construct by means of which
- 'pure intuition' introduces an order for chaotic data; and for the schools of
- transcendentalists derived from Kant this construct has remained in the
- inferior position of a derivative from the proper ultimate substantial
- reality. For them it is an element in 'appearance'; and appearance is to be
- distinguished from reality. The philosophy of organism is an attempt,
- with the minimum of critical adjustment, to return to the conceptions of
- 'the vulgar/ f In the first place, the discussion must fasten on the notion of
- a 'sensible object/ to quote Newton's phrase. We may expand Newton's
- phrase, and state that the common sense of mankind conceives that all its
- notions ultimately refer to actual entities, or as Newton terms them,
- 'sensible objects.' Newton, basing himself upon [112] current physical
- notions, conceived 'sensible objects' to be the material bodies to which
- the science of dynamics applies. He was then left with the antithesis be-
- tween 'sensible objects' and empty space. Newton, indeed, as a private
- opinion, conjectured that there is a material medium pervading space.
- But he also held that there might not be such a medium. For him the
- notion 'empty space'— that is, mere spatiality — had sense, conceived as
- an independent actual existence 'from infinity to infinity/ In this he
- differed from Descartes. Modern physics sides with Descartes. It has in-
- troduced the notion of the 'physical field.' Also the latest speculations tend
- to remove the sharp distinction between the 'occupied' portions of the
- field and the 'unoccupied' portion. Further, in these lectures (cf. Ch. Ill of
- Part II), a distinction is introduced, not explicitly in the mind either of
- 'the vulgar' or of Newton. This distinction is that between (i) an actual
- entity, (ii) an enduring object, (hi) a corpuscular society, (iv) a non-
- corpuscular society, (v) a non-social nexus. A non-social nexus is what
- answers to the notion of 'chaos.' The extensive continuum is that general
- relational element in experience whereby the actual entities experienced,
- and that unit experience itself, are united in the solidarity of one common
- world. The actual entities atomize it, and thereby make real what was
- antecedently merely potential. The atomization of the extensive con-
- tinuum is also its temporalization; that is to say, it is the process of the
- becoming of actuality into what in itself is merely potential. The sys-
- tematic scheme, in its completeness embracing the actual past and the
- potential future, is prehended in the positive experience of each actual
- entity. In this sense, it is Kant's 'form of intuition'; but it is derived from
- the actual world qua datum, and thus is not 'pure' in Kant's sense of that
- term. It is not productive of the ordered world, but derivative from it.
- The prehension of this scheme is one more example that actual fact in-
- cludes in its own constitution [113] real potentiality which is referent
- beyond itself. The former example is 'appetition.'
- The Extensive Continuum 73
- SECTION IV
- Newton in his description of space and time has confused what is 'real'
- potentiality with what is actual fact. He has thereby been led to diverge
- from the judgment of 'the vulgar' who "conceive those quantities under no
- other notions but from the relation they bear to sensible objects."! The
- philosophy of organism starts by agreeing with 'the vulgar' except that the
- term 'sensible object' is replaced by 'actual entity'; so as to free our notions
- from participation in an epistemologicalf theory as to sense-perception.
- When we further consider how to adjust Newton's other descriptions to
- the organic theory, the surprising fact emerges that we must identify the
- atomized quantum of extension correlative to an actual entity, with New-
- ton's absolute place and absolute duration. Newton's proof that motion
- does not apply to absolute place, which in its nature is immovable, also
- holds. Thus an actual entity never moves: it is where it is and what it is.
- In order to emphasize this characteristic by a phrase connecting the notion
- of 'actual entity' more closely with our ordinary habits of thought, I will
- also use the term 'actual occasion' in the place of the term 'actual entity.'
- Thus the actual world is built up of actual occasions; and by the oncologi-
- cal principle whatever things there are in any sense of 'existence,' are de-
- rived by abstraction from actual occasions. I shall use the term 'event' in
- the more general sense of a nexus of actual occasions, inter-related in some
- determinate fashion in one extensive quantum. An actual occasion is the
- limiting type of an event with only one member.
- It is quite obvious that meanings have to be found for the notions of
- 'motion' and of 'moving bodies.' For the present, this enquiry must be
- postponed to a later chapter [114] (cf. Part IV and also Ch. Ill of this
- Part). It is sufficient to say that a molecule in the sense of a moving body,
- with a history of local change, is not an actual occasion; it must therefore
- be some kind of nexus of actual occasions. In this sense it is an event, but
- not an actual occasion. The fundamental meaning of the notion of
- 'change' is 'the difference between actual occasions comprised in some
- determinate event.'
- A further elucidation of the status of the extensive continuum in the
- organic philosophy is obtained by comparison with Descartes' doctrine of
- material bodies. It is at once evident that the organic theory is much
- closer to Descartes' views than to Newton's, On this topic Spinoza is prac-
- tically a logical systematization of Descartes, purging him of inconsis-
- tencies. But this attainment of logical coherence is obtained by empha-
- sizing just those elements in Descartes which the philosophy of organism
- rejects. In this respect, Spinoza perforins the same office for Descartes that
- Hume does for Locke. The philosophy of organism may be conceived as a
- recurrence to Descartes and to Locke, in respect to just those elements in
- their philosophies which are usually rejected by reason of their inconsis-
- tency with the elements which their successors developed. Thus the phi-
- 74 Discussions and Applications
- losophy of organism is pluralistic in contrast with Spinoza's monism; and
- is a doctrine of experience prehending actualities, in contrast with Hume's
- sensationalist phenomenalism.
- First let us recur to Descartes at the stage of thought antecedent to his
- disastrous classification of substances into two species, bodily substance and
- mental substance. At the beginning of Meditation i, he writes:
- For example, there is the fact that I am here, seated by the fire,
- attired in a dressing gown, having this paper in my hands and other
- similar matters. And how could I deny that these hands and this body
- are mine, were it not perhaps that I compare myself to certain per-
- sons, devoid of sense. . . . But they are mad, and I should not [JJ5]
- be any thef less insane were I to follow examples so extravagant.
- At the same time I must remember that I am a man, and that con-
- sequently I am in the habit of sleeping, and in my dreams represent-
- ing to myself the same things or sometimes even less probable things,
- than do those who are insane in their waking moments. ... At the
- same time we must at least confess that the things which are repre-
- sented to us in sleep are like painted representations which can only
- have been formed as the counterparts of something real and true [ad
- similiiudinem rerum verarum], and that in this way those general
- things at least, i.e. eyes, a head, hands, and a whole body, are not
- imaginary things, but things really existent. . . . And for the same
- reason, although these general things, to wit, [a body], 6 eyes, a head,
- hands, and such like, may be imaginary, we are bound at the same
- time to confess that there are at least some other objects yet more
- simple and more universal, which are real and true [vera esse]; and of
- these just in the same way as with certain real colours, all these images
- of things which dwell in our thoughts, whether true and real or false
- and fantastic, are formed.
- To such a class of things pertains corporeal nature in general, and
- its extension, the figure of extended things, their quantity or magni-
- tude and number, as also the place in which they are, the time which
- measures their duration, and so on. . . .
- In Meditation II, after a slight recapitulation, he continues, speaking of
- God:
- Then without doubt I exist also if he deceives me, and let him
- deceive me as much as he will, he can never cause me to be nothing
- so long as I think that I am something. So that after having reflected
- well and carefully examined all things, we must come to the definite
- conclusion that this proposition: I am, I exist, is necessarily true each
- time that I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it.
- [116} At the end of the quotation from Meditation J, Descartes uses the
- 6 Haldane and Ross enclose in square brackets phrases appearing in the French
- version, and not in the Latin. I have compared with the Latin.
- The Extensive Continuum 75
- phrase res vera in the same sense as that in which I have used the term
- 'actual/ It means 'existence' in the fullest sense of that term, beyond
- which there is no other. Descartes, indeed, would ascribe to God 'exis-
- tence' in a generically different sense. In the philosophy of organism, as
- here developed, God's existence is not generically different from that of
- other actual entities, except that he is 'primordial' in a sense to be grad-
- ually explained.
- Descartes does not explicitly frame the definition of actuality in terms
- of the ontological principle, as given in Section IVt of this chapter, that
- actual occasions form the ground from which all other types of existence
- are derivative and abstracted; but he practically formulates an equivalent in
- subject-predicate phraseology, when he writes: "For this reason, when we
- perceive any attribute, we therefore conclude that some existing thing or
- substance to which it may be attributed, is necessarily present." 7 For
- Descartes the word 'substance' is the equivalent of my phrase 'actual occa-
- sion.' I refrain from the term 'substance,' for one reason because it sug-
- gests the subject-predicate notion; and for another reason because Des-
- cartes and Locke permit their substances to undergo adventures of chang-
- ing qualifications, and thereby create difficulties.
- In the quotation from the second Meditation: "I am, I exist, is nec-
- essarily true each time that I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it,"f
- Descartes adopts the position that an act of experience is the primary type
- of actual occasion. But in his subsequent developments he assumes that
- his mental substances endure change. Here he goes beyond his argument.
- For each time he pronounces 'I am, I exist/ the actual occasion, which is
- the ego, is different; and the 'he' which is common to the two egos is an
- eternal object or, alternatively, the nexus of successive occasions. Also in
- the quotation from the first [117] Meditation he begins by appealing to an
- act of experience— "I am here, seated by the fire. ..." He then associates
- this act of experience with his body— "these hands and body are mine.*'
- He then finally appeals for some final notion of actual entities in the
- remarkable sentence: "And for the same reason, although these general
- things, to wit, [a body], eyes, a head, hands, and such like, may be imaginary,
- we are bound at the same time to confess that there are at least some
- other objects yet more simple and more universal, which are real and true;
- and of these ... all these images of things which dwell in our thoughts,
- whether true and real or false and fantastic, are formed."
- Notice the peculiarly intimate association with immediate experience
- which Descartes claims for his body, an association beyond the mere
- sense-perception of the contemporary world— "these hands and feet are
- mine." In the philosophy of organism this immediate association is the
- recognition of them as distinguishable data whose formal constitutions are
- immediately felt in the origination of experience. In this function the
- 7 Principles of Philosophy, Part I, 52.
- 76 Discussions and Applications
- animal body does not differ in principle from the rest of the past actual
- world; but it does differ in an intimacy of association by reason of which
- its spatial and temporal connections obtain some definition in the ex-
- perience of the subject. What is vague for the rest of the world has ob-
- tained some additional measure of distinctness for the bodily organs. But,
- in principle, it would be equally true to say, The actual world is mine.'
- Descartes also asserts that "objects yet more simple and more uni-
- versal, which are real and true" are what the "images of things which
- dwellf in our thoughts"! are formed of. This does not seem to accord
- with his theory of perception, of a later date, stated in his Principles, Part
- IV, 196, 197, 198. In the later theory the emphasis is on the judicium, in
- the sense of Inference/ and not in the sense of inspectio of realitas ob-
- jectiva. But it does accord with the organic theory, that the objectifications
- of other actual occasions form the given data from which an actual occa-
- [118] sion originates. He has also brought the body into its immediate
- association with the act of experience. Descartes, with Newton, assumes
- that the extensive continuum is actual in the full sense of being an actual
- entity. But he refrains from the additional material bodies which Newton
- provides. Also in his efforts to guard his representative 'ideas' from the
- fatal gap between mental symbol and actuality symbolized, he practically,
- in some sentences, expresses the doctrine of objectification here put for-
- ward. Thus:
- Hence the idea of the sun will be the sun itself existing in the
- mind, not indeed formally, as it exists in the sky, but objectively,
- i.e. in the way in which objects are wont to exist in the mind; and this
- mode of being is truly much less perfect than that in which things
- exist outside the mind, but it is not on that account mere nothing,
- as I have already said. 8
- Both Descartes and Locke, in order to close the gap between idea repre-
- senting and actual entity represented/ require this doctrine of 'the sun
- itself existing in the mind/ But though, as in this passage, they at times
- casually state it in order to push aside the epistemological difficulty, they
- neither of them live up to these admissions. They relapse into the tacit
- presupposition of the mind with its private ideas which are in fact qualities
- without intelligible connection with the entities represented.
- But if we take the doctrine of objectification seriously, the extensive
- continuum at once becomes the primary factor in objectification. It pro-
- vides the general scheme of extensive perspective which is exhibited in all
- the mutual objectifications by which actual entities prehend each other.
- Thus in itself, the extensive continuum is a scheme of real potentiality
- which must find exemplification t in the mutual prehension of all actual
- entities. It also finds exemplification in each actual entity considered
- 8 Reply to Objections J: I have already quoted this passage in my Science and
- the* Modem Wodd f note to Ch. IV.
- The Extensive Continuum 77
- 'formally/ In this sense, actual entities are extensive, [JJ9] since they arise
- out of a potentiality for division, which in actual fact is not divided (cf.
- Part IV). It is for this reason, as stated above, that the phrase 'actual
- occasion' is used in the place of 'actual entity/
- Descartes' doctrine of the physical world as exhibiting an extensive
- plenum of actual entities is practically the same as the 'organic' doctrine.
- But Descartes' bodies have to move, and this presupposition introduces
- new obscurities. It is exactly at this point that Newton provides a clear
- conception in comparison with that of Descartes. In the 'organic' doctrine,
- motion is not attributable to an actual occasion.
- In the 'organic' theory, (i) there is only one type of temporal actual
- entity; (ii) each such actual entity is extensive; (iii) from the standpoint
- of any one actual entity, the 'given/ actual world is a nexus of actual en-
- tities, transforming the potentiality of the extensive scheme into a plenum
- of actual occasions; (iv) in this plenum, motion cannot be significantly
- attributed to any actual occasion; (v) the plenum is continuous in respect
- to the potentiality from which it arises, but each actual entity is atomic;
- (vi) the term 'actual occasion' is used synonymously t with 'actual entity';
- but chiefly when its character of extensiveness has some direct relevance to
- the discussion, either extensiveness in the form of temporal extensiveness,
- that is to say 'duration/ or extensiveness in the form of spatial extension,
- or in the more complete signification of spatio-temporal extensiveness.
- SECTION V
- The baseless metaphysical doctrine of 'undifferentiated endurance' is a
- subordinate derivative from the misapprehension of the proper character
- of the extensive scheme.
- In our perception of the contemporary world via presentational im-
- mediacy, nexus of actual entities are objectified for the percipient under
- the perspective of their characters of extensive continuity. In the percep-
- tion of a contemporary stone, for example, the separate indi- \120) viduality
- of each actual entity in the nexus constituting the stone is merged into the
- unity of the extensive plenum, which for Descartes and for common sense,
- is the stone. The complete objectification is effected by the generic exten-
- sive perspective of the stone, specialized into the specific perspective of
- some sense-datum, such as some definite colour, for example. Thus the
- immediate percept assumes the character of the quiet undifferentiated en-
- durance of the material stone, perceived by means of its quality of colour.
- This basic notion dominates language, and haunts both science and philos-
- ophy. Further, by an unfortunate application of the excellent maxim, that
- our conjectural explanation should always proceed by the utilization of a
- vera causa, whenever science or philosophy has ventured to extrapolate
- beyond the limits of the immediate deliverance of direct perception, a
- satisfactory explanation has always complied with the condition that sub-
- stances with undifferentiated endurance of essential attributes be pro-
- 78 Discussions and Applications
- duced, and that activity be explained as the occasional modification of
- their accidental qualities and relations. Thus the imaginations of men are
- dominated by the quiet extensive stone with its relationships of positions,
- and its quality of colour—relationships and qualities which occasionally
- change. The stone, thus interpreted, guarantees the vera causa, and con-
- jectural explanations in science and philosophy follow its model.
- Thus in framing cosmological theory, the notion of continuous stuff with
- permanent attributes, enduring without differentiation, and retaining its
- self-identity through any stretch of time however small or large, has been
- fundamental. The stuff undergoes change in respect to accidental qualities
- and relations; but it is numerically self-identical in its character of one
- actual entity throughout its accidental adventures. The admission of this
- fundamental metaphysical concept has wrecked the various systems of
- pluralistic realism.
- This metaphysical concept has formed the basis of scientific materialism.
- For example, when the activities [121] associated with so-called empty
- space required scientific formulation, the scientists of the nineteenth cen-
- tury produced the materialistic ether as the ultimate substratum whose
- accidental adventures constituted these activities.
- But the interpretation of the stone, on which the whole concept is
- based, has proved to be entirely mistaken. In the first place, from the
- seventeenth century onwards the notion of the simple inherence of the
- colour in the stone has had to be given up. This introduces the further
- difficulty that it is the colour which is extended and only inferentially the
- stone, since now we have had to separate the colour from the stone.
- Secondly, the molecular theory has robbed the stone of its continuity, of
- its unity, and of its passiveness. The stone is now conceived as a society of
- separate molecules in violent agitation. But the metaphysical concepts,
- which had their origin in a mistake about the stone, were now applied to
- the individual molecules. Each atom was still a stuff which retained its self-
- identity and its essential attributes in any portion of time— however short,
- and however long— provided that it did not perish. The notion of the un-
- differentiated endurance of substances with essential attributes and with
- accidental adventures! was still applied. This is the root doctrine of ma-
- terialism: the substance, thus conceived, is the ultimate actual entity.
- But this materialistic concept has proved to be as mistaken for the atom
- as it was for the stone. 'The atom is only explicable as a society with ac-
- tivities involving rhythms with their definite periods. Again the concept
- shifted its application: protons and electrons were conceived as ma-
- terialistic electric charges whose activities could be construed as locomotive
- adventures. We are now approaching the limits of any reasonable certainty
- in our scientific knowledge; but again there is evidence that the concept
- may be mistaken. The mysterious quanta of energy have made their ap-
- pearance, derived, as it would seem, from the recesses of protons, or of
- electrons. Still worse for the concept, these quanta seem to dissolve [122]
- The Extensive Continuum 79
- into the vibrations of light. Also the material of the stars seems to be
- wasting itself in the production of the vibrations.
- Further, the quanta of energy are associated by a simple law with the
- periodic rhythms which we detect in the molecules. Thus the quanta are,
- themselves, in their own nature, somehow vibratory; but they emanate
- from the protons and electrons. Thus there is every reason to believe that
- rhythmic periods cannot be dissociated from the protonic and electronic
- entities.
- The same concept has been applied in other connections where it even
- more obviously fails. It is said that 'men are rational/ This is palpably
- false: they are only intermittently rational—merely liable to rationality.
- Again the phrase 'Socrates is mortal' is only another way of saying that
- 'perhaps he will die/ The intellect of Socrates is intermittent: he occa-
- sionally sleeps and he can be drugged or stunned.
- The simple notion of an enduring substance sustaining persistent quali-
- ties, either essentially or accidentally, expresses a useful abstract for many
- purposes of life. But whenever we try to use it as a fundamental statement
- of the nature of things, it proves itself mistaken. It arose from a mistake
- and has never succeeded in any of its applications. But it has had one
- success: it has entrenched itself in language, in Aristotelian logic, and in
- metaphysics. For its employment in language and in logic, there is— as
- stated above— a sound pragmatic defence. But in metaphysics the concept
- is sheer error. This error does not consist in the employment of the word
- 'substance'; but in the employment of the notion of an actual entity which
- is characterized by essential qualities, and remains numerically one amidst
- the changes of accidental relations and of accidental qualities. The con-
- trary doctrine is that an actual entity never changes, and that it is the out-
- come of whatever can be ascribed to it in the way of qualitv or relationship.
- There then remain two alternatives for philosophy: (i) a monistic universe
- [123] with the illusion of change; and (ii) a pluralistic universe in which
- 'change' means the diversities among the actual entities which belong to
- some one society of a definite type.
- SECTION VI
- We can now, in a preliminary way, summarize some of the agreements
- and disagreements between the philosophy of organism and the seven-
- teenth-century founders of the modern philosophic and scientific traditions.
- It is the basis of any realistic philosophy, that in perception there is a
- disclosure of objectified data, which are known as having a community
- with the immediate experience for which they are data. This 'community'*
- is a community of common activity involving mutual implication. This
- premise is asserted as a primary fact, implicitly assumed in every detail of
- our organization of life. It is implicitly asserted by Locke in his statement
- (II, XXIII, 7, heading), "Power, a great part of our complex ideas of
- 80 Discussions and Applications
- substances ."t The philosophy of organism extends the Cartesian subjectiv-
- ism by affirming the 'ontological principle' and by construing it as the defi-
- nition of 'actuality/ This amounts to the assumption that each actual entity
- is a locus for the universe. Accordingly Descartes' other statement, that
- every attribute requires a substance,! is merely a special, limited example
- of this more general principle.
- Newton, in his treatment of space, transforms potentiality into actual fact,
- that is to say, into a creature, instead of a datum for creatures. According
- to the philosophy of organism, the extensive space-time continuum is the
- fundamental aspect of the limitation laid upon abstract potentiality by the
- actual world. A more complete rendering of this limited, 'real' potentiality
- is the 'physical field/ A new creation has to arise from the actual world as
- much as from pure potentiality: it arises from the total universe and not
- solely from its mere abstract elements. It also adds to that universe. Thus
- [124] every actual entity springs from that universe which there is for it.
- Causation is nothing else than one outcome of the principle that every
- actual entity has to house its actual world.
- According to Newton, a portion of space cannot move. We have to ask
- how this truth, obvious from Newton's point of view, takes shape in the
- organic theory. Instead of a region of space, we should consider a bit of the
- physical field. This bit, expressing one way in which the actual world in-
- volves the potentiality for a new creation, acquires the unity of an actual
- entity. The physical field is, in this way, atomized with definite divisions: it
- becomes a 'nexus' f of actualities. Such a quantum (i.e., each actual divi-
- sion) of the extensive continuum is the primary phase of a creature. This
- quantum is constituted by its totality of relationships and cannot move.
- Also the creature cannot have any external adventures, but only the in-
- ternal adventure of becoming. Its birth is its end.
- This is a theory of monads; but it differs from Leibniz's in that his
- monads change. In the organic theory, they merely become. Each monadic
- creature is a mode of the process of 'feeling' the world, of housing the
- world in one unit of complex feeling, in every way determinate. Such a
- unit is an 'actual occasion'; it is the ultimate creature derivative from the
- creative process.
- The term 'event' is used in a more genera] sense. An event is a nexus of
- actual occasions inter-related in some determinate fashion in some exten-
- sive quantum: it is either a nexus in its formal completeness, or it is an
- objectified nexus. One actual occasion is a limiting type of event. The
- most general sense of the meaning of change is 'the differences between
- actual occasions in one event.' For example, a molecule is a historic route
- of actual occasions; and such a route is an 'event.' Now the motion of the
- molecule is nothing else than the differences between the successive occa-
- sions of its life-history in respect to the extensive quanta from which they
- arise; \12S] and the changes in the molecule are the consequential dif-
- ferences in the actual occasions.
- The Extensive Continuum 81
- The organic doctrine is closer to Descartes than to Newton. Also it is
- close to Spinoza; but Spinoza bases his philosophy upon the monistic sub-
- stance, of which the actual occasions are inferior modes. The philosophy
- of organism inverts this point of view.
- As to the direct knowledge of the actual world as a datum for the
- immediacy of feeling, we first refer to Descartes in Meditation J, 'These
- hands and this body are mine' 7 ; also to Hume in his many assertions of the
- type, we see with our eyes. Such statements witness to direct knowledge of
- the antecedent functioning of the body in sense-perception. Both agree-
- though Hume more explicitly— that sense-perception of the contemporary
- world is accompanied by perception of the 'withness' of the body. It is
- this withness that makes the body the starting point for our knowledge of
- the circumambient world. We find here our direct knowledge of 'causal
- efficacy/ Hume and Descartes in their theory of direct perceptive knowl-
- edge dropped out this withness of the body; and thus confined perception
- to presentational immediacy. Santayana, in his doctrine of 'animal faith/
- practically agrees with Hume and Descartes as to this withness of the
- actual world, including the body. Santayana also excludes our knowledge
- of it from givenness. Descartes calls it a certain kind of 'understanding';
- Santayana calls it 'animal faith' provoked by 'shock'; and Hume calls it
- "practice. 7
- But we must— to avoid 'solipsism of the present moment' — include in
- direct perception something more than presentational immediacy. For the
- organic theory, the most primitive perception is 'feeling the body as func-
- tioning/ This is a feeling of the world in the past; it is the inheritance of
- the world as a complex of feeling; namely, it is the feeling of derived feel-
- ings. The later, sophisticated perception is 'feeling the contemporary
- world/ Even this presentational immediacy begins with [126] sense-presen-
- tation of the contemporary body. The body, however, is only a peculiarly
- intimate bit of the world. Just as Descartes said, 'this body is mine'; so he
- should have said, 'this actual world is mine/ My process of 'being myself
- is my origination from my possession of the world.
- It is obvious that there arise the questions of comparative relevance and
- of comparative vagueness, which constitute the perspective of the world.
- For example, the body is that portion of the world where, in causal per-
- ception, there is some distinct separation of regions. There is not, in causal
- perception, this distinctness for the past world external to the body. We
- eke out our knowledge by 'symbolic transference 7 from causal perception
- to sense-presentation, and vice versa.
- Those realists, who base themselves upon the notion of substance, do
- not get away from the notion of actual entities which move and change.
- From the point of view of the philosophy of organism, there is great
- merit in Newton's immovable receptacles. But for Newton they are eternal.
- Locke's notion of time hits the mark better: time is 'perpetually perish-
- ing.' In the organic philosophy an actual entity has 'perished* when it is
- 82 Discussions and Applications
- complete. The pragmatic use of the actual entity, constituting its static
- life, lies in the future. The creature perishes and is immortal. The actual
- entities beyond it can say, 'It is mine/ But the possession imposes
- conformation.
- This conception of an actual entity in the fluent world is little more
- than an expansion of a sentence in the Timaeus: 9 "But that which is
- conceived by opinion with the help of sensation and without reason, is
- always in af process of becoming and perishing and never really is." Berg-
- son, in his protest against "spatialization," is only echoing Plato's phrase
- 'and never really is/
- 9 28A;f Jowett's translation. Professor A. E. Taylor in his Commentary On
- Plato's Timaeus renders the word 8o£ a by 'belief or 'judgment' in the place of
- Jowett's word 'opinion/ Taylor's translation brings out the Platonic influence in
- Descartes' Meditations, namely Plato's 8o£ a is the Cartesian judicium.
- CHAPTER III
- THE ORDER OF NATURE
- SECTION I
- [127] In this, and in the next chapter, among modern philosophers we
- are chiefly concerned with Hume and with Kant, and among ancient phi-
- losophers with the Timaeus of Plato. These chapters are concerned with
- the allied problems of 'order in the universe/ of 'induction/ and of 'gen-
- eral truths/ The present chapter is wholly concerned with the topic of
- 'order/ For the organic doctrine the problem of order assumes primary
- importance. No actual entity can rise beyond what the actual world as a
- datum from its standpoint— its actual world— allows it to be. Each such
- entity arises from a primary phase of the concrescence of objectifications
- which are in some respects settled: the basis of its experience is 'given/
- Now the correlative of 'order' is 'disorder/ There can be no peculiar mean-
- ing in the notion of 'order' unless this contrast holds. Apart from it, 'order*
- must be a synonym for 'givenness/ But 'order' means more than 'given-
- ness/ though it presupposes 'givenness';t 'disorder' is also 'given/ Each
- actual entity requires a totality of 'givenness/ and each totality of 'given-
- ness' attains its measure of 'order/
- Four grounds of 'order' at once emerge:
- (i) That 'order' in the actual world is differentiated from mere
- 'givenness' by introduction of adaptation for the attainment of an end.
- (ii) That this end is concerned with the gradations of intensity in the
- satisfactions of actual entities (members of the nexus) in whose formal
- constitutions the nexus [128] (i.e., antecedent members of the nexus) in
- question is objectified.
- (iii) That the heightening of intensity arises from order such that the
- multiplicity of components in the nexus can enter explicit feeling as con-
- trasts, and are not dismissed into negative prehensions as incompatibilities.
- (iv) That 'intensity' in the formal constitution of a subject-superject
- involves 'appetition' in its objective functioning as superject.
- 'Order' is a mere generic term: there can only be some definite specific
- 'order/ not merely 'order' in the vague. Thus every definite total phase of
- 'givenness' involves a reference to that specific 'order' which is its dominant
- ideal, and involves the specific 'disorder' due to its inclusion of 'given'
- components which exclude the attainment of the full ideal. The attain-
- ment is partial, and thus there is 'disorder'; but there is some attainment,
- 83
- 84 Discussions and Applications
- and thus there is some 'order/ There is not just one ideal 'order' which
- all actual entities should attain and fail to attain . In each case there is an
- ideal peculiar to each particular actual entity, and arising from the domi-
- nant components in its phase of 'givenness.' This notion of 'dominance*
- will have to be discussed later in connection with the notion of the sys-
- tematic character of a 'cosmic epoch' and of the subordinate systematic
- characters of 'societies' included in a cosmic epoch. The notion of one
- ideal arises from the disastrous overmoralization of thought under the in-
- fluence of fanaticism, or pedantry. The notion of a dominant ideal peculiar
- to each actual entity is Platonic.
- It is notable that no biological science has been able to express itself
- apart from phraseology which is meaningless unless it refers to ideals proper
- to the organism in question. This aspect of the universe impressed itself
- on that great biologist and philosopher, Aristotle. His philosophy led to a
- wild overstressing of the notion of 'final causes'! during the Christian mid-
- dle ages; and thence, by a reaction, to the correlative overstressing of [129]
- the notion of 'efficient causes' during the modern scientific period. One
- task of a sound metaphysics is to exhibit final and efficient causes in their
- proper relation to each other. The necessity and the difficulty of this task
- are stressed by Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
- Thus the notion of 'order' is bound up with the notion of an actual
- entity as involving an attainment which is a specific satisfaction. This satis-
- faction is the attainment of something individual to the entity in question.
- It cannot be construed as a component contributing to its own concres-
- cence; it is the ultimate fact, individual to the entity. The notion of 'satis-
- faction' is the notion of the 'entity as concrete' abstracted from the 'process
- of concrescence'; it is the outcome separated from the process, thereby
- losing the actuality of the atomic entity, which is both process and out-
- come. 'Satisfaction' provides the individual element in the composition of
- the actual entity— that element which has led to the definition of substance
- as 'requiring nothing but itself in order to exist.' But the 'satisfaction' is
- the 'superject' rather than the 'substance' or the 'subject.' It closes up the
- entity; and yet is the superject adding its character to the creativity whereby
- there is a becoming of entities superseding the one in question. The
- 'formal' reality of the actuality in question belongs to its process of con-
- crescence and not to its 'satisfaction/ This is the sense in which the
- philosophy of organism interprets Plato's phrase 'and never really is'; for
- the superject can only be interpreted in terms of its 'objective immortality/
- 'Satisfaction' is a generic term: there are specific differences between
- the 'satisfactions' of different entities, including gradations of intensity.
- These specific differences can only be expressed by the analysis of the com-
- ponents in the concrescence out of which the actual entity arises. The in-
- tensity of satisfaction is promoted by the 'order' in the phases from which
- concrescence arises and through which it passes; it is enfeebled by the [130]
- 'disorder/ The components in the concrescence are thus 'values' con-
- The Order of Nature 85
- tributary to the 'satisfaction/ The concrescence is thus the building up
- of a determinate 'satisfaction/ which constitutes the completion of the
- actual togetherness of the discrete components. The process of concres-
- cence terminates with the attainment of a fully determinate 'satisfaction';
- and the creativity thereby passes over into the 'given' primary phase for the
- concrescence of other actual entities. This transcendence is thereby estab-
- lished when there is attainment of determinate 'satisfaction' completing
- the antecedent entity. Completion is the perishing of immediacy: 'It never
- really is/f
- No actual entity can be conscious of its own satisfaction; for such knowl-
- edge would be a component in the process, and would thereby alter the
- satisfaction. In respect to the entity in question the satisfaction can only
- be considered as a creative determination, by which the objectifications of
- the entity beyond itself are settled. In other words, the 'satisfaction' of an
- entity can only be discussed in terms of the usefulness of that entity. It is
- a qualification of creativity. The tone of feeling embodied in this satisfac-
- tion passes into the world beyond, by reason of these objectifications. The
- world is self-creative; and the actual entity as self-creating creature passes
- into its immortal function of part-creator of the transcendent world. In its
- self-creation the actual entity is guided by its ideal of itself as individual
- satisfaction and as transcendent creator. The enjoyment of this ideal is the
- 'subjective aim/ by reason of which the actual entity is a determinate
- process.
- This subjective aim is not primarily intellectual; it is the lure for feeling.
- This lure for feeling is the germ of mind. Here I am using the term 'mind'
- to mean the complex of mental operations involved in the constitution of
- an actual entity. Mental operations do not necessarily involve conscious-
- ness. The concrescence, absorb- [131] ing the derived data into immediate
- privacy, consists in mating the data with ways of feeling provocative of the
- private synthesis. These subjective ways of feeling are not merely receptive
- of the data as alien facts; they clothe the dry bones with the flesh of a real
- being, emotional, purposive, appreciative. The miracle of creation is de-
- scribed in the vision of the prophet Ezekiel: "So I prophesied as he com-
- manded me, and the breath came into them, and they lived, and stood up
- upon their feet, an exceeding great army." T
- The breath of feeling which creates a new individual fact has an origina-
- tion not wholly traceable to the mere data. It conforms to the data, in that
- it feels the data. But the how of feeling, though it is germane to the data,
- is not fully determined by the data. The relevant feeling is not settled, as
- to its inclusions or exclusions of 'subjective form/ by the data about which
- the feeling is concerned. The concrescent process is the elimination of
- these indeterminations of subjective forms. The quality of feeling has to be
- definite in respect to the eternal objects with which feeling clothes itself
- 1 Ezekiel, xxxvii:10.t
- 86 Discussions and Applications
- in its self-definition. It is a mode of ingression of eternal objects into the
- actual occasion. But this self-definition is analysable into two phases. First,
- the conceptual ingression of the eternal objects in the double r&le of being
- germane to the data and of being potentials for physical feeling. This is
- the ingression of an eternal object in the r61e of a conceptual lure for feel-
- ing. The second phase is the admission of the lure into the reality of feeling,
- or its rejection from this reality. The relevance of an eternal object in its
- role of lure is a fact inherent in the data. In this sense the eternal object
- is a constituent of the 'objective lure/ But the admission into, or rejection
- from, reality of conceptual feeling is the originative decision of the actual
- occasion. In this sense an actual occasion is causa sui. The subjective forms
- of the prehen- [132] sions in one phase of concrescence control the specific
- integrations of prehensions in later phases of that concrescence.
- An example of the lure for feeling is given by Hume himself. In the first
- section of his Treatise* he lays down the proposition, "That all our simple
- ideas in their first appearance, are derived from simple impressions ? which
- are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent!' It must be
- remembered that in the organic philosophy the 'data of objectifications' are
- the nearest analogue to Hume's 'simple impressions/ Thus, modifying
- Hume's principle, the only lure to conceptual feeling is an exact con-
- formation to the qualities realized in the objectified actualities. But Hume
- (toe. eft.) notes an exception which carries with it the exact principle
- which has just been laid down, namely, the principle of relevant potentials,
- unrealized in the datum and yet constituent of an 'objective lure' by
- proximity to the datum. The point is that 'order' in the actual world in-
- troduces a derivative 'order' among eternal objects. Hume writes:
- There is. however, one contradictory phenomenon, which may prove,
- that it is not absolutely impossible for ideas to go before their corre-
- spondent impressions. I believe it will readily be allowed, that the sev-
- eral distinct ideas of colours, which enter by the eyes, orf those of
- sounds, which are conveyed by the hearing, are really different from
- each other, though, at the same time, resembling. Now, if this be true
- of different colours, it must be no less so of the different shades of the
- same colour, that each of them produces a distinct idea, independent of
- the rest. . . . Suppose, therefore, a person to have enjoyed his sight for
- thirty years, and to have become perfectly well acquainted with colours
- of all kinds, excepting one particular shade of blue, for instance, which
- it never hast been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades
- of that colour, except that single one, be placed before him, descending
- gradually from the deepest to the [133] lightest; it is plain, that he
- will perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, and will be sensible
- that there is a greater distance in that place, betwixtt the contiguous
- colours, than in any other. Now I ask, whether it is possible for him,
- from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, andt raise up to
- himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been
- The Order of Nature 87
- conveyed to him by his senses? I believe there are few but will be of
- opinion that he can; and this may serve as a proof, that the simple
- ideas are not always derived from the correspondent impressions;
- though the instance t is so particular and singular, that it is scarce
- worth our observing, and does not merit that, for it alone, we should
- alter our general maxim.
- This passage requires no comment, except for its final clause. Hume puts
- the 'instance' aside as being 'particular and singular'; it is exactly this esti-
- mate which is challenged by the philosophy of organism. The analysis of
- concrescence, here adopted, conceives that there is an origination of con-
- ceptual feeling, admitting or rejecting whatever is apt for feeling by reason
- of its germaneness to the basic data. The gradation of eternal objects in
- respect to this germaneness is the 'objective lure' for feeling; the concres-
- cent process admits a selection from this 'objective lure 7 into subjective
- efficiency. This is the subjective 'ideal of itself which guides the process.
- Also the basic data are constituted by the actual world which 'belongs to'
- that instance of concrescent process. Feelings are 'vectors'; for they feel
- what is there and transform it into what is here.
- The term 'potential difference' is an old one in physical science; and re-
- cently it has been introduced in physiology with a meaning diverse from,
- though generically allied to, its older meaning in physics. The ultimate fact
- in the constitution of an actual entity which suggests this term is the ob-
- jective lure for feeling. In the comparison of two actual entities, the con-
- trast be- \134] tween their objective lures is their 'potential difference'; and
- all other uses of this phrase are abstractions derivative from this ultimate
- meaning.
- The 'objectifications' of the actual entities in the actual world, relative to
- a definite actual entity, constitute the efficient causes out of which that
- actual entity arises; the 'subjective aim' at 'satisfaction' constitutes the final
- cause, or lure, whereby there is determinate concrescence; and that at-
- tained 'satisfaction' remains as an element in the content of creative pur-
- pose. There is, in this way, transcendence of the creativity; and this
- transcendence effects determinate objectifications for the renewal of the
- process in the concrescence of actualities beyond that satisfied superject.
- Thus an actual entity has a threefold! character: (i) it has the char-
- acter 'given' for it by the past; (ii) it has the subjective character aimed
- at in its process of concrescence; (iii) it has the superjective character,
- which is the pragmatic value of its specific satisfaction qualifying the
- transcendent creativity.
- In the case of the primordial actual entity, which is God, there is no
- past. Thus the ideal realization of conceptual feeling takes the precedence.
- God differs from other actual entities in rhe fact that Hume's principle, of
- the derivate character of conceptual feelings, does not hold for him. There
- is still, however, the same threefold character: (i) The 'primordial na-
- ture' of God is the concrescence of at unity of conceptual feelings, in-
- 88 Discussions and Applications
- eluding among their data all eternal objects. The concrescence is directed
- by the subjective aim. that the subjective forms of the feelings shall be
- such as to constitute the eternal objects into relevant lures of feeling* sev-
- erally appropriate for all realizable basic conditions, (ii) The 'consequent
- nature' of God is the physical prehension by God of the actualities of the
- evolving universe. His! primordial nature directs such perspectives of ob-
- jectification that each novel actuality in the temporal world contributes
- such elements as it can to a realization in God [J 35] free from inhibitions
- of intensity by reason of discordance, (iii) The 'super jective nature' f of
- God is the character of the pragmatic value of his specific satisfaction
- qualifying the transcendent creativity in the various temporal instances.
- This is the conception of God, according to which he is considered as the
- outcome of creativity, as the foundation of order, and as the goad* to-
- wards novelty. 'Order' and 'novelty' are but the instruments of his sub-
- jective aim which is the intensification of 'formal immediacy.' It is to be
- noted that every actual entity, including God, is something individual for
- its own sake; and thereby transcends the rest of actuality. And also it is to
- be noted that every actual entity, including God, is a creature transcended
- by the creativity which it qualifies. A temporal occasion in respect to the
- second element of its character, and God in respect to the first element of
- his character satisfy Spinoza's definition of substance, that it is causa sui.
- To be causa sui means that the process of concrescence is its own reason
- for the decision in respect to the qualitative clothing of feelings. It is
- finally responsible for the decision by which any lure for feeling is ad-
- mitted to efficiency. The freedom inherent in the universe is constituted
- by this element of self-causation.
- In the subsequent discussion, 'actual entity' will be taken to mean a con-
- ditioned actual entity of the temporal world, unless God is expressly in-
- cluded in the discussion. The term 'actual occasion' will always exclude
- God from its scope.
- The philosophy of organism is the inversion of Kant's philosophy. The
- Critique of Pure Reason describes the process by which subjective data
- pass into the appearance of an objective world. Trie philosophy of organ-
- ism seeks to describe how objective data pass into subjective satisfaction,
- and how order in the objective data provides intensity in the subjective
- satisfaction. For Kant, the world emerges from the subject; for the philoso-
- phy of [J 36] organism, the subject emerges from the world— a 'super ject'
- rather than a 'subject.' The word 'object' thus means an entity which is a
- potentiality for being a component in feeling; and the word 'subject' means
- the entity constituted by the process of feeling, and including this process.
- The feeler is the unity emergent from its own feelings; and feelings are the
- details of the process intermediary between this unity and its many data.
- The data are the potentials for feeling; that is to say, they are objects. The
- process is the elimination of indeterminateness of feeling from the unity
- of one subjective experience. The degree of order in the datum is measured
- The Order of Nature 89
- by the degree of richness in the objective lure. The 'intensity 7 achieved be-
- longs to the subjective form of the satisfaction,
- SECTION II
- It has been explained in the previous section that the notion of 'order' is
- primarily applicable to the objectified data for individual actual entities.
- It has been necessary to give a sketch of some categories applying to an
- actual entity in order to show how this can be the case. But there is a
- derivative sense of the term 'order/ which is more usually in our minds
- when we use that word. We speak of the 'order of nature/ meaning
- thereby the order reigning in that limited portion of the universe, 2 or even
- of the surface of the earth, which has come under our observation. We also
- speak of a man of orderly life, or of disorderly life. In any of these senses,
- the term 'order' evidently applies to the relations among themselves en-
- joyed by many actual entities which thereby form a society. The term
- 'society' will always be restricted to mean a nexus of actual entities which
- are 'ordered' among themselves in the sense to be explained in this sec-
- tion. 3 [137] The point of a 'society,' as the term is here used, is that it is
- self-sustaining; in other words, that it is its own reason. Thus a society is
- more than a set of entities to which the same class-name applies: that is
- to say, it involves more than a merely mathematical conception of 'order.'
- To constitute a society, the class-name has got to apply to each member,
- by reason of genetic derivation from other members of that same society.
- The members of the society are alike because, by reason of their common
- character, they impose on other members of the society the conditions
- which lead to that likeness.
- This likeness 4 consists in the fact that (i) a certain element of 'form'
- is a contributory component to the individual satisfaction of each member
- of the society; and that (ii) the contribution by the element to the objecti-
- fication of any one member of the society for prehension by other mem-
- bers promotes its analogous reproduction in the satisfactions of those other
- members. Thus a set of entities is a society (i) in virtue of a 'defining
- characteristic' shared by its members, and (ii) in virtue of the presence of
- the defining characteristic being due to the environment provided by the
- society itself.
- For example, the life of** man is a historic route of actual occasions
- which in a marked degree— to be discussed more fully later—inherit from
- each other. That set of occasions, dating from his first acquirement of the
- 2 Cf. The Fitness of the Environment, New York, Macmiilan, 1913, The
- Order of Nature, Harvard Univ. Press, 1917, and Blood, Ha ward Univ. Press,
- 1928, Ch. 1, allt by Professor L. }. Henderson. These works are fundamental
- for anv discussion of this subject.
- 3 Also cf.t Part I, Ch. Ill, Sect. II.
- 4 Cf. Parti, Ch. Ill, Sect. II.
- 90 Discussions and Applications
- Greek language and including all those occasions up to his loss of any
- adequate knowledge of that language, constitutes a society in reference to
- knowledge of the Greek language. Such knowledge is a common character-
- istic inherited from occasion to occasion along the historic route. This
- example has purposely been chosen for its reference to a somewhat trivial
- element of order, viz. knowledge of the Greek language; a more important
- character of order would have been that complex character in virtue of
- which a man is considered to be the same enduring person from birth to
- death. Also in this in- [138] stance the members of the society are arranged
- in a serial order by their genetic relations. Such a society is said 5 to possess
- 'personal order/
- Thus a society is, for each of its members, an environment with some
- element of order in it, persisting by reason of the genetic relations between
- its own members. Such an element of order is the order prevalent in the
- society.
- But there is no society in isolation. Every society must be considered
- with its background of a wider environment of actual entities, which also
- contribute their objectifications to which the members of the society must
- conform. Thus the given contributions of the environment must at least
- be permissive of the self-sustenance of the society. Also, in proportion to
- its importance, this background must contribute those general characters
- which the more special character of the society presupposes for its mem-
- bers. But this means that the environment, together with the society in
- question, must form a larger society in respect to some more general
- characters than those defining the society from which we started. Thus we
- arrive at the principle that every society requires a social background, of
- which it is itself a part. In reference to any given society the world of actual
- entities is to be conceived as forming a background in layers of social order,
- the defining characteristics becoming wider and more general as we widen
- the background. Of course, the remote actualities of the background have
- their own specific characteristics of various types of social order. But such
- specific characteristics have become irrelevant for the society in question
- by reason of the inhibitions and attenuations introduced by discordance,
- that is to say, by disorder.
- The metaphysical characteristics of an actual entity— in the proper gen-
- eral sense of 'metaphysics'— should be those which apply to all actual en-
- tities. It may be doubted whether such metaphysical concepts have ever
- [J 39] been formulated in their strict purity— even taking into account
- the most general principles of logic and of mathematics. We have to con-
- fine ourselves to societies sufficiently wide, and yet such that their defining
- characteristics cannot safely be ascribed to all actual entities which have
- been or may be.
- The causal laws which dominate a social environment are the product
- 5 Cf. Part I, Ch. Ill, Sect. II.
- The Order of Nature 91
- of the defining characteristic of that society. But the society is only efficient
- through its individual members. Thus in a society, the members can only
- exist by reason of the laws which dominate the society, and the laws only
- come into being by reason of the analogous characters of the members
- of the society.
- But there is not any perfect attainment of an ideal order whereby the
- indefinite endurance of a society is secured. A society arises from disorder,
- where 'disorder 7 is defined by reference to the ideal for that society; the
- favourable background of a larger environment either itself decays, or
- ceases to favour the persistence of the society after some stage of growth:
- the society then ceases to reproduce its members, and finally after a stage
- of decay passes out of existence. Thus a system of 'laws' determining re-
- production in some portion of the universe gradually rises into dominance;
- it has its stage of endurance, and passes out of existence with the decay
- of the society from which it emanates.
- The arbitrary, as it were 'given/ elements in the laws of nature warn us
- that we are in a special cosmic epoch. Here the phrase 'cosmic epoch' is
- used to mean that widest society of actual entities whose immediate rele-
- vance to ourselves is traceable. This epoch is characterized by electronic
- and protonic actual entities, and by yet more ultimate actual entities which
- can be dimly discerned in the quanta of energy. Maxwell's equations of
- the electromagnetic field hold sway by reason of the throngs of electrons
- and of protons. Also each electron is a society of electronic occasions, and
- each proton is a soci- [MO] ety of protonic occasions. These occasions are
- the reasons for the electromagnetic laws; but their capacity for reproduc-
- tion, whereby each electron and each proton has a long life, and whereby
- new electrons and new protons come into being, is itself due to these same
- laws. But there is disorder in the sense that the laws are not perfectly
- obeyed, and that the reproduction is mingled with instances of failure.
- There is accordingly a gradual transition to new types of order, supervening
- upon a gradual rise into dominance on the part of the present natural
- laws.
- But the arbitrary factors in the order of nature are not confined to the
- electromagnetic laws. There are the four dimensions of the spatio-temporal
- continuum, the geometrical axioms, even the mere dimensional character
- of the continuum— apart from the particular number of dimensions— and
- the fact of measurability. In later chapters (cf. Part IV) it will be evident
- that all these properties are additional to the more basic fact of extensive-
- ness; also, that even extensiveness allows of grades of specialization, arbi-
- trarily one way or another, antecedently to the introduction of any of these
- additional notions. By this discovery the logical and mathematical investi-
- gations of the last two centuries are very relevant to philosophy. For the
- cosmological theories of Descartes, Newton, Locke, Hume, and Kant were
- framed in ignorance of that fact. Indeed, in the Timaeus Plato seems to be
- more aware of it than any of his successors, in the sense that he frames
- 92 Discussions and Applications
- statements whose meaning is elucidated by its explicit recognition. These
- 'given 7 factors in geometry point to the wider society of which the elec-
- tronic cosmic epoch constitutes a fragment.
- A society does not in any sense create the complex of eternal objects
- which constitutes its defining characteristic. It only elicits that complex
- into importance for its members, and secures the reproduction of its mem-
- bership. In speaking of a society—unless the context ex- [141] pressly re-
- quires another interpretation— 'membership' will always refer to the actual
- occasions, and not to subordinate enduring objects composed of actual
- occasions such as the life of an electron or of a man. These latter societies
- are the strands of 'personal' order which enter into many societies; gen-
- erally speaking, whenever we are concerned with occupied space, we are
- dealing with this restricted type of corpuscular societies; and whenever
- we are thinking of the physical field in empty space, we are dealing with
- societies of the wider type. It seems as if the careers of waves of light illus-
- trate the transition from the more restricted type to the wider type.
- Thus our cosmic epoch is to be conceived primarily as a society of elec-
- tromagnetic occasions, including electronic and protonic occasions, and
- only occasionally— for the sake of brevity in statement—as a society of elec-
- trons and protons. There is the same distinction between thinking of an
- army either as a class of men, or as a class of regiments.
- SECTION III
- Thus the physical relations, the geometrical relations of measurement,
- the dimensional relations, and the various grades of extensive relations,
- involved in the physical and geometrical theory of nature, are derivative
- from a series of societies of increasing width of prevalence, the more spe-
- cial societies being included in the wider societies. This situation consti-
- tutes the physical and geometrical order of nature. Beyond these societies
- there is disorder, where 'disorder' is a relative term expressing the lack of
- importance possessed by the defining characteristics of the societies in
- question beyond their own bounds. When those societies decay, it will not
- mean that their defining characteristics cease to exist; but that they lapse
- into unimportance for the actual entities in question. The term 'disorder'
- refers to a society only partially influential in impressing its characteristics
- in the [142] form of prevalent laws. This doctrine, that order is a social
- product, appears in modern science as the statistical theory of the laws of
- nature, and in the emphasis on genetic relation.
- But there may evidently be a state in which there are no prevalent so-
- cieties securing any congruent unity of effect. This is a state of chaotic
- disorder; it is disorder approaching an absolute sense of that term. In such
- an ideal state, what is 'given' for any actual entity is the outcome of
- thwarting, contrary decisions from the settled world. Chaotic disorder
- means lack of dominant definition of compatible contrasts in the satisfac-
- The Order of Nature 93
- tions attained, and consequent enfeeblement of intensity. It means the
- lapse towards slighter actuality. It is a natural figure of speech, but only
- a figure of speech, to conceive a slighter actuality as being an approach
- towards nonentity. But you cannot approach nothing; for there is nothing
- to approach. It is an approach towards the futility of being a faint compro-
- mise between contrary reasons. The dominance of societies, harmoniously
- requiring each other, is the essential condition for depth of satisfaction.
- The Timaeus of Plato, and the Scholium of Newton— the latter already
- in large part quoted— are the two statements of cosmological theory which
- have had the chief influence on Western thought. To the modern reader,
- the Timaeus, considered as a statement of scientific details, is in compar-
- ison with the Scholium simply foolish. But what it lacks in superficial de-
- tail, it makes up for by its philosophic depth. If it be read as an allegory,
- it conveys profound truth; whereas the Scholium is an immensely able
- statement of details which, although abstract and inadequate as a philoso-
- phy, can within certain limits be thoroughly trusted for the deduction of
- truths at the same level of abstraction as itself. The penalty of its philo-
- sophical deficiency is that the Scholium conveys no hint of the limits of
- its own application. The practical effect is that the readers, and almost
- certainly Newton himself, so construe its meaning as to fall into [143} what
- I have elsewhere 6 termed the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness/ It is the
- office of metaphysics to determine the limits of the applicability of such
- abstract notions.
- The Scholium betrays its abstractness by affording no hint of that aspect
- of self-production, of generation, of cf>6ai<;, of natura naturans, which is
- so prominent in nature. For the Scholium, nature is merely, and com-
- pletely, there, externally designed and obedient. The full sweep of the
- modern doctrine of evolution would have confused the Newton of the
- Scholium, but would have enlightened the Plato of the Timaeus. So far
- as Newton is concerned, we have his own word for this statement. In a
- letter to Bentley, he writes: "When I wrote my treatise about our system,
- I had an eye upon such principles as might work with considering men for
- the belief of a Deity; . . ." 7 The concept in Newton's mind is that of a
- fully articulated system requiring a definite supernatural origin with that
- articulation. This is the form of the cosmological argument, now generally
- abandoned as invalid; because our notion of causation concerns the rela-
- tions of states of things within the actual world, and can only be illegit-
- imately extended to a transcendent derivation. The notion of God, which
- will be discussed later (cf. Part V), is that of an actual entity immanent
- in the actual world, but transcending any finite cosmic epoch — a being at
- once actual, eternal, immanent, and transcendent. The transcendence of
- 6 Cf. Science and the\ Modern World, Ch. III.
- 7 This quotation is taken from Jebb's Life of Bentley, Ch. II. The Life is pub-
- lished in the English Men of Letters series.
- 94 Discussions and Applications
- God is not peculiar to him. Every actual entity, in virtue ot its novelty,
- transcends its universe, God included.
- In the Scholium, space and time, with all their current mathematical
- properties, are ready-made for the material masses; the material masses are
- ready-made for the 'forces' which constitute their action and reaction; and
- space, and time, and material masses, and forces, are [144] alike ready-
- made for the initial motions which the Deity impresses throughout the
- universe. It is not possible to extract from the Scholium— construed with
- misplaced concreteness— either a theism, or an atheism, or an epistemology,
- which can survive a comparison with the facts. This is the inescapable
- conclusion to be inferred from Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Re-
- ligion. Biology is also reduced to a mystery; and finally physics itself has
- now reached a stage of experimental knowledge inexplicable in terms of
- the categories of the Scholium.
- In the Timaeus, there are many phrases and statements which find their
- final lucid expression in the Scholium. While noting this concurrence of
- the two great cosmological documents guiding Western thought, it can-
- not be too clearly understood that, within its limits of abstraction, what
- the Scholium says is true, and that it is expressed with the lucidity of
- genius. Thus any cosmological document which cannot be read as an inter-
- pretation of the Scholium is worthless. But there is another side to the
- Timaeus which finds no analogy in the Scholium. In general terms, this
- side of the Timaeus may be termed its metaphysical character, that is to
- say, its endeavour to connect the behaviour of things with the formal na-
- ture of things. The behaviour apart from the things is abstract, and so are
- the things apart from their behaviour. Newton— wisely, for his purposes-
- made this abstraction which the Timaeus endeavours to avoid.
- In the first place, the Timaeus connects behaviour with the ultimate
- molecular characters of the actual entities. Plato conceives the notion of
- definite societies of actual molecular entities, each society with its de-
- fining characteristics. He does not conceive this assemblage of societies as
- causa sui. But he does conceive it as the work of subordinate deities, who
- are the animating principles of those departments of nature. In Greek
- thought, either poetic or philosophic, the separation between the cpOoiq
- and such deities had not that absolute character which it has for us who
- have inherited the Semitic Jehovah.
- [J 45] Newton could have accepted a molecular theory as easily as Plato,
- but there is this difference between them: Newton would have been sur-
- prised at the modern quantum theory and at the dissolution of quanta into
- vibrations; Plato would have expected it. While we note the many things
- said by Plato in the Timaeus which are now foolishness, we must also give
- him credit for that aspect of his teaching in which he was two thousand
- years ahead of his time. Plato accounted for the sharp-cut differences be-
- tween kinds of natural things, by assuming an approximation of the mole-
- The Order of Nature 95
- cules of the fundamental kinds respectively to the mathematical forms of
- the regular solids. He also assumed that certain qualitative contrasts in oc-
- currences, such as that between musical notes, depended on the participa-
- tion of these occurrences in some of the simpler ratios between integral
- numbers. He thus obtained a reason why there should be an approxima-
- tion to sharp-cut differences between kinds of molecules, and why there
- should be sharp-cut relations of harmony standing out amid dissonance.
- Thus 'contrast'— as the opposite of incompatibility—depends on a certain
- simplicity of circumstance; but the higher contrasts depend on the assem-
- blage of a multiplicity of lower contrasts, this assemblage again exhibiting
- higher types of simplicity.
- It is well to remember that the modern quantum theory, + with its sur-
- prises in dealing with the atom, is only the latest instance of a well-marked
- character of nature, which in each particular instance is only explained by
- some ad hoc dogmatic assumption. The theory of biological evolution
- would not in itself lead us to expect the sharply distinguished genera and
- species which we find in nature. There might be an occasional bunching of
- individuals round certain typical forms; but there is no explanation of the
- almost complete absence of intermediate forms. Again Newton's Scholium
- gives no hint of the ninety-two possibilities for atoms, or of the limited
- number of ways in which atoms can be combined so as to form molecules.
- Physicists are now explaining these [J 46] chemical facts by means of con-
- ceptions which Plato would have welcomed.
- There is another point in which the organic philosophy only repeats
- Plato. In the Timaeus the origin of the present cosmic epoch is traced back
- to an aboriginal disorder, chaotic according to our ideals. This is the evolu-
- tionary doctrine of the philosophy of organism. Plato's notion has puz-
- zled critics who are obsessed with the Semitic 8 theory of a wholly tran-
- scendent God creating out of nothing an accidental universe. Newton held
- the Semitic theory. The Scholium made no provision for the evolution of
- matter— very naturally, since the topic lay outside its scope. The result has
- been that the non-evolution of matter has been a tacit presupposition
- throughout modern thought. Until the last few years the sole alternatives
- were: either the material universe, with its present type of order, is eternal;
- or else it came into being, and will pass out of being, according to the fiat
- of Jehovah. Thus, on all sides, Plato's allegory of the evolution of a new
- type of order based on new types of dominant societies became a daydream,
- puzzling to commentators.
- Milton, curiously enough, in his Paradise Lost wavers between the
- Timaeus and the Semitic doctrine. This is only another instance of the
- intermixture of classical and Hebrew notions on which his charm of
- 8 The book of Genesis is too primitive to bear upon this point.
- 96 Discussions and Applications
- thought depends. In the description of Satan's journey across Chaos, Satan
- discovers
- The secrets of the hoary deep, a dark
- Illimitable ocean, without bound,
- Without dimension, where length, breadth and highth,
- And time and place are lost; where eldest Night f
- And Chaos, ancestors of Nature, hold
- Eternal anarchy amidst the noise
- Of endless wars, and by confusion stand. 9
- Milton is here performing for Plato the same poetic service that Lucre-
- tius performed for Democritus—with [147] less justification, since Plato
- was quite capable of being his own poet. Also the fact of Satan's journey
- helped to evolve order; for he left a permanent track, useful for the devils
- and the damned.
- The appeal to Plato in this section has been an appeal to the facts
- against the modes of expression prevalent in the last few centuries. These
- recent modes of expression are partly the outcome of a mixture of theology
- and philosophy, and are partly due to the Newtonian physics, no longer
- accepted as a fundamental statement. But language and thought have been
- framed according to that mould; and it is necessary to remind ourselves
- that this is not the way in which the world has been described by some of
- the greatest intellects. Both for Plato and for Aristotle the process of the
- actual world has been conceived as a real incoming of forms into real po-
- tentiality, issuing into that real togetherness which is an actual thing.
- Also, for the Timaeus, the creation of the world is the incoming of a type
- of order establishing a cosmic epoch. It is not the beginning of matter of
- fact, but the incoming of a certain type of social order.
- SECTION IV
- The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion— largely
- conjectural— of the hierarchy of societies composing our present epoch. In
- this way, the preceding discussion of 'order' may be elucidated. It is to be
- carefully noted that we are now deserting metaphysical generality. We shall
- be considering the more special possibilities of explanation consistent with
- our general cosmological doctrine, but not necessitated by it.
- The physical world is bound together by a general type of relatedness
- which constitutes it into an extensive continuum. When we analyse the
- properties of this continuum we discover that they fall into two classes, of
- which one— the more special— presupposes the other— the more general. 10
- The more general type of properties [148] expresses the mere fact of 'ex-
- tensive connection/ of 'whole and part/ of various types of 'geometrical
- 9 Paradise Lost, Bk. II.
- 10 Cf. Part IV for a detailed discussion.
- The Order of Nature 97
- elements' derivable by 'extensive abstraction ; but excluding the introduc-
- tion of more special properties by which straight lines are definable xl and
- measurability thereby introduced.
- In these general properties of extensive connection, we discern the de-
- fining characteristic of a vast nexus extending far beyond our immediate
- cosmic epoch. It contains in itself other epochs, with more particular
- characteristics incompatible with each other. Then from the standpoint of
- our present epoch, the fundamental society in so far as it transcends our
- own epoch seems a vast confusion mitigated by the few, faint elements of
- order contained in its own defining characteristic of 'extensive connection. 7
- We cannot discriminate its other epochs of vigorous order, and we merely
- conceive it as harbouring the faint flush of the dawn of order in our own
- epoch. This ultimate, vast society constitutes the whole environment within
- which our epoch is set, so far as systematic characteristics are discernible
- by us in our present stage of development. In the future the growth of
- theory may endow our successors with keener powers of discernment.
- Our logical analysis, in company with immediate intuition (inspectio),
- enables us to discern a more special society within the society of pure ex-
- tension. This is the 'geometrical 7 society. In this society 12 those specialized
- relationships hold, in virtue of which straight lines are defined. Systematic
- geometry is illustrated in such a geometrical society; and metrical rela-
- tionships can be defined in terms of the analogies of function within the
- scheme of any one systematic geometry. These 'analogies of function 7 are
- what is meant by the notion of 'congruence. 7 This notion is nonsense apart
- from a systematic geometry. The inclusion of extensive quantity [149]
- among fundamental categoreal notions is a complete mistake. This notion
- is definable in terms of each systematic geometry finding its application in a
- geometrical society. It is to be noticed that a systematic geometry is deter-
- mined by the definition of straight lines applicable to the society in ques-
- tion. Contrary to the general opinio^ this definition is possible in inde-
- pendence of the notion of 'measurement. 7 It cannot however be proved
- that in the same geometrical society there may not be competing families
- of loci with equal claims to the status of being a complete family of straight
- lines.
- Given a family of straight lines, expressing a system of relatedness in a
- 'geometric 7 society, the notion of 'congruence 7 and thence of 'measurement 7
- is now determinable in a systematic way throughout the society. But again
- in this case there certainly are competing systems of measurement. Hence
- in connection with each family of straight lines— allowing there be more
- than one such family— there are alternative systems 13 of metrical geom-
- ^ Cf. Part IV, Chs.t III, IV, V.
- 12 Cf . Part IV, especially Chs. Ill, IV, V.
- 13 The existence of alternative systems was demonstrated by Cayley in his
- "Sixth Memoir on Quantics" in Transactions of the Royal Society, 1859.t
- 98 Discussions and Applications
- etry, no one system being more fundamental than the other. Our present
- cosmic epoch is formed by an 'electromagnetic 7 society, which is a more
- special society contained within the geometric society. In this society yet
- more special defining characteristics obtain. These characteristics presup-
- pose those of the two wider societies within which the 'electromagnetic'
- society is contained. But in the ''electromagnetic' society the ambiguity as
- to the relative importance of competing families of straight lines (if there
- be such competing families), and the ambiguity as to the relative im-
- portance of competing definitions of congruence, are determined in favour
- of one family and one 14 congruence-definition. This determination is
- effected by an additional set of physical relationships throughout the so-
- ciety. But this set has lost [ISO] its merely systematic character because it
- constitutes our neighbourhood. These relationships involve components ex-
- pressive of certain individual diversities, and identities between the occa-
- sions which are the members of the nexus. But these diversities and iden-
- tities are correlated according to a systematic law expressible in terms of the
- systematic measurements derived from the geometric nexus. We here
- arrive at the notion of physical quantities which vary from individual to
- individual; this is the notion of the systematization of individual differ-
- ences, the notion of Taw/
- It is the ideal of mathematical physicists to formulate this systematic
- law in its complete generality for our epoch. It is sufficient for our purposes
- to indicate the presumed character of this law by naming the members of
- the society 'electromagnetic occasions/ Thus our present epoch is domi-
- nated by a society of electromagnetic occasions. In so far as this dominance
- approaches completeness, the systematic law which physics seeks is ab-
- solutely dominant. In so far as the dominance is incomplete, the obedience
- is a statistical fact with its corresponding lapses.
- The electromagnetic society exhibits the physical electromagnetic field
- which is the topic of physical science. The members of this nexus are the
- electromagnetic occasions.
- But in its turn, this electromagnetic society would provide no adequate
- order for the production of individual occasions realizing peculiar 'inten-
- sities 7 of experience unless it were pervaded by more special societies,
- vehicles of such order. The physical world exhibits a bewildering com-
- plexity of such societies, favouring each other, competing with each other.
- The most general examples of such societies are the regular trains of
- waves, individual electrons, protons, individual molecules, societies of
- molecules such as inorganic bodies, living cells, and societies of cells such
- as vegetable and animal bodies.
- 14 The transformations into an indefinite variety of coordinates, to which the
- 'tensor theory' refers, all presuppose one congruence-definition. t The invariance
- of the Einsteinian *ds' expresses this fact.
- The Order of Nature 99
- SECTION V
- [151] It is obvious that the simple classification (cf. Part I, Ch. Ill, Sect.
- II) of societies into 'enduring objects/ 'corpuscular societies/ and 'non-
- corpuscular societies' requires amplification. The notion of a society which
- includes subordinate societies and nexus with a definite pattern of struc-
- tural inter-relations f must be introduced. Such societies will be termed
- 'structured/
- A structured society as a whole provides a favourable environment for
- the subordinate societies which it harbours within itself. Also the whole
- society must be set in a wider environment permissive of its continuance.
- Some of the component groups of occasions in a structured society can be
- termed 'subordinate societies/ But other such groups must be given the
- wider designation of 'subordinate nexus/ The distinction arises because in
- some instances a group of occasions, such as ? for example, a particular en-
- during entity, could have retained the dominant features of its defining
- characteristic in the general environment, apart from the structured society.
- It would have lost some features; in other words, the analogous sort of
- enduring entity in the general environment is, in its mode of definiteness,
- not quite identical with the enduring entity within the structured environ-
- ment. But, abstracting such additional details from the generalized de-
- fining characteristic, the enduring object with that generalized character-
- istic may be conceived as independent of the structured society within
- which it finds itself. t For example, we speak of a molecule within a living
- cell, because its general molecular features are independent of the environ-
- ment of the cell. Thus a molecule is a subordinate society in the structured
- society which we call the 'living cell/
- But there may be other nexus included in a structured society which,
- excepting the general systematic characteristics of the external environ-
- ment, present no features capable of genetically sustaining themselves apart
- from [152] the special environment provided by that structured society.
- It is misleading, therefore, to term such a nexus a 'society' when it is be-
- ing considered in abstraction from the whole structured society. In such an
- abstraction it can be assigned no 'social' features. Recurring to the example
- of a living cell, it will be argued that the occasions composing the 'empty 7
- space within the cell exhibit special features which analogous occasions out-
- side the cell are devoid of. Thus the nexus, which is the empty space within
- a living cell, is called a 'subordinate nexus/ but not a 'subordinate society/
- Molecules are structured societies, and so in all probability are separate
- electrons and protons. Crystals are structured societies. But gases are not
- structured societies in any important sense of that term; although their
- individual molecules are structured societies.
- It must be remembered that each individual occasion within a special
- form of society includes features which do not occur in analogous occasions
- 100 Discussions and Applications
- in the external environment. The first stage of systematic investigation
- must always be the identification of analogies between occasions within the
- society and occasions without it. The second stage is constituted by the
- more subtle procedure of noting the differences between behaviour within
- and without the society, differences t of behaviour exhibited by occasions
- which also have close analogies to each other. The history of science is
- marked by the vehement, dogmatic denial of such differences, until they
- are found out.
- An obvious instance of such distinction of behaviour is afforded by the
- notion of the deformation of the shape of an electron according to varia-
- tions in its physical situation.
- A 'structured society 7 may be more or less 'complex' in respect to the
- multiplicity of its associated sub-societies and sub-nexus and to the intricacy
- of their structural pattern.
- A structured society which is highly complex can be [153] correspond-
- ingly favourable to intensity of satisfaction for certain sets of its com-
- ponent members. This intensity arises by reason of the ordered complexity
- of the contrasts which the society stages for these components.!
- The structural relations gather intensity from this intensity in the in-
- dividual experiences. Thus the growth of a complex structured society
- exemplifies the general purpose pervading nature. The mere complexity of
- givenness which procures incompatibilities has been superseded by the
- complexity of order which procures contrasts.
- SECTION VI
- The doctrine that every society requires a wider social environment
- leads to the distinction that a society may be more or less 'stabilized' in
- reference to certain sorts of changes in that environment. A society is
- 'stabilized' in reference to a species of change when it can persist through
- an environment whose relevant parts exhibit that sort of change. If the
- society would cease to persist through an environment with that sort of
- heterogeneity, then the society is in that respect 'unstable/ A complex so-
- ciety which is stable provided that the environment exhibits certain fea-
- tures t is said to be 'specialized 7 in respect to those features. The notion of
- 'specialization 7 seems to include both that of 'complexity 7 and that of
- strictly conditioned 'stability/
- An unspecialized society can survive through important changes in its
- environment. This means that it can take on different functions in respect
- to its relationship to a changing environment. In general the defining char-
- acteristic of such a society will not include any particular determination
- of structural pattern. By reason of this flexibility of structural pattern, the
- society can adopt that special pattern adapted to the circumstances of the
- moment. Thus an unspecialized society is apt to be deficient in structural
- pattern, when viewed as a whole.
- The Order of Nature 101
- [154] Thus in general an unspecialized society does not secure conditions
- favourable for intensity of satisfaction among its members, whereas t a
- structured society with a high grade of complexity will in general be de-
- ficient in survival value. In other words, such societies will in general be
- 'specialized' in the sense of requiring a very special sort of environment.
- Thus the problem t for Nature is the production of societies which are
- 'structured' with a high 'complexity/ and which are at the same time 'un-
- specialized. 7 In this way, intensity is mated with survival.
- SECTION VII
- There are two ways in which structured societies have solved this prob-
- lem. Both ways depend on that enhancement of the mental pole, which
- is a factor in intensity of experience. One way is by eliciting a massive
- average objectification of a nexus, while eliminating the detailed diversities
- of the various members of the nexus in question. This method, in fact,
- employs the device of blocking out unwelcome detail. It depends on the
- fundamental truth that objectification is abstraction. It utilizes this abstrac-
- tion inherent in objectification so as to dismiss the thwarting elements of a
- nexus into negative prehensions. At the same time the complex intensity
- in the structured society is supported by the massive objectifications of the
- many environmental nexus, each in its unity as one nexus, and not in its
- multiplicity as many actual occasions.
- This mode of solution requires the intervention of mentality operating in
- accordance with the Category of Transmutation (i.e., Categoreal Obliga-
- tion VI ) . It ignores diversity of detail by overwhelming the nexus by means
- of some congenial uniformity which pervades it. The environment may
- then change indefinitely so far as concerns the ignored details— so long as
- they can be ignored.
- The close association of all physical bodies, organic and [155] inorganic
- alike, with 'presented loci' definable 15 by straight lines, suggests that this
- development of mentality is characteristic of the actual occasions which
- make up the structured societies which we know as 'material bodies; This
- close association is evidenced by the importance of 'acceleration' in the
- science of dynamics.! For 'acceleration 7 is nothing else than a mode of
- estimating the shift from one family of 'presented loci' to another such
- family (cf. Part IV).
- Such mentality represents the first grade of ascent beyond the mere re-
- productive stage which employs nothing more than the Category of Con-
- ceptual Reproduction (i.e., Categoreal Obligation IV). There is some
- initiative of conceptual integration, but no originality in conceptual pre-
- hension. This initiative belongs to the Category of Transmutation, and the
- excluded originality belongs to the Category of Reversion.
- 15 Cf. Ch. IV of this Partt and also Part IV.
- 102 Discussions and Applications
- These material bodies belong to the lowest grade of structured societies
- which are obvious to our gross apprehensions. They comprise societies of
- various types of complexity— crystals, rocks, planets, and suns. Such bodies
- are easily the most long-lived of the structured societies known to us,
- capable of being traced through their individual life-histories.
- The second way of solving the problem is by an initiative in conceptual
- prehensions, i.e., in appetition. The purpose of this initiative is to receive
- the novel elements of the environment into explicit feelings with such sub-
- jective forms as conciliate them with the complex experiences proper to
- members of the structured society. Thus in each concrescent occasion its
- subjective aim originates novelty to match the novelty of the environment.
- In the case of the higher organisms, this conceptual initiative amounts to
- thinking about the diverse experiences; in the case of lower organisms,! this
- conceptual initiative merely amounts to thoughtless adjustment of aesthetic
- emphasis in obedience to an ideal of harmony. [156] In either case the
- creative determination which transcends the occasion in question has been
- deflected by an impulse original to that occasion. This deflection in general
- originates a self-preservative reaction throughout the whole society. It may
- be unfortunate or inadequate; and in the case of persistent failure we are
- in the province of pathology.
- This second mode of solution also presupposes the former mode. Thus
- the Categories of Conceptual Reversion and of Transmutation are both
- called into play.
- Structured societies in which the second mode of solution has im-
- portance are termed 'living/ It is obvious that a structured society may have
- more or less 'life/ and that there is no absolute gap between living' and
- 'non-living 7 societies. For certain purposes, whatever 'life' there is in a
- society may be important; and for other purposes, unimportant.
- A structured society in which the second mode is unimportant, and the
- first mode is important will be termed 'inorganic'
- In accordance with this doctrine of life, 7 the primary meaning of 'life'
- is the origination of conceptual novelty— novelty of appetition. Such origi-
- nation can only occur in accordance with the Category of Reversion. Thus
- a society is only to be termed 'living' in a derivative sense. A 'living society'
- is one which includes some 'living occasions.' Thus a society may be more
- or less 'living,' according to the prevalence in it of living occasions. Also
- an occasion may be more or less living according to the relative importance
- of the novel factors in its final satisfaction.
- Thus the two ways in which dominant members of structured societies
- secure stability amid environmental novelties are (i) elimination of diver-
- sities of detail, and (ii) origination of novelties of conceptual reaction. As
- the result, there is withdrawal or addition of those details of emphasis
- whereby the subjective aim directs the [157] integration of prehensions in
- the concrescent phases of dominant members.
- The Order of Nature 103
- SECTION VIII
- There is yet another factor in 'living 7 societies which requires more de-
- tached analysis. A structured society consists in the patterned intertwining
- of various nexus with markedly diverse defining characteristics. Some of
- these nexus are of lower types than others, and some will be of markedly
- higher types. There will be the 'subservient' nexus and the 'regnant 7 nexus
- within the same structured society. This structured society will provide the
- immediate environment which sustains each of its sub-societies, subservient
- and regnant alike. In a living society only some of its nexus will be such
- that the mental poles of all their members have any original reactions.
- These will be its 'entirely living 7 nexus, and in practice a society is only
- called 'living 7 when such nexus are regnant. Thus a living society involves
- nexus which are 'inorganic/ and nexus which are inorganic do not need
- the protection of the whole 'living 7 society for their survival in a changing
- external I environment. Such nexus are societies. But 'entirely living 7 nexus
- do require such protection, if they are to survive. According to this con-
- jectural theory, an 'entirely living 7 nexus is not a 'society. 7 This is the theory
- of the animal body, including a unicellular body as a particular instance.
- A complex inorganic system of interaction is built up for the protection of
- the 'entirely living 7 nexus, and the originative actions of the living elements
- are protective of the whole system. On the other hand, the reactions! of
- the whole system provide the intimate environment required by the 'en-
- tirely living 7 nexus. We do not know of any living society devoid of its sub-
- servient apparatus of inorganic societies.
- 'Physical Physiology deals with the subservient inorganic apparatus; and
- 'Psychological Physiology 7 seeks to deal with 'entirely living 7 nexus, partly
- in abstraction [158] from the inorganic apparatus, and partly in respect to
- their response to the inorganic apparatus, and partly in regard to their
- response to each other. Physical Physiology has, in the last century, estab-
- lished itself as a unified science; Psychological Physiology is still in the
- process of incubation.
- It must be remembered that an integral living society, as we know it, not
- only includes the subservient inorganic apparatus, but also includes many
- living nexus,t at least one for each 'cell/
- SECTION IX
- It will throw light upon the cosmology of the philosophy of organism to
- conjecture some fundamental principles of Psychological Physiology as
- suggested by that cosmology and by the preceding conjectures concerning
- the 'societies 7 of our epoch. These principles are not necessitated by this
- cosmology; but they seem to be the simplest principles which are both
- consonant with that cosmology, and also fit the facts.
- 104 Discussions and Applications
- In the first instance, consider a single living cell. Such a cell includes
- subservient inorganic societies, such as molecules and electrons. Thus, the
- cell is an 'animal body'; and we must presuppose the physical physiology 7
- proper to this instance. But what of the individual living occasions?
- The first question to be asked is as to whether the living occasions, in
- abstraction from the inorganic occasions of the animal body, form a cor-
- puscular sub-society, so that each living occasion is a member of an en-
- during entity with its personal order. In particular we may ask whether
- this corpuscular society reduces to the extreme instance of such a society,
- namely, to one enduring entity with its one personal order. f
- The evidence before us is of course extremely slight; but so far as it
- goes, it suggests a negative answer to both these questions. A cell gives no
- evidence whatever of a single unified mentality, guided in each of its occa-
- [J59] sions by inheritance from its own past. The problem to be solved is
- that of a certain originality in the response of a cell to external stimulus.
- The theory of an enduring entity with its inherited mentality gives us a
- reason why this mentality should be swayed by its own past. We ask for
- something original at the moment, and we are provided with a reason for
- limiting originality. Life is a bid for freedom: an enduring entity binds
- any one of its occasions to the line of its ancestry. The doctrine of the
- enduring soul with its permanent characteristics is exactly the irrelevant
- answer to the problem which life presents. That problem is, How can there
- be originality? And the answer explains how the soul need be no more
- original than a stone.
- The theory of a corpuscular society, made up of many enduring entities,
- fits the evidence no better. The same objections apply. The root fact is that
- 'endurance 7 is a device whereby an occasion is peculiarly bound by a single
- line of physical ancestry, while 'life 7 means novelty, introduced in accord-
- ance with the Category of Conceptual Reversion. There are the same
- objections to many traditions as there are to one tradition. What has to be
- explained is originality of response to stimulus. This amounts to the doc-
- trine that an organism is 'alive 7 when in some measure its reactions are
- inexplicable by any tradition of pure physical inheritance.
- Explanation by 'tradition 7 is merely another phraseology for explana-
- tion by 'efficient cause. 7 We require explanation by 'final cause. 7 Thus a
- single occasion is alive when the subjective aim which determines its pro-
- cess of concrescence has introduced a novelty of definiteness not to be
- found in the inherited data of its primary phase. The novelty is introduced
- conceptually and disturbs the inherited 'responsive 7 adjustment of subjec-
- tive forms. It alters the 'values/ in the artist's sense of that term.
- It follows from these considerations that in abstraction from its animal
- body an 'entirely living* nexus is not [J 60] properly a society at all, since
- 'life' cannot be a defining characteristic. It is the name for originality, and
- not for tradition. The mere response to stimulus is characteristic of all
- societies whether inorganic or alive. Action and reaction are bound to-
- The Order of Nature 105
- gether. The characteristic of life is reaction adapted to the capture of in-
- tensity, under a large variety of circumstances. But the reaction is dictated
- by the present and not by the past. It is the clutch at vivid immediacy.
- SECTION X
- Another characteristic of a living society is that it requires food. In a
- museum the crystals are kept under glass cases; in zoological gardens the
- animals are fed. Having regard to the universality of reactions with envi-
- ronment, the distinction is not quite absolute. It cannot, however, be
- ignored. The crystals are not agencies requiring the destruction of elab-
- orate societies derived from the environment; a living society is such an
- agency. The societies which it destroys are its food. This food is destroyed
- by dissolving it into somewhat simpler social elements. It has been robbed
- of something. Thus, all societies require interplay with their environment;
- and in the case of living societies this interplay takes the form of robbery.
- The living society may, or may not, be a higher type of organism than the
- food which it disintegrates. But whether or no it be for the general good,
- life is robbery. It is at this point that with life morals become acute. The
- robber requires justification.
- The primordial appetitions which jointly constitute God's purpose are
- seeking intensity, and not preservation. Because they are primordial, there
- is nothing to preserve. He, in his primordial nature, is unmoved by love for
- this particular, or that particular; for in this foundational process of crea-
- tivity, there are no preconstituted particulars. In the foundations of his
- being, God is indifferent alike to preservation and to novelty. [161] He
- cares not whether an immediate occasion be old or new, so far as concerns
- derivation from its ancestry. His aim 16 for it is depth of satisfaction as an
- intermediate step towards the fulfilment of his own being. His tenderness
- is directed towards each actual occasion, as it arises.
- Thus God's purpose in the creative advance is the evocation of inten-
- sities. The evocation of societies is purely subsidiary to this absolute end.
- The characteristic of a living society is that a complex structure of in-
- organic societies is woven together for the production of a non-social nexus
- characterized by the intense physical experiences of its members. But such
- an experience is derivate from the complex order of the material animal
- body, and not from the simple 'personal order' of past occasions with
- analogous experience. There is intense experience without the shackle of
- reiteration from the past. This is the condition for spontaneity of concep-
- tual reaction. The conclusion to be drawn from this argument is that life
- is a characteristic of 'empty space' and not of space 'occupied' by any cor-
- puscular society. In a nexus of living occasions, there is a certain social
- deficiency. Life lurks in the interstices of each living cell, and in the in-
- 16 Cf. Part V.
- 106 Discussions and Applications
- terstices of the brain. In the history of a living society, its more vivid
- manifestations wander to whatever quarter is receiving from the animal
- body an enormous variety of physical experience. This experience, if
- treated inorganically, must be reduced to compatibility by the normal ad-
- justments of mere responsive reception. This means the dismissal of in-
- compatible elements into negative prehensions.
- The complexity of the animal body is so ordered that in the critical por-
- tions of its interstices the varied datum of physical experience is complex,
- and on the edge of a compatibility beyond that to be achieved by mere in-
- organic treatment. A novel conceptual prehension disturbs [162] the sub-
- jective forms of the initial responsive phase. Some negative prehensions are
- thus avoided, and higher contrasts are introduced into experience.
- So far as the functioning of the animal body is concerned, the total
- result is that the transmission of physical influence, through the empty
- space within it, has not been entirely in conformity with the physical laws
- holding for inorganic societies. The molecules within an animal body ex-
- hibit certain peculiarities of behaviour not to be detected outside an animal
- body. In fact, living societies illustrate the doctrine that the laws of nature
- develop together with societies which constitute an epoch. There are sta-
- tistical expressions of the prevalent types of interaction. In a living cell, the
- statistical balance has been disturbed.
- The connection of 'food' with 'life' is now evident. The highly complex
- inorganic societies required for the structure of a cell, or other living body,
- lose their stability amid the diversity of the environment. But, in the
- physical field of empty space produced by the originality of living occasions,
- chemical dissociations and associations take place which would not other-
- wise occur. The structure is breaking down and being repaired. The food
- is that supply of highly complex societies from the outside which, under the
- influence of life, will enter into the necessary associations to repair the
- waste. Thus life acts as though it were a catalytic agent.
- The short summary of this account of a living cell is as follows: (i) an
- extremely complex and delicately poised chemical structure; (ii) for the
- occasions in the interstitial f 'empty' space a complex objective datum
- derived from this complex structure; (iii) under normal 'responsive' treat-
- ment, devoid of originality, the complex detail reduced to physical sim-
- plicity by negative prehensions; (iv) this detail preserved for positive feel-
- ing by the emotional and purposive readjustments produced by originality
- of conceptual feeling (appetition); (v) the physical distortion of the field,
- leading to instability of [163] the structure; (vi) the structure accepting
- repair by food from the environment.
- SECTION XI
- The complexity of nature is inexhaustible. So far we have argued that the
- nature of life is not to be sought by its identification with some society of
- The Order of Nature 107
- occasions, which are living in virtue of the defining characteristic of that
- society. An 'entirely living' nexus is 7 in respect to its life, not social. Each
- member of the nexus derives the necessities of its being from its prehen-
- sions of its complex social environment; by itself the nexus lacks the genetic
- power which belongs to 'societies/ But a living nexus, though non-social in
- virtue of its life/ may support a thread of personal order along some his-
- torical route of its members. Such an enduring entity is a living person/
- It is not of the essence of life to be a living person. Indeed a living person
- requires that its immediate environment be a living, non-social nexus.
- The defining characteristic of a living person is some definite type of
- hybrid prehensions transmitted from occasion to occasion of its existence.
- The term 'hybrid' is defined more particularly in Part III. It is sufficient
- to state here that a 'hybrid' prehension is the prehension by one subject of
- a conceptual prehension, or of an 'impure' prehension, belonging to the
- mentality of another subject. By this transmission the mental originality
- of the living occasions receives a character and a depth. In this way origi-
- nality is both 'canalized'— to use Bergson's word— and intensified. Its range
- is widened within limits. Apart from canalization, depth of originality
- would spell disaster for the animal body. With it, personal mentality can
- be evolved, so as to combine its individual originality with the safety of the
- material organism on which it depends. Thus life turns back into society: it
- binds originality within bounds, and gains the massiveness due to reiterated
- character.
- In the case of single cells, of vegetation, and of the [164] lower forms of
- animal life, we have no ground for conjecturing living personality. But in
- the case of the higher animals there is central direction, which suggests
- that in their case each animal body harbours a living person, or living per-
- sons. Our own self-consciousness is direct awareness of ourselves as such
- persons. 17 There are limits to such unified control, which indicate dis-
- sociation of personality, multiple personalities in successive alternations,
- and even multiple personalities in joint possession. This last case belongs
- to the pathology of religion, and in primitive times has been interpreted as
- demoniac possession. Thus, though life in its essence is the gain of inten-
- sity through freedom, yet it can also submit to canalization and so gain the
- massiveness of order. But it is not necessary merely to presuppose the
- drastic case of personal order. We may conjecture, though without much
- evidence, that even in the lowest form of life the entirely living nexus is
- canalized into some faint form of mutual conformity. Such conformity
- amounts to social order depending on hybrid prehensions of originalities in
- the mental poles of the antecedent members of the nexus. The survival
- power, arising from adaptation and regeneration, is thus explained. Thus
- life is a passage from physical order to pure mental originality, and from
- 17 This account of a living personality requires completion by reference to its
- objectification in the consequent nature of God. Cf. Part V, Ch. II.
- 108 Discussions and Applications
- pure mental originality to canalized mental originality. It must also be
- noted that the pure mental originality works by the canalization of rele-
- vance arising from the primordial nature of God. Thus an originality in the
- temporal world is conditioned, though not determined, by an initial sub-
- jective aim supplied by the ground of all order and of all originality.
- Finally, we have to consider the type of structured + society which gives
- rise to the traditional body-mind problem. For example, human men-
- tality is partly the outcome of the human body, partly the single directive
- [165] agency of the body, partly a system of cogitations which have a cer-
- tain irrelevance to the physical relationships of the body. The Cartesian
- philosophy is based upon the seeming fact— the plain fact— of one body
- and one mind, which are two substances in causaU association. For the
- philosophy of organism the problem is transformed.
- Each actuality is essentially bipolar, physical and mental, and the physi-
- cal inheritance is essentially accompanied by a conceptual reaction partly
- conformed to it, and partly introductory of a+ relevant novel contrast, but
- always introducing emphasis, valuation, and purpose. The integration of
- the physical and mental side into a unity of experience is a self-formation
- which is a process of concrescence, and which by the principle of objective
- immortality characterizes the creativity which transcends it. So though
- mentality is non-spatial, mentality is always a reaction from, and integra-
- tion with, physical experience which is spatial. It is obvious that we must
- not demand another mentality presiding over these other actualities (a
- kind of Uncle Sam, over and above all the U.S. citizens). All the life in
- the body is the life of the individual cells. There are thus millions upon
- millions of centres of life in each animal body. So what needs to be ex-
- plained is not dissociation of personality but unifying control, by reason
- of which we not only have unified behaviour, which can be observed by
- others, but also consciousness of a unified experience.
- A good many actions do not seem to be due to the unifying control, e.g.,
- with proper stimulants a heart can be made to go on beating after it has
- been taken out of the body. There are centres of reaction and control which
- cannot be identified with the centre of experience. This is still more so with
- insects. For example, worms and jellyfish seem to be merely harmonized
- cells, very little centralized; when cut in two, their parts go on performing
- their functions independently. Through a series of animals we can trace a
- progressive rise into a [166] centrality of control. Insects have some cen-
- tral control; even in man, many of the body's actions are done with some
- independence, but with an organ of central control of very high-grade char-
- acter in the brain.
- The state of things, according to the philosophy of organism, is very dif-
- ferent from the Scholastic view of St. Thomas Aquinas, of the mind as in-
- forming the body. The living body is a coordination of high-grade actual
- occasions; but in a living body of a low type the occasions are much nearer
- to a democracy. In a living body of a high type there are grades of occa-
- The Order of Nature 109
- sions so coordinated by their paths of inheritance through the body, that
- a peculiar richness of inheritance is enjoyed by various occasions in some
- parts of the body. Finally, the brain is coordinated so that a peculiar rich-
- ness of inheritance is enjoyed now by this and now by that part; and thus
- there is produced the presiding personality at that moment in the body.
- Owing to the delicate organization of the body, there is a returned influ-
- ence, an inheritance of character derived from the presiding occasion and
- modifying the subsequent occasions through the rest of the body.
- We must remember the extreme generality of the notion of an enduring
- object— a genetic character inherited through a historic route of actual
- occasions. Some kinds of enduring objects form material bodies, others do
- not. But just as the difference between living and non-living occasions is
- not sharp, but more or less, so the distinction between an enduring object
- which is an atomic material body and one which is nott is again more or
- less. Thus the question as to whether to call an enduring object a transition
- of matter or of character is very much a verbal question as to where you
- draw the line between the various properties (cf. the way in which the
- distinction between matter and radiant energy has now vanished).
- Thus in an animal body the presiding occasion, if there be one, is the
- final node, or intersection, of a complex [167} structure of many enduring
- objects. Such a structure pervades the human body. The harmonized rela-
- tions of the parts of the body constitute this wealth of inheritance into a
- harmony of contrasts, issuing into intensity of experience. The inhibitions
- of opposites have been adjusted into the contrasts of opposites. The human
- mind is thus conscious of its bodilyt inheritance. There is also an enduring
- object formed by the inheritance from presiding occasion to presiding oc-
- casion. This endurance of the mind is only one more example of the gen-
- eral principle on which the body is constructed. This route of presiding
- occasions probably wanders from part to part of the brain, dissociated from
- the physical material atoms. But central personal dominance is only partial,
- and in pathological cases is apt to vanish.
- CHAPTER IV
- ORGANISMS AND ENVIRONMENT
- SECTION I
- [168] So far the discussion has chiefly concentrated upon the discrimina-
- tion of the modes of functioning which in germ, or in mere capacity, are
- represented in the constitution of each actual entity. The presumption
- that there is only one genus of actual entities constitutes an ideal of cos-
- mological theory to which the philosophy of organism endeavours to don-
- form. The description of the generic character of an actual entity should
- include God, as well as the lowliest actual occasion, though there is a spe-
- cific difference between the nature of God and that of any occasion.
- Also the differences between actual occasions, arising from the charac-
- ters of their data, and from the narrowness and widths of their feelings,
- and from the comparative importance of various stages, enable a classifica-
- tion to be made whereby these occasions are gathered into various types.
- From the metaphysical standpoint these types are not to be sharply dis-
- criminated; as a matter of empirical observation, the occasions do seem to
- fall into fairly distinct classes.
- The character of an actual entity is finally governed by its datum; what-
- ever be the freedom of feeling arising in the concrescence, there can be no
- transgression of the limitations of capacity inherent in the datum. The
- datum both limits and supplies. It follows from this doctrine that the
- character of an organism depends on that of its environment. But the
- character of an environment is the sum of the characters of the various
- societies of actual entities which jointly constitute that envi- [J 69] ron-
- ment; although it is pure assumption that every environment is com-
- pletely overrun by societies of entities. Spread through the environment
- there may be many entities which cannot be assigned to any society of
- entities. The societies in an environment will constitute its orderly ele-
- ment, and the non-social actual entities will constitute its element of
- chaos. There is no reason, so far as our knowledge is concerned, to con-
- ceive the actual world as purely orderly, or as purely chaotic.
- Apart from the reiteration gained from its societies, an environment
- does not provide the massiveness of emphasis capable of dismissing its
- contrary elements into negative prehensions. Any ideal of depth of satis-
- faction, arising from the combination of narrowness and width, can only
- be achieved through adequate order. In proportion to the chaos there is
- triviality. There are different types of order; and it is not true that in pro-
- Organisms and Environment 111
- portion to the orderliness there is depth. There are various types of order,
- and some of them provide more trivial satisfaction than do others. Thus,
- if there is to be progress beyond limited ideals, the course of history by
- way of escape must venture along the borders of chaos in its substitution
- of higher for lower types of order.
- The immanence of God gives reason for the belief that pure chaos is
- intrinsically impossible. At the other end of the scale, the immensity of
- the world negatives the belief that any state of order can be so established
- that beyond it there can be no progress. This belief in a final order, popu-
- lar in religious and philosophic thought, seems to be due to the prevalent
- fallacy that all types of seriality necessarily involve terminal instances.
- It follows that Tennyson's phrase,
- . . . onef far-off divine event
- To which the whole creation moves,
- presents a fallacious conception of the universe.
- An actual entity must be classified in respect to its [170] 'satisfaction/
- and this arises out of its datum by the operations constituting its 'process/
- Satisfactions can be classified by reference to 'triviality/ Vagueness/ 'nar-
- rowness/ 'width.' Triviality and vagueness are characteristics in the satis-
- faction which have their origins respectively in opposed characteristics in
- the datum. Triviality arises from lack of coordination in the factors of the
- datum, so that no feeling arising from one factor is reinforced by any
- feeling arising from another factor. In other words, the specific constitu-
- tion of the actual entity in question is not such as to elicit depth of feel-
- ing from contrasts thus presented. Incompatibility has predominated over
- contrast. Then the process can involve no coordinating intensification
- either from a reinforced narrowness, or from enhancement of relevance
- due to the higher contrasts derived from harmonized width. Triviality is
- due to the wrong sort of width; that is to say, it is due to width without
- any reinforced narrowness in its higher categories. Harmony is this com-
- bination of width and narrowness. Some narrow concentration on a
- limited set of effects is essential for depth; but the difference arises in the
- levels of the categories of contrast involved. A high category involves un-
- plumbed potentiality for the realization of depth in its lower components.
- Thus 'triviality' arises from excess of incompatible differentiation.
- On the other hand, 'vagueness' is due to excess of identification. In the
- datum the objectifications of various actual entities are replicas with faint
- coordinations of perspective contrast. Under these conditions the con-
- trasts between the various objectifications are faint, and there is deficiency
- in supplementary feeling discriminating the objects from each other.
- There can thus be intensive narrowness in the prehension of the whole
- nexus, by reason of the common character,! combined with vagueness,
- which is the irrelevance of the differences between the definite actual en-
- tities of the nexus. The objectified entities reinforce each other by their
- 112 Discussions and Applications
- likeness. But there [171] is lack of differentiation among the component
- objectifications owing to the deficiency in relevant contrasts.
- In this way a group of actual entities contributes to the satisfaction as
- one extensive whole. It is divisible, but the actual divisions, and their
- sporadic differences of character, have sunk into comparative irrelevance
- beside the one character belonging to the whole and any of its parts.
- By reason of vagueness, many count as one, and are subject to indefi-
- nite possibilities of division into such multifold unities. When there is
- such vague prehension, the differences between the actual entities so pre-
- hended are faint chaotic factors in the environment, and have thereby
- been relegated to irrelevance. Thus vagueness is an essential condition for
- the narrowness which is one condition for depth of relevance. It enables a
- background to contribute its relevant quota, and it enables a social group
- in the foreground to gain concentrated relevance for its community of
- character. The right chaos, and the right vagueness, are jointly required
- for any effective harmony. They produce the massive simplicity which has
- been expressed by the term 'narrowness/ Thus chaos is not to be identified
- with evil; for harmony requires the due coordination of chaos, vagueness,
- narrowness, and width.
- According to this account, the background in which the environment is
- set must be discriminated into two layers. There is first the relevant back-
- ground, providing a massive systematic uniformity. This background is
- the presupposed world to which all ordinary propositions refer. Secondly,
- there is the more remote chaotic background which has merely an irrelevant
- triviality, so far as concerns direct objectification in the actual entity in
- question. This background represents those entities in the actual world
- with such perspective remoteness that there is even a chaos of diverse
- cosmic epochs. In the background there is triviality, vagueness, and mas-
- sive uniformity; in the foreground discrimination and [172] contrasts, but
- always negative prehensions of irrelevant diversities.
- SECTION II
- Intensity is the reward of narrowness. The domination of the environ-
- ment by a few social groups is the factor producing both the vagueness of
- discrimination between actual entities and the intensification of relevance
- of common characteristics. These are the two requisites for narrowness.
- The lower organisms have low-grade types of narrowness; the higher or-
- ganisms have intensified contrasts in the higher categories. In describing
- the capacities, realized or unrealized, of an actual occasion, we have, with
- Locke, tacitly taken human experience as an example upon which to
- found the generalized description required for metaphysics. But when we
- turn to the lower organisms we have first to determine which among such
- capacities fade from realization into irrelevance, that is to say, by com-
- parison with human experience which is our standard.
- Organisms and Environment 113
- In any metaphysical scheme founded upon the Kantian or Hegelian
- traditions, experience is the product of operations which lie among the
- higher of the human modes of functioning. For such schemes, ordered ex-
- perience is the result of schematization of modes of thought, concerning
- causation, substance, quality, quantity.
- The process by which experiential unity is attained f is thereby con-
- ceived in the guise of modes of thought. The exception is to be found in
- Kant's preliminary sections on 'Transcendental Aesthetic/ by which he
- provides space and time. But Kant, following Hume, assumes the radical
- disconnection of impressions qua data; and therefore conceives his tran-
- scendental aesthetic* to be the mere description of a subjective process
- appropriating the data by orderliness of feeling.
- The philosophy of organism aspires to construct a critique of pure
- feeling, in the philosophical position in [173] which Kant put his Critique
- of Pure Reason. This should also supersede the remaining Critiques re-
- quired in the Kantian philosophy. Thus in the organic philosophy Kant's
- 'Transcendental Aesthetic' becomes a distorted fragment of what should
- have been his main topic. The datum includes its own interconnections,
- and the first stage of the process of feeling is the reception into the
- ^responsive conformity of feeling whereby the datum, which is mere po-
- tentiality, becomes the individualized basis for a complex unity of
- realization.
- This conception, as found in the philosophy of organism, is practically
- identical with Locke's ways of thought in the latter half of his Essay. He
- speaks of the ideas in the perceived objects, and tacitly presupposes their
- identification with corresponding ideas in the perceiving mind. The ideas in
- the objects have been appropriated by the subjective functioning of the
- perceiving mind. This mode of phraseology can be construed as a casual
- carelessness of speech on the part of Locke, or a philosophic inconsistency.
- But apart from this inconsistency Locke's philosophy falls to pieces; as in
- fact was its fate in the hands of Hume.
- There is, however, a fundamental misconception to be found in Locke,
- and in prevalent doctrines of perception. It concerns the answer to the
- question t as to the description of the primitive types of experience. Locke
- assumes that the utmost primitiveness is to be found in sense-perception.
- The seventeenth-century physics, with the complexities of primary and
- secondary qualities, should have warned philosophers that sense-percep-
- tion was involved in complex modes of functioning. Primitive feeling is to
- be found at a lower level. The mistake was natural for mediaeval and Greek
- philosophers: for they had not modern physics before them as a plain
- warning. In sense-perception we have passed the Rubicon, dividing direct
- perception from the higher forms of mentality, which play with error and
- thus found intellectual empires.
- [174] The more primitive types of experience are concerned with sense-
- reception, and not with sense-perception. This statement will require some
- 114 Discussions and Applications
- prolonged explanation. But the course of thought can be indicated by
- adopting Bergson's admirable phraseology, sense-reception is 'unspatial-
- ized/ and sense-perception is 'spatialized/ In sense-reception the sensa are
- the definiteness of emotion: they are emotional forms transmitted from
- occasion to occasion. Finally in some occasion of adequate complexity, the
- Category of Transmutation endows them with the new function of charac-
- terizing nexus.
- SECTION HI
- In the first place, those eternal objects which will be classified under the
- name 'sensa' constitute the lowest category of eternal objects. Such eternal
- objects do not express a manner of relatedness between other eternal ob-
- jects. They are not contrasts, or patterns. Sensa are necessary as com-
- ponents in any actual entity, relevant in the realization of the higher
- grades. But a sensum does not, for its own realization, require any eternal
- object of a lower grade, though it does involve the potentiality of pattern
- and does gain access of intensity from some realization of status in some
- realized pattern. Thus a sensum requires, as a rescue from its shallowness
- of zero width, some selective relevance of wider complex eternal objects
- which include it as a component; but it does not involve the relevance of
- any eternal objects which it presupposes. Thus, in one sense, a sensum is
- simple; for its realization does not involve the concurrent realization of
- certain definite eternal objects, which are its definite simple components.
- But, in another sense, each sensum is complex; for it cannot be dissociated
- from its potentiality for ingression into any actual entity, and fromf its
- potentiality of contrasts and of patterned relationships with other eternal
- objects. Thus each sensum shares the characteristic common to all eternal
- objects, that it introduces the notion of the logi- [175] cal variable, in both
- forms, the unselective 'any' and the selective 'some/
- It is possible that this definition of 'sensa' excludes some cases of con-
- trast which are ordinarily termed 'sensa' and that it includes some emo-
- tional qualities which are ordinarily excluded. Its convenience consists in
- the fact that it is founded on a metaphysical principle, and not on an
- empirical investigation of the physiology of the human body.
- Narrowness in the lowest category achieves such intensity as belongs to
- such experience, but fails by reason of deficiency of width. Contrast elicits
- depth, and only shallow experience is possible when there is a lack of pat-
- terned contrast. Hume notices the comparative failure of the higher fa-
- culty of imagination in respect to mere sensa. He exaggerates this com-
- parative failure into a dogma of absolute inhibition to imagine a novel
- sensum; whereas the evidence which he himself adduces, of the imagina-
- tion of a new shade of colour to fill a gap in a graduated scale of shades,
- shows t that a contrast between given shades can be imaginatively extended
- so as to generate the imagination of the missing shade. But Hume's ex-
- Organisms and Environment 115
- ample also shows that imagination finds its easiest freedom among the
- higher categories of eternal objects,
- A pattern is in a sense simple: a pattern is the 'manner' of a complex
- contrast abstracted from the specific eternal objects which constitute the
- 'matter' of the contrast. But the pattern refers unselectively to any eternal
- objects with the potentiality of being elements in the 'matter' of some
- contrast in that 'manner/
- A pattern and a sensum are thus both simple in the sense that neither
- involves other specified eternal objects in its own realization. The manner
- of a pattern is the individual essence of the pattern. But no individual
- essence is realizable apart from some of its potentialities of relationship,
- that is, apart from its relational essence. But a pattern lacks simplicity in
- another sense, in which \176] a sensum retains simplicity. The realization
- of a pattern necessarily involves the concurrent realization of a group of
- eternal objects capable of contrast in that pattern. The realization of the
- pattern is through the realization of this contrast. The realization might
- have occurred by means of another contrast in the same pattern; but
- some complex contrast in that pattern is required. But the realization of a
- sensum in its ideal shallowness of intensity, with zero width, does not
- require any other eternal object, other than its intrinsic apparatus of indi-
- vidual and relational essence; it can remain just itself, with its unrealized
- potentialities for patterned contrasts. An actual entity with this absolute
- narrowness has an ideal faintness of satisfaction, differing from the ideal
- zero of chaos, but equally impossible. For realization means ingression in
- an actual entity, and this involves the synthesis of all ingredients with data
- derived from a complex universe. Realization is ideally distinguishable
- from the ingression of contrasts, but not in fact.
- The simplest grade of actual occasions must be conceived as experienc-
- ing a few sensa, with the minimum of patterned contrast. The sensa are
- then experienced emotionally, and constitute the specific feelings whose
- intensities sum up into the unity of satisfaction. In such occasions the proc-
- ess is deficient in its highest phases; the process is the slave to the datum.
- There is the individualizing phase of conformal feeling, but the originative
- phases of supplementary and conceptual feelings f are negligible.
- SECTION IV
- According to this account, the experience of the simplest grade of ac-
- tual entity is to be conceived as the unoriginative response to the datum
- with its simple content of sensa. The datum is simple, because it presents
- the objectified experiences of the past under the guise of simplicity. Occa-
- sions A, B, and C enter into the experience of occasion M as themselves
- experiencing [177] sensa Si and s 2 unified by some faint contrast between
- s x and s 2 . Occasion JVf responsively feels sensa $1 and s 2 as its own sensa-
- tions. There is thus a transmission of sensation emotion from A, B, and C
- to M. If M had the wit of self-analysis, M would know that it felt its own
- 116 Discussions and Applications
- sensa, by reason of a transfer from A, B, and C to itself. Thus the (un-
- conscious) direct perception of A, B, and C is merely the causal efficacy
- of A, B, and C as elements in the constitution of M. Such direct percep-
- tion will suffer from vagueness; for if A, B, and C tell the same tale with
- minor variation of intensity, the discrimination of A, and B, and C from
- each other will be irrelevant. There may thus remain a sense of the causal
- efficacy of actual presences, whose exact relationships in the external world
- are shrouded. Thus the experience of M is to be conceived as a quantitative
- emotion arising from the contribution of sensa from A, B, C and propor-
- tionately conformed to by M.
- Generalizing from the language of physics, the experience of M is an
- intensity arising out of specific sensa, directed from A, B, C. There is in
- fact a directed influx from A, B, C of quantitative feeling, arising from
- specific forms of feeling. The experience has a vector character, a common
- measure of intensity, and specific forms of feelings conveying that inten-
- sity. If we substitute the term 'energy' for the concept of a quantitative
- emotional intensity, and the term 'form of energy 7 for the concept of
- 'specific form of feeling/ and remember that in physics Vector' means defi-
- nite transmission from elsewhere, we see that this metaphysical description
- of the simplest elements in the constitution of actual entities agrees ab-
- solutely with the general principles according to which the notions of
- modern physics are framed. The 'datum/ in metaphysics is the basis of the
- vector-theory in physics; the quantitative satisfaction in metaphysics is
- the basis of the scalar localization of energy in physics; the 'sensa' in
- metaphysics are the basis of the diversity of specific forms under which
- energy clothes itself. Sci- [178] entific descriptions are, of course, entwined
- with the specific details of geometry and physical laws, which arise from
- the special order of the cosmic epoch in which we find ourselves. But the
- general principles of physics are exactly what we should expect as a spe-
- cific exemplification of the metaphysics required by the philosophy of
- organism. It has been a defect in the modern philosophies that they throw
- no light whatever on any scientific principles. Science should investigate
- particular species, and metaphysics should investigate the generic notions
- under which those specific principles should fall. Yet, modern realisms
- have had nothing to say about scientific principles; and modern idealisms
- have merely contributed the unhelpful suggestion that the phenomenal
- world is one of the inferior avocations of the Absolute.
- The direct perception whereby the datum in the immediate subject is
- inherited from the past can thus, under an abstraction, be conceived as the
- transference of throbs of emotional energy, clothed in the specific forms
- provided by sensa. Since the vagueness in the experientf subject will veil
- the separate objeetifi cations wherein there are individual contributions
- to the total satisfaction, the emotional energy in the final satisfaction wears
- the aspect of a total intensity capable of all gradations of ideal variation.
- But in its origin it represents the totality arising from the contributions of
- Organisms and Environment 117
- separate objects to that form of energy. Thus, having regard to its origin,
- a real atomic structure of each form of energy is discernible, so much from
- each objectified actual occasion; and only a finite number of actual occa-
- sions will be relevant.
- This direct perception, characterized by mere subjective responsiveness
- and by lack of origination in the higher phases, exhibits the constitution
- of an actual entity under the guise of receptivity. In the language of causa-
- tion, it describes the efficient causation operative in the actual world. In
- the language of epistemology, as framed by Locke, it describes how the
- ideas of particular [179] existents are absorbed into the subjectivity of the
- percipient and are the datum for its experience of the external world. In
- the language of science, it describes how the quantitative intensity of lo-
- calized energy bears in itself the vector marks of its origin, and the spe-
- cialities of its specific forms; it also gives a reason for the atomic quanta
- to be discerned in the building up of a quantity of energy. In this way,
- the philosophy of organism— as it should— appeals to the facts.
- SECTION V
- The current accounts of perception are the stronghold of modern meta-
- physical difficulties. They have their origin in the same misunderstanding
- which led to the incubus of the substance-quality categories. The Greeks
- looked at a stone, and perceived that it was grey. The Greeks were ig-
- norant of modern physics; but modern philosophers discuss perception in
- terms of categories derived from the Greeks.
- The Greeks started from perception in its most elaborate and sophisti-
- cated form, namely, visual perception. In visual perception, crude per-
- ception is most completely made over by the originative phases in ex-
- perience, phases which are especially prominent in human experience. If
- we wish to disentangle the two earlier prehensive phases— the receptive
- phases, namely, the datum and the subjective response— from the more
- advanced originative phases, we must consider what is common to all
- modes of perception, amid the bewildering variety of originative
- amplification.
- On this topic I am content to appeal to Hume. He writes: "But my
- senses convey to me only the impressions of coloured points, disposed in a
- certain manner. If the eye is sensible of any thingt further, I desire it may
- be pointed out to me/' 1 And again: "It is universally allowed by the
- writers on optics, that the eye at all times sees an equal number of physical
- points, and that a man [180] on the top of a mountain has no larger an
- image presented to his senses, than when he is cooped up in the narrow-
- est court or chamber." 2
- In each of these quotations Hume explicitly asserts that the eye sees.
- 1 Treatise, Bk. U Part II, Sect. III. Italics not his.
- 2 Treatise, Bk. I, Part III, Sect. IX.*
- 118 Discussions and Applications
- The conventional comment on such a passage is that Hume, for the sake
- of intelligibility, is using common forms of expression; that he is only
- really speaking of impressions on the mind; and that in the dim future,
- some learned scholar will gain reputation by emending 'eye' into 'ego/
- The reason for citing the passages is to enforce the thesis that the form
- of speech is literary and intelligible because it expresses the ultimate truth
- of animal perception. The ultimate momentary 'ego' has as its datum the
- 'eye as experiencing such-and-such f sights/ In the second quotation, the
- reference to the number of physical points is a reference to the excited
- area on the retina. Thus the 'eye as experiencing such-and-such sights' is
- passed on as a datum 7 from the cells of the retina, throughf the train of
- actual entities forming the relevant nerves, up to the brain. Any direct
- relation of eye to brain is entirely overshadowed by this intensity of in-
- direct transmission. Of course this statement is merely a pale abstraction
- from the physiological theory of vision. But the physiological account
- does not pretend to be anything more than indirect inductive knowledge.
- The point here to be noticed is the immediate literary obviousness of 'the
- eye as experiencing such-and-such sights/ This is the very reason why
- Hume uses the expression in spite of his own philosophy. The conclusion,
- which the philosophy of organism draws, is that in human experience the
- fundamental fact of perception is the inclusion, in the datum, of the ob-
- jectification of an antecedent part of the human body with such-and-such
- experiences. Hume agrees with this conclusion f sufficiently well so as to
- argue from it, when it suits his purpose. He writes:
- I would fain ask those philosophers, who found so much of their
- reasonings on the distinction [J 81] of substance and accident, and
- imagine we have clear ideas of each, whether the idea of substance be
- derived from the impressions of sensation or reflection? If it be con-
- veyed to usf by our senses, I ask, which of them, and after what man-
- ner? If it be perceived by the eyes, it must be a colour; if by the ears, a
- sound; if by the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. 3
- We can prolong Hume's list: the feeling of the stone is in the hand; the
- feeling of the food is the ache in the stomach; the compassionate yearning
- is in the bowels, according to biblical writers; the feeling of well-being is in
- the viscera passim; ill temper is the emotional tone derivative from the
- disordered liver.
- In this list, Hume's and its prolongation, for some cases—as in sight,
- for example— the supplementary phase in the ultimate subject overbal-
- ances in importance the datum inherited from the eye. In other cases, as
- in touch, the datum of 'the feeling in the hand' maintains its importance,
- however much the intensity, or even the character, of the feeling may be
- due to supplementation in the ultimate subject: this instance should be
- contrasted with that of sight. In the instance of the ache the stomach, as
- 3 Treatise, Bk. I, Part I, Sect. VI.
- Organisms and Environment 119
- datum, is of chief importance, and the food though obscurely felt is
- secondary— at least, until the intellectual analysis of the situation due to
- the doctor, professional or amateur. In the instances of compassion, well-
- being, and ill temper, the supplementary feelings in the ultimate subject
- predominate, though there are obscure references to the bodily organs as
- inherited data.
- This survey supports the view that the predominant basis of perception
- is perception of the various bodily organs, as passing on their experiences
- by channels of transmission and of enhancement. It is the accepted doc-
- trine in physical science that a living body is to be interpreted according
- to what is known of other sections of the physical universe. This is a sound
- axiom; but it [182] is double-edged. For it carries with it the converse de-
- duction that other sections of the universe are to be interpreted in ac-
- cordance with what we know of the human body.
- It is also a sound rule that all interpretation should be based upon a
- vera causa. Now the original reliance upon 'the grey stone 7 has been
- shown by modern physics to be due to a misapprehension of a complex
- situation; but we have direct knowledge of the relationship of our central
- intelligence to our bodily feelings. According to this interpretation, the
- human body is to be conceived as a complex 'amplifier'— to use the lan-
- guage of the technology of electromagnetism. The various actual entities,
- which compose the body, are so coordinated that the experiences of any
- part of the body are transmitted to one or more central occasions to be
- inherited with enhancements accruing upon the way, or finally added by
- reason of the final integration. The enduring personality is the historic
- route of living occasions which are severally dominant in the body at suc-
- cessive instants. The human body is thus achieving on a scale of concen-
- trated efficiency a type of social organization, which with every gradation
- of efficiency constitutes the orderliness whereby a cosmic epoch shelters in
- itself intensity of satisfaction.
- The crude aboriginal character of direct perception is inheritance. What
- is inherited is feeling-tone with evidence of its origin: in other words, vector
- feeling-tone. In the higher grades of perception vague feeling-tone dif-
- ferentiates itself into various types of sensa— those of touch, sight, smell,
- etc.— each transmuted into a definite prehension of tonal contemporary
- nexus f by the final percipient.
- SECTION VI
- In principle, the animal body is only the more highly organized and
- immediate part of the general environment for its dominant actual occa-
- sion, which is the ultimate [183] percipient. But the transition from with-
- out to within the body marks the passage from lower to higher grades of
- actual occasions. The higher the grade, the more vigorous and the more
- original is the enhancement from the supplementary phase. Pure recep-
- 120 Discussions and Applications
- tivity and transmission givef place to the trigger-action of life whereby
- there is release of energy in novel forms. Thus the transmitted datum ac-
- quires sensa enhanced in relevance or even changed in character by the
- passage from the low-grade external world into the intimacy of the human
- body. The datum transmitted from the stone becomes the touch-feeling
- in the hand, but it preserves the vector characterf of its origin from the
- stone. The touch-feeling in the hand with this vector origin from the stone
- is transmitted to the percipient in the brain. Thus the final perception is
- the perception of the stone through the touch in the hand. In this per-
- ception the stone is vague and faintly relevant in comparison with the
- hand. But, however dim, it is there.
- In the transmission of inheritance from A to B, to C, to D, A is ob-
- jectified by the eternal object S as a datum for B; where S is a sensum or a
- complex pattern of sensa. Then B is objectified for C. But the datum for
- B is thereby capable of some relevance for C, namely, A as objectified for
- B becomes reobjectified for C; and so on to D 7 and throughout the line of
- objectifications. Then for the ultimate subject M the datum includes A as
- thus transmitted, B as thus transmitted, and so on. The final objectifica-
- tions for M are effected by a set S 3 f of eternal objects which is a modifica-
- tion of the original group S. The modification consists partly in relegation
- of elements into comparative irrelevance, partly in enhancement of rele-
- vance for other elements, partly in supplementation by eliciting into
- important relevance some eternal objects not in the original S. Generally
- there will be vagueness in the distinction between A, and B, and C, and
- D, etc., in their function as components in the datum for M. Some of the
- line, A and C for instance, may stand out \184] with distinctness by rea-
- son of some peculiar feat of original supplementation which retains its
- undimmed importance in subsequent transmission. Other members of the
- chain may sink into oblivion. For example, in touch there is a reference to
- the stone in contact with the hand, and a reference to the hand; but in
- normal, healthy, bodily operations the chain of occasions along the arm
- sinks into the background, almost into complete oblivion. Thus M, which
- has some analytic consciousness of its datum, is conscious of the feeling in
- its hand as the hand touches the stone. According to this account, per-
- ception in its primary form is consciousness of the causal efficacy of the
- external world by reason of which the percipient is a concrescence from a
- definitely constituted datum. The vector character of the datum is this
- causal efficacy.
- Thus perception, in this primary sense, is perception of the settled
- world in the past as constituted by its feeling-tones, and as efficacious by
- reason of those feeling-tones. Perception, in this sense of the term, will be
- called 'perception in the mode of causal efficacy/ Memory is an example
- of perception in this mode. For memory is perception relating to the data
- from some historic route of ultimate percipient subjects Mi, M 2 , M 3 ,
- etc., leading up to M which is the memorizing percipient.
- Organisms and Environment 121
- SECTION VII
- It is evident that 'perception in the mode of causal efficacy' is not that
- sort of perception which has received chief attention in the philosophical
- tradition. Philosophers have disdained the information about the universe
- obtained through their visceral feelings, and have concentrated on visual
- feelings.
- What we ordinarily term our visual perceptions are the result of the
- later stages in the concrescence of the percipient occasion. When we
- register in consciousness our visual perception of a grey stone, something
- more than bare sight is meant. The 'stone' has a reference [185] to its
- past, when it could have been used as a+ missile if small enough, or as a seat
- if large enough. A 'stone' has certainly a history, and probably a future. It is
- one of the elements in the actual world which has got to be referred to
- as an actual reason and not as an abstract potentiality. But we all know
- that the mere sight involved, in the perception of the grey stone, is the
- sight of a grey shape contemporaneous with the percipient, and with
- certain spatial relations to the percipient, more or less vaguely defined.
- Thus the mere sight is confined to the illustration of the geometrical
- perspective relatedness, of a certain contemporary spatial region, to the
- percipient, the illustration being effected by the mediation of 'grey/ The
- sensum 'grey' rescues that region from its vague confusion with other
- regions.
- Perception which merely, by means of a sensum, rescues from vagueness
- a contemporary spatial region, in respect to its spatial shape and its spatial
- perspective from the percipient, will be called 'perception in the mode of
- presentational immediacy.'
- Perception in this mode has already been considered in Part II, Chapter
- II. A more elaborate discussion of it can now be undertaken. 4 The defini-
- tion, which has just been given, extends beyond the particular case of
- sight. The unravelling of the complex interplay between the two modes of
- perception— causal efficacy and presentational immediacy— t is one main
- problem of the theory of perception. 5 The ordinary philosophical discus-
- sion of perception is almost wholly concerned with this interplay, and
- ignores the two pure modes which are essential for its proper explanation.
- The interplay between the two modes will be termed 'symbolic reference.'
- [186] Such symbolic reference is so habitual in human experience that
- great care is required to distinguish the two modes. In order to find ob-
- 4 Also cf.f subsequent discussions in Parts III and IV.
- 5 Cf. my Barbour-Page lectures, Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect, delivered
- at the University of Virginia, April, 1927 (New York: Macrnillan, 1927; Cam-
- bridge University Press, 1928).+ Another discussion of this question is there
- undertaken, with other illustrations, Cf. also Professor Norman Kemp Smith's
- Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge, Macrnillan, 1924.
- 122 Discussions and Applications
- vious examples of the pure mode of causal efficacy we must have recourse
- to the viscera and to memory; and to find examples of the pure mode of
- presentational immediacy we must have recourse to so-called 'delusive'
- perceptions. For example, the image of a grey stone as seen in a mirror
- illustrates the space behind the mirror; the visual delusions arising from
- some delirium, or some imaginative excitement, illustrate surrounding
- spatial regions; analogously for the double-vision due to maladjustment of
- the eyes; the sight at night, of the stars and nebulae and Milky Way,
- illustrates vague regions of the contemporary sky; the feelings in ampu-
- tated limbs illustrate spaces beyond the actual body; a bodily pain, re-
- ferred to some part not the cause of the disorder, illustrates the painful
- region though not the pain -giving region. All these are perfectly good ex-
- amples of the pure mode of presentational immediacy.
- The epithet 'delusive/ which fits many, if not all, of these examples of
- presentational immediacy, is evidence that the mediating eternal object is
- not to be ascribed to the donation of the perceived region. It must have
- acquired its ingression in this mode from one of the originative phases of
- the percipient occasion. To this extent, the philosophy of organism is in
- agreement with the seventeenth-century doctrine of primary and second-
- ary qualities, the mediating eternal object being, in this mode of ingres-
- sion, a secondary quality. But in the philosophy of organism the doctrine
- does not have the consequences which follow in the earlier philosophies.
- The account of perception in the pure mode of presentational imme-
- diacy, which has just been given, agrees absolutely with Descartes' doctrine
- of perception in general, so far as can be judged from his arguments which
- presuppose perception, and putting aside a few detached [J 87] passages
- wherein he comes near to the doctrine of 'objectification' and near to
- Locke's second doctrine of 'ideas determined to particular existents.' Any-
- how, his conclusion immediately follows that, in perception, thus de-
- scribed, all that is perceived is that the object has extension and is
- implicated in a complex of extensive relatedness with the animal body
- of the percipient. Part of the difficulties of Cartesian philosophy, and
- of any philosophy which accepts this account as a complete account
- of perception, is to explain how we know more than this meagre fact
- about the world although our only avenue of direct knowledge limits
- us to this barren residium. Also, if this be all that we perceive about
- the physical world, we have no basis for ascribing the origination of
- the mediating sensa to any functioning of the human body. We are thus
- driven to the Cartesian duality of substances, bodies and minds. Percep-
- tion is to be ascribed to mental functioning in respect to the barren ex-
- tensive universe. We have already done violence to our immediate con-
- viction by thus thrusting the human body out of the story; for, as Hume
- himself declares, we know that we see by our eyes, and taste by our palates.
- But when we have gone so far, it is inevitable to take a further step, and
- to discard our other conviction that we are perceiving a world of actual
- Organisms and Environment 123
- things within which we find ourselves. For a barren, extensive world is not
- really what we mean. We thus reduce perceptions to consciousness of
- impressions on the mind, consisting of sensa with 'manners' of related-
- ness. We then come to Hume, and to Kant. Kant's philosophy is an en-
- deavour to retrieve some meaning for the two convictions which we have
- successively discarded. We have noted that Locke wavers in his account of
- perception, so that in the earlier portion of his Essay he agrees with Hume,
- and in the later portion with the philosophy of organism. We have also
- noted that Hume is inconsistent to the extent of arguing from a convic-
- tion which is discarded in his philosophy.
- SECTION VIII
- [188] Presentational immediacy illustrates the contemporary world in re-
- spect to its potentiality for extensive subdivision into atomic actualities
- and in respect to the scheme of perspective relationships which thereby
- eventuates. But it gives no information as to the actual atomization of
- this contemporary 'real potentiality/ By its limitations it exemplifies the
- doctrine, already stated above, that the contemporary world happens in-
- dependently of the actual occasion with which it is contemporary. This is
- in fact the definition of contemporaneousness (cf. Part II, Ch. II, Sect. I);
- namely, that actual occasions, A and B, are mutually contemporary, when
- A does not contribute to the datum for B, and B does not contribute to
- the datum for A, except that both A and B are atomic regions in the po-
- tential scheme of spatio-temporal extensiveness which is a datum for both
- A and B.
- Hume's polemic respecting causation is, in fact, one prolonged, con-
- vincing argument that pure presentational immediacy does not disclose
- any causal influence, either whereby one actual entity is constitutive of
- the percipient actual entity, or whereby one perceived actual entity is con-
- stitutive of another perceived actual entity. The conclusion is that, in so
- far as concerns their disclosure by presentational immediacy, actual en-
- tities in the contemporary universe are causally independent of each other.
- The two pure modes of perception in this way disclose a variety of loci
- defined by reference to the percipient occasion M. For example, there are
- the actual occasions of the settled world which provide the datum for M;
- these lie in M's causal past. Again, there are the potential occasions for
- which M decides its own potentialities of contribution to their data; these
- lie in M's causal future. There are also those actual occasions which lie
- neither in M's causal past, nor in M's causal future. Such actual occasions
- are called M's 'contemporaries/ These \189] three loci are defined solely
- by reference to the pure mode of causal efficacy.
- We now turn to the pure mode of presentational immediacy. One great
- difference from the previous way+ of obtaining loci at once comes into
- view. In considering the causal mode, the past and the future were de-
- 124 Discussions and Applications
- fined positively, and the contemporaries of M were defined negatively as
- lying neither in M's past nor in JVf s future. In dealing with presentational
- immediacy the opposite way must be taken. For presentational immediacy
- gives positive information only about the immediate present as defined by
- itself. Presentational immediacy illustrates, by means of sensa, potential
- subdivisions within a cross-section of the world, which is in this way ob-
- jectified for M. This cross-section is JVPs immediate present. What is in
- this way illustrated is the potentiality for subdivision into actual atomic
- occasions; we can also recognize potentialities for subdivision of regions
- whose subdivisions remain unillustrated by any contrast of sensa. There
- are well-known limitations to such direct perceptions of unillustrated po-
- tentiality, a perception outrunning the real illustration of division by con-
- trasted sensa. Such limitations constitute the minima sensibilia.
- Hume's polemic respecting causation constitutes a proof that M's 'im-
- mediate present' lies within the locus of M's contemporaries. The presen-
- tation to M of this locus, forming its immediate present, contributes to
- M's datum two facts about the universe: one fact is that there is a 'unison
- of becoming/ constituting a positive relation of all the occasions in this
- community to any one of them. The members of this community share in
- a common immediacy; they are in 'unison' as to their becoming: that is
- to say, any pair of occasions in the locus are contemporaries. The other
- fact is the subjective illustration of the potential extensive subdivision
- with complete vagueness respecting the actual atomization. For example,
- the stone, which in the immediate [190] present is a group of many actual
- occasions, is illustrated as one grey spatial region. But, to go back to the
- former fact, the many actual entities of the present stone and the per-
- cipient are connected together in the 'unison of immediate becoming.'
- This community of concrescent occasions, forming M's immediate present,
- thus establishes a principle of common relatedness, a principle realized as
- an element in M's datum. This is the principle of mutual relatedness in
- the 'unison of becoming/ But this mutual relatedness is independent of
- the illustration by those sensa t through which presentational immediacy
- for M is effected. Also the illustration by these sensa has unequal relevance
- for M, throughout the locus. In its spatially remote parts it becomes vaguer
- and vaguer, fainter and fainter; and yet the principle of 'unison of be-
- coming' still holds, in despite of the fading importance of the sensa. We
- thus find that the locus— namely, M's immediate present— is determined
- by the condition of 'mutual unison' independently of variations of rele-
- vant importance in M's illustrative sensa, and extends to their utmost
- bounds of faintness, and is equally determinate beyond such bounds. We
- thus gain the conception of a locus in which any two atomic actualities
- are in 'concrescent unison,' and which is particularized by the fact that M
- belongs to it, and so do all actual occasions belonging to extensive regions
- which lie in M's immediate present as illustrated by importantly relevant
- sensa. This complete region is the prolongation of M's immediate present
- Organisms and Environment 125
- beyond M's direct perception, the prolongation being effected by the
- principle of 'concrescent unison/
- A complete region, satisfying the principle of 'concrescent unison/ will
- be called a 'duration/ A duration is a cross-section of the universe; it is
- the immediate present condition of the world at some epoch, according to
- the old 'classical' theory of time— a theory never doubted until within the
- last few years. It will have been seen that the philosophy of organism
- accepts and defines this [191] notion. Some measure of acceptance is
- imposed upon metaphysics. If the notion be wholly rejected no appeal to
- universal obviousness of conviction can have any weight; since there can
- be no stronger instance of this force of obviousness.
- The 'classical' theory of time tacitly assumed that a duration included
- the directly perceived immediate present of each one of its members. The
- converse proposition certainly follows from the account given above, that
- the immediate present of each actual occasion lies in a duration. An actual
- occasion will be said 6 to be 'cogredientf with' or 'stationary in' the dura-
- tion including its directly perceived immediate present. The actual occa-
- sion is included in its own immediate present; so that each actual occa-
- sion through its percipience in the pure mode of presentational imme-
- diacy—if such percipience has important relevance— defines one duration
- in which it is included. The percipient occasion is 'stationary' in this
- duration.
- But the classical theory also assumed the converse of this statement. It
- assumed that any actual occasion only lies in one duration; so that if N
- lies in the duration including M's immediate present, then M lies in the
- duration including N's immediate present. The philosophy of organism, in
- agreement with recent physics, rejects this conversion; though it holds that
- such rejection is based on scientific examination of our cosmic epoch, and
- not on any more general metaphysical principle. According to the philoso-
- phy of organism, in the present cosmic epoch only one duration includes
- all M's immediate present; this one duration will be called M's 'presented
- duration.' But M itself lies in many durations; each duration including M
- also includes some portions of M's presented duration. In the case of
- human perception practically all the important portions are thus included;
- also in human experience the relationship to such dura- \192] tions is what
- we express by the notion of 'movement/
- To sum up this discussion. In respect to any one actual occasion M
- there are three distinct nexus of occasions to be considered:
- (i) The nexus of M's contemporaries, defined by the characteristic that
- M and any one of its contemporaries happen in causal independence of
- each other.
- (ii) Durations including M;f any such duration is defined by the char-
- acteristic that any two of its members are contemporaries. (It follows that
- 6 Cf. my Principles of Natural Knowledge, Ch. XI, and my Concept of Nature,
- Ch. V.
- 126 Discussions and Applications
- any member of such a duration is contemporary with M, and thence that
- such durations are all included in the locus (i). The characteristic prop-
- erty of a duration is termed 'unison of becoming/)
- (iii) M's presented locus, which is the contemporary nexus perceived in
- the mode of presentational immediacy, with its regions defined by sensa.
- It is assumed, on the basis of direct intuition, that JVf s presented locus is
- closely related to some one duration including M. It is also assumed, as
- the outcome of modern physical theory, that there is more than one dura-
- tion including M. The single duration which is so related to M's presented
- locus is termed 'JVf s presented duration/ But this connection is criticized
- in the following sections of this chapter. In Part IV, the connection of
- these 'presented' loci to regions defined by straight lines is considered in
- more detail; the notion of 'strain-loci'* is there introduced.
- SECTION IX
- Physical science has recently arrived at the stage in which the practical
- identification, made in the preceding section, between the 'presented
- locus' of an actual entity, and a locus in 'unison of becoming with the
- actual entity must be qualified.
- The two notions, 'presented locus' and 'unison of becoming/ are dis-
- tinct. The identification merely rests on the obvious experience of daily
- life. In any recasting of [193] thought it is obligatory to include the iden-
- tification as a practical approximation to the truth, sufficient for daily life.
- Subject to this limitation, there is no reason for rejecting any distinction
- between them which the evidence suggests.
- In the first place, the presented locus is defined by some systematic
- relation to the human body— so far as we rely, as we must, upon human
- experience. A certain state of geometrical strain in the body, and a certain
- qualitative physiological excitement in the cells of the body, govern the
- whole process of presentational immediacy. In sense-perception the whole
- function of antecedent occurrences outside the body is merely to excite
- these strains and physiological excitements within the body. But any
- other means of production would do just as well, so long as the relevant
- states of the body are in fact produced. The perceptions are functions of
- the bodily states. The geometrical details of the projected sense-perception
- depend on the geometrical strains in the body, the qualitative sensa de-
- pend on the physiological excitements of the requisite cells in the body.
- Thus the presented locus must be a locus with a systematic geometrical
- relation to the body. According to all the evidence, it is completely inde-
- pendent of the contemporary actualities which in fact make up the nexus
- of actualities in the locus. For example, we see a picture on the wall with
- direct vision. But if we turn our back to the wall, and gaze into a good
- mirror, we see the same sight as an image behind the mirror. Thus, given
- the proper physiological state of the body, the locus presented in sense-
- Organisms and Environment 127
- perception is independent of the details of the actual happenings which
- it includes. This is not to sayt that sense-perception is irrelevant to the
- real world. It demonstrates to us the real extensive continuum in terms of **
- which these contemporary happenings have their own experiences quali-
- fied. Its additional information in terms of the qualitative sensa has rele-
- vance in proportion to the relevance of the immediate bodily state to the
- imme- [194] diate happenings throughout the locus. Both are derived
- from a past which is practically common to them all. Thus there is always
- some relevance; the correct interpretation of this relevance is the art of
- utilizing the perceptive mode of presentational immediacy as a means for
- understanding the world as a medium.
- But the question which is of interest for this discussion is how this
- systematic relevance, of body to presented locus, is definable. This is not a
- mere logical question. The problem is to point out that element in the
- nature of things constituting such a geometrical relevance of the bodv to
- the presented locus. If there be such an element, we can understand that a
- certain state of the body may lift it into an important factor of our
- experience.
- The only possible elements capable of this extended systematic relevance
- beyond the body are straight lines and planes. Planes are definable in
- terms of straight lines, so that we can concentrate attention upon straight
- lines.
- It is a dogma of science that straight lines are not definable in terms of
- mere notions of extension. Thus, in the expositions of recent physical
- theory, straight lines are defined in terms of the actual physical happenings.
- The disadvantage of this doctrine is that there is no method of charac-
- terizing the possibilities of physical events antecedently to their actual
- occurrence. It is easy to verify that in fact there is a tacit relevance to an
- underlying system, by reference to which the physical loci— including those
- called 'straight lines'— are defined. The question is how to define this un-
- derlying system in terms of 'pure' straight lines, determinable without ref-
- erence to the casual** details of the happenings.
- It will be shown later (cf. Part IV, Chs. Ill and IV) that this dogma of
- the indefinability of straight lines is mistaken. Thus the systematic relation
- of the body to the presented locus occasions no theoretical difficulty.
- All measurement is effected by observations of sensa [195] with geo-
- metrical relations within this presented locus. Also all scientific observa-
- tion of the unchanged character of things ultimately depends! upon the
- maintenance of directly observed geometrical analogies within such loci.
- However far the testing of instruments is carried, finally all scientific
- interpretation is based upon the assumption of directly observed unchange-
- ably of some instrument for seconds, for hours, for months, for years.
- When we test this assumption we can only use another instrument; and
- there! cannot be an infinite regress of instruments.
- Thus ultimately all science depends upon direct observation of homol-
- 128 Discussions and Applications
- ogy of status within a system. Also the observed system is the complex of
- geometrical relations within some presented locus.
- In the second place, a locus of entities in 'unison of becoming' ob-
- viously depends on the particular actual entities. The question, as to how
- the extensive continuum is in fact atomized by the atomic actualities, is
- relevant to the determination of the locus. The factor of temporal en-
- durance selected for any one actuality will depend upon its initial 'sub-
- jective aim/ The categoreal conditions which govern the 'subjective aim'
- are discussed later in Part III. They consist generally in satisfying some
- condition of a maximum, to be obtained by the transmission of inherited
- types of order. This is the foundation of the 'stationary' conditions in
- terms of which the ultimate formulations of physical science can be
- mathematically expressed.
- Thus the loci of 'unison of becoming' are only determinable in terms of
- the actual happenings of the world. But the conditions which they satisfy
- are expressed in terms of measurements derived from the qualification of
- actualities by the systematic character of the extensive continuum.
- The term 'duration' will be used for a locus of 'unison of becoming/
- and the terms 'presented locus' and 'strain- [196] locus' for the systematic
- locus involved in presentational immediacy. 7
- The strain-loci provide the systematic geometry with its homology of
- relations throughout all its regions; the durations share in the deficiency of
- homology characteristic of the physical field which arises from the pe-
- culiarities of the actual events.
- SECTION X
- We can now sum up this discussion of organisms, order, societies,! nexus.
- The aim of the philosophy of organism is to express a coherent cos-
- mology based upon the notions of 'system,' 'process/ 'creative advance into
- novelty,' 'res vera! (in Descartes' sense), 'stubborn fact/ 'individual unity of
- experience,' 'feeling/ 'time as perpetual perishing/ 'endurance as re-crea-
- tion/ 'purpose,' 'universals as forms of defmiteness/ 'particulars— i.e., res
- verae—as ultimate agents of stubborn fact.'
- Every one of these notions is explicitly formulated either by Descartes
- or by Locke. Also no one can be dropped without doing violence to com-
- mon sense. But neither Descartes nor Locke weaves these notions into one
- coherent system of cosmology. In so far as either philosopher is systematic,
- he relies on alternative notions which in the end lead to Hume's extreme
- of sensationalism.
- In the philosophy of organism it is held that the notion of 'organism'
- has two meanings, interconnected but intellectually separable, namely,
- the microscopic meaning and the macroscopic meaning.** The microscopic
- 7 In The Concept of Nature these two loci were not discriminated, namely,
- durations and strain-loci.
- Organisms and Environment 129
- meaning is concerned with the formal constitution of an actual occasion,
- considered as a process of realizing an individual unity of experience. The
- macroscopic meaning is concerned with the givenness of the actual world,
- considered as the stubborn fact which at once limits and provides [197]
- opportunity for the actual occasion. The canalization of the creative urge,
- exemplified in its massive reproduction of social nexus, is for common
- sense the final illustration of the power of stubborn fact. Also in our ex-
- perience, we essentially arise out of our bodies which are the stubborn
- facts of the immediate relevant past. We are also carried on by our im-
- mediate past of personal experience; we finish a sentence because we have
- begun it. The sentence may embody a new thought, never phrased before,
- or an old one rephrased with verbal novelty. There need be no well-worn
- association between the sounds of the earlier and the later words. But it
- remains remorselessly true, that we finish a sentence because we have be-
- gun it. We are governed by stubborn fact.
- It is in respect to this 'stubborn fact' that the theories of modern philos-
- ophy are weakest. Philosophers have worried themselves about remote
- consequences, and the inductive formulations of science. They should con-
- fine attention to the rush of immediate transition. Their explanations
- would then be seen in their native absurdity.
- CHAPTER V
- LOCKE AND HUME
- SECTION I
- [198] A more detailed discussion of Descartes, Locke, and Hume— in
- this and in the succeeding chapter— may make plain how deeply the philos-
- ophy of organism is founded on seventeenth-century thought and how at
- certain critical points it diverges from that thought
- We shall understand better the discussion, if we start with some analysis
- of the presuppositions upon which Hume's philosophy rests. These pre-
- suppositions were not original to Hume, nor have they ceased with him.
- They were largely accepted by Kant and are widely prevalent in modern
- philosophy. The philosophy of organism can be best understood by con-
- ceiving it as accepting large portions of the expositions of Hume and Kant,
- with the exception of these presuppositions, and of inferences directly
- derived from them. Hume is a writer of unrivalled clearness; and, as far as
- possible ? it will be well to allow him to express his ideas in his own words.
- He writes:
- We may observe, that it is universally allowed by philosophers,
- and is besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really pres-
- ent with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas, and
- that external objects become known to us only by those perceptions
- they occasion. To hate, to love, to think, to feel, to see; all this is
- nothing but to perceive. 1
- Again:
- All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into
- two distinct kinds, which I shall call impressions and ideas. The
- difference betwixt these consists in [199] the degrees of force and live-
- liness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into
- our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions which enter with
- most force and violence, we may name impressions; and, under this
- name, I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as
- they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas, I mean the
- faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance,
- are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only
- those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the imme-
- diate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion, 2
- 1 Treatise, Bk. I, Part II, Sect. VI.
- 2 Treatise, Bk. I, Part I, Sect. I.
- Locke and Hume 131
- The exceptions made in the above quotation are, of course, due to the
- fact that the 'perceptions' arising in these excepted ways are 'impressions'
- and not 'ideas/ Hume immediately draws attention to the fact that he
- deserts Locke's wide use of the term 'idea/ and restores it to its more usual
- and narrow meaning. He divides both ideas and impressions into 'simple'
- and 'complex/ He then adds:
- ... we shall here content ourselves with establishing one general
- proposition, That all our simple ideas in their first appearance, are
- derived from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them,
- and which they exactly represent?
- When Hume passes on to complex impressions and ideas, his admirable
- clearness partially deserts him. He fails to distinguish sufficiently between
- (i) the ' ( manner' (or 'order') in which many simples constitute some one
- complex perception, i.e., impression or idea; and (ii) the efficacious fact by
- reason of which this complex perception arises; and (iii) the mere multi-
- plicity of simples which constitute the complex perception in this definite
- manner. In this respect Hume's followers only differ from Hume by dis-
- carding some of that clarity which never wholly deserts him. Each one of
- these three notions is an essential element in his argument. He writes:
- [200] ... we may conclude with certainty, that the idea of extension is
- nothing but a copy of these coloured f points, and of the manner of
- their appearance. 4
- Also he writes:
- Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chancef alone would
- join them; and it is impossible the same simple ideas should! fall
- regularly into complex ones (as they commonly do), without some
- bond of union among them, some associating quality, by which one
- idea naturally introduces another. This uniting principle among ideas
- is not to be considered as an inseparable connection; for that has been
- already 5 excluded from the imagination: nor yet are we to conclude,
- that without it the mind cannot join two ideas; for nothing is more
- free than that faculty: but we are only to regard it as a gentle force,
- which commonly prevails, and is the cause why, among other things,
- languages so nearly correspond to each other; Nature, in a manner,
- pointing out to every one those simple ideas, which are most proper
- to be united into a complex one. 6
- As a final quotation, to illustrate Hume's employment of the third no-
- tion, we have:
- The idea of a substance as well as that of a mode, is nothing but a col-
- lection of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a
- particular name assigned them, . . . But the difference betwixt these
- 3 Treatise, Bk. I, Part I, Sect. I.
- 4 Treatise, Bk. I, Part II, Sect. III.
- 5 Cf. Hume's previous section.
- 6 Treatise, Bk. I, Part I, Sect. IV.
- 132 Discussions and Applications
- ideas consists in this, that the particular qualities, which form at sub-
- stance, are commonly referred to an unknown something [italics
- Hume's], in which they are supposed to inhere; or granting this fiction
- should not take place, are at least supposed to be closely and in-
- separably connected by the relations of contiguity and causation.
- The effect of this is, that whatever new simple quality we discover to
- have the same connection with the rest, we immediately comprehend
- it among them, even though it did not enter into the first conception
- of the substance. . . . The principle of union being regarded as the
- chief part of the complex [201] idea, gives entrance to whatever qual-
- ity afterwards occurs, and is equally comprehended by it, as are the
- others, which first presented themselves. . . . 7
- In this last quotation, the phrase 'principle of union' is ambiguous as
- between 'manner' and 'efficacious' reason. In either sense, it is inconsistent
- with the phrase 'nothing but a collection,' which at the beginning of \fhe
- quotation settles so simply the notion of 'substance.'
- Returning to the first of this sequence of three quotations, we note that
- any particular 'manner' of composition must itself be a simple idea, or im-
- pression. For otherwise we require yet another 'manner' of composition
- for the original manner, and so on indefinitely. Thus there is either a
- vicious infinity or a final simple idea. But Hume admits that there are
- novel compound ideas which are not copies of compound impressions.
- Thus he should also admit that there is a novel simple idea conveying the
- novel 'manner,' which is not a copy of an impression. He has also himself
- drawn attention to another exception in respect to missing shades of
- colour in a graduated colour scheme. This exception cannot be restricted
- to colour, and must be extended to sound, and smell, and to all gradua-
- tions of sensations. Thus Hume's proposition, that simple ideas are all
- copies of simple impressions, is subject to such considerable qualifications
- that it cannot be taken for an ultimate philosophical principle, at least
- not when enunciated in Hume's unguarded fashion. Hume himself, in
- the passage (Part I, Sect. IV) quoted above for its relevance to his doc-
- trine of the association of ideas, says, ". . . for nothing is more free than
- that faculty [i.e., the imagination]." But he limits its freedom to the
- production of novel complex ideas, disregarding the exceptional case of
- missing shades. This question of imaginative freedom is obviously treated
- very superficially by Hume. Imagination is never very free: it does not
- seem to be limited to complex ideas, as asserted by [202] him; but such
- freedom as it has in fact seems to establish the principle of the possibility
- of diverse actual entities with diverse grades of imaginative freedom,
- some more, some less, than the instances in question.
- In this discussion of Hume's doctrine of imaginative freedom, two
- other points have been left aside. One such point is the difference be-
- 7 Treatise, Bk. I, Part I, Sect. VI. Italics not in edition quoted, except where
- noted.*
- Locke and Hume 133
- tween various grades of generic abstraction, for example, scarlet, red ?
- colour, sense-datum, manner of connectedness of diverse sense-data. The
- other point is the contrast between 'simplicity' and 'complexity/ We may
- doubt whether 'simplicity' is ever more than a relative term, having regard
- to some definite procedure of analysis. I hold this to be the case; and by
- reason of this opinion find yet another reason for discarding Hume's
- doctrine which would debar imagination from the free conceptual pro-
- duction of any type of eternal objects, such as Hume calls 'simple/ But
- there is no such fact as absolute freedom; every actual entity possesses
- only such freedom t as is inherent in the primary phase 'given' by its stand-
- point of relativity to its actual universe. Freedom, givenness, potentiality,
- are notions which presuppose each other and limit each other.
- SECTION II
- Hume, at the end of this passage on the connectedness of ideas, places
- the sentence "... Nature, in a manner, pointing out to every one those
- simple ideas, which are most proper to be united into a complex one." *
- Hume's philosophy is occupied with the double search, first, for manners
- of unity, whereby many simples become one complex impression; and
- secondly, for a standard of propriety by which to criticize the production
- of ideas.
- Hume can find only one standard of propriety, and that is, repetition.
- Repetition is capable of more or less: the more often impressions are
- repeated, the more proper it is that ideas should copy them. Fortunately,
- and without any reason so far as Hume can discover, complex [203] im-
- pressions, often repeated, are also often copied by their corresponding
- complex ideas.
- Also the frequency of ideas following upon the frequency of their cor-
- relate impressions is also attended by an expectation of the repetition of
- the impression. Hume also believes, without any reason he can assign, that
- this expectation is pragmatically justified. It is this pragmatic justification,
- without metaphysical reason, which constitutes the propriety attaching to
- 'repetition/ This is the analysis of the course of thought involved in Hume's
- doctrine of the association of ideas in its relation to causation, and in
- Hume's final appeal to practice.
- It is a great mistake to attribute to Hume any disbelief in the importance
- of the notion of 'cause and effect/ Throughout the Treatise he steadily
- affirms its fundamental importance; and finally, when he cannot fit it into
- his metaphysics, he appeals beyond his metaphysics to an ultimate justifi-
- cation outside any rational systematization. This ultimate justification is
- 'practice/
- Hume writes:
- As our senses show us in one instance two bodies, or motions, or
- qualities, in certain relations of succession and contiguity, so our
- memory presents us only with a multitude of instances wherein we
- 134 Discussions and Applications
- always find like bodies, motions, or qualities, in like relations. From
- the mere repetition of any past impression, even to infinity, there
- never will arise any new original idea, such as that of a necessary
- connection; and the number of impressions has in this case no more
- effect than if we confined ourselves to one only. But though this rea-
- soning seems just and obvious, yet, as it would be folly to despair too
- soon, we shall continue the thread of our discourse; and having found,
- that after the discovery of the constant conjunction of any objects, we
- always draw an inference from one object to another, we shall now
- examine the nature of that inference, and of the transition from the
- impression to the idea. Perhaps it will appear in the end, that the
- necessary connection depends on the inference, instead of the in-
- ference's depending on [204} the necessary connection. . . . The only
- connection or relation of objects, which can lead us beyond the im-
- mediate impressions of our memory and senses, is that of cause and
- effect; and that because it is the only one, on which we can found a
- just inference from one object to another. The idea of cause and
- effect is derived from experience [italics Hume's], which informs us,
- that such particular objects, in all past instances, have been con-
- stantly conjoined with each other: and as an object similar to one of
- these is supposed to be immediately present in its impression, we
- thence presume on the existence of one similar to its usual attendant.
- According to this account of things, which is, I think, in every point
- unquestionable, probability is founded on the presumption of a re-
- semblance betwixt those objects of which we have had experience,
- and those of which we have had none; and, therefore, it is impossible
- t this presumption can arise from probability*
- Hume's difficulty with 'cause and effect' is that it lies "beyond the im-
- mediate impressions of our memory and senses."! In other words, this man-
- ner of connection is not given in any impression. Thus the whole basis of
- the idea, its propriety, is to be traced to the repetition of impressions. At
- this point of his argument, Hume seems to have overlooked the difficulty
- that 'repetition' stands with regard to 'impressions' in exactly the same
- position as does 'cause and effect.' Hume has confused a 'repetition of
- impressions' with an 'impression of repetitions of impressions/ In Hume's
- own words on another topic (Part II, Sect. V) :
- For whence should it be derived? Does it arise from an impression of
- sensation or of reflection? Point it out distinctly to us, that we may
- know its nature and qualities. But if you cannot point out any such
- impression [Hume's italics], you may be certain you are mistaken,
- when you imagine you have any such idea*
- Hume's answer to this criticism would, of course, be [205} that he ad-
- mits 'memory.' But the question is what is consistent with Hume's own
- 8 Treatise, Bk. I, Part III, Sect. VI. Italics not in Treatise.
- Locke and Hume 135
- doctrine. This is Hume's doctrine of memory (Part III, Sect. V): "Since
- therefore the memory is known, neither by the order of its complex ideas,
- nor f the nature of its simple ones; it follows, that the difference be-
- twixt it and the imagination lies in its superior force and vivacity." But (in
- Part I, Sect. I) he writes: "By ideas I mean the faint images of these [i.e.,
- impressions] in thinking and reasoning/' and later on he expands 'faint'
- into "degree of force and vivacity." 9 Thus, purely differing in 'force and
- vivacity/ we have the order: impressions, memories, ideas.
- This doctrine is very implausible; and, to speak bluntly, is in contradic-
- tion to plain fact. But, even worse, it omits the vital character of memory,
- namely, that it is memory. In fact the whole notion of repetition is lost in
- the 'force and vivacity doctrine. What Hume does explain is that with a
- number of different perceptions immediately concurrent, he sorts them
- out into three different classes according to force and vivacity. But the
- repetition character, which he ascribes to simple ideas, and which is the
- whole point of memory, finds no place in his explanation. Nor can it do
- so, without an entire recasting of his fundamental philosophic notions.
- SECTION III
- Hume's argument has become circular. In the beginning of his Treatise,
- he lays down the 'general proposition': "That all our simple ideas in their
- first appearance, are derived from simple impressions, . . ." He proves this
- by an empirical survey. But the proposition itself employs— covertly, so far
- as language is concerned— the notion of 'repetition/ which itself is not an
- 'impression/ Again, later he finds 'necessary connection': he discards \206]
- this because he can find no corresponding impression. But the original
- proposition was only founded on an empirical survey; so the argument for
- dismissal is purely circular. Further, if Hume had only attended to his
- own excellent Part II, Section VI, "Of the Idea of Existence, and of external
- Existence,"! he would have remembered that whatever we do think of,
- thereby in some sense 'exists.' Thus, having the idea of 'necessary con-
- nection/ the only question is as to its exemplification in the connectedness
- of our 'impressions.' He muddies the importance of an idea with the fact
- of our entertainment of the idea. We cannot even be wrong in thinking
- that we think of 'necessary connection/ unless we are thinking of 'neces-
- sary connection.' Of course, we may be very wrong in believing that the
- notion is important.
- The reasons for this examination of Hume, including the prolonged
- quotations, are (i) that Hume states with great clearness important as-
- pects of our experience; (ii) that the defects in his statements are emi-
- 9 This doctrine of 'force and vivacity' is withdrawn in the last sentence* of
- Hume's Appendix to the Treatise. But the argument in the Treatise is substan-
- tially built upon it. In the light of the retraction the whole 'sensationalist' doc-
- trine requires reconsideration. The withdrawal cannot be treated as a minor
- adjustment.
- 1 36 Discussions and Applications
- nently natural defects which emerge with great clearness, owing to the
- excellence of his presentation; and (iii) that Hume differs from the great
- majority of his followers chiefly by the way in which he faces up to the
- problems raised by his own philosophy.
- The first point to notice is that Hume's philosophy is pervaded by the
- notion of 'repetition/ and that memory is a particular example of this
- character of experience, that in some sense there is entwined in its funda-
- mental nature the fact that it is repeating something. Tear 'repetition' out
- of 'experience/ and there is nothing left. On the other hand, 'immediacy/
- or 'first-handedness/ is another element in experience. Feeling overwhelms
- repetition; and there remains the immediate, first-handed fact, which is the
- actual world in an immediate complex unity of feeling.
- There is another contrasted pair of elements in experience, clustering
- round the notion of time, namely, 'endurance' and 'change/ Descartes,
- who emphasizes the notion [207] of 'substance/ also emphasizes 'change/
- Hume, who minimizes the notion of 'substance/ similarly emphasizes
- 'change/ He writes:
- Now as time is composed of parts that are not coexistent, an un-
- changeable object, since it produces none but coexistent impressions,
- produces none that can give us the idea of time: and, consequently,
- that idea must be derived from a succession of changeable objects,
- and time in its first appearance can never be severed from such a
- succession. 10
- Whereas Descartes writes:
- ... for this [i.e., 'the nature of time or of the duration of things'] is
- of such a kind that its parts do not depend one upon the other, and
- never co-exist; and from the fact that we now are, it does not follow
- that we shall be a moment afterwards, if some cause— the same that
- first produced us— does not continue so to produce us; that is to say,
- to conserve us.
- And again:
- We shall likewise have a very different understanding of duration,
- order and number, if, in place of mingling with the idea that we
- have of them what properly speaking pertains to the conception of sub-
- stance, we merely consider that the duration of each thing is a mode
- under which we shall consider this thing in so far as it continues to
- exist; . . , 11
- We have certainly to make room in our philosophy for the two con-
- trasted notions, one that every actual entity endures, and the other that
- every morning is a new fact with its measure of change.
- These various aspects can be summed up in the statement that ex-
- perience involves a becoming, that becoming means that something be-
- 10 Treatise, Bk. I, Part II, Sect. III.
- 11 Principles, Part I, 21, and 55.
- Locke and Hume 1 37
- comes, and that what becomes involves repetition transformed into novel
- immediacy.
- This statement directly traverses one main presupposition which Des-
- cartes and Hume agree in stating explicitly. This presupposition is that of
- the individual independence of successive temporal occasions. For [208]
- example, Descartes, in the passage cited above, writes: "[The nature of
- time is such]t that its parts do not depend one upon the other, . . ." Also
- Hume's impressions are self-contained, and he can find no temporal re-
- lationship other than mere serial order. This statement about Hume re-
- quires qualifying so far as concerns the connection between 'impressions'
- and 'ideas/ There is a relation of 'derivation' of 'ideas' from 'impressions'
- which he is always citing and never discussing. So far as it is to be taken
- seriously — for he never refers it to a correlate 'impression'— it constitutes
- an exception to the individual independence of successive 'perceptions.'
- This presupposition of individual independence is what I have elsewhere 12
- called, the 'fallacy of simple location.' The notion of 'simple location' is
- inconsistent with any admission of 'repetition'; Hume's difficulties arise
- from the fact that he starts with simple locations and ends with repetition.
- In the organic philosophy the notion of repetition is fundamental. The
- doctrine of objectification is an endeavourf to express how what is settled
- in actuality is repeated under limitations, so as to be 'given' for immediacy.
- Later, in discussing 'time,' this doctrine will be termed the doctrine of
- 'objective immortality.'
- SECTION IV
- The doctrine of the individual independence of real facts is derived
- from the notion that the subject-predicate form of statement conveys a
- truth which is metaphysically ultimate. According to this view, an indi-
- vidual substance with its predicates constitutes the ultimate type of ac-
- tuality. If there be one individual, the philosophy is monistic; if there be
- many individuals, the philosophy is pluralistic. With this metaphysical
- presupposition, the relations between individual substances constitute
- metaphysical nuisances: there is no place for them. Accordingly— in de-
- fiance of the most obvious deliverance of our intuitive 'prejudices'— every
- [209] respectable philosophy of the subject-predicate type is monistic.
- The exclusive dominance of the substance-quality metaphysics was enor-
- mouslv promoted by the logical bias of the mediaeval period. It was re-
- tarded by the study of Plato and of Aristotle. These authors included the
- strains of thought which issued in this doctrine, but included them in-
- consistently mingled with other notions. The substance-quality meta-
- physics triumphed with exclusive dominance in Descartes' doctrines. Un-
- fortunately he did not realize that his notion of the 'res vera' did not en-
- tail the same disjunction of ultimate facts as that entailed by the Aris-
- 12 Cf. Science and the Modem World, Ch. III.
- 1 38 Discussions and Applications
- totelian notion of 'primary substance/ Locke led a revolt from this dom-
- inance, but inconsistently. For him and also for Hume, in the background
- and tacitly presupposed in all explanations, there remained the mind with
- its perceptions. The perceptions, for Hume, are what the mind knows
- about itself; and tacitly the knowable facts are always treated as qualities
- of a subject— the subject being the mind. His final criticism of the notion
- of the 'mind' does not alter the plain fact that the whole of the previous
- discussion has included this presupposition. Hume's final criticism only
- exposes the metaphysical superficiality of his preceding exposition.
- In the philosophy of organism a subject-predicate proposition is con-
- sidered as expressing a high abstraction.
- The metaphysical superiority of Locke over Hume is exhibited in his
- wide use of the term 'idea/ which Locke himself introduced and Hume
- abandoned. Its use marks the fact that his tacit subject-predicate bias is
- slight in its warping effect. He first (I, I, 8*) explains: "... I have used
- it [i.e., idea] to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or
- whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking; . . ."
- But later (III, III, 6t), without any explicit notice of the widening of
- use, he writes: ". . . and ideas become 13 \210] general by separating from
- them the circumstances of time, and place, and any other ideas that may
- determine them to this or that particular existence" Here, for Locke, the
- operations of the mind originate from ideas 'determined' to particular
- existents. This is a fundamental principle with Locke; it is a casual con-
- cession to the habits of language with Hume; and it is a fundamental
- principle with the philosophy of organism. In an earlier section (II, XXIII,
- 1) Locke expresses more vaguely the same doctrine, though in this con-
- text he immediately waters it down into an unexplained notion of 'going
- constantly together': "The mind, being, . . . furnished with a great number
- of the simple ideas conveyed in by the senses, as they are found in ex-
- terior things, . . . takes notice, also, that a certain number of these simple
- ideas go constantly together"
- But Locke wavers in his use of this principle of some sort of perception
- of 'particular existents'; and Hume seeks consistency by abandoning it;
- while the philosophy of organism seeks to reconstruct Locke by abandon-
- ing those parts of his philosophy which are inconsistent with this prin-
- ciple. But the principle itself is to be found plainly stated by Locke.
- Hume has only impressions of 'sensation' and of 'reflection/ He writes:
- "The first kind arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes." 14
- Note the tacit presupposition of 'the soul' as subject, and 'impression of
- sensation' as predicate. Also note the dismissal of any intrinsic relevance to
- a particular existent, which is an existent in the same sense as the 'soul' is
- an existent; whereas Locke illustrates his meaning by referring (cf. Ill,
- 13 Italics mine.*
- 14 Treatise, Bk. I, Part I, Sect. II.
- Locke and Hume 139
- HI, 7) to a 'child —corresponding to 'the soul 7 in Hume's phrase— and to
- its 'nurse' of whom the child has its 'idea/
- Hume is certainly inconsistent, because he cannot entirely disregard
- common sense. But his inconsistencies are violent, and his main argument
- negates Locke's use. [21 J] As an example of his glaring inconsistency of
- phraseology, note:
- As to those impressions, which arise from the senses, their ultimate
- cause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and
- it will always be impossible to decide with certainty, whether they
- arrive immediately from the object, or are produced by the creative
- power of the mind, or are derived from the Author of our being. 15
- Here he inconsistently speaks of the object, whereas he has nothing on
- hand in his philosophy which justifies the demonstrative word 'the! In
- the second reference 'the object' has emerged into daylight. He writes:
- "There is no object which implies the existence of any other, if we con-
- sider these objects in themselves, and never look beyond the ideas which
- we form of them." This quotation exhibits an ingenious confusion whereby
- Hume makes the best of two metaphysical worlds, the world with Locke's
- principle, and his own world which is without Locke's principle.
- But Locke's principle amounts to this: That there are many actual
- existents, and that in some sense one actual existent repeats itself in
- another actual existent, so that in the analysis of the latter existent a
- component 'determined to' the former existent is discoverable. The phi-
- losophy of organism expresses this principle by its doctrines of 'prehen-
- sion' and of 'objectification.' Locke always supposes that consciousness is
- consciousness of the ideas in the conscious mind. But he never separates
- the 'ideas' from the 'consciousness.' The philosophy of organism makes
- this separation, and thereby relegates consciousness to a subordinate meta-
- physical position; and gives to Locke's Essay a metaphysical interpretation
- which was not in Locke's mind. This separation asserts Kant's principle:
- "Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind
- blind." 16 But Kant's principle is here applied in exactly the converse way
- to Kant's own use of it. Kant is obsessed with the mentality [212] of 'in-
- tuition,' and hence f with its necessary involution in consciousness. His*
- suppressed premise is 'Intuitions are never blind.'
- SECTION V
- In one important respect Hume's philosophical conceptions show a
- marked superiority over those of Locke. In the Essay Concerning Human
- Understanding, the emphasis is laid upon the morphological structure of
- 'human understanding.' The logical relationships of various sorts of 'ideas'
- are examined. Now, whether in physics, biology, or elsewhere, morphology,
- is Treatise, Bk. I, Part III, Sect. V; cf. also Sect. VI. f
- 16 Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Logic,' Introduction, Sect. I.t
- 140 Discussions and Applications
- in the sense of the analysis of logical relationships, constitutes the first
- stage of knowledge. It is the basis of the new 'mathematical' method
- which Descartes introduced. Morphology deals in analytical propositions,
- as they are termed by Kant. For example, Locke writes: "The common
- names of substances, as well as other general terms, stand for sorts:
- which 1? is nothing else but the being made signs of such complex ideas,
- wherein several particular substances do or might agree, by virtue of which
- they are capable of being comprehended in one common conception, and
- be signified by one name." And again: "Our abstract ideas are to us the
- measures of species." And again: "Nor let any one say, that the power of
- propagation in animals by the mixture of male and female, and in plants
- by seeds, keeps the supposed real species distinct and entire/ 7 18 In tech-
- nical language, Locke had no use for genetic evolution.
- On the other hand, Hume's train of thought unwittingly emphasizes
- 'process/ His very scepticism is nothing but the discovery that there is
- something in the world which cannot be expressed in analytic proposi-
- tions. Hume discovered that "We murder to dissect/' He did not say
- this, because he belonged to the mid-eighteenth century; and so left the
- remark to Wordsworth. But, in [213] effect, Hume discovered that an ac-
- tual entity is at once a process, and is atomic; so that in no sense is it the
- sum of its parts. Hume proclaimed the bankruptcy of morphology.
- Hume's account of the process discoverable in 'the soul' is as follows:
- first, impressions of sensation, of unknown origin; then, ideas of such im-
- pressions, 'derived from' the impressions; then, impressions of reflection
- 'derived from' the antecedent ideas; and then, ideas of impressions of re-
- flection. Somewhere in this process, there is to be found repetition of im-
- pressions, and thence by 'habit'— by which we may suppose that a par-
- ticular mode of 'derivation' is meant— by habit, a repetition of the cor-
- relate ideas; and thence expectancy of the repetition of the correlate im-
- pressions. This expectancy would be an 'impression or reflection.' It is
- difficult to understand why Hume exempts 'habit' from the same criticism
- as that applied to the notion of 'cause/ We have no 'impression' of 'habit/
- just as we have no 'impression' of 'cause.' Cause, repetition, habit are all
- in the same boat.
- Somewhat inconsistently, Hume never allows impressions of sensation
- to be derived from the correlate ideas; though, as the difference between
- them only consists in 'force and vivacity,' the reason for this refusal can-
- not be found inl his philosophy. The truth is that Hume retained an
- obstinate belief in an external world which his principles forbade him to
- confess in his philosophical constructions. He reserved that belief for his
- daily life, and for his historical and sociological writings, and for his
- Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,
- The merit of Hume's account is that the process described is within
- 17 Italics mine.
- 18 III, VI, 1,22,23.
- Locke and Hume 141
- 'the soul/ In the philosophy of organism 'the soul' as it appears in Hume,
- and 'the mind' as it appears in Locke and Hume, are replaced by the
- phrases 'the actual entity/ and 'the actual occasion/ these phrases being
- synonymous.
- Two defects, found equally in Locke and in Hume, are, first, the con-
- fusion between a Lockian 'idea' and [214] consciousness of such an idea;
- and, secondly, the assigned relations between 'ideas' of sensation and
- 'ideas' of reflection.! In Hume's language, this latter point is concerned
- with the relations between 'impressions of sensation' and 'impressions of
- reflection.' Hume and Locke, with the overintellectualist bias prevalent
- among philosophers, assume that emotional feelings are necessarily deriva-
- tive from sensations. This is conspicuously not the case; the correlation
- between such feelings and sensations is on the whole a secondary effect.
- Emotions conspicuously brush aside sensations and fasten upon the 'par-
- ticular' objects to which— in Locke's phrase— certain 'ideas' are 'deter-
- mined. 7 The confinement of our prehension of other actual entities to the
- mediation of private sensations is pure myth. The converse doctrine is
- nearer the truth: the more primitive mode of objectification is via emo-
- tional tone, and only in exceptional organisms does objectification, via
- sensation, supervene with any effectiveness. In their doctrine on this
- point, Locke and Hume were probably only repeating the mediaeval tradi-
- tion, and they have passed on the tradition to their successors. None the
- less, the doctrine is founded upon no necessity of thought, and lacks
- empirical confirmation. If we consider the matter physiologically, the emo-
- tional tone depends mainly on the condition of the viscera which are
- peculiarly ineffective in generating sensations. Thus the whole notion of
- prehension should be inverted. We prehend other actual entities more
- primitively by direct mediation of emotional tone, and only secondarily
- and waveringly by direct mediation of sense. The two modes fuse with
- important effects upon our perceptive knowledge. This topic must be
- reserved (cf. Parts III and IV) for further discussion; but it is fundamental
- in the philosophy of organism. One difficulty in appealing to modern
- psychology, for the purpose of a preliminary survey of the nature of ex-
- perience, is that so much of that science is based upon the presupposition
- of the sensationalist mythology. Thus the sim- [215] pier, more naive sur-
- veys of Locke and Hume are philosophically the more useful.
- Later, in Part III, a 'prehension' will be analysed into 'prehending sub-
- ject/ 'object prehended/ and 'subjective form.' The philosophy of or-
- ganism follows Locke in admitting particular 'exterior things' into the
- category of 'object prehended.' It also follows Hume in his admission at
- the end of his Appendix to the Treatise: "Had I said, that two ideas of the
- same object can only be different by their different jeeling y I should have
- been nearer the truth." What Hume here calls 'feeling' is expanded in the
- philosophy of organism into the doctrine of 'subjective form.' But there is
- another ineradicable difference between some prehensions, namely, their
- 142 Discussions and Applications
- diversity of prehending subjects, when the two prehensions are in that
- respect diverse. The subsequent uses of the term 'feeling' are in the sense
- of the positive' type of prehensions, and not in the sense in which Hume
- uses it in the above quotation.
- The approximation of the philosophy of organism to Santayana's doc-
- trine of 'animal faith' is effected by this doctrine of objectification by the
- mediation of 'feeling/
- Santayana would deny that 'animal faith' has in it any element of given-
- ness. This denial is presumably made in deference to the sensationalist
- doctrine, that all knowledge of the external world arises by the mediation
- of private sensations. If we allow the term 'animal faith' to describe a
- kind of perception which has been neglected by the philosophic tradition,
- then practically the whole of Santayana's discussion 19 is in accord with
- the organic philosophy.
- The divergence from, and the analogy to, Santayana's doctrine can be
- understood by quoting two sentences:
- I propose therefore to use the word existence ... to designate not
- data of intuition but facts or events believed to occur in nature. These
- facts or events will include, first, intuitions themselves, or instances of
- con- [216] sciousness, like pains and pleasures and all remembered ex-
- periences and mental discourse; and second, physical things and
- events, having a transcendent relation to the data of intuition which,
- in belief, may be used as signs for them; . . .*
- It may be remarked in passing that this quotation illustrates Santayana's
- admirable clarity of thought, a characteristic which he shares with the men
- of genius of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Now the exact point
- where Santayana differs from the organic philosophy ist his implicit as-
- sumption that 'intuitions themselves* cannot be among the 'data of in-
- tuition/ that is to say, the data of other intuitions. This possibility is what
- Santayana denies and the organic philosophy asserts. In this respect
- Santayana is voicing the position which, implicitly or explicitly, pervades
- modern philosophy. He is only distinguished by his clarity of thought. If
- Santayana's position be granted, there is a phenomenal veil, a primitive
- credulity associated with action and valuation, and a mysterious symbolism
- from the veil to the realities behind the veil. The only difference between
- such philosophers lies in their reading of the symbolism, some read more
- and some less. There can be no decision between them, since there are no
- rational principles which penetrate from the veil to the dark background of
- reality.
- The organic philosophy denies this doctrine because, first, it is contrary
- to naive experience; secondly, 'memory' is a very special instance of an
- antecedent act of experience becoming a datum of intuition for another
- act of experience; thirdly, the rejected doctrine is derived from the mis-
- 19 Cf . his Scepticism and Animal Faith.
- Locke and Hume 143
- conception of Locke, already noted previously (cf. Part II, Ch. I, Sect.
- VI), that logical simplicity can be identified with priority in the con-
- crescent process. Locke, in his first two books,t attempts to build up
- experience from the basic elements of simple 'ideas' of, sensation. These
- simple ideas are practically Santayana's 'intuitions of essences. 7 Santayana
- explicitly [217] repudiates the misconception, but in so doing he knocks
- away one of the supports of his doctrine. A fourth reason for the rejection
- of the doctrine is that the way is thereby opened for a rational scheme of
- cosmology in which a final reality is identified with acts of experience.
- CHAPTER VI
- FROM DESCARTES TO KANT
- SECTION I
- [218] A comparison of thet different ways in which Descartes and Locke
- respectively conceived the scope of their investigations at once discloses the
- very important shift which Locke introduced into the tradition of philo-
- sophic thought. Descartes asked the fundamental metaphysical question,
- What is it to be an actual entity? He found three kinds of actual entities,
- namely, cogitating minds, extended bodies, and God. His word for an
- actual entity was 'substance/ The fundamental proposition, whereby the
- analysis of actuality could be achieved, took the form of predicating a
- quality of the substance in question. A quality was either an accident or an
- essential attribute. In the Cartesian philosophy there was room for three
- distinct kinds of change: one was the change of accidents of an enduring
- substance; another was the origination of an individual substance; and the
- third was the cessation of the existence of an enduring substance. Any
- individual belonging to either of the first two kinds of substances did not
- require any other individual of either of these kinds in order to exist. But
- it did require the concurrence of God. Thus the essential attributes of a
- mind were its dependence on God and its cogitations; and the essential
- attributes of a body were its dependence on God and its extension. Des-
- cartes does not apply the term 'attribute' to the 'dependence on God ? ; but
- it is an essential element in his philosophy. It is quite obvious that the
- accidental relationships between diverse individual substances form a great
- difficulty for Descartes. If they are to be included in his scheme of the
- actual [219] world, they must be qualities of a substance. Thus a relation-
- ship is the correlation of a pair of qualities,! one belonging exclusively to
- one individual, and the other exclusively to the other individual. The cor-
- relaton itself must be referred to God as one of his accidental qualities.
- This is exactly Descartes' procedure in his theory of representative ideas.
- In this theory, the perceived individual has one quality; the perceiving in-
- dividual has anothert quality which is the 'idea' representing this quality;
- God is aware of the correlation; and the perceiver's knowledge of God
- guarantees for him the veracity of his idea. It is unnecessary to criticize
- this very artificial account of what common sense believes to be our direct
- knowledge of other actual entities. But it is the only account consistent
- with the metaphysical materials provided by Descartes, combined with his
- assumption of a multiplicity of actual entities. In this assumption of a
- 144
- From Descartes To Kant 145
- multiplicity of actual entities the philosophy of organism follows Des-
- cartes. It is, however! obvious that there are only two ways out of Descartes*
- difficulties; one way is to have recourse to some form of monism; the other
- way is to reconstruct Descartes' metaphysical machinery.
- But Descartes asserts one principle which is the basis of all philosophy:
- he holds that the whole pyramid of knowledge is based upon the im-
- mediate operation of knowing which is either an essential (for Descartes),
- or a contributory, element in the composition of an immediate actual en-
- tity. This is also a first principle for the philosophy of organism. But
- Descartes allowed the subject-predicate form of proposition, and the
- philosophical tradition derived from it, to dictate his subsequent meta-
- physical development. For his philosophy, 'actuality' meant 'to be a sub-
- stance with inhering qualities/ For the philosophy of organism, the per-
- cipient occasion is its own standard of actuality. If in its knowledge other
- actual entities appear, it can only be because they conform to its standard
- of actuality. There can only be [220] evidence of a world of actual entities,
- if the immediate actual entity discloses them as essential to its own com-
- position. Descartes' notion of an unessential experience of the external
- world is entirely alien to the organic philosophy. This is the root point of
- divergence; and is the reason why the organic philosophy has to abandon
- any approach to the substance-quality notion of actuality. The organic
- philosophy interprets experience as meaning the 'self-enjoyment of being
- one among many, and of being one arising out of the composition of
- many/ Descartes interprets experience as meaning the 'self-enjoyment, by
- an individual substance, of its qualification by ideas/ t
- SECTION II
- Locke explicitly discards metaphysics. His enquiry has a limited scope:
- This therefore being my purpose, to inquire into the original, cer-
- tainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and
- degrees of belief, opinion, and assent, I shall not at present meddle
- with the physical consideration of the mind, or trouble myself to
- examine wherein its essence consists, ... It shall suffice to my present
- purpose, to consider the discerning faculties of a man as they are em-
- ployed about the objects which they have to do with; . . }
- The enduring importance of Locke's work comes from the candour,
- clarity, and adequacy with which he stated the evidence, uninfluenced by
- the bias of metaphysical theory. He explained, in the sense of stating
- plainly, and not in the more usual sense of 'explaining away/ By an ironic
- development in the history of thought, Locke's successors, who arrogated
- to themselves the title of 'empiricists,' have been chiefly employed in ex-
- plaining away the obvious facts of experience in obedience to the a priori
- doctrine of sensationalism, inherited from the mediaeval philosophy which
- 1 Essay, I, I, 2.
- 146 Discussions and Applications
- they despised. Locke's Essay is the invaluable storehouse for those who
- wish to [221] confront their metaphysical constructions by a recourse to
- the facts.
- Hume clipped his explanation by this a priori theory, which he states
- explicitly in the first quotation made from his Treatise in the previous
- chapter. It cannot be too often repeated:
- We may observe, that it is universally allowed by philosophers, and is
- besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really present with
- the mind but its perceptions f or impressions and ideas, and that ex-
- ternal objects become known to us only by those perceptions they
- occasion. To hate, to love, to think, to feel, to see; all this is nothing
- but to perceive.
- Hume, in agreement with what 'is universally allowed by philosophers/
- interprets this statement in a sensationalist sense. In accordance with
- this sense, an impression is nothing else than a particular instance of the
- mind's awareness of a universal, which may either be simple, or may be a
- manner of union of many simple universals. For Hume, hating, loving,
- thinking, feeling, are nothing but perceptions derivate from these funda-
- mental impressions. This is the a priori sensationalist dogma, which bounds
- all Hume's discoveries in the realm of experience. It is probable that this
- dogma was in Locke's mind throughout the earlier portion of his Essay.
- But Locke was not seeking consistency with any a priori dogma. He also
- finds in experience 'ideas' with characteristics which 'determine them to
- this or that particular existent.' Such inconsistency with their dogma
- shocks empiricists, who refuse to admit experience, naked and unashamed,
- devoid of their a priori figleaf. Locke is merely stating what, in practice,
- nobody doubts. But Locke would have agreed with Hume in refusing to
- admit that 'ideas of reflection' may be directly 'determined to some par-
- ticular existent,' without the intervention of 'ideas of sensation.' In this
- respect, Locke was a sensationalist, and the philosophy of organism is not
- sensationalist. But Locke's avoidance of metaphysics only led him up to a
- stage of thought for which meta- [222] physics is essential to clarity. The
- questions as to the status of a 'particular existent,' and of an 'idea deter-
- mined to a particular existent,' demand metaphysical discussion. Locke is
- never tired of disparaging the notion of 'substance'; but he gives no hint of
- alternative categories which he would employ to analysef the notions of
- an 'actual entity' and of 'reality.' But his Essay, however, does contain a
- line of thought which can be developed into a metaphysic. In the first
- place, he distinctly holds that ideas of particular existents— for example,
- the child's idea of its mother —constitute the fundamental data which the
- mental functioning welds into a unity by a determinate process of ab-
- sorption, including comparison, emphasis, and abstraction. He also holds
- that 'powers' are to be ascribed to particular existents whereby the con-
- stitutions of other particulars are conditioned. Correlatively, he holds that
- the constitutions of particular existents must be described so as to exhibit
- From Descartes To Kant 147
- their 'capacities' for being conditioned by such 'powers' in other particulars.
- He also holds that all qualities have in some sense a relational element in
- them. Perhaps, though Locke does not say so, this notion of the relational
- element in qualities is illustrated in the following passage: "Besides, there
- is scarce any particular thing existing, which, in some of its simple ideas,
- does not communicate with a greater, and in others with a less, number of
- particular beings: . . ." 2 Locke here expresses the notion of an identity be-
- tween two simple ideas in the form of a 'communication' between the par-
- ticular existents which possess that common quality. This passage also
- illustrates Locke's habit of employing the term 'idea't in a sense other than
- particular content of an act of awareness. Finally, Locke's notion of the
- passage of time is that something is 'perpetually perishing/ If he had
- grasped the notion that the actual entity 'perishes' in the passage of time,
- so that no actual entity changes, he would have arrived [223] at the point
- of view of the philosophy of organism. What he does say, is "perpetually
- perishing parts of succession." 3 Here, as elsewhere, Locke's neglect of
- ultimate questions revenges itself upon him. Nothing can make the var-
- ious parts of his Essay mutually consistent. He never revises the sub-
- stance-quality categories which remain presupposed throughout his Essay.
- In the first two books of the Essay , he professes to lay the foundations of
- his doctrine of ideas. These books are implicitly dominated by the notion
- of the ideas as mere qualifications of the substrate mind. In the third book
- of the Essay he is apparently passing on to the application of his estab-
- lished doctrine of ideas to the subordinate question of the function of
- language. But he tacitly introduces a new doctrine of ideas, which is dif-
- ficult to conciliate with the sensationalist doctrine of the preceding books.
- Hume concentrates upon the doctrine of Locke's earlier books; the phi-
- losophy of organism concentrates upon that of the later books in the Essay.
- If Locke's Essay is to be interpreted as a consistent scheme of thought, un-
- doubtedly Hume is right; but such an interpretation offers violence to
- Locke's contribution to philosophy.
- SECTION III
- In the philosophy of organism it is assumed that an actual entity is
- composite. 'Actuality* is the fundamental exemplification of composition;
- all other meanings of 'composition' are referent to this root-meaning. But
- 'actuality' is a general term, which merely indicates this ultimate type of
- composite unity: there are many composite unities to which this general
- term applies. There is no general fact of composition, not expressible in
- terms of the composite constitutions of the individual occasions. Every
- proposition is entertained in the constitution of some one actual entity, or
- severally in the constitutions of many actual entities. This is only [224]
- * Essay, III, IX, 14.
- 3 II, XIV, 1.
- 148 Discussions and Applications
- another rendering of the 'ontological principle/ It follows from the on-
- tological principle, thus interpreted, that the notion of a 'common world'
- must find its exemplification in the constitution of each actual entity, taken
- by itself for analysis. For an actual entity cannot be a member of a 'com-
- mon world/ except in the sense that the 'common world' is a constituent
- of its own constitution. It follows that every item of the universe, includ-
- ing all the other actual entities, is a constituentt in the constitution of any
- one actual entity. This conclusion has already been employed under the
- title of the principle of relativity/ This principle of relativity is the axiom
- by which the ontological principle is rescued from issuing in an extreme
- monism. Hume adumbrates this principle in his notion of 'repetition/
- Some principle is now required to rescue actual entities from being
- undifferentiated repetitions, each of the other, with mere numerical di-
- versity. This requisite is supplied by the 'principle of intensive relevance/
- The notion of intensive relevance is fundamental for the meaning of such
- concepts as 'alternative possibilities/ 'more or less/ 'important or negli-
- gible. 7 The principle asserts that any item of the universe, however pre-
- posterous as an abstract thought, or however remote as an actual entity,
- has its own gradation of relevance, as prehended, in the constitution of any
- one actual entity: it might have had more relevance: and it might have had
- less relevance, including the zero of relevance involved in the negative
- prehension; but in fact it has just that relevance whereby it finds its
- status in the constitution of that actual entity. It will be remembered that
- Hume finds it necessary to introduce the notion of variations in 'force and
- vivacity/ He is here making a particular application— and, as I believe, an
- unsuccessful application— of the general principle of intensive relevance.
- There is interconnection between the degrees of relevance of different
- items in the same actual entity. This fact of interconnection is asserted in
- the 'principle of \225] compatibility and contrariety/ There are items
- which, in certain respective gradations of relevance, are contraries to each
- other; so that those items, with their respective intensities of relevance,
- cannot coexist in the constitution of one actual entity. If some group of
- items, with their variety of relevance, can coexist in one actual entity, then
- the group, as thus variously relevant, is a compatible group. The various
- specific essences of one genus, whereby an actual entity may belong to one
- or other of the species but cannot belong to more than one, illustrate the
- incompatibility between two groups of items. Also in so far as a specific
- essence is complex, the specific essence is necessarily composed of com-
- patible items, if there has been any exemplification of that species. But
- 'feelings' are the entities which are primarily 'compatible 7 or 'incom-
- patible/ All other usages of these terms are derivative.
- The words 'real' and 'potential 7 are, in this exposition, taken in senses
- which are antithetical. In their primary senses, they qualify the 'eternal
- objects/ These eternal objects determine how the world of actual entities
- enters into the constitution of each one of its members via its feelings.
- From Descartes To Kant 149
- And they also express how the constitution of any one actual entity is
- analysable into phases, related as presupposed and presupposing. Eternal
- objects express how the predecessor-phase is absorbed into the successor-
- phaset without limitation of itself, but with additions necessary for the
- determination of an actual unity in the form of individual satisfaction. The
- actual entities enter into each others' constitutions under limitations im-
- posed by incompatibilities 4 of feelings. Such incompatibilities relegate
- various elements in the constitutions of felt objects to the intensive zero,
- which is termed 'irrelevance/ The preceding phases enter into their succes-
- sors with additions which eliminate the inde- [226] terminations. The how
- of the limitations, and the how of the additions, are alike the realization of
- eternal objects in the constitution of the actual entity in question. An
- eternal object in abstraction from any one particular actual entity is a
- potentiality for ingression into actual entities. In its ingression into any
- one actual entity, either as relev9.it or as irrelevant, it retains its poten-
- tiality of indefinite diversity of modes of ingression, a potential indeter-
- mination rendered determinate in this instance. The definite ingression
- into a particular actual entity is not to be conceived as the sheer evocation
- of that eternal object from 'not-being' into 'being'; it is the evocation of
- determination out of indetermination. Potentiality becomes reality; and
- yet retains its message of alternatives which the actual entity has avoided.
- In the constitution of an actual entity: —what ever component is red, might
- have been green; and whatever component is loved, might have been
- coldly esteemed. The term 'universal' is unfortunate in its application to
- eternal objects; for it seems to deny, and in fact it was meant to deny, that
- the actual entities also fall within the scope of the principle of relativity.
- If the term 'eternal objects' is disliked, the term 'potentials' would be
- suitable. The eternal objects are the pure potentials of the universe; and
- the actual entities differ from each other in their realization of potentials.
- Locke's term 'idea,' in his primary use of it in the first two books of the
- Essay, means the determinate ingression of an eternal object into the ac-
- tual entity in question. But he also introduces the limitation t to conscious
- mentality, which is here abandoned.
- Thus in the philosophy of organism, Locke's first use of the term 'idea'
- is covered by the doctrine of the 'ingression 7 of eternal objects into actual
- entities; and his second use of the same term is covered by the doctrine of
- the 'objectification' of actual entities. The two doctrines cannot be ex-
- plained apart from each other: they constitute explanations of the two
- fundamental principles— [227] the ontological principle and the principle
- of relativity.
- The four stages constitutive of an actual entity have been stated above
- in Part II, Chapter III, Section I. They can be named, datum, process,
- 4 Dr. H. M. Sheffer has pointed out the fundamental logical importance of the
- notion of 'incompatibility'; cf. Trans. Amer. Math. Soc.,f Vol. XIV, pp. 481-
- 488; and Introduction to Vol. 1 of Principia Mathematica (2nd edition).
- 150 Discussions and Applications
- satisfaction, decision. The two terminal stages have to do with 'becoming'
- in the sense of the transition from the settled actual world to the new-
- actual entity relatively to which that settlement is defined. But such
- 'definition* must be found as an element in the actual entities concerned.
- The 'settlement' which an actual entity 'finds' is its datum. It is to be con-
- ceived as a limited perspective of the 'settled' world provided by the
- eternal objects concerned. This datum is 'decided' by the settled world.
- It is 'prehended' by the new superseding entity. The datum is the ob-
- jective content of the experience. The decision, providing the datum, is a
- transference of self-limited appetition; the settled world provides the 'real
- potentiality' that its many actualities be felt compatibly; and the new
- concrescence starts from this datum. The perspective is provided by the
- elimination of incompatibilities. The final stage, the 'decision/ is how the
- actual entity, having attained its individual 'satisfaction/ thereby adds a
- determinate condition to the settlement for the future beyond itself. Thus
- the 'datum' is the 'decision received/ and the 'decision' is the 'decision
- transmitted/ Between these two decisions, received and transmitted, there
- lie the two stages, 'process 7 and 'satisfaction.' The datum is indeterminate
- as regards the final satisfaction. The 'process' is the addition of those ele-
- ments of feeling whereby these indeterminations are dissolved into de-
- terminate linkages attaining the actual unity of an individual actual entity.
- The actual entity, in becoming itself, also solves the question as to what
- it is to be. Thus process is the stage in which the creative idea works
- towards the definition and attainment of a determinate individuality.
- Process is the growth and attainment of a final end. The progressive defini-
- [228] tion of the final end is the efficacious condition for its attainment.
- The determinate unity of an actual entity is bound together by the final
- causation towards an ideal progressively defined by its progressive relation
- to the determinations and indeterminations of the datum. The ideal, itself
- felt, defines what 'self shall arise from the datum; and the ideal is also
- an element in the self which thus arises.
- According to this account, efficient causation expresses the transition
- from actual entity to actual entity; and final causation expresses the in-
- ternal process whereby the actual entity becomes itself. There is the be-
- coming of the datum, which is to be found in the past of the world; and
- there is the becoming of the immediate self from the datum. This latter
- becoming is the immediate actual process. An actual entity is at once the
- product of the efficient past, and is also, in Spinoza's phrase, causa sui.
- Every philosophy recognizes, in some form or other, this factor of self-
- causation, in what it takes to be ultimate actual fact. Spinoza's words have
- already been quoted. Descartes' argument, from the very fact of thinking,
- assumes that this freely determined operation is thereby constitutive of an
- occasion in the endurance of an actual entity. He writes (Meditation II) :
- "I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or that I
- From Descartes To Kant 151
- mentally conceive it." Descartes in his own philosophy conceives the
- thinker as creating the occasional thought. The philosophy of organism
- inverts the order, and conceives the thought as a constituent operation in
- the creation of the occasional thinker. The thinker is the final end whereby
- there is the thought. In this inversion we have the final contrast between a
- philosophy of substance and a philosophy of organism. The operations of
- an organism are directed towards the organism as a 'superject/ and are not
- directed from the organism as a 'subject/ The operations are directed from
- antecedent organisms and to the immediate organism. They are Vectors/
- in that they convey the many [229] things into the constitution of the
- single super ject. The creative process is rhythmic: it swings from the
- publicity of many things to the individual privacy; and it swings back from
- the private individual to the publicity of the objectified individual. The
- former swing is dominated by the final cause, which is the ideal; and the
- latter swing is dominated by the efficient cause, t which is actual.
- SECTION IV
- From the point of view of the philosophy of organism, the credit must
- be given to Hume that he emphasized the 'process' inherent in the fact of
- being a mind. His analysis of that process is faulty in its details. It was
- bound to be so; because, with Locke, he misconceived his problem to be
- the analysis of mental operations. He should have conceived it as the anal-
- ysis of operations constituent of actual entities. He would then have
- found mental operations in their proper place. Kant followed Hume in
- this misconception; and was thus led to balance the world upon thought-
- oblivious to the scanty supply of thinking. But Hume, Kant, and the
- philosophy of organism agree that the task of the critical reason is the
- analysis of constructs; and 'construction' is 'process/ Hume's analysis of
- the construct which constitutes a mental occasion is: impressions of sen-
- sation, ideas of impressions of sensation, impressions of reflection, ideas of
- impressions of reflection. This analysis may be found obscurely in Locke.
- But Hume exhibits it as an orderly process; and then endeavours— and
- fails— to express in terms of it our ordinary beliefs, in which he shares.
- For subsequent empiricists the pleasure of the dogma has overcome the
- metaphysical rule of evidence: that we must bow to those presumptions,
- which, in despite of criticism, we still employ for the regulation of our
- lives. Such presumptions are imperative in experience. Rationalism is
- the search for the coherence of such presumptions. Hume, in his series of
- ideas and of impressions, derivates from impressions of sensation, im-
- plicitly allows \230) that the building-up of experience is a process of addi-
- tion to original data. The philosophy of organism, in this respect, agrees with
- Hume. It disagrees with Hume as to the proper characterization of the
- primary data. In Hume's philosophy the primary impressions are char-
- acterized in terms of universals, e.g., in the first section of his Treatise he
- 152 Discussions and Applications
- refers to the colour 'red 7 as an illustration. This is also the doctrine of the
- first two books of Locke's Essay. But in Locke's third book a different
- doctrine appears, and the primary data are explicitly said to be 'ideas of
- particular existents.' According to Locke's second doctrine, the ideas of
- universals are derived from these primary data by a process of comparison
- and analysis. The philosophy of organism agrees in principle with this
- second doctrine of Locke's. It is difficult, and trifling, to determine the
- exact extent of the agreement; because the expositions of Locke and Hume
- bring in the very derivative operations involving consciousness. The or-
- ganic philosophy does not hold that the 'particular existents' are prehended
- apart from universals; on the contrary, it holds that they are prehended by
- the mediation of universals. In other words, each actuality is prehended
- by means of some element of its own definiteness. This is the doctrine of
- the 'objectification' of actual entities. Thus the primary stage in the con-
- crescence of an actual entity is the way in which the antecedent universe
- enters into the constitution of the entity in question, so as to constitute the
- basis of its nascent individuality. A converse way of looking at this truth is
- that the relevance to other actual entities of its own status in the actual
- world t is the initial datum in the process of its concrescence. When it is
- desired to emphasize this interpretation of the datum, the phrase 'objec-
- tive content' will be used synonymously with the term 'datum. 7 Of course,
- strictly speaking, the universals, to which Hume confines the datum, are
- also 'objects'; but the phrase 'objective content' is meant to emphasize the
- doctrine of 'objectificarion' of actual entities. If experi- \231] ence be not
- based upon an objective content, there can be no escape from a solipsist
- subjectivism. But Hume, and Locke in his main doctrine, fail to provide
- experience with any objective content. Kant, fort whom 'process' is
- mainly a process of thought, accepts Hume's doctrine as to the 'datum'
- and turns the 'apparent' objective content into the end of the construct.
- So far, Kant's 'apparent' objective content seems to take the place of the
- 'satisfaction' in the philosophy of organism. In this way there can be no
- real escape from the solipsist difficulty. But Kant in his appeal to 'practical
- reason' admits also the 'satisfaction' in a sense analogous to that in the
- philosophy of organism; and by an analysis of its complex character he
- arrives at ultimate actualities which, according to his account, cannot be
- discovered by any analysis of 'mere appearance.' This is a very complex
- doctrine, which has been reproduced in all philosophies derivative from
- Kant. The doctrine gives each actual entity two worlds, one world of mere
- appearance, and the other world compact of ultimate substantial fact. On
- this point, as to the absence of 'objective content' in the datum for ex-
- perience, Santayana 5 seems to agree with Hume and Kant. But if his in-
- troduction of 'animal faith' is to be taken as a re-examination of the datum
- under the influence of the sceptical conclusion from Hume's doctrine, then
- 5 Cf . Scepticism and Animal Faith.
- From Descartes To Kant 153
- he, as his second doctrine, is practically reasserting Locke's second doc-
- trine. But if he is appealing to 'practice' away from the critical examina-
- tion of our sources of information, he must be classed with Hume and
- Kant, although differing from them in every detail of procedure.
- In view of the anti-rationalism of Hume's contented appeal to 'practice/
- it is very difficult to understand— except as another example of anti-ra-
- tionalism— the strong objection, entertained by Hume and by his 'em-
- piricist' followers, to the anti-rationalistic basis of some forms of religious
- faith. This strain of anti-rationalism [232] which Locke and Hume ex-
- plicitly introduced into philosophy marks the final triumph of the anti-
- rationalistic reaction against the rationalism of the Middle Ages. Ration-
- alism is the belief that clarity can only be reached by pushing explanation
- to its utmost limits. Locke, who hoped to attain final clarity in his analysis
- of human understanding in divorce from metaphysics, was, so far, an anti-
- rationalist. But Hume, in so far as he is to be construed as remaining con-
- tent with two uncoordinated sets of beliefs, one based on the critical ex-
- amination of our sources of knowledge, and the other on the uncritical +
- examination of beliefs involved in 'practice,' reaches the high watermark
- of anti-rationalism in philosophy; for 'explanation' is the analysis of
- coordination.
- SECTION V
- The process whereby an actual entity, starting from its objective con-
- tent, attains its individual satisfaction, will be more particularly analysed
- in Part III. The primary character of this process is that it is individual to
- the actual entity; it expresses how the datum, which involves the actual
- world, becomes a component in the one actual entity. There must there-
- fore be no further reference to other actual entities; the elements available
- for the explanation are simply, the objective content, eternal objects, and
- the selective concrescence of feelings whereby an actual entity becomes
- itself. It must be remembered that the objective content is analysable into
- actual entities under limited perspectives provided by their own natures:
- these limited perspectives involve eternal objects in grades of relevance. If
- the 'process' were primarily a process of understanding, we should have to
- note that 'grades of relevance' are only other eternal objects in grades of
- relevance, and so on indefinitely. But we have not the sort of understand-
- ings which embrace such indefinite progressions. Accordingly there is here
- a vicious regress, if the process be essentially a process of understanding.
- But this is not the primary [233] description of it; the process is a process
- of 'feeling.' In feeling, what is felt is not necessarily analysed; in under-
- standing, what is understood is analysed, in so far as it is understood. Un-
- derstanding is a special form of feeling. Thus there is no vicious regress in
- feeling, by reason of the indefinite complexity of what is felt. Kant, in his
- 154 Discussions and Applications
- 'Transcendental Aesthetic/ 1 emphasizes the doctrine that in intuition a
- complex datum is intuited as one.
- Again the selection involved in the phrase 'selective concrescence* is not
- a selection among the components of the objective content; for, by hy-
- pothesis, the objective content is a datum. The compatibilities and in-
- compatibilities which impose the perspective, transforming the actual
- world into the datum, are inherent in the nature of things. Thus the
- selection is a selection of relevant eternal objects whereby what is a
- datum from without is transformed into its complete determination as a
- fact within. The problem whicht the concrescence solves is, how the many
- components of the objective content are to be unified in one felt content
- with its complex subjective form. This one felt content is the 'satisfaction/
- whereby the actual entity is its particular individual self; to use Descartes'
- phrase, 'requiring nothing but itself in order to exist/ In the conception of
- the actual entity in its phase of satisfaction, the entity has attained its in-
- dividual separation from other things; it has absorbed the datum, and it
- has not yet lost itself in the swing back to the 'decision' whereby its ap-
- petition becomes an element in the data of other entities superseding it.
- Time has stood still—if only it could.
- Thus process is the admission of eternal objects in their new role of
- investing the datum with the individuality of the subject. The datum,*
- quat mere datum, includes the many individualities of the actual world.
- The satisfaction includes these many individualities as subordinate con-
- tributors to the one individuality. The process admits or rejects t eternal
- objects which by their absorption into the subjective forms of the many
- feelings [234] effect this integration. The attainment of satisfaction rele-
- gates all eternal objects which are not 'felt' either as determinants of
- definiteness in the data,t or as determinants of definiteness in the subjective
- form of the satisfaction, into the status of contraries to the eternal objects
- which are thus felt. Thus all indeterminations respecting the potentialities
- of the universe are definitely solved so far as concerns the satisfaction of
- the subject in question.
- The process can be analysed genetically into a series of subordinate
- phases which presuppose their antecedents. Neither the intermediate
- phases, nor the datum which is the primary phase of all, determine the
- final phase of determinate individualization. Thus an actual entity, on its
- ^subjective side, is nothing else than what the universe is for it, including
- its own reactions. The reactions are the subjective forms of the feelings,
- elaborated into definiteness through stages of process. An actual entity
- achieves its own unity by its determinate feelings respecting every item of
- the datum. Every individual objectification in the datum has its perspec-
- tive defined by its own eternal objects with their own relevance compatible
- with the relevance of other objectifications. Each such objectification, and
- each such complex of objectifications, in the datum is met with a corre-
- spondent feeling, with its determinate subjective form, until the many
- From Descartes To Kant 155
- become one experience, the satisfaction. The philosophies of substance
- presuppose a subject which then encounters a datum, and then reacts to
- the datum. The philosophy of organism presupposes a datum which is met
- with feelings, and progressively attains the unity of a subject. But with
- this doctrine, 'superject' would be a better term than 'subject/ Locke's
- 'ideas of reflection' are the feelings, in so far as they have entered into
- consciousness.
- It is by reference to feelings that the notion of 'immediacy' obtains its
- meaning. The mere objectification of actual entities by eternal objects
- lacks 'immediacy/ It is 'repetition'; and this is a contrary to 'immediacy.'
- [235] But 'process' is the rush of feelings whereby second-handedness at-
- tains subjective immediacy; in this way, subjective form overwhelms repe-
- tition, and transforms it into immediately felt satisfaction; objectivity is
- absorbed into subjectivity. It is useful to compare this analysis of the
- construction of an act of experience with Kant's. In the first place Kant's
- act of experience is essentially knowledge. Thus whatever is not knowledge
- is necessarily inchoate, and merely on its way to knowledge. In comparing
- Kant's procedure with that of the philosophy of organism, it must be
- remembered that an 'apparent' objective content is the end of Kant's
- process, and thus takes the place of 'satisfaction' in the process as analysed
- in the philosophy of organism. In Kant's phraseology at the beginning of
- the Critique of Pure Reason, this 'apparent' objective content is referred to
- as 'objects.' He also accepts Hume's sensationalist account of the datum.
- Kant places this sentence at the commencement of the Critique: "Objects
- therefore are given to us through our sensibility. Sensibility alone supplies
- us with intuitions. These intuitions become thought through the under-
- standing, and hence arise conceptions." 6 This is expanded later in a form
- which makes Kant's adhesion to Hume's doctrine of the datum more
- explicit:
- And here we see that the impressions of the senses give the first im-
- pulse to the whole faculty of knowledge with respect to them, and
- thus produce experience which consists of two very heterogeneous
- elements, namely, matter for knowledge, derived from the senses \eine
- Materiel zur Erkenntniss aus den Sinnen] f and a certain form accord-
- ing to which it is arranged, derived from the internal source of pure
- intuition and pure thought, first brought into action by the former,
- and then producing concepts. 7
- Also:
- Thoughts with- [236] out content are empty, intuitions without con-
- cepts are blind. 8
- 6 "Vermittelst der Sinnlichkeit also werden uns Gegenstande gegeben, und sic
- allein liefert uns Anschauungenjf durch den Verstand aber werden sie gedacht,
- und von ihm entspringen BegrirTe." Translation in the text is Max Muller's.
- 7 Transcendental Analytic,' f Ch. II, Sect. I (Max Muller).
- 8 'Transcendental Logic,' Introduction, Sect. L*
- 156 Discussions and Applications
- In this last statement the philosophy of organism is in agreement with
- Kant; but for a different reason. It is agreed that the functioning of
- concepts is an essential factor in knowledge, so that 'intuitions without
- concepts are blind/ But for Kant, apart from concepts there is nothing to
- know; since objects related in a knowable world are the product of con-
- ceptual functioning whereby categoreal form is introduced into the sense-
- datum, which otherwise is intuited in the form of a mere spatio-temporal
- flux of sensations. Knowledge requires that this mere flux be particularized
- by conceptual functioning, whereby the flux is understood as a nexus of
- 'objects/ Thus for Kant the process whereby there is experience is a
- process from subjectivity to apparent objectivity. The philosophy of or-
- ganism inverts this analysis, and explains the process as proceeding from
- objectivity to subjectivity, namely, from the objectivity, whereby the ex-
- ternal world is a datum, to the subjectivity, whereby there is one in-
- dividual experience. Thus, according to the philosophy of organism, in
- every act of experience there are objects for knowledge; but, apart from
- the inclusion of intellectual functioning in that act of experience, there is
- no knowledge.
- We have now come to Kant, the great philosopher who first, fully and
- explicitly, introduced into philosophy the conception of an act of ex-
- perience as a constructive functioning, transforming subjectivity into ob-
- jectivity 7 , or objectivity into subjectivity; the order is immaterial in com-
- parison with the general idea. We find the first beginnings of the notion in
- Locke and in Hume. Indeed, in Locke, the process is conceived in its
- correct order, at least in the view of the philosophy of organism. But the
- whole notion is only vaguely and inadequately conceived. The full sweep
- of the notion is due to Kant. The second half of the modern period of
- philosophical thought is to be dated from Hume and Kant. In it the [237]
- development of cosmology has been hampered by the stress laid upon one,
- or other, of three misconceptions:
- (i) The substance-quality doctrine of actuality.
- (ii) The sensationalist doctrine of perception.
- (iii) The Kantian doctrine of the objective world as a construct from
- subjective experience.
- The combined influence of these allied errors has been to reduce philos-
- ophy to a negligible influence in the formation of contemporary modes
- of thought. Hume himself introduces the ominous appeal to 'practice-
- not in criticism of his premises, but in supplement to his conclusions.
- Bradley, who repudiates Hume, finds the objective world in which we live,
- and move, and have our being, 'inconsistent if taken as real/ Neither side
- conciliates philosophical conceptions of a real world with the world of
- daily experience.
- CHAPTER VII
- THE SUBJECTIVIST PRINCIPLE
- SECTION I
- [238] It is impossible to scrutinize too carefully the character to be as-
- signed to the datum in the act of experience. The whole philosophical
- system depends on it. Hume's doctrine of 'impressions of sensation' (Trea-
- tise, Book I, Part I, Sect. II) is twofold. I will call one part of his doctrine
- 'The Subjectivist Principle' and the other part 'The Sensationalist Prin-
- ciple/ It is usual to combine the two under the heading of the 'sensation-
- alist doctrine'; but two principles are really involved, and many philos-
- ophers—Locke, for instance— are not equally consistent in their adhesion
- to both of them. The philosophy of organism denies both of these doc-
- trines, in the form in which they are considered in this chapter, though it
- accepts a reformed subjectivist principle (cf. Sect. Vf below and Part II,
- Ch. IX). Locke accepted the sensationalist principle, and was inconsistent
- in his statements respecting the subjectivist principle. With the exception
- of some lapses, he accepted the latter in the first two books of his Essay,
- and rejected it tacitly, but persistently, in the third and fourth books.
- Kant (in the Critique of Pure Reason) accepted the subjectivist principle,
- and rejected the sensationalist principle.
- The sensationalist principle acquires dominating importance, if the
- subjectivist principle be accepted. Kant's realization of this importance
- constituted the basis of his contribution to philosophy. The history of
- modern philosophy is the story of attempts to evade the inflexible con-
- sequences of the subjectivist principle, explicitly or implicitly accepted.
- The great merit of Hume and of [239] Kant is the explicitness with which
- they faced the difficulty.
- The subjectivist principle is, that the datum in the act of experience can
- be adequately analysed purely in terms of universals.
- The sensationalist principle is, that the primary activity in the act of
- experience is the bare subjective entertainment of the datum, devoid of
- any subjective form of reception. This is the doctrine of mere sensation.
- The subjectivist principle follows from three premises: (i) The ac-
- ceptance of the 'substance-quality' concept as expressing the ultimate on-
- tological principle, (ii) The acceptance of Aristotle's definition of a pri-
- mary substance, as always a subject and never a predicate, (in) The
- assumption that the experient subject is a primary substance. The first
- premise states that the final metaphysical fact is always to be expressed as
- 157
- 158 Discussions and Applications
- a quality inhering in a substance. The second premise divides qualities and
- primary substances into two mutually exclusive classes. The two premises
- together are the foundation of the traditional distinction between uni-
- versal and particulars. The philosophy of organism denies the premises on
- which this distinction is founded. It admits two ultimate classes of entities,
- mutually exclusive. One class consists of 'actual entities/ which in the
- philosophical tradition are mis-described as 'particulars'; and the other
- class consists of forms of definiteness, here named 'eternal objects/ which
- in comparison with actual entities are mis-described as 'universals.' These
- mis-descriptions have already been considered (Part II, Ch. I, Sect. V).
- Descartes held, with some flashes of inconsistency arising from the use
- of 'realitas objectiva/ the subjectivist principle as to the datum. But he
- also held that this mitigation of the subjeetivist* principle enabled the
- 'process' within experience to include a sound argument for the existence
- of God; and thence a sound argument for the general veridical character of
- those presumptions [240] as to the external world which somehow arise
- in the process.
- According to the philosophy of organism, it is only by the introduction
- of covert inconsistencies into the subjectivist principle, as here stated, that
- there can be any escape from what Santayana calls, 'solipsism of the pres-
- ent moment/ Thus Descartes' mode of escape is either illusory, or its
- premises are incompletely stated. This covert introduction is always arising
- because common sense is inflexibly objectivist. We perceive other things
- which are in the world of actualities in the same sense as we are. Also our
- emotions are directed towards other things, including of course our bodily
- organs. These are our primary beliefs which philosophers proceed to
- dissect.
- Now philosophy has always proceeded on the sound principle that its
- generalizations f must be based upon the primary elements in actual ex-
- perience as starting-points. Greek philosophy had recourse to the common
- forms of language to suggest its generalizations. It found the typical state-
- ment, 'That stone is grey'; and it evolved the generalization that the actual
- world can be conceived as a collection of primary substances qualified by
- universal qualities. Of course, this was not the only generalization evolved:
- Greek philosophy was subtle and multiform, also it was not inflexibly
- consistent. But this general notion was always influencing thought, ex-
- plicitly or implicitly.
- A theory of knowledge was also needed. Again philosophy started on a
- sound principle, that all knowledge is grounded on perception. Perception
- was then analysed, and found to be the awareness that a universal quality
- is qualifying a particular substance. Thus perception is the catching of a
- universal quality in the act of qualifying a particular substance. It was
- then asked, how the perceiver perceives; and the answer is,t by his organs
- of sensation. Thus the universal qualities which qualify the perceived
- substances are, in respect to the [24 1] perceiver, his private sensations re-
- The Subjectivist Principle 159
- ferred to particular substances other than himself. So far, the tradition of
- philosophy includes, among other elements, a factor of extreme ob-
- jectivism in metaphysics, whereby the subject-predicate form of proposition
- is taken as expressing a fundamental metaphysical truth. Descartes modi-
- fied traditional philosophy in two opposite ways. He increased the meta-
- physical emphasis on the substance-quality forms of thought. The actual
- things 'required nothing but themselves in order to exist/ and were to be
- thought of in terms of their qualities, some of them essential attributes,
- and others accidental modes. He also laid down the principle, that those
- substances which are the subjects enjoying conscious experiences t provide
- the primary data for philosophy, namely, themselves as in the enjoyment
- of such experience. This is the famous subjectivist bias which entered into
- modern philosophy through Descartes. In this doctrine Descartes undoubt-
- edly made the greatest philosophical discovery since the age of Plato and
- Aristotle. For his doctrine directly traversed the notion that the proposi-
- tion, 'This stone is grey/ expresses a primary form of known fact from
- which metaphysics can start its generalizations. If we are to go back to the
- subjective enjoyment of experience, the type of primary starting-point is
- 'my perception of this stone as grey.' Primitive men were not metaphysi-
- cians, nor were they interested in the expression of concrete experience.
- Their language merely expressed useful abstractions, such as 'greyness of
- the stone/ But like Columbus who never visited America, Descartes missed
- the full sweep of his own discovery, and he and his successors, Locke and
- Hume, continued to construe the functionings of the subjective enjoyment
- of experience according to the substance-quality categories. Yet if the
- enjoyment of experience be the constitutive subjective fact, these cate-
- gories have lost all claim to any fundamental character in metaphysics.
- Hume — to proceed at once to the consistent exponent of the method-
- looked for a [242] universal quality to function as qualifying the mind, by
- way of explanation of its perceptive enjoyment. Now if we scan 'my per-
- ception of this stone as grey' in order to find a universal, the only available
- candidate is 'greyness/ Accordingly for Hume, 'greyness/ functioning as a
- sensation qualifying the mind, is a fundamental type of fact for meta-
- physical generalization. The result is Hume's simple impressions of sensa-
- tion, which form the starting-point of his philosophy. But this is an entire
- muddle, f for the perceiving mind is not grey, and so grey is now made to
- perform a new role. From the original fact 'my perception of this stone as
- grey/ Hume extracts 'Awareness of sensation of greyness'; and puts it
- forward as the ultimate datum in this element of experience.
- He has discarded the objective actuality of the stone-image in his search
- for a universal quality: this 'objective actuality' is Descartes' 'realitas ob-
- jective! \ Hume's search was undertaken in obedience to a metaphysical
- principle which had lost all claim to validity, if the Cartesian discovery be
- accepted. He is then content with 'sensation of greyness/ which is just as
- much a particular as the original stone-image. He is aware of 'this sensa-
- 160 Discussions and Applications
- tion of greyness.' What he has done is to assert arbitrarily the 'subjectivism
- and 'sensationalist' principles as applying to the datum for experience: the
- notion 'this sensation of greyness' has no reference to any other actual
- entity. Hume thus applies to the experiencing subject Descartes' principle,
- that it requires no other actual entity in order to exist. The fact that fi-
- nally Hume criticizes the Cartesian notion of mindt does not alter the
- other fact that his antecedent arguments presuppose that notion.
- It is to be noticed that Hume can only analyse the sensation in terms of
- af universal and of its realization in the prehending mind. For example,
- to take the first examples which in his Treatise he gives of such analysis, we
- find 'red/ 'scarlet/ 'orange/ 'sweet/ 'bitter/ Thus Hume describes 'im-
- pressions of sensation' in the exact terms in which the philosophy of or-
- ganism describes con- [243] ceptual feelings. They are the particular feel-
- ings of universals, and are not feelings of other particular existents ex-
- emplifying universals. Hume admits this identification, and can find no
- distinction except in 'force and vivacity/ He writes: "The first circum-
- stance that strikes my eye, is the great resemblance between our impres-
- sions and ideas in every particular except their degree of force and
- vivacity/'*
- In contrast to Hume, the philosophy of organism keeps 'this stone as
- grey' in the datum for the experience in question. It is, in fact, the 'objec-
- tive datum' of a certain physical feeling, belonging to a derivative type in
- a late phase of a concrescence. But this doctrine fully accepts Descartes'
- discovery that subjective experiencing is the primary metaphysical situa-
- tion which is presented to metaphysics for analysis. This doctrine is the
- 'reformed subjectivist principle,' t mentioned earlier in this chapter. Ac-
- cordingly, the notion 'this stone as grey' is a derivative abstraction, neces-
- sary indeed as an element in the description of the fundamental experien-
- tial feeling, but delusive as a metaphysical starting-point. This derivative
- abstraction is called an 'objectification/
- The justification for this procedure is, first, common sense, and, sec-
- ondly, the avoidance of the difficulties which have dogged the subjectivist
- and sensationalist principles of modern philosophy. Descartes' discovery
- on the side of subjectivism requires balancing by an 'objectivist' principle
- as to the datum for experience. Also, with the advent of Cartesian subjec-
- tivism, the substance-quality category has lost all claim to metaphysical
- primacy; and, with this disposition of substance-quality, we can reject the
- notion of individual substances, each with its private world of qualities
- and sensations.
- SECTION II
- In the philosophy of organism knowledge is relegated to the intermedi-
- ate phase of j>rocess. Cognizance belongs to the genus of subjective forms
- which are admitted, or [244] not admitted, to the function of absorbing
- the objective content into the subjectivity of satisfaction. Its 'importance'
- The Subjectivist Principle 161
- is therefore no necessary element in the concrete actual entity. In the case
- of any one such entity, it may merely constitute an instance of what
- Locke terms 'a capacity/ If we are considering the society of successive
- actual occasions in the historic route forming the life of an enduring ob-
- ject, some of the earlier actual occasions may be without knowledge, and
- some of the later may possess knowledge. In such a case, the unknowing
- man has become knowing. There is nothing surprising in this conclusion;
- it happens daily for most of us, when we sleep at night and wake in the
- morning. Every actual entity has the capacity for knowledge, and there is
- graduation in the intensity of various items of knowledge; but, in gen-
- eral, knowledge seems to be negligible apart from a peculiar complexity in
- the constitution of some actual occasion.
- We— as enduring objects with personal order— objectify the occasions of
- our own past with peculiar completeness in our immediate present. We
- find in those occasions, as known from our present standpoint, a surprising
- variation in the range and intensity of our realized knowledge. We sleep;
- we are half-awake; we are aware of our perceptions, but are devoid of
- generalities in thought; we are vividly absorbed within a small region of
- abstract though while oblivious to the world around; we are attending to
- our emotions— some torrent of passion— to them and to nothing else; we
- are morbidly discursive in the width of our attention; and finally we sink
- back into temporary obliviousness, sleeping or stunned. Also we can re-
- member factors experienced in our immediate past, which at the time we
- failed to notice. When we survey the chequered history of our own capac-
- ity for knowledge, does common sense allow us to believe that the opera-
- tions of judgment, operations which require definition in terms of con-
- scious apprehension, are those operations which are foundational in exist-
- ence either as \245] an essential attribute for an actual entity, or as the
- final culmination whereby unity of experience is attained?!
- The general case x of conscious perception is the negative perception,
- namely, 'perceiving this stone as not grey/ The 'grey' then has ingression
- in its full character of a conceptual novelty, illustrating an alternative. In
- the positive case, 'perceiving this stone as grey/ the grey has ingression in
- its character of a possible novelty, but in fact by its conformity empha-
- sizing the dative grey, blindly felt. Consciousness is the feeling of nega-
- tion: in the perception of 'the stone as grey/ such feeling is in barest
- germ; in the perception of 'the stone as not grey/ such feeling is int full
- development. Thus the negative perception is the triumph of conscious-
- ness. It finally rises to the peak of free imagination, in which the con-
- ceptual novelties search through a universe in which they are not datively
- exemplified.
- Consciousness is the subjective form involved in feeling the contrast
- between the 'theory' which may be erroneous and the fact which is 'given/
- Thus consciousness involves the rise into importance of the contrast be-
- 1 Cf. Part III, for the full account.
- 162 Discussions and Applications
- tween the eternal objects designated by the words 'any' and 'just that/
- Conscious perception is ? therefore, the most primitive form of judgment.
- The organic philosophy holds that consciousness only arises in a Jate
- derivative phase of complex integrations. If an actual occasion be such
- that phases of this sort are negligible in its concrescence, then in its ex-
- perience there is no knowledge;! owing to the fact that consciousness is a
- subjective form belonging to the later phases, the prehensions which it
- directly irradiates are those of an 'impure' type. Consciousness only il-
- luminates the more primitive types of prehension so far as these prehen-
- sions are still elements in the products of integration. Thus those elements
- of our experience which stand out clearly and distinctly in our conscious-
- ness are not its basic facts; they are the derivative modifications which
- arise in the process. For [246] example, consciousness only dimly illumi-
- nates the prehensions in the mode of causal efficacy, because these pre-
- hensions are primitive elements in our experience. But prehensions in the
- mode of presentational immediacy are among those prehensions which we
- enjoy with the most vivid consciousness. These prehensions are late
- derivatives in the concrescence of an experient subject. The consequences
- of the neglect of this law, that the late derivative elements are more clearly
- illuminated by consciousness than the primitive elements, have been fatal
- to the proper analysis of an experient occasion. In fact, most of the diffi-
- culties of philosophy are produced by it. Experience has been explained in
- a thoroughly topsy-turvy fashion, the wrong end first. In particular, emo-
- tional and purposeful experience have been made to follow upon Hume's
- impressions of sensation.
- To sum up: (i) Consciousness is a subjective form arising in the higher
- phases of concrescence, (ii) Consciousness primarily illuminates the higher
- phase in which it arises, and only illuminates earlier phases derivatively, as
- they remain components in the higher phase, (iii) It follows that the
- order of dawning, clearly and distinctly, in consciousness is not the order
- of metaphysical priority.
- SECTION III
- The primitive form of physical experience is emotional— blind emo-
- tion—received as felt elsewhere in another occasion and conformally ap-
- propriated as a subjective passion. In the language appropriate to the
- higher stages of experience, the primitive element is sympathy, that is,
- feeling the feeling in another and feeling conformally with another. We
- are so used to considering the high abstraction, 'the stone as green/ that
- we have difficulty in eliciting into consciousness the notion of 'green' as
- the qualifying character of an emotion. Yet, the aesthetic feelings, whereby
- there is pictorial art, are nothing else than products of the contrasts [247]
- latent in a variety of colours qualifying emotion, contrasts which are made
- possible by their patterned relevance to each other. The separation of the
- The Sub jecti vist Principle 163
- emotional experience from the presentational intuition is a high abstrac-
- tion of thought. Thus the primitive experience is emotional feeling, f felt
- in its relevance to a world beyond. The feeling is blind and the relevance
- is vague. Also feeling, and reference to an exterior world, t pass into ap-
- petition, which is the feeling of determinate relevance to a world about to
- be. In the phraseology of physics, this primitive experience is 'vector
- feeling/ that is to say, feeling from a beyond which is determinate and
- pointing to a beyond which is to be determined. But the feeling is sub-
- jectively rooted in the immediacy of the present occasion: it is what the
- occasion feels for itself, as derived from the past and as merging into the
- future. In this vector transmission of primitive feeling the primitive pro-
- vision of width for contrast is secured by pulses of emotion, which in the
- coordinate division of occasions (cf. Part IV) appear as wave-lengths and
- vibrations. In any particular cosmic epoch, the order of nature has secured
- the necessary differentiation of function, so as to avoid incompatibilities,
- by shepherding the sensa characteristic of that epoch each into association
- with a definite pulse. Thus the transmission of each sensum is associated
- with its own wave-length. In physics, such transmission can be conceived
- as corpuscular or undulatory, according to the special importance of par-
- ticular features in the instance considered. The higher phases of experi-
- ence increase the dimension of width, and elicit contrasts of higher types.
- The clash of uncoordinated emotions in the lower categories isf avoided:
- the aspect of inhibition and of transitory satisfaction is diminished. Ex-
- perience realizes itself as an element in what is everlasting (cf. Part V, Ch.
- II), and as embodying in itself the everlasting component of the universe.
- This gain does not necessarily involve consciousness. Also it involves en-
- hanced subjective emphasis. The occasion [248] has become less of a detail
- and more of a totality, so far as its subjective experience is concerned. The
- feeling of this width, with its enhancement of permanence, takes the form
- of blind zest, which can become self-defeating by excess of subjective em-
- phasis. The inhibitions of zest by lack of adequate width to combine the
- contraries inherent in the environment lead to the destruction of the type
- of order concerned. Every increase of sensitivity requires an evolution
- towards adaptation. It must be remembered, however, that emotion in
- human experience, or even in animal experience, is not bare emotion. It
- is emotion interpreted, integrated, and transformed into higher categories
- of feeling. But even so, the emotional appetitive elements in our conscious
- experience are those which most closely resemble the basic elements of all
- physical experience.
- SECTION IV
- The distinction between the various stages of concrescence consists in
- the diverse modes of ingression of the eternal objects involved. The im-
- manent decision, whereby there is a supervening of stages in an actual
- 164 Discussions and Applications
- entity, is always the determinant of a process of integration whereby com-
- pletion is arrived at— at least, such 'formal' completion as is proper to a
- single actual entity. This determination originates with conceptual pre-
- hensions which enter into integration with the physical prehensions,!
- modifying both the data and the subjective forms.
- The limitation whereby there is a perspective relegation of eternal ob-
- jects to the background is the characteristic of decision. Transcendent
- decision includes God's decision. He is the actual entity in virtue of which
- the entire multiplicity of eternal objects obtains its graded relevance to
- each stage of concrescence. Apart from God, there could be no relevant
- novelty. Whatever arises in actual entities from God's decision, arises first
- conceptually, and is transmuted into the physical world (cf. Part III). In
- 'transcendent decision' there is transi- [249] tion from the past to the im-
- mediacy of the present; and in 'immanent decision' there is the process of
- acquisition of subjective form and the integration of feelings. In this
- process the creativity, universal throughout actuality, is characterized by
- the datum from the past; and it meets this dead datum— universalized
- into a character of creativity— by the vivifying novelty of subjective form
- selected from the multiplicity of pure potentiality. In the process, the old
- meets the new, and this meeting constitutes the satisfaction of an im-
- mediate particular individual.
- Eternal objects in any one of their modes of subjective ingrcssion are
- then functioning in the guise of subjective novelty meeting the objective
- datum from the past. This word 'feeling' is a mere technical term; but it
- has been chosen to suggest that functioning through which the con-
- crescent actuality appropriates the datum so as to make it its own. There
- are three successive phases of feelings, namely, a phase of 'conformal'f
- feelings, one of 'conceptual' feelings, and one of 'comparative' feelings,
- including 'propositional' feelings in this last species. In the conformal
- feelings the how of feeling reproduces what is felt. Some conformation is
- necessary as a basis of vector transition, whereby the past is synthesized
- with the present. The one eternal object in its two-way function, as a
- determinant of the datum and as a determinant of the subjective form, is
- thus relational. In this sense the solidarity of the universe is based on the
- relational functioning of eternal objects. The two latter? phases can be
- put together as the 'supplemental' phase.
- An eternal object when it has ingression through its function of ob-
- jectifying the actual world, so as to present the datum for prehension, is
- functioning 'datively.' Hence, to sum up, there are four modes of func-
- tioning whereby an eternal object has ingression into the constitution of
- an actual entity: (i) as dative ingression, (ii) in conformal physical feeling,
- (iii) in conceptual feeling, (iv) in comparative feeling.
- \2S0] But the addition of diverse eternal objects is not of the essence of
- 'supplementation': the essence consists in the adjustment of subjective
- importance by functioning of subjective origin. The graduated emotional
- The Subjectivist Principle 165
- intensity of the subject is constituting itself by reference to the physical
- data, datively there and conformally felt. All references to 'attention'
- usually refer to such supplementation in which the addition of diverse
- eternal objects is at a minimum; whereas references to 'emotion' usually
- refer to such supplementation complicated by profuse addition of diverse
- eternal objects. Supplementary feeling is emotional and purposeful, be-
- cause it is what is felt by mere reason of the subjective appropriation of
- the objective data. But it is of the essence of supplementary feeling that it
- does not challenge its initial phase of conformal feeling by any reference to
- incompatibility. The stages of the subjective ingression of eternal objects
- involve essential compatibility. The process exhibits an inevitable con-
- tinuity of functioning. Each stage carries in itself the promise of its suc-
- cessor, and each succeeding stage carries in itself the antecedent out of
- which it arose. For example, t the complexity of the datum carries in itself
- the transition from the conformal feelings to supplementary feelings in
- which contrasts, latent in the datum, achieve real unity between the com-
- ponents. Thus components in the datum, which qua dative, are diverse,
- become united in specific realized contrast. As elements in the datum, the
- components are individually given, with the potentiality for a contrast,
- which in the supplementary stage is either included or excluded. The con-
- formal stage merely transforms the objective content into subjective feel-
- ings. But the supplementary stage adds, or excludes, the realization of the
- contrasts by which the original datum passes into its emotional unity.
- This account enables us to conceive the stage of consciousness as a pro-
- longation of the stage of supplementation. The concrescence is an in-
- dividualization of the whole universe. Every eternal object, whether rele-
- vant [25 J] or irrelevant to the datum, is still patient of its contrasts with
- the datum. The process by which such contrasts are admitted or rejected
- involves the stage of conceptual feeling; and consciousness is evidently
- only a further exhibition of this stage of supplementary feeling. Concep-
- tual feelings do not necessarily involve consciousness. This point is
- elaborated in detail in Part III.
- Again in this explanation, 'contrast' has appeared as the general case;
- while 'identification' is a sub-species arising when one and the same
- eternal object is contrasted in its two modes of functioning.
- Thus the two latter stages of feeling are constituted by the realization of
- specific modes of diversity and identity, the realization also involving an
- adjustment of intensities of relevance. Mere diversity, and mere identity,
- are generic terms. Two components in the constitution of an actual entity
- are specifically diverse and specifically identical by reason of the definite
- potential contrast involved in the diversity of the implicated eternal ob-
- jects, and by reason of the definite self-identity of each eternal object. The
- specific identity arising from the synthesis of diverse modes of functioning
- of one eternal object is the 'individual essence' of that eternal object. But
- the concrescence reaches the goal required by the Category of Objective
- 166 Discussions and Applications
- Unity, that in any subject one entity can only be felt once. Nothing can be
- duplicated. The many potentialities for one entity must be synthesizedt
- into one fact. Hence arise the incompatibilities productive of elimination.
- Properly speaking, modes of functioning are compared, thereby evoking
- specific contrasts and specific identifications. The two latter stages of feel-
- ing are the stages of comparison; these stages involve comparisons, and
- comparisons of comparisons; and the admission, or exclusion, of an in-
- definite complexity of potentialities for comparison, in ascending grades.
- The ultimate attainment is 'satisfaction/ This is the final characteriza-
- tion of the unity of feeling of the one [252] actual entity, the 'superject'
- which is familiarly termed the 'subject/ In a sense this satisfaction is two-
- dimensional. It has a dimension of narrowness, and a dimension of width.
- The dimension of narrowness refers to the intensities of individual emo-
- tions arising out of individual components in the datum. In this dimen-
- sion, the higher levels of coordination are irrelevant. The dimension of
- width arises out of the higher levels of coordination, by which the in-
- tensities in the dimension of narrowness become subordinated to a co-
- ordination which depends upon the higher levels of comparison. The
- savouring of the complexity of the universe can enter into satisfaction
- only through the dimension of width. The emotional depths at the low
- levels have their limits: the function of width is to deepen the ocean of
- feeling, and to remove the diminutions of depth produced by the inter-
- ference of diverse emotions uncoordinated at a higher level. In the place
- of the Hegelian hierarchy of categories of thought, the philosophy of
- organism finds a hierarchy of categories of feeling.
- SECTION V
- The reformed subjectivist principle adopted by the philosophy of or-
- ganism is merely an alternative statement of the principle of relativity (the
- fourth Category of Explanation). This principle states that it belongs to
- the nature of a 'being that it is a potential for every 'becoming/ Thus all
- things are to be conceived as qualifications of actual occasions. According
- to the ninth Category of Explanation, how an actual entity becomes con-
- stitutes what that actual entity is. This principle states that the being of a
- res vera is constituted by its 'becoming/ The way in which one actual
- entity is qualified by other actual entities is the 'experience' of the actual
- world enjoyed by that actual entity, as subject. The subjectivist principle**
- is that the whole universe consists of elements disclosed in the analysis of
- the experiences of subjects. Process is the becoming of experience. [253] It
- follows that the philosophy of organism entirely accepts the subjectivist
- bias of modern philosophy. It also accepts Hume's doctrine that nothing
- is to be received into the philosophical scheme which is not discoverable
- as an element in subjective experience. This is the ontological principle.
- Thus Hume's demand that causation be describable as an element in ex-
- The Subjectivist Principle 167
- perience is, on these principles, entirely justifiable. The point of the crit-
- icisms of Hume's procedure is that we have direct intuition of inheritance
- and memory: thus the only problem is, so to describe the general character
- of experience that these intuitions may be included. It is here that Hume
- fails. Also those modern empiricists who substitute law' for 'causation'
- fail even worse than Hume. For 'law' no more satisfies Hume's tests than
- does 'causation/ There is no 'impression' of law, or of lawfulness. Even
- allowing memory, according to Humian principles what has happened in
- experience has happened in experience, and that is all that can be said.
- Everything else is bluff, combined with the fraudulent insertion of 'prob-
- ability' into a conclusion which demands 'blank ignorance.'
- The difficulties of all schools of modern philosophy lie in the fact that,
- having accepted the subjectivist principle,** they continue to use philosoph-
- ical categories derived from another point of view. These categories are not
- wrong, but they deal with abstractions unsuitable for metaphysical use.
- It is for this reason that the notions of the 'extensive continuum' and of
- 'presentational t immediacy' require such careful discussion from every
- point of view. The notions of the 'green leaf and of the 'round ball' are
- at the base of traditional metaphysics. They have generated two miscon-
- ceptions: one is the concept of vacuous actuality, void of subjective ex-
- perience; and the other is the concept of quality inherent in substance.
- In their proper character, as high abstractions, both of these notions are of
- the utmost pragmatic use. In fact, language has been formed chiefly to
- express such con- \2S4) cepts. It is for this reason that language, in its
- ordinary usages, penetrates but a short distance into the principles of
- metaphysics. Finally, the reformed subjectivist principle must be repeated:
- that apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing,
- nothing, bare nothingness.
- It is now evident that the final analogy to philosophies of the Hegelian
- school, noted in the Preface, is not accidental. The universe is at once the
- multiplicity of res verae] and the solidarity of res verae. The solidarity is
- itself the efficiency of the macroscopic res vera, embodying the principle
- of unbounded permanence acquiring novelty through flux. The multiplicity
- is composed of microscopic res verae, each embodying the principle of
- bounded flux acquiring 'everlasting' permanence. On one side, the one
- becomes many; and on the other side, the many become one. But what
- becomes is always a res vera, and the concrescence t of a res vera is the
- development of a subjective aim. This development is nothing else than
- the Hegelian development of an idea. The elaboration of this aspect of
- the philosophy of organism, with the purpose of obtaining an interpre-
- tation of the religious experience of mankind, is undertaken in Part V of
- these lectures.
- Cosmological story, in every part and in every chapter, relates the inter-
- play of the static vision and the dynamic history. But the whole story is
- comprised within the account of the subjective concrescence of res verae.
- CHAPTER VIII
- SYMBOLIC REFERENCE
- SECTION I
- [255] The pure mode of presentational immediacy gives no information
- as to the past or the future. It merely presents an illustrated portion of
- the presented duration. It thereby defines a cross-section of the universe:
- hut does not in itself define on which side lies the past, and on which
- side the future. In order to solve such questions we now come to the
- interplay between the two pure modes. This mixed mode of perception is
- here named 'symbolic reference/ The failure to lay due emphasis on
- symbolic reference is one of the reasons for metaphysical difficulties; it has
- reduced the notion of 'meaning' to a mystery.
- The first principle, explanatory of symbolic reference, is that for such
- reference a 'common ground' is required. By this necessity for a 'common
- ground' it is meant that there must be components in experience which
- are directly recognized as identical in each of the pure perceptive modes.
- In the transition to a higher phase of experience, there is a concrescence in
- which prehensions in the two modes are brought into a unity of feeling:
- this concrescent unity arises from a congruity of their subjective forms in
- virtue of the identity relation between the two prehensions, owing to some
- components in common. Thus the symbolic reference belongs to one of
- the later originative phases of experience. These later phases are dis-
- tinguished by their new element of originative freedom. Accordingly,
- while the two pure perceptive modes are incapable of error, symbolic
- reference introduces this possibility. When human experience is in ques-
- tion, 'per- \256] ception' almost always means 'perception in the mixed
- mode of symbolic reference/ Thus, in general, human perception is sub-
- ject to error, because, in respect to those components most clearly in
- consciousness, it is interpretative. In fact, error is the mark of the higher
- organisms, and is the schoolmaster by whose agency there is upward
- evolution. For example, the evolutionary use of intelligence is that it
- enables the individual to profit by error without being slaughtered
- by it. But at present, we are not considering conceptual or intellectual
- functioning.
- One main element of common ground, shared between the two pure
- modes, is the presented locus. This locus enters subordinately into the
- perceptive mode of causal efficacy, vaguely exemplifying its participation
- in the general scheme of extensive interconnection, involved in the real
- 168
- Symbolic Reference 169
- potentiality. It is not disclosed by that perceptive mode in any other way;
- at least it is not directly disclosed. The further disclosure must be in-
- direct, since contemporary events are exactly those which are neither
- causing, nor caused by, the percipient actual occasion. Now, although the
- various causal pasts (i.e., 'actual worlds') of the contemporary actual occa-
- sions are not wholly identical with the causal past of the percipient actual
- occasion, yet, so far as important relevance is concerned, these causal pasts
- are practically identical. Thus there is, in the mode of causal efficacy, a
- direct perception of those antecedent actual occasions which are causally
- efficacious both for the percipient and for the relevant events in the pre-
- sented locus. The percipient therefore, under the limitation of its own
- perspective, prehends the causal influences to which the presented locus in
- its important regions is subjected. This amounts to an indirect perception
- of this locus, a perception in which the direct components belong to the
- pure mode of causal efficacy. If we now turn to the perceptive mode of
- presentational immediacy, the regions, perceived by direct and indirect
- knowledge respectively, are inverted in comparison with the other mode.
- The presented locus is directly illus- [257] trated by the sensa; while the
- causal past, the causal future, and the other contemporary events, are only
- indirectly perceived by means of their extensive relations to the presented
- locus. It must be remembered that the presented locus has its fourth
- dimension of temporal thickness 'spatialized' as the specious present of
- the percipient. Thus the presented locus, with the animal body of the
- percipient as the region from which perspectives are focussed, is the re-
- gional origin by reference to which in this perceptive mode the complete
- scheme of extensive regions is rendered determinate. The respective roles
- of the two perceptive modes in experience are aptly exemplified by the
- fact that all scientific observations, such as measurements, determinations
- of relative spatial position, determinations of sense-data such as colours,
- sounds, tastes, smells, temperature feelings, touch feelings, etc., are made
- in the perceptive mode of presentational immediacy: and that great care is
- exerted to keep this mode pure, that is to say, devoid of symbolic reference
- to causal efficacy. In this way accuracy is secured, in the sense that the
- direct observation is purged of all interpretation. On the other hand all
- scientific theory is stated in terms referring exclusively to the scheme of
- relatedness, which, so far as it is observed, involves the percepta in the
- pure mode of causal efficacy. It thus stands out at once, that what we
- want to know about, from the point of view either of curiosity or of tech-
- nology, chiefly resides in those aspects of the world disclosed in causal
- efficacy: but that what we can distinctly register is chiefly to be found
- among the percepta in the mode of presentational immediacy.
- The presented locus is a common ground for the symbolic reference,
- because it is directly and distinctly perceived in presentational immediacy,
- and is indistinctly and indirectly perceived in causal efficacy. In the latter
- mode, the indistinctness is such that the detailed geometrical relationships
- 170 Discussions and Applications
- are, for the most part, incurably vague. Particular regions are, in this per-
- ceptive mode, [258] in general not distinguishable. In this respect, causal
- efficacy stands in contrast to presentational immediacy with its direct
- illustration of certain distinct regions.
- But there are exceptions to this geometrical indistinctness of causal
- efficacy. In the first place, the separation of the potential extensive scheme
- into past and future lies with the mode of causal efficacy and not with that
- of presentational immediacy. The mathematical measurements, derivable
- from the latter, are indifferent to this distinction; whereas the physical
- theory, expressed in terms of the former, is wholly concerned with it. In
- the next place, the animal body of the percipient is a region for which
- causal efficacy acquires some accuracy in its distinction of regions—not all
- the distinctness of the other mode, but sufficient to allow of important
- identifications. For example, we see with our eyes, we taste with our
- palates, we touch with our hands, etc.: here the causal efficacy defines
- regions which are identified with themselves as perceived with greater
- distinctness by the other mode. To take one example, the slight eye-strain
- in the act of sight is an instance of regional definition by presentational
- immediacy. But in itself it is no more to be correlated with projected sight
- than is a contemporary stomach-ache, or a throb in the foot. The obvious
- correlation of the eye-strain with sight arises from the perception, in the
- other mode, of the eye as efficacious in sight. This correlation takes place
- in virtue of the identity of the two regions, the region of the eye-strain, and
- the region of eye-efficacy. But the eye-strain is so immeasurably the su-
- perior in its power of regional definition that, as usual, we depend upon
- it for explicit geometrical correlations with other parts of the body. In
- this way, the animal body is the great central ground underlying all sym-
- bolic reference. In respect to bodily perceptions the two modes achieve the
- maximum of symbolic reference, and pool their feelings referent to identi-
- cal regions. Every statement about the geometrical relationships of physi-
- cal bodies in the world is ultimately [259] referable to certain definite
- human bodies as origins of reference. A traveller, who has lost his way,
- should not ask, Where am I? What he really wants to know is, Where are
- the other places? He has got his own body, but he has lost them.
- SECTION II
- The second 'ground' for symbolic reference is the connection between
- the two modes effected by the identity of an eternal object ingredient in
- both of them. It will be remembered that the former 'ground' was the
- identity of the extensive region throughout such stages of direct percep-
- tion and synthesis, when there was a diversity of eternal objects, for ex-
- ample, eye-region, visual sensa, eye-strain. But now we pass to a diversity of
- regions combined with an identity of the eternal object, for example, visual
- sensa given by efficacy of eye-region, and the region of the stone perceived
- Symbolic Reference 171
- in the mode of presentational immediacy under the illustration of the
- same visual sensa.t In this connection the 'make-believe' character of mod-
- ern empiricism is well shown by putting into juxtaposition f two widely
- separated passages x from Hume's Treatise: "Impressions may be divided
- into two kinds, those of sensation, and those of reflection. The first kind
- arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes. 7 ' And "If it be per-
- ceived by the eyes, it must be a colour; . . ."
- The earlier passage is Hume's make-believe, when he is thinking of his
- philosophical principles. He then refers the visual sensations 'in the soul'
- to 'unknown causes.' But in the second passage, the heat of argument
- elicits his real conviction— everybody's real conviction— that visual sensa-
- tions arise 'by the eyes.' The causes are not a bit 'unknown,' and among
- them there is usually to be found the efficacy of the eyes. If Hume had
- stopped to investigate the alternative causes for the occurrence of visual
- sensations— for example, eye-sight, or excessive consumption of alcohol-
- he might have hesitated in his [260] profession of ignorance. If the causes
- be indeed unknown, it is absurd to bother about eye-sight and intoxica-
- tion. The reason for the existence of oculists and prohibitionists is that
- various causes are known.
- We can now complete our account of presentational immediacy. In this
- perceptive mode the sensa are 'given' for the percipient, but this donation
- is not to be ascribed to the spatial object which is thereby presented, the
- stone, for example. Now it is a primary doctrine that what is 'given' is
- given by reason of objectifications of actual entities from the settled past.
- We therefore seek for the actual occasions to whose objectifications this
- donation is to be ascribed. In this procedure we are only agreeing with the
- spirit of Descartes' fifty-second principle (Part I): "For this reason, when
- we perceive any attribute, we therefore conclude that some existing thing
- or substance to which it may be attributed, is necessarily present." Com-
- mon sense, physical theory, and physiological theory, combine to point out
- a historic route of inheritance, from actual occasion to succeeding actual
- occasion, first physically in the external environment, then physiologi-
- cally—through the eyes in the case of visual data— up the nerves, into the
- brain. The donation— taking sight as an example— is not confined to defi-
- nite sensa, such as shades of colour: it also includes geometrical relation-
- ships to the general environment. In this chain of inheritances, the eye is
- picked out to rise into perceptive prominence, because another historic
- route of physiological inheritance starts from it, whereby a later occa-
- sion (almost identical with the earlier) is illustrated by the sensum 'eye-
- strain' in the mode of presentational immediacy; but this eye-strain is an-
- other allied story. In the visual datum for the percipient there are first these
- components of colour-sensa combined with geometrical relationships to
- the external world of the settled past: secondly, there are also in the datum
- the general geometrical relationships forming the completion of this po-
- tential scheme into the contemporary world, and into [261] the future.
- 1 Book I, Part I, Sects. II and VI (italics mine).*
- 1 72 Discussions and Applications
- The responsive phase absorbs these data as material for a subjective unity
- of feeling: the supplemental stage heightens the relevance of the colour-
- sensa, and supplements the geometrical relationships of the past by picking
- out the contemporary region of the stone to be the contemporary repre-
- sentative of the efficacious historic routes. There then results in the mode
- of presentational immediacy, the perception of the region illustrated by the
- sensum termed 'grey/ The term 'stone' is primarily applied to a certain
- historic route in the past, which is an efficacious element in this train of
- circumstance. It is only properly applied to the contemporary region il-
- lustrated by 'grey' on the assumption that this contemporary region is the
- prolongation, of that historic route, into the presented locus. This assump-
- tion may, or may not, be true. Further, the illustration of the contemporary
- region of *grey ? may be due to quite other efficacious historic routes— for
- example, to lighting effects arranged by theatrical producers— and in such
- a case, the term 'stone' may suggest an even more violent error than in the
- former example. What is directly perceived, certainly and without shadow
- of doubt, is a grey region of the presented locus. Any further interpretation,
- instinctive or by intellectual judgment, must be put down to symbolic
- reference.
- This account makes it plain that the perceptive mode of presentational
- immediacy arises in the later, originative, integrative phases of the process
- of concrescence. The perceptive mode of causal efficacy is to be traced to
- the constitution of the datum by reason of which there is a concrete per-
- cipient entity. Thus we must assign the mode of causal efficacy to the
- fundamental constitution of an occasion so that in germ this mode be-
- longs even to organisms of the lowest grade; while the mode of presenta-
- tional immediacy requires the more sophistical activity of the later stages
- of process, so as to belong only to organisms of a relatively high grade. So
- far as we can judge, such high-grade organisms are relatively few, in [262]
- comparison with the whole number of organisms in our immediate en-
- vironment. Presentational immediacy is an outgrowth from the complex
- datum implanted by causal efficacy. But, by the originative power of the
- supplemental phase, what was vague, ill defined, and hardly relevant in
- causal efficacy, becomes distinct, well defined, and importantly relevant in
- presentational immediacy. In the responsive phase, the grey colour, t and
- the geometrical relations between the efficacious, bodily routes and the
- contemporary occasions, were subjective sensationst associated with barely
- relevant geometrical relations: they represented the vivid sensational qual-
- ities in the enjoyment of which the percipient subject barely distinguished
- vague indirect relationships to the external world. The supplemental phase
- lifts the presented duration into vivid distinctness, so that the vague effi-
- cacy of the indistinct external world in the immediate past is precipitated
- upon the representative regions in the contemporary present. In the usual
- language, the sensations are projected. This phraseology is unfortunate;
- for there never were sensations apart from these geometrical relations.
- Symbolic Reference 173
- Presentational immediacy is the enhancement of the importance of rela-
- tionships which were already in the datum, vaguely and with slight rele-
- vance. This fact, that presentational immediacy' deals with the same
- datum as does 'causal efficacy/ gives the ultimate reason why there is a
- common 'ground' for 'symbolic reference/ The two modes express the
- same datum under different proportions of relevance. The two genetic-
- processes involving presentational immediacy must be carefully distin-
- guished. There is first the complex genetic process in which presentational
- immediacy originates. This process extends downwards even to occasions
- which belong to the historic routes of certain types of inorganic enduring
- objects, namely, to those enduring objects whose aggregates form the
- subject-matter of the science of Newtonian dynamics. t Secondly, prehen-
- sions in the mode of presentational immediacy are involved as components
- in [263] integration with other prehensions which are usually, though not
- always, f in other modes. These integrations often involve various types of
- 'symbolic reference/ This symbolic reference is the interpretativet element
- in human experience. Language almost exclusively refers to presentational
- immediacy as interpreted by symbolic reference. For example, we say that
- 'we see the stone 7 where stone is an interpretation of stone-image: also
- we say that 'we see the stone-image with our eyes'; this is an interpreta-
- tion arising from the complex integration of (i) the causal efficacy of the
- antecedent eye in the vision, (ii) the presentational immediacy of the
- stone-image, (iii) the presentational immediacy of the eye-strain. When
- we say that 'we see the stone with our eyes/ the interpretations of these
- two examples are combined.
- SECTION III
- The discussion of the problem constituted by the connection between
- causation and perception t has been conducted by the various schools of
- thought derived from Hume and Kant under the misapprehension gen-
- erated by an inversion of the true constitution of experience. The inversion
- was explicit in the writings of Hume and of Kant: for both of them presen-
- tational immediacy was the primary fact of perception, and any apprehen-
- sion of causation was, somehow or other, to be .elicited from this primary
- fact. This view of the relation between causation and perception, as items
- in experience, was not original to these great philosophers. It is to be found
- presupposed in Locke and Descartes; and they derived it from mediaeval
- predecessors. But the modern critical movement in philosophy arose when
- Hume and Kant emphasized the fundamental, inescapable, importance
- which this doctrine possesses for any philosophy admitting its truth. The
- philosophy of organism does not admit its truth, and thus rejects the
- touchstone which is the neolithic weapon of 'criticaF philosophy. It must
- be remembered that clearness in consciousness is no evidence \264] for
- primitiveness in the genetic process: the opposite doctrine is more nearly
- true.
- 174 Discussions and Applications
- Owing to its long dominance, it has been usual to assume as an obvious
- fact the primacy of presentational immediacy. We open our eyes and our
- other sense-organs; we then survey the contemporary world decorated with
- sights, and sounds, and tastes; and then, by the sole aid of this information
- about the contemporary world, thus decorated, we draw what conclusions
- we can as to the actual world. No philosopher really holds that this is the
- sole source of information: Hume and his followers appeal vaguely to
- 'memory' and to 'practice/ in order to supplement their direct information;
- and Kant wrote other Critiques^ in order to supplement his Critique of
- Pure Reason. But the general procedure of modern philosophical 'criticism'
- is to tie down opponents strictly to the front door of presentational im-
- mediacy as the sole source of information, while one's own philosophy
- makes its escape by a back door veiled under the ordinary usages of
- language.
- If this 'Humian' doctrine be true, certain conclusions as to 'behaviour't
- ought to follow— conclusions which, in the most striking way, are not
- verified. It is almost indecent to draw the attention of philosophers to the
- minor transactions of daily life, away from the classic sources of philo-
- sophic knowledge; but, after all, it is the empiricists who began this appeal
- to Caesar.
- According to Hume, our behaviour presupposing causation is due to the
- repetition of associated presentational experiences. Thus the vivid present-
- ment of the antecedent percepts should vividly generate the behaviour,
- in action or thought, towards the associated consequent. The clear, dis-
- tinct, overwhelming perception of the one is the overwhelming reason
- for the subjective transition to the other. For behaviour, interpretable as
- implying causation, is on this theory the subjective response to presenta-
- tional immediacy. According to Hume this subjective response is the be-
- ginning and the end of all that [26S] there is to be said about causation.
- In Hume's theory the response is response to presentational immediacy,
- and to nothing else. Also the situation elicited in response is nothing but
- an immediate presentation, or the memory of one. Let us apply this ex-
- planation to reflex action: In the dark, the electric light is suddenly turned
- on and the man's eyes blink. There is a simple physiological explanation
- of this trifling incident.
- But this physiological explanation is couched wholly in terms of causal
- efficacy: it is the conjectural record of the travel of a spasm of excitement
- along nerves to some nodal centre, and of the return spasm of contraction
- back to the eyelids. The correct technical phraseology would not alter the
- fact that the explanation does not involve any appeal to presentational
- immediacy either for actual occasions resident in the nerves, or for the
- man. At the most there is a tacit supposition as to what a physiologist,
- who in fact was not there, might have seen if he had been there, and if
- he could have vivisected the man without affecting these occurrences, and
- if he could have observed with a microscope which also in fact was absent.
- Symbolic Reference 175
- Thus the physiological explanation remains, from the point of view of
- Hume's philosophy, a tissue of irrelevancies. It presupposes a side of the
- universe about which, on Hume's theory, we must remain in blank ig-
- norance.
- Let us now dismiss physiology and turn to the private experience of the
- blinking man. The sequence of percepts, in the mode of presentational
- immediacy, ist flash of light, feeling of eye-closure, instant of darkness.
- The three are practically simultaneous; though the flash maintains its
- priority over the other two, and these two latter percepts are indistinguish-
- able as to priority. According to the philosophy of organism, the man also
- experiences another percept in the mode of causal efficacy. He feels that
- the experiences of the eye in the matter of the flash are causal of the blink.
- The man himself will have no doubt of it. In fact, it is the feeling [266] of
- causality which enables the man to distinguish the priority of the flash;
- and the inversion of the argument, whereby the temporal sequence 'flash
- to blink' is made the premise for the 'causality' belief, has its origin in
- pure theory. The man will explain his experience by saying, "The flash
- made me blink'; and if his statement be doubted, he will reply, 'I know
- it, because I felt it.'
- The philosophy of organism accepts the man's statement, that the flash
- made him blink. But Hume intervenes with another explanation. He first
- points out that in the mode of presentational immediacy there is no per-
- cept of the flash making the man blink. In this mode there are merely
- the two percepts— the flash and the blink— combining the two latter of
- the three percepts under the one term 'blink.' Hume refuses to admit the
- man's protestation, that the compulsion to blink is just what he did feel.
- The refusal is based on the dogma t that all percepts are in the mode of
- presentational immediacy— a dogma not to be upset by a mere appeal to
- direct experience. Besides,! Hume has another interpretation of the man's
- experience: what the man really felt was his habit of blinking after flashes.
- The word 'association' explains it all, according to Hume. But how can a
- 'habit' be felt, when a 'cause' cannot be felt? Is there any presentational
- immediacy in the feeling of a 'habit'? Hume by a sleight of hand confuses
- a 'habit of feeling blinks after flashes' with a 'feeling of the habit of feel-
- ing blinks after flashes/
- We have here a perfect example of the practice of applying the test of
- presentational immediacy to procure the critical rejection of some doc-
- trines, and of allowing other doctrines to slip out by a back door, so as
- to evade the test. The notion of causation arose because mankind lives
- amid experiences in the mode of causal efficacy.
- SECTION IV
- We will keep to the appeal to ordinary experience, and \267] consider
- another situation, which Hume's philosophy is ill equipped to explain.
- 176 Discussions and Applications
- The 'causal feeling' according to that doctrine arises from the long asso-
- ciation of well-marked presentations of sensa, one precedent to the other.
- It would seem therefore that inhibitions of sensa, given in presentational
- immediacy, should be accompanied by a corresponding absence of 'causal
- feeling'; for the explanation of how there is 'causal feeling' presupposes
- the well-marked familiar sensa, in presentational immediacy. Unfortu-
- nately the contrary is the case. An inhibition of familiar sensa is very apt
- to leave us a prey to vague terrors respecting a circumambient world of
- causal operations. In the dark there are vague presences, doubtfully feared:
- in the silence, the irresistible causal efficacy of nature presses itself upon
- us; in the vagueness of the low hum of insects in an August woodland, the
- inflow into ourselves of feelings from enveloping nature overwhelms us;
- in the dim consciousness of half-sleep, the presentations of sense fade
- away, and we are left with the vague feeling of influences from vague
- things around us. It is quite untrue that the feelings of various types of
- influences are dependent upon the familiarity of well-marked sensa in
- immediate presentment. Every way of omitting the sensa still leaves us a
- prey to vague feelings of influence. Such feelings, divorced from immediate
- sensa, are pleasant, or unpleasant, according to mood; but they are always
- vague as to spatial and temporal definition, though their explicit domi-
- nance in experience may be heightened in the absence of sensa.
- Further, our experiences! of our various bodily parts are primarily per-
- ceptions of them as reasons for 'projected' sensa : the hand] is the reason
- for the projected touch-sensum, the eye is the reason for the projected
- sight-sensum. Our bodily experience is primarily an experience of the de-
- pendence of presentational immediacy upon causal efficacy. Hume's doc-
- trine inverts this relationship by making causal efficacy, as an experience,
- dependent upon presentational immediacy. This doc- [268] trine, whatever
- be its merits, is not based upon any appeal to experience.
- Bodily experiences, in the mode of causal efficacy, are distinguished by
- their comparative accuracy of spatial definition. The causal influences from
- the body have lost the extreme vagueness of those which inflow from the
- external world. But, even for the body, causal efficacy is dogged with
- vagueness compared to presentational immediacy. These conclusions are
- confirmed if we descend* the scale of organic being. It does not seem
- to be the sense of causal awareness that the lower living things lack, so
- much as variety of sense-presentation, and then vivid distinctness of presen-
- tational immediacy. But animals, and even vegetables, in low forms of
- organism exhibit modes of behaviour directed towards self-preservation.
- There is every indication of a vague feeling of causal relationship with
- the external world, of some intensity, vaguely defined as to quality, and
- with some vague definition as to locality. A jellyfish advances and with-
- draws, and in so doing exhibits some perception of causal relationship with
- the world beyond itself; a plant grows downwards to the damp earth, and
- upwards towards the light. There is thus some direct reason for attributing
- Symbolic Reference 177
- dim, slow feelings of causal nexus, although we have no reason for any
- ascription of the definite percepts in the mode of presentational im-
- mediacy.
- But the philosophy of organism attributes 'feeling' throughout the ac-
- tual world. It bases this doctrine upon the directly observed fact that
- 'feeling' survives as a known element constitutive of the 'formal' existence
- of such actual entities as we can best observe. Also when we observe the
- causal nexus, devoid of interplay with sense-presentation, the influx of
- feeling with vague qualitative and 'vector' definition t is what we find. The
- dominance of the scalar physical quantity, inertia, in the Newtonian
- physics obscured the recognition of the truth that all fundamental phys-
- ical quantities are vector and not scalar.
- [269] When we pass to inorganic actual occasions, we have lost the two
- higher originative phases in the 'process,' namely, the 'supplemental' phase,
- and the 'mental' phase. They are lost in the sense that, so far as our ob-
- servations go, they are negligible. The influx of objectifications of the
- actualities of the world as organized vehicles of feeling is responded to by
- a mere subjective appropriation of such elements of feeling in their re-
- ceived relevance. The inorganic occasions are merely what the causal past
- allows them to be.
- As we pass to the inorganic world, causation never for a moment seems
- to lose its grip. What is lost is originativeness, and any evidence of im-
- mediate absorption in the present. So far as we can see, inorganic entities
- are vehicles for receiving, for storing in a napkin, and for restoring with-
- out loss or gain.
- In the actual world we discern four grades of actual occasions, grades
- which are not to be sharply distinguished from each other. First, and
- lowest, there are the actual occasions in so-called 'empty space'; secondly,
- there are the actual occasions which are moments in the life-histories of
- enduring non-living objects, such as electrons or other primitive organ-
- isms; thirdly, there are the actual occasions which are moments in the
- life-histories of enduring living objects; fourthly, there are the actual oc-
- casions which are moments in the life-histories of enduring objects with
- conscious knowledge.
- We may imaginatively conjecture that the first grade is to be identified
- with actual occasions for which 'presented durations' are negligible ele-
- ments among their data, negligible by reason of negligible presentational
- immediacy. Thus no intelligible definition of rest and motion is possible
- for historic routes including them, because they correspond to no inherent
- spatializationf of the actual world.
- The second grade is to be identified with actual occasions for which
- 'presented durations' are important elements in their data, but with a limi-
- tation only to be [270] observed in the lower moments of human experi-
- ence. In such occasions the data of felt sensa, derived "from the more
- primitive data of causal efficacy, are projected onto the contemporary
- 178 Discussions and Applications
- 'presented locus' without any clear illustration of special regions in that
- locus. The past has been lifted into the present, but the vague differentia-
- tions in the past have not been transformed into any precise differentia-
- tions within the present. The enhancement of precision has not arrived.
- The third grade is to be identified with occasions in which presentational
- immediacy has assumed some enhanced precision, so that 'symbolic trans-
- ference' has lifted into importance precisely discriminated regions in the
- 'presented duration/ The delicate activities of self-preservation are now
- becoming possible by the transference of the vague message of the past
- onto the more precisely discriminated regions of the presented duration.
- Symbolic transference is dependent upon the flashes of conceptual orig-
- inality constituting life.
- The fourth grade is to be identified with the canalized importance of
- free conceptual functionings, whereby blind experience is analysed by
- comparison with the imaginative realization of mere potentiality. In this
- way, experience receives a reorganization in the relative importance of its
- components by the joint operation of imaginative enjoyment and of judg-
- ment. The growth of reason is the increasing importance of critical judg-
- ment in the discipline of imaginative enjoyment.
- SECTION V
- One reason for the philosophical difficulties over causation is that Hume,
- and subsequently Kant, conceived the causal nexus as, in its primary
- character, derived from the presupposed sequence of immediate presenta-
- tions. But if we interrogate experience, the exact converse is the case; the
- perceptive mode of immediate presentation affords information about the
- percepta in the more aboriginal mode of causal efficacy.
- [271] Thus symbolic reference, though in complex human experience
- it works both ways, is chiefly to be thought of as the elucidation of per-
- cepta in the mode of causal efficacy by the fluctuating intervention of
- percepta in the mode of presentational immediacy.
- The former mode produces percepta which are vague, not to be con-
- trolled, heavy with emotion: it produces the sense of derivation from an
- immediate past, and of passage to an immediate future; a sense of emo-
- tional feeling, belonging to oneself in the past, passing into oneself in
- the present, and passing from oneself in the present towards oneself in the
- future; a sense of influx of influence from other vaguer presences in the
- past, localized and yet evading local definition, such influence modifying,
- enhancing, inhibiting, diverting, the stream of feeling which we are re-
- ceiving, unifying, enjoying, and transmitting. This is our general sense
- of existence, as one item among others, in an efficacious actual world.
- By diversion of attention we can inhibit its entry into consciousness;
- but, whether mentally analysed or no, it remains the given uncontrolled
- basis upon which our character weaves itself. Our bodies are largely con-
- Symbolic Reference 179
- trivances whereby some central actual occasion may inherit these basic
- experiences of its antecedent parts. Thus organic bodies have their parts
- coordinated by a peculiar vividness in their mutual inheritance. In a sense,
- the difference between a living organism and the inorganic environment
- is only a question of degree; but it is a difference of degree which makes
- all the difference— in effect, it is a difference of quality.
- The percepta in the mode of presentational immediacy have the con-
- verse characteristics. In comparison, they are distinct, definite, controllable,
- apt for immediate enjoyment, and with the minimum of reference to past,
- or to future. We are subject to our percepta in the mode of efficacy, we
- adjust our percepta in the mode of immediacy. But, in fact, our process
- of self-construction for the achievement of unified experience produces!
- a new [272] product, in which percepta in one mode, and percepta in the
- other mode, are synthesized into one subjective feeling. For example, we
- are perceiving before our eyes a grey stone.
- We shall find that generally— though not always— the adjectival words
- express information derived from the mode of immediacy, while the sub-
- stantives convey our dim percepts in the mode of efficacy. For example,
- 'grey' refers to the grey shape immediately before our eyes: this percept
- is definite, limited, controllable, pleasant or unpleasant, and with no ref-
- erence to past or to future. It is this sort of percept which has led to Des-
- cartes' definition of substances as 'requiring nothing but themselves in
- order to exist/ and to his notion of 'extension' as the principal f attribute
- of a genus of substances. It has also led to Hume's notion of 'impressions
- of sensation' t arising from unknown sources, and in complete indepen-
- dence so far as any discerniblef nexus is concerned. But the other element
- in the compound percept has a widely different character. The word
- 'stone' is selected, no doubt, because its dictionary meaning will afford
- some help in understanding the particular percepta meant. But the word
- is meant to refer to particular feelings of efficacy in the immediate past,
- combined with anticipations for the immediate future; this feeling is
- vaguely localized, and conjecturallyt identified with the very definite
- localization of the 'grey' perceptum.
- Thus, so far as concerns conscious judgment, the symbolic reference is
- the acceptance of the evidence of percepta, in the mode of immediacy,
- as evidence for the localization and discrimination of vague percepta in
- the mode of efficacy. So far as bodily feelings are concerned, there is some
- direct check on this procedure; but, beyond the body, the appeal is to the
- pragmatic consequences, involving some future state of bodily feelings
- which can be checked up.
- But throughout this discussion of perception there has been excessive
- emphasis on the mental phase in the [273} experiential process. This is
- inevitable because we can only discuss experiences which have entered into
- conscious analysis. But perception is a feeling which has its seat in the two
- earlier phases of the experiential! process, namely, the 'responsive' phase,
- 1 80 Discussions and Appli ations
- and the 'supplemental' phase. Perception, in these phases, is the appropri-
- ation of the datum by the subject so as to transform the datum into a
- unity of subjective feeling. The mode of efficacy belongs to the responsive
- phase, in which the objectifications are felt according to their relevance
- in the datum: the mode of immediacy belongs to the supplemental phase
- in which the faint indirect relevance, in the datum, of relationships to re-
- gions of the presented locus ist lifted into distinct, prominent, relevance.
- The question as to which regions have their relatedness to other con-
- stituents of the datum— such as 'grey/ for instance— thus accentuated,
- depends upon the coordination of the bodily organs through which the
- routes of inheritance pass. In a fortunately construed** animal body, this
- selection is determined chiefly by the inheritance received by the super-
- ficial organst=the skin, the eyes, etc.— from the external environment,
- and preserves the relevance of the vector character of that external
- inheritance. When this is the case, the perceptive mode of immediacy
- has definite relevance to the future efficacy of the external environment,
- and then indirectly illustrates the inheritance which the presented locus
- receives from the immediate past.
- But this illustration does not gain its first importance from any rational
- analysis. The two modes are unified by a blind symbolic reference by which
- supplemental feelings derived from the intensive, but vague, mode of
- efficacy are precipitated upon the distinct regions illustrated in the mode
- of immediacy. The integration of the two modes in supplemental feeling
- makes what would have been vague to be distinct, and what would have
- been shallow to be intense. This is the perception of the grey stone, in the
- mixed mode of symbolic reference.
- [274] Such perception can be erroneous, in the sense that the feeling
- associates regions in the presented locus with inheritances from the past,
- which in fact have not been thus transmitted into the present regions.
- In the mixed mode, the perceptive determination is purely due to the
- bodily organs, and thus there is a gap in the perceptive logic— so to speak.
- This gap is not due to any conceptual freedom on the part of the ultimate
- subject. It is not a mistake due to consciousness. It is due to the fact that
- the body, as an instrument for synthesizing and enhancing feelings, is
- faulty, in the sense that it produces feelings which have but slight reference
- to the real state of the presented duration.
- SECTION VI
- Symbolic reference between the two perceptive modes affords the main
- example of the principles which govern all symbolism. The requisites for
- symbolism are that there be two species of percepta; and that a perceptum
- of one species has some 'ground' in common with a perceptum of another
- species, so that a correlation between the pair of percepta is established.
- Symbolic Reference 181
- The feelings, and emotions, and genera characteristics associated with the
- members of one species are in some ways markedly diverse from those as-
- sociated with the other species. Then there is 'symbolic reference' between
- the two species when the perception of a member of one species evokes
- its correlate in the other species, and precipitates upon this correlate the
- fusion of feelings, emotions, and derivate actions, which belong to either
- of the pair of correlates, and which are also enhanced by this correlation.
- The species from which the symbolic reference starts is called the 'species
- of symbols/ and the species withf which it ends is called the 'species of
- meanings/ In this way there can be symbolic reference between two species
- in the same perceptive mode: but the chief example of symbolism, upon
- which is based a great portion of the lives [275] of all high-grade animals,
- is that between the two perceptive modes.
- Symbolism can be justified, or unjustified. The test of justification must
- always be pragmatic. In so far ast symbolism has led to a route of inheri-
- tance, along the percipient occasions forming the percipient 'person/
- which constitutes a fortunate evolution, the symbolism is justified; and,
- in so far as the symbolism has led to an unfortunate evolution, it is un-
- justified. In a slightly narrower sense the symbolism can be right or wrong;
- and Tightness or wrongness is also tested pragmatically. Along the 'historic
- route' there is the inheritance of feelings derived from symbolic reference:
- now, if feelings respecting some definite element in experience be clue
- to two sources, one source being this inheritance, and the other source
- being direct perception in one of the pure modes, then, if the feelings
- from the two sources enhance each other by synthesis, the symbolic ref-
- erence is right; but, if they are at variance so as to depress each other, the
- symbolic reference is wrong. The Tightness, or wrongness, of symbolism is
- an instance of the symbolism being fortunate or unfortunate; but mere
- 'rectitude/ in the sense defined above, does' not cover all that can be in-
- cluded in the more general concept of 'fortune/ So much of human ex-
- perience is bound up with symbolic reference, that it is hardly an exag-
- geration to say that the very meaning of truth is pragmatic. But though
- this statement is hardly an exaggeration, still it is an exaggeration, for the
- pragmatic test can never work, unless on some occasion— in the future,
- or in the present— there is a definite determination of what is true on that
- occasion. Otherwise the poor pragmatist remains an intellectual Hamlet,
- perpetually adjourning decision of judgment to some later date. According
- to the doctrines here stated, the day of judgment arrives when the 'mean-
- ing' is sufficiently distinct and relevant, as a perceptum in its proper pure
- mode, to afford comparison with the precipitate of feeling derived
- [276] from symbolic reference. There is no inherent distinction between
- the sort of percepta which are symbols f and the sort of percepta which
- are meanings. When two species are correlated by a 'ground' of relatedness,
- it depends upon the experiential process, constituting the percipient!
- 182 Discussions and Applications
- subject, as to which species is the group of symbols, and which is the group
- of meanings. Also it equally depends upon the percipient as to whether
- there is any symbolic reference at all.
- Language is the example of symbolism which most naturally presents
- itself for consideration of the uses of symbolism. Its somewhat artificial
- character makes the various constitutive elements in symbolism to be the
- more evident. For the sake of simplicity, only spoken language will be con-
- sidered here.
- A single word is not one definite sound. Every instance of its utterance
- differs in some respect from every other instance: the pitch of the voice,
- the intonation, the accent, the quality of sound, the rhythmic relations
- of the component sounds, the intensity of sound, all vary. Thus a word is
- a species of sounds, with specific identity and individual differences. When
- we recognize the species, we have heard the word. But what we have heard
- is merely the sound— euphonious or harsh, concordant with or discordant
- with other accompanying sounds. The word is heard in the pure perceptive
- mode of immediacy, and primarily elicits merely the contrasts and iden-
- tities with other percepta in that mode. So far there is no symbolic
- interplay.
- If the meaning of the word be an event, then either that event is directly
- known, as a remembered perceptum in an earlier occasion of the percip-
- ient's life, or that event is only vaguely known by its dated spatio-temporal
- nexus with events which are directly known. Anyhow there is a chain of
- symbolic references (inherited along the historic route of the percipient's
- life, and reinforced by the production of novel and symbolic references
- at various occasions along that route) whereby in the datum [277] for the
- percipient occasion there is a faintly relevant nexus between the word in
- that occasion of utterance and the event. The sound of the word,! in
- presentational immediacy, by symbolic references elicits this nexus into
- important relevance, and thence precipitates feelings, and thoughts, upon
- the enhanced objectification of the event. Such enhanced relevance of the
- event may be unfortunate, or even unjustified; but it is the function of
- words to produce it. The discussion of mentality is reserved for Part III:
- it is a mistake to think of words as primarily the vehicle of thoughts.
- Language also illustrates the doctrine that, in regard to a couple of prop-
- erly correlated species of things, it depends upon the constitution of the
- percipient subject to assign which species is acting as 'symbol' and which
- as 'meaning.' The word 'forest' may suggest! memories of forests; but
- equally the sight of a forest, or memories of forests, may suggest the word
- 'forest.' Sometimes we are bothered because the immediate experience has
- not elicited the word we want. In such a case the word with the right sort
- of correlation with the experience has failed to become importantly rele-
- vant in the constitution of our experience.
- But we do not usually think of the things as symbolizing the words cor-
- related to them. This failure to invert our ideas arises from the most useful
- Symbolic Reference 183
- aspect of symbolism. In general the symbols are more handy elements in
- our experience than are the meanings. We can say the word 'forest' when-
- ever we like; but only under certain conditions can we directly experience
- an existent forest. To procure such an experience usually involves a prob-
- lem of transportation only possible on our holidays. Also it is not so easy
- even to remember forest scenes with any vividness; and we usually find that
- the immediate experience of the word 'forest' helps to elicit such recollec-
- tions. In such ways language is handy as an instrument of communication
- along the successive occasions of the historic route forming the life of one
- individual. By an [278] extension of these same principles of behaviour, it
- communicates from the occasions of one individual to the succeeding oc-
- casions of another individual. The same means which are handy for pro-
- curing the immediate presentation of a word to oneself are equally effec-
- tive for presenting it to another person. Thus we may have a two-way
- system of symbolic reference involving two persons, A and B. The forest,
- recollected by A, symbolizes the word 'forest' for A; then A, for his own
- sake and for B's sake, pronounces the word 'forest'*; then by the efficacy
- of the environment and of B'$ bodily parts, and by the supplemental en-
- hancement due to B's experiential process, the word 'forest' is perceived
- by B in the mode of immediacy; and, finally by symbolic reference, B
- recollects vaguely various forest scenes. In this use of language for com-
- munication between two persons, there is in principle nothing which differs
- from its use by one person for communication along the route of his own
- actual occasions.
- This discussion shows that one essential purpose of symbols arises from
- their handiness. For this reason the Egyptian papyrus made ink-written
- language a more useful symbolism than the Babylonian language im-
- pressed on brick. It is easier to smell incense than to produce certain
- religious emotions; so, if the two can be correlated, incense is a suitable
- symbol for such emotions. Indeed, for many purposes, certain aesthetic
- experiences which are easy to produce make better symbols than do words,
- written or spoken. Quarrels over symbolism constitute one of the many
- causes of religious discord. One difficulty in symbolism is that the unhandy
- meanings are often vague. For instance, this is the case with the percepta
- in the mode of efficacy which are symbolized by percepta in the mode of
- immediacy: also, as another instance, the incense is definite, but the re-
- ligious emotions are apt to be indefinite. The result is that the meanings
- are often shifting and indeterminate. This happens even in the case of
- words: other people misun- [279] derstand their import. Also, in the case
- of incense the exact religious emotions finally reached are very uncertain:
- perhaps we would prefer that some of them were never elicited.
- Symbolism is essential for the higher grades of life; and the errors of
- symbolism can never be wholly avoided.
- CHAPTER IX
- THE PROPOSITIONS
- SECTION I
- [280] A living occasion is characterized by a flash of novelty among the
- appetitions of its mental pole. Such 'appetitions/ i.e., 'conceptual prehen-
- sions/ can be 'pure' or 'impure/ An 'impure' prehension arises from the
- integration of a 'pure 7 conceptual prehension with a physical prehension
- originating in the physical pole. The datum of a pure conceptual prehen-
- sion is an eternal object; the datum of an impure prehension is a proposi-
- tion, otherwise termed a 'theory/
- The integration of a conceptual and physical prehension need not issue
- in an impure prehension: the eternal object as a mere potentiality, un-
- determined as to its physical realization, may lose its indetermination, i.e.,
- its universality, by integration with itself as an element in the realized
- definiteness of the physical datum of the physical prehension. In this case
- we obtain what in Part III is termed a 'physical purpose/ In a physical
- purpose the subjective form has acquired a special appetition— adversion
- or aversion— in respect to that eternal object as a realized element of
- definiteness in that physical datum. This acquisition is derived from the
- conceptual prehension. The 'abruptness* of mental operations is here il-
- lustrated. The physical datum in itself illustrates an indefinite number
- of eternal objects. The 'physical purpose 7 has focussed appetition upon an
- abruptly selected eternal object.
- But with the growth of intensity in the mental pole, evidenced by the
- flash of novelty in appetition, the appetition takes the form of a 'preposi-
- tional prehension/ [281] These prehensions will be studied more partic-
- ularly in Part III. They are the prehensions of 'theories/ It is evident, how-
- ever, that the primary function of theories is as a lure for feeling, thereby
- providing immediacy of enjoyment and purpose. Unfortunately theories,
- under their name of 'propositions/ have been handed over to logicians,
- who have countenanced the doctrine that their one function is to be
- judged as to their truth or falsehood. Indeed Bradley does not mention
- 'propositions' in his Logic. t He writes only of 'judgments/ Other authors
- define propositions as a component in judgment. The doctrine here laid
- clown is that, in the realization of propositions, 'judgment 7 is at very rare
- component, and so is 'consciousness/ The existence of imaginative litera-
- 184
- The Propositions 185
- ture should have warned logicians that their narrow doctrine is absurd.
- It is difficult to believe that all logicians as they read Hamlet's speech,
- "To be, or not to be: . . ." commence by judging whether the initial
- proposition be true or false, and keep up the task of judgment through-
- out the whole thirty-five lines. Surely, at some point in the reading, judg-
- ment is eclipsed by aesthetic delight. The speech, for the theatre audience,
- is purely theoretical, a mere lure for feeling.
- Again, consider strong religious emotion— consider a Christian medi-
- tating on the sayings in the Gospels. He is not judging 'true or false'; he
- is eliciting their value as elements in feeling. In fact, he may ground his
- judgment of truth upon his realization of value. But such a procedure is
- impossible, if the primary function of propositions is to be elements in
- judgments.
- The 'lure for feeling' is the final cause guiding the concrescence of
- feelings. By this concrescence the multifold datum of the primary phase
- is gathered into the unity of the final satisfaction of feeling. The 'objective
- lure' is that discrimination among eternal objects introduced into the
- universe by the real internal constitutions of the actual occasions forming
- the datum of the concrescence under review. This discrimination also
- in- \282] volves eternal objects excluded from value in the temporal occa-
- sions of that datum, in addition to involving the eternal objects included
- for such occasions.
- For example, consider the Battle of Waterloo. This battle resulted in
- the defeat of Napoleon, and in a constitution of our actual world grounded
- upon that defeat. But the abstract notions, expressing the possibilities of
- another course of history which would' have followed upon his victory,
- are relevant to the facts which actually happened. We may not think it
- of practical importance that imaginative historians should dwell upon
- such hypothetical alternatives. But we confess their relevance in thinking
- about them at all, even to the extent of dismissing them. But some imag-
- inative writers do not dismiss such ideas. Thus, in our actual world of
- today, there is a penumbra of eternal objects, constituted by relevance to
- the Battle of Waterloo. Some people do admit elements from this pen-
- umbral complex into effective feeling, and others wholly exclude them.
- Some are conscious of this internal decision of admission or rejection; for
- others the ideas float into their minds as day-dreams without consciousness
- of deliberate decision; for others, their emotional tone, of gratification
- or regret, of friendliness or hatred, is obscurely influenced by this pen-
- umbra of alternatives, without any conscious analysis of its content. The
- elements of this penumbra are prepositional prehensions, and not pure
- conceptual prehensions; for their implication of the particular nexus which
- ist the Battle of Waterloo is an essential factor.
- Thus an element in this penumbral complex is what is termed a 'propo-
- sition/ A proposition is at new kind of entity. It is a hybrid between pure
- 186 Discussions and Applications
- potentialities and actualities. A 'singular' proposition is the potentiality
- of an actual world including a definite set of actual entities in a nexus of
- reactions involving the hypothetical ingression of a definite set of eternal
- objects.
- A 'general' proposition only differs from a 'singular' proposition by the
- generalization of 'one definite set of [283] actual entities' into "any set
- belonging to a certain sort of sets.' If the sort of sets includes all sets with
- potentiality for that nexus of reactions, the proposition is called 'universal.'
- For the sake of simplicity, we will confine attention to singular propo-
- sitions; although a slight elaboration of explanation will easily extend the
- discussion to include general and universal propositions.
- The definite set of actual entities involved are called the 'logical sub-
- jects of the proposition'; and the definite set of eternal objects involved
- are called the 'predicates of the proposition.' The predicates define a
- potentiality of relatedness for the subjects. The predicates form one com-
- plex eternal object: this is 'the complex predicate.' The 'singular' propo-
- sition is the potentiality of this complex predicate finding realization in
- the nexus of reactions between the logical subjects, with assigned stations
- in the pattern for the various logical subjects.
- In a proposition the various logical subjects involved are impartially
- concerned. The proposition is no more about one logical subject than an-
- other logical subject. But according to the ontological principle, every
- proposition must be somewhere. The 'locus' of a proposition consists of
- those actual occasions whose actual worlds include the logical subjects
- of the proposition. When an actual entity belongs to the locus of a propo-
- sition, then conversely the proposition is an element in the lure for feeling
- of that actual entity. If by the decision of the concrescence, the proposi-
- tion has been admitted into feeling, then the proposition constitutes what
- the feeling has felt. The proposition constitutes a lure for a member of
- its locus by reason of the germaneness of the complex predicate to the
- logical subjects, having regard to forms of definiteness in the actual world
- of that member, and to its antecedent phases of feeling.
- The interest in logic, dominating overintellectualized philosophers, has
- obscured the main function of propositions in the nature of things. They
- are not primarily [284] for belief, but for feeling at the physical level of
- unconsciousness. They constitute a source for the origination of feeling
- which is not tied down to mere datum. A proposition is 'realized' by a
- member of its locus, when it is admitted into feeling.
- There are two types of relationship between a proposition and the actual
- world of a member of its locus. The proposition may be conformal or
- non-con formal to the actual world, true or false.
- When a conformal proposition is admitted into feeling, the reaction
- to the datum has simply resulted in the conformation of feeling to fact,
- with some emotional accession or diminution, by which the feelings in-
- The Propositions 187
- herent in alien fact are synthesized in a new individual valuation. The
- prehension of the proposition has abruptly emphasized one form of defi-
- niteness illustrated in fact.
- When a non-conformal proposition is admitted into feeling, the re-
- action to the datum has resulted in the synthesis of fact with the alterna-
- tive potentiality of the complex predicate. A novelty has emerged into
- creation. The novelty may promote or destroy order; it may be good or
- bad. But it is new, a new type of individual, and not merely a new inten-
- sity of individual feeling. That member of the locus has introduced a new
- form into the actual world; or,t at least, an old form in a new function.
- The conception of propositions as merely material for judgments is fatal
- to any understanding of their role in the universe. In that purely logical
- aspect, non-conformal propositions aret merely wrong, and therefore worse
- than useless. But in their primary role, they pave the way along which
- the world advances into novelty. Error is the price which we pay for
- progress.
- The term 'proposition' suits these hybrid entities, t provided that we
- substitute the broad notion of 'feeling' for the narrower notions of 'judg-
- ment' and 'belief/ A proposition is an element in the objective lure pro-
- posed for feeling, and when admitted into feeling it constitutes [2851 what
- is felt. The 'imaginative' feeling (cf. Part III) of a proposition is one of
- the ways of feeling it; and intellectual belief is another way oft feeling the
- proposition, a way which presupposes imaginative feeling. Judgment is
- the decision admitting a proposition into intellectual belief.
- Anyone who at bedtime consciously reviews the events of the day is
- subconsciously projecting them against the penumbral welter of alterna-
- tives. He is also unconsciously deciding feelings so as to maximize his pri-
- mary feeling, and to secure its propagation beyond his immediate present
- occasion. In considering the life-history of occasions, forming the historic
- route of an enduring physical object, there are three possibilities as to the
- subjective aims which dominate the internal concrescence of the separate
- occasions. Either (i), the satisfactions f of the antecedent occasions may
- be uniform with each other, and each internally without discord or incite-
- ment to novelty. In such a case, apart from novel discordance introduced
- by the environment, there is the mere conformal transformation of the
- feeling belonging to the datum into the identical feeling belonging to the
- immediate subject. Such pure conformation involves the exclusion of all
- the contraries involved in the lure, with their various grades of proximity
- and remoteness. This is an absolute extreme of undifferentiated endurance,
- of which we have no direct evidence. In every instance for which we can
- analyse, however imperfectly, the formal constitutions of successive oc-
- casions, these constitutions are characterized by contraries supervening
- upon the aboriginal data, butt with a regularity of alternation which pro-
- cures stability in the life-history. Contrast is thus gained. Tn physical sci-
- 188 Discussions and Applications
- ence, this is vibration/ This is the main character of the life-histories of
- an inorganic physical object, stabilized in type.
- Or (ii), there is a zest for the enhancement of some dominant element
- of feeling, received from the data, enhanced by decision admitting non-
- conformation of [286] conceptual feeling to other elements in the data,
- and culminating in a satisfaction transmitting enhancement of the dom-
- inant element by reason of novel contrasts and inhibitions. Such a life-history
- involves growth dominated by a single final end. This is the main character
- of a physical object in process of growth. Such physical objects are mainly
- 'organic/ so far as concerns our present knowledge of the world.
- Or (iii), there is a zest for the elimination of all dominant elements of
- feeling, received from the data. In such a case, the route soon loses its
- historic individuality. It is the case of decay.
- The first point to be noticed is that the admission of the selected ele-
- ments in the lure, as felt contraries, primarily generates purpose; it then
- issues in satisfaction; and satisfaction qualifies the efficient causation. But
- a felt 'contrary' is consciousness in germ. When the contrasts and identi-
- ties of such feelings are themselves felt, we have consciousness. It is the
- knowledge of ideas, in Locke's sense of that term. Consciousness requires
- more than the mere entertainment of theory. It is the feeling of the con-
- trast of theory, as mere theory, with fact, as mere fact. This contrast holds
- whether or no the theory be correct.
- A proposition, in abstraction from any particular actual entity which
- may be realizing it in feeling, is a manner of germaneness of a certain
- set of eternal objects to a certain set of actual entities. Every proposition
- presupposes those actual entities which are its logical subjects. It also pre-
- supposes certain definite actual entities, or a certain type of actual entities,!
- within a wide systematic nexus. In an extreme case, this nexus may com-
- prise any actual entity whatsoever.
- The presupposed logical subjects may not be in the actual world of
- some actual entity. In this case, the proposition does not exist for that
- actual entity. The pure concept of such a proposition refers in the hypo-
- thetical future beyond that actual entity. The propo- [287] sition itself awaits
- its logical subjects. Thus propositions grow with the creative advance of the
- world. They are neither pure potentials, nor pure actualities; they are a
- manner of potential nexus involving pure potentials and pure actualities.
- They are a new type of entities. Entities of this impure type presuppose
- the two pure types of entities.
- The primary mode of realization of a proposition in an actual entityt
- is not by judgment, but by entertainment. A proposition is entertained
- when it is admitted into feeling. Horror, relief, purpose, are primarily
- feelings involving the entertainment of propositions.
- In conclusion, there are four main types of entities in the universe, of
- which two are primary types and two are hybrid types. The primary types
- are actual entities and pure potentials (eternal objects); the hybrid types
- The Propositions 189
- are feelings and propositions (theories). Feelings are the 'real' components
- of actual entities. Propositions are only realizable as one sort of 'objective'
- datum for feelings.
- The primary element in the 'lure for feeling' is the subject's prehension
- of the primordial nature of God. Conceptual feelings are generated, and
- by integration with physical feelings a subsequent phase of prepositional
- feelings supervenes. The lure for feeling develops with the concrescent
- phases of the subject in question. I have spoken of it elsewhere (cf. Science
- and the\ Modern World, Ch. XI).
- It is this realized extension of eternal relatedness beyond the mutual
- relatedness of the actual occasions which prehends into each occasion
- the full sweep of eternal relatedness. I term this abrupt* realization
- the 'graded envisagement' which each occasion prehends into its syn-
- thesis. This gradedt envisagement is how the actual includes what
- (in one sense) is 'not-being' as a positive factor in its own achieve-
- ment. It is the source of error, of truth, of art, of ethics, and of re-
- ligion. By it, fact is confronted with alternatives. [288]
- SECTION lit
- All metaphysical theories which admit a disjunction between the
- component elements of individual experience on the one hand.t and on the
- other hand the component elements of the external world, must inevitably
- run into difficulties over the truth and falsehood of propositions, and
- over the grounds for judgment. The former difficulty is metaphysical, the
- latter epistemological. But all difficulties as to first principles are only
- camouflaged metaphysical difficulties. Thus also the epistemological dif-
- ficulty is only solvable by an appeal to ontology. The first difficulty poses
- the question as to the account of truth and falsehood, and the second
- difficulty poses the question as to the account of the intuitive perception
- of truth and falsehood. The former concerns propositions, the latter con-
- cerns judgments. There is a togetherness of the component elements in
- individual experience. This 'togetherness' has that special peculiar meaning
- of 'togetherness in experience.' It is a togetherness of its own kind, ex-
- plicable by reference to nothing else. For the purpose of this discussion
- it is indifferent whether we speak of a 'stream' of experience, or of an
- 'occasion' of experience. With the former alternative there is togetherness
- in the stream, and with the latter alternative there is togetherness in the
- occasion. In either case, there is the unique 'experiential togetherness.'
- The consideration of experiential togetherness raises the final metaphysi-
- cal question: whether there is any other meaning of 'togetherness.' The
- denial of any alternative meaning, that is to say, of any meaning not
- abstracted from the experiential meaning, is the 'subjectivist' doctrine.
- This reformed version of the subjecfivist doctrine is the doctrine of the
- philosophy of organism.
- 190 Discussions and Applications
- The contrary doctrine, that there is a 'togetherness' not derivative from
- experiential togetherness, leads to the disjunction of the components of
- subjective experience from the community of the external world. This
- dis- [289] junction creates the insurmountable difficulty for epistemology.
- For intuitive judgment is concerned with togetherness in experience, and
- there is no bridge between togetherness in experience, and togetherness
- of the non-experiential sort.
- This difficulty is the point of Kant's 'transcendental' criticism. He
- adopted a subjectivist position, so that the temporal world was merely
- experienced. But according to his form of the subjectivist doctrine, in the
- Critique of Pure Reason, no element in the temporal world could itself
- be an experient. His temporal world, as in that Critique, was in its essence
- dead, phantasmal, phenomenal. Kant was a mathematical physicist, and
- his cosmological solution was sufficient for the abstractions to which math-
- ematical physics is confined.
- The difficulties of the subjectivist doctrine arise when it is combined
- with the 'sensationalist' doctrine concerning the analysis of the compo-
- nents which are together in experience. According to that analysis in such
- a component the only elements not stamped with the particularity of that
- individual 'occasion'— or 'stream'— of experience are universals such as
- 'redness' or 'shape,' With the sensationalist assumption, or with any gen-
- eralization of that doctrine, so long as the elements in question are uni-
- versals, the only alternatives are, either Bradley's doctrine of a single ex-
- perient, the absolute, or Leibniz's doctrine of many windowless monads.
- Kant, in his final metaphysics, must either retreat to Leibniz, or advance
- to Bradley. Either alternative stamps experience with a certain air of
- illusoriness.t The Leibnizian solution can mitigate the illusoriness only
- by recourse to a pious dependence upon God. This principle was invoked
- by Descartes and by Leibniz, in order to help out their epistemology. It is
- a device very repugnant to a consistent rationality. The very possibility of
- knowledge should not be an accident of God's goodness; it should depend
- on the interwoven natures of things. After all, God's knowledge has equally
- to be explained.
- [290] The philosophy of organism admits the subjectivist doctrine (as
- here stated), but rejects the sensationalist doctrine: hence its doctrine of
- the objectification of one actual occasion in the experience of another
- actual occasion. Each actual entity is a throb of experience including the
- actual world within its scope. The problems of efficient causation and of
- knowledge receive a common explanation by reference to the texture of
- actual occasions. The theory of judgment in the philosophy of organism
- can equally well be described as a 'correspondence' theory or as a 'coher-
- ence' theory. It is a correspondence theory, because it describes judgment
- as the subjective form of the integral prehension of the conformity, or of the
- non-conformity, of at proposition and an objectified nexus. The prehen-
- sion in question arises from the synthesis of two prehensions, one physical
- The Propositions 191
- and the other mental. The physical prehension is the prehension of the
- nexus of objectified actual occasions. The mental prehension is the pre-
- hension of the proposition. This latter prehension is necessarily 'impure/
- and it arises from a history of antecedent synthesis whereby a pure con-
- ceptual prehension transfers its datum as a predicate of hypothetical re-
- latedness for the actualities in the datum of some physical prehension
- (cf. Part III). But the origination of a propositional prehension does not
- concern us in this description of judgment. The sole point is the synthesis
- of a physical prehension and propositional prehension into an 'intellectual'
- prehension (cf. Part III) whose subjective form involves judgment.
- This judgment is concerned with a conformity of two components
- within one experience. It is thus a 'coherence' theory. It is also concerned
- with the conformity of a proposition, not restricted to that individual ex-
- perience, with a nexus whose relatedness is derived from the various ex-
- periences of its own members and not from that of the judging experient.t
- In this sense there is a 'correspondence' theory. But, at this point of the
- argument, a distinction must be made. We shall say that a [291] proposi-
- tion can be true or false, and that a judgment can be correct, or incorrect,
- or suspended. With this distinction we see that there is a 'correspondence'
- theory of the truth and falsehood of propositions, and a 'coherence' theory
- of the correctness, incorrectness and suspensiont of judgments.
- In the 'organic' doctrine, a clear distinction between a judgment and
- a proposition has been made. A judgment is a feeling in the 'process' of
- the judging subject, and it is correct or incorrect respecting that subject.
- It enters, as a value, into the satisfaction of that subject; and it can only
- be criticized by the judgments of actual entities in the future. A judgment
- concerns the universe in process of prehension by the judging subject. It
- will primarily concern a definite selection of objectified actual entities, and
- of eternal objects; and it affirms the physical objectification— for the judg-
- ing subject— of those actual entities by the ingression of those eternal ob-
- jects; so that there is one objectified nexus of those actual entities, judged
- to be really interconnected, and qualified, by those eternal objects. This
- judgment affirms, correctly or incorrectly, a real fact in the constitution of
- the judging subject. Here there is no room for any qualification of the
- categorical character of the judgment. The judgment is made about itself
- by the judging subject, and is at feeling in the constitution of the judging
- subject. The actual entities, with which the judgment is explicitly con-
- cerned, comprise the 'logical' subjects of the judgment, and the selected
- eternal objects form the 'qualities' and 'relations' which are affirmed of
- the logical subjects.
- This affirmation about the logical subjects is obviously 'affirmation' in a
- sense derivative from the meaning of 'affirmation' about the judging sub-
- ject. Identification of the two senses will lead to error. In the latter** sense
- there is abstraction from the judging subject. The subjectivist principle
- has been transcended, and the judgment has shifted its emphasis from
- 192 Discussions and Applications
- the objectified nexus [292] to the truth-value of the proposition in ques-
- tion. Having regard to the fact that judgment concerns the subjective form
- of an impure feeling arising from the integration of simpler feelings, we
- note that judgments are divisible into two sorts. These are (i) intuitive
- judgments and (ii) derivative judgments. In an intuitive judgment the
- integration of the physical datum with the proposition elicits into feeling
- the full complex detail of the proposition in its comparison of identity,
- or diversity, in regard to the complex detail of the physical datum. The
- intuitive judgment is the consciousness of this complex detailed com-
- parison involving identity and diversity. Such a judgment is in its nature
- correct. For it is the consciousness of what is.
- In a derivative judgment the integration of the physical datum with
- the proposition elicits into feeling the full complex detail of the proposi-
- tion, but does not elicit into feeling the full comparison of this detail with
- the complex detail of the physical fact. There is some comparison involv-
- ing the remainder of the detail. But the subjective form embraces the
- totality of the proposition, instead of assuming a complex pattern which
- discriminates between the compared and the uncompared components. In
- derivative judgments there can be error. Logic is the analysis of the rela-
- tionships between propositions in virtue of which derivative judgments
- will not introduce errors, other than those already attaching to the judg-
- ments in+ the premises. Most judgments are derivative; such judgments
- illustrate the doctrine that the subjective form of a feeling is affected by
- the totality of the actual occasion. This has been termed the 'sensitivity' of
- feelings in one occasion. In an intuitive judgment the subjective form of
- assent or dissent has been restrained, so as to derive its character solely
- from the contrasts in the datum. Even in this case, the emotional force of
- the judgment, as it passes into purpose, is derived from the whole judging
- subject
- Further, the judging subject and the logical subjects [293] refer to a uni-
- verse with the general metaphysical character which represents its 'pa-
- tience' for those subjects, and also its 'patience' for those eternal objects.
- In each judgment the universe is ranged in a hierarchy of wider and wider
- societies, as explained above (cf. Part II, Ch. III). It follows that the
- distinction between the logical subjects, with their qualities and relations,
- and the universe as systematic background, is not quite so sharply defined
- as the previous explanation suggests. For it is a matter of convention as
- to which of the proximate societies are reckoned as logical subjects and
- which as background. Another way of stating this shading off of logical
- subjects into background t is to say that the patience of the universe for a
- real fact in a judging subject is a hierarchical patience involving systematic
- gradations of character. This discussion substantiates the statement made
- above (cf. Part I, Ch. I, Sect. V), that a verbal statement is never the full
- expression of a proposition.
- We now recur to the distinction between a proposition and a judgment.
- The Propositions 193
- A proposition emerges in the analysis of a judgment; it is the datum of
- the judgment in abstraction from the judging subject and from the sub-
- jective form. A judgment x is a synthetic feeling, embracing two subordinate
- feelings in one unity of feeling. Of these subordinate feelings one is propo-
- sitional, merely entertaining the proposition which is its datum. The same
- proposition can constitute the content of diverse judgments by diverse
- judging entities respectively. The possibility of diverse judgments by di-
- verse actual entities, having the same content (of 'proposition' in con-
- trast with 'nexus'), requires that the same complex of logical subjects, ob-
- jectified via the same eternal objects, can enter as a partial constituent
- into the 'real' essences of diverse actual entities. The judgment is a de-
- cision of feeling, the proposition is what is felt; but it is only part of the
- datum felt.
- But, since each actual world is relative to standpoint, [294] it is only
- some actual entities which will have the standpoints so as to include,! in
- their actual world, the actual entities which constitute the logical subjects
- of the proposition. Thus every proposition defines the judging subjects
- for which it is a proposition. Every proposition presupposes some definite
- settled actual entities in the actual world of its judging subject; and thus
- its possible judging subjects must have these actual entities in the actual
- world of each of them. All judgment requires knowledge of the pre-
- supposed actual entities. Thus in addition to the requisite composition of
- the actual world presupposed by a proposition, there must be the requi-
- site knowledge of that world presupposed by a judgment, whether the
- judgment be correct or incorrect. For actual entities, whose actual worlds
- have not the requisite composition, the proposition is non-existent; for
- actual entities, without the requisite knowledge, the judgment is im-
- possible. It is quite true that a more abstract proposition can be modelled
- on the lines of the original proposition, so as to avoid the presupposition of
- some or all of these settled actual entities which are the logical subjects
- in the original proposition. This new proposition will have meaning for a
- wider group of possible subjects than the original proposition. Some propo-
- sitions seem to us to have meaning for all possible judging subjects. This
- may be the case; but I do not dare to affirm that our metaphysical capac-
- ities are sufficiently developed to warrant any certainty on this question.
- Perhaps we are always presupposing some wide society beyond which our
- imaginations cannot leap. But the vagueness of verbal statements is such
- that the same form of words is taken to represent a whole set of allied
- propositions of various grades of abstractness.
- A judgment weakens or strengthens the decision whereby the judged
- proposition, as a constituent in the lure, is admitted as an efficient element
- m the concrescence, with the reinforcement of knowledge. A judgment is
- the critique of a lure for feeling.
- 1 Cf. Part III, Ch. V.f
- 194 Discussions and Applications
- SECTION III
- [295] It now remains to consider the sense in which the actual world,
- in some systematic aspect, enters into each proposition. This investigation
- is wholly concerned with the notion of the logical subjects of the proposi-
- tion. These logical subjects are, in the old sense of the term, 'particulars.'
- They are not concepts in comparison with other concepts; they are par-
- ticular facts in a potential pattern.
- But particulars must be indicated; because the proposition concerns just
- those particulars and no others. Thus the indication belongs to the propo-
- sition; namely, 'Those particulars as thus indicated in such-and-such a
- predicative pattern' constitutes the proposition. Apart from the indication
- there is no proposition because there are no determinate particulars. Thus
- we have to study the theory of indication.
- Some definitions are required:
- A 'relation' between occasions is an eternal object illustrated in the
- complex of mutual prehensions by virtue of which those occasions con-
- stitute a nexus.
- A relation is called a 'dual relation' when the nexus in which it is real-
- ized consists of two, and only two, actual occasions. It is a 'triple relation'
- when there are three occasions, and so on.
- There will, in general, be an indefinite number of eternal objects thus
- illustrated in the mutual prehensions of the occasions of any one nexus;
- that is to say, there are an indefinite number of relations realized between
- the occasions of any particular nexus.
- A 'general principle' is an eternal object which is only illustrated through
- its 'instances,' which are also eternal objects. Thus the realization of an
- instance is also the realization of the general principle of which that eter-
- nal object is an instance. But the converse is not true; namely, the realiza-
- tion of the general principle does not involve the realization of any par-
- ticular instance, though [296] it does necessitate the realization of some
- instance. Thus the instances each involve the general principle, but the
- general principle only involves at least one instance. In general, the in-
- stances of a general principle are mutually exclusive, so that the realiza-
- tion of one instance involves the exclusion of the other instances. For
- example, colour is a general principle and colours are the instances. So if
- all sensible bodies exhibit the general principle, which is colour, each body
- exhibits some definite colour. Also each body exhibiting a definite colour
- is thereby 'coloured.'
- A nexus exhibits an 'indicative system' of dual relations among its mem-
- bers, when (i) one, and only one, relation of the system relates each pair
- of its members; and (ii) these relations are instances of a general prin-
- ciple; and (iii) the relation (in the system) between any member A and
- anv other member B does not also relate A and a member of the nexus
- The Propositions 195
- other than B; and (iv) the relations (in the system) between A and B
- and between A and C suffice to define the relation (in the system) be-
- tween B and C, where A, B, and C are any three members of the nexus.
- Thus if A and X be any two members of the nexus, and if X has knowl-
- edge of A's systematic relation to it and also of A's systematic relations to
- B ? C, and D, where B, C, and D are members of the nexus, then X has
- knowledge of its own systematic relations to B, C, and D, and of the
- mutual systematic relations between B, C, and D. Such a nexus admits of
- the precise indication of its members from the standpoint of any one of
- them. The relative where' presupposes a nexus exhibiting an indicative
- system. More complex types of indicative systems can be defined; but the
- simplest type suffices to illustrate the principle involved. We have been
- defining Aristotle's category of 'position/ It will be noticed that in a nexus
- with an indicative system of relations, the subjective aspect of experience
- can be eliminated from propositions involved. For a knowledge of B and
- C and D as from A [297] yields a proposition concerning C and D as from
- B. Thus the prevalent notion, that the particular subject of experience can,
- in the nature of the case, never be eliminated from the experienced fact,
- is quite untrue.
- Every proposition presupposes some general nexus with an indicative
- relational system. This nexus includes its locus of judging subjects and
- also its logical subjects. This presupposition is part of the proposition, and
- the proposition cannot be entertained by any subject for which the pre-
- supposition is not valid. Thus in a proposition certain characteristics are
- presupposed for the judging subject and for the logical subjects. This pre-
- supposition of character can be carried further than the mere requirements
- of indication require. For example, in 'Socrates is mortal' the mere spatio-
- temporal indicative system may be sufficient to indicate 'Socrates/ But
- the proposition may mean 'The man Socrates is mortal/ or 'The philoso-
- pher Socrates is mortal/ The superfluous indication may be part of the
- proposition. Anyhow, the principle that a proposition presupposes the
- actual world as exhibiting some systematic aspect has now been explained.
- This discussion can be illustrated by the proposition, 'Caesar has crossed
- the Rubicon/ This form of words symbolizes an indefinite number of di-
- verse propositions. In its least abstract form 'Caesar stands for a society of
- settled actual entities in the actual world from the standpoint of the judg-
- ing subject, with their objectifications consciously perceived by the sub-
- ject. The whole theory of perception will come up for further discussion
- in a later chapter (cf. Part III); at this point it can be assumed. The word
- 'Rubicon' is to be explained in the same way as the word 'Caesar/ The
- only points left ambiguous respecting 'Caesar' and 'Rubicon' are that
- these societies— either or both, and each with its defining characteristic-
- may be conjecturally supposed to be prolonged up to the world contem-
- porary with the judging subject, or, even more conjecturally, into the
- future [298] world beyond the subject. The past tense of the word 'has'
- 196 Discussions and Applications
- shows that this point of ambiguity is irrelevant, so that the proposition can
- be framed so as to ignore it. But it need not be so framed: one of Caesar's
- old soldiers may in later years have sat on the bank of the river and medi-
- tated on the assassination of Caesar, and on Caesar's passage over the
- little river tranquilly flowing before his gaze. This would have been a
- different proposition from the more direct one which I am now consider-
- ing. Nothing could better illustrate the hopeless ambiguity of language;
- since both propositions fit the same verbal phraseology. There is yet a
- third proposition: a modern traveller sitting on the bank of the Rubicon,
- and meditating on his direct perceptions of actual occasions can locate,
- relatively to himself by spatio-temporal specifications, an event which
- inferentially and conjecturally he believes to include a portion of the past
- history of the Rubicon as directly known to him. He also, by an analogous
- process of inference and conjecture, and of spatio-temporal specification,
- locates relatively to himself another event which he believes to contain
- the life of Caesar of whom he has no direct knowledge. The proposition
- meditated on by this traveller sitting on the bank of the modern river is
- evidently a different proposition to that in the mind of Caesar's old soldier.
- Then there is the proposition which might have been in the mind of one
- of the crowd who listened to Antony's speech, a man who had seen Caesar
- and not the Rubicon.
- It is obvious that in this way an indefinite number of highly special
- propositions can be produced, differing from each other by fine gradations.
- Everything depends upon the differences in direct perceptive knowledge
- which these various propositions presuppose for their subjects. But there
- are propositions of at more general type, for which 'Caesar' and 'Rubicon'
- have more generalized, vaguer meanings. In these vaguer meanings. 'Caesar'
- and 'Rubicon' indicate the entities, if any, located by any one member of
- a type of routes, starting from a [299] certain type of inference and con-
- jecture. Also there are some such propositions in which the fact of there
- being such entities, to be thus located, is part of the content whereby the
- judgment is true or false; and there are other propositions in which even
- this requisite is evaded, so far as truth or falsehood is concerned. It is by
- reason of these various types of more abstract propositions that we can
- conceive the hypothetical existence of the more special propositions which
- for some of us, as judging subjects, would be meaningless.
- This discussion should show the futility of taking any verbal statement,
- such as 'Caesar has crossed the Rubicon/ and arguing about the meaning.
- Also any proposition, which satisfies the verbal form so as to be one of its
- possibilities of meaning, defines its own locus of subjects; and only for
- such subjects is there the possibility of a judgment whose content is that
- proposition.
- A proposition is the potentiality of the objectification of certain pre-
- supposed actual entities via certain qualities and relations, the objectifi-
- cation being for some unspecified subject for which the presupposition has
- The Propositions 197
- meaning in direct experience. The judgment is the conscious affirmation
- by a particular subject— for which the presupposition holds— that this
- potentiality is, or is not, realized for it. It must be noticed that 'realized'
- does not mean 'realized in direct conscious experience/ but does mean
- 'realized as being contributory to the datum out of which that judging
- subject originates/ Since direct t conscious experience is usually absent, a
- judgment can be erroneous.
- Thus a proposition is an example of what Locke calls an 'idea deter-
- mined to particular existences/ It is the potentiality of such an idea; the
- realized idea, admitted to decision in a given subject, is the judgment,
- which may be a true or false idea about the particular things. The discus-
- sion of this question must be resumed (cf. Part III) when conceptual
- activity is examined. But it is evident that a proposition is a complex
- entity which [300] stands between the eternal objects and the actual oc-
- casions. Compared to eternal objects a proposition shares in the concrete
- particularity of actual occasions; and compared to actual occasions a propo-
- sition shares in the abstract generality of eternal objects. Finally, it must
- be remembered that propositions enter into experience in other ways than
- through judgment-feelings. +
- SECTION IV
- A metaphysical proposition— in the proper, general sense of the termt
- 'metaphysical— signifies a proposition which (i) has meaning for any-
- actual occasion, as a subject entertaining it, and (ii) is 'general/ in the
- sense that its predicate potentially relates any and every set of actual oc-
- casions, providing the suitable number of logical subjects for the predi-
- cative pattern, and (iii) has a 'uniform' truth-value, in the sense that, by
- reason of its form and scope, its truth-value is identical with the truth-
- value of each of the singular propositions to be obtained by restricting the
- application of the predicate to any one set of logical subjects. It is obvious
- that, if a metaphysical proposition be true, the third condition is un-
- necessary. For a general proposition can only be true if this condition be
- fulfilled. But if the general proposition be false, then it is only metaphysical
- when in addition each of the derivate singular propositions is false. The
- general proposition would be false, if any one of the derivate singular
- propositions were false. But the third condition is expressed in the propo-
- sition without any dependence upon the determination of the proposition's
- truth or falsehood.
- There can be no cosmic epoch for which the singular propositions de-
- rived from a metaphysical proposition differ in truth-valuet from those of
- any other cosmic epoch.
- We certainly think that we entertain metaphysical propositions: but,
- having regard to the mistakes of the past respecting the principles of
- geometry, it is wise to [30 J] reserve some scepticism on this point The
- 198 Discussions and Applications
- propositions which seem to be most obviously metaphysical are the arith-
- metical theorems. I will therefore illustrate the justification both for the
- belief, and for the residual scepticism, by an examination of one of the
- simplest of such theorems: One and one make two. 2
- Certainly, this proposition, construed in the sense 'one entity and an-
- other entity make two entities/" seems to be properly metaphysical without
- any shadow of limitation upon its generality, or truth. But we must hesi-
- tate even here, when we notice that it is usually asserted, with equal con-
- fidence as to the generality of its metaphysical truth, in a sense which is
- certainly limited, and sometimes untrue. In our reference to the actual
- world, we rarely consider an individual actual entity. The objects of our
- thoughts are almost always societies, or looser groups of actual entities.
- Now, for the sake of simplicity, consider a society of the 'personal' type.
- Such a society will be a linear succession of actual occasions forming a
- historical route in which some defining characteristic is inherited by each
- occasion from its predecessors. A society of this sort is an 'enduring ob-
- ject/ Probably, a simple enduring object is simpler than anything which
- we ordinarily perceive or think about. It is the simplest type of society;
- and for any duration of its existence it requires that its environment be
- largely composed of analogous simplef enduring objects. What we nor-
- mally consider is the wider society in which many strands of enduring
- objects are to be found, a 'corpuscular society/
- Now consider two distinct enduring objects. They will be easier to
- think about if their defining characteristics are different. We will call these
- defining characteristics a and b y and also will use these letters, a and b,
- as the names of the two enduring objects. Now the proposition 'one entity
- and another entity make two [302] entities' is usually construed in the
- sense that, given two enduring objects, any act of attention which con-
- sciously comprehends an actual occasion from each of the two historic
- routes will necessarily discover two actual occasions, one from each of the
- two distinct routes. For example, suppose that a cup and a saucer are two
- such enduring objects, which of course they are not; we always assume
- that, so long as they are both in existence and are sufficiently close to be
- seen in one glance, any act of attention, whereby we perceive the cup and
- perceive the saucer, will thereby involve the perception of two actual en-
- tities, one the cup in one occasion of its existence and the other the saucer
- in one occasion of its existence. There can be no reasonable doubt as to
- the truth of this assumption in this particular example. But in making
- it, we are very far from the metaphysical proposition from which we
- started. We are in fact stating a truth concerning the wide societies of
- entities amid which our lives are placed. It is a truth concerning this
- cosmos, but not a metaphysical truth.
- Let us return to the two truly simple enduring objects, a and b. Also
- 2 For the proof of this proposition, cf. Principia Mathematical Vol. II,
- *110.643.
- The Propositions 199
- let us assume that their defining characteristics, a and b, are not con-
- traries, so that both of them can qualify the same actual occasion. Then
- there is no general metaphysical reason why the distinct routes of a and b
- should not intersect in at least one actual occasion. Indeed, having regard
- to the extreme generality of the notion of a simple enduring object, it is
- practically certain that— with the proper choice for the defining character-
- istics, a and b— intersecting historic routes for a and b must have fre-
- quently come into existence. In such a contingency a being who could
- consciously distinguish the two distinct enduring objects a and b, so as
- to have knowledge of their distinct defining characteristics and their dis-
- tinct historic routes, might find a and b exemplified in one actual entity.
- It is as though the cup and the saucer were at one instant identical; and
- then, later on, resumed their distinct existence.
- [303] We hardly ever apply arithmetic in its pure metaphysical sense,
- without the addition of presumptions which depend for their truth on the
- character of the societies dominating the cosmic epoch in which we live.
- It is hardly necessary to draw attention to the fact, that ordinary verbal
- statements make no pretence of discriminating the different senses in which
- an arithmetical statement can be understood.
- There is no difficulty in imagining a world— i.e., a cosmic epoch— in
- which arithmetic would be an interesting fanciful topic for dreamers, but
- useless for practical people engrossed in the business of life. In fact, we
- seem to have been only barely rescued from such a state of things. For
- amid the actual occasions located in the wilds of so-called 'empty space/
- and well removed from the enduring objects which go to form the en-
- during material bodies, it is quite probable that the contemplation of
- arithmetic would not direct attention to any very important relations of
- things. It is, of course, a mere speculation that any actual entity, occurring
- in such an environment of faintly coordinated achievement, achieves the
- intricacy of constitution required for conscious mental operations.
- SECTION V
- We ask the metaphysical question, What is there in the nature of
- things, whereby an inductive inference, or a judgment of general truth,
- can be significantly termed 'correct' or Incorrect'? For example, we believe
- now— July 1, 1927— that the railway time-tables for the United States,
- valid for the previous months of May and June, represent the facts as to
- the past running of the trains, within certain marginal limits of unpunc-
- tuality, and allowing for a few individual breakdowns. Also we believe
- that the current time-tables for July will be exemplified, subject to the
- same qualifications. On the evidence before us our beliefs are justified,
- provided that we introduce into our judgments some estimate of the
- [304] high probability which is all that we mean to affirm. If we are con-
- sidering astronomical events, our affirmations will include an estimate of
- 200 Discussions and Applications
- a higher probability. Though even here some margin of uncertainty may
- exist The computers of some famous observatory may have made an un-
- precedented error; or some unknown physical law may have important
- relevance to the condition of the star mainly concerned, leading to its
- unexpected explosion. 3
- This astronomical contingency, and the beliefs which cluster round it,
- have been stated with some detail, because— as thus expressed— they
- illustrate the problem as it shapes itself in philosophy. Also the example
- of the railway time-tables illustrates another point. For it is possible
- momentarily, in Vermont on July 1, 1927, to forget that the unprecedented
- Mississippi floods happened during that May and June; so that although
- the estimate as to error in punctuality was justified by the evidence con-
- sciously before us, it did not in fact allow for the considerable derange-
- ment of the traffic in some states in the Union. 4 The point of this illus-
- tration from railway trains is that there is a conformity to matter of fact
- which these judgments exhibit, even if the events concerned have not
- happened, or will not happen. These considerations introduce the funda-
- mental principle concerning 'judgment/ It is that all judgment is categor-
- ical; it concerns a proposition true or false in its application to the actual
- occasion which is the subject making the judgment. This doctrine is not
- so far from Bradley's doctrine of judgment, as explained in his Logic.
- According to Bradley, the ultimate subject of every judgment is the one
- ultimate substance, the absolute. Also, according to him, the judging
- subject is a mode of the absolute, self-contradictory if taken to be inde-
- pendently actual. For Bradley, the judging subject has only a [305] deriva-
- tive actuality, which is the expression of its status as an affection of the
- absolute. Thus,! in Bradley's doctrine, a judgment is an operation by which
- the absolute, under the limitations of one of its affections, enjoys self-
- consciousness of its enjoyment of affections. It will be noticed that in
- this bald summary of Bradley's position, I am borrowing Spinoza's phrase,
- 'affeciiones substantial
- In the philosophy of organism, an actual occasion—as has been stated
- above— is the whole universe in process of attainment of a particular
- satisfaction. Bradley's doctrine of actuality is simply inverted. The final
- actuality is the particular process with its particular attainment of satis-
- faction. The actuality of the universe is merely derivative from its soli-
- darity in each actual entity. It must be held that judgment concerns the
- universe as objectified from the standpoint of the judging subject. It con-
- cerns the universe through that subject.
- With this doctrine in mind, we pass to the discussion of the sense in
- which probability can be a positive fact in an actual entity; so that a propo-
- 8 Since this sentence was written in July, 1927, a star has unexpectedly split
- in two, in March, 1928.
- 4 Still less, at the time of writing this sentence, were the Vermont floods of
- November, 1927, foreseen.
- The Propositions 201
- sition expressing the probability of some other proposition can in this
- respect agree or disagree with the constitution of the judging entity. The
- notion of 'probability/ in the widest sense of that term, presents a puzzling
- philosophical problem. The mathematical theory of probability is based
- upon certain statistical assumptions. When these assumptions hold, the
- meaning of probability is simple; and the only remaining difficulties are
- concerned with the technical mathematical development. But it is not
- easy to understand how the statistical theory can apply to all cases to
- which the notion of more or less probability is habitually applied. For
- example, when we consider— as we do consider— the probability of some
- scientific conjecture as to the internal constitution of the stars, or as to
- the future of human society after some unprecedented convulsion, we
- seem to be influenced by some analogy which it is very difficult to convert
- into an appeal to any definite statistical fact. We may consider that it is
- probable [306] that the judgment could be justified by some statistical
- appeal, if we only knew where to look. This is the belief that the statistical
- probability is itself probable. But here, evidently, there is an appeal to a
- wider meaning of probability in order to support the statistical probability
- applicable to the present case. It is arguable that this wider probability
- is itself another statistical probability as to the existence of the special
- statistics relevant to such types of scientific argument. But in this explana-
- tion puzzling questions are accumulating; and it is impossible to avoid the
- suspicion that we are being put off with one of those make-believe ex-
- planations, so useful to reasoners who are wedded to a theory. The phi-
- losophy of organism provides two distinct elements in the universe from
- which an intuition of probability can originate. One of them is statistical.
- In this and the next two sections, + an attempt will be made to justify
- the statistical theory. It is therefore the more imperative to survey care-
- fully the difficulties which have to be met.
- In the first place, probability is always relative* to evidence; so, on
- the statistical theory, the numerical probability will mean the numerical
- ratio of favourable to unfavourable cases in the particular class of 'cases'
- selected as the 'ground 7 for statistical comparison. But alternative 'grounds'
- certainly exist. Accordingly we must provide a reason,f not based upon
- 'probability/ why one 'ground' is selected rather than another. We may
- admit such a chain of vaguer and vaguer probabilities, in which our first
- ground is selected as statistically probable in respect to its superiority to
- other 'grounds' of other types. We are thus driven back to a second-order
- ground' of probability. We may logically proceed to third-order 'grounds/
- and so on. But if the statistical theory is to be substantiated, after a finite
- number of steps we must reach a 'ground' which is not selected for any
- reason of probability. It must be selected because it is the 'ground' pre-
- supposed in all our reasonings. [307] Apart from some such ultimate
- 'ground,' the statistical theory, viewed as an ultimate explanation for all
- our uses of the notion of 'probability/ must inevitably fail. This failure
- 202 Discussions and Applications
- arises by reason of the complete arbitrariness of the ultimate 'ground'
- upon which the whole estimate of probability finally rests.
- Secondly, the primary requisite for a 'ground' suitable for statistical
- probability seems itself to appeal to probability. The members of the
- class, called the 'ground/ must themselves be 'cases of equal probability/
- some favourable and some unfavourable, with the possibility of the limit-
- ing types of 'ground' in which all members are favourable, or all members
- are unfavourable. The proposition in question, whose probability is to be
- estimated, must be known to be a member of the 'ground'; but no other
- evidence, as to the set— favourable or unfavourable—to which t the propo-
- sition belongs, enters into consideration. It is evident that 7 for the ulti-
- mate ground, the phrase 'cases of equal probability' must be explicable
- without reference to any notion of probability. The principle of such an
- explanation is easily found by reference to the six faces of dice. A die is
- a given fact; and its faces do not differ, qua faces, in any circumstance
- relative to their fall with one face upwards or another face upwards. Also
- beyond this given fact, there is ignorance. Thus again we are driven to an
- ultimate fact: there must be an ultimate species, and the specific character
- must be irrelevant to the 'favourableness' or 'unfavourableness' of the
- members of the species in their capacity of cases. All this must be given
- in direct knowledge without any appeal to probability. Also there must
- be equally direct knowledge of the proportion of favourable or unfavour-
- able cases within the species— at least within the limits of precision or
- vagueness presupposed in the conclusion.
- Thirdly, it is another requisite for a 'ground' that the number of in-
- stances which it includes be finite. The whole theory of the ratios of car-
- dinal numbers, on which [308] statistical probability depends, breaks down
- when the cardinal numbers are infinite.
- Fourthly, the method of 'sampling' professes to evade two objections.
- One of them is the breakdown, mentioned above, when the number of
- cases in the ground' is infinite. The other objection, thus evaded, is that
- in practice the case in question is novel and does not belong to the
- 'ground' which is in fact examined. According to this second objection,
- unless there is some further evidence, the statistical state of the 'ground'
- is bogus evidence as to the probability of the case in question. To sum
- up: The method of sampling professes to overcome! (i) the difficulty
- arising from the infinity of the ground; and (ii) that arising from the
- novelty of the case in question, whereby it does not belong to the ground
- examined. In the discussion it must be remembered that we are con-
- sidering that ultimate ground which must not require any appeal to prob-
- ability beyond itself. Thus the statistical facts as to the ground! must be
- 'given' and not merely 'probable.'
- (i) When we have ant infinite 'ground/ containing an infinite number
- of favourable cases and an infinite number of unfavourable cases, 'random'
- sampling can give no help towards the establishment of statistical proba-
- The Propositions 203
- bility; for one reason because no such notion of ratios can apply to these
- infinities; and for another reason, no sample is 'random'; it has only fol-
- lowed a complex method. A finite number of samples each following some
- method of its own, however complex each method may be, will give a
- statistical result entirely dependent upon those methods. In so far as
- repetitions of so-called random samplings give concordant results, the only
- conclusion to be drawn is that there is a relevant, though concealed, anal-
- ogy between the 'random' methods. Thus a finite 'ground' is essential for
- statistical probability. It must be understood that this argument implies
- no criticism on a properly interpreted method of sampling applied to a
- finite 'ground/
- [309] (ii) When the 'case' in question does not belong to the ground
- examined, theret can, apart from further information, be no rational in-
- ference from the 'ground' to the novel case. If probability be in truth
- purely statistical, and if there be no additional information, there can be
- no escape from this conclusion. But we certainly do unhesitatingly argue
- from a 'ground'' which does not include the case in question, to a probable
- conclusion concerning the case in question. Thus either such an inference
- is irrational, futile, useless; or, when there is justification, there is additional
- information. This is the famous dilemma which perplexes the theories of
- induction t and of probability.
- SECTION VI
- It is evident that the ultimate 'ground' to which all probable judgments
- must refer can be nothing else than the actual world as objectified in judg-
- ing subjects. A judging subject is always passing a judgment upon its own
- data. Thus, if the statistical theory is to hold, the relations between the
- judging subject and its data must be such as to evade the difficulties which
- beset that theory.
- Every actual entity is in its nature essentially social; and this in two
- ways. First, the outlines of its own character are determined by the data
- which its environment provides for its process of feeling. Secondly, these
- data are not extrinsic to the entity; they constitute that display of the
- universe which is inherent in the entity. Thus the data upon which the
- subject passes judgment are themselves components conditioning the
- character of the judging subject. It follows that any general presupposi-
- tion as to the character of the experiencing subject also implies a general
- presupposition as to the social environment providing the display for that
- subject. In other words, a species of subject requires a species of data as
- its preliminary phase of concrescence. But such data are nothing but the
- social environment under the [310] abstraction effected by objectification.
- Also the character of the abstraction itself depends on the environment.
- The species of data requisite for the presumed judging subject presupposes
- an environment of a certain social character.
- 204 Discussions and Applications
- Thus, according to the philosophy of organism, inductive reasoning
- gains its validity by reason of a suppressed premise. This tacit presuppo-
- sition is that the particular future which is the logical subject of the
- judgment, inductively justified, shall include actualities which have close
- analogy to some contemporary subject enjoying assigned experience; for
- example, an analogy to the judging subject in question, or to some sort
- of actuality presupposed as in the actual world which is the logical subject
- of the inductive judgment. It is also presumed that this future is derived
- from the present by a continuity of inheritance in which this condition
- is maintained. There is thus the presupposition of the maintenance of the
- general social environment— -eft/ier by reference to judging subjects, or
- by more direct reference to the preservation of the general type of material
- world requisite for the presupposed character of one or more of the logical
- subjects of the proposition.
- In this connection, I can only repeat, as a final summary, a paragraph
- from my Science and the Modern World (Ch. Ill):
- You will observe that I do not hold induction to be in its essence the
- divinationt of general laws. It is the derivation of some characteristics
- of a particular future from the known characteristics of a particular
- past. The wider assumption of general laws holding for all cognizable
- occasions appears a very unsafe addendum to attach to this limited
- knowledge. All we can ask of the present occasion is that it shall
- determine a particular community of occasions, which are in some
- respects mutually qualified by reason of their inclusion within that
- same community.
- It is evident that, in this discussion of induction, the philosophy of or-
- ganism [311] appears as an enlargement of the premise in ethical discus-
- sions: that man is a social animal. Analogously, every actual occasion is
- social, so that when we have presumed the existence of any persistent type
- of actual occasions, we have thereby made presumptions as to types of
- societies comprised in its environment. Another way of stating this ex-
- planation of the validity of induction is, that in every forecast there is a
- presupposition of a certain type of actual entities, and that the question
- then asked is, Under what circumstances will these entities find them-
- selves? The reason that an answer can be given is that the presupposed
- type of entities requires a presupposed type of data for the primary phases
- of these actual entities; and that a presupposed type of data requires a
- presupposed type of social environment. But the laws of nature are the
- outcome of the social environment. Hence when we have presupposed a
- type of actual occasions, we have already some information as to the laws
- of nature in operation throughout the environment.
- In every inductive judgment, there is therefore contained a presupposi-
- tion of the maintenance of the general order of the immediate environ-
- ment, so far as concerns actual entities within the scope of the induction.
- The inductive judgment has regard to the statistical probabilities inherent
- in this given order. The anticipations are devoid of meaning apart from
- The Propositions 205
- the definite cosmic order which they presuppose. Also survival requires
- order, and to presuppose survival, apart from the type of order which that
- type of survival requires, is a contradiction. It is at this point that the
- organic philosophy differs from any form of Cartesian 'substance-philoso-
- phy/ For if a substance requires nothing but itself in order to exist, its
- survival can tell no tale as to the survival of order in its environment. Thus
- no conclusion can be drawn respecting the external relationships of the
- surviving substance to its future environment. For [312] the organic phi-
- losophy, anticipations as to the future of a piece of rock presuppose an
- environment with the type of order which that piece of rock requires.
- Thus the completely unknown environment never enters into an inductive
- judgment. The induction is about the statistical probabilities of this en-
- vironment, or about the graded relevance to it of eternal objects.
- Thus the appeal to the mere unknown is automatically ruled out. The
- question, as to what will happen to an unspecified entity in an unspecified
- environment, has no answer. Induction always cocerns societies of actual
- entities which are important for the stability of the immediate en-
- vironment.
- SECTION VII
- In the preceding section there has been a covert appeal to probability.
- It is the purpose of this section to explain how the probability, thus in-
- voked, can be explained according to the statistical theory. First, we have
- to note exactly where this appeal to probability enters into the notion of
- induction. An inductive argument always includes a hypothesis, namely,
- that the environment which is the subject-matter considered contains a
- society of actual occasions analogous to a society in the present. But
- analogous societies require analogous data for their several occasions; and
- analogous data can be provided only by the objectifications provided by
- analogous environments. But the laws of nature are derived from the
- characters of the societies dominating the environment. Thus the laws of
- nature dominating the environment in question have some analogy to
- the laws of nature dominating the immediate environment.
- Now the notions of 'analogy' and of 'dominance 7 both leave a margin
- of uncertainty. We can ask, How far analogous? and How far dominant?
- If there were exact analogy, and complete dominance, there would be a
- mixture of certainty as to general conditions and of complete ignorance
- as to specific details. But such a descrip- [313] tion does not apply either
- to our knowledge of the immediate present, or of the past, or to our in-
- ductive knowledge of the future. Our conscious experience involves a
- baffling mixture of certainty, ignorance, and probability.
- Now it is evident that the theory of cosmic epochs, due to the domi-
- nance of societies of actual occasions, provides the basis for a statistical
- explanation of probability. In any one epoch there are a definite set of
- 206 Discussions and Applications
- dominant societies in certain ordered interconnections. There is also an
- admixture of chaotic occasions which cannot be classified as belonging to
- any society. But, having regard to the enornious extension of any cosmic
- epoch, we are practically dealing with infinities, so that some method of
- sampling is required, rooted in the nature of the case and not arbitrarily
- adopted.
- This natural method of sampling is provided by the data which form
- the primary phase of any one actual occasion. Each actual occasion ob-
- jectifies the other actual occasions in its environment. This environment
- can be limited to the relevant portion of the cosmic epoch. It is a finite
- region of the extensive continuum, so far as adequate importance is con-
- cerned in respect to individual differences among actual occasions. Also,
- in respect to the importance of individual differences, we may assume
- that there is a lower limit to the extension of each relevant occasion within
- this region. With these two presumptions, it follows that the relevant
- objectifications, forming the relevant data for any one occasion, refer to
- a finite sample of actual occasions in the environment. Accordingly our
- knowledge of the external world, and of the conditions upon which its
- laws depend, t is, through and through, of that numerical character which
- a statistical theory of probability requires. Such a theory does not require
- that exact statistical calculations bet made. All that is meant by such a
- theory is that our probability judgments are ultimately derivable from
- vague estimates of 'more or less' in a numerical sense. [314] We have an
- unprecise intuition of the statistical basis of the sort of way in which
- things happen.
- Note. — By far the best discussion of the philosophical theory of probability
- is to be found in Mr. }. Maynard Keynes' book, A Treatise on Probability. This
- treatise must long remain the standard work on the subject. My conclusions in
- this chapter do not seem to me to differ fundamentally from those of Mr.
- Keynes as set out towards the conclusion of his Chapter XXI. But Mr. Keynes
- here seems to revert to a view of probability very analogous to that form of the
- 'frequency theory' which, as suggested by me,f he criticized acutely (and rightly,
- so far as concerned that special form) in his Chapter VIII.
- SECTION VIII
- So far the argument of the three! preceding sections has been devoted
- to the explanation of the statistical ground for a probability judgment. But
- the same discussion also discloses an alternative non-statistical ground for
- such a judgment.
- The main line of thought has been (i) that each actual occasion has at
- the base of its own constitution the environment from which it springs;
- (ii) that in this function of the environment abstraction has been made
- from its indefinite multiplicity of forms of definiteness, so as to obtain a
- concordant experience of the elements retained; (in) that any actual oc-
- casion belonging to an assigned species requires an environment adapted
- The Propositions 207
- to that species, so that the presupposition of a species involves a pre-
- supposition concerning the environment; (iv) that in every inductive judg-
- ment, and in every judgment of probability, there is a presupposition, im-
- plicit or explicit, of one, or more, species of actual occasions implicated in
- the situation considered, so that, by (iii),t there is a presupposition of
- some general type of environment.
- Thus the basis of all probability and induction is the fact of analogy
- between an environment presupposed and an environment directly ex-
- perienced.
- The argument, as to the statistical basis of probability, then recurred to
- the doctrine of social order. According to this doctrine, all social order
- depends on the statistical dominance in the environment of occasions be-
- longing [315] to the requisite societies. The laws of nature are statistical
- laws derived from this fact. Thus the judgment of probability can be
- derived from an intuition— in general vague and imprecise— as to the sta-
- tistical basis of the presupposed environment. This judgment can be de-
- rived from the analogy with the experienced environment. There will be
- such factors in experience adequate to justify a judgment of the inductive
- type.
- But there is another factor from which, in combination with the four
- premises, a non-statistical judgment of probability can be derived. The
- principle of the graduated 'intensive relevance' of eternal objects to the
- primary physical data of experience expresses a real fact as to the pref-
- erential adaptation of selected eternal objects to novel occasions originat-
- ing from an assigned environment.
- This principle expresses the prehension by every creature of the grad-
- uated order of appetitions constituting the primordial nature of God.
- There can thus be an intuition of an intrinsic suitability of some definite
- outcome from a presupposed situation. There will be nothing statistical in
- this suitability. It depends upon the fundamental graduation of appeti-
- tions which lies at the base of things, and which solves all indeterminations
- of transition.
- In this way, there can be an intuition of probability respecting the origi-
- nation of some novelty. It is evident that the statistical theory entirely
- fails to provide any basis for such judgments.
- It must not be thought that these non-statistical judgments are in any
- sense religious. They lie at a far lower level of experience than do the
- religious emotions. The secularization of the concept of God's functions
- in the world is at least as urgent a requisite of thought as is the seculariza-
- tion of other elements in experience. The concept of God is certainly one
- essential element in religious feeling. But the converse is not true; the
- concept of religious feeling is not an essential element in the con- [316] cept
- of God's function in the universe. In this respect religious literature has
- been sadly misleading to philosophic theory, partly by attraction and partly
- by repulsion.
- CHAPTER X
- PROCESS
- SECTION I
- [317] That all things flow' is the first vague generalization which the
- unsystematized, barely analysed, intuition of men has produced. It is the
- theme of some of the best Hebrew poetry in the Psalms; it appears as one
- of the first generalizations of Greek philosophy in the form of the saying
- of Heraclitus; amid the later barbarism of Anglo-Saxon thought it reappears
- in the story of the sparrow flitting through the banqueting? hall of the
- Northumbrian king; and in all stages of civilization its recollection lends
- its pathos to poetry. Without doubt, if we are to go back to that ultimate,
- integral experience, unwarped by the sophistications of theory, that ex-
- perience whose elucidation is the final aim of philosophy, the flux of things
- is one ultimate generalization around which we must weave our philo-
- sophical system.
- At this point we have transformed the phrase, 'all things flow/ into the
- alternative phrase, 'the flux of things.' In so doing, the notion of the 'flux'
- has been held up before our thoughts as one primary notion for further
- analysis. But in the sentence 'all things flow,' there are three words— and
- we have started by isolating the last word of the three. We move back-
- ward to the next word 'things' and ask. What sort of things flow? Finally
- we reach the first word 'all' and ask, What is the meaning of the 'many'
- things engaged in this common flux, and in what sense, if any, can the
- word 'all' refer to a definitely indicated set of these many things?
- The elucidation of meaning involved in the phrase 'all things flow't is
- one chief task of metaphysics.
- [318] But there is a rival notion, antithetical to the former. I cannot
- at the moment recall one immortal phrase which expresses it with the
- same completeness as that with which! the alternative notion has been
- rendered by Heraclitus. This other notion dwells on permanences of
- things— the solid earth, the mountains, the stones, the Egyptian Pyramids,
- the spirit of man, God,
- The best rendering of integral experience, expressing its general form
- divested of irrelevant details, is often to be found in the utterances of
- religious aspiration. One of the reasons of the thinness of so much modern
- metaphysics is its neglect of this wealth of expression of ultimate feeling.
- 208
- Process 209
- Accordingly we find in the first two lines of a famous hymn a full ex-
- pression of the union of the two notions in one integral experience:
- Abide with me;
- Fast falls the eventide.
- Here the first line expresses the permanences, 'abide/ 'me' and the 'Being'
- addressed; and the second line sets these permanences amid the inescapable
- flux. Here at length we find formulated the complete problem of meta-
- physics. Those philosophers who start with the first line have given us the
- metaphysics of 'substance 7 ; and those who start with the second line have
- developed the metaphysics of 'flux/ But, in truth, the two lines cannot be
- torn apart in this way; and we find that a wavering balance between the
- two is a characteristic of the greater number of philosophers. Plato found
- his permanences in a static, spiritual heaven, and his flux in the entangle-
- ment of his forms amid the fluent imperfections of the physical world.
- Here I draw attention to the word 'imperfection/ In any assertion as to
- Plato I speak under correction; but I believe that Plato's authority can be
- claimed for the doctrine that the things that flow are imperfect in the
- sense of 'limited' and of 'definitely exclusive of much that they might be
- and are not/ The lines quoted from the hymn are an almost perfect
- expres- [3 J 9] sion of the direct intuition from which the main position of
- the Platonic philosophy is derived. Aristotle corrected his Platonism into
- a somewhat different! balance. He was the apostle of 'substance and at-
- tribute/ and of the classifies tory logic which this notion suggests. But, on
- the other side, he makes a masterly analysis of the notion of 'generation/
- Aristotle in his own person expressed a useful protest against the Platonic
- tendency to separate a static spiritual world from a fluent world of super-
- ficial experience. The later Platonic schools stressed this tendency: just as
- the mediaeval Aristotelian thought allowed the static notions of Aristotle's
- logic to formulate some of the main metaphysical problems in terms which
- have lasted till today.
- On the whole, the history of philosophy supports Bergson's charge that
- the human intellect 'spatializes the universe'; that is to say, that it tends
- to ignore the fluency, and to analyse the world in terms of static categories.
- Indeed Bergson went further and conceived this tendency as an inherent
- necessity of the intellect. I do not believe this accusation; but I do hold
- that 'spatialization' is the shortest route to a clear-cut philosophy expressed
- in reasonably familiar language. Descartes gave an almost perfect example
- of such a system of thought. The difficulties of Cartesianism with its
- three clear-cut substances, and with its 'duration' and 'measured time'
- well in the background, illustrate the result of the subordination of fluency.
- This subordination is to be found in the unanalysed longing of the hymn,
- in Plato's vision of heavenly perfection, in Aristotle's logical concepts,
- and in Descartes' mathematical mentality. Newton, that Napoleon of the
- world of thought, brusquely ordered fluency back into the world, regi-
- 210 Discussions and Applications
- merited into his 'absolute mathematical time, flowing equably without
- regard to anything external/ He also gave it a mathematical uniform in
- the shape of his Theory of Fluxions.
- At this point the group of seventeenth- and eighteenth- [320] century
- philosophers practically made a discovery, which, although it lies on the
- surface of their writings, they only half-realized. The discovery is that
- there are two kinds of fluency. One kind is the concrescence\ which, in
- Locke's language, is 'the real internal constitution of a particular existent/
- The other kind is the transition from particular existent to particular
- existent. This transition, again in Locke's language, is the 'perpetually
- perishing' which is one aspect of the notion of time; and in another aspect
- the transition is the origination of the present in conformity with the
- 'power' of the past.
- The phrase 'the real internal constitution of a particular existent/ the
- description of the human understanding as a process of reflection upon
- data, the phrase 'perpetually perishing/ and the word 'power' together
- with its elucidation are all to be found in Locke's Essay. Yet owing to the
- limited scope of his investigation Locke did not generalize or put his
- scattered ideas together. This implicit notion of the two kinds of flux finds
- further unconscious illustration in Hume, It is all but explicit in Kant,
- though— as I think— misdescribed. Finally, it is lost in the evolutionary
- monism of Hegel and of his derivative schools. With all his inconsistencies,
- Locke is the philosopher to whom it is most useful to recur, when we de-
- sire to make explicit the discovery of the two kinds of fluency, required for
- the description of the fluent world. One kind is the fluency inherent in the
- constitution of the particular existent. This kind I have called 'concres-
- cence.' The other kind is the fluency whereby the perishing of the process,
- on the completion of the particular existent, constitutes that existent as
- an original element in the constitutions of other particular existents
- elicited by repetitions of process. This kind I have called 'transition/ Con-
- crescence moves towards its final cause, which is its subjective aim; transi-
- tion is the vehicle of the efficient cause, which is the immortal past.
- The discussion of how the actual particular occasions become original
- elements for a new creation is termed [32 1] the theory of objectifi cation.
- The objectified particular occasions together have the unity of a datum for
- the creative concrescence. But in acquiring this measure of connection,
- their inherent presuppositions of each other eliminate certain elements
- in their constitutions, and elicit into relevance other elements. Thus ob-
- jectification is an operation of mutually adjusted abstraction, or elimina-
- tion, whereby the many occasions of the actual world become one complex
- datum. This fact of the elimination by reason of synthesis is sometimes
- termed the perspective of the actual world from the standpoint of
- that concrescence. Each actual occasion defines its own actual world
- from which it originates. No two occasions can have identical actual
- worlds.
- Process 211
- SECTION II
- 'Concrescence' is the name for the process in which the universe of
- many things acquires an individual unity in a determinate relegation of
- each item of the 'many' to its subordination in the constitution of the
- novel 'one/
- The most general term 'thing'— or, equivalently, 'entity'— means nothing
- else than to be one of the 'many' which find their niches in each instance
- of concrescence. Each instance of concrescence is itself the novel indi-
- vidual 'thing' in question. There are not 'the concrescence' and 'the! novel
- thing': when we analyse the novel thing we find nothing but the concres-
- cence. 'Actuality' means nothing else than this ultimate entry into the
- concrete, in abstraction from which there is mere nonentity. In other
- words, abstraction from the notion of 'entry into the concrete' is a self-
- contradictory notion, since it asks us to conceive a thing as not a thing.
- An instance of concrescence is termed an 'actual entity'— or, equiva-
- lently, an 'actual occasion.' There is not one completed set of things which
- are actual occasions. For the fundamental inescapable fact is the creativity
- [322] in virtue of which there can be no 'many things' which are not sub-
- ordinated in a concrete unity. Thus a set of all actual occasions is by the
- nature of things a standpoint for another concrescence which elicits a con-
- crete unity from those many actual occasions. Thus we can never survey
- the actual world except from the standpoint of an immediate concrescence
- which is falsifying the presupposed completion. The creativity in virtue of
- which any relative** complete actual world is, by the nature of things, the
- datum for a new concrescencet is termed 'transition.' Thus, by reason of
- transition, 'the actual world' is always a relative term, and refers to that
- basis of presupposed actual occasions which is a datum for the novel
- concrescence.
- An actual occasion is analysable. The analysis discloses operations trans-
- forming entities which are individually alien t into components of a com-
- plex which is concretely one. The term 'feeling' will be used as the generic
- description of such operations. We thus say that an actual occasion is a
- concrescence effected by a process of feelings.
- A feeling can be considered in respect to (i) the actual occasions felt,
- (ii) the eternal objects felt, (hi) the feelings felt, and (iv) its own sub-
- jective forms of intensity. In the process of concrescence the diverse feel-
- ings pass on to wider generalities of integral feeling.
- Such a wider generality is a feeling of a complex of feelings, including
- their specific elements of identity and contrast. This process of the integra-
- tion of feeling proceeds until the concrete unity of feeling is obtained. In
- this concrete unity all indetermination as to the realization of possibilities
- has been eliminated. The many entities of the universe, including those
- originating in the concrescence itself, find their respective roles in this
- 212 Discussions and Applications
- final unity. This final unity is termed the 'satisfaction.' The 'satisfaction'
- is the culmination of the concrescence into a completely determinate
- matter of fact. In any of its antecedent stages the concrescence exhibits
- sheer inde- [323] termination as to the nexus between its many components.
- SECTION III
- An actual occasion is nothing but the unity to be ascribed to a particular
- instance of concrescence. This concrescence is thus nothing else than the
- 'real internal constitution' of the actual occasion in question. The analysis
- of the formal constitution of an actual entity has given three stages in the
- process of feeling: (i) the responsive phase, (ii) the supplemental stage,
- and (hi) the satisfaction.
- The satisfaction is merely the culmination marking the evaporation of
- all indetermination; so that, in respect to all modes of feeling and to all
- entities in the universe, the satisfied actual entity embodies a determinate
- attitude of 'yes' or 'no/ Thus the satisfaction is the attainment of the
- private ideal which is the final cause of the concrescence. But the process
- itself lies in the two former phases. The first phase is the phase of pure
- reception of the actual world in its guise of objective datum for aesthetic
- synthesis. In this phase there is the mere reception of the actual world as
- a multiplicity of private centres of feeling, implicated in a nexus of mutual
- presupposition. The feelings are felt as belonging to the external centres,
- and are not absorbed into the private immediacy. The second stage is
- governed by the private ideal, gradually shaped in the process itself;
- whereby the many feelings, derivatively felt as alien, are transformed into
- a unity of aesthetic appreciation immediately felt as private. This is the
- incoming of 'appetition/ which in its higher exemplifications we term
- 'vision.' In the language of physical science, the 'scalar' form overwhelms
- the original 'vector' form: the origins become subordinate to the individual
- experience. The vector form is not lost, but is submerged as the founda-
- tion of the scalar superstructure.
- In this second stage the feelings assume an emotional [324] character
- by reason of this influx of conceptual feelings. But the reason why the
- origins are not lost in the private emotion is that there is no element in
- the universe capable of pure privacy. If we could obtain a complete analy-
- sis of meaning, the notion of pure privacy would be seen to be self-
- contradictory. Emotional feeling is still subject to the third metaphysical
- principle,** that to be 'something' is 'to have the potentiality for acquiring
- real unity with other entities.' Hence, 'to be a real component of an actual
- entity' is in some way 'to realize this potentiality.' Thus 'emotion' is 'emo-
- tional feeling ; and Vhat is felt' is the presupposed vector situation. In
- physical science this principle takes the form which should never be lost
- sight of in fundamental speculation, that scalar quantities are constructs
- derivative from vector quantities. In more familiar language, this prin-
- Process 213
- ciple can be expressed by the statement that the notion of 'passing on' is
- more fundamental than that of a private individual fact. In the abstract
- language here adopted for metaphysical statement, 'passing on 7 becomes
- 'creativity/ in the dictionary sense of the verb create, 'to bring forth, beget,
- produce/ Thus, according to the third principle, no entity can be divorced
- from the notion of creativity. An entity is at least a particular form
- capable of infusing its own particularity into creativity. An actual entity,
- or a phase of an actual entity, is more than that; but, at least, it is that.
- Locke's 'particular ideas' are merely the antecedent actual entities exer-
- cising their function of infusing with their own particularity the 'passing
- on/t which is the primary phase of the 'real internal constitution' of the
- actual entity in question. In obedience to a prevalent misconception,
- 'Locke termed this latter entity the 'mind'; and discussed its 'furniture/
- when he should have discussed 'mental operations' in their capacity of
- later phases in the constitutions of actual entities. Locke himself flittingly
- expresses this fundamental vector function of his 'ideas/ In a paragraph,
- forming a portion of a quotation already [325] made, he writes: "I confess
- power includes in it some kind of relation,— a relation to action or change;
- as, indeed, which of our ideas, of what kind soever, when attentively con-
- sidered, does not?" x
- SECTION IV
- The second phase, that of supplementation, divides itself into two
- subordinate phases. Both of these phases may be trivial; also they are not
- truly separable, since they interfere with each other by intensification or
- inhibition. If both phases are trivial, the whole second phase is merely the
- definite negation of individual origination; and the process passes passively
- to its satisfaction. The actual entity is then the mere vehicle for the trans-
- ference of inherited constitutions of feeling. Its private immediacy passes
- out of the picture. Of these two sub-phases, the former— so far as there is
- an order— is that of aesthetic supplement, and the latter is that of intel-
- lectual supplement.
- In the aesthetic supplement there is an emotional appreciation of the
- contrasts and rhythms inherent in the unification of the objective content
- in the concrescence of one actual occasion. In this phase perception is
- heightened by its assumption of pain and pleasure, beauty and distaste.
- It is the phase of inhibitions and intensifications. It is the phase in which
- blue becomes more intense by reason of its contrasts, and shape acquires
- dominance by reason of its loveliness. What was received as alien, has
- been recreated as private. This is the phase of perceptivity, including
- emotional reactions to perceptivity. In this phase, private immediacy has
- welded the data into a new fact of blind feeling. Pure aesthetic supple-
- 1 Essay, II, XXI, 3.t
- 214 Discussions and Applications
- ment has solved its problem. This phase requires an influx of conceptual
- feelings and their integration with the pure physical feelings .
- But 'blindness' of the process, so far, retains an indetermination. There
- must be either a determinate nega- [326] tion of intellectual 'sight/ or an
- admittance of intellectual 'sight/ The negationt of intellectual sight is
- the dismissal into irrelevancet of eternal objects in their abstract status of
- pure potentials. 'What might be' has the capability of relevant contrast
- with 'what is/ If the pure potentials, in this abstract capacity, are dis-
- missed from relevance, the second sub-phase is trivial. The process then
- constitutes a blind actual occasion, 'blind' in the sense that no intellectual
- operations are involved; though conceptual operations are always involved.
- Thus there is always mentality in the form of 'vision/ but not always
- mentality in the form of conscious 'intellectuality/
- But if some eternal objects, in their abstract capacity, are realized as
- relevant to actual fact, there is an actual occasion with intellectual opera-
- tions. The complex of such intellectual operations is sometimes termed the
- 'mind' of the actual occasion; and the actual occasion is also termed
- 'conscious/ But the term 'mind' conveys the suggestion of independent
- substance. This is not meant here: a better term is the 'consciousness'
- belonging to the actual occasion.
- An eternal object realized in respect to its pure potentiality as related
- to determinate logical subjects is termed a 'prepositional feeling' in the
- mentality of the actual occasion in question. The consciousness belonging
- to an actual occasion is its sub-phase of intellectual supplementation, when
- that sub-phase is not purely trivial. This sub-phase is the eliciting, into
- feeling, oft the full contrast between mere propositional potentiality and
- realized fact.
- SECTION V
- To sum up: There are two species of process, macroscopic! process, and
- microscopic process. The macroscopic process is the transition from at-
- tained actuality to actuality in attainment; while the microscopic process
- is the conversion of conditions which are merely real into determinate
- actuality. The former process effects the [327] transition from the 'actual'
- to the 'merely real'; and the latter process effects the growth from the real
- to the actual. The former process is efficient; the latter process ist teleo-
- logical. The future is merely real, without being actual; whereas the past
- is a nexus of actualities. The actualities are constituted by their real genetic
- phases. The present is the immediacy of teleological process whereby
- reality becomes actual. The former process provides the conditions which
- really govern attainment; whereas the latter process provides the ends
- actually attained. The notion of 'organism' is combined with that of
- 'process' in a twofold manner. The community of actual things is an
- organism; but it is not a static organism. It is an incompletion in process
- Process 215
- of production. Thus the expansion of the universe in respect to actual
- things is the first meaning of 'process'; and the universe in any stage of
- its expansion is the first meaning of 'organism/ In this sense, an organism
- is a nexus.
- Secondly, each actual entity is itself only describable as an organic pro-
- cess. It repeats in microcosm what the universe is in macrocosm. It is a
- process proceeding from phase to phase, each phase being the real basis
- from which its successor proceeds towards the completion of the thing
- in question. Each actual entity bears in its constitution the 'reasons' why
- its conditions are what they are. These 'reasons' are the other actual en-
- tities objectified for it.
- An 'object' is a transcendent element characterizing that definiteness
- to which our 'experience' has to conform. In this sense, the future has
- objective reality in the present, but no formal actuality. For it is inherent
- in the constitution of the immediate, present actuality that a future will
- supersede it. Also conditions to which that future must conform, includ-
- ing real relationships to the present, are really objective in the immediate
- actuality.
- Thus each actual entity, although complete so far as concerns its micro-
- scopic process, is yet incomplete by reason of its objective inclusion of
- the macroscopicf [328] process. It really experiences a future which must
- be actual, although the completed actualities of that future are undeter-
- mined. In this sense, each actual occasion experiences its own objective
- immortality.
- Note. — The function here ascribed to an 'object' is in general agreement with
- a paragraph (p. 249, 2nd! edition) in Professor Kemp Smith's Commentary on
- Kant's Critique, where he is considering Kant's 'Objective Deduction' as in the
- first edition of the Critique: "When we examine the objective, we find that the
- primary characteristic distinguishing it from the subjective is that it lays a com-
- pulsion upon our minds, constraining us to think about it in a certain way. By
- an object is meant something which will not allow us to think at haphazard."
- There is of course the vital difference, among others, that where Kemp Smith,
- expounding Kant, writes 'thinking/ the philosophy of organism substitutes
- 'experiencing.'
- PART III
- THE THEORY OF PREHENSIONS
- CHAPTER I
- THE THEORY OF FEELINGS
- SECTION I
- [334] The philosophy of organism is a cell-theory of actuality. Each ul-
- timate unit of fact is a cell-complex, not analysable into components with
- equivalent completeness of actuality.
- The cell can be considered genetically and morphologically. The ge-
- netic theoryt is considered in this part; [335] the morphological theory is
- considered in Part IV, under the title of the 'extensive analysis' of an
- actual entity.
- In the genetic theory, the cell is exhibited as appropriating for the
- foundation of its own existence, the various elements of the universe out
- of which it arises. Each process of appropriation of a particular element
- is termed a prehension. The ultimate elements of the universe, thus ap-
- propriated, are the already constituted! actual entities, and the eternal
- objects. All the actual entities are positively prehended, but only a selec-
- tion of the eternal objects. In the course of the integrations of these
- various prehensions, entities of other categoreal types become relevant;
- and some new entities of these types, such as novel propositions and
- generic contrasts, come into existence. These relevant entities of these
- other types are also prehended into the constitution of the concrescent
- cell. This genetic process has now to be traced in its main outlines.
- An actual entity is a process in the course of which many operations
- with incomplete subjective unity terminate in a completed unity of opera-
- tion, termed the 'satisfaction/ The 'satisfaction' is the contentment of
- the creative urge by the fulfilment of its categoreal demands. The analysis
- of these categories is one aim of metaphysics.
- The process itself is the constitution of the actual entity; in Locke's
- phrase, it is the 'real internal constitution' of the actual entity. In the
- older phraseology employed by Descartes, the process is what the actual
- entity is in itself, Jormaliter. 7 The terms 'formal' and 'formally' are here
- used in this sense.
- The terminal unity of operation, here called the 'satisfaction/ embodies
- what the actual entity is beyond itself. In Locke's phraseology, the 'powers'
- of the actual entity are discovered in the analysis of the satisfaction. In
- Descartes' phraseology, the satisfaction is the actual entity considered as
- analysable in respect to its existence [336] 'objective,'* It is the actual
- entity as a definite, determinate, settled fact, stubborn and with unavoid-
- 219
- 220 The Theory of Prehensions
- able consequences. The actual entity as described by the morphology of
- its satisfaction is the actual entity 'spatialized/ to use Bergson's term. The
- actual entity, thus spatialized, is at given individual fact actuated by its
- own 'substantial form/ Its own process, which is its own internal existence,
- has evaporated, worn out and satisfied; but its effects are all to be described
- in terms of its "satisfaction/ The 'effects' of an actual entity are its in-
- terventions in concrescent processes other than its own. Any entity, thus
- intervening in processes transcending itself, is said to be functioning as an
- 'object/ According to the fourth Category of Explanation it is the one
- general metaphysical character of all entities of all sorts, that they function
- as objects. It is this metaphysical character which constitutes the solidarity
- of the universe. The peculiarity of an actual entity is that it can be con-
- sidered both 'objectively' and 'formally/ The 'objective' aspect is mor-
- phological so far as that actual entity is concerned: by this it is meant
- that the process involved is transcendent relatively to it, so that the esse
- of its satisfaction is sentiri. The 'formal' aspect is functional so far as that
- actual entity is concerned: by this it is meant that the process involved is
- immanent in it. But the objective consideration is pragmatic. It is the
- consideration of the actual entity in respect to its consequences. In the
- present chapter the emphasis is laid upon the formal consideration of an
- actual entity. But this formal consideration of one actual entity requires
- reference to the objective intervention of other actual entities. This ob-
- jective intervention of other entities constitutes the creative character
- which conditions the concrescence in question. The satisfaction of each
- actual entity is an element in the givenness of the universe: it limits bound-
- less, abstract possibility into the particular real potentiality from which
- each novel concrescence originates. The 'boundless, abstract possibility'
- means the creativity [337] considered solely in reference to the possibilities
- of the intervention of eternal objects, and in abstraction from the ob-
- jective intervention of actual entities belonging to any definite actual
- world, including God among the actualities abstracted from.
- SECTION II
- The possibility of finite truths depends on the fact that the satisfaction
- of an actual entity is divisible into a variety of determinate operations.
- The operations are 'prehensions/ But the negative prehensions which con-
- sist of exclusions from contribution to the concrescence can be treated
- in their subordination to the positive prehensions. These positive prehen-
- sions are termed 'feelings/ The process of concrescence is divisible into
- an initial stage of many feelings, and a succession of subsequent phases
- of more complex feelings integrating the earlier simpler feelings, up to
- the satisfaction which is one complex unity of feeling. This is the genetic'
- analysis of the satisfaction. Its 'coordinate' analysis will be given later,
- in Part IV.
- The Theory of Feelings 221
- Thus a component feeling in the satisfaction is to be assigned, for its
- origination, to an earlier phase of the concrescence.
- This is the general description of the divisible character of the satis-
- faction, from the genetic standpoint. The extensiveness which underlies
- the spatio-temporal relations of the universe is another outcome of this
- divisible character. Also the abstraction from its own full formal consti-
- tution involved in objectifications of one actual entity in the constitu-
- tions of other actual entities equally depends upon this same divisible
- character, whereby the actual entity is conveyed in the particularity of
- some one of its feelings. A feeling— i.e., a positive prehension — is essen-
- tially a transition effecting a concrescence. Its complex constitution is
- analysable into five factors which express what that transition consists of,
- and effects. The factors are: (i) the 'subject' which feels, (ii) the 'initial
- [338] data' which are to be felt, (iii) the 'elimination' in virtue of nega-
- tive prehensions, (iv) the 'objective datum 7 which is felt, (v) the 'sub-
- jective form* which is how that subject feels that objective datum.
- A feeling is in all respects determinate, with a determinate subject,
- determinate initial data, determinate negative prehensions, a determinate
- objective datum, and a determinate subjective form. There is a transition
- from the initial data to the objective datum effected by the elimination.
- The initial data constitute a 'multiplicity/ or merely one 'proper' entity,
- while the objective datum is a 'nexus/ a proposition, or a 'proper' entity
- of some categoreal type. There is a concrescence of the initial data into the
- objective datum, made possible by the elimination, and effected by the
- subjective form. The objective datum is the perspective of the initial data.i
- The subjective form receives its determination from the negative prehen-
- sions, the objective datum, and the conceptual origination of the subject.
- The negative prehensions are determined by the categoreal conditions
- governing feelings, by the subjective form, and by the initial data. This
- mutual determination of the elements involved in a feeling is one expres-
- sion of the truth that the subject of the feeling is causa sui. The partial
- nature of a feeling, other than the complete satisfaction, is manifest by the
- impossibility of understanding its generation without recourse to the whole
- subject. There is a mutual sensitivity of feelings in one subject, governed by
- categoreal conditions. This mutual sensitivity expresses the notion of final
- causation in the guise of a pre-established harmony.
- SECTION III
- A feeling cannot be abstracted from the actual entity entertaining it.
- This actual entity is termed the 'subject' of the feeling. It is in virtue of
- its subject that the feeling is one thing. If we abstract the subject from
- the feeling we are left with many things. Thus a feeling is [339] a particu-
- lar in the same sense in which each actual entity is a particular. It is one
- aspect of its own subject.
- 222 The Theory of Prehensions
- The term 'subject' has been retained because in this sense it is familiar
- in philosophy. But it is misleading. The term 'superject* would be better.
- The subject-superject is the purpose of the process originating the feelings.
- The feelings are inseparable from the end at which they aim; and this end
- is the feeler. The feelings aim at the feeler, as their final cause. The feelings
- are what they are in order that their subject may be what it is. Then
- transcendently, since the subject is what it is in virtue of its feelings, it is
- only by means of its feelings that the subject objectively conditions the
- creativity transcendent beyond itself. In our own relatively high grade
- of human existence, this doctrine of feelings and their subject is best il-
- lustrated by our notion of moral responsibility. The subject is responsible
- for being what it is in virtue of its feelings. It is also derivatively respon-
- sible for the consequences of its existence because they flow from its
- feelings.
- If the subject-predicate form of statement be taken to be metaphysically
- ultimate, it is then impossible to express this doctrine of feelings and their
- superject. It is better to say that the feelings aim at their subject, than
- to say that they are aimed at their subject. For the latter mode of expres-
- sion removes the subject from the scope of the feeling and assigns it to
- an external agency. Thus the feeling would be wrongly abstracted from its
- own final cause. This final cause is an inherent element in the feeling,
- constituting the unity of that feeling. An actual entity feels as it does
- feel in order to be the actual entity which it is. In this way an actual en-
- tity satisfies Spinoza's notion of substance: it is causa sui. The creativity
- is not an external agency with its own ulterior purposes. All actual entities
- share with God this characteristic of self-causation. For this reason every
- actual entity also shares with God the characteristic of transcending all
- other actual entities, including God. The [340] universe is thus a creative
- advance into novelty. The alternative to this doctrine is a static morpho-
- logical universe.
- SECTION IV
- There are three main categoreal conditions which flow from the final
- nature of things. These three conditions are: (i) the Category of Subjective
- Unity, (ii) the Category of Objective Identity, and (iii) the Category of
- Objective Diversity. Later we shall isolate five** other categoreal conditions.
- But the three conditions mentioned above have an air of ultimate meta-
- physical generality.
- The first category has to do with self-realization. Self-realization is the
- ultimate fact of facts. An actuality is self-realizing, and whatever is self-
- realizing is an actuality. An actual entity is at once the subject of self-
- realization, and the superject which is self-realized.
- The second and third categories have to do with objective determina-
- tion. All entities, including even other actual entities, enter into the self-
- realization of an actuality in the capacity of determinants of the definite-
- The Theory of Feelings 223
- ness of that actuality. By reason of this objective functioning of entities
- there is truth and falsehood. For every actuality is devoid of a shadow of
- ambiguity: it is exactly what it is, by reason of its objective definition at
- the hands of other entities. In abstraction from actualization, truth and
- falsehood are meaningless: we are in the region of nonsense, a limbo where
- nothing has any claim to existence. But definition is the soul of actuality:
- the attainment of a peculiar definiteness is the final cause which animates
- a particular process; and its attainment halts its process, so that by tran-
- scendence it passes into its objective immortality as a new objective con-
- dition added to the riches of definiteness attainable, the 'real potentiality'
- of the universe.
- A distinction must here be made. Each task of creation is a social effort,
- employing the whole universe. Each novel actuality is a new partner add-
- ing a new con- [341] dition. Every new condition can be absorbed into ad-
- ditional fullness of attainment. On the other hand, each condition is ex-
- clusive, intolerant of diversities; except so far as it finds itself in a web
- of conditions which convert its exclusions into contrasts. A new actuality
- may appear in the wrong society, amid which its claims to efficacy act
- mainly as inhibitions. Then a weary task is set for creative function, by an
- epoch of new creations to remove the inhibition. Insistence on birth at
- the wrong season is the trick of evil. In other words, the novel fact may
- throw back, inhibit, and delay. But the advance, when it does arrive, will
- be richer in content, more fully conditioned, and more stable. For in its
- objective efficacy an actual entity can only inhibit by reason of its alterna-
- tive positive contribution.
- A chain of facts is like a barrier reef. On one side there is wreckage,
- and beyond it harbourage and safety. The categories governing the deter-
- mination of things are the reasons why there should be evil; and are also
- the reasons why, in the advance of the world, particular evil facts are finally
- transcended.
- SECTION V
- Category I. The many feelings which belong to an incomplete phase in
- the process of an actual entity, though unintegrated by reason of the in-
- completeness of the phase, are compatible for synthesis by reason of the
- unity of their subject.
- This is the Category of 'Subjective Unity/ This category is one expression
- of the general principle that the one subject is the final end which condi-
- tions each component feeling. Thus the superject is already present as a
- condition, determining how each feeling conducts its own process. Al-
- though in any incomplete phase there are many unsynthesized feelings,
- yet each of these feelings is conditioned by the other feelings. The process
- of each feeling is such as to render that feeling integrable with the other
- feelings.
- [342] This Category of Subjective Unity is the reason why no feeling can
- 224 The Theory of Prehensions
- be abstracted from its subject. For the subject is at work in the feeling, in
- order that it may be the subject with that feeling. The feeling is an epi-
- sode in self-production, and is referent to its aim. This aim is a certain
- definite unity with its companion feelings.
- This doctrine of the inherence of the subject in the process of its pro-
- duction requires that in the primary phase of the subjective process there
- be a conceptual feeling of subjective aim: the physical and other feelings
- originate as steps towards realizing this conceptual aim through their
- treatment of initial data. This basic conceptual feeling suffers simplifica-
- tion in the successive phases of the concrescence. It starts with conditioned
- alternatives, and by successive decisions is reduced to coherence. The doc-
- trine of responsibility is entirely concerned with this modification. In each
- phase the corresponding conceptual feeling is the 'subjective end* charac-
- teristic of that phase. The many feelings, in any incomplete phase, are
- necessarily compatible with each other by reason of their individual con-
- formity to the subjective end evolved for that phase.
- This Category of Subjective Unity is a doctrine of pre-established har-
- mony, applied to the many feelings in an incomplete phase. If we recur
- therefore to the seven kinds of 'proper' entities, and ask how to classify
- an incomplete phase, we find that it has the unity of a proposition. In ab-
- straction from the creative urge by which each such phase is merely an
- incident in a process, this phase is merely a proposition about its com-
- ponent feelings and their ultimate superject. The pre-established harmony
- is the self-consistency of this proposition, that is to say, its capacity for
- realization. But such abstraction from the process does violence to its
- nature; for the phase is an incident in the process. When we try to do
- justice to this aspect of the phase, we must say that it is a proposition
- seeking truth. It is a lure to the supervention of those integrating feel-
- ings by which the mere [343] potentiality of the proposition, with its out-
- standing indeterminations as to its setting amid the details of the universe,
- is converted intof the fully determinate actuality.
- The ground, or origin, of the concrescent process! is the multiplicity
- of data in the universe, actual entities and eternal objects and propositions
- and nexus. Each new phase in the concrescence means the retreat of mere
- propositional unity before the growing grasp of real unity of feeling. Each
- successive propositional phase is a lure to the creation of feelings which
- promote its realization. Each temporal entity, in one sense, originates from
- its mental pole, analogously to God himself. It derives from God its basic
- conceptual aim, relevant to its actual world, yet with indeterminations
- awaiting its own decisions. This subjective aim, in its successive modifi-
- cations, remains the unifying factor governing the successive phases of
- interplay between physical and conceptual feelings. These decisions are
- impossible for the nascent creature antecedently to the novelties in the
- phases of its concrescence. But this statement in its turn requires amplifi-
- The Theory of Feelings 225
- cation. With this amplification the doctrine, that the primary phase of a
- temporal actual entity is physical, is recovered. A 'physical feeling' is here
- defined to be the feeling of another actuality. If the other actuality be
- objectified by its conceptual feelings, the physical feeling of the subject
- in question is termed 'hybrid/ Thus the primary phase is a hybrid physical
- feeling of God, in respect to God's conceptual feeling which is immedi-
- ately relevant to the universe 'given' for that concrescence. There is then,
- according to the Category of Conceptual Valuation, i.e., Categoreal Obliga-
- tion IV, a derived conceptual feeling which reproduces for the subject the
- data and valuation of God's conceptual feeling. This conceptual feeling
- is the initial conceptual aim referred to in the preceding statement. In this
- sense, God can be termed the creator of each temporal actual entity. But
- the phrase is apt to be misleading by [344] its suggestion that the ultimate
- creativity of the universe is to be ascribed to God's volition. The true
- metaphysical position is that God is the aboriginal instance of this creativ-
- ity, and is therefore the aboriginal condition which qualifies its action. It
- is the function of actuality to characterize the creativity, and God is the
- eternal primordial character. But,t of course, there is no meaning to
- 'creativity' apart from its 'creatures,' and no meaning to 'God' apart from
- the 'creativity' and the 'temporal creatures,' and no meaning to the 'tem-
- poral creatures' t apart from 'creativity' and 'God.'
- Category II. There can be no duplication of any element in the ob-
- jective datum of the satisfaction of an actual entity, so far as concerns the
- function of that element in that satisfaction.
- This is the 'Category of Objective Identity.' This category asserts the es-
- sential self-identity of any entity as regards its status in each individuali-
- zation of the universe. In such a concrescence one thing has one rdle,
- and cannot assume any duplicity. This is the very meaning of self-identity,
- that, in any actual confrontation of thing with thing, one thing cannot
- confront itself in alien rdles. Any one thing remains obstinately itself
- playing a part with self-consistent unity. This category is one ground of
- incompatibility.
- Category III. There can be no 'coalescence' of diverse elements in the
- objective datum of an actual entity, so far as concerns the functions of
- those elements in that satisfaction.
- This is the 'Category of Objective Diversity.' Here* the term 'coalescence'
- means the self-contradictory notion of diverse elements exercising an ab-
- solute identity of function, devoid of the contrasts inherent in their di-
- versities. In other words, in a real complex unity each particular component
- imposes its own particularity on its status. No entity can have an abstract
- status in a real unity. Its status must be such that only it can fill and only
- that actuality can supply.
- [345] The neglect of this category is a prevalent error in metaphysical
- reasoning. This category is another ground of incompatibility.
- 226 The Theory of Prehensions
- SECTION VI
- The importance of these categories can only be understood by consider-
- ing each actual world in the light of a 'medium' leading up to the con-
- crescence of the actual entity in question. It will be remembered that the
- phrase actual world' has always reference to some one concrescence.
- Any actual entity, which we will name A, feels other actual entities, f
- which we will name B, C, and D. Thus B, C, and D all lie in the actual
- world of A. But C and D may lie in the actual world of B, and are then
- felt by it; also D may lie in the actual world of C and be felt by it. This
- example might be simplified, or might be changed to one of any degree of
- complication. Now B, as an initial datum for A's feeling, also presents C
- and D for A to feel through its mediation. Also C, as an initial datum for
- A ? s feeling, also presents D for A to feel through its mediation. Thus, in
- this artificially simplified example, A has D presented for feeling through
- three distinct sources: (i) directly as a crude datum, (ii) by the mediation
- of B, and (iii) by the mediation of C. This threefold presentation is D, in
- its function of an initial datum for A's feeling of it, so far as concerns the
- mediation of B and C. But, of course, the artificial simplification of the
- medium to two intermediaries is very far from any real case. The medium
- between D and A consists of all those actual entities which lie in the
- actual world of A and not in the actual world of D. For the sake of sim-
- plicity the explanation will continue in terms of this threefold presen-
- tation.
- There are thus three sources of feeling, D direct, D in its nexus with
- C, and D in its nexus with B. Thus in the basic phase of A's concresence
- there arise three prehensions of the datum D. According to the first cate-
- gory [346] these prehensions are not independent. This subjective unity
- of the concrescence introduces negative prehensions, so that D in the di-
- rect feeling is not felt in its formal completeness, but objectified with the
- elimination of such of its prehensions as are inconsistent with D felt
- through the mediation of B, and through the mediation of C. Thus the
- three component feelings of the first phasef are consistent, so as to pass
- into the integration of the second phase in which there is A's one feeling
- of a coherent objectification of D. Since D is necessarily self-consistent,
- the inconsistencies must arise from the subjective forms of the prehen-
- sions of D by B directly, by C directly, and by A directly. These incon-
- sistencies lead to the eliminations in A's total prehension of D.
- In this process, the negative prehensions which effect the elimination are
- not merely negligible. The process through which a feeling passes in con-
- stituting itself! also records itself in the subjective form of the integral
- feeling. The negative prehensions have their own subjective forms which
- they contribute to the process. A feeling bears on itself the scars of its
- birth; it recollects as a subjective emotion its struggle for existence; it re-
- The Theory of Feelings 227
- tains the impress of what it might have been, but is not. It is for this
- reason that what an actual entity has avoided as a datum for feeling may
- yet be an important part of its equipment. The actual cannot be reduced
- to mere matter of fact in divorce from the potential.
- The same principle of explanation also holds in the case of a con-
- ceptual prehension, in which the datum is an eternal object. In the first
- phase of this conceptual prehension, there is this eternal object to be
- felt as a mere abstract capacity for giving definiteness to a physical feeling.
- But also there are the feelings of the objectifications of innumerable actual
- entities. Some of these physical feelings illustrate this same eternal object
- as an element providing their definiteness. There are in this way diverse
- prehensions of the same eternal object; and by the first category these
- various prehensions must be [347] consistent, so as to pass into the inte-
- gration of the subsequent phase in which there is one coherent complex
- feeling, namely, a conceptual feeling of that eternal object. This sub-
- jective insistence on consistency may, from the beginning, replace the
- positive feelings by negative prehensions.
- SECTION VII
- In the explanations of the preceding section, only the first category
- has been explicitly alluded to. It must now be pointed out how the other
- categories have been tacitly presupposed.
- The fact that there is integration at all arises from the condition ex-
- pressed by the Category of Objective Identity. The same entity, be it actual
- entity or be it eternal object, cannot be felt twice in the formal constitu-
- tion of one concrescence. The incomplete phases with their many feelings
- of one object are only to be interpreted in terms of the final satisfaction
- with its one feeling of that one object Thus objective identity requires
- integration of the many feelings of one object into the one feeling of
- that object. The analysis of an actual entity is only intellectual, or, to speak
- with a wider scope, only objective. Each actual entity is a cell with atomic
- unity. But in analysis it can only be understood as a process; it can only
- be felt as a process, that is to say, as in passage. The actual entity is divis-
- ible; but is in fact undivided. The divisibility can thus only refer to its
- objectifications in which it transcends itself. But such transcendence is
- self-revelation.
- [348] +The third category is concerned with the antithesis to oneness,
- namely, diversity. An actual entity is not merely one; it is also definitely
- complex. But, to be definitely complex is to include definite diverse ele-
- ments in definite ways. The category of objective deversity expresses the
- inexorable condition— that a complex unity must provide for each of its
- components a real diversity of status, with a reality which bears the same
- sense as its own reality and is peculiar to itself. In other words, a real unity
- cannot provide sham diversities of status for its diverse components.
- 228 The Theory of Prehensions
- This category is in truth only a particular application of the second
- category. For a 'status' is after all something; and, according to the Cate-
- gory of Objective Identity, it cannot duplicate its r61e. Thus if the 'status 7
- be the status of this, it cannot in the same sense be the status of that. The
- prohibition of sham diversities of status sweeps away the 'class-theory' t of
- particular substances, which was waveringly suggested by Locke (II,
- XXIII, 1), was more emphatically endorsed by Hume (Treatise, Bk. I,t
- Part I, Sect. 6), and has been adopted by Hume's followers. For the es-
- sence of a class is that it assigns no diversity of function to the members
- of its extension. The members of a class are diverse members in virtue
- of mere logical disjunction. The 'class/ thus appealed to, is a mere mul-
- tiplicity. But in the prevalent discussion of classes, there are illegitimate
- transitions to the notions of a 'nexus' and of a 'proposition.' The appeal to
- a class to perform the services of a proper entity is exactly analogous to
- an appeal to an imaginary terrier to kill a real rat.
- +Thus the process of integration, which lies at the very heart of the
- concrescence, is the urge imposed on the concrescent unity of that uni-
- verse by the three Categories of Subjective Unity, of Objective Identity, and
- of Objective Diversity. The oneness of the universe, and the oneness of
- each element in the universe, repeat themselves to the crack of doom in
- the creative advance from creature to creature, each creature including in
- itself the whole of history and exemplifying the self-identity of things and
- their mutual diversities.
- SECTION VIII
- This diversity of status, combined with the real unity of the components,
- means that the real synthesis of two component elements in the objective
- datum of a feeling [349] must be infected with the individual particulari-
- ties of each of the relata. Thus the synthesis in its completeness expresses
- the joint particularities of that pair of relata, and can relate no others. A
- complex entity with this individual definiteness, arising out of determinate-
- ness of eternal objects, will be termed a 'contrast/ A contrast cannot be
- abstracted from the contrasted relata.
- The most obvious examples of a contrast are to be found by confining
- attention purely to eternal objects. The contrast between blue and red
- cannot be repeated as that contrast between any other pair of colours,
- or any pair of sounds, or between a colour and a sound. It is just the con-
- trast between blue and red, that and nothing else. Certain abstractions from
- that contrast, certain values inherent in it, can also be got from other
- contrasts. But they are other contrasts, and not that contrast; and the
- abstractions are not 'contrasts' of the same categoreal type.
- In another sense, a 'nexus' falls under the meaning of the term 'con-
- trast'; though we shall avoid this application of the term. What are or-
- dinarily termed 'relations' are abstractions from contrasts. A relation can
- The Theory of Feelings 229
- be found in many contrasts; and when it is so found, it is said to relate
- the things contrasted. The term 'multiple contrast 7 will be used when
- there are or may be more than two elements jointly contrasted, and it is
- desired to draw attention to that fact. A multiple contrast is analysable
- into component dual contrasts. But a multiple contrast is not a mere ag-
- gregation of dual contrasts. It is one contrast, over and above its com-
- ponent contrasts. This doctrine that a multiple contrast cannot be con-
- ceived as a mere disjunction of dual contrasts is the basis of the doctrine
- of emergent evolution. It is the doctrine of real unities being more than
- a mere collective disjunction of component elements. This doctrine has
- the same ground as the objection to the class-theory of particular sub-
- stances. The doctrine is a commonplace of art.
- Bradley's discussions of relations are confused by his [350] failure to
- distinguish between relations and contrasts. A relation is a genus of con-
- trasts. He is then distressed— or would have been distressed if he had not
- been consoled by the notion of 'mereness' as in 'mere appearance'— to
- find that a relation will not do the work of a contrast. It fails to contrast.
- Thus Bradley's argument proves that relations, among other things, are
- 'mere'; that is to say, are indiscretions of the absolute, apings of reality
- without self-consistency.
- SECTION IX
- One use of the term 'contrast' is to mean that particularity of conjoint
- unity which arises from the realized togetherness of eternal objects. But
- there is another, and more usual, sense of 'particularity/ This is the sense
- in which the term 'particular' is applied to an actual entity.
- One actual entity has a status among other actual entities, not expres-
- sible wholly in terms of contrasts between eternal objects. For example,
- the complex nexus of ancient imperial Rome to European history is not
- wholly expressible in universals. It is not merely the contrast of a sort of
- city, imperial, Roman, ancient, with a sort of history of a sort of con-
- tinent, sea-indented, river-diversified, with alpine divisions, begirt by larger
- continental masses and oceanic wastes, civilized, barbarized, christianized,
- commercialized, industrialized. The nexus in question does involve such
- a complex contrast of universals. But it involves more. For it is the nexus
- of that Rome with that Europe. We cannot be conscious of this nexus
- purely by the aid of conceptual feelings. This nexus is implicit, below con-
- sciousness, in our physical feelings. In part we are conscious of such
- physical feelings, and of that particularity of the nexus between particular
- actual entities. This consciousness takes the form of our consciousness of
- particular spatial and temporal relations between things directly perceived.
- But, as in the case of Rome and Europe, so far as con- \3S1] cerns the mass
- of our far-reaching knowledge, the particular nexus between the partic-
- ular actualities in question ist only indicated by constructive reference
- to the physical feelings of which we are conscious.
- 230 The Theory of Prehensions
- This peculiar particularity of the nexus between actual entities can be
- put in another way. Owing to the disastrous confusion, more especially
- by Hume, of conceptual feelings with perceptual feelings, the truism
- that we can only conceive in terms of universals has been stretched to
- mean that we can only feel in terms of universals. This is untrue. Our
- perceptual feelings feel particular existents; that is to say, a physical
- feeling, belonging to the percipient, feels the nexus between two other
- actualities, A and B. It feels feelings of A which feel B, and feels feelings
- of B which feel A. It integrates these feelings, so as to unify their identity
- of elements. These identical elements form the factor defining the nexus
- between A and B, a nexus also retaining the particular diversity of A and
- B in its uniting force.
- Also the more complex multiple nexus between many actual entities in
- the actual world of a percipient is felt by that percipient. But this nexus,
- as thus felt, can be abstracted from that particular percipient. It is the
- same nexus for all percipients which include those actual entities in their
- actual worlds. The multiple nexus is how those actual entities are really
- together in all subsequent unifications of the universe, by reason of the
- objective immortality of their real mutual prehensions of each other.
- We thus arrive at the notion of the actual world of any actual entity,
- as a nexus whose objectification constitutes the complete unity of ob-
- jective datum for the physical feeling of that actual entity. This actual
- entity is the original percipient of that nexus. But any other actual entity
- which includes in its own actual world that original percipientf also in-
- cludes that previous nexus as a portion of its own actual world. Thus each
- actual world is a nexus which in this sense is independent of its original
- [352] percipient. It enjoys an objective immortality in the future beyond
- itself.
- Every nexus is a component nexus, first accomplished in some later phase
- of concrescence of an actual entity, and ever afterwards having its status
- in actual worlds as an unalterable fact, dated and located among the
- actual entities connected in itself. If in a nexus there be a realized con-
- trast of universals, this contrast is located in that actual entity to which
- it belongs as first originated in one of its integrative feelings. Thus every
- realized contrast has a location, which is particular with the particularity
- of actual entities. It is a particular complex matter of fact, realized; and,
- because of its reality, a standing condition in every subsequent actual
- world from which creative advance must originate.
- It is this complete individual particularity of each actuality, and of each
- nexus, and of each realized contrast, which is the reason for the three
- Categoreal Conditions—of Subjective Unity, of Objective Identity, and of
- Objective Diversity. The word 'event* is used sometimes in the sense of a
- nexus of actual entities, and sometimes in the sense of a nexus as objecti-
- fied by universals. In either sense, it is a definite fact with a date.
- The initial data of a complex feeling, as mere data, are many; though
- The Theory of Feelings 231
- as felt they are one in the objective unity of a pattern. Thus a nexus is a
- realized pattern of the initial data: though this pattern is merely relative to
- the feeling, expressive of those factors in the many data by reason of which
- they can acquire their unity in the feeling. This is the second use of the
- term nexus, mentioned above.
- Thus, just as the 'feeling as one' cannot bear the abstraction from it of
- the subject, so the 'data as one' cannot bear the abstraction from it of
- every feeling which feels it as such. According to the ontological principle,
- the impartial nexus is an objective datum in the consequent nature of God;
- since it is somewhere and yet not by any necessity of its own nature im-
- plicated in the [353] feelings of any determined actual entity of the actual
- world. The nexus involves realization somewhere. This is the first use of
- the term nexus.
- In two extreme cases the initial data of a feeling have a unity of their
- own. In one case, the data reduce to a single actual entity, other than the
- subject of the feeling; and in the other case the data reduce to a single
- eternal object. These are called 'primary feelings/ A particular feeling
- divorced from its subject is nonsense.
- There are thus two laws respecting the feelings constituting the com-
- plex satisfaction of an actual entity: (i) An entity can only be felt once,
- and (ii) the diverse feelings, in the same subject, of the same entity as
- datum which are to be unified into one feeling, must be compatible in their
- treatment of the entity felt. In conformity with this pre-established har-
- mony, 'incompatibility' would have dictated from the beginning that some
- 'feeling' be replaced by a negative prehension.
- SECTION X
- The subjective forms of feelings are best discussed in connection with
- the different types of feelings which can arise. This classification into types
- has regard to the differences among feelings in respect to their initial data,
- their objective data, and their subjective forms. But these sources of dif-
- ference cannot wholly be kept separate.
- A feeling is the appropriation of some elements in the universe to be
- components in the real internal constitution of its subject. The elements
- are the initial data; they are what the feeling feels. But they are felt under
- an abstraction. The process of the feeling involves negative prehensions
- which effect elimination. Thus the initial data are felt under a 'perspective'
- which is the objective datum of the feeling.
- In virtue of this elimination the components of the complex objective
- datum have become 'objects' intervening in the constitution t of the sub-
- ject of the feeling. In the phraseology of mathematical physics a feeling
- has a [354] 'vector' character. A feeling is the agency by which other things
- are built into the constitution of its one subject in process of concrescence.
- Feelings are constitutive of the nexus by reason of which the universe finds
- its unification ever renewed by novel concrescence. The universe is always
- 232 The Theory of Prehensions
- one, since there is no surveying it except from an actual entity which uni-
- fies it. Also the universe is always new, since the immediate actual entity is
- the superject of feelings which are essentially novelties.
- The essential novelty of a feeling attaches to its subjective form. The
- initial data, and even the nexus which is the objective datum, may have
- served other feelings with other subjects. But the subjective form is the
- immediate novelty; it is how that subject is feeling that objective datum.
- There is no tearing this subjective form from the novelty of this con-
- crescence. It is enveloped in the immediacy of its immediate present. The
- fundamental example of the notion 'quality inhering inf particular sub-
- stance' is afforded by 'subjective form inhering in feeling/ If we abstract
- the form from the feeling, we are left with an eternal object as the rem-
- nant of subjective form.
- A feeling can be genetically described in terms of its process of origina-
- tion, with its negative prehensions whereby its many initial data become
- its complex objective datum. In this process the subjective form originates,
- and carries into the feeling its own history transformed into the way in
- which the feeling feels. The way in which the feeling feels expresses how
- the feeling came into being. It expresses the purpose which urged it for-
- ward, and the obstacles which it encountered, and the indeterminations
- which were dissolved by the originative decisions of the subject.
- There are an indefinite number of types of feeling according to the
- complexity of the initial data which the feeling integrates, and according
- to the complexity of the objective datum which it finally feels. But there
- are three primary types of feeling which enter into the forma- [355] tion of
- all the more complex feelings. These types are: (i) that of simple physical
- feelings, (ii) that of conceptual feelings, and (iii) that of transmuted
- feelings. In a simple physical feeling, the initial datum is a single actual
- entity; in a conceptual feeling, the objective datum is an eternal object;!
- in a transmuted feeling, the objective datum is a nexus of actual entities.
- Simple physical feelings and transmuted feelings make up the class of
- physical feelings.
- In none of these feelings, taken in their original purity devoid of ac-
- cretions from later integrations, does the subjective form involve conscious-
- ness. Although in a propositional feeling the subjective form may involve
- judgment, this element in the subjective form is not necessarily present.
- One final remark must be added to the general description of a feeling.
- A feeling is a component in the concrescence of a novel actual entity. The
- feeling is always novel in reference to its data; since its subjective form,
- though it must always have reproductive reference to the data, is not
- wholly determined by them. The process of the concrescence is a progres-
- sive integration of feelings controlled by their subjective forms. In this
- synthesis, feelings of an earlier phase sink into the components of some
- more complex feeling of a later phase. Thus each phase adds its element
- of novelty, until the final phase in which the one complex 'satisfaction' is
- The Theory of Feelings 233
- reached. Thus the actual entity, as viewed morphologically through its
- 'satisfaction/ is novel in reference to any one of its component feelings. It
- presupposes those feelings. But conversely, no feeling can be abstracted
- either from its data, or its subject. It is essentially a feeling aiming at that
- subject, and motivated by that aim. Thus the subjective form embodies
- the pragmatic aspect of the feeling; for the datum is felt with that subjec-
- tive form in order that the subject may be the superject which it is.
- In the analysis of a feeling, whatever presents itself as also ante rem is a
- datum, whatever presents itself as \}S6] exclusively in re is subjective form,
- whatever presents itself in re and post rem is 'subject-superject/ This doc-
- trine of 'feeling' is the central doctrine respecting the becoming of an
- actual entity. In a feeling the actual world, selectively appropriated, is the
- presupposed datum, not formless but with its own realized form selectively
- germane, in other words 'objectified/ The subjective form is the ingression
- of novel form peculiar to the new particular fact, and with its peculiar
- mode of fusion with the objective datum. The subjective form in abstrac-
- tion from the feeling is merely a complex eternal object. In the becoming,
- it meets the 'data' which are selected from the actual world. In other
- words, the data are already 'in being/ There the term 'in being' is for the
- moment used as equivalent to the term 'in realization/
- SECTION XI
- **A subjective form has two factors, its qualitative pattern and its pattern
- of intensive quantity. But these two factors of pattern cannot wholly be
- considered in abstraction from each other. For the relative intensities of
- the qualitative elements in the qualitative pattern are among the relational
- factors which constitute that qualitative pattern. Also conversely, there are
- qualitative relations among the qualitative elements and they constitute an
- abstract qualitative pattern for the qualitative relations. The pattern of
- intensities is not only the variety of qualitative elements with such-and-
- such intensities; but it is also the variety of qualitative elements, as in
- such-and-such an abstract qualitative pattern, with such-and-such inten-
- sities. Thus the two patterns are not really separable. It is true that there
- is an abstract qualitative pattern, and an abstract intensive pattern; but in
- the fused pattern the abstract qualitative pattern lends itself t to the in-
- tensities, and the abstract intensive pattern lends itself to the qualities.
- Further, the subjective form cannot be absolutely dis- [357] joined from
- the pattern of the objective datum. Some elements of the subjective form
- can be thus disjoined; and they form the subjective form as in abstraction
- from the patterns of the objective datum. But the full subjective form can-
- not be abstracted from the pattern of the objective datum. The intel-
- lectual disjunction is not a real separation. Also the subjective form, amid
- its own original elements, always involves reproduction of the pattern of
- the objective datum.
- As a simple example of this description of a feeling, consider the audi-
- 234 The Theory of Prehensions
- tion of sound. In order to avoid unnecessary complexity, let the sound be
- one definite note. The audition of this note is a feeling. This feeling has
- first an auditor, who is the subject of the feeling. But the auditor would not
- be the auditor that he is apart from this feeling of his.
- Secondly, there is the complex ordered environment composed of certain
- other actual entities which, however vaguely, is felt by reason of this audi-
- tion. This environment is the datum of this feeling. It is the external
- world, as grasped systematically in this feeling. In this audition it is felt
- under the objectification of vague spatial relations, and as exhibiting musi-
- cal qualities. But the analytic discrimination of this datum of the feeling
- is in part vague and conjectural, so far as consciousness is concerned: there
- is the antecedent physiological functioning of the human body, and the
- presentational immediacy of the presented locus.
- There is also an emotional sensory pattern, the subjective form, which is
- more definite and more easily analysable. The note, in its capacity of a
- private sensation, has pitch, quality, and intensity. It is analysable into its
- fundamental tone, and a selection of its overtones. This analysis reveals an
- abstract qualitative pattern which is the complex relatedness of the funda-
- mental tone-quality* with the tone-qualities of its select overtones. This
- qualitative pattern may, or may not, include relations of a spatial type, if
- some of the overtones come [358] from instruments spatially separate— f for
- example, from a spatial pattern of tuning forks.
- The fundamental tone, and its overtones, have, each of them, their own
- intensities. This pattern of intensities can be analysed into the relative
- intensities of the various tones and the absolute intensity which is the
- total loudness. The scale of relative intensities enters into the final quality
- of the note, with some independence of its absolute loudness.
- Also the spatial pattern of the tuning forks and the resonance of the mu-
- sic chamber enter into this quality. But these also concern the datum of the
- feeling. Also in this integration of feeling we must include the qualitative
- and quantitative auditory contributions derived from various nerve-routes of
- the body. In this way the animal body, as part of the external world, takes
- a particularly prominent place in the pattern of the datum of the feeling.
- Also in the subjective form we must reckon qualities of joy and distaste, of
- adversion and of aversion, which attach integrally to the audition, and also
- differentially to various elements of the audition. In an earlier phase of the
- auditor, there is audition divested of such joy and distaste. This earlier,
- bare audition does not in its own nature determine this additional qualifi-
- cation. It originates as the audition becomes an element in a higher syn-
- thesis, and yet it is an element in the final component feeling. Thus the
- audition gains complexity of subjective form by its integration with other
- feelings. Also, though we can discern three patterns, namely, the pattern of
- the datum, the pattern of emotional quality, and the pattern of emotional
- intensity, we cannot analyse either of the latter patterns in complete
- separation either from the pattern of the datum, or from each other.
- The Theory of Feelings 235
- The final concrete component in the satisfaction is the audition with its
- subject, its datum, and its emotional pattern as finally completed. It is a
- particular fact not to be torn away from any of its elements.
- SECTION XII
- [359] Prehensions are not atomic; they can be divided into other pre-
- hensions and combined into other prehensions. Also prehensions are not
- independent of each other. The relation between their subjective forms is
- constituted by the one subjective aim which guides their formation. This
- correlation of subjective forms is termed 'the mutual sensitivity' of prehen-
- sions (cf. Part I, Ch. II, Sect. HI, Categoreal Obligation VII, The Cate-
- gory of Subjective Harmony 7 ).
- The prehensions in disjunction are abstractions; each of them is its sub-
- ject viewed in that abstract objectification. The actuality is the totality of
- prehensions with subjective unity in process of concrescence into concrete
- unity.
- There are an indefinite number of prehensions, overlapping, subdividing,
- and supplementary to each other. The principle, according to which a pre-
- hension can be discovered, is to take any component in the objective
- datum of the satisfaction; in the complex pattern of the subjective form
- of the satisfaction there will be a component with direct relevance to this
- element in the datum. Then in the satisfaction, there is a prehension of
- this component of the objective datum with that component of the total
- subjective form as its subjective form.
- The genetic growth of this prehension can then be traced by considering
- the transmission of the various elements of the datum from the actual
- world, and— in the case of eternal objects— their origination in the con-
- ceptual prehensions. There is then a growth of prehensions, with integra-
- tions, eliminations, and determination of subjective forms. But the deter-
- mination f of successive phases of subjective forms, whereby the integra-
- tions have the characters that they do have, depends on the unity of the
- subject imposing a mutual sensitivity upon the prehensions. Thus a pre-
- hension, considered genetically, can never free itself from the incurable
- atomicity [360] of the actual entity to which it belongs. The selection of a
- subordinate prehension from the satisfaction— as described above— involves
- a hypothetical, propositional point of view. The fact is the satisfaction as
- one. There is some arbitrariness in taking a component from the datum
- with a component from the subjective form, and in considering them, on
- the ground of congruity, as forming a subordinate prehension. The justifi-
- cation is that the genetic process can be thereby analysed. If no such
- analysis of the growth of that subordinate prehension can be given, then
- there has been a faulty analysis of the satisfaction. This relation between
- the satisfaction and the genetic process is expressed in the eighth and ninth
- categories of explanation (cf. Part I, Ch. II, Sect. II).
- CHAPTER II
- THE PRIMARY FEELINGS
- SECTION I
- [361] A 'simple physical feeling' entertained in one subject is a feeling
- for which the initial datum is another single actual entity, and the ob-
- jective datum is another feeling entertained by the latter actual entity.
- Thus in a simple physical feeling there are two actual entities con-
- cerned. One of them is the subject of that feeling, and the other is the
- initial datum of the feeling. A second feeling is also concerned, namely,
- the objective datum of the simple physical feeling. This second feeling is
- the 'objectification' of its subject for the subject of the simple physical
- feeling. The initial datum is objectified as being the subject of the feeling
- which is the objective datum: the objectification is the 'perspective' of the
- initial datum.
- A simple physical feeling is an act of causation. The actual entity which
- is the initial datum is the 'cause/ the simple physical feeling is the 'effect/
- and the subject entertaining the simple physical feeling is the actual entity
- 'conditioned' by the effect. This 'conditioned' actual entity will also be
- called the 'effect.' All complex causal action can be reduced to a complex
- of such primary components. Therefore simple physical feelings will also
- be called 'causal' feelings.
- But it is equally true to say that a simple physical feeling is the most
- primitive type of an act of perception, devoid of consciousness. The actual
- entity which is the initial datum is the actual entity perceived, the ob-
- jective datum is the 'perspective' under which that actual entity is per-
- ceived, and the subject of the simple physical feeling [362] is the perceiver.
- This is not an example of conscious perception. For the subjective form
- of a simple physical feeling does not involve consciousness, unless acquired
- in subsequent phases of integration. It seems as though in practice, for
- human beings at least, only transmuted feelings acquire consciousness,
- never simple physical feelings. Consciousness originates in the higher
- phases of integration and illuminates those phases with the greater clarity
- and distinctness.
- Thus a simple physical feeling is one feeling which feels another feeling.
- But the feeling felt has a subject diverse from the subject of the feeling
- which feels it. A multiplicity of simple physical feelings entering into the
- propositional unity of a phase constitutes the first phase in the concres-
- cence of the actual entity which is the common subject of all these feel-
- The Primary Feelings 237
- ings. The limitation, whereby the actual entities felt are severally reduced
- to the perspective of one of their own feelings, is imposed by the Gate-
- goreal Condition of Subjective Unity, requiring a harmonious compatibility
- in the feelings of each incomplete phase. Thus the negative prehensions,
- involved in the production of any one feeling, are not independent of the
- other feelings. The subjective forms of feelings depend in part on the
- negative prehensions. This primary phase of simple physical feelings con-
- stitutes the machinery by reason of which the creativity transcends the
- world already actual, and yet remains conditioned by that actual world in
- its new impersonation.
- Owing to the vagueness of our conscious analysis of complex feelings,
- perhaps we never consciously discriminate one simple physical feeling in
- isolation. But all our physical relationships arc made up of such simple
- physical feelings, as their atomic bricks. Apart from inhibitions or additions,
- weakenings or intensifications, due to the history of its production, the
- subjective form of a physical feeling is re-enaction of the subjective form
- of the feeling felt. Thus the cause passes on its feeling to be reproduced
- by the new subject as its own, and yet [363] as inseparable from the cause.
- There is a flow of feeling. But the re-enaction is not perfect. The cate-
- goreal demands of the concrescence require adjustments of the pattern of
- emotional intensities. The cause is objectively in the constitution of the
- effect, in virtue of being the feeler of the feeling reproduced in the effect
- with partial equivalence of subjective form. Also the cause's feeling has its
- own objective datum, and its own initial datum. Thus this antecedent
- initial datum has now entered into the datum of the effect's feeling at
- second-hand through the mediation of the cause.
- The reason why the cause is objectively in the effectt is that the cause's
- feeling cannot, as a feeling, be abstracted from its subject which is the
- cause. This passage of the cause into the effect is the cumulative character
- of time. The irreversibility of time depends on this character.
- Note that in the 'satisfaction' there is an integration of simple physical
- feelings. No simple physical feeling need be distinguished in consciousness.
- Physical feelings may be merged with feelings of any type, and of whatever
- complexity. A simple physical feeling has the dual character of being the
- cause's feeling re-enacted for the effect as subject. But this transference of
- feeling effects a partial identification of cause with effect, and not a mere
- representation of the cause. It is the cumulation of the universe and not a
- stage-play about it. In a simple feeling there is a double particularity in
- reference to the actual world, the particular cause and the particular ef-
- fect. In Locke's language (III, III, 6), and with his limitation of thought,
- a simple feeling is an idea in one mind 'determined to this or that particu-
- lar existent.' Locke is here expressing what only metaphysicians can doubt.
- By reason of this duplicity in a simple feeling there is a vector character
- which transfers the cause into the effect. It is a feeling from the cause
- which acquires the subjectivity of the new effect without loss of its original
- 238 The Theory of Prehensions
- [364] subjectivity in the cause. Simple physical feelings embody the re-
- productive character of nature, and also the objective immortality of the
- past. In virtue of these feelings time is the conformation of the immediate
- present to the past. Such feelings are 'conformar feelings.
- The novel actual entity, which is the effect, is the reproduction of the
- many actual entities of the past. But in this reproduction there is abstrac-
- tion from their various totalities of feeling. This abstraction is required by
- the categoreal conditions for compatible synthesis in the novel unity. This
- abstractive 'objectification' is rendered possible by reason of the 'divisible'
- character of the satisfactions of actual entities. By reason of this 'divisible'
- character causation is the transfer of a feeling, and not of a total satisfac-
- tion. The other feelings are dismissed by negative prehensions, owing to
- their lack of compliance with categoreal demands.
- A simple physical feeling enjoys a characteristic which has been variously
- described as 're-enaction/ 'reproduction/ and 'conformation/ This charac-
- teristic can be more accurately explained in terms of the eternal objects
- involved. There are eternal objects determinant of the definiteness of the
- objective datum which is the 'cause/ and eternal objects determinant of
- the definiteness of the subjective form belonging to the 'effect/ When
- there is re-enaction there is one eternal object with two-way functioning,
- namely, as partial determinant of the objective datum, and as partial de-
- terminant of the subjective form. In this two-way role, the eternal object
- is functioning relationally between the initial data on the one hand and
- the concrescent subject on the other. It is playing one self-consistent role in
- obedience to the Category of Objective Identity.
- Physical science is the science investigating spatio-temporal and quan-
- titative characteristics of simple physical feelings. The actual entities of the
- actual world are bound together in a nexus of these feelings. Also in the
- creative advance, the nexus proper to an antecedent [365] actual world is
- not destroyed. It is reproduced and added to, by the new bonds of feeling
- with the novel actualities which transcend it and include it. But these
- bonds have always their vector character. Accordingly the ultimate physical
- entities for physical science are always vectors indicating transference. In
- the world there is nothing static. But there is reproduction; and hence the
- permanence which is the result of order, and the cause of it. And yet there
- is always change; for time is cumulative as well as reproductive, and the
- cumulation of the many is not their reproduction as many.
- This section on simple physical feelings lays the foundation of the treat-
- ment of cosmology in the philosophy of organism. It contains the discus-
- sion of the ultimate elements from which a more complete philosophical
- discussion of the physical world— that is to say, of nature— must be derived.
- In the first place an endeavour has been made to do justice alike to the
- aspect of the world emphasized by Descartes and to the atomism of the
- modern quantum theory. Descartes saw the natural world as an extensive
- spatial plenum, enduring through time. Modern physicists see energy
- The Primary Feelings 239
- transferred in definite quanta. This quantum theory also has analogues in
- recent neurology. Again fatigue is the expression of cumulation- it is phys-
- ical memory. Further,! causation and physical memory spring from the
- same root: both of them are physical perception. Cosmology must do
- equal justice to atomism, to continuity, to causation, to memory, to percep-
- tion, to qualitative and quantitative forms of energy, and to extension.
- But so far there has been no reference to the ultimate vibratory characters
- of organisms and to the 'potential' element in nature.
- SECTION II
- Conceptual feelings and simple causal feelings constitute the two main
- species of 'primary' feelings. All other feelings of whatever complexity
- arise out of a process of integration which starts with a phase of these
- [366] primary feelings. There is, however, a difference between the species.
- An actual entity in the actual world of a subject must enter into the con-
- crescence of that subject by some simple causal feeling, however vague,
- trivial, and submerged. Negative prehensions may eliminate its distinctive
- importance. But in some way, by some trace of causal feeling, the remote
- actual entity is prehended positively. In the case of an eternal object,
- there is no such necessity. In any given concrescence, it may be included
- positively by means of a conceptual feeling; but it may be excluded by a
- negative prehension. The actualities have to be felt, while the pure po-
- tentials can be dismissed. So far as concerns their functionings as objects,
- this is the great distinction between an actual entity and an eternal object.
- The one is stubborn matter of fact; and the other never loses its 'accent 7 of
- potentiality.
- In each concrescence there is a twofold aspect of the creative urge. In
- one aspect there is the origination of simple causal feelings; and in the
- other aspect there is the origination of conceptual feelings. These con-
- trasted aspects will be called the physical and the mental poles of an ac-
- tual entity. No actual entity is devoid of either pole; though their relative
- importance differs in different actual entities. Also conceptual feelings do
- not necessarily involve consciousness; though there can be no conscious
- feelings which do not involve conceptual feelings as elements in the
- synthesis.
- Thus an actual entity is essentially dipolar, with its physical and mental
- poles; and even the physical world cannot be properly understood without
- reference to its other side, which is the complex of mental operations. The
- primary mental operations are conceptual feelings.
- A conceptual feeling is feeling an eternal object in the primary meta-
- physical character of being an 'object/ that is to say, feeling its capacity
- for being a realized determinant of process. Immanence and transcendence
- are the characteristics of an object: as a realized determinant it [367] is
- immanent; as a capacity for determination it is transcendent; in both roles
- 240 The Theory of Prehensions
- it is relevant to something not itself. There is no character belonging to
- the actual apart from its exclusive determination by selected eternal ob-
- jects. The definiteness of the actual arises from the exclusiveness of eternal
- objects in their function as determinants. If the actual entity be this, then
- by the nature of the case it is not that or that. The fact of incompatible
- alternatives is the ultimate fact in virtue of which there is definite charac-
- ter. A conceptual feeling is the feeling of an eternal object in respect to its
- general capacity as a determinant of character, including thereby its ca-
- pacity of exclusiveness. In the technical phraseology of these lectures, a
- conceptual feeling is a feeling whose 'datum' is an eternal object. Anal-
- ogously a negative prehension is termed 'conceptual'! when its datum is
- an eternal object. In a conceptual feeling there is no necessary progress
- from the 'initial data' to the 'objective datum/ The two may be identical,
- except in so far as conceptual feelings with diverse sources of origination
- acquire integration.
- Conceptual prehensions, positive or negative, constitute the primary
- operations among those belonging to the mental pole of an, actual entity.
- SECTION III
- The subjective form of a conceptual feeling has the character of a Val-
- uation/ and this notion must now be explained.
- A conceptual feeling arises in some incomplete phase of its subject and
- passes into a supervening phase in which it has found integration with
- other feelings. In this supervening phase, the eternal object, which is the
- datum of the conceptual feeling, is an ingredient in some sort of datum in
- which the other components are the objective data of other feelings in the
- earlier phase. This new datum is the integrated datum; it will be some sort
- of 'contrast/ By the first categoreal condition the feelings [368] of the
- earlier phase are compatible for integration. Thus the supervention of the
- later phase does not involve elimination by negative prehensions; such
- eliminations of positive prehensions in the concrescent subject would
- divide that subject into many subjects, and would divide these many sub-
- jects from the superject. But, though there can be no elimination from the
- supervening phase as a whole, there may be elimination from some new
- integral feeling which is merely one component of that phase.
- But in the formation of this integrated datum there must be determina-
- tion of exactly how this eternal object has ingress into that datum con-
- jointly with the remaining eternal objects and actual entities derived from
- the other feelings. This determination is effected by the subjective forms
- of the component conceptual feelings. Again it is to be remembered that,
- by the first categoreal condition, this subjective form is not independent of
- the other feelings in the earlier phase, and thus is such as to effect this
- determination. Also the integral feeling has its subjective form with its
- pattern of intensiveness. This patterned intensiveness regulates the dis-
- The Primary Feelings 241
- tinctive lelative importance of each element of the datum as felt in that
- feeling. This intensive regulation of that eternal object f as felt in the in-
- tegrated datum, is determined by the subjective form of the conceptual
- feeling. Yet again, by reference to the first, and seventh, categoreal condi-
- tions, this intensive form of the conceptual feeling has dependence also in
- this respect on the other feelings of the earlier phase. Thus, according as
- the valuation of the conceptual feeling is a Valuation up' or a Valuation
- down/ the importance of the eternal object as felt in the integrated feel-
- ing is enhanced, or attenuated. Thus the valuation is both qualitative, de-
- termining how the eternal object is to be utilized, and is also intensive,
- determining what importance that utilization is to assume.
- Thus a valuation has three characteristics:
- (i) According to the Categories of Subjective Unity, and [369] of Sub-
- jective Harmony, the valuation is dependent on the other feelings in its
- phase of origination.
- (ii) The valuation determines in what status the eternal object has in-
- gression into the integrated nexus physically felt.
- (iii) The valuation values up, or down, so as to determine the intensive
- importance accorded to the eternal object by the subjective form of the
- integral feeling.
- These three characteristics of an integral feeling, derived from its con-
- ceptual components, are summed up in the term 'valuation/
- But though these three characteristics are included in a valuation, they
- are merely the outcome of the subjective aim of the subject, determining
- what it is itself integrally to be, in its own character of the superject of its
- own process.
- SECTION IV
- Consciousness concerns the subjective form of a feeling. But such a sub-
- jective form requires a certain type of objective datum. A subjective form
- in abstraction loses its reality, and sinks into an eternal object capable of
- determining a feeling into that distinctive type of definiteness. But when
- the eternal object 'informs' a feeling it can only so operate in virtue of its
- conformation to the other components which jointly constitute the defi-
- niteness of the feeling. The moral of this slight discussion must now be
- applied to the notion of 'consciousness/ Consciousness is an element in
- feeling which belongs to its subjective form. But there can only be that
- sort of subjective form when the objective datum has an adequate charac-
- ter. Further, the objective datum can only assume this character when it is
- derivate from initial data which carry in their individual selves the re-
- ciprocal possibilities of this objective synthesis.
- A pure conceptual feeling in its first mode of origination never involves
- consciousness. In this respect a pure mental feeling, conceptual or proposi-
- tional, is analogous [370] to a pure physical feeling. A primary feeling of
- 242 The Theory of Prehensions
- either type, or a propositional feeling, can enrich its subjective form with
- consciousness only hy means of its alliances.
- Whenever there is consciousness there is some element of recollection.
- It recalls earlier phases from the dim recesses of the unconscious. Long ago
- this truth was asserted in Plato's doctrine of reminiscence. No doubt Plato
- was directly thinking of glimpses of eternal truths lingering in a soul
- derivate from a timeless heaven of pure form. Be that as it may, then in a
- wider sense consciousness enlightens experience which precedes it, and
- could be without it if considered as a mere datum.
- Hume, with opposite limitations to his meaning, asserts the same doc-
- trine. He maintains that we can never conceptually entertain what we have
- never antecedently experienced through impressions of sensation. The
- philosophy of organism generalizes the notion of 'impressions of sensation'
- into that of 'pure physical feeling/ Even then Hume's assertion is too un-
- guarded according to Hume's own showing. But the immediate point is
- the deep-seated alliance of consciousness with recollection both for Plato
- and for Hume.
- Here we maintain the doctrine that, in the analysis of the origination of
- any conscious feeling, some component physical feelings are to be found;
- and conversely, whenever there is consciousness, there is some component
- of conceptual functioning. For the abstract element in the concrete fact is
- exactly what provokes our consciousness. The consciousness is what arises
- in some process of synthesis of physical and mental operations. In hist
- doctrine of ideas, Locke goes further than Hume and is, as I think, more
- accurate in expressing the facts; though Hume adds something which
- Locke omits.
- Locke upholds the direct conscious apprehension of 'things without'
- (e.g.,t Essay, II, XXI, 1), otherwise termed 'exterior things' (II, XXIII, 1),
- or 'this or that particular existence' (III, III, 6), and illustrated by an in-
- dividual nurse and an individual mother (III, III, 7). [371] In the philos-
- ophy of organism the nexus, which is the basis for such direct apprehen-
- sion, is provided by the physical feelings. The philosophy of organism
- here takes the opposite road to that taken alike by Descartes and by Kant.
- Both of these philosophers accepted (Descartes with hesitations, and Kant
- without question) the traditional subjectivist sensationalism, and assigned
- the intuition of 'things without' peculiarly to the intelligence.
- Hume's addition consists in expressing and discussing, with the utmost
- clarity, the traditional sensationalist dogma. Thus for Hume, as for Locke
- when he remembers to speak in terms of this doctrine, an 'impression' is
- the conscious apprehension of a universal. For example, he writes {Trea-
- tise, Bk. I,t Part I, Ch. I), "That idea of red, which we form in the dark,
- and that impression which strikes our eyes in sunshine, differ only in de-
- gree, not in nature." t This means that a consistent sensationalism cannot
- distinguish between a percept and a concept. Hume had not in his mind
- (at least when philosophizing, though he admits it for other sorts of 'prac-
- The Primary Feelings 243
- tice') the fourth category of explanation, that no entity can be abstracted
- from its capacity to function as an object in the process of the actual world.
- To function as an object' is 'to be a determinant of the definiteness of an
- actual occurrence/ According to the philosophy of organism, a pure con-
- cept does not involve consciousness, at least in our human experience.
- Consciousness arises when a synthetic feeling integrates physical and con-
- ceptual feelings. Traditional philosophy in its account of conscious per-
- ception has exclusively fixed attention on its pure conceptual side; and
- thereby has made difficulties for itself in the theory of knowledge. Locke,
- with his naive good sense, assumes that perception involves more than this
- conceptual side; though he fails to grasp the inconsistency of this assump-
- tion with the extreme subjectivist sensational doctrine. Physical feelings
- form the non-conceptual element in our awareness of [372] nature. 1 Also,
- all awareness, even awareness of concepts, requires at least the synthesis of
- physical feelings with conceptual feeling. In awareness actuality, as a
- process in fact, is integrated with the potentialities which illustrate either
- what it is and might not be, or what it is not and might be. In other
- words, there is no consciousness without reference to definiteness, affirma-
- tion, and negation. Also affirmation involves its contrast with negation,
- and negation involves its contrast with affirmation. Further, affirmation
- and negation are alike meaningless apart from reference to the definiteness
- of particular actualities. Consciousness is how we feel the affirmation-
- negation contrast. Conceptual feeling is the feeling of an unqualified nega-
- tion; that is to say, it is the feeling of a definite eternal object with the
- definite extrusion of any particular realization. Consciousness requires that
- the objective datum should involve (as one side of a contrast) a qualified
- negative determined to some definite situation. It will be found later (cf.
- Ch. IV) that this doctrine implies that there is no consciousness apart
- from propositions as one element in the objective datum.
- 1 Cf. The Concept of Nature, Ch. I.
- CHAPTER III
- THE TRANSMISSION OF FEELINGS
- SECTION I
- [373] According to the ontological principle there is nothing which
- floats into the world from nowhere. Everything in the actual world is re-
- ferable to some actual entity. It is either transmitted from an actual entity
- in the past, or belongs to the subjective aim of the actual entity to whose
- concrescence it belongs. This subjective aim is both an example and a limi-
- tation of the ontological principle. It is an example, in that the principle is
- here applied to the immediacy of concrescent fact. The subject completes
- itself during the process of concrescence by a self-criticism of its own
- incomplete phases. In another sense the subjective aim limits the on-
- tological principle by its own autonomy. But the initial stage of its aim is
- an endowment which the subject inherits from the inevitable ordering of
- things, conceptually realized in the nature of God. The immediacy of the
- concrescent subject is constituted by its living aim at its own self-constitu-
- tion. Thus the initial stage of the aim is rooted in the nature of God, and
- its completion depends on the self-causation of the subject-superject. This
- function of God is analogous to the remorseless working of things in
- Greek and in Buddhist thought. The initial aim is the best for that im-
- passe. But if the best be bad, then the ruthlessness of God can be personi-
- fied as Ate, the goddess of mischief. The chaff is burnt. What is inexorable
- in God, is valuation as an aim towards 'order'; and 'order' means 'society
- permissive of actualities with patterned intensity of feeling arising from
- adjusted con- [374] trasts/t In this sense God is the principle of concretion;
- namely, he is that actual entity from which each temporal concrescence
- receives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts. That aim
- determines the initial gradations of relevance of eternal objects for con-
- ceptual feeling; and constitutes the autonomous subject in its primary
- phase of feelings with its initial conceptual valuations, and with its initial
- physical purposes. Thus the transition of the creativity from an actual
- world to the correlate novel concrescence is conditioned by the relevance
- of God's all-embracing conceptual valuations to the particular possibilities
- of transmission from the actual world, and by its relevance to the various
- possibilities of initial subjective form available for the initial feelings. In
- this way there is constituted the concrescent subject in its primary phase
- with its dipolar constitution, physical and mental, indissoluble.
- 244
- The Transmission of Feelings 245
- If we prefer the phraseology, we can say that God and the actual world
- jointly constitute the character of the creativity for the initial phase of the
- novel concrescence. The subject, thus constituted, is the autonomous mas-
- ter of its own concrescence into subject-superject. It passes from a sub-
- jective aim in concrescence into a superject with objective immortality. At
- any stage it is subject-superject. According to this explanation, self-deter-
- mination is always imaginative in its origin. The deterministic efficient
- causation is the inflow of the actual world in its own proper character of
- its own feelings, with their own intensive strength, felt and re-enacted by
- the novel concrescent subject. But this re-enaction has a mere character of
- conformation to pattern. The subjective valuation is the work of novel
- conceptual feeling; and in proportion to its importance, acquired in com-
- plex processes of integration and reintegration, this autonomous concep-
- tual element modifies the subjective forms throughout the whole range of
- feeling in that concrescence and thereby guides the integrations.
- In so far as there is negligible autonomous energy, the [375] subject
- merely receives the physical feelings, confirms their valuations according to
- the 'order' of that epoch, and transmits by reason of its own objective im-
- mortality. Its own flash of autonomous individual experience is negligible
- for the science which is tracing transmissions up to the conscious ex-
- perience of a final observer. But as soon as individual experience is not
- negligible, the autonomy of the subject in the modification of its initial
- subjective aim must be taken into account. Each creative act is the uni-
- verse incarnating itself as one, and there is nothing above it by way of final
- condition.
- SECTION II
- The general doctrine of the previous section requires an examination of
- principles regulating the transmission of feelings into data for novel feel-
- ings in a new concrescence. Since no feeling can be abstracted from its sub-
- ject, this transmission is merely another way of considering the objectifica-
- tion of actual entities. A feeling will be called 'physical' when its datum
- involves objectifications of other actual entities. In the previous chapter
- the special case of 'simple physical feelings' was discussed. A feeling be-
- longing to this special case has as its datum only one actual entity, and
- this actual entity is objectified by one of its feelings. All the more com-
- plex kinds of physical feelings arise in subsequent phases of concrescence,
- in virtue of integrations of simple t physical feelings with each other and
- with conceptual feelings. But before proceeding to these more complex
- physical feelings, a subdivision of simple physical feelings must be con-
- sidered. Such feelings are subdivided into 'pure physical feelings' and 'hy-
- brid physical feelings/ In a 'pure physical feeling' the actual entity which
- is the datum is objectified by one of its own physical feelings. Thus having
- regard to the 're-enaction' which is characteristic of the subjective form of
- 246 The Theory of Prehensions
- a simple physical feeling, we have— in the case of the simpler actual en-
- tities—an example of the transference of energy in the physical [376]
- world. When the datum is an actual entity of a highly complex grade, the
- physical feeling by which it is objectified as a datum may be of a highly
- complex character, and the simple notion of a transference of some form
- of energy to the new subject may entirely fail to exhaust the important
- aspects of the pure physical feeling in question.
- In a 'hybrid physical feeling' the actual entity forming the datum is
- objectified by one of its own conceptual feelings. Thus having regard to
- the element of autonomy which is characteristic of the subjective form of
- a conceptual feeling, we have— in the case of the more complex actual
- entities— an example of the origination and direction of energy in the
- physical world. In general, this simplified aspect of a hybrid physical feel-
- ing does not exhaust its role in the concrescence of its subject.
- The disastrous separation of body and mind, characteristic of philo-
- sophical systems which are in any important respect derived from Car-
- tesianism, is avoided in the philosophy of organism by the doctrines of
- hybrid physical feelings and of the transmuted feelings. In these ways
- conceptual feelings pass into the category of physical feelings. Also con-
- versely, physical feelings give rise to conceptual feelings, and conceptual
- feelings give rise to other conceptual feelings— according to the doctrines
- of the Categories of Conceptual Valuation (Category IV), and of Con-
- ceptual Reversion (Category V), to be discussed in the subsequent sec-
- tions of this chapter.
- One important characteristic of a hybrid feeling is the intensity of the
- conceptual feeling which originates from it, according to the Category of
- Subjective Valuation. In the next section, this Categoreal Condition of
- 'Conceptual Valuation' is considered in relation to all physical feelings,
- 'pure' and 'hybrid' alike. The present section will only anticipate that dis-
- cussion so far as hybrid feelings are concerned. Thus the part of the general
- category now relevant can be formulated:
- [377] A hybrid physical feeling originates for its subject a conceptual
- feeling with the same datum as that of the conceptual feeling of the ante-
- cedent subject. But the two conceptual feelings in the two subjects re-
- spectively may have different subjective forms.
- There is an autonomy in the formation of the subjective forms of con-
- ceptual feelings, conditioned only by the unity of the subject as expressed
- in categoreal conditions I, VII, and VIII. These conditions for unity cor-
- relate the sympathetic subjective form of the hybrid feeling with the
- autonomous subjective form of the derivative conceptual feeling with the
- same subject.
- There are evidently two sub-species of hybrid feelings: (i) those which
- feel the conceptual feelings of temporal actual entities, and (ii) those
- which feel the conceptual feelings of God.
- The objectification of God in a temporal subject is effected by the hy-
- The Transmission of Feelings 247
- brid feelings with God's conceptual feelings as data. Those of God's feel-
- ings which are positively prehended are those with some compatibility of
- contrast, or of identity, with physical feelings transmitted from the tem-
- poral world. But when we take God into account, then we can assert with-
- out any qualification Hume's principle, that all conceptual feelings are
- derived from physical feelings. The limitation of Hume's principle intro-
- duced by the consideration of the Category of Conceptual Reversion
- (cf. Sect. Ill of this chapter) is to be construed as referring merely to the
- transmission from the temporal world, leaving God out of account. Apart
- from the intervention of God, there could be nothing new in the world,
- and no order in the world. The course of creation would be a dead level
- of ineffectiveness, with all balance and intensity progressively excluded by
- the cross currents of incompatibility. The novel hybrid feelings derived
- from God, with the derivative sympathetic conceptual valuations, are the
- foundations of progress. [378]
- SECTION III
- Conceptual feelings are primarily derivate from physical feelings, and
- secondarily from each other. In this statement, the consideration of God's
- intervention is excluded. When this intervention is taken into account,
- all conceptual feelings must be derived from physical feelings. Unfettered
- conceptual valuation, 'infinite' in Spinoza's sense of that term, is only
- possible once in the universe; since that creative act is objectively immortal
- as an inescapable condition characterizing creative action.
- But, unless otherwise stated, only the temporal entities of the actual
- world will be considered. We have to discuss the categoreal conditions for
- such derivation of conceptual feelings from the physical feelings relating
- to the temporal world. By the Categoreal Condition of Subjective Unity-
- Category I— the initial phase of physical feelings has the propositional
- unity of feelings compatible for integration into one feeling of the actual
- world. But the completed determination of the subjective form of this
- final ''satisfaction' awaits the origination of conceptual feelings whose
- subjective forms introduce the factor of Valuation/ that is, Valuation up'
- or Valuation down/
- Thus a supplementary phase succeeds to the initial purely physical
- phase. This supplementary phase starts with two subordinate phases of
- conceptual origination, and then passes into phases of integration, and of
- reintegration, in which propositional feelings, and intellectual feelings, may
- emerge. In the present chapter we are concerned with the first two phases
- of merely conceptual origination. These are not phases of conceptual
- analysis, but of conceptual valuation. The subsequent analytic phases in-
- volve propositional feelings, and in certain circumstances issue in con-
- sciousness. But in this chaptert we are merely concerned with blind con-
- ceptual valuation, and with the effect of such valuation upon physical
- 248 The Theory of Prehensioiis
- feel- [379] ings which lie in the future beyond the actual entities in which
- such valuations occur.
- The initial problem is to discover the principles according to which
- some eternal objects are prehended positively and others are prehended
- negatively. Some are felt and others are eliminated.
- In the solution of this problem five* additional categoreal conditions
- must be added to the three such conditions which have already been ex-
- plained. The conditions have regard to the origination, and coordination,
- of conceptual feelings. They govern the general process of 'conceptual
- imagination/ so far as concerns its origination from physical experience.
- Category IV. The Category of Conceptual Valuation. From each physi-
- cal feeling there is the derivation of a purely conceptual feeling whose
- datum is the eternal object exemplified in the definiteness of the actual
- entity, or oft the nexus, physically felt.
- This category maintains the old principle that mentality originates from
- sensitive experience. It lays down the principle that all sensitive experience
- originates mental operations. It does not, however, mean that there is no
- origination of other mental operations derivative from these primary men-
- tal operations. Nor does it mean that these mental operations involve
- consciousness, which is the product of intricate integration.
- The mental pole originates as the conceptual counterpart of operations
- in the physical pole. The two poles are inseparable in their origination.
- The mental pole starts with the conceptual registration of the physical
- pole. This conceptual registration constitutes the sole datum of experience
- according to the sensationalist school. Writers of this school entirely
- neglect physical feelings, originating in the physical pole. Hume's 'im-
- pressions of sensation' and Kant's sensational data are considered in terms
- only applicable to conceptual registration. Hence Kant's notion of the
- chaos of such ulti- [380] mate data. Also Hume— at least, in his Treatise-
- can only find differences of 'force and vivacity/
- The subjective form of a conceptual feeling is valuation. These valua-
- tions are subject to the Category of Subjective Unity. Thus the conceptual
- registration is conceptual valuation; and conceptual valuation introduces
- creative purpose. The mental pole introduces the subject as a determinant
- of its own concrescence. The mental pole is the subject determining its
- own ideal of itself by reference to eternal principles of valuation autono-
- mously modified in their application to its own physical objective datum.
- Every actual entity is 'in time' so far as its physical pole is concerned, and
- is 'out of time' so far as its mental pole is concerned. It is the union of
- two worlds, namely, the temporal world, and the world of autonomous
- valuation. The integration of each simple physical feeling with its con-
- ceptual counterpart produces in a subsequent phase a physical feeling
- whose subjective form of re-enaction has gained or lost subjective intensity
- according to the valuation up, or the valuation down, in the conceptual
- feeling. So far there is merely subjective readjustment of the subjective
- The Transmission of Feelings 249
- forms. This is the phase of physical purpose. The effect of the conceptual
- feeling is thus, so far, merely to provide that the modified subjective form
- is not merely derived from the re-enaction of the objectified actual entity.
- Also, in the complex subsequent integrations, we find that the conceptual
- counterpart has a role in detachment from the physical feeling out of
- which it originates.
- Category V. The Category of Conceptual Reversion. There is sec-
- ondary origination of conceptual feelings with data which are partially
- identical with, and partially diverse from, the eternal objects forming the
- data in the primary phase of the mental pole; the determination of iden-
- tity and diversity depending on the subjective aim at attaining depth of
- intensity by reason of contrast.
- Thus the first phase of the mental pole is conceptual [381] reproduction,
- and the second phase is a phase of conceptual reversion. In this second
- phase the proximate novelties are conceptually felt. This is the process by
- which the subsequent enrichment of subjective forms, both in qualitative
- pattern, and in intensity through contrast, is made possible by the positive
- conceptual prehension of relevant alternatives. 1 There is a conceptual con-
- trast of physical incompatibles. This is the category which, as thus stated,
- seems to limit the strict application of Plato's principle of reminiscence,
- and of Hume's principle of recollection. Probably it does not contradict
- anything that Plato meant by his principle. But it does limit the rigid
- application of Hume's principle. Indeed Hume himself admitted excep-
- tions. It is the category by which novelty enters the world; so that even
- amid stability there is never undifferentiated endurance. But, as the cate-
- gory states, reversion is always limited by the necessary inclusion of ele-
- ments identical with elements in feelings of the antecedent phase. By the
- Category of Subjective Unity, and by the seventh Category of Subjective
- Harmony, to be explained later, all origination of feelings is governed
- by the subjective imposition of aptitude for final synthesis. Also by the
- Category of Objective Identity this aptitude always has its ground in the
- two-way functionings of self-identical elements. Then in synthesis there
- must always be a ground of identity and an aim at contrast. The aim at
- contrast arises from the depth of intensity promoted by contrast. The
- joint necessity of this ground of identity, and this aim at contrast, is
- partially expressed in this Category of Conceptual Reversion, This 'aim
- at contrast' is the expression of the ultimate creative purpose that each
- unification shall achieve some maximum depth of intensity of feeling,
- subject to the conditions of its concrescence. This ultimate purpose is
- formulated in Category VIII.
- The question, how, and in what sense, one unrealized [382] eternal ob-
- ject can be more, or less, proximate to an eternal object in realized ingres-
- sion— that is to say, in comparison with any other unfelt eternal object—
- 1 For another discussion of this topic, cf. my Religion in the Making, Ch. Ill,
- Sect. VII.
- 250 The Theory of Prehensions
- is left unanswered by this Category of Reversion. In conformity with the
- ontological principle, this question can be answered only by reference to
- some actual entity. Every eternal object has entered into the conceptual
- feelings of God. Thus, a more fundamental account must ascribe the re-
- verted conceptual feeling in a temporal subject to its conceptual feeling de-
- rived, according to Category IV, from the hybrid physical feeling of the
- relevancies conceptually ordered in God's experience. In this way, by the
- recognition of God's characterization of the creative act, a more complete
- rational explanation is attained. The Category of Reversion is then abol-
- ished;* and Hume's principle of the derivation of conceptual experience
- from physical experience remains without any exception.
- SECTION IV
- The two categories of the preceding section concerned the efficacy of
- physical feelings, pure or hybrid, for the origination of conceptual feelings
- in a later phase of their own subject. The present section considers analo-
- gous feelings with diverse subjects 'scattered' throughout members of a
- nexus. It considers a single subject, subsequent to the nexus, prehending
- this multiplicity of scattered feelings as the data for a corresponding mul-
- tiplicity of its own simple physical feelings, some pure and some hybrid.
- It then formulates the process by which in that subject an analogy between
- these various feelings— constituted by one eternal object, of whatever com-
- plexity, implicated in the various analogous data of these feelings— is, by
- a supervening process of integration, converted into one feeling having
- for its datum the specific contrast between the nexus as one entity and
- that eternal object. This contrast is what is familiarly known as the quali-
- fication of the nexus by that eternal object. An inter- [383] mediate stage
- in this process of integration is the formation in the final subject of one
- conceptual feeling with that eternal object as its datum. This conceptual
- feeling has an impartial relevance to the above-mentioned various simple
- physical feelings of the various members of the nexus. It is this impartiality
- of the conceptual feeling which leads to the integration in which the many
- members of the nexus are collected into the one nexus which they form,
- and in which that nexus is set in contrast to the one eternal object which
- has emerged from their analogies.
- Thus pure, and hybrid, physical feelings, issuing into a single concep-
- tual feeling, constitute the preliminary phase of this transmutation in the
- prehending subject. The integration of these feelings in that subject leads
- to the transmuted physical feeling of a nexus as qualified by that eternal
- object which is the datum of the single conceptual feeling. In this way the
- world is physically felt as a unity, and is felt as divisible into parts which
- are unities, namely, nexus. Each such unity has its own characteristics
- arising from the undiscriminated actual entities which are members of
- that nexus. In some cases objectification of the nexus has only indirect
- The Transmission of Feelings 251
- reference to the characteristics of its individual atomic actualities. In such
- a case the objectification may introduce new elements into the world, for-
- tunate or unfortunate. Usually the objectification gives direct informa-
- tion, so that the prehending subject shapes itself as the direct outcome of
- the order prevalent in the prehended nexus. Transmutation is the way
- in which the actual world is felt as a community, and is so felt in virtue
- of its prevalent order. For it arises by reason of the analogies between the
- various members of the prehended nexus, and eliminates their differences.
- Apart from transmutation our feeble intellectual operations would fail to
- penetrate into the dominant characteristics of things. We can only under-
- stand by discarding. Transmutation depends upon a categoreal condition.
- [384] Category VI. The Category of Transmutation. When (in accord-
- ance with Category IV, or with Categories IV and V) one and the samet
- conceptual feeling is derived impartially by a prehending subject from
- its analogous simple physical feelings of various actual entities, then in
- a subsequent phase of integration—of these simple physical feelings to-
- gether with the derivate conceptual feeling— the prehending subject may
- transmute the datum of this conceptual feeling into a contrast with the
- nexus of those prehended actual entities, or of some part of that nexus;
- so that the nexus (or its part), thus qualified, is the objective datum of a
- feeling entertained by this prehending subject.
- Such a transmutation of simple physical feelings of many actualities
- into one physical feeling of a nexus as one, is called a 'transmuted feeling/
- The origination of such a feeling depends upon intensities, valuations, and
- eliminations conjointly favourable.
- In order to understand this categoreal condition, it must be noted that
- the integration of simple physical feelings into a complex physical feeling
- only provides for the various actual entities of the nexus being felt as sep-
- arate entities requiring each other. We have to account for the substitu-
- tion of the one nexus in place of its component actual entities. This is
- Leibniz's problem which arises in his Monadology. He solves the problem
- by an unanalysed doctrine of 'confusion/ Some category is required to pro-
- vide a physical feeling of a nexus as one entity with its own categoreal
- type of existence. This one physical feeling in the final subject is derived
- by transmutation from the various analogous physical feelings entertained
- by the various members of the nexus, together with their various analogous
- conceptual feelings (with these various members as subjects) originated
- from these physical feelings, either directly according to Category IV,
- or indirectly according to Category V. The analogy of the physical feel-
- ings consists in the fact that their definite character exhibits the same in-
- gredient [385] eternal object. The analogy of the conceptual feelings con-
- sists in the fact that this one eternal object, or one reversion from this
- eternal object, is the datum for the various relevant conceptual feelings
- entertained respectively by members of the nexus. The final prehending
- subject prehends the members of the nexus, (i) by 'pure' physical feelings
- 252 The Theory of Prehensions
- in which the members are severally objectified by these analogous physical
- feelings, and (ii) by hybrid physical feelings in which the members are
- severally objectified by these analogous conceptual feelings.
- In the prehending subject, these analogous, pure physical feelings origi-
- nate a conceptual feeling, according to Category IV; and, according to
- Category V, there may be a reverted conceptual feeling. There will be
- only one direct conceptual feeling; for the simple physical feelings (in the
- final subject) are analogous in the sense of exemplifying the same eternal
- object. (If there be no reversion, this analogy extends over the pure and
- the hybrid physical feelings. If there be important reversion, this analogy
- only extends over the hybrid feelings with the reverted conceptual feel-
- ings as data. This latter case is only important when the reverted feelings
- involve the predominantly intense valuation.) Thus these many physical
- feelings of diverse actualities originate in the final subject one conceptual
- feeling. This single conceptual feeling has therefore an impartial reference
- throughout the actualities of the nexus. Also reverted conceptual feelings
- in the nexus are, in this connection, negligible unless they preserved this
- impartiality of reference throughout the nexus. Excluding for the moment
- the consideration of reverted feelings in the actualities of the nexus, the
- hybrid physical feelings in the prehending subject also, by Category IV,
- generate one conceptual feeling with impartial reference; also it is the same
- conceptual feeling as that generated by the pure physical feelings (in the
- final subject). Thus (with no reversion) the influence of the hybrid
- physical feelings [386] is to enhance the intensity of the conceptual feeling
- derived from the pure physical feelings. But there may be reversions to
- be considered, that is to say, reversions with impartial reference throughout
- the nexus. The reversion may originate in the separate actualities of the
- nexus, or in the final prehending subject, or there may be a double rever-
- sion involving both sources. Thus we must allow for the possibility of di-
- verse reverted feelings, each with impartial reference. In so far as there
- is concordance and the reversions are dominant, there will issue one con-
- ceptual feeling of enhanced intensity. When there is discordance among
- these various conceptual feelings, there will be elimination, and in general
- no transmutation. But when, from some (or all) of these sources of im-
- partial conceptual feelings, one dominant impartial conceptual feeling
- emerges with adequate intensity, transmutation will supervene.
- This impartiality of reference has then been transmuted into the physi-
- cal feeling of that nexus, whole or partial, contrasted with some one eternal
- object. It will be noted that this one impartial conceptual feeling is an
- essential element of the process, whereby an impartial reference to the
- whole nexus is introduced. Otherwise there would be no element to trans-
- mute particular relevancies to the many members into general relevance
- to the whole.
- The eternal object which characterizes the nexus in this physical feeling
- The Transmission of Feelings 253
- may be an eternal object characterizing the analogous physical feelings,
- belonging to all, or some, of the members of the nexus. In this case, the
- nexus as a whole derives a character which in some way belongs to its
- various members.
- Again in the transmuted feeling only part of the original nexus may
- be objectified, and the eternal object may have been derived from mem-
- bers of the other part of the original nexus. This is the case for perception
- in the mode of 'presentational immediacy/ to be further discussed in a
- later chapter (Part IV, Ch. V; cf. alsof [387] Part II, Ch. II, Sect. I, and
- Part II, Ch. IV, Sect. VII, and Part II, Ch. VIII) .
- Also the eternal object may be the datum of a reverted conceptual feel-
- ing, only indirectly derived from the members of the original nexus. In
- this case, the transmuted feeling of the nexus introduces novelty; and in
- unfortunate cases this novelty may be termed 'error/ But all the same,
- the transmuted feeling, whatever be its history of transmutation, is a definite
- physical fact whereby the final subject prehends the nexus. For example,
- considering the example of presentational immediacy, colour-blindness
- may be called 'error'; but nevertheless, it is a physical fact. A transmuted
- feeling comes under the definition of a physical feeling.
- Our usual way of consciously prehending the world is by these trans-
- muted physical feelings. It is only when we are consciously aware of alien
- mentalities that we even approximate to the conscious prehension of a
- single actual entity. It will be found that transmuted feelings are very
- analogous to prepositional feelings, and to conscious perceptions and
- judgments in their sequence of integration. Vagueness has its origin in
- transmuted feelings. For a quality, characterizing the mutual prehen-
- sions of all the members of a nexus, is transmuted into a predicate of the
- nexus. The intensity arising from the force of repetition makes this trans-
- muted perception to be the prominent type of those feelings which in
- further integrations acquire consciousness as an element in their subjective
- forms. It represents a simplification of physical feeling, effected in the
- course of integration.
- According to this category the conceptual feelings entertained in any
- nexus modify the future role of that nexus as a physical objective datum.
- This category governs the transition from conceptual feelings in one actual
- entity to physical feelings either in a supervening phase of itself or in a
- later actual entity. What is conceptual earlier is felt physically later in an
- extended role. Thus, for instance, a new 'form' has its emergent ingres-
- sion con- [388] ceptually by reversion, and receives delayed exemplification
- physically when the other categoreal conditions permit.
- This joint operation of Categories IV and VI produces what has been
- termed 'adversion' and 'aversion/ For the conceptual feelings in the ac-
- tualities of the nexus, produced according to Category IV, have data
- identical with the pattern exemplified in the objective data of the many
- 254 The Theory of Prehensions
- physical feelings. If in the conceptual feelings there is valuation upward,
- then the physical feelings are transmitted t to the new concrescence with
- enhanced intensity in its subjective form. This is 'adversion/
- But if in the conceptual feelings there is valuation downward, then the
- physical feelings are (in the later concrescence) either eliminated, or are
- transmitted to it with attenuated intensity. This is 'aversion/ Thus 'adver-
- sion' and 'aversion' are types of 'decision/
- Thus the conceptual feeling with its valuation has primarily the charac-
- ter of purpose, since it is the agent whereby the decision is made as to
- the causal efficacy of its subject in its objectifications beyond itself. But it
- only achieves this character of purpose by its integration with the physical
- feeling from which it originates. This integration is considered in Chapter
- V on 'Comparative Feelings/
- It is evident that ad version and aversion, and also the Category of
- Transmutation, only have importance in the case of high-grade organ-
- isms. They constitute the first step towards intellectual mentality, though
- in themselves they do not amount to consciousness. But an actual entity
- which includes these operations must have an important intensity of con-
- ceptual feelings able to mask and fuse the simple physical feelings.
- Also the examination of the Category of Transmutation shows that the
- approach to intellectuality consists in the gain of a power of abstraction.
- The irrelevant multiplicity of detail is eliminated, and emphasis is laid
- on the elements of systematic order in the actual world. In [389] so far
- as there is trivial order, there must be trivialized actual entities. The right
- coordination of the negative prehensions is one secret of mental progress;
- but unless some systematic scheme of relatedness characterizes the en-
- vironment, there will be nothing left whereby to constitute vivid pre-
- hension of the world. The low-grade organism is merely the summation
- of the forms of energy which flow in upon it in all their multiplicity of
- detail. It receives, and it transmits; but it fails to simplify into intelligible
- system. The physical theory of the structural flow of energy has to do
- with the transmission of simple physical feelings from individual actuality
- to individual actuality. Thus some sort of quantum theory in physics,
- relevant to the existing type of cosmic order, is to be expected. The physical
- theory of alternative forms of energy, and of the transformation from one
- form to another form, ultimately depends upon transmission conditioned
- by some exemplification of the Categories of Transmutation and Reversion.
- SECTION V
- The seventh categoreal condition governs the efficacy of conceptual
- feelings both in the completion of their own subjects, and also in the
- objectifications of their subjects in subsequent concrescence. It is the
- Category of 'Subjectivet Harmony/
- Category VII. The Category of Subjective Harmony. The valuations of
- The Transmission of Feelings 255
- conceptual feelings are mutually determined by their adaptation to be
- joint elements in a satisfaction aimed at by the subject.
- This categoreal condition should be compared with the Category of
- 'Subjective Unity/ and also with the Category of 'Conceptual Reversion/ In
- the former category the intrinsic inconsistencies, termed logical/ are the
- formative conditions in the pre-established harmony. In this seventh
- category, and in the Category of Reversion, aesthetic adaptation for an
- end is the formative condition in the pre-established harmony. These three
- categories [390] express the ultimate particularity of feelings. For the
- superject which is their outcome is also the subject which is operative in
- their production. They are the creation of their own creature. The point
- to be noticed is that the actual entity, in a state of process during which it
- is not fully definite, determines its own ultimate definiteness. This is the
- whole point of moral responsibility. Such responsibility is conditioned by
- the limits of the data, and by the categoreal conditions of concrescence.
- But autonomy is negligible unless the complexity is such that there is
- great energy in the production of conceptual feelings according to the
- Category of Reversion. This Category of Reversion has to be considered in
- connection with the Category of Aesthetic Harmony.** For the contrasts
- produced by reversion are contrasts required for the fulfillment of the
- aesthetic ideal. Unless there is complexity, ideal diversities lead to physical
- impossibilities, and thence to impoverishment. It requires a complex con-
- stitution to stage diversities as consistent contrasts.
- It is only by reason of the Categories of Subjective Unity, and of Subjec-
- tive Harmony, that the process constitutes the character of the product,
- and that conversely the analysis of the product discloses the process. J
- CHAPTER IV
- PROPOSITIONS AND FEELINGS
- SECTION I
- [391] The nature of consciousness has not yet been adequately ana-
- lysed. The initial basic feelings, physical and conceptual, have been men-
- tioned, and so also has the final synthesis into the affirmation-negation
- contrast. But between the beginning and the end of the integration into
- consciousness, there lies the origination of a 'propositional feeling/ A
- propositional feeling is a feeling whose objective datum is a proposition.
- Such a feeling does not in itself involve consciousness. But all forms of
- consciousness arise from ways of integration of propositional feelings with
- other feelings, either physical feelings or conceptual feelings. Conscious-
- ness belongs to the subjective forms of such feelings.
- A proposition enters into experience as the entity forming the datum of
- a complex feeling derived from the integration of a physical feeling with
- a conceptual feeling. 1 Now a conceptual feeling does not refer to the actual
- world, in the sense that the history of this actual world has any peculiar
- relevance to its datum. This datum is an eternal object; and an eternal
- object refers only to the purely general any among undetermined actual
- entities. In itself an eternal object evades any selection among actualities
- or epochs. You cannot know what is red by merely thinking of redness.
- You can only find red things by adventuring amid physical experiences
- in this actual world. This doctrine is the ultimate ground of empiricism;
- namely, that eternal objects tell no tales as to their ingressions.
- [392] But now a new kind of entity presents itself. Such entities are the
- tales that perhaps might be told about particular actualities. Such entities
- are neither actual entities, nor eternal objects, nor feelings. They are prop-
- ositions. A proposition must be true or false. Herein a proposition differs
- from an eternal object; for no eternal object is ever true or false. This
- difference between propositions and eternal objects arises from the fact
- that truth and falsehood are always grounded upon a reason. But according
- to the ontological principle (the eighteenth! 'category of explanation'),
- a reason is always a reference to determinate actual entities. Now an eter-
- nal object, in itself, abstracts from all determinate actual entities, includ-
- ing even God. It is merely referent to any such entities, in the absolutely
- general sense of any. Then there can be no reason upon which to found
- 1 Cf.t also 'Physical Purposes' considered in Ch. V.
- Propositions and Feelings 257
- the truth or falsehood of an eternal object. The very diversity of eternal
- objects has for its reason their diversity of functioning in this actual world.
- Thus the endeavour to understand eternal objects in complete abstrac-
- tion from the actual world results in reducing them to mere undifferen-
- tiated nonentities. This is an exemplification of the categoreal principle,
- that the general metaphysical character of being an entity is *'to be a deter-
- minant in the becoming of actualities/ Accordingly the differentiated
- relevance of eternal objects to each instance of the creative process re-
- quires their conceptual realization in the primordial nature of God. He
- does not create eternal objects; for his nature requires them in the same
- degree that they require him. This is an exemplification of the coherence
- of the categoreal types of existence. The general relationships of eternal
- objects to each other, relationships of diversity and of pattern, are their
- relationships in God's conceptual realization. Apart from this realization,
- there is mere isolation indistinguishable from nonentity.
- But a proposition, while preserving the indeterminateness of an eternal
- object, makes an incomplete abstrac- [393] tion from determinate actual
- entities. It is a complex entity, with determinate actual entities among its
- components. These determinate actual entities, considered formaliter and
- not as in the abstraction of the proposition, do afford a reason determining
- the truth or falsehood of the proposition. But the proposition in itself,
- apart from recourse to these reasons, tells no tale about itself; and in this
- respect it is indeterminate like the eternal objects.
- A propositional feeling (as has been stated) arises from a special type
- of integration synthesizing a physical feeling with a conceptual feeling.
- The objective datum of the physical feeling is either one actual entity,
- if the feeling be simple, or is a determinate nexus of actual entities, if the
- physical feeling be more complex. The datum of the conceptual feeling is
- an eternal object which is referent (qua possibility) + to any actual entities,
- where the any is absolutely general and devoid of selection. In the in-
- tegrated objective datum the physical feeling provides its determinate set
- of actual entities, indicated by their felt physical relationships to the sub-
- ject of the feeling. These actual entities are the logical subjects of the
- proposition. The absolute generality of the notion of any, inherent in an
- eternal object, is thus eliminated in the fusion. In the proposition, the
- eternal object, in respect to its possibilities as a determinant of nexus, f is
- restricted to these logical subjects. The proposition may have the restricted
- generality of referring to any among these provided logical subjects; or
- it may have the singularity of referring to the complete set of provided
- logical subjects as potential relata, each with its assigned status, in the
- complex pattern which is the eternal object. The proposition is the poten-
- tiality of the eternal object, as a determinant of denniteness, in some
- determinate mode of restricted reference to the logical subjects. This
- e ternal object is the 'predicative pattern' of the proposition. The set of
- logical subjects is either completely singled out as these logical subjects in
- 258 The Theory of Prehensions
- this predicative pattern or is collec- [394] tively singled out as any of these
- logical subjects in this pattern, or as some of these logical subjects in this
- pattern. Thus the physical feeling indicates the logical subjects and pro-
- vides them respectively with that individual definition necessary to assign
- the hypothetic status of each in the predicative pattern. The conceptual
- feeling provides the predicative pattern. Thus in a proposition the logical
- subjects are reduced to the status of food for a possibility. Their real role
- in actuality is abstracted from; they are no longer factors in fact, except
- for the purpose of their physical indication. Each logical subject becomes
- a bare 'W among actualities, with its assigned hypothetical relevance to
- the predicate. 2
- It is evident that the datum of the conceptual feeling reappears as the
- predicate in the proposition which is the datum of the integral, preposi-
- tional feeling. In this synthesis the eternal object has suffered the elimina-
- tion of its absolute generality of reference. The datum of the physical
- feeling has also suffered elimination. For the peculiar objectification of
- the actual entities, really effected in the physical feeling, is eliminated,
- except in so far as it is required for the services of the indication. The
- objectification remains only to indicate that definiteness which the logical
- subjects must have in order to be hypothetical food for that predicate.
- This necessary indication of the logical subjects requires the actual world
- as a systematic environment. For there can be no definite position in pure
- abstraction. The proposition is the possibility of that predicate applying
- in that assigned way to those logical subjects. In every proposition, as
- such and without going beyond it, there is complete indeterminateness
- so far as concerns its own realization in a propositional feeling, and as
- regards its own truth. The logical subjects are, nevertheless, in fact actual
- entities which are definite in their realized mutual relatedness. Thus the
- proposition is in fact true, or false. But its own [395] truth, or its own
- falsity, is no business of a proposition. That question concerns only a
- subject entertaining a propositional feeling with that proposition for its
- datum. Such an actual entity is termed a 'prehending subject' of the
- proposition. Even a prehending subject is not necessarily judging the
- proposition. That particular case has been discussed earlier in Chapter
- IX of Part II. In that chapter the term 'judging subject' was used in place
- of the wider term 'prehending subject/
- To summarize this discussion of the general nature of a proposition:
- A proposition shares with an eternal object the character of indeterminate-
- ness, in that both are definite potentialities for actuality with undeter-
- mined realization in actuality. But they differ in that an eternal object
- refers to actuality with absolute generality, whereas a proposition refers
- to indicated logical subjects. Truth and falsehood always require some
- element of sheer givenness. Eternal objects cannot demonstrate what they
- 2 Cf . my Concept of Nature, Ch. I, for another exposition of this train of
- thought.
- Propositions and Feelings 259
- are except in some given fact. The logical subjects of a proposition supply
- the element of givenness requisite for truth and falsehood.
- SECTION II
- A proposition has neither the particularity of a feeling, nor the reality
- of a nexus. It is at datum for feeling, awaiting a subject feeling it. Its
- relevance to the actual world by means of its logical subjects makes it a
- lure for feeling. In fact many subjects may feel it with diverse feelings,
- and with diverse sorts of feelings. The fact that propositions were first
- considered in connection with logic, and the moralistic preference for
- true propositions, have obscured the role of propositions in the actual
- world. Logicians only discuss the judgment of propositions. Indeed some
- philosophers fail to distinguish propositions from judgments; and most
- logicians consider propositions as merely appanages to judgments. The
- result is that false propositions have fared badly, thrown into the dust-
- heap, neglected. But in the real world it is more important [396] that a
- proposition be interesting than that it be true. The importance of truth is,
- that it adds to interest. The doctrine here maintained is that judgment-
- feelings form only one subdivision of propositional feelings: and arise
- from the special sort of integration of propositional feelings with other
- feelings. Propositional feelings are not, in their simplest examples, con-
- scious feelings. Consciousness only arises in some integrations in which
- propositional feelings are among the components integrated. Another point
- to notice is that the physical feeling, which is always one component in
- the history of an integral propositional feeling, has no unique relation to
- the proposition in question, nor has the subject of that feeling, which is
- also a subject prehending the proposition. Any subject with any physical
- feeling which includes in its objective datum the requisite logical subjects!
- can in a supervening phase entertain a propositional feeling with that
- proposition as its datum. It has only to originate a conceptual feeling with
- the requisite predicative pattern as its datum, and then to integrate the
- two feelings into the required propositional feeling.
- Evidently new propositions come into being with the creative advance of
- the world. For every proposition involves its logical subjects; and it cannot
- be the proposition which it is, unless those logical subjects are the actual
- entities which they are. Thus no actual entity can feel a proposition, if its
- actual world does not include the logical subjects of that proposition. The
- proposition 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' could not be felt by Hannibal
- m any occasion of his existence on earth. Hannibal could feel propositions
- with certain analogies to this proposition, but not this proposition. It is,
- farther, to be noticed that the form of words in which propositions are
- framed also includes an incitement to the origination of an affirmative
- judgment-feeling. In imaginative literature, this incitement is inhibited
- by the general context, and even by the form and make-up of the material
- 260 The Theory of Prehensions
- book. Sometimes there is even a form of words designed [397] to inhibit
- the formation of a judgment-feeling, such as 'once upon a time/ The
- verbal statement also includes words and phrases to symbolize the sort of
- physical feelings necessary to indicate the logical subjects of the proposi-
- tion. But language is always elliptical, and depends for its meaning upon
- the circumstances of its publication. For example, the word 'Caesar' may
- mean a puppy dog, or a negro slave, or the first Roman emperor.
- The actual entities whose actual worlds include the logical subjects of
- a proposition will be said to fall within the 'locus' of that proposition.
- The proposition is prehensible by them. Of those actual entities which
- fall within the locus of a proposition, only some will prehend it positively.
- There are two kinds of pure propositional feelings, namely, 'imaginative
- feelings' and 'perceptive feelings/ These kinds are not sharply distin-
- guished, but their extreme instances function very differently.
- SECTION III
- A propositional feeling can arise only in a late phase of the process of
- the prehending subject. For it requires, in earlier phases: (a) a physical
- feeling whose objective datum includes the requisite logical subjects; and
- (/?) a physical feeling involving a certain eternal object among the deter-
- minants of the definiteness of its datum; and (y) the conceptual feeling
- of this eternal object, necessarily derivate from the physical feeling under
- heading (/?), according to categoreal condition IV; and perhaps (8), some
- conceptual feeling which is a reversion from the former conceptual feeling,
- according to categoreal condition V, involving another eternal object as
- its datum.
- The physical feeling under the heading (a) will be termed the 'indica-
- tive feeling'; the physical feeling under heading (/?) will be called the
- 'physical recognition/ The physical recognition is the physical basis of the
- conceptual feeling which provides the predicative pattern.
- [398] The 'predicative pattern' is either the eternal object which is the
- datum of the conceptual feeling under the heading (y), or it is the eternal
- object which is the datum of the conceptual feeling under the heading (8).
- In the former case, the second conceptual feeling, namely, that under the
- heading (8), is irrelevant to the consideration of the propositional feeling.
- In either case, that conceptual feeling whose datum is the predicative
- pattern is called the 'predicative feeling/
- In this account of the origin of the predicative feeling, we are in gen-
- eral agreement with Locke and Hume, who hold that every conceptual
- feeling has a physical basis. But Hume lays down the principle that all
- eternal objects are first felt physically, and thus would only allow of the
- origination of the predicative feeling under heading (y). However he
- makes two concessions which ruin his general principle. For he allows the
- independent origination of intermediate 'shades' in a scale of shades, and
- Propositions and Feelings 261
- also of new 'manners' of pattern. Both of these cases are allowed for by
- the principle of 'reversion/ which is appealed to under heading (8). The
- propositional feeling arises in the later phase in which there is integration
- of the 'indicative feeling' with the 'predicative feeling/ In this integra-
- tion the two data are synthesized by a double elimination involving both
- data. The actual entities involved in the datum of the indicative feeling
- are reduced to a bare multiplicity in which each is a bare 'it' with the elimi-
- nation of the eternal object really constituting the definiteness of that
- nexus. But the integration rescues them from this mere multiplicity by
- placing them in the unity of a proposition with the given predicative!
- pattern. Thus the actualities, which were first felt as sheer matter of fact,
- have been transformed into a set of logical subjects with the potentiality
- for realizing an assigned predicative pattern. The predicative pattern has
- also been limited by elimination. For as a datum in the conceptual feeling,
- it held its possibility for realization in respect to absolutely any actual en-
- tities; but in [399] the proposition its possibilities are limited to just
- these logical subjects.
- The subjective form of the propositional feeling will depend on cir-
- cumstances, according to categoreal condition VII. It may, or may not,
- involve consciousness; it may, or may not, involve judgment. It will involve
- aversion, or adversion, that is to say, decision. The subjective form will
- only involve consciousness when the 'affirmation-negation* contrast has
- entered into it. In other words, consciousness enters into the subjective
- forms of feelings, when those feelings are components in an integral feel-
- ing whose datum is the contrast between a nexus which is, and a propo-
- sition which in its own nature negates the decision of its truth or false-
- hood. The logical subjects of the proposition are the actual entities in the
- nexus. Consciousness is the way of feeling that particular real nexus, as in
- contrast with imaginative freedom about it. The consciousness may con-
- fer importance upon what the real thing is, or upon what the imagination
- is, or upon both.
- SECTION IV
- A proposition, as such, is impartial between its prehending subjects,
- and in its own nature it does not fully determine the subjective forms of
- such prehensions. But the different propositional feelings, with the same
- proposition as datum, in different prehending subjects, are widely different
- according to differences of their histories in these subjects. They can be
- divided into two main types, here termed, respectively, 'perceptive feel-
- ings' and 'imaginative feelings/ This difference is founded on the com-
- parison between the 'indicative feeling' from which the logical subjects
- are derived, and the 'physical recognition' from which the predicative
- pattern is derived.
- [400] t These physical feelings are either identical or different. If they
- 262 The Theory of Prehensions
- be one and the same feeling, the derived propositional feeling is here
- called a 'perceptive feeling/ For in this case, as will be seen, the proposi-
- tion predicates of its logical subjects a character derived from the way in
- which they are physically felt by that prehending subject.
- If the physical feelings be different, the derived propositional feeling
- is here called an 'imaginative feeling: For in this case, as will be seen, the
- proposition predicates of its logical subjects a character without any guar-
- antee of close relevance to the logical subjects. Since these physical feel-
- ings are complex, there are degrees of difference between them. Two
- physical feelings may be widely diverse or almost identical. Thus the
- distinction between the two types of propositional feelings is not as sharp-
- cut as it might be. This distinction is still further blurred by noting that
- three distinct cases arise which differentiate perceptive feelings into three
- species, which in their turn shade off into each other.
- Since we are now dealing with perceptive feelings, we have on hand only
- one physical feeling which enjoys the role both of the indicative feeling,
- and of the physical recognition. In the first place, suppose that the predica-
- tive pattern is derived straight from the physical recognition under the
- heading (y), so that there is no reversion and the heading (8) is irrelevant.
- In this case the derived propositional feeling will be termed an 'authen-
- tic perceptive feeling/ Such a feeling, by virtue of its modes of origination,
- has as its datum a proposition whose predicate is in some way realized in
- the real nexus of its [401] logical subjects. Thus the proposition felt pro-
- poses a predicate derived from the real nexus, and not refracted by the
- prehending subject. But nevertheless the proposition need not be true, so
- far as concerns the way in which it implicates the logical subjects with
- the predicate. For the primary physical feeling of that nexus by the pre-
- hending subject may have involved 'transmutation' according to categoreal
- condition VI. In this case, the proposition ascribes to its logical subjects
- the physical enjoyment of a nexus with the definition of its predicate;
- whereas that predicate may have only been enjoyed conceptually by these
- logical subjects. Thus, what the proposition proposes as a physical fact
- in the nexus, was in truth only a mental fact. Unless it is understood for
- what it is, error arises. Such understanding belongs to the subjective form.
- But if the primary physical feeling involves no reversion in any stage,
- then the predicate of the proposition is that eternal object which con-
- stitutes the definiteness of that nexus. In this case, the proposition is, with-
- out qualification, true. The authentic perceptive feeling will then be
- termed 'direct/ Thus there are 'indirect' perceptive feelings (when 're-
- version' is involved), and 'direct' perceptive feelings; and feelings of both
- these species are termed 'authentic/ In the case of these 'authentic' feelings,
- the predicate has realization in the nexus, physically or ideally, apart from
- any reference to the prehending subject.
- + Thirdly, and lastly, the predicative feeling may have arisen in the pre-
- hending subject by reversion, according to the heading (8) of the previous
- Propositions and Feelings 263
- section. In this case the predicate has in it some elements which really
- contribute to the definiteness of the nexus; but it has also some elements
- which contrast with corresponding elements in the nexus. These latter
- elements have been introduced in the concrescence of the prehending
- subject. The predicate is thus distorted from the truth by the subjectivity
- of the prehending subject. Such a perceptive feeling will be termed 'un-
- authentic/
- Unauthentic feelings are feelings derived from a 'tied' imagination, in
- the sense that there is only one physical basis for the whole origination,
- namely, that physical feeling which is both the 'indicative' feeling! and
- the 'physical recognition/ The imagination is tied to one ultimate fact.
- SECTION V
- Imaginative feelings belong to the general case when the indicative
- feeling and the physical recognition differ. [402] But there are degrees
- of difference, which can vary from the case when the two nexus, forming
- the objective data of the two feelings respectively, enjoy the extreme of
- remote disconnection, to the case at the other extreme when the two
- nexus are almost identical. But in so far as there is diversity between the
- feelings, there is some trace of a free imagination. The proposition which
- is the objective datum of an imaginative feeling has a predicate derived,
- with or without reversions, from a nexus which in some respects differs
- from the nexus providing the logical subjects. Thus the proposition is felt
- as an imaginative notion concerning its logical subjects. The proposition
- in its own nature gives no suggestion as to how it should be felt. In one
- prehending subject it may be the datum of a perceptive feeling, and in
- another prehending subject it may be the datum of an imaginative feeling.
- But the subjective forms of the two feelings will differ according to the
- differences in the histories of the origination of those feelings in their
- respective subjects.
- The subjective forms of propositional feelings are dominated by valua-
- tion, rather than by consciousness. In a pure propositional feeling the
- logical subjects have preserved their indicated particularity, but have lost
- their own real modes of objectification. The subjective form lies in the
- twilight zone between pure physical feeling and the clear consciousness
- which apprehends the contrast between physical feeling and imagined
- possibility. A propositional feeling is a lure to creative emergence in the
- transcendent future. When it is functioning as a lure, the propositional
- feeling about the logical subjects of the proposition may in some subse-
- quent phase promote decision involving intensification of some physical
- reeling of those subjects in the nexus. Thus, according to the various
- categoreal conditions, propositions intensify, attenuate, inhibit, or trans-
- mute, without necessarily entering into clear consciousness, or encounter-
- ing judgment.
- 264 The Theory of Prehensions
- It follows that in the pursuit of truth even physical [403] feelings must
- be criticized, since their evidence is not final apart from an analysis of
- their origination. This conclusion merely confirms what is a commonplace
- in all scientific investigation, that we can never start from dogmatic cer-
- tainty. Such certainty is always an ideal to which we approximate as the
- result of critical analysis. When we have verified that we depend upon an
- authentic perceptive feeling, whose origination involves no reversions,
- then we know that the proposition which is the datum of that feeling is
- true. Thus there can be no immediate guarantee of the truth of a propo-
- sition, by reason of the mode of origination of the propositional feeling,
- apart from a critical scrutiny of that mode of origination.
- The feeling has to be (i) perceptive, (ii) authentic, and (iii) direct,
- where a definite meaning has, in the preceding section, been assigned to
- each of these conditions.
- t There is, however, always this limitation to the security of direct
- knowledge, based on direct physical feeling, namely, that the creative
- emergence can import into the physical feelings of the actual world
- pseudo-determinants which arise from the concepts entertained in that
- actual world, and not from the physical feelings in that world.
- This possibility of error is peculiarly evident in the case of that special
- class of physical feelings which belong to the mode of 'presentational
- immediacy/
- The proposition which is the datum of an imaginative feeling may be
- true. The two questions of the origination of consciousness in the sub-
- jective forms of feelings, and of the intuitive judgment of a proposition,
- apart from the mode of origination of the feeling of it, must now be
- considered.
- SECTION VI
- Language, as usual, is always ambiguous as to the exact proposition
- which it indicates. Spoken language is merely a series of squeaks. Its func-
- tion is (a) to arouse in the prehending subject some physical feeling in-
- dicative of the logical subjects of the proposition, (/?) to arouse in the
- prehending subject some physical feeling which plays the part of the
- 'physical recognition/ (y) to promote the sublimation of the 'physical
- recognition' into the conceptual 'predicative feeling/ (8) to promote the
- integration of the indicative feeling and the predicative feeling into the
- required propositional feeling. But in this complex function there is always
- a tacit reference to [404] the environment of the occasion of utterance.
- Consider the traditional example, 'Socrates is mortal/
- This proposition may mean It is mortal/ In this case the word 'Socrates'
- in the circumstances of its utterance merely promotes a physical feeling
- indicating the it which is mortal.
- The proposition may mean 'It is Socratic and mortal'; where 'Socratic
- is an additional element in the predicative pattern.
- Propositions and Feelings 265
- We now turn to the words denoting the predicative pattern, namely,
- either 'mortal,' or 'Socratic and mortal.' The slightest consideration dis-
- closes the fact that it is pure convention to suppose that there is only
- one logical subject to the proposition. The word 'mortal' means a certain
- relationship to the general nexus of actual entities in this world which isf
- possible for any one of the actual entities. 'Mortal' does not mean 'mortal
- in any possible world/ it means 'mortal in this world.' Thus there is a
- general reference to this actual world as exemplifying a scheme of things
- which render 'mortality' realizable in it.
- The word 'Socratic' means 'realizing the Socratic predicate in Athenian
- society.' It does not mean 'Socratic, in any possible world'; nor does it
- mean 'Socratic, anywhere in this world': it means 'Socratic, in Athens.'
- Thus 'Socratic,' as here used, refers to a society of actual entities realizing
- certain general systematic properties such that the Socratic predicate is
- realizable in that environment. Also the 'Athenian society' requires that
- this actual world exemplifies a certain systematic scheme, amid which
- 'Athenianism' is realizable.
- Thus in the one meaning of the phrase 'Socrates is mortal,' the logical
- subjects are one singular It (Socrates) and the actual entities of this actual
- world, forming a society amid which mortality is realizable and including
- the former 'IV In the other meaning, there are also included among the
- logical subjects the actual entities forming the Athenian society. These
- actual entities are [405] required for the realization of the predicative
- pattern 'Socratic and mortal' and are the definitely indicated logical sub-
- jects. They also require that the general scheme of this actual world be
- such as to support 'Athenianism' in conjunction with 'mortality .'+
- CHAPTER V
- THE HIGHER PHASES OF EXPERIENCE
- SECTION I
- [406] 'Comparative feelings' are the result of integrations not yet con-
- sidered: their data are generic contrasts. The infinite variety of the more
- complex feelings come under the heading 'comparative feelings/
- We have now to examine two simple types of comparative feelings.
- One type arises from the integration of a 'propositional feeling' with the
- 'indicative feeling' from which it is partly derived. Feelings of this type
- will be termed 'intellectual feelings/ This type of comparative feelings is
- subdivided into two species: one species consists of 'conscious percep-
- tions'; and the other species consists of 'intuitive judgments/ The sub-
- jective forms of intuitive judgments also involve consciousness. Thus
- 'conscious perceptions' and 'intuitive judgments' are alike 'intellectual
- feelings/ Comparative feelings of the other type are termed 'physical pur-
- poses/ Such a feeling arises from the integration of a conceptual feeling
- with the basic physical feeling from which it is derived, either directly
- according to categoreal condition IV (the Category of Conceptual Valua-
- tion), or indirectly according to categoreal condition V (the Category
- of Conceptual Reversion). But this integration is a more primitive type
- of integration than that which produces, from the same basic physical
- feeling, the species of propositional feelings termed 'perceptive/ The
- subjective forms of these physical purposes are either 'adversions' or
- 'aversions/ The subjective forms of physical purposes do not involve
- consciousness unless these feelings acquire integration with conscious
- perceptions or intuitive judgments. \407]
- SECTION II
- In an intellectual feeling the datum is the generic contrast between a
- nexus of actual entities and a proposition with its logical subjects mem
- bers of the nexus. In every generic contrast its unity arises from the two-
- way functioning of certain entities which are components in each of the
- contrasted factors. This unity expresses the conformation to the second
- categoreal condition (the Category of Objective Identity). The common
- 'subject' entertaining the two feelings effects an integration whereby each
- of these actual entities obtains its one role of a two-way functioning in
- the one generic contrast. As an element in the subject no objectified actual
- 266
- The Higher Phases of Experience 267
- entity can play two disconnected parts. There can only be one analysable
- part. Thus what in origination is describable as a pair of distinct ways of
- functioning of each actual entity in the two factors of the generic con-
- trast respectivelyt is realized in the subject as one r61e with a two-way
- aspect. This two-way aspect is unified as 'contrast/ This one analysable
- part involves in itself the contrast between the sheer matter of fact, namely,
- what the objectified actual entity in question contributes to the objecti-
- fied nexus in the physical feeling, and the mere potentiality of the same
- actual entity for playing its assigned part in the predicative pattern of the
- proposition, in the eventuality of the proposition's realization. This con-
- trast is what has been termed the 'affirmation-negation contrast/ It is the
- contrast between the affirmation of objectified fact in the physical feeling,
- and the mere potentiality, which is the negation of such affirmation, in
- the propositional feeling. It is the contrast between 'in fact' and 'might be,'
- in respect to particular instances in this actual world. The subjective form
- of the feeling of this contrast is consciousness. Thus in experience, con-
- sciousness arises by reason of intellectual feelings, and in proportion to
- the variety and intensity of such feelings. But, in conformity with the
- seventh [408] categoreal condition (the Category of Subjective Harmony),
- subjective forms, which arise as factors in any feeling, are finally in the
- satisfaction shared in the unity of all feelings;f all feelings acquire their
- quota of irradiation in consciousness.
- This account agrees with the plain facts of our conscious experience.
- Consciousness flickers; and even at its brightest, there is a small focal
- region of clear illumination, and a large penumbral region of experience
- which tells of intense experience in dim apprehension. The simplicity of
- clear consciousness is no measure of the complexity of complete experi-
- ence. Also this character of our experience suggests that consciousness is
- the crown of experience, only occasionally attained, not its necessary
- base.
- SECTION III
- A feeling is termed a 'belief/ or is said to include an element of 'belief/
- when its datum is a proposition, and its subjective form includes, as the
- defining element in its emotional pattern, a certain form, or eternal object,
- associated with some gradation of intensity. This eternal object is 'belief-
- character/ When this character enters into the emotional pattern, then,
- according to the intensity involved, the feeling, whatever else it be, is to
- some degree a belief.
- This variation in the intensity of belief-character is insisted on by Locke
- in his Essay. He writes (IV, XV, 3) :
- The entertainment the mind gives this sort of propositions is called
- "belief/' "assent/' or "opinion/' which is the admitting or receiving any
- proposition for true, upon arguments or proofs that are found to per-
- suade us to receive it as true, without certain knowledge that it is so.
- 268 The Theory of Prehensions
- And herein lies the difference between probability and certainty,
- faith and knowledge, that in all thef parts of knowledge there is intui-
- tion; each immediate idea, each step has its visible and certain connec-
- tion: in belief not so.
- [409] Locke's distinction between certainty and uncertain belief is ad-
- mirable. But it is not nearly so important as it looks. For it is not the im-
- mediate intuition that we are usually concerned with. We only have its
- recollection recorded in words. Whether the verbal record of a recollec-
- tion recalls to our minds a true proposition must always be a matter of
- great uncertainty. Accordingly our attitude towards an immediate intuition
- must be that of the gladiators, "morituri te salutamus," as we pass into the
- limbo where we rely upon the uncertain record. It must be understood
- that we are not speaking of the objective probability of a proposition,
- expressing its relation to certain other propositions. Comparative firmness
- of belief is a psychological fact which may, or may not, be justified by the
- objective evidence. This belief-character takes various forms from its fusion
- with consciousness derived from the various types of intellectual feelings.
- SECTION IV
- Conscious perception is the feeling of what is relevant to immediate
- fact in contrast with its potential irrelevance. This general description
- must now be explained in detail.
- "Conscious perceptions' are of such importance that it is worth while
- to rehearse the whole sequence of their origination. It will be seen that
- alternative modes of origination are involved, and that some of these
- modes produce erroneous perceptions. Thus the criticism of conscious per-
- ceptions has the same importance as the criticism of judgments, intuitive
- and inferential.
- In the first place, there is one basic physical feeling, from which the
- whole sequence of feelings originates for the 'subject' in question. From
- this physical feeling, the propositional feeling of the sort termed 'percep-
- tive' arises. The conscious perception is the comparative feeling arising
- from the integration of the perceptive feeling with this original physical
- feeling.
- [410] In the account of the origination of the 'perceptive' feeling (Part
- III, Ch. IV, Sect. IV), the various species of such feelings are analysed
- first into 'authentic' feelings and 'unauthentic' feelings; and secondly,
- 'authentic' feelings are analysed into 'direct' feelingsf and 'indirect' feel-
- ings. Without qualification a direct perceptive feeling feels its logical sub-
- jects as potentially invested with a predicate expressing an intrinsic char-
- acter of the nexus which is the initial datum of the physical feeling; with
- qualification this statement is also true of an indirect feeling. The qualifi-
- cation is that the secondary conceptual feelings, entertained in the nexus
- The Higher Phases of Experience 269
- by reason of reversion (cf. categoreal condition V), have been trans-
- muted so as to be felt in the 'subject' (the final subject of the conscious
- perception) as if they had been physical facts in the nexus. Of course
- such transmutation of physical feeling only arises when no incompatibili-
- ties are involved.
- Thus, in general, a transmuted physical feeling only arises as the out-
- come of a complex process of incompatibilities and inhibitions. Apart
- from exceptional circumstances only to be found in few high-grade organ-
- isms, transmutation only accounts for physical feelings of negligible in-
- tensity. It is, however, important to note that even authentic physical
- feelings can distort the character of the nexus felt by transmuting felt
- concept into felt physical fact. In this way authentic perceptive feelings
- can introduce error into thought; and transmuted physical feelings can
- introduce novelty into the physical world. Such novelty may be either for-
- tunate or disastrous. But the point is that novelty in the physical world,
- and error in authentic perceptive feeling, arise by conceptual functioning,
- according to the Category of Reversion.
- Putting aside the case when these transmuted perceptive feelings have
- importance, consider the prehending subject with its direct perceptive
- feeling. The subject has its concrescent phase involving two factors, the
- orig- [411] inal physical feeling, and the derived perceptive feeling. In the
- earlier factor the nexus, physically felt, is objectified through its own proper
- physical bonds. There are no incompatibilities between fact and reverted
- concept to produce attenuation. The objective datum is therefore felt
- with its own proper intensities, transmitted to the subjective form of the
- physical feeling. The other factor in the integration is the 'perceptive'
- feeling. The datum of this feeling is the proposition with the actual en-
- tities of the nexus as its logical subjects, and with its predicate also de-
- rived from the nexus. The whole origination of this perceptive feeling has
- its sole basis in the physical feeling, which plays the part both of 'indicative
- feeling' and of 'physical recognition' (cf. Part III, Ch. IV, Sect. III).
- The integration of the two factors into the conscious perception thus
- confronts the nexus as fact, with the potentiality derived from itself, lim-
- ited to itself, and exemplified in itself. This confrontation is the generic
- contrast which is the objective datum of the integral feeling. The sub-
- jective form thus assumes its vivid immediate consciousness of what the
- nexus really is in the way of potentiality realized. In Hume's phraseology,
- there is an 'impression' of the utmost 'force and vivacity/
- There are therefore two immediate guarantees of the correctness of a
- conscious perception: one is Hume's test of 'force and vivacity,' and the
- other is the illumination by consciousness of the various feelings involved
- m the process. Thus the fact, that the physical feeling has not transmuted
- concept into physical bond, lies open for inspection. Neither of these
- tests is infallible. There is also the delayed test, that the future conforms
- 270 The Theory of Prehensions
- to expectations derived from this assumption. This latter test can be re-
- alized only by future occasions in the life of an enduring object, the en-
- during percipient.
- It is to be observed that what is in doubt is not the immediate percep-
- tion of a nexus which is a fragment of [412] the actual world. The du-
- bitable element is the definition of this nexus by the observed predicate.
- An unauthentic perceptive feeling arises in the subject when its own
- conceptual origination from its own basic physical feeling passed on to
- the secondary stage of producing a reverted conceptual feeling to play the
- part of predicative feeling. The physical feeling may, or may not, have also
- suffered loss of direct relevance by reason of derivation from conceptual
- reversions in the nexus. But anyhow the subject by its own process of
- reversion has produced for the logical subjects a predicate which has no
- immediate relevance to the nexus, either as physical fact or as conceptual
- functioning in the nexus. Thus the comparative feeling which integrates
- the physical feeling with the unauthentic perceptive feeling has for its
- datum the generic contrast of the nexus with a proposition, whose logical
- subjects comprise the actualities in the nexus, and whose predicate partly
- agrees with the complex pattern exemplified in the nexus and partly dis-
- agrees with it This case is really the conscious perception of a proposition
- imaginatively arrived at, which concerns the nexus and disagrees with the
- facts. The case is in fact more analogous to intellectual feelings of the
- second species, namely, to intuitive judgments. But by reason of the use
- of one basic physical feeling, in the double function of indicative feeling
- and of physical recollection, the proposition in the comparative feeling
- will have some of the vivid relevance to the nexus in the same feeling,
- which arises in the case of authentic perceptions. Practically, however, this
- case is an intuitive judgment in which there is consciousness of a proposi-
- tion as erroneous.
- SECTION V
- The term 'judgment' refers to three species among the comparative
- feelings with which we are concerned. In each of these feelings the datum
- is the generic contrast between an objectified nexus and a proposition
- whose logical subjects make up the nexus. The three species [413] are com-
- posed of (i) those feelings in the 'yes-form/ (ii) those feelings in the
- 'no-form/ and (iii) those feelings in the 'suspense-form.'
- In all three species of felt contrast, the datum obtains its unity by reason
- of the objective identify of the actual entities on both sides of the con-
- trast In the yes-form' there is the further ground of unity by reason of
- the identity of the pattern of the objectified nexus with the predicate. In
- the 'no-form' this latter ground of unity is replaced by a contrast involving
- incompatible diversity. In the 'suspense-form' t the predicate is neither
- identical, nor incompatible, with the pattern. It is diverse from, and com-
- The Higher Phases of Experience 271
- patible with, the pattern in the nexus as objectified: the nexus, in its own
- 'formal' existence, may, or may not, in fact exemplify both the pattern
- and the predicate. In this species of comparative feeling there is therefore
- contrast between pattern and predicate, without incompatibility.
- In intuitive judgments, as has been stated, the comparative feeling is
- the integration of the physical feeling of a nexus with a propositional feel-
- ing whose logical subjects are the actual entities in the nexus. So far as
- this general description is concerned intuitive judgments and conscious
- perceptions do not differ, and are therefore classed together as 'intellectual'
- feelings. But in the case of intuitive judgments there is a more complex
- process of origination. There are two distinct physical feelings, the in-
- dicative feeling and the physical recollection (Part III, Ch. IV, Sect. III).
- The predicative feeling originates from the physical recollection, either
- immediately according to categoreal condition IV or mediately according
- to categoreal condition V. The integration of the predicative feeling with
- the indicative feeling produces the 'imaginative feeling' f (cf. Part III,
- Ch. IV, Sect. V). This is a propositional feeling with the logical subjects
- of its datum* derived from the indicative feelingf and with the predica-
- tive pattern derived from the! physical recollection. These two physical
- feelings may be relatively \414) disconnected in their origination. Thus the
- imaginative feeling may have in its subjective form no bias as to belief or
- disbelief; or, if there be such bias, the intensity of the emotion may be
- slight.
- The intuitive judgment is the comparative feeling with its datum con-
- stituted by the generic contrast between the nexus involved in the indica-
- tive feeling and the proposition involved in the imaginative feeling. In this
- generic contrast each actual entity has its contrast of two-way functioning.
- One way is its functioning in the exemplified pattern of the nexus, and
- the other way is its functioning in the potential pattern of the proposition.
- If in addition to the contrast between exemplification and potentiality,
- there be identity as to pattern and predicate, then by the Category of Ob-
- jective Unity there is also the single complex eternal object in its two-
- way functioning, namely, as exemplified and as potential. In this case, the
- proposition coheres with the nexus and this coherence is its truth. Thus
- 'truth' is the absence of incompatibility or of any 'material contrast' in
- the patterns of the nexus and of the proposition in their generic contrast.
- The sole contrast, involving the Category of Objective Diversity, is merely
- that between exemplification and potentiality, and in all other respects
- the coherence is governed by the Category of Objective Identity.
- If a contrast arise in any respect other than that between exemplifica-
- tion and potentiality, then the two patterns are not identical. Then the
- proposition in some sense, important or unimportant, is not felt as true.
- It will be noted that the intuitive judgment in its subjective form con-
- forms to what there is to feel in its datum. Thus error cannot arise from
- the subjective form of the integration constituting the judgment. But it
- 272 The Theory of Prehensions
- can arise because the indicative feeling, which is one of the factors in-
- tegrated, may in its origin have involved [415] reversion. Thus error arises
- by reason of operations which lie below consciousness, though they may
- emerge into consciousness and lie open for criticism.
- Finally, what differentiates an intuitive judgment from a conscious
- perception is that a conscious perception is the outcome of an originative
- process which has its closest possible restriction to the fact, thus con-
- sciously perceived. But the distinction between the two species is not
- absolute. Among the conscious perceptions we find transmutations by
- which concepts entertained in the nexus are transmuted into physical
- feelings in the nexus, and also the unauthentic propositional feelings in
- which a proposition with a 'reverted' predicate has arisen. These are cases
- in which conscious perceptions take on the general character of intuitive
- judgments. On the other hand the diversity between the two physical
- feelings— when they are diverse— may be trivial. The nexus which is the
- datum of the one may be practically identical with the nexus which is
- the datum of the other. In such a case an intuitive judgment approximates
- to a conscious perception.
- The condensed analysis of the stages of origination of an intuitive judg-
- ment is (i) the 'physical recollection' and the 'indicative feeling/ (ii) the
- 'predicative feeling/ derived from the 'physical recollection/ f (iii) the
- 'imaginative feeling/I derived by integration of the 'predicative feeling'
- with the 'indicative feeling/ (iv) the 'intuitive judgment/ f derived by
- integration of the 'imaginative feeling' with the 'indicative feeling.' t
- It is a great mistake to describe the subjective form of an intuitive
- judgment as necessarily including definite belief or disbelief in the propo-
- sition. Three cases arise. The generic contrast which is the datum of the
- intuitive judgment may exhibit the predicate of the proposition as exem-
- plified in the objectified nexus. In this case, the subjective form will in-
- clude definite belief. Secondly, the predicate may be exhibited as incom-
- patible with the [416] eternal objects exemplified in the objectified nexus.
- In this case, the subjective form will include definite disbelief. But there is
- a third case, which is in fact the more usual one: the predicate may be
- exhibited as irrelevant, wholly or partially, to the eternal objects exem-
- plified in the objectified nexus. In this case, the subjective form need ex-
- hibit neither belief nor disbelief. It may include one or the othert of these
- decisions, but it need not do so. This third case will be termed the case
- of 'suspended judgment,' Thus an intuitive judgment may be a belief, or
- a disbelief, or a suspended judgment It is the task of the inferential pro-
- cess sometimes to convert a suspended judgment into a belief, or a dis-
- belief, so far as the final satisfaction is concerned.
- But the main function of intellectual feelings is neither belief, nor dis-
- belief, nor even suspension of judgment. The main function of these
- feelings is to heighten the emotional intensity accompanying the valua-
- tions in the conceptual feelings involved, and in the mere* physical
- The Higher Phases of Experience 273
- purposes which are more primitive than any intellectual feelings. They per-
- form this function by the sharp-cut way in which they limit abstract
- valuation to express possibilities relevant to definite logical subjects.
- In so far as these logical subjects, by reason of other prehensions, are
- topics of interest, the proposition becomes a lure for the conditioning of
- creative action. In other words, its prehension effects a modification of the
- subjective aim.
- Intellectual feelings, in their primary function, are concentration of
- attention involving increase of importance. This concentration of atten-
- tion also introduces the criticism of physical purposes, which is the intel-
- lectual judgment of truth or falsehood. But intellectual feelings are not
- to be understood unless it be remembered that they already find at work
- 'physical purposes' more primitive than themselves. Consciousness follows,
- and does not precede, the entry of the conceptual prehensions of the
- relevant universals. [417]
- SECTION VI
- It is evident that an affirmative intuitive judgment is very analogous to
- a conscious perception. A conscious perception is a very simplified type
- of affirmative intuitive judgment; and a direct affirmative intuitive judg-
- ment is a very sophisticated case of conscious perception. The difference
- between the two has its origin in the fact that one involves a perceptive
- feeling, and the other involves an imaginative feeling. Only one set of
- actual entities is involved in the formation of the perceptive feeling. These
- actual entities are the logical subjects of the proposition which is felt.
- But two sets of actual entities are involved in the formation of an imagi-
- native feeling. Only one of these sets provides the logical subjects of the
- proposition which is felt: the other set is finally eliminated in the process
- of origination. The difference between the two feelings, the perceptive
- feeling and the imaginative feeling, does not therefore lie in the proposi-
- tion which is felt. It lies in the emotional patterns of the two feelings. In
- either case this emotional pattern is derivative from the process of origina-
- tion. In the case of the perceptive feeling, the emotional pattern reflects
- the close connection of the predicate with the logical; subjects, throughout
- the process of origination. In the case of the imaginative feeling, this emo-
- tional pattern reflects the initial disconnection of the predicate from the
- logical subjects. This example illustrates that in the integration of feelings,
- components which are eliminated from the matter of the integral feeling
- may yet leave their mark on its emotional pattern. The triumph of con-
- sciousness comes with the negative intuitive judgment. In this case there
- is a conscious feeling of what might be, and is not. The feeling directly
- concerns the definite negative prehensions enjoyed by its subject. It is the
- feeling of absence, and it feels this absence as produced by the definite
- exclusiveness of what is really present. Thus, the explicitness of negation,
- 274 The Theory of Prehensions
- [418] which is the peculiar characteristic of consciousness, is here at its
- maximum.
- The two cases of intuitive judgment, namely, the affirmative intuitive
- judgment and the negative intuitive judgment, are comparatively rare.
- These two cases of intuitive judgment, together with conscious perception,
- correspond to what Locke calls 'knowledge/ Locke's section (IV, XIV, 4)t
- on this subject is short enough to be quoted in full:
- Judgment is the presuming things to be so without perceiving it.—
- Thus the mind has two faculties conversant about truth and false-
- hood,—
- First, Knowledge, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubt-
- edly satisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas.
- Secondly, Judgment, which is the putting ideas together, or separat-
- ing them from one another in the mind, when their certain agree-
- ment or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so; which
- is, as the word imports, taken to be so before it certainly appears.
- And if it so unites or separates them as in reality things are, it is right
- judgment
- What Locke calls 'judgment' is here termed 'inferential judgment/
- The process of origination of a suspended judgment consists in (i) the
- 'physical recollection' and the 'indicative feeling/ (ii) the 'conceptual
- imagination/ derivative from the 'physical recollection/ (iii) the 'preposi-
- tional imagination/ derived by integration of the 'indicative feeling' with
- the 'conceptual imagination/ (iv) the 'suspended judgment,* derived by
- integration of the 'indicative feeling' with the 'propositional imagination/
- the relation between the objectifying predicate and the imagined predi-
- cate} being such as to preclude either case of direct judgment.
- The suspended judgment thus consists of the integration of the imagi-
- native feeling with the indicative feeling, in the case where the imagined
- predicate fails to find identification with the objectifying predicate, or
- with [419] any part of it; but does find compatible contrast with it. It is
- the feeling of the contrast between what the logical subjects evidently are,
- and what the same subjects in addition may be. This suspended judgment
- is our consciousness of the limitations involved in objectification. If, in the
- comparison of an imaginative feeling with fact, we merely knew what is
- and what is not, then we should have no basis for discovering the work of
- objectification in effecting omissions from the formal constitutions of
- things. It is this additional knowledge of the compatibility of what we
- imagine with what we physically feel, that gives this information. We must
- not oversimplify the formal constitutions of the higher grade of acts of
- concrescence by construing a suspended judgment as though it were a
- negative judgment. Our whole progress in scientific theory, and even in
- subtility of direct observation, depends on the use of suspended judgments.
- It is to be noted that a suspended judgment is not a judgment of proba-
- bility. It is a judgment of compatibility. The judgment tells us what may
- be additional information respecting the formal constitutions of the logical
- The Higher Phases of Experience 275
- subjects, information which is neither included nor excluded by our direct
- perception. This is a judgment of fact concerning ourselves. Suspended
- judgments are weapons essential to scientific progress. But in intuitive
- judgments the emotional pattern may be dominated by indifference to
- truth or falsehood. We have then 'conscious imagination/ We are feeling
- the actual world with the conscious imputation of imagined predicates
- be they true or false.
- When we compare these three cases of intuitive judgment (involving
- attention to truth) with conscious imagination (involving inattention to
- truth), that is to say, with 'imputative feeling/ we note that, except in the
- case of negative judgments, the datum of the conscious imagination is
- identical with the datum of the corresponding judgment. Nevertheless,
- the feelings are very different in their emotional patterns. One emotional
- [420] pattern is dominated by indifference to truth; and the other emo-
- tional pattern by attention to truth. This indifference to truth is other-
- wise to be expressed as readiness to eliminate the true objectifying pat-
- tern exemplified in the objective datum of the physical feeling in question;
- while the attention to truth is merely the refusal to eliminate this pattern.
- But these emotional elements in the subjective forms are not dictated
- by any diversity of data in the two feelings. For except in the case of the
- direct negative judgment, the datum is the same in both types of feeling.
- The emotional form of a feeling cannot be merely deduced from datum
- felt, though it has close relation to it. The emotional pattern in the sub-
- jective form of any one feeling arises from the subjective aim dominating
- the entire concrescent process. The other feelings of the subject may be
- conceived as catalytic agents. They are intellectually separable from the
- feeling in question. But that feeling is in fact the outcome of the subjec-
- tive aim of the subject which is its locus; and the emotional pattern is the
- peculiar way in which the subject asserts itself in its feeling. This explana-
- tion of the status of the emotional pattern is merely an application of the
- doctrine that a feeling appropriates elements of the universe, which in
- themselves are other than the subject; and absorbs these elements into
- the real internal constitution of its subject by synthesizing them in the
- unity of an emotional pattern expressive of its own subjectivity.
- This mutual dependence of the emotional pattern of a feeling on the
- other feelings of the same subjectf may be termed the 'mutual sensitivity'
- of feelings. It is also one aspect of the incurable 'particularity' of a feeling,
- in the sense that no feeling can be abstracted from its subject.
- SECTION VII
- 'Physical purposes' constitute a type of comparative feelings more primi-
- tive than the type of intellectual feel- \421] ings. In general, it seems as
- though intellectual feelings are negligible, so as only to obtain importance
- in exceptional actual entities. We have no means of testing this assump-
- 276 The Theory of Prehensions
- tion in any crucial way. It is however the assumption usually made; and
- therefore it may be presumed that there is some evidence which persuades
- people to embrace the doctrine. But in fact no evidence, one way or the
- other, has ever been produced. We know that there are some few entities
- on the surface of this earth with intellectual feelings; and there our knowl-
- edge ends, so far as temporal entities are concerned.
- In the more primitive type of comparative feelings indetermination as
- to its own ingressions— so prominent in intellectual feelings— is the aspect
- of the eternal object which is pushed into the background. In such a type
- of physical purposes the integration of a physical feeling and a conceptual
- feeling does not involve the reduction of the objective datum of the physi-
- cal feeling to a multiplicity of bare logical subjects. The objective datum
- remains the nexus that it is, exemplifying the eternal objects whose in-
- gression constitutes its definiteness. Also the indeterminateness as to its
- own ingressions is eliminated from the eternal object which is the datum
- of the conceptual} feeling. In the integral comparative feeling the datum
- is the contrast of the conceptual datum with the reality of the objectified
- nexus. The physical feeling is feeling a real fact; the conceptual feeling is
- valuing an abstract possibility. The new datum is the compatibility or in-
- compatibility of the fact as felt with the eternal object as a datum in
- feeling. This synthesis of a pure abstraction with a real fact, as in feeling,
- is a generic contrast. In respect to physical purposes, the cosmological
- scheme which is here being developed requires f us to hold that all actual
- entities include physical purposes. The constancy of physical purposes ex-
- plains the persistence of the order of nature, and in particular of 'enduring
- objects/
- [422] The chain of stages in which a physical purpose originates is sim-
- pler than in the case of intellectual feelings: (i) there is a physical feeling;
- (ii) the primary conceptual correlate of the physical feeling is generated,
- according to categoreal condition IV; (iii) this physical feeling is in-
- tegrated with its conceptual correlate to form the physical purpose. Such
- physical purposes are called physical purposes of the first species.
- In such a physical purpose, the datum is the generic contrast between
- the nexus, felt in the physical feeling, and the eternal object valued in the
- conceptual feeling. This eternal object is also exemplified as the pattern of
- the nexus. Thus the conceptual valuation now closes in upon the feeling
- of the nexus as it stands in the generic contrast, exemplifying the valued
- eternal object. This valuation accorded} to the physical feeling endows
- the transcendent creativity with the character of adversion, or of aversion.
- The character of adversion secures the reproduction of the physical feeling,
- as one element in the objectification of the subject beyond itself. Such re-
- production may be thwarted by incompatible objectification derived from
- other feelings. But a physical feeling, whose valuation produces adversion,
- is thereby an element with some force of persistence into the future be-
- yond its own subject. It is felt and re-enacted down a route of occasions
- The Higher Phases of Experience 277
- forming an enduring object. Finally this chain of transmission meets with
- incompatibilities, and is attenuated, or modified, or eliminated from fur-
- ther endurance.
- When there is aversion, instead of adversion, the transcendent creativity
- assumes the character that it inhibits, or attenuates, the objectification of
- that subject in the guise of that feeling. Thus aversion tends to eliminate
- one possibility by which the subject may itself be objectified in the future.
- Thus adversions promote stability; and aversions promote change without
- any indication of the sort of change. In itself an aversion [423] promotes
- the elimination of content, and the lapse into triviality.
- The bare character of mere responsive re-enaction constituting the origi-
- nal physical feeling in its first phase t is enriched in the second phase by
- the valuation accruing from integration with the conceptual correlate. In
- this way, the dipolar character of concrescent experience provides in the
- physical pole for the objective side of experience, derivative from an ex-
- ternal actual world, and provides in the mental pole for the subjective side
- of experience, derivative from the subjective conceptual valuations cor-
- relate to the physical feelings. The mental operations have a double office.
- They achieve, in the immediate subject, the subjective aim of that subject
- as to the satisfaction to be obtained from its own initial data. In this way
- the decision derived from the actual world, which is the efficient cause, is
- completed by the decision embodied in the subjective aim,f which is the
- final cause. Secondly, the physical purposes of a subject by their valuations
- determine the relative efficiency of the various feelings to enter into the
- objectifications of that subject in the creative advance beyond itself. In
- this function, the mental operations determine their subject in its charac-
- ter of an efficient cause. Thus the mental pole is the link whereby the
- creativity is endowed with the double character of final causation, and
- efficient causation. The mental pole is constituted by the decisions in vir-
- tue of which matters of fact enter into the character of the creativity. It
- has no necessary connection with consciousness; though, where there is
- origination of intellectual feelings, consciousness does in fact enter into
- the subjective forms.
- SECTION VIII
- The second species of physical purposes is due to the origination of
- reversions in the mental pole. It is due to this second species that vibration
- and rhythm have a [424] dominating importance in the physical world.
- Reversions are the conceptions which arise by reason of the lure of con-
- trast, as a condition for intensity of experience. This lure is expressible as
- a categoreal condition.
- Categoreal Condition VIII. The Category of Subjective Intensity. The
- subjective aim, whereby there is origination of conceptual feeling, is at+
- intensity of feeling (a) in the immediate subject, and (p) in the relevant
- future.
- 278 The Theory of Prehensions
- We first note (i) that intensity of feeling due to any realized ingression
- of an eternal object is heightened when that eternal object is one element
- in a realized contrast between eternal objects, and (ii) that two or more
- contrasts may be incompatible for joint ingression, or may jointly enter
- into a higher contrast.
- It follows that balanced complexity is the outcome of this* Category of
- Subjective Aim. Here 'complexity' means the realization of contrasts, of
- contrasts of contrasts, and so on; and 'balance' means the absence of at-
- tenuations due to the elimination of contrasts which some elements in the
- pattern would introduce and other elements inhibit.
- Thus there is the urge towards the realization of the maximum number
- of eternal objects subject to the restraint that they must be under condi-
- tions of contrast. But this limitation to 'conditions of contrast' is the de-
- mand for 'balance/ For 'balance' here means that no realized eternal ob-
- ject shall eliminate potential contrasts between other realized eternal ob-
- jects. Such eliminations attenuate the intensities of feeling derivable from
- the ingressions of the various elements of the pattern. Thus so far as the
- immediate present subject is concerned, the origination of conceptual val-
- uation according to Category IV is devoted to such a disposition of em-
- phasis as to maximize the integral intensity derivable from the most fa-
- vourable balance. The subjective aim is the selection of the balance amid
- the given materials. But one element in the immediate feelings of the
- concrescent [425] subject is comprised of the anticipatory feelings of the
- transcendent future in its relation to immediate fact. This is the feeling
- of the objective immortality inherent in the nature of actuality. Such an-
- ticipatory feelings involve realization of the relevance of eternal objects as
- decided in the primordial nature of God. In so far as these feelings in the
- higher organisms rise to important intensities there are effective feelings
- of the more remote alternative possibilities. Such feelings are the con-
- ceptual feelings which arise in accordance with the Category of Reversion
- (Category Vt).
- But there must be 'balance/ and 'balance' is the adjustment of identities
- and diversities for the introduction of contrast with the avoidance of in-
- hibitions by incompatibilities. Thus this secondary phase, involving the
- future, introduces reversion and is subject to Category VIII. t Each re-
- verted conceptual feeling hast its datum largely identical with that of its
- correlate primary feeling of the same pole. In this way, readiness for syn-
- thesis is promoted. But the introduction of contrast is obtained by the
- differences, or reversions, in some elements of the complex data. The
- category expresses the rule that what is identical, and what is reverted, are
- determined by the aim at a favourable balance. The reversion is due to
- the aim at complexity as one condition for intensity.
- When this reverted conceptual feeling acquires a relatively high in-
- tensity of upward valuation in its subjective form, the resulting integra-
- tion of physical feeling, primary conceptual feeling, and secondary con-
- The Higher Phases of Experience 279
- ceptual feeling, produces a more complex physical purpose than in the
- former case when the reverted conceptual feeling was negligible. There is
- now the physical feeling as valued by its integration with the primary
- conceptual feeling, the integration with the contrasted secondary concep-
- tual feeling, the heightening of the scale of subjective intensity by the
- introduction of conceptual contrast, and the concentration of this height-
- ened intensity upon the reverted \426] feeling in virtue of its being the
- novel factor introducing the contrast. The physical purpose thus provides
- the creativity with a complex character, which is governed (i) by the
- Category of Conceptual Reversion, in virtue of which the secondary concep-
- tual feeling arises, (ii) bv the Category of Transmutation, in virtue of which
- conceptual feeling can be transmitted as physical feeling, (iii) by the
- Category of Subjective Harmony, in virtue of which the subjective forms of
- the two conceptual feelings are adjusted to procure the subjective aim,
- and (iv) bv the Category of Subjective Intensity, in virtue of which the
- aim is determined to the attainment of balanced intensity from feelings
- integrated in virtue of near-identity, and contrasted in virtue of reversions.
- Thus in the successive occasions of an enduring object in which the
- inheritance is governed by this complex physical purpose, the reverted
- conceptual feeling is transmitted into the next occasion as physical feeling,
- and the pattern of the original physical feeling now reappears as the datum
- in the reverted conceptual feeling. Thus along the route of the life-history
- there is a chain of contrasts in the physical feelings of the successive occa-
- sions. This chain is inherited as a vivid contrast of physical feelings, and
- in each occasion there is the physical feeling with its primary valuation in
- contrast with the reverted conceptual feeling.
- Thus an enduring object gains the enhanced intensity of feeling arising
- from contrast between inheritance and novel effect, and also gains the en-
- hanced intensity arising from the combined inheritance of its stable
- rhythmic character throughout its life-history. It has the weight of repeti-
- tion, the intensity of contrast, and the balance between the two factors of
- the contrast. In this way the association of endurance with rhythm and
- physical vibration ist to be explained. They arise out of the conditions
- for intensity and stability. The subjective aim is seeking width with its
- contrasts, within the unity of a general design. An intense experience is
- an aesthetic fact, and [427] its categoreal conditions are to be generalized
- from aesthetic laws in particular arts.
- T .ie categoreal conditions, appealed to above, can be summarized thus : 1
- 1. The novel consequent must be graded in relevance so as to pre-
- serve some identity of character with the ground.
- 2. The novel consequent must be graded in relevance so as to pre-
- serve some contrast with the ground in respect to that same identity
- of character,
- 1 My Religion in the Making, Ch. Ill, Sect. VIl.t
- 280 The Theory of Prehensions
- These two principles are derived from the doctrine that an actual
- fact is a fact of aesthetic experience. All aesthetic experience is feeling
- arising out of the realization of contrast under identity.
- In the expansion of this account which has been given here, a third
- principle has been added, that new forms enter into positive realizations
- first as conceptual experience, and are then transmuted into physical
- experience. But conceptual experience does not in itself involve con-
- sciousness; its essence is valuation.
- Between physical purposes and the conscious purposes introduced by
- the intellectual feelings there lie the propositional feelings which have
- not acquired consciousness in their subjective forms by association with
- intellectual feelings. Such propositional feelings mark a stage of existence
- intermediate between the purely physical stage and the stage of conscious
- intellectual operations. The propositions are lures for feelings, and give
- to feelings a definiteness of enjoyment and purpose which is absent in
- the blank evaluation of physical feeling into physical purpose. In this
- blank evaluation we have merely the determination of the comparative
- creative efficacies of the component feelings of actual entities. In a proposi-
- tional feeling there is the 'hold up'— or, in its original sense, the epoch—
- of the valuation of the predicative pattern in its relevance to the definite
- logical subjects which are otherwise felt as definite elements in experience.
- \428] There is the arrest of the emotional pattern round this sheer fact
- as a possibility, with the corresponding gain in distinctness of its relevance
- to the future. The particular possibility for the transcendent creativity—
- in the sense of its advance from subject to subject— this particular possi-
- bility has been picked out, held up, and clothed with emotion. The stage
- of existence in which propositional feelings are important apart from in-
- tellectual feelings, may be identified with Bergson's stage of pure and in-
- stinctive intuition. There are thus three stages, the stage of pure physical
- purpose, the stage of pure instinctive intuition, and the stage of intellectual
- feelings. But these stages are not sharply distinguished. There are stages
- in which there are propositional feelings with every degree of importance
- or of unimportance; there are stages in which there are intellectual feelings
- with every degree of importance or of unimportance. Also,f even in a higher
- stage, there are whole recesses of feeling which in the final satisfaction
- acquire merely the characteristics of their own proper stage, physical or
- propositional.
- PART IV
- THE THEORY OF EXTENSION
- CHAPTER I
- COORDINATE! DIVISION
- SECTION I
- [433] There are two distinct ways of 'dividing' the satisfaction of an
- actual entity into component feelings, genetically and coordinately. Genetic
- division is division of the concrescence; coordinate division is division of
- the concrete. In the 'genetic' mode, the prehensions are exhibited in their
- genetic relationship to each other. The actual entity is seen as a process;
- there is a growth from phase to phase; there are processes of integration
- and of [434] reintegration. At length a complex unity of objective datum
- is obtained, in the guise of a contrast of actual entities, eternal objects,
- and propositions, felt with corresponding complex unity of subjective form.
- This genetic passage from phase to phase is not in physical time: the
- exactly converse point of view expresses the relationship of concrescence
- to physical time. It can be put shortly by saying, that physical time ex-
- presses some features of the growth, but not the growth of the features.
- The final complete feeling is the "'satisfaction.'
- Physical time makes its appearance in the 'coordinate' analysis of the
- 'satisfaction/ The actual entity is the enjoyment of a certain quantum of
- physical time. But the genetic process is not the temporal succession:
- such a view is exactly what is denied by the epochal theory of time. Each
- phase in the genetic process presupposes the entire quantum, and so does
- each feeling in each phase. The subjective unity dominating the process
- forbids the division of that extensive quantum which originates with the
- primary phase of the subjective aim. The problem dominating the con-
- crescence is the actualization of the quantum in solidoA The quantum is
- that standpoint in the extensive continuum which is consonant with the
- subjective aim in its original derivation from God. Here 'God' is that
- actuality in the world, in virtue of which there is physical law/
- There is a spatial element in the quantum as well as a temporal ele-
- ment. Thus the quantum is an extensive region. This region is the deter-
- minate basis which the concrescence presupposes. This basis governs the
- objectifications of the actual world which are possible for the novel con-
- crescence. The coordinate divisibility of the satisfaction is the 'satisfaction'
- considered in its relationship to the divisibility of this region.
- The concrescence presupposes its basic region, and not the region its
- concrescence. Thus the subjective unity of the concrescence is irrelevant
- 283
- 284 The Theory of Extension
- to the divisibility of the [435] region. In dividing the region we are ignoring
- the subjective unity which is inconsistent with such division. But the re-
- gion is, after all, divisible, although in the genetic growth it is undivided.
- So this divisible character of the undivided region is reflected into the
- character of the satisfaction. When we divide the satisfaction coordinately,
- we do not find feelings which are separate, but feelings which might be
- separate. In the same way, the divisions of the region are not divisions
- which are; they are divisions which might be. Each such mode of division
- of the extensive region yields 'extensive quanta': also an 'extensive quan-
- tum' has been termed a 'standpoint/ This notion of a 'standpoint' must
- now be briefly explained.
- The notion has reference to three allied doctrines. First, there is the
- doctrine of 'the actual world' as receiving its definition from the immediate
- concrescent actuality in question. Each actual entity arises out of its own
- peculiar actual world. Secondly, there is the doctrine of each actual world
- as a 'medium/ According to this doctrine, if S be the concrescent subject
- in question, and A and B be two actual entities in its actual world, then
- either A is in the actual world of B, or B is in the actual world of A, or A
- and B are contemporaries. If, for example, A be in the actual world of B,
- then for the immediate subject S there are (1) the direct objectification
- of A in S, and (2) the indirect objectification by reason of the chain of
- objectification, A in B and B in S. Such chains can be extended to any
- length by the inclusion of many intermediate actualities between A
- and S.
- Thirdly, it is to be noticed that 'decided' conditions are never such as
- to banish freedom. They only qualify it. There is always a contingency
- left open for immediate decision. This consideration is exemplified by an
- indetermination respecting 'the actual world' which is to decide the con-
- ditions for an immediately novel concrescence. There are alternatives as to
- its determination, which are left over for immediate decision. Some actual
- [436] entities may be either in the settled past, or in the contemporary
- nexus, or even left to the undecided future, according to immediate de-
- cision. Also the indirect chains of successive objectifications will be modi-
- fied according to such choice. These alternatives are represented by the
- indecision as to the particular quantum of extension to be chosen for the
- basis of the novel concrescence.
- SECTION II
- The sense in which the coordinate divisions of the satisfaction are
- 'feelings which might be separated has now to be discussed.
- Each such coordinate division corresponds to a definite sub-region of
- the basic region. It expresses that component of the satisfaction which
- has the character of a unified feeling of the actual world from the stand-
- point of that sub-region. In so far as the objectification of the actual world
- Coordinate Division 285
- from this restricted standpoint is concerned, there is nothing to distinguish
- this coordinate division from an actual entity. But it is only the physical
- pole of the actual entity which is thus divisible. The mental pole is in-
- curably one. Thus the subjective form of this coordinate division is de-
- rived from the origination of conceptual feelings which have regard to
- the complete region, and are not restricted to the sub-region in question.
- In other words, the conceptual feelings have regard to the complete actual
- entity, and not to the coordinate division in question. Thus the whole
- course of the genetic derivation of the coordinate division is not explicable
- by reference to the categoreal conditions governing the concrescence of
- feeling arising from the mere physical feeling of the restricted objective
- datum. The originative energy of the mental pole constitutes the urge
- whereby its conceptual prehensions adjust and readjust subjective forms
- and thereby determine the specific modes of integration terminating in
- the 'satisfaction/
- It is obvious that in so far as the mental pole is trivial [437] as to orig-
- inality, what is inexplicable in the coordinate division (taken as actually
- separate) becomes thereby trivial. Thus for many abstractions concerning
- low-grade actual entities, the coordinate divisions approach the character
- of being actual entities on the same level as the actual entity from which
- they are derived.
- It is thus an empirical question to decide in relation to special topics,
- whether the distinction between a coordinate division and a true actual
- entity is, or is not, relevant. In so far as it is not relevant we are dealing
- with an indefinitely subdivisible extensive universe.
- A coordinate division is thus to be classed as a generic contrast. The two
- components of the contrast are, (i) the parent actual entity, and (ii) the
- proposition which is the potentiality of that superject having arisen from
- the physical standpoint of the restricted sub-region. The proposition is
- thus the potentiality of eliminating from the physical pole of the parent
- entity all the objectified actual world, except those elements derivable from
- that standpoint; and yet retaining the relevant elements of the subjective
- form.
- The unqualified proposition is false, because the mental pole, which
- is in fact operative, would not be the mental pole under the hypothesis
- of the proposition. But, for many purposes, the falsity of the proposition
- is irrelevant. The proposition is very complex; and with the relevant quali-
- fications depending on the topic in question, it expresses the truth. In
- other words, the unqualified false proposition is a matrix from which an
- indefinite number of true qualified propositions can be derived. The req-
- uisite qualification depends on the special topic in question, and ex-
- presses the limits of the application of the unqualified proposition rele-
- vantly to that topic.
- The unqualified proposition expresses the indefinite divisibility of the
- actual world; the qualifications express the features of the world which
- 286 The Theory of Extension
- are lost sight of by the [438] unguarded use of this principle. The actual
- world is atomic: but in some senses it is indefinitely divisible.
- SECTION III
- The atomic actual entities individually express the genetic unity of the
- universe. The world expands through recurrent unifications of itself, each,
- by the addition of itself, automatically recreating the multiplicity anew.
- The other type of indefinite multiplicity, introduced by the indefinite
- coordinate divisibility of each atomic actuality, seems to show that, at
- least for certain purposes, the actual world is to be conceived as a mere
- indefinite multiplicity.
- But this conclusion is to be limited by the principle of 'extensive order'
- which steps in. The atomic unity of the world, expressed by a multiplicity
- of atoms, is now replaced by the solidarity of the extensive continuum.
- This solidarity embraces not only the coordinate divisions within each
- atomic actuality, but also exhibits the coordinate divisions of all atomic
- actualities from each other in one scheme of relationship.
- In an earlier chapter (Part II, Ch. IV, Sects. IV to IXt) the sense in
- which the world can be conceived as a medium for the transmission of in-
- fluences! has been discussed. This orderly arrangement of a variety of
- routes of transmission, by which alternative objectifications of an ante-
- cedent actuality A can be indirectly received into the constitution of a sub-
- sequent actuality B, is the foundation of the extensive relationship among
- diverse actual entities. But this scheme of external extensive relationships
- links itself with the schemes of internal division which are internal to the
- several actual entities. There is, in this way, one basic scheme of extensive
- connection which expresses on one uniform plant (i) the general condi-
- tions to which the bonds, uniting the atomic actualities into a nexus, con-
- form, and (ii) the general conditions to which the bonds, uniting the
- infinite num- [439] ber of coordinate subdivisions of the satisfaction of any
- actual entity, conform.
- As an example of (ii), suppose that P is a coordinate division of an
- actual occasion A. Then P can be conceived as an actual occasion with its
- own actual world forming its initial datum in its first phase of genetic
- origination. In fact, P is the hypothetical satisfaction of a hypothetical
- process of concrescence with this standpoint. The other coordinate divi-
- sions of A are either in the 'actual world' for P, or are contemporary with
- P, or are coordinate divisions of P, or have a complex relation to P ex-
- pressed by the property that each one of them is coordinately divisible
- into prehensions Q^ Q 2 . . ., such that each of them has one or othert
- of the three above-mentioned relations to P.
- Further, in addition to the merely potential subdivisions of a satisfaction
- into coordinate feelings, there is the merely potential aggregation of actual
- entities into a super-actuality in respect to which the true actualities play
- Coordinate Division 287
- the part of coordinate subdivisions. In other words, just as,f for some pur-
- poses, one atomic actuality can be treated as though it were many co-
- ordinate actualities, in the same way, for other purposes, t a nexus of many
- actualities can be treated as though it were one actuality. This is what we
- habitually do in the case of the span of life of a molecule, or of a piece of
- rock, or of a human body.
- This extensiveness is the pervading generic form to which the morpho-
- logical structures t of the organisms of the world conform. These organisms
- are of two types: one type consists of the individual actual entities; the
- other type consists of nexus of actual entities. Both types are correlated
- by their common extensiveness. If we confine our attention to the sub-
- division of an actual entity into coordinate parts, we shall conceive of
- extensiveness as purely derived from the notion of 'whole and part/ that
- is to say, 'extensive whole and extensive part/ This was the view taken
- by me in myt two earlier investigations of the [440] subject. 1 This defect
- of starting-point revenged itself in the fact that the 'method of extensive
- abstraction' developed in those works was unable to define a 'point't with-
- out the intervention of the theory of 'duration/ Thus what should have
- been a property of 'durations' became the definition of a point. By this
- mode of approach the extensive relations of actual entities mutually ex-
- ternal to each other were pushed into the background; though they are
- equally fundamental.
- Since that date Professor T. de Laguna 2 has shown that the somewhat
- more general notion of 'extensive connection' can be adopted as the start-
- ing-point for the investigation of extension; and that the more limited
- notion of 'whole and part 7 can be defined in terms of it. In this way, as
- Professor de Laguna has shown, my difficulty in the definition of a point,
- without recourse to other considerations, can be overcome.
- This whole question is investigated in the succeeding chapters of this
- Part.t Also I there give a definition of a straight line, and of 'flat' loci gen-
- erally, in terms of purely extensive principles without reference to measure-
- ment or to durations.
- SECTION IV
- An actual entity, in its character of being a physical occasion, is an act
- of blind perceptivity of the other physical occasions of the actual world.
- When we consider such an occasion morphologically, as a given entity,
- its perceptive bonds are divisible by reason of the extensive divisibility of
- its own standpoints, and by reason of the extensive divisibility of the other
- actual occasions. Thus we reach perceptive bonds involving one sub-region
- of the basic region of the perceiver, and one subdivision of the basic region
- 1 Cf. The Principles of Natural Knowledge, 1919, and The Concept of Nature,
- 1920, Cambridge University Press, England.
- 2 Cf. Professor de Laguna'sf three articles in the Journal of Philosophy, Psy-
- chology, and Scientific Method, Vol. XIX, 1922, especially the third article.
- 288 The Theory of Extension
- of the perceived. The relationship between these sub-regions involves the
- status of inter- [441] mediate regions functioning as agents in the process
- of transmission. In other words, the perspective of one sub-region from
- the other is dependent on the fact that the extensive relations express
- the conditions laid on the actual world in its function of a medium.
- These extensive relations do not make determinate what is transmitted;
- but they do determine conditions to which all transmission must conform.
- They represent the systematic scheme which is involved in the real poten-
- tiality from which every actual occasion arises. This scheme is also involved
- in the attained fact which every actual occasion is. The 'extensive' scheme
- is nothing else than the generic morphology of the internal relations which
- bind the actual occasions into a nexus, and which bind the prehensions of
- any one actual occasion into a unity, coordinately divisible.
- For Descartes the primary attribute of physical bodies is extension; for
- the philosophy of organism the primary relationship of physical occasions
- is extensive connection. This ultimate relationship is sui generis 7 and can-
- not be defined or explained. But its formal properties can be stated. Also,t
- in view of these formal properties, there are definable derivative notions
- which are of importance in expressing the morphological structure. Some
- general character of coordinate divisibility is probably an ultimate meta-
- physical character, persistent in every cosmic epoch of physical occasions.
- Thus some of the simpler characteristics of extensive connection, as here
- stated, are probably such ultimate metaphysical necessities.
- But when we examine the characteristics considered in the next chapter,
- it is difficult to draw the line distinguishing characteristics so general that
- we cannot conceive any alternatives, from characteristics so special that we
- imagine them to belong merely to our cosmic epoch. Such an epoch may
- be, relatively to our powers, of immeasurable extent, temporally and spa-
- tially. But in reference to the ultimate nature of things, it is a limited
- nexus. Beyond that nexus, entities with new relationships, unrealized in
- our experiences and unforeseen by our imagi- [442} nations, will make their
- appearance, introducing into the universe new types of order.
- But, for our epoch, extensive connection with its various characteristics
- is the fundamental organic relationship whereby the physical world is
- properly described as a community. There are no important physical rela-
- tionships outside the extensive scheme. To be an actual occasion in the
- physical world means that the entity in question is a relatum in this
- scheme of extensive connection. In this epoch, the scheme defines what
- is physically actual.
- The more ultimate side of this scheme, perhaps that side which is meta-
- physically necessary, is at once evident by the consideration of the mutual
- implication of extensive whole and extensive part. If you abolish the
- whole, you abolish its parts; and if you abolish any part, then that whole
- is abolished.
- In this general description of the states of extension, nothing has been
- Coordinate Division 289
- said about physical time or physical space, or of the more general notion
- of creative advance. These are notions which presuppose the more gen-
- eral relationship of extension. They express additional facts about the
- actual occasions. The extensiveness of space is really the spatialization of
- extension; and the extensiveness of time is really the temporalization of
- extension. Physical time expresses the reflection of genetic divisibility into
- coordinate divisibility.
- So far as mere extensiveness is concerned, space might as well have
- three hundred and thirty-three dimensions, instead of the modest three
- dimensions of our present epoch. The three dimensions of space form
- an additional fact about the physical occasions. Indeed the sheer dimen-
- sionality of space, apart from the precise number of dimensions, is such
- an additional fact, not involved in the mere notion of extension. Also the
- seriality of time, unique or multiple, cannot be derived from the sole no-
- tion of extension.
- [443] The notion of nature as an organic extensive community omits
- the equally essential point of view that nature is never complete. It is
- always passing beyond itself. This is the creative advance of nature. Here
- we come to the problem of time. The immediately relevant point to notice
- is that time and space are characteristics of nature which presuppose the
- scheme of extension. But extension does not in itself determine the special
- facts which are true respecting physical time and physical space.
- SECTION V
- The consideration of coordination and genesis raises a question wider
- than any yet discussed in this chapter.
- The theory of 'prehensions' embodies a protest against the 'bifurcation'
- of nature. It embodies even more than that: its protest is against the
- bifurcation of actualities. In the analysis of actuality the antithesis be-
- tween publicity and privacy obtrudes itself at every stage. There are ele-
- ments only to be understood by reference to what is beyond the fact in
- question; and there are elements expressive of the immediate, private, per-
- sonal, individuality of the fact in question. The former elements express
- the publicity of the world; the latter elements express the privacy of the
- individual.
- An actual entity considered in reference to the publicity of things is a
- superjecf ; namely, it arises from the publicity which it finds, and it adds
- itself to the publicity which it transmits. It is a moment of passage from
- decided public facts to a novel public fact. Public facts are, in their nature,
- coordinate.
- An actual entity considered in reference to the privacy of things is a
- 'subject'; namely, it is a moment of the genesis of self-enjoyment. It con-
- sists of a purposed self-creation out of materials which are at hand in vir-
- tue of their publicity.
- 290 The Theory of Extension
- Eternal objects have the same dual reference. An eternal object con-
- sidered in reference to the publicity [444] of things is at 'universal';
- namely, in its own nature it refers to the general public facts of the world
- without any disclosure of the empirical details of its own implication in
- them. Its own nature as an entity requires ingression— positive or negative
- —in every detailed actuality; but its nature does not disclose the private
- details of any actuality.
- An eternal object considered in reference to the privacy of things is a
- 'quality' or 'characteristic'; namely, in its own nature, as exemplified in any
- actuality, it constitutes an element in the private definiteness of that ac-
- tuality. It refers itself publicly; but it is enjoyed privately.
- The theory of prehensions is founded upon the doctrine that there are
- no concrete facts which are merely public, or merely private. The dis-
- tinction between publicity and privacy is a distinction of reason, and is
- not a distinction between mutually exclusive concrete facts. The sole
- concrete facts, in terms of which actualities can be analysed, are prehen-
- sions; and every prehension has its public side and its private side. Its
- public side is constituted by the complex datum prehended; and its private
- side is constituted by the subjective form through which a private quality
- is imposed on the public datum. The separations of perceptual fact from
- emotional fact; and of causal fact from emotional fact, and from per-
- ceptual fact;t and of perceptual fact, emotional fact, and causal fact, from
- purposive fact; have constituted a complex of bifurcations, fatal to a satis-
- factory cosmology. The facts of nature are the actualities; and the facts
- into which the actualities are divisible are their prehensions, with their
- public origins, their private forms, and their private aims. But the actuali-
- ties are moments of passage into a novel stage of publicity; and the co-
- ordination of prehensions expresses the publicity of the world, so far as
- it can be considered in abstraction from private genesis. Prehensions have
- public careers, but they are born privately. [445]
- SECTION VI
- The antithesis between publicity and privacy is reflected in the classi-
- fication of eternal objects according to their primary modes of ingression
- into actual entities. An eternal object can only function in the con-
- crescence of an actual entity in one of three ways: (i) it can be an element
- in the definiteness of some objectified nexus, or of some single actual entity,
- which is the datum of a feeling; (ii) it can be an element in the definite-
- ness of the subjective form of some feeling; or (iii) it can be an element
- in the datum of a conceptual, or propositional, feeling. AH other modes
- of ingression arise from integrations which presuppose these modes.
- Now the third mode is merely the conceptual valuation of the potential
- ingression in one of the other two modes. It is a real ingression into actu-
- Coordinate Division 291
- ality; but it is a restricted ingression with mere potentiality withholding
- the immediate realization of its function of conferring definiteness.
- The two former modes of ingression thus constitute the ways in which
- the functioning of an eternal object is unrestrictedly realized. But we
- now ask whether either mode is indifferently open to each eternal object.
- The answer is the classification of eternal objects into two species, the
- 'objective' species, and the 'subjective' species.
- An eternal object of the objective species can only obtain ingression in
- the first mode, and never in the second mode. It is always, in its un-
- restricted realization, an element in the definiteness of an actual entity,
- or a nexus, which is the datum of a feeling belonging to the subject in
- question.
- Thus a member of this species can only function relationally: by a
- necessity of its nature it is introducing one actual entity, or nexus, into
- the real internal constitution of another actual entity. Its sole avocation
- is to be an agent in objectification. It can never be an element in [446] the
- definiteness of a subjective form. The solidarity of the world rests upon
- the incurable objectivity of this species of eternal objects. A member of
- this species inevitably introduces into the immediate subject other actu-
- alities. The definiteness with which it invests the external world may, or
- may not, conform to the real internal constitutions of the actualities ob-
- jectified. But conformably, or non-con formably, such is the character of
- that nexus for that actual entity. This is a real physical fact, with its
- physical consequences. Eternal objects of the objective species are the
- mathematical Platonict forms. They concern the world as a medium.
- But the description of sensa given above (Part II, Ch. IV,t Sect. Ill)
- will include some members of the subjective species.
- A member of the subjective species is, in its primary character, an ele-
- ment in the definiteness of the subjective form of a feeling. It is a deter-
- minate way in which a feeling can feel. It is an emotion, or an intensity, or
- an adversion, or an aversion, or a pleasure, or a pain. It defines the sub-
- jective form of feeling of one actual entity. Aj may be that component of
- A's constitution through which A is objectified for B. Thus when B feels
- A b it feels 'A with that feeling/ In this way, the eternal object which con-
- tributes to the definiteness of A's feeling becomes an eternal object con-
- tributing to the definiteness of A as an objective datum in B ? s prehension
- of A. The eternal object can then function both subjectively and relatively.
- It can be a private element in a subjective form, and also an agent in the
- objectification. In this latter character it may come under the operation
- of the Category of Transmutation and become a characteristic of a nexus
- as objectified for a percipient.
- In the first stage of B's physical feeling, the subjective form of B's feel-
- ing is conformed to the subjective form of A's feeling. Thus this eternal
- object in B's experience will have a two-way mode of functioning. It will
- be among the determinants of A for B, and it will be among [447] the
- 292 The Theory of Extension
- determinants of B's way of sympathy with A. The intensity of physical
- energy belongs to the subjective species of eternal objects, but the peculiar
- form of the flux of energy belongs to the objective species.
- For example, 'redness* may first be the definiteness of an emotion which
- is a subjective form in the experience of A; it then becomes an agent
- whereby A is objectified for B, so that A is objectified in respect to its
- prehension with this emotion. But A may be only one occasion of a nexus,
- such that each of its members is objectified for B by a prehension with an
- analogous subjective form. Then by the operation of the Category of
- Transmutation, the nexus is objectified for B as illustrated by the charac-
- teristic 'redness/ The nexus will also be illustrated by its mathematical
- forms which are eternal objects of the objective species.
- SECTION VII
- The feelings— or, more accurately, the quasi-feelings— introduced by
- the coordinate division of actual entities eliminate the proper status of the
- subjects entertaining the feelings. For the subjective forms of feelings are
- only explicable by the categoreal demands arising from the unity of the
- subject. Thus the coordinate division of an actual entity produces feelings
- whose subjective forms are partially eliminated and partially inexplicable.
- But this mode of division preserves undistorted the elements of deflnite-
- ness introduced by eternal objects of the objective species.
- Thus in so far as the relationships of these feelings require an appeal
- to subjective forms for their explanation, the gap must be supplied by the
- introduction of arbitrary laws of nature regulating the relations of inten-
- sities. Alternatively, the subjective forms become arbitrary epiphenomenal
- facts, inoperative in physical nature, though claiming operative importance.
- The order of nature, prevalent in the cosmic epoch in question, exhibits
- itself as a morphological scheme in- [448] volving eternal objects of the ob-
- jective species. The most fundamental elements in this scheme are those
- eternal objects in terms of which the general principles of coordinate divi-
- sion itself are expressed. These eternal objects express the theory of exten-
- sion in its most general aspect. In this theory the notion of the atomicity
- of actual entities, each with its concrescent privacy, has been entirely
- eliminated. We are left with the theory of extensive connection, of whole
- and part, of points, lines, and surfaces, and of straightness and flatness.
- The substance of this chapter can be recapitulated in a summary: Ge-
- netic division is concerned with an actual occasion in its character of a
- concrescent immediacy. Coordinate division is concerned with an actual
- occasion in its character of a concrete object. Thus for genetic division
- the primary fact about an occasion is its initial 'dative 7 phase; for coordi-
- nate division the primary fact is the final 'satisfaction/ But with the at-
- tainment of the 'satisfaction/ the immediacy of final causation is lost, and
- the occasion passes into its objective immortality, in virtue of which efE-
- Coordinate Division 293
- cient causation is constituted. Thus in coordinate division we are analysing
- the complexity of the occasion in its function of an efficient cause. It is
- in this connection that the morphological scheme of extensiveness attains
- its importance. In this way we obtain an analysis of the dative phase in
- terms of the 'satisfactions* of the past world. These satisfactions are sys-
- tematically disposed in their relative status, according as one is, or is not,
- in the actual world of another. Also they are divisible into prehensions
- which can be treated as quasi-actualities with the same morphological
- system of relative status. This morphological system gains special order
- from the defining characteristic of the present cosmic epoch. The ex-
- tensive continuum is this specialized ordering of the concrete occasions
- and of the prehensions into which they are divisible.
- CHAPTER II
- EXTENSIVE CONNECTION
- SECTION I
- [449] In this chapter we enumerate the chief characteristics of the
- physical relationship termed 'extensive connection/ We also enumerate
- the derivative notions which are of importance in our physical experience.
- This importance has its origin in the characteristics enumerated. The defi-
- nitions of the derivative notions, as mere definitions, are equally applicable
- to any scheme of relationship whatever its characteristics. But they are
- only of importance when the relationship in question has the character-
- istics here enumerated for extensive connection.
- No attempt will be made to reduce these enumerated characteristics to
- a logical minimum from which the remainder can be deduced by strict
- deduction. There is not a unique set of logical minima from which the
- rest can be deduced. There are many such sets. The investigation of such
- sets has great logical interest and has an importance which extends beyond
- logic. But it is irrelevant for the purposes of this discussion.
- For the sake of brevity the terms 'connection' and 'connected' will be
- used in the place of 'extensive connection' and Extensively connected/
- The term 'region' will be used for the relata which are involved in the
- scheme of 'extensive connection/ Thus, in the shortened phraseology,
- regions are the things which are connected.
- A set of diagrams will illustrate the type of relationship meant by 'con-
- nection/ The two areas, A and B, in each diagram exhibit an instance of
- connection with each other,
- [450] Such diagrams are apt to be misleading: t for one reason, because
- they introduce features as obvious, which it is our business to define in
- terms of our fundamental notion of 'connection'; for another reason, be-
- cause they introduce features which are special to the two-dimensional,
- spatial extensiveness of a sheet of paper.
- In the three diagrams of Set II, the areas, A and B, are not connected;
- but they are 'mediately' connected by the area C.
- SECTION II
- Definition Li Two regions are 'mediately' connected when they are
- both connected with a third region.
- 294
- Extensive Connection
- 295
- DIAGRAMS I
- (vi)
- Assumption 1. Connection and mediate connection are both of them
- symmetrical relations; that is to say, if region A is connected, or mediately
- connected, with region B, then region B is connected, or mediately con-
- nected, with region A.
- [451] It is obvious that the part of this assumption which concerns medi-
- ate connection can be proved from the terms of the definition. In the sub-
- sequent development of definitions and assumptions we shall not draw at-
- tention to such instances of the possibility of proof.
- Assumption 2. No region is connected with all the other regions; and
- any two regions are mediately connected.
- Assumption 3. Connection is not transitive; that is to say, if A be con-
- nected with B, and B with C, it does not thereby follow that A is con-
- nected with C; though in certain cases it does happen that A is connected
- with C.
- Assumption 4, No region is connected, or mediately connected, with
- itself.
- [452] This assumption is merely a convenient arrangement of nomen-
- clature.
- Definition 2. Region A is said to 'include' region B when every region
- connected with B is also connected with A. As an alternative nomen-
- clature, region B will be said to be 'part' of region A.
- This definition of 'inclusion' is due to Professor de Laguna; it constitutes
- an important addition to the theory of extension. In such investigations,
- as the present one, the definitions are the really vital portion of the subject.
- 296
- The Theory of Extension
- (i)
- DIAGRAMS II t
- (ii)
- Assumption 5. When one region includes another, the two regions are
- connected.
- Assumption 6. The relation of inclusion is transitive.
- Assumption 7. A region does not include itself.
- Assumption 8. The relation of inclusion is asymmetrical: that is to say,
- if A includes B, then B does not include A.
- Assumption 9. Every region includes other regions; and a pair of regions
- thus included in one region are not necessarily connected with each other.
- Such pairs can always be found, included in any given region.
- Definition 3, Two regions are said to 'overlap/ when there is a third re-
- gion which they both include.
- Assumption 10. The relation of overlapping is symmetrical.
- Assumption J J. If one region includes another region, the two regions
- overlap.
- Assumption 12. Two regions which overlap are connected.
- Definition 4. A 'dissection' of any given region A, is a set of regions,
- which is such that (i) all its members are included in A, (ii) no two of
- its members overlap, (iii) any region included in A, but not a member of
- the set, either is included in one member of the set, or overlaps more than
- one member of the set.
- Assumption 13. t There are many dissections of any given region.
- Extensive Connection 297
- [453] Assumption 14A A dissection of a region is not a dissection of any
- other region.
- Definition 5. A region is called an 'intersect' of two overlapping regions,
- A and B, when (i) either it is included in both A and B, or it is one of the
- two regions and is included in the other, and (ii) no region, also included
- in both A and B, can overlap it without being included in it.
- Definition 6A If there be one, and only one, intersect of two regions, A
- and B, those regions are said to overlap with 'unique intersection'; if there
- be more than one intersect, they are said to overlap with 'multiple
- intersection/
- Assumption ISA Any region included in both of two overlapping re-
- gions, and not itself an intersect, is included in one, and only one, inter-
- sect.
- Assumption 16 A If A includes B, then B is the sole intersect of A and B.
- Assumption 17 A An intersect of two regions, which is not one of the
- two regions, is included in both regions.
- Assumption 18 A Each pair of overlapping regions has at least one
- intersect.
- Definition 7. Two regions are 'externally' connected when (i) they are
- connected, and (ii) they do not overlap. The possibility of this definition
- is another of the advantages gained from the adoption of Professor de
- Laguna's starting-point, 'extensive connection/ over my original starting-
- point, 1 'extensive whole and extensive part/ External connection is il-
- lustrated by diagrams (v) and (vi) in Set I of the diagrams. So far, we
- have not discriminated between the two cases illustrated respectively by
- these two diagrams. The notion of external connection is a long step
- towards the elaboration of the notion of a 'surface/ which has not yet been
- touched upon.
- Definition 8, A region B is 'tangentially' included in a region A, when
- (i) B is included in A, and (ii) there are \454] regions which are externally
- connected with both A and B.
- Definition 9. A region B is 'non-tangentially' included in a region A
- when (i) B is included in A, and (ii) there is no third region which is
- externally connected with both A and B.
- The possibility, at this stage, of the three definitions 7, 8, and 9, con-
- stitutes the advantage to be gained by starting from Professor de Laguna's
- notion of 'extensive connection/ Non-tangential inclusion is illustrated by
- diagram (i) of the first set; and the two cases—as yet undiscriminated—
- of tangential inclusion are illustrated by diagrams (ii) and (iii).
- SECTION III
- Definition 10. A set of regions is called an 'abstractive set/ when (i) any
- two members of the set are such that one of them includes the other
- 1 Cf . my Principles of Natural Knowledge, and Concept of Nature.
- 298 The Theory of Extension
- non-tangentially, andf (ii) there is no region included in every member of
- the set.
- This definition practically limits abstractive sets to those sets which were
- termed 'simple abstractive sets' in iiiy Principles of Natural Knowledge
- (paragraph 37.6). Since every region includes other regions, and since the
- relation of inclusion is transitive, it is evident that every abstractive set
- must be composed of an infinite number of members.
- By reference to the particular case of three-dimensioned space, we see
- that abstractive sets can have different types of convergence. For in this
- case, an abstractive set can converge either to a point, or to a line, or to an
- area. But it is to be noted that we have not defined either points, or lines,
- or areas; and that we propose to define them in terms of abstractive sets.
- Thus we must define the various types of abstractive sets without reference
- to the notions, point, line, area.
- Definition 11. An abstractive set a is said to 'cover' an [455] abstractive
- set p, when every member of the set a includes some members of the
- set p.
- It is to be noticed that each abstractive set is to be conceived with its
- members in serial order, determined by the relation of inclusion. The
- series starts with a region of any size, and converges indefinitely towards
- smaller and smaller regions, without any limiting region. When the set a
- covers the set p 7 each member of a includes all the members of the con-
- vergent tail of p,\ provided that we start far enough down in the serial
- arrangement of the set p. It will be found that, though an abstractive set
- must start with some region at its big end, these initial large-sized regions
- never enter into our reasoning. Attention is always fixed on what relations
- occur when we have proceeded far enough down the series. The only re-
- lations which are interesting are those which, if they commence anywhere,
- continue throughout the remainder of the infinite series.
- Definition 12. Two abstractive sets are said to be 'equivalent' when each
- set covers the other.
- Thus if a and p be the two equivalent abstractive sets, and A 1 be any
- member of a, there is some member of p, B ± say, which is included in Aijf
- also there is some member of a, A 2 say, which is included in B^ also
- there is some member of p, B 2 say, which is included in A 2 ;t and so
- on indefinitely. Two equivalent abstractive sets are equivalent in respect to
- their convergence. But, in so far as the two sets are diverse, there will be
- relationships and characteristics in respect to which those sets are not
- equivalent, in a more general sense of the term 'equivalence/ The connec-
- tion of this special sense of 'equivalence' to physical properties is explained
- more particularly in Chapter IV of the Concept of Nature.
- Assumption 19 A An abstractive set is equivalent to itself. This assump-
- tion is merely a convenient arrangement of nomenclature. An abstractive
- set obviously satisfies the conditions for such reflexive equivalence.
- Definition 13. A geometrical element is a complete [456] group of ab-
- Extensive Connection 299
- stractive sets equivalent to each other, and not equivalent to any abstrac-
- tive set outside the group.
- Assumption 20 A The relation of equivalence is transitive and sym-
- metrical.
- Thus any two members of a geometrical element are equivalent to each
- other; and an abstractive set, not belonging to the geometrical element, is
- not equivalent to any member of that geometrical element. It is evident
- that each abstractive set belongs to one, and only one, geometrical element.
- Definition 14. The geometrical element to which an abstractive set
- belongs! is called the geometrical element 'associated' with that abstrac-
- tive set. Thus a geometrical element is 'associated* with each of its
- members.
- Assumption 21 A Any abstractive set which covers any member of a geo-
- metrical elementf also covers every member of that element.
- Assumption 22 A An abstractive set which is covered by any member of
- a geometrical elementf is also covered by every member of that element.
- Assumption 23 A If a and b be two geometrical elements, either every
- member of a covers every member of b, or no member of a covers any
- member of b.
- Definition IS. The geometrical element a is said to be 'incident* in the
- geometrical element 6, when every member of b covers every member of a,
- but a and b are not identical.
- Assumption 24 A A geometrical element is not incident in itself.
- This assumption is merely a convenient arrangement of nomenclature.
- When the geometrical element a is incident in the geometrical element
- 6, the members of a will be said to have a 'sharper convergence* than those
- of 6.
- Definition 16. A geometrical element is called a 'point/ when there is no
- geometrical element incident in it. This definition of a 'point* is to be
- compared with Euclid's definition: 'A point is without parts.*
- [457} Definition 16.1. The members of a geometrical element are said to
- be 'prime* in reference to assigned conditions, when (i) every member of
- that geometrical element satisfies! those conditions; (ii) if any abstractive
- set satisfies those conditions, every member of its associated geometrical
- element satisfies them; (iii) there is no geometrical element, with mem-
- bers satisfying those conditions, which is also incident in the given geo-
- metrical element.
- The term 'prime* will also be applied to a geometrical element, when
- its members are 'prime* in the sense defined above.
- It is obvious that a point is, in a sense, an 'absolute* prime. This is, in
- fact, the sense in which the definition! of a point, given here, conforms to
- Euclid's definition.
- Definition 17. An abstractive set which is a member of a point will be
- called punctual.*
- Definition 18. A geometrical element is called a 'segment between two
- 300 The Theory of Extension
- points P and QJ when its members are prime in reference to the condition
- that the points P and O are incident in it.
- Definition 19. When a geometrical element is a segment between two
- points, those points are called the 'end-points' of the segment.
- Definition 20. An abstractive set which is a member of a segment is
- called 'segmental/
- Assumption 25. f There are many diverse segments with the same end-
- points; t but a segment has only one pair of end-points.
- This assumption illustrates the fact that there can be many geometrical
- elements which are prime in reference to some given conditions. There are,
- however, conditions such that there is only one geometrical element prime
- to any one of them. For example, the set of points incident in one geo-
- metrical element uniquely defines that geometrical element. Also another
- instance of uniqueness is to be found in the theory of 'flat' geometrical
- elements, to be considered in the next chapter. A particular instance of
- such 'flat' elements is afforded \458] by straight lines. The whole theory of
- geometry depends upon the discovery of conditions which correspond to
- one, and only one, prime geometrical element. The Greeks, with their
- usual fortunate intuition, chanced upon such conditions in their notions of
- straight lines and planes. There is every reason, however, to believe that,
- in other epochs, widely different types of conditions with this property may
- be important— perhaps even in this epoch. The discovery of them is ob-
- viously of the first importance. It is possible that the modern Einsteinian
- reconstruction of physics is best conceived as the discovery of the inter-
- weaving in nature of different types of such conditions.
- SECTION IV
- Definition 21. A point is said to be 'situated' in a region, when the
- region is a member of one of the punctual abstractive sets which compose
- that point.
- Assumption 26 A If a point be situated in a region, the regions, suf-
- ficiently far down the convergent tails of the various abstractive sets com-
- posing that point, are included in that region non-tangentially.
- Definition 22, A point is said to be situated in the 'surface' of a region,
- when all the regions in which it is situated overlap that region but are
- not included in it.
- Definition 23. A 'complete locus' is a set of points which compose either
- (i) all the points situated in a region, or (ii) all the points situated in the
- surface of a region, or (hi) all the points incident in a geometrical element
- A 'locus' always means a 'locus of points. 7
- Assumption 27 X A 'complete locus,' as defined in Definition 23, consists
- of an infinite number of points.
- Definition 24. When a complete locus consists of all the points situated
- in a region, it is called the 'volume' of that region; when a complete locus
- consists of all the points in the surface of a region, the locus itself is called
- Extensive Connection 301
- the 'surface* of that region; when a complete locus consists of all the points
- incident in a segment between end- [459] points, the locus is called a linear
- stretch* between those end-points.
- Assumption 28 A There is a one-to-one correlation between volumes and
- regions, between surfaces and regions, and between linear stretches and
- segments, and between any geometrical element and the locus of points
- incident in it.
- Assumption 29 A If two points lie in a given volume, there are linear
- stretches joining those two points, whose points all lie in that volume.
- Assumption 30 A If two points lie in a given surface, there are linear
- stretches joining those two points, whose points all lie in that surface.
- Assumption 31 A If two points lie in a given linear stretch, there is one,
- and only one, linear stretch with those points as end-points, whose points
- lie wholly in the given linear stretch.
- It should be noted that the terms 'volume' and 'surface* are not meant
- to imply that volumes are three-dimensional, or that surfaces are two-di-
- mensional. In the application of this theory of extension to the existing
- physical world of our epoch, volumes are four-dimensional, and surfaces
- are three-dimensional. But linear stretches are one-dimensional.
- +A sufficient number of assumptions, some provable and some axio-
- matic, have now been stated; so as to make clear the sort of development
- of the theory required for this stage of the definitions. In particular, the
- notion of the order of points in a linear stretch can now be elaborated
- from the definition of the notion of 'between/ But such investigations will
- lead us too far into the mathematical principles of geometry. +
- [S46]i An explanatory paragraph is required at the end of this chapter to
- make clear the principle that a certain determinate boundedness is re-
- quired for the notion of a region— i.e., for the notion of an extensive
- standpoint in the real potentiality for actualization. The inside of a re-
- gion, its volume, has a complete boundedness denied to the extensive po-
- tentiality external to it. The boundedness applies both to the spatial and
- the temporal aspects of extension. Wherever there is ambiguity as to the
- contrast of boundedness between inside and outside, there is no proper
- region. In the next chapter all the ovals, members of one ovate class, pre-
- serve this property of boundedness, in the same sense for each of the ovals.
- Thus in the case of Elliptic Geometry (page 330) no oval can include
- half a straight line. On page 304, Condition vii has been expressed care-
- lessly, so as to apply only to the case of infinite spatiality, i.e., to Euclidean
- and Hyperbolic Geometry.
- CHAPTER III
- FLAT LOCI
- SECTION I
- [460] Modern physical science, with its dependence on the exact no-
- tions of mathematics, began with the foundation of Greek Geometry. The
- first definition of Euclid's Elements runs,
- "A point is that of which there is no part/'
- The second definition runs,
- "A line is breadthless length."
- The fourth definition runs,
- "A straight line is any line which lies evenly with the points on itself."
- These translations are taken from Euclid In Greek, Book I, edited with
- notes by Sir Thomas L. Heath, the greatest living authority on Euclid's
- Elements. Heath ascribes the second definition "to the Platonic school, if
- not to Plato himself/' f For the Greek phrase translated 'evenly' Heath
- also suggests the alternatives 'on a footing of equality,' 'evenly placed/
- 'without bias/
- Euclid's first 'postulate* is (Heath's translation):
- "Let the following be postulated: to draw a straight line from any point
- to any point."
- Heath points out that this postulate was meant to imply f existence and
- uniqueness.
- As these statements occur in Greek science, a muddle arises between
- 'forms' and concrete physical things. Geometry starts with the purpose of
- investigating cer- [461] tain forms of physical things. But in its initial defini-
- tions of the 'point' and the 'line,' it seems immediately to postulate certain
- ultimate physical things of a very peculiar character. Plato himself ap-
- pears to have had some suspicion of this confusion when (Heath, loc.
- cit.) he "objected to recognizing points as a separate class of things at
- all."t He ought to have gone further, and have made the same objection to
- all the geometrical entities, namely, points, lines, and surfaces. He wanted
- 'forms,' and he obtained new physical entities.
- According to the previous chapter, "extension' should be construed in
- terms of 'extensive connection'; that is to say, extension is a form of
- relationship between the actualities of a nexus. A point is a nexus of actual
- entities with a certain 'form'; and so is a 'segment/ Thus geometry is the
- investigation of the morphology of nexus.
- 302
- Flat Loci 303
- SECTION II
- The weak point of the Euclidean definition of a straight line is, that
- nothing has been deduced from it. The notion expressed by the phrases
- 'evenly/ or 'evenly placed/ requires definition. The definition should be
- such that the uniqueness of the straight segment between two points can
- be deduced from it. Neither of these demands has ever been satisfied, with
- the result that in modern times the notion of 'straightness' has been based
- on that of measurement. A straight line has, in modern times, been defined
- as the shortest distance between two points. In the classic geometry, the
- converse procedure was adopted, and measurement presupposed straight
- lines. But, with the modern definition, the notion of the 'shortest distance'
- in its turn requires explanation. 1 This notion is practically defined to mean
- the line which is the route of certain physical occurrences.
- In this section it will be shown that the gap in the old [462] classical
- theory can be remedied. Straight lines will be defined in terms of the
- extensive notions, developed in the preceding chapter; and the uniqueness
- of the straight line joining two points will be proved to follow from the
- terms of the definition.
- A class of 'oval' regions must first be defined. Now the only weapon
- which we have for this definition is the notion of regions which overlap
- with a unique intersect (cf. Def. 6 of previous chapter). It is evidently a
- property of a pair of ovals that they can only overlap with a unique inter-
- sect. But it is equally evident that some regions which are not ovals also
- overlap with a unique intersect. However the class of ovals has the prop-
- erty that any region, not a member of it, intersects some ovals with mul-
- tiple intersects. Also sub-sets of ovals can be found satisfying various
- conditions.
- Thus we proceed to define a class whose region shall have those relations
- to each other, and to other regions, which we ascribe to the class of ovals.
- In other words,! we cannot define a single oval, but we can define a class
- of ovals. Such a class will be called 'ovate/ The definition of an ovate class
- proceeds by enumerating all those peculiar properties possessed by in-
- dividual members of the class, or by sub-sets of members of the class. It will
- be found in the course of this enumeration that an extensive continuum
- which possesses an ovate class is dimensional in respect to that class. Thus
- existence of straight lines in an extensive continuum is bound up with the
- dimensional character of the continuum; and both characteristics are rela-
- tive to a particular ovate class of regions in the continuum. It seems prob-
- able that an extensive continuum will possess only one ovate class. But I
- have not succeeded in proving that property; nor is it necessary for the
- argument.
- A preliminary definition is convenient:
- 1 Cf. Part IV, Ch. V, on 'Measurement.'
- 304 The Theory of Extension
- Definition 0.1. An 'ovate abstractive set' is an abstractive set whose
- members all belong to the complete ovate class under consideration.
- [463] The characteristics of an ovate class will be divided into two
- groups: (a) the group of non-abstractive conditions, and (b) the group of
- abstractive conditions.
- Definition 1. A class of regions is called 'ovate/ when it satisfies the
- conditions belonging to the two following groups, (a) and (b):
- (a) The N on- Abstractive Group
- (i) Any two overlapping regions of the ovate class have a unique inter-
- sect which also belongs to that ovate class.
- (ii) Any region, not a member of the ovate class, overlaps some members
- of that class with 'multiple intersection' (cf. Def. 6 of previous chapter).
- (iii) Any member of the ovate class overlaps some regions, not of that
- class, with multiple intersection.
- (iv) Any pair of members of the ovate class, which are externally con-
- nected, have their surfaces touching either in a 'complete locus' of points
- (cf. Ch. II, Def. 23 and Ass. 27t ), or in a single point.
- (v) Any region, not belonging to the ovate class, is externally con-
- nected with some member of that class so that their surfaces touch in a
- set of points which does not form a 'complete locus/
- (vi) Any member of the ovate class is externally connected with some
- region not of that class so that their surfaces touch in a set of points which
- does not form a 'complete locus/
- (vii) Any finite number of regions are jointly included in some member
- of the ovate class.*
- (viii) If A and B be members of the ovate class, and A include B, then
- there are members of the class which include B and are included in A.
- (ix) There are dissections (cf. Def. 4 of the previous chapter) of every
- member of the ovate class, which consist wholly of members of that class;
- and there are dissections consisting wholly or partly of members not be-
- longing to that class.
- [464] (b) The Abstractive Group
- (i) Among the members of any point, there are ovate abstractive sets.
- (ii) If any set of two, or of three, or of four, points be considered, there
- are abstractive sets 'prime in reference to the twofold condition, (a) of
- covering the points in question, and (b) of being equivalent to an ovate
- abstractive set.
- (iii) Theret are sets of five points such that no abstractive set exists
- prime in reference to the twofold condition, (a) of covering the points in
- question, and (b) oi being equivalent to an ovate abstractive set.
- By reason of the definitions of this latter group, the extensive continuum
- in question is called 'four-dimensional/ Analogously, an extensive con-
- Flat Loci 305
- tinuum of any number of dimensions can be defined. The physical ex-
- tensive continuum with which we are concerned in this cosmic epoch is
- four-dimensional. Notice that the property of being 'dimensional* is rela-
- tive to a particular ovate class in the extensive continuum. There may be
- 'ovate' classes satisfying all the conditions with the exception of the 'di-
- mensional* conditions. Also a continuum may have one number of dimen-
- sions relating to one ovate class, and another number of dimensions relat-
- ing! to another ovate class.
- Possibly physical laws, of the type presupposing continuity, depend on
- the interwoven properties of two, or more, distinct ovate classes.
- SECTION III
- Assumption 1. In the extensive continuum of the present epoch there is
- at least one ovate class, with the characteristics of the two groups, (a) and
- (b), of the previous section.
- Definition 2. One such ovate class will be denoted by a: all definitions
- will be made relatively to this selected ovate class.
- [465] It is indifferent to the argument whether or no there be an al-
- ternative ovate class. If there be, the derivative entities defined in reference
- to this alternative class are entirely different to those defined in reference to
- a. It is sufficient for us, that one such class interests us by the importance
- of its physical relations.
- Assumption 2. If two abstractive sets are prime in reference to the same
- twofold condition, (a) of covering a given group of points, and (b) of be-
- ing equivalent to some ovate abstractive set, then they are equivalent
- By reason of the importance of this proposition a proof is given.
- Proof. The two abstractive sets are either equivalent to the same ovate
- abstractive set, or to different ovate abstractive sets. In the former al-
- ternative, the required conclusion is obvious. In the latter alternative, let
- /a and v be the two different ovate abstractive sets. Each of these sets,
- /a and v, satisfies the twofold condition. We have to prove that they are
- equivalent to each other. Let M and N be any regions belonging to ju. and
- v respectively. Then since the convergent portions of the abstractive sets
- belonging to the various points of the given group must ultimately consist
- of regions all lying in M and all lying in N, it follows that M and N inter-
- sect. But, being oval, M and N have only one intersect, and all the points
- in question must be situated in it. Also this intersect is oval. Hence, by
- selecting such intersects, a third abstractive set can be found which satisfies
- the twofold condition and is covered both by //, and by v. But since
- /* and v are prime in reference to this condition, they are both of them
- equivalent to this third abstractive class. Hence they are equivalent to each
- other. Q.E.D.
- Corollary, It follows that all abstractive sets, prime with respect to the
- same twofold condition of this type, belong to one geometrical element.
- 306 The Theory of Extension
- Definition 3. The single geometrical element defined, as in the enuncia-
- tion of Assumption 2, by a set of two points is called a 'straight' segment
- between those end- [466] points. If the set comprise more than two points,
- the geometrical element is called 'flat/ 'Straight 7 segments are also in-
- cluded under the designation 'flat geometrical elements/
- If a set of points define a flat geometrical element, as in the enunciation
- of Assumption 2, it may happen that the same geometrical element is
- defined by some sub-set of those points. Hence we have the following
- definition:
- Definition 4. A set of points, defining a flat geometrical element, is said
- to be in its lowest terms when it contains no sub-set defining the same
- flat geometrical element.
- Assumption 3. No two sets of a finite number of points, both in their
- lowest terms, define the same flat geometrical element.
- Definition 5. The locus of points incident in a 'straight segment' is called
- the 'straight line' between the end-points of the segment.
- Definition 6. The locus of points incident in a flat geometrical element
- is called the 'content' of that element. It is also called a 'flat locus/
- Assumption 4. If any sub-set of points lief in a flat locus, that sub-set also
- defines a flat locus contained within the given locus.
- Definition 6.1 A A complete straight line is a locus of points such that,
- (i) the straight line joining any two members of the locus lies wholly
- within the locus, (ii) every sub-set in the locus, which is in its lowest terms,
- consists of a pair of points, (iii) no points can be added to the locus with-
- out loss of one, or both, of the characteristics (i) and (ii).
- Definition 7. A triangle is the flat locus defined by three points which
- are not collinear. The three points are the angular points of the triangle.
- Definition 8. A plane is a locus of non-collinear points such that, (i) the
- triangle defined by any three non-collinear members of the locus lies
- wholly within the locus, [467] (ii) any finite number of points in the
- locus lie in some triangle wholly contained in the locus, (iii) no set of
- points can be added to the locus without loss of one, or both, of the
- characteristics (i) and (ii).
- Definition 9. A tetrahedron is the flat locus defined by four points which
- are not coplanar. The four points are called the corners of the tetrahedron.
- Definition 10. A three-dimensional flat space is a locus of non-coplanar
- points such that, (i) the tetrahedron defined by any four non-coplanar
- points of the locus lies wholly within the locus, (ii) any finite number of
- points in the locus lief in some tetrahedron wholly contained in the
- locus, (iii) no set of points can be added to the locus without the loss of
- one, or both, of the characteristics (i) and (ii).
- Any further development of definitions and propositions will lead to
- mathematical details irrelevant to our immediate purposes. It suffices to
- have proved that characteristic properties of straight lines, planes, and
- three-dimensional flat spaces are discoverable in the extensive continuum
- Flat Loci 307
- without any recourse to measurement. The systematic character of a con-
- tinuum depends on its possession of one or more ovate classes. Here, the
- particular case of a 'dimensional' ovate class has been considered.
- SECTION IV
- The importance of the notion of 'external connection* requires further
- discussion.
- First, there is a purely geometrical question to be noted. The theory of
- the external connection of oval regions throws light on the Euclidean
- concept of 'evenness/ A pair of ovals (cf. Sect. Ill) can only be externally
- connected in a 'complete locus/ or in a single point. We now consider that
- species of 'complete loci' which can be the points common to the surfaces
- of a pair of ovals externally connected. We exclude the case of one-point
- contact. The species seems to have what the [468] Greeks meant by their
- term 'even* (taoq). On either side of such a locus, there is the interior of
- one oval and the exterior of another oval, so that the locus is 'even' in
- respect to the contrasted notions of 'concavity' and 'convexity/ It is an
- extra 'assumption'— provable or otherwise according to the particular log-
- ical development of the subject which may have been adopted— that all
- 'even' loci are 'flat/ and that all 'flat' loci are 'even/
- The second question for discussion concerns the physical importance of
- 'external connection/ So long as the atomic character of actual entities is
- unrecognized, the application of Zeno's method of argument makes it
- difficult to understand the notion of continuous transmission which reigns
- in physical science. But the concept of 'actual occasions/ adopted in the
- philosophy of organism, allows of the following explanation of physical
- transmission.
- Let two actual occasions be termed 'contiguous' when the regions con-
- stituting their 'standpoints' are externally connected. Then by reason of
- the absence of intermediate actual occasions, the objectification of the
- antecedent occasion in the later occasion is peculiarly complete. There will
- be a set of antecedent, contiguous occasions objectified in any given occa-
- sion; and the abstraction which attends every objectification will merely be
- due to the necessary harmonizations of these objectifications. The ob-
- jectifications of the more distant past will be termed 'mediate'; the con-
- tiguous occasions will have 'immediate' objectification. The mediate ob-
- jectifications will be transmitted through various routes of successive im-
- mediate objectifications. Thus the notion of continuous transmission in
- science must be replaced by the notion of immediate transmission through
- a route of successive quanta of extensiveness. These quanta of extensive-
- ness are the basic regions of successive contiguous occasions. It is not neces-
- sary for the philosophy of organism entirely to deny that there [469] is
- direct objectification of one occasion in a later occasion which is not
- contiguous to it. Indeed, the contrary opinion would seem the more nat-
- 308 The Theory of Extension
- ural for this doctrine. Provided that physical science maintains its denial
- of 'action at a distance/ the safer guess is that direct objectification is
- practically negligible except for contiguous occasions; but that this prac-
- tical negligibility is a characteristic of the present cosmic epoch, without
- any metaphysical generality. Also a further distinction should be intro-
- duced. Physical prehensions fall into two species, pure physical prehen-
- sions and hybrid physical prehensions. A pure physical prehension is a
- prehension whose datum is an antecedent occasion objectified in respect to
- one of its own physical prehensions. A hybrid prehension has as its datum
- an antecedent occasion objectified in respect to a conceptual prehension.
- Thus a pure physical prehension is the transmission of physical feeling,
- while hybrid prehension is the transmission of mental feeling.
- There is no reason to assimilate the conditions for hybrid prehensions to
- those for pure physical prehensions. Indeed the contrary hypothesis is the
- more natural. For the conceptual pole does not share in the coordinate
- divisibility of the physical pole, and the extensive continuum is derived
- from this coordinate divisibility. Thus the doctrine of immediate objecti-
- fication for the mental poles and of mediate objectification for the physi-
- cal poles seems most consonant to the philosophy of organism in its ap-
- plication to the present cosmic epoch. This conclusion has some empirical
- support, both from the evidence for peculiar instances of telepathy, and
- from the instinctive apprehension of a tone of feeling in ordinary social
- intercourse.
- But of course such immediate objectification is also reinforced, or weak-
- ened, by routes of mediate objectification. Also pure and hybrid prehen-
- sions are integrated and thus hopelessly intermixed. Hence it will only be
- in exceptional circumstances that an immediate hybrid {470} prehension
- has sufficient vivid definition to receive a subjective form of clear con-
- scious attention.
- SECTION V
- We have now traced the main characteristics of that real potentiality
- from which the first phase of a physical occasion takes its rise. These
- characteristics remain inwoven in the constitution of the subject through-
- out its adventure of self-formation. The actual entity is the product of the
- interplay of physical pole with mental pole. In this way, potentiality passes
- into actuality, and extensive relations mould qualitative content and ob-
- jectifications of other particulars into a coherent finite experience.
- In general, consciousness is negligible; and even the approach to it in
- vivid propositional feelings has failed to attain importance. Blind physical
- purposes reign. It is now obvious that blind prehensions, physical and
- mental, are the ultimate bricks of the physical universe. They are bound
- together within each actuality by the subjective unity of aim which governs
- their allied genesis and their final concrescence. They are also bound to-
- Flat Loci 309
- gether beyond the limits of their peculiar subjects by the way in which the
- prehension in one subject becomes f the objective datum for the prehen-
- sion in a later subject, thus objectifying the earlier subject for the later
- subject. The two types of interconnection of prehensions are themselves
- bound together in one common scheme, the relationship of extension.
- It is by means of 'extension' that the bonds between prehensions take
- on the dual aspect of internal relations, which are yet in a sense external
- relations. It is evident that if the solidarity of the physical world is to be
- relevant to the description of its individual actualities, it can only be by
- reason of the fundamental internality of the relationships in question. On
- the other hand, if the individual discreteness of the actualities is to have
- its weight, there must be an aspect in these relationships [471] from which
- they can be conceived as external, that is, as bonds between divided things.
- The extensive scheme serves this double purpose.
- The Cartesian subjectivism in its application to physical science became
- Newton's assumption of individually existent physical bodies, with merely
- external relationships. We diverge from Descartes by holding that what he
- has described as primary attributes of physical bodies t are really the forms
- of internal relationships between actual occasions, and within actual occa-
- sions. Such a change of thought is the shift from materialism to organism,
- as the basic idea of physical science.
- In the language of physical science, the change from materialism to
- 'organic realism'— as the new outlook may be termed—is the displacement
- of the notion of static stuff by the notion of fluent energy. Such energy
- has its structure of action and flow, and is inconceivable apart from such
- structure. It is also conditioned by 'quantum' requirements. These are the
- reflections into physical science of the individual prehensions, and of the
- individual actual entities to which these prehensions belong. Mathematical
- physics translates the saying of Heraclitus, 'AH things flow,' into its own
- language. It then becomes, All things are vectors. Mathematical physics
- also accepts the atomistic doctrine of Democritus. It translates it into the
- phrase, All flow of energy obeys 'quantum' conditions.
- But what has vanished from the field of ultimate scientific conceptions
- is the notion of vacuous material existence with passive endurance, with
- primary individual attributes, and with accidental adventures. Some fea-
- tures of the physical world can be expressed in that way. But the concept
- is useless as an ultimate notion in science, and in cosmology.
- CHAPTER IV
- STRAINS
- SECTION I
- [472] There is nothing in the real world which is merely an inert fact.
- Every reality is there for feeling: it promotes feeling; and it is felt. Also
- there is nothing which belongs merely to the privacy of feeling of one
- individual actuality. All origination is private. But what has been thus
- originated, publicly pervades the world. Thus the geometrical facts con-
- cerning straight and flat loci are public facts characterizing the feelings of
- actual entities. It so happens that in this epoch of the universe the feelings
- involving them are of dominating importance. A feeling in which the
- forms exemplified in the datum concern geometrical, straight, and flat
- loci will be called a 'strain/ In a strain qualitative elements, other than the
- geometrical forms, express themselves as qualities implicated in those
- forms; also the forms are the forms ingredient in particular nexus forming
- the objective data of the physical feelings in question. It is to be remem-
- bered that two points determine a complete straight line, that three non-
- collinear points determine a complete plane, and that four non-coplanar
- points determine a complete three-dimensional flat locus.
- Thus a strain has a complex distribution of geometrical significance.
- There is the geometrical 'seat' which is composed of a limited set of loci
- which are certain sets of points. These points belong to the volume de-
- fining the standpoint of the experient subject. A strain is a complex in-
- tegration of simpler feelings; and it includes in its complex character sim-
- pler feelings in which the qualities concerned are more particularly asso-
- ciated with [473] this seat. But the geometrical interest which dominates
- the growth of a strain lifts into importance the complete lines, planes, and
- three-dimensional flats, which are defined by the seat of the strain. In the
- process of integration, these wider geometrical elements acquire implica-
- tion with the qualities originated in the simpler stages. The process is an
- example of the Category of Transmutation; and is to be explained by the
- intervention of intermediate conceptual feelings. Thus extensive regions,
- which are penetrated by the geometrical elements concerned, acquire ob-
- jectification by means of the qualities and geometrical relations derived
- from the simpler feelings. This type of objectification is characterized by
- the close association of qualities and definite geometrical relations. It is the
- basis of the so-called 'projection' of sensa. This projection of sensa in a
- strain takes many forms according to the differences among various strains.
- Strains 311
- Sometimes the 'seat' retains its individual importance; sometimes in the
- final synthesis it has been almost eliminated from the final synthesis of
- feelings into the one strain. Sometimes the whole extensive region indi-
- cated by the wider geometrical elements is only vaguely geometricized. In
- this case, there is feeble geometrical indication: the strain then takes the
- vague form of feeling certain qualities which are vaguely external. Some-
- times the extensive region is geometricized without any corresponding
- elimination of importance from the seat. In this case,f there is a dual
- reference, to the seat here, and to some objectified region there. The here
- is usually some portion of an animal body; whereas the geometricized
- region may be within, or without, the animal body concerned.
- It is obvious that important feelings of strain involve complex processes
- of concrescence. They are accordingly only to be found in comparatively
- high-grade actual entities. They do not in any respect necessarily involve
- consciousness, or even that approach to consciousness which we associate
- with life. But we shall find that the [474] behaviour of enduring physical
- objects is only explicable by reference to the peculiarities of their strains.
- On the other hand, the occurrences in empty space require less emphasis
- on any peculiar ordering of strains. But the growth of ordered physical
- complexity is dependent on the growth of ordered relationships among
- strains. Fundamental equations in mathematical physics, such as Maxwell's
- electromagnetic equations, are expressions of the ordering of strains
- throughout the physical universe.
- SECTION II
- Presentational immediacy is our perception of the contemporary world
- by means of the senses. It is a physical feeling. But it is a physical feeling
- of a complex type to the formation of which conceptual feelings, more
- primitive physical feelings, and transmutation have played their parts amid
- processes of integration. Its objective datum is a nexus of contemporary
- events, under the definite illustration of certain qualities and relations:
- these qualities and relations are prehended with the subjective form de-
- rived from the primitive physical feelings, thus becoming our 'private' sen-
- sations. Finally, as in the case of all physical feelings, this complex deriva-
- tive physical feeling acquires integration with the valuation inherent in its
- conceptual realization! as a type of experience.
- Naive common sense insists, first, on the 'subject* entertaining this
- feeling; and, secondly, on the analytic components in the order: (i) region
- in contemporary world as datum, (ii) sensations as derivative from, and
- illustrative of, this datum, (Hi) integral feeling involving these elements,
- (iv) appreciative subjective form, (v) interpretative subjective form, (vi)
- purposive subjective form. But this analysis of presentational immediacy
- has not exhausted the content of the feeling. For we feel with the body.
- 312 The Theory of Extension
- There may be some further specialization into a particular organ of sen-
- sation; but in any case the 'withness' of the body is an ever-present, [475]
- though elusive, element in our perceptions of presentational immediacy.
- This 'withness' is the trace of the origination of the feeling concerned,
- enshrined by that feeling in its subjective form and in its objective datum.
- But in itself this 'withness of the body ? can be isolated as a component
- feeling in the final 'satisfaction/ From this point of view, the body, or its
- organ of sensation, becomes the objective datum of a component feeling;
- and this feeling has its own subjective form. Also this feeling is physical,
- so that we must look for an eternal object, to be a determinant of the
- definiteness of the body, as objective datum. This component feeling will
- be called the feeling of bodily efficacy. It is more primitive than the feel-
- ing of presentational immediacy which issues from it. Both in common
- sense and in physiological theory, this bodily efficacy is a component pre-
- supposed by the presentational immediacy and leading up to it. Thus, in
- the immediate subject, the presentational immediacy is to be conceived as
- originated in a late phase, by the synthesis of the feeling of bodily efficacy
- with other feelings. We have now to consider the nature of the other
- feelings, and the complex eternal object concerned in the feeling of bodily
- efficacy.
- In the first place, this eternal object must be partially identified with the
- eternal object in the final feeling of presentational immediacy. The whole
- point of the connection between the two feelings is that the presentational
- immediacy is derivative from the bodily efficacy. The present perception is
- strictly inherited from the antecedent bodily functioning, unless all phys-
- iological teaching is to be abandoned. Both eternal objects are highly com-
- plex; and the complex elements of the second eternal object must at least
- be involved in the complex elements of the former eternal object.
- This complex eternal object is analysable into a sense-datum and a geo-
- metrical pattern. In physics, the geometrical pattern appears as a state of
- strain of that actual occasion in the body which is the subject of the \476)
- feeling. But this feeling of bodily efficacy in the final percipient is the re-
- enaction of an antecedent feeling by an antecedent actual entity in the
- body. Thus in this antecedent entity there is a feeling concerned with the
- same sense-datum and a highly analogous state of strain. The feeling must
- be a 'strain* in the sense defined in the previous section. Now this strain
- involves a geometricized region, which in this case also involves a 'focal'
- region as part of itself. This 'focal' region is a region of dense concurrence
- of straight lines defined by the 'seat/ It is the region onto which there is
- so-called 'projection/
- These lines enter into feeling through a process of integration of yet
- simpler feelings which primarily concern the 'seat' of the pattern. These
- lines have a twofold function as determinants of the feeling. They de-
- fine the 'strain* of the feeler, and they define the focal region which they
- thus relate to the feeler. In so far as we are merely considering an abstract
- Strains 313
- pattern, we are dealing with an abstract eternal object. But as a deter-
- minant of a concrete feeling in a concrete percipient we are dealing with
- the feeling as relating its subject (which includes the 'seat' in its volume)
- to a definite spatial region (the focal region) external to itself. This defi-
- nite contemporary focal region is a nexus which is part of the objective
- datum. Thus the feeling of bodily efficacy is the feeling of the sense-da-
- tum as generally implicated in the whole region (of antecedent 'seats' and
- focal regions) geometrically defined by the inherited strains. This pat-
- terned region is peculiarly dominated by the final 'seat' in the body of the
- feeler, and by the final 'focal' region. Thus the sense-datum has a general
- spatial relation, in which two spatial regions are dominant. Feelings of
- this sort are inherited by man}' strands from the antecedent bodily nerves.
- But in considering one definite feeling of presentational immediacy, these
- many strands of transmission of bodily efficacy, in their final deliverance to
- the ultimate percipient, converge upon the same focal region as picked out
- by the many bodily 'strains/
- \477] In the integration of these feelings a double act of transmutation
- is achieved. In each of the successive feelings transmitted along the suc-
- cessive actual entities of a bodily nervous strand there are two regions
- mainly concerned; and there is a relation between them constituted by
- intermediate regions picked out by the linkage of the pattern. One region
- is the focal region already discussed, the other region is the seat in the
- immediate subject, constituting its geometrical standpoint. The 'strain' of
- the final actual entity defines the 'seat' and the 'focal region' and the in-
- termediarv regions, and more vaguely the whole of a 'presented' space.
- This final feeling of bodily strain— in the sense of 'strain' defined in the
- previous section— is the last of a route of analogous feelings inherited one
- from the other along the series of bodily occasions along some nerve, or
- other path in the body. There will be parallel routes of such analogous
- feelings, which finally converge with concurrent reinforcement upon the
- single occasion, or route of occasions, which is the ultimate percipient.
- Each of these bodily strain-feelings defines its own seat and its own
- focal region and intermediaries. The sense-datum is vaguely associated
- with the external world as thus felt and defined. But as such feelings are
- 'transmuted,' either gradually, or at critical nodes in the body, there is an
- increasing development of special emphasis. Now emphasis is valuation,
- and can only be changed by renewed valuation. But valuation arises in
- conceptual feelings. The conceptual counterpart of these physical feelings
- can be analysed into many conceptual feelings, associating the sense-datum
- with various regions defined by the strain. This conceptual feeling, by its
- reference to definite regions, belongs to the secondary type termed 'propo-
- sitional feelings.' One subordinate propositionai feeling associates the
- sense-datum with the 'seat' of the feeler, another with the 'focal' region of
- the feeler, another with the intermediary region of the feeler, another with
- the seats of the antecedent elements of the [478] nervous strand, and so
- 314 The Theory of Extension
- on. The total association of the sense-datum with space-time is analysable
- into a bewildering variety of associations with definite regions, contem-
- porary and antecedent. In general, and apart from high-grade organisms,
- this spatio-temporal association of the sense-datum is integrated into a
- vague sense of externality. The component valuations have in such cases
- failed to differentiate themselves into grades of intensity. But in high-
- gradet cases, in which presentational immediacy is prominent, one of
- three cases happens. Either (i) the association of the sense-datum with
- the seats of some antecedent sets of feelers is exclusively emphasized, or
- (ii) the association of the sense-datum with the focal region of the final
- percipient is exclusively emphasized, or (iii) the association of the sense-
- datum both with the seats of antecedent feelers and with the focal region
- of the immediate feeler is emphasized.
- But these regions are not apprehended in abstraction from the general
- spatio-temporal continuum. The prehension of a region is always the pre-
- hension of systematic elements in the extensive relationship between the
- seat of the immediate feeler and the region concerned. When these valua-
- tions have been effected, the Category of Transmutation provides for the
- transmission to the succeeding subject of a feeling of these regions quali-
- fied by (i.e., contrasted with) that sense-datum. In the first case, there are
- purely bodily sensations; in the second case, there are 'projected' sensations,
- involving regions of contemporary space beyond the body; in the third
- case, there are both bodily feelings and sensations externally projected.
- Thus in the case of all sensory feeling, there is initial privacy of concep-
- tual emphasis passing into publicity of physical feeling.
- Thus, by the agency of the Category of Transmutation, there are two
- types of feelings, for which the objective datum is a nexus with undiscrim-
- inated actual entities. The feelings of the first type are feelings of 'causal
- efficacy'; and those of the second type are those of 'presenta- [479] tional
- immediacy/ In the first type, the analogous elements in the various feelings
- of the various actualities of the bodily nexus are transmuted into a feeling
- ascribed to the bodily nexus as one entity. In the second type, the trans-
- mutation is more elaborate and shifts the nexus concerned from the ante-
- cedent bodily nexus (i.e., the 'seat') to the contemporary focal nexus.
- Both these types of feeling are the outcome of a complex process of
- massive simplification which is characteristic of higher grades of actual
- entities. They apparently have but slight importance in the constitutions
- of actual occasions in empty space; but they have dominating importance
- in the physical feelings belonging to the life-historyt of enduring organisms
- —the inorganic and organic, alike.
- In respect to the sensa concerned, there is a gradual transformation of
- their functions as they pass from occasion to occasion along a route of in-
- heritance up to some final high-grade experient. In their most primitive
- form of functioning, a sensum is felt physically with emotional enjoyment
- Strains 315
- of its sheer individual essence. For example, red is felt with emotional en-
- joyment of its sheer redness. In this primitive prehension we have aborig-
- inal physical feeling in which the subject feels itself as enjoying redness.
- This is Hume's 'impression of sensation' stripped of all spatial relations
- with other such impressions. In so far as they spring up in this primitive,
- aboriginal way, they— in Hume's words— "arise in the soul from unknown
- causes." But in fact we can never isolate such ultimate irrationalities. In
- our experience, as in distinct analysis, physical feelings are always derived
- from some antecedent experient. Occasion B prehends occasion A as an
- antecedent subject experiencing a sensum with emotional intensity. Also
- B's subjective form of emotion is conformed to A's subjective form. Thus
- there is a vector transmission of emotional feeling of a sensum from A to
- B. In this way B feels the sensum as derived from A and feels it with an
- emotional form [480] also derived from A. This is the most primitive form
- of the feeling of causal efficacy. In physics it is the transmission of a form
- of energy. In the bodily transmission from occasion to occasion of a high-
- grade animal body, there is a gradual modification of these functions of
- sensa. In their most primitive functioning for the initial occasions within
- the animal body, they are qualifications of emotion— types of energy, in
- the language of physics;f in their final functioning for the high-grade
- experient occasion at the end of the route, they are qualities 'inherent' in
- a presented, contemporary nexus. In the final percipient any conscious
- feeling of the primitive emotional functioning of the sensum is often en-
- tirely absent. But this is not always the case; for example, the perception
- of a red cloak may often be associated with a feeling of red irritation.
- To return to Hume's doctrine (cf. Treatise, Part III, Sect. V) of the
- origination of 'impressions of sensation' from unknown causes, it is
- first necessary to distinguish logical priority from physical priority. Un-
- doubtedly an impression of sensation is logically the simplest of physical
- prehensions. It is the percipient occasion feeling the sensum as participat-
- ing in its own concrescence. This is the enjoyment of a private sensation.
- There is a logical simplicity about such a sensation which makes it the
- primitive, aboriginal type of physical feeling. But there are two objections
- to Hume's doctrine which assigns to them a physical priority. First, there
- is the empirical objection. Hume's theory of a complex of such impres-
- sions elaborated into a supposition of a common physical world is entirely
- contrary to naive experience. We find ourselves in the double role of agents
- and patients in a common world, and the conscious recognition of impres-
- sions of sensation is the work of sophisticated elaboration. This is also
- Locke's doctrine in the third and fourth books of his Essay. The child
- first dimly elucidates the complex externality of particu- [481] lar things
- exhibiting a welter of forms of definiteness, and then disentangles his im-
- pressions of these forms in isolation. A young man does not initiate his
- experience by dancing with impressions of sensation, and then proceed
- 316 The Theory of Extension
- to conjecture a partner. His experience takes the converse route. The un-
- empirica! character of the philosophical school derived from Hume can-
- not be too often insisted upon. The true empirical doctrine is that physi-
- cal feelings are in their origin vectors, and that the genetic process of con-
- crescence introduces the elements which emphasize privacy.
- Secondly, Hume's doctrine is necessarily irrational. For if the impres-
- sions of sensation arise from unknown causes (cf. Hume, loc. cit.) a stop
- is put to the rationalistic search for a rational cosmology. Such a cos-
- mology requires that metaphysics shall provide a doctrine of relevance
- between a form and any occasion in which it participates. If there be no
- such doctrine, all hope of approximating to a rational view of the world
- vanishes.
- Hume's doctrine has no recommendation except the pleasure which it
- gives to its adherents.
- The philosophy of organism provides for this relevance by means of
- two doctrines, (i) the doctrine of God embodying a basic completeness
- of appetition, and (ii) the doctrine of each occasion effecting a concres-
- cence of the universe, including God. Then, by the Category of Conceptual
- Reproduction, the vector prehensions of God's appetition, and of other
- occasions, issue in the mental pole of conceptual prehensions; and by
- integration of this pole with the pure physical prehensions there arise the
- primitive physical feelings of sensa, with their subjective forms, t emotional
- and purposive. These feelings, with their primitive simplicity, arise into
- distinctness by reason of the elimination effected by this integration of the
- vector prehensions with the conceptual appetitions. Such primitive feel-
- ings cannot be separated from their subjective forms. The subject never
- loses its triple character of recipient, patient, and agent. These primitive
- feel- [482] ings have already been considered under the name of 'physical
- purposes' (cf. Part III, Ch. V). They correspond to Hume's 'impressions
- of sensation/ But they do not originate the process of experience.
- We see that a feeling of presentational immediacy comes into being
- by reason of an integration of a conceptual feeling drawn from bodily effi-
- cacy with a bare regional feeling which is also a component in a complex
- feeling of bodily efficacy. Also this bare regional feeling is reinforced with
- the general regional feeling which is the whole of our direct physical feel-
- ing of the contemporary world: and the conceptual feeling is reinforced
- by the generation of physical purpose. This integration takes the form of
- the creative imputation of the complex eternal object, ingredient in the
- bodily efficacy, onto some contemporary focal region felt in the strain-
- feeling. Also the subjective form is transmitted from the conceptual valu-
- ation and the derivate physical purpose.' But this subjective form is that
- suitable to the bodily efficacy out of which it has arisen. Thus the mere
- region with its imputed eternal object is felt as though there had been a
- feeling of its efficacy. But there is no mutual efficacy of contemporary
- Strains 317
- regions. This transference of subjective form is termed 'symbolic trans-
- ference/ *
- An additional conceptual feeling, with its valuation, arises from this
- physical feeling of presentational immediacy. It is the conceptual feeling
- of a region thus characterized. This is the aesthetic valuation proper to
- the bare objective datum of the presentational immediacy. But this valua-
- tion is less primitive than that gained from the conceptual prehension
- by symbolic transference. The primitive subjective form includes a valua-
- tion as though the contemporary region, by its own proper constitution,
- were causally effective on the percipient sub- [483] ject. The secondary
- valuation is the aesthetic appreciation of the bare fact: this bare fact is
- merely that region, thus qualified. Thus the contemporary world, as felt
- through the senses, is valued for its own sake, by means of a later concep-
- tual feeling; but it is also valued for its derivation from antecedent effi-
- cacy, by means of transmutation from earlier conceptual feeling com-
- bined with derivate 'physical purpose/
- But none of these operations can be segregated from nature into the
- subjective privacy of a mind. Mental and physical operations are incurably
- intertwined; and both issue into publicity, and are derived from publicity.
- The vector character of prehension is fundamental.
- SECTION III
- It is the mark of a high-grade organism to eliminate, by negative pre-
- hension, the irrelevant accidents in its environment, and to elicit massive
- attention to every variety of systematic order. For this purpose, the Cate-
- gory of Transmutation is the master-principle. By its operation each nexus
- can be prehended in terms of the analogies among its own members, or
- in terms of analogies among the members of other nexus but yet relevant
- to it. In this way the organism in question suppresses the mere multi-
- plicities of things, and designs its own contrasts. The canons of art are
- merely the expression, in specialized forms, of the requisites for depth of
- experience. The principles of morality are allied to the canons of art, in
- that they also express, in another connection, the same requisites. Owing
- to the principle that contemporary actual entities occur in relative inde-
- pendence, the nexus of contemporary actual entities are peculiarly favour-
- able for this transference of systematic qualities from other nexus to them-
- selves. For a difficulty arises in the operation of the Category of Transmuta-
- tion, when a characteristic prevalent among the individual entities of one
- nexus is to be transferred to another nexus treated as a unity. The diffi-
- culty is that the individual actuali- \484] ties of the recipient nexus are also
- 1 Cf. my three Barbour-Page lectures, Symbolism, at the University of Virginia
- (New York: Macmillan, 1927, and Cambridge University Press, 1928) ;t and
- also above, Part II, Ch. VIII.
- 318 The Theory of Extension
- respectively objectified in the percipient subject by systematic character-
- istics which equally demand the transference to their own nexus; but this
- is the nexus which should be the recipient of the other transference. Thus
- there are competing qualities struggling to effect the objectification of the
- same nexus. The result is attenuation and elimination.
- When the recipient nexus is composed of entities contemporary with
- the percipient subject, this difficulty vanishes. For the contemporary en-
- tities do not enter into the constitution of the percipient subject by ob-
- jectification through any of their own feelings. Thus their only direct con-
- nection with the subject is their implication in the same extensive scheme.
- Thus a nexus of actual entities, contemporary with the percipient subject,
- puts up no alternative characteristics to inhibit the transference to it of
- characteristics from antecedent nexus.
- A high-grade percipient is necessarily an occasion in the historic route
- of an enduring object. If this route is to propagate itself successfully into
- the future, it is above all things necessary that its decisions in the imme-
- diate occasion should have the closest relevance to the concurrent hap-
- penings among contemporary occasions. For these contemporary entities
- will, in the near future, form the 'immediate past' for the future embodi-
- ment of the enduring object. This 'immediate past' is of overwhelming in-
- fluence; for all routes of transmission from the more remote past must
- pass through it. Thus the contemporary occasions tell nothing; and yet
- are of supreme importance for the survival of the enduring object.
- This gap in the experience of the percipient subject is bridged by presen-
- tational immediacy. This type of experience is the lesson of the past re-
- flected into the present. The more important contemporary occasions
- are those in the near neighborhood. Their actual worlds \485] are prac-
- tically identical with that of the percipient subject. The percipient pre-
- bends the nexus of contemporary occasions by the mediation of eternal
- objects which it inherits from its own past. Also it selects the contemporary
- nexus thus prehended by the efficacy of strains whose focal regions are
- important elements in the past of those nexus. Thus, for successful orga-
- nisms, presentational immediacy— though it yields no direct experience
- about the contemporary world, and though in unfortunate instances the
- experience which it does yield may be irrelevant— does yield experience
- which expresses how the contemporary world has in fact emerged from
- its own past.
- Presentational immediacy works on the principle that it is better to ob-
- tain information about the contemporary world, even if occasionally it be
- misleading.
- SECTION IV
- Depth of experience is gained by concentrating emphasis on the sys-
- tematic structural systems in the environment, and discarding individual
- variations. Every element of systematic structure is emphasized, every in-
- Strains 319
- dividual aberration is pushed into the background. The variety sought is
- the variety of structures, and never the variety of individuals. For example, t
- we neglect empty space in comparison with the structural systematic
- nexus which is the historic route of an enduring object. In every possible
- way, the more advanced organisms simplify their experience so as to em-
- phasize those nexus with some element of tightness of systematic structure.
- In pursuance of this principle, the regions, geometricized by the various
- strains in such an organism, not only lie in the contemporary world, t but
- they coalesce so as to emphasize one unified locus in the contemporary
- world. This selected locus is penetrated by the straight lines, the planes,
- and the three-dimensional flat loci associated with the strains. This is the
- 'strain-locus' belonging to an occasion in the history of an enduring object.
- \486] This occasion is the immediate percipient subject under considera-
- tion. Each such occasion has its one strain-locus which serves for all its
- strains. The focal regions of the various strains all lie within this strain-
- locus, and are in general distinct. But the strain-locus as a whole is com-
- mon to all the strains. Each occasion lies in its own strain-locus.
- The meaning of the term 'rest' is the relation of an occasion to its
- strain-locus, if there be one. An occasion with no unified strain-locus has
- no dominating locus with which it can have the relationship of 'rest/ An
- occasion 'rests' in its strain-locus. This is why it is nonsense to ask of an
- occasion in empty space whether it be 'at rest' in reference to some locus.
- For, since such occasions have no strain-loci ? the relationship of 'rest' does
- not apply to them. The strain-locus is the locus which is thoroughly geo-
- metricized by the strain-feelings of the percipient occasion. It must have
- the property of being continent of straight lines, and of flat loci of all
- dimensions. Thus its boundaries will be three-dimensional t flat loci, non-
- intersecting. A strain-locus approximates to a three-dimensional flat locus;
- but in fact it is four-dimensional, with a time-thickness.
- SECTION V
- Reviewing the discussion in the preceding sections of this chapter and
- of Chapter IV of Part II, we note that, in reference to any one actual
- occasion M, seven (but cf. Section VHIt) distinct considerations define
- loci composed of other actual occasions. In the first place, there are three
- loci defined by causal efficacy, namelv, the 'causal past' of M, the 'causal
- future' of M, and the 'contemporaries' of M. An actual occasion P, be-
- longing to M's causal past, is objectified for M by a perspective represen-
- tation of its own (i.e., P's) qualities of feeling and intensities of feeling.
- There is a quantitative and qualitative vector flow of feeling from P to M;
- and in this way, what P is subjectively, belongs to M objectively. An [487]
- actual occasion Q, belonging to M's causal future, is in the converse rela-
- tion to M, compared to P's relation. For the causal future is composed of
- those actual occasions which will have M in their respective causal pasts. t
- 320 The Theory of Extension
- Actual occasions R and S,t which are contemporary with M, are those
- actual occasions which lie neither in M's causal past, nor in M's causal
- future. The peculiarity of the locus of contemporaries of M is that any two
- of its members, such as R and S, need not be contemporaries of each other.
- They may be mutually contemporaries, but not necessarily. It is evident
- from the form of the definition of 'contemporary/ that if R be contem-
- porary with M, then M is contemporary with R. This peculiarity of the
- locus of JVTs contemporaries— that R and S may be both contemporaries
- of M, but not contemporaries of each other— points to another set of loci.
- A 'duration' is a locus of actual occasions, such that (a) any two members
- of the locus are contemporaries, and (/?) that any actual occasion, not
- belonging to the duration, is in the causal past or causal future of some
- members of the duration.
- A duration is a complete locus of actual occasions in 'unison of becom-
- ing/ or in 'concrescent unison. 7 It is the old-fashioned 'present state of
- the world/ In reference to a given duration, D, the actual world is divided
- into three mutually exclusive loci. One of these loci is the duration D it-
- self. Another of these loci is composed of actual occasions which lie in the
- past of some members of D: this locus is the 'past of the duration D/ The
- remaining locus is composed of actual occasions which lie in the future of
- some members of D: this locus is the 'future of the duration D/
- By its definition, a duration which contains an occasion Mf must lie
- within the locus of the contemporaries of M. According to the classical
- pre-relativistic notions of time, there would be only one duration including
- M, and it would contain all M's contemporaries. According to modern
- relativistic views, t we must admit that there are many durations including
- M— in fact, an infinite [488] number, so that no one of them contains all
- M's contemporaries.
- Thus the past of a duration D includes the whole past of any actual
- occasion belonging to D, such as M for example, and it also includes some
- of ivis contemporaries. Also the future of the duration D includes the
- whole future of M, and also includes some of M's contemporaries.
- So far, starting from an actual occasion M, we find six loci, or types of
- loci, defined purely in terms of notions derived from 'causal efficacy/ These
- loci are, M's causal past, M's causal future, M's contemporaries, the set
- of durations defined by M; and finally, taking any one such duration which
- we call D as typical, there is D's past, and D's future. Thus there are the
- three definite loci, the causal past, the causal future,* and the contem-
- poraries, which are defined uniquely by M; and there are the set of dura-
- tions defined by M, and the set of 'durational pasts' and the set of 'dura-
- tional futures/ The paradox which has been introduced by the modern
- theory of relativity is twofold. First, the actual occasion M does not, as a
- general characteristic of all actual occasions, define a unique duration;
- and secondly,! such a unique duration, if defined, does not include all the
- contemporaries of M.
- Strains 321
- But among the set of durations, there may be one with a unique asso-
- ciation with M. For the mode of presentational immediacy objectifies for
- Mf the actual occasions within one particular duration. This is the 'pre-
- sented duration/ Such a presented duration is an inherent factor in the
- character of an 'enduring physical object.' It is practically identical with
- the strain-locus. This locus is the reason why there is a certain absoluteness
- in the notions of rest, velocity, and acceleration. For this presented dura-
- tion is the spatialized world in which the physical object is at rest, at least
- momentarily for its occasion M. This spatialized world is objectified for M
- by M's own conditioned range of feeling-tones which have been inherited
- from the causal past of the actual occasion [489] in question, namely, of
- M. Thus the presented duration is with peculiar vividness part of the
- character of the actual occasion, A historic route of actual occasions,!
- each with its presented duration, constitutes a physical object.
- Our partial consciousness of the objectifications of the presented dura-
- tion constitutes our knowledge of the present world, so far as it is derived
- from the senses. Remembering that objectifications constitute the objec-
- tive conditions from which an actual occasion (M) initiates its successive
- phases of feeling, we must admit that, in the most general sense, the ob-
- jectifications express the causality by which the external world fashions
- the actual occasion in question. Thus the objectifications of the presented
- duration represent a recovery by its contemporaries of a very real efficacy
- in the determination of M. It is true that the eternal objects which effect
- this objectification belong to the feeling-tones which M derives from the
- past. But it is a past which is largely common to M and to the presented
- duration. Thus by the intermediacy of the past, the presented duration has
- its efficacy in the production of M. This efficacy does not derogate from
- the principle of the independence of contemporary occasions. For the con-
- temporary occasions in the presented duration are only efficacious through
- the feeling-tones of their sources, and not through their own immediate
- feeling-tones.
- Thus in so far as Bergson ascribes the 'spatialization' of the world to a
- distortion introduced by the intellect, he is in error. This spatialization is
- a real factor in the physical constitution of every actual occasion belong-
- ing to the life-history f of an enduring physical object. For actual occasions
- in so-called 'empty space/ there is no reason to believe that any duration
- has been singled out for spatialization; that is to say, that physical per-
- ception in the mode of presentational immediacy is negligible for such
- occasions. The reality of the rest and the motion of enduring physical
- objects depends on this spatializa- [490] tion for occasions in their historic
- routes. The presented duration is the duration in respect to which the
- enduring object is momentarily at rest. It is that duration which is the
- strain-locus of that occasion in the life-history of the enduring object.
- CHAPTER V
- MEASUREMENT
- SECTION I
- [491] The identification of the strain-locus with a duration is only an
- approximation based upon empirical evidence. Their definitions are en-
- tirely different. A duration is a complete set of actual occasions, such that
- all the members are mutually contemporary one with the other. This
- property is expressed by the statement that the members enjoy 'unison of
- immediacy/ The completeness consists in the fact that no other actual
- occasion can be added to the set without loss of this unison of immediacy.
- Every occasion outside the set is in the past or in the future of some
- members of the set, and is contemporary with other members of the set.
- According as an occasion is in the past, or the future, of some members
- of a duration, the occasion is said to be in the past, or in the future, of
- that duration.
- No occasion can be both in the past and in the future! of a duration.
- Thus a duration forms a barrier in the world between its past and its fu-
- ture. Any route of occasions, in which adjacent members are contiguous,
- and such that it includes members of the past, and members of the future,
- of a duration, must also include one or more members of that duration.
- This is the notion of a duration, which has already been explained (cf.
- Part II, Ch. IV ? Sects. VIII and IX).
- The definition of a strain-locus (cf. previous chapter) depends entirely
- on the geometrical elements which arc the elements of geometric form in
- the objectification of a nexus including the experient occasion in question.
- These [492] elements are (i) a set of points, within the volume of the
- regional standpoint of the experient occasion, and (ii) the set of straight
- lines defined by all the pairs of these points. The set of points is the 'seat
- of the strain; the set of straight lines is the set of projectors/ The com-
- plete region penetrated by the 'projectors' is the strain-locus. A strain-
- locus is bounded by two 'flat' three-dimensional surfaces. When some
- members of the seat have a special function in the strain-feeling, the pro-
- jectors which join pairs of these points may define a subordinate region
- in the strain-locus; this subordinate region is termed the 'focal region/
- The strain-loci in the present epoch seem to be confined to the con-
- temporaries of their experient occasions. In fact 'strain-loci 7 occur as essen-
- tial components for perception in the mode of presentational immediacy.
- B22
- Measurement 323
- In this mode of perception there is a unique strain-locus for each such
- experient. Rest and motion are definable by reference to real strain-loci,
- and to potential strain-loci. Thus the molecules, forming material bodies
- for which the science of dynamics is important, may be presumed to have
- unique strain-loci associated with their prehensions.
- This recapitulation of the theories of durations and strain-loci brings
- out the entire disconnection of their definitions. There is no reason, de-
- rivable from these definitions, why there should be any close association
- between the strain-locus of an experient occasion and any duration includ-
- ing that occasion among its members. It is an empirical fact that mankind
- invariably conceives the presented world as consisting of such a duration.
- This is the contemporary world as immediately perceived by the senses.
- But close association does not necessarily involve unqualified identification.
- It is permissible, in framing a cosmology to accord with scientific theory,
- to assume that the associated pair, strain-locus and presented duration, do
- not involve one and the same extensive region. From the point of view of
- conscious per- [493] ception, the divergence may be negligible, though im-
- portant for scientific theory.
- SECTION II
- Thet notions which have led to the phraseology characterizing the 'pro-
- jected' sensa as 'secondary qualities' arise out of a fundamental difference
- between 'strain-loci' and their associated 'presented durations.' A strain-
- locus is entirely determined by the experient in question. It extends be-
- yond that experient indefinitely, although defined by geometrical elements
- entirely within the extensive region which is the standpoint of the ex-
- perient. The 'seat' of the strain-locus, which is a set of points within this
- region, is sufficient to effect this definition of the complete strain-locus by
- the aid of the straight lines termed the 'projectors.' These straight lines
- are nexus whose geometrical relations are forms ingredient in a strain-
- feeling with these nexus as data. Presentational immediacy arises from
- the integration of a strain-feeling and a 'physical purpose,' so that, by the
- Category of Transmutation, the sensum involved in the 'physical purpose'
- is projected onto some external focal region defined by projectors.
- It is to be noted that this doctrine of presentational immediacy and of
- the strain-locus entirely depends upon a definition of straight lines in terms
- of mere extensiveness. If the definition depends upon the actual physical
- occasions beyond the experient, the experient should find the actual phys-
- ical structures of his environment a block, or an assistance, to his 'projec-
- tion' to focal regions beyond them. The projection of sensa in presenta-
- tional immediacy depends entirely upon the state of the brain and upon
- systematic geometrical relations characterizing the brain. How the brain
- is excited, whether by visual stimuli through the eye, or by auditory stimuli
- through the ear, or by the excessive consumption of alcohol, or by hyster-
- 324 The Theory of Extension
- ical emotion, is completely indifferent; granted the proper excitement of
- the brain, the experient will per- [494] ceive some definite contemporary
- region illustrated by the projected sensa. The indifference of presentational
- immediacy to contemporary actualities in the environment cannot be ex-
- aggerated. It is only by reason of the fortunate dependence of the experi-
- ent and of these contemporary actualities on a common past, that presen-
- tational immediacy is more than a barren aesthetic display. It does display
- something, namely, the real extensiveness of the contemporary world. It
- involves the contemporary actualities but only objectifies them as condi-
- tioned by extensive relations. It displays a system pervading the world, a
- world including and transcending the experient. It is a vivid display of
- systematic real potentiality, inclusive of the experient and reaching beyond
- it. In so far as straight lines can only be defined in terms of measurements,
- requiring particular actual occasions for their performance, the theory of
- geometry lacks the requisite disengagement from particular physical fact.
- The requisite geometrical forms can then only be introduced after exam-
- ination of the particular actual occasions required for measurement. But
- the theory of 'projection/ explained above, requires that the definition of
- a complete straight line be logically prior to the particular actualities in
- the extensive environment. This requisite has been supplied by the pre-
- ceding theory of straight lines (cf. Ch. Hit). The projectors do depend
- upon the one experient occasion. But even this dependence merely re-
- quires that component feelings of that occasion should participate in
- certain geometric elements, namely, a set of points, and the straight lines
- defined by them, among their data. Thus, according to this explanation,
- presentational immediacy is the mode in which vivid feelings of contem-
- porary geometrical relations, with especial emphasis on certain 'focal' re-
- gions, enter into experience.
- This doctrine is what common sense always assumes. When we see a
- coloured shape, it may be a real man, or a ghost, or an image behind a
- mirror, or a hallucination; [495] but whatever it be, there it is— ex-
- hibiting to us a certain region of external space. If we are gazing at a
- nebula, a thousand light-years away, we are not looking backward through
- a thousand years. Such ways of speaking are interpretative phrases,
- diverting attention from the primary fact of direct experience, observing
- the illumination of a contemporary patch of the heavens. In philosophy,
- it is of the utmost importance to beware of the interpretative vagaries of
- language. Further, the extent of the patch illuminated will depend en-
- tirely upon the magnifying power of the telescope used. The correlation
- of the patch, thus seen through the telescope, with a smaller patch, de-
- fined by direct 'projection' from the observer, is again a question of scien-
- tific interpretation. This smaller patch is what we are said to have seen
- 'magnified' by the use of the telescope. What we do see is the bigger patch,
- and we correlate it with the smaller patch by theoretical calculation. The
- scientific explanation neglects the telescope and the larger patch really
- Measurement 325
- seen, and considers them as merely instrumental intermediaries. It con-
- centrates on the contemporary smaller patch, and finally deserts even that
- patch in favour of another region a thousand years in the past. This ex-
- planation is only one illustration of the way in which so-called statements
- of direct observation are, through and through, merely interpretative
- statements of simple direct experience. When we say that we have seen
- a man, we may mean that we have seen a patch which we believe to be a
- man. In this case, our total relevant experience may be more than that
- of bare sight. In Descartes' phraseology, our experience of the external
- world embraces not only an 'inspectio' of the 'realitas objective' in the pre-
- hensions in question, but also a 'judicium' which calls into play the totality
- of our experience beyond those prehensions. The objection to this doctrine
- of 'presentational immediacy'— that it presupposes a definition of straight
- lines, freed from dependence on external actualities— has been removed
- by the production of such a definition in Ch. III.* [496] Of course the
- point of the definition is to demonstrate that the extensive continuum,
- apart from the particular actualities into which it is atomized, includes in
- its systematic structure the relationships of regions expressed by straight
- lines. These relationships are there for perception.
- SECTION III
- The Cartesian doctrine of the 'realitas objective attaching to presenta-
- tional immediacy is entirely denied by the modern doctrine of private
- psychological fields. Locke's doctrine of 'secondary qualities' is a halfway
- house to the modern position, and indeed so is Descartes' own position
- considered as a whole. Descartes' doctrine on this point is obscure, and
- is interpretable as according with that of the philosophy of organism. But
- Locke conceives the sensa as purely mental additions to the facts of physi-
- cal nature. Both philosophers conceive the physical world as in essential
- independence of the mental world, though the two worlds have ill-defined
- accidental relationships. According to the philosophy of organism, physical
- and mental operations are inextricably intertwined; also we find the sensa
- functioning as forms participating in the vector prehensions of one occa-
- sion by another; and finally in tracing the origin of presentational im-
- mediacy, we find mental operations transmuting the functions of sensa
- so as to transfer them from being participants in causal prehensions into
- participants in presentational t prehensions. But throughout the whole
- story, the sensa are participating in nature as much as anything else. It is
- the function of mentality to modify the physical participation of eternal
- objects: the case of presentational prehensions is only one conspicuous
- example. The whole doctrine of mentality— from the case of God down-
- wards—is that it is a modifying agency. But Descartes and Locke aban-
- don the 'realitas objectiva' so far as sensa are concerned (but for Descartes,
- cf. Meditation f,t "it is certain all the same that the colours of [497] which
- 326 The Theory of Extension
- this is composed are necessarily real"), and hope to save it so far as ex-
- tensive relations are concerned. This is an impossible compromise. It was
- easily swept aside by Berkeley and Hume. (Cf. Enquiry , Sect. XII, Part I.f
- Hume,t with obvious truth, refers to Berkeley as the originator of this
- train of argument.) The modern doctrine of 'private psychological fields'
- is the logical result of Hume's doctrine, though it is a result which Hume
- 'as an agent' refused to accept. This modern doctrine raises a great diffi-
- culty in the interpretation of modern science. For all exact observation is
- made in these private psychological fields. It is then no use talking about
- instruments and laboratories and physical energy. What is really being
- observed are narrow bands of colour-sensa in the private psychological
- space of colour- vis ion. The impressions of sensation which collectively
- form this entirely private experience 'arise in the soul from unknown
- causes/ The spectroscope is a myth, the radiant energy is a myth, the ob-
- server's eye is a myth, the observer's brain is a myth, and the observer's
- record of his experiment on a sheet of paper is a myth. When,f some
- months later, he reads his notes to a learned society, he has a new visual
- experience of black marks on a white background in a new private psycho-
- logical field. And again, these experiences arise in his soul 'from unknown
- causes.' It is merely 'custom' which leads him to connect his earlier with
- his later experiences.
- AH exact measurements are, on this theory, observations in such private
- psychological fields.
- Hume himself 'as an agent' refused to accept this doctrine. The con-
- clusion is that Hume's account of experience is unduly simplified. This is
- the conclusion adopted by the philosophy of organism.
- But one important fact does emerge from the discussion: that all exact
- measurements concern perceptions in the mode of presentational imme-
- diacy; and that such observations purely concern the systematic geometric
- forms of the environment, forms defined by projectors [498] from the
- 'seat' of the strain and irrespective of the actualities which constitute the
- environment. The contemporary actualities of the world are irrelevant to
- these observations. AH scientific measurements merely concern the sys-
- tematic real potentiality out of which these actualities arise. This is the
- meaning of the doctrine that physical science is solely concerned with the
- mathematical relations of the world.
- These mathematical relations belong to the systematic order of exten-
- siveness which characterizes the cosmic epoch in which we live. The
- societies of enduring objects— electrons, protons, molecules, material bodies
- —at once sustain that order and arise out of it The mathematical rela-
- tions involved in presentational immediacy thus belong equally to the
- world perceived and to the naturef of the percipient They are, at the
- same time, public fact and private experience.
- The perceptive mode of presentational immediacy is in one sense bar-
- ren. So far as— apart from symbolic transference— it discloses the con-
- Measurement 327
- temporary world, that world, thus objectified, is devoid of all elements
- constitutive of subjective form, elements emotional, appreciative, pur-
- posive. The bonds of the objectified nexus only exhibit the definiteness
- of mathematical relations.
- But in another sense this perceptive mode has overwhelming signifi-
- cance. It exhibits that complex of systematic mathematical relations which
- participate in all the nexus of our cosmic epoch, in the widest meaning of
- that term. These relations only characterize the epoch by reason of their
- foundation in the immediate experience of the society of occasions domi-
- nating that epoch. Thus we find a special application of the doctrine of
- the interaction between societies of occasions and the laws of nature. The
- perceptive mode in presentational immediacy is one of the defining char-
- acteristics of the societies which constitute the nexus termed material
- bodies. Also in some fainter intensity it belongs to the electromagnetic
- occasions in empty space. From the point of view of a [499] single experi-
- ent, that mode discloses systematic relations which dominate the environ-
- ment. But the environment is dominated by these relationships by reason
- of the experiences of the individual occasions constituting the societies.
- It is by reason of this disclosure of ultimate system that an intellectual
- comprehension of the physical universe is possible. There is a systematic
- framework permeating all relevant fact. By reference to this framework the
- variant, various, vagrant, evanescent details of the abundant world can
- have their mutual relations exhibited by their correlation to the common
- terms of a universal system. Sounds differ qualitatively among themselves,
- sounds differ qualitatively from colours, colours differ qualitatively from
- the rhythmic throbs of emotion and of pain; yet all alike are periodic
- and have their spatial relations and their wave-lengths. The discovery of
- the true relevance of the mathematical relations disclosed in presentational
- immediacy was the first step in the intellectual conquest of nature. Accu-
- rate science was then born. Apart from these relations as facts in nature,
- such science is meaningless, a tale told by an idiot and credited by fools.
- For example, the conjecture by an eminent astronomer, based on measure-
- ments of photographic plates, that the period of the revolution of our
- galaxy of stars is about three hundred million years can only derive its
- meaning from the systematic geometrical relations which permeate the
- epoch. But he would have required the same reference to system, if he
- had made an analogous statement about the period of revolution of a
- child's top. Also the two periods are comparable in terms of the system.
- SECTION IV
- Measurement depends upon counting and upon permanence. The ques-
- tion is, what is counted, and what is permanent? The things that are
- counted are the inches on a straight metal rod, a yard-measure. Also the
- thing [500] that is permanent is this yard-measure in respect both to its
- 328 The Theory of Extension
- internal relations and in respect to some of its extensive relations to the
- geometry of the world. In the first place, the rod is straight. Thus the
- measurement depends on the straightness and not the straightness upon
- the measurement. The modern answer to this statement is that the
- measurement is a comparison of infinitesimals, or of an approximation to
- infinitesimals. The answer to this answer is that there are no infinitesimals,
- and that therefore there can be no approximation to them. In mathe-
- matics,! all phraseology about infinitesimals is merely disguised statement
- about a class of finites. This doctrine has been conclusive mathematical
- theory since the time of Weierstrass in the middle of the nineteenth
- century. Also all the contortions of curvature are possible for a segment
- between any end-points.
- Of course, in all measurement there is approximation in our supposi-
- tions as to the yard-measure, t But it is approximation to straightness. Also
- having regard to the systematic geometry of straight lines, and to the
- type of approximation exhibited by the rod, the smaller the portion used,
- the more negligible are the percentage errors introduced by the defects
- from straightness. But unless the notion of straightness has a definite
- meaning in reference to the extensive relations, this whole procedure in
- practical measurement is meaningless. There is nothing to distinguish one
- contorted segment between end-points from another contorted segment
- between those end-points. One is no straighter than another. Also any
- percentage differences between their lengths can exist.
- Again, the inches are counted because they are congruent and are end-
- on along the straight rod. No one counts coincident inches. The counting
- essentially is concerned with non-coincident straight segments. The nu-
- merical measure of length is the indication of the fact that the yard-
- measure is a straight rod divisible into thirty-six congruent inch-long
- segments.
- [50 J] There is a modern doctrine that 'congruence' means the possibility
- of coincidence. If this be the case, then the importance of congruence
- would arise when the possibility is realized. Alternatively, the possibility
- could be of importance as a lure entering into the subjective aim. If the
- latter alternative were true, congruence would play its part in the form of
- a tendency of congruent bodies to coalesce, or to resist coalescence. In
- fact, there would be adversion to, or aversion from,t coalescence. Of course
- the suggestion is fantastic. Recurring to the former alternative, the inv
- portance of the thirty-six inches along the yard-measure depends on the
- fact that they are not coincident and, until the destruction of the rod,
- never will be coincident. There is a realized property of the rod that it is
- thirty-six inches in length. Thus although 'coincidence' is used as a test
- of congruence, it is not the meaning of congruence.
- We must now consider the use of 'coincidence' as a test. Congruence is
- tested either by the transference of a steel yard-measure from coincidence
- Measurement 329
- with one body to coincidence with another body, or by some optical means
- dependent on the use of an optical instrument and on the congruence of
- successive wave-lengths t in a train of waves, or by some other vibratory
- device dependent on analogous principles.
- It is at once evident that all these tests aref dependent on a direct in-
- tuition of permanence. This 'permanence' means 'permanence in respect
- to congruence'! for the various instruments employed, namely, the yard-
- measure, or the optical instruments, or analogous instruments. For exam-
- ple, the yard-measure is assumed to remain congruent to its previous self,
- as it is transferred from one setting to another setting. It is not sufficient
- to intuit that it remains the same body. Substances that are very deform-
- able preserve that sort of self-identity. The required property is that of
- self-congruence. Minute variations of physical conditions will make the
- rod vary slightly; also sense-perception is never absolutely exact. [502] But
- unless there be a meaning to 'exactitude/ the notions of a 'slight variation'
- and of a 'slight defect from exactitude' are nonsense. Apart from such a
- meaning the two occasions of the rod's existence are incomparable, except
- by another experiment depending upon the same principles. There can
- only be a finite number of such experiments; so ultimately we are reduced
- to these direct judgments.
- However far the testing of instruments and the corrections for changes
- of physical factors, such as temperature, are carried, there is always a final
- dependence upon direct intuitions that relevant circumstances are un-
- changed. Instruments are used from minute to minute, from hour to hour,
- and from day to day, with the sole guarantee of antecedent tests and of
- the appearance of invariability of relevant circumstances.
- This 'appearance' is always a perception in the mode of presentational
- immediacy. If such perception be in any sense 'private' in contradistinction
- to a correlative meaning for the term 'public/ then the perceptions, on
- which scientific measurement depends, t merely throw light upon the pri-
- vate psychology of the particular observer, and have no 'public' import.
- Such a conclusion is so obviously inconsistent with our beliefs as to
- the intercommunication of real actualities in a public world, that it may
- be dismissed as a reductio ad absurdum, having regard to the groundwork
- of common experience which is the final test of all science and philosophy.
- A great deal of modern scientific philosophy consists in recurrence to the
- theory of 'privacy' when such statements seem to afford a short cut to
- simplicity of statement, and— on the other hand—of employment of the
- notion of observing a public world when that concept is essential for ex-
- pressing the status of science in common experience. Science is either an
- important statement of systematic theory correlating observations of a
- common world, or is the daydream oi a solitary intelligence with a taste
- for the daydream of publication. But [503] it is not philosophy to vacillate
- from one point of view to the other.
- 330 The Theory of Extension
- SECTION V
- Finally, thet meaning of 'congruence' as a relation between two geo-
- metrical elements in a strain-locus must be considered. It will be sufficient
- to consider this meaning in reference to two segments of straight lines,
- and to treat all other meanings as derivative from this.
- A strain-locus is defined by the 'projectors 7 which penetrate any one
- finite region within it. Such a locus is a systematic whole, independently
- of the actualities which may atomize it. In this it is to be distinguished
- from a 'duration* which does depend on its physical content. A strain-
- locus depends merely upon its geometrical content. This geometrical con-
- tent is expressed by any adequate set of 'axioms* from which the systematic
- interconnections t of its included straight lines and points can be deduced.
- This conclusion requires the systematic uniformity of the geometry of a
- strain-locus, but refers to further empirical observation for the discovery
- of the particular character of this uniform system. For example, the ques-
- tion as to whether a complete straight line be a 'closed' serial locus of
- points or an 'open* serial locus, is entirely a question for such discovery.
- The only decision is to be found by comparing the rival theories in re-
- spect to their power of elucidating observed facts.
- The only relevant properties of straight lines are (i) their completeness,
- (ii) their inclusion of points, (iii) their unique definition by any pair of
- included points, (iv) their possibility of mutual intersection in a single
- point. The additional axioms which express the systematic geometrical
- theory must not have reference to length or to congruence. For these no-
- tions are to be derived from the theory. Thus the axioms must have ex-
- clusive reference to the intersection of straight lines, and to their inclusion
- or exclusion of points indicated by the intersections of other lines. Such
- sets of axioms are [504] well known to mathematicians. There are many
- such sets which respectively constitute alternative geometrical theories.
- Also given one set of axioms constituting a definite geometrical theory,
- different sets of axioms can easily be obtained which are equivalent to each
- other in the sense that all the other sets can be deduced from any one of
- them. AH such equivalent sets produce the same geometrical theory. Equiv-
- alent sets have their importance, but not for the present investigation. We
- can therefore neglect them, and different sets of axioms will mean sets of
- axioms which constitute incompatible geometrical theories.
- There are many such sets, with a great variety of peculiar properties.
- There are, however, three such sets which combine a peculiar simplicity
- with a very general conformation to the observed facts. These sets give
- the non-metrical properties of the three geometrical theories respectively
- known to mathematicians as the theory of Elliptic Geometry, of Euclidean
- Geometry, and of Hyperbolic Geometry.* It will serve no purpose to give
- the three sets of axioms. But it is very easy to explain the main point of
- Measurement 331
- difference between the theories, without being led too far from the philo-
- sophical discussion.
- In the first place, a definition of a 'plane' can be given which is com-
- mon to all the three theories. The definition already given in Chapter III
- of this Part will suffice. But an alternative definition can be stated thus:
- If A, B, C be any three non-collinear points, and AB, BC, CA denote the
- three complete straight lines containing,! respectively, A and B, B and C,
- C and A, then the straight lines which respectively intersect both members
- of any pair of these three lines, not both lines at one of the corners A or
- B or C, pass through all the points constituting one plane, and all their
- incident points are incident in the plane.
- Thus a plane is defined to be the locus of all the points incident in at
- least one of such a group of straight lines. The axioms are such that this
- definition is equivalent to [505] the definition in Chapter III. Also the
- axioms secure that any straight line, passing through two points in a plane,
- is itselft wholly incident in that plane. Also it follows from the definition
- of a plane that a line I and a point P, not incident in I, are coplanar.
- The distinction between the three geometrical theories can now be ex-
- plained by the aid of such a triplet, a point P, a line I not passing through
- P, and the plane n in which P and I are both incident. Consider all the
- lines through P and incident in the plane jr.. Then in the Elliptic Geo-
- metrical Theory, all these lines intersect the line I; in the Euclidean Geo-
- metrical Theory, all these lines intersect the line f, with the exception of
- one and only one line— the unique parallel to I through P; in the Hyper-
- bolic Geometrical Theory the lines through P in the plane are divisible
- into two classes, one class consisting of the lines intersecting f, the other
- class consisting of the lines not intersecting I, and each class with an in-
- finite number of members. Then it has been shown by Cayley and von
- Staudt 1 that the congruence of segments and the numerical measures of
- the distances involved are definable. The simplest case is that of Euclidean
- Geometry, In that case the basic fact is that the opposite sides of parallelo-
- grams are equal. A further complication is required to define congruence
- between segments which are not parallel. But it would serve no purpose to
- enter into the detailed solutions of this mathematical problem.
- But the illustration afforded by the particular case of the congruence of
- the opposite sides of parallelograms! enables the general principle under-
- lying the notion of congruence to be explained. Two segments are congru-
- ent when there is a certain analogy between their functions in a systematic
- pattern of straight lines, which includes both of them.
- The definition of this analogy is the definition of con- [5061 gruence in
- terms of non-metrical geometry. It is possible to discover diverse analogies
- which give definitions of congruence which are inconsistent with each
- 1 Cf. Cayley's "Sixth Memoir On Quantics," Transactions of the Royal So-
- ciety, 1859; vonf Staudt's Geometrie der Lage, 1847; and Beitrage zur Geom-
- etrie der Lage, 1856.
- 332 The Theory of Extension
- other. That definition which enters importantly into the internal consti-
- tutions of the dominating social entities is the important definition for the
- cosmic epoch in question.
- Measurement is now possible throughout the extensive continuum. This
- measurement is a systematic procedure dependent on the dominant so-
- cieties of the cosmic epoch. When one form of measurement has been
- given, alternative forms with assigned mathematical relations to the initial
- form can be defined. One such system is as good as any other, so far as
- mathematical procedure is concerned. The only point to be remembered is
- that each system of 'coordinates' must have its definable relation to the
- analogy which constitutes congruence.
- SECTION VI
- Physical measurement is now possible. The modern procedure, intro-
- duced by Einstein, is a generalization of the method of least action/ It
- consists in considering any continuous line between any two points in
- the spatio-temporal continuum and seeking to express the physical prop-
- erties of the field as an integral along it. The measurements which are
- presupposed are the geometrical measurements constituting the coordi-
- nates of the various points involved. Various physical quantities enter as
- the 'constants' involved in the algebraic functions concerned. These con-
- stants depend on the actual occasions which atomize the extensive con-
- tinuum. The physical properties of the medium are expressed by various
- conditions satisfied by this integral.
- It is usual to term an 'infinitesimal' element of this integral by the name
- of an element of distance. But this name, though satisfactory as a technical
- phraseology, is entirely misleading. There can be no theory of the con-
- gruence of different elements of the path. The notion of coincidence does
- not apply. There is no systematic [507] theory possible, since the so-called
- 'infinitesimal* distance depends on the actual entities throughout the en-
- vironment. The only way of expressing such so-called distance is to make
- use of the presupposed geometrical measurements. The mistake arises
- because, unconsciously, the minds of physicists are infected by a presup-
- position which comes down from Aristotle through Kant. Aristotle placed
- 'quantity' among his categories, and did not distinguish between extensive
- quantity and intensive quantity. Kant made this distinction, but consid-
- ered both of them as categoreal notions. It follows from Cayley's and von
- Staudt's work (cf. loc. cit.) that extensive quantity is a construct. The
- current physical theory presupposes a comparison of so-called lengths
- among segments without any theory as to the basis on which this com-
- parison is to be made, and in ignoration of the fact that all exact observa-
- tion belongs to the mode of presentational immediacy. Further, the fact is
- neglected that there are no infinitesimals, and that a comparison of finite
- segments is thus required. For this reason, it would be better— so far as
- Measurement 333
- explanation is concerned — to abandon the term 'distance' for this integral,
- and to call it by some such name as 'impetus/ suggestive of its physical
- import. 2
- It is to be noted, however, that the conclusions of this discussion involve
- no objection to the modern treatment of ultimate physical laws in the
- guise of a problem in differential geometry. The integral impetus is an
- extensive quantity, a length/ The differential element of impetus is
- the differential element of systematic length weighted with the individual
- peculiarities of its relevant environment. The whole theory of the physical
- field is the interweaving of the individual peculiarities of actual occasions
- upon the background of systematic geometry. This systematic geometry ex-
- presses the most general 'substantial form' inherited throughout the vast
- cosmic society which \508] constitutes the primary real potentiality condi-
- tioning concrescence. 3 In this doctrine, the organic philosophy is very near
- to the philosophy of Descartes.
- The whole argument can be summarized thus:
- (i) Actual occasions are immovable, so that the doctrine of coincidence
- is nonsense.
- (ii) Extensive quantity is a logical construct, expressing the number of
- congruent units which are (a) non-overlapping, and (b) exhaustive of the
- nexus in question.
- (iii) Congruence is only definable as a certain definite analogy of func-
- tion in a systematic complex which embraces both congruent elements.
- (iv) That all experimental measurement involves ultimate intuitions of
- congruence between earlier and later states of the instruments employed.
- (v) That all exact observation is made by perception in the mode of
- presentational immediacy.
- (vi) That if such perception merely concerns a private psychological
- field, science is the daydream of an individual without any public import.
- (vii) That perception in the mode of presentational immediacy solely
- depends upon the 'withness' of the 'body/ and only exhibits the external
- contemporary world in respect to its systematic geometrical relationship
- to the 'body/
- 2 Cf. my book, The Principle of Relativity, University Press, Cambridge, 1922.
- 3 This theory of the derivation of the basic uniformity requisite for congruence,
- and thence for measurement, should be compared with that of two deeply in-
- teresting articles: (i) "The Theory of Relativity and The First Principles of Sci-
- ence/* and (ii) "The Macroscopic Atomic Theory/' Journal of Philosophy , Vol.
- XXV, f by Professor F. S. C. Northrop of Yale. I cannot adjust his doctrine of
- a 'macroscopic atom' to my cosmological outlook. Nor does this norion seem
- necessary if my doctrine of 'microscopic atomic occasions' be accepted. But
- Professor Northrop's theory does seem to be the only alternative if this doctrine
- be abandoned. I regret that the articles did not come under my notice till this
- work had been finally revised for publication.
- PART V
- FINAL INTERPRETATION
- CHAPTER I
- THE IDEAL OPPOSITES
- SECTION I
- [512] The chief danger to philosophy is narrowness in the selection of
- evidence. This narrowness arises from the idiosyncrasies and timidities of
- particular authors, of particular social groups, of particular schools of
- thought, of particular epochs in the history of civilization. The evidence
- relied upon is arbitrarily biased by the temperaments of individuals, by
- the provincialities of groups, and by the limitations of schemes of thought.
- The evil, resulting from this distortion of evidence, is at its worst in the
- consideration of the topic of the final part of this investigation— ultimate
- ideals. We must commence this topic by an endeavour to state impartially
- the general types of the great ideals which have prevailed at sundry sea-
- sons and places. Our test in the selection,! to be impartial, must be prag-
- matic: the chosen stage of exemplification must be such as to compel at-
- tention, by its own intrinsic interest, or by the intrinsic interest of the
- results which flow from it. For example, the stern self-restraint of the Ro-
- man farmers in the early history of the Republic issued in the great epoch
- of the Roman Empire; and the stern self-restraint of the early Puritans in
- New England issued in the flowering of New England culture. The epoch
- of the Covenanters has had for its issue the deep impression which mod-
- ern civilization owes to Scotland. Neither the Roman farmers, nor the
- American Puritans, nor the Covenanters, can wholly command allegiance.
- Also they differ from each other. But in either case, there is greatness there,
- greatly exemplified. In contrast to this example, we find the flowering time
- of the aesthetic culture of ancient Greece, the Augustan epoch in Rome,
- the Italian Renaissance, the Elizabethan epoch in England, the Restora-
- tion epoch in England, \513) French and Teutonic civilization throughout
- the centuries of the modern world, Modern Paris, and Modern New York.
- Moralists have much to say about some of these societies. Yet, while there
- is any critical judgment in the lives of men, such achievements can never
- be forgotten. In the estimation of either type of these contrasted examples,
- sheer contempt betokens blindness. In each of these instances, there are
- elements which compel admiration. There is a greatness in the lives of
- those who build up religious systems, a greatness in action, in idea and in
- self-subordination, embodied in instance after instance through centuries
- of growth. There is a greatness in the rebels who destroy such systems:
- 337
- 338 Final Interpretation
- they are the Titans who storm heaven, armed with passionate sincerity. It
- may be that the revolt is the mere assertion by youth of its right to its
- proper brilliance, to that final good of immediate joy. Philosophy may not
- neglect the multifariousness of the world— the fairies dance, and Christ is
- nailed to the cross.
- SECTION II
- There are various contrasted qualities of temperament, which control the
- formation of the mentalities of different epochs. In a previous chapter
- (Part II, Ch. X) attention has already been drawn to the sense of perma-
- nence dominating the invocation 'Abide with Me/ and the sense of flux
- dominating the sequel 'Fast Falls the Eventide/ Ideals fashion themselves
- round these two notions, permanence and flux. In the inescapable flux,
- there is something that abides; in the overwhelming permanence, there is
- an element that escapes into flux. Permanence can be snatched only out of
- flux; and the passing moment can find its adequate intensity only by its
- submission to permanence. Those who would disjoin the two elements
- can find no interpretation of patent facts.
- The four symbolic figures in the Medici chapel in Florence— Michel-
- angelo's masterpieces of statuary, Day [514] and Night, Evening and
- Dawn— exhibit the everlasting elements in the passage of fact. The figures
- stay there, reclining in their recurring sequence, forever showing the es-
- sences in the nature of things. The perfect realization is not merely the
- exemplification of what in abstraction is timeless. It does more: it implants
- timelessness on what in its essence is passing. The perfect moment is fade-
- less in the lapse of time. Time has then lost its character of 'perpetual
- perishing'; it becomes the 'moving image of eternity/
- SECTION III
- Another contrast is equally essential for the understanding of ideals— the
- contrast between order as the condition for excellence, and order as stifling
- the freshness of living. This contrast is met with in the theory of educa-
- tion. The condition for excellence is a thorough training in technique.
- Sheer skill must pass out of the sphere of conscious exercise, and must
- have assumed the character of unconscious habit. The first, the second,
- and the third condition for high achievement is scholarship, in that en-
- larged sense including knowledge and acquired instinct controlling action.
- The paradox which wrecks so many promising theories of education is
- that the training which produces skill is so very apt to stifle imaginative
- zest. Skill demands repetition, and imaginative zest is tinged with impulse.
- Up to a certain point each gain in skill opens new paths for the imagina-
- tion. But in each individual formal training has its limit of usefulness. Be-
- Ideal Opposites 339
- yond that limit there is degeneration: The lilies of the field toil not,
- neither do they spin/
- The social history of mankind exhibits great organizations in their al-
- ternating functions of conditions for progress, and of contrivances for
- stunting humanity. The history of the Mediterranean lands, and of west-
- ern Europe, is the history of the blessing and the curset of political or-
- ganizations, of religious organizations, of [SIS] schemes of thought, of so-
- cial agencies for large purposes. The moment of dominance, prayed for,
- worked for, sacrificed for, by generations of the noblest spirits, marks the
- turning point where the blessing passes into the curse. Some new principle
- of refreshment is required. The art of progress is to preserve order amid
- change, and to preserve change amid order. Life refuses to be embalmed
- alive. The more prolonged the halt in some unrelieved system of order, the
- greater the crash of the dead society.
- The same principle is exhibited by the tedium arising from the unre-
- lieved dominance of a fashion in art. Europe, having covered itself with
- treasures of Gothic architecture, entered upon generations of satiation.
- These jaded epochs seem to have lost all sense of that particular form of
- loveliness. It seems as though the last delicacies of feeling require some
- element of novelty to relieve their massive inheritance from bygone sys-
- tem. Order is not sufficient. What is required, is something much more
- complex. It is order entering upon novelty; so that the massiveness of
- order does not degenerate into mere repetition; and so that the novelty
- is always reflected upon a background of system.
- But the two elements must not really be disjoined. It belongs to the
- goodness of the world, that its settled order should deal tenderly with the
- faint discordant light of the dawn of another age. Also order, as it sinks
- into the background before new conditions, has its requirements. The old
- dominance should be transformed into the firm foundations, upon which
- new feelings arise, drawing their intensities from delicacies of contrast be-
- tween system and freshness. In either alternative of excess, whether the
- past be lost, or be dominant, the present is enfeebled. This is only an
- application of Aristotle's doctrine of the 'golden mean/ The lesson of the
- transmutation of causal efficacy into presentational immediacy is that great
- ends are reached by life in the present; life novel and immediate, but
- deriving its richness by its full inheritance from the rightly organized [S16]
- animal body. It is by reason of the body, with its miracle of order, that
- the treasures of the past environment are poured into the living occasion.
- The final percipient route of occasions is perhaps some thread of happen-
- ings wandering in 'empty' space amid the interstices of the brain. It toils
- not, neither does it spin. It receives from the past; it lives in the present. It
- is shaken by its intensities of private feeling, adversion or aversion. In its
- turn, this culmination of bodily life transmits itself as an element of
- novelty throughout the avenues of the body. Its sole use to the body is its
- vivid originality: it is the organ of novelty.
- 340 Final Interpretation
- SECTION IV
- The world is thus faced by the paradox that, at least in its higher ac-
- tualities, it craves for novelty and yet is haunted by terror at the loss of the
- past, with its familiarities and its loved ones. It seeks escape from time in
- its character of 'perpetually perishing/ Part of the joy of the new years is
- the hope of the old round of seasons, with their stable facts— of friendship,
- and love, and old association. Yet conjointly with this terror, the present
- as mere unrelieved preservation of the past assumes the character of a
- horror of the past, rejection of it, revolt:
- To die be given, or attain,
- Fierce work it were to do again.*
- Each new epoch enters upon its career by waging unrelenting war upon
- the aesthetic gods of its immediate predecessor. Yet the culminating fact of
- conscious, rational life refuses to conceive itself as a transient enjoyment,
- transiently useful. In the order of the physical world its role is defined by
- its introduction of novelty. But, just as physical feelings are haunted by
- the vague insistence of causality, so the higher intellectual feelings are
- haunted by the vague insistence of another order, where there is no un-
- rest, no travel, no shipwreck: There shall be no more sea/
- [517] This is the problem which gradually shapes itself as religion
- reaches its higher phases in civilized communities. The most general
- formulation of the religious problem is the question whether the process of
- the temporal world passes into the formation of other actualities, bound
- together in an order in which novelty does not mean loss.
- The ultimate evil in the temporal world is deeper than any specific evil.
- It lies in the fact that the past fades, that time is a 'perpetual perishing/
- Objectification involves elimination. The present fact has not the past
- fact with it in any full immediacy. The process of time veils the past be-
- low distinctive feeling. There is a unison of becoming among things in
- the present. Why should there not be novelty without loss of this direct
- unison of immediacy among things? In the temporal world, it is the em-
- pirical fact that process entails loss: the past is present under an abstrac-
- tion. But there is no reason, of any ultimate metaphysical generality, why
- this should be the whole story. The nature of evil is that the characters of
- things are mutually obstructive. Thus the depths of life require a process of
- selection. But the selection is elimination as the first step towards another
- temporal order seeking to minimize obstructive modes. Selection is at once
- the measure of evil, and the process of its evasion. It means t discarding
- the element of obstructiveness in fact. No element in fact is ineffectual:
- thus the straggle with evil is a process of building up a mode of utilization
- by the provision of intermediate elements introducing a complex structure
- of harmony. The triviality in some initial reconstruction of order expresses
- the fact that actualities are being produced, which, trivial in their own
- Ideal Opposites 341
- proper character of immediate 'ends/ are proper 'means' for the emergence
- of a world at once lucid, and intrinsically of immediate worth.
- The evil of the world is that those elements which are translucent so far
- as transmission is concerned, in themselves are of slight weight; and that
- those elements [518] with individual weight, by their discord, impose upon
- vivid immediacy the obligation that it fade into night. 'He giveth his be-
- loved—sleep/
- In our cosmological construction we are, therefore, f left with the final
- opposites, joy and sorrow, good and evil, disjunction and conjunction—
- that is to say, the many in one—flux and permanence, greatness and
- triviality, freedom and necessity, God and the World. In this list, the pairs
- of opposites are in experience with a certain ultimate directness of in-
- tuition, except in the case of the last pair. God and the World introduce
- the note of interpretation. They embody the interpretation of the cos-
- mological problem in terms of a fundamental metaphysical doctrine as to
- the quality of creative origination, namely, conceptual appetition and
- physical realization. This topic constitutes the last chapter of Cosmology.
- 344 Final Interpretation
- Thus, when we make a distinction of reason, and con- [522] sider God in
- the abstraction of a primordial actuality, we must ascribe to him neither
- fulness of feeling, nor consciousness. He is the unconditioned actuality of
- conceptual feeling at the base of things; so that, by reason of this pri-
- mordial actuality, there is an order in the relevance of eternal objects to
- the process of creation. His unity of conceptual operations is a free crea-
- tive act, untrammelled by reference to any particular course of things. It
- is deflected neither by love, nor by hatred, for what in fact comes to pass.
- The particularities of the actual world presuppose it; while it merely pre-
- supposes the general metaphysical character of creative advance, of which
- it is the primordial exemplification. The primordial nature of God is the
- acquirement by creativity of a primordial character.
- His conceptual actuality at once exemplifies and establishes the cate-
- goreal conditions. The conceptual feelings, which compose his primordial
- nature, exemplify in their subjective forms their mutual sensitivity and
- their subjective unity of subjective aim. These subjective forms are valua-
- tions determining the relative relevance of eternal objects for each occa-
- sion of actuality.
- He is the lure for feeling, the eternal urge of desire. His particular
- relevance to each creative act,f as it arises from its own conditioned stand-
- point in the world, constitutes him the initial 'object of desire' establish-
- ing the initial phase of each subjective aim. A quotation from Aristotle's
- Metaphysics 1 expresses some analogies to, and some differences from, this
- line of thought:
- And since that which is moved and moves f is intermediate, there is
- something! which moves without being moved, being eternal, sub-
- stance, and actuality. And the object of desire and the object of thought
- move in this way; they move without being moved. The primary objects
- of desire and of thoughts are the same. For the apparent good is the
- object of appetite, and the real good is the primary object of rational
- wish.f But desire is conse- [523] quent on opinion rather than opinion
- on desire; for the thinking is the starting-point. And thought is moved
- by the object of thought, and one of the two columns t of op-
- posites is in itself the object of thought; . . .
- Aristotle had not made the distinction between conceptual feelings and
- the intellectual feelings which alone involve consciousness. But if 'con-
- ceptual feeling/ with its subjective form of valuation, be substituted for
- 'thought/ 'thinking/ and 'opinion/ in the above quotation, the agreement
- is exact.
- SECTION III
- There is another side to the nature of God which cannot be omitted.
- Throughout this exposition of the philosophy of organism we have been
- 1 Metaphysics 1072a 23-32, t trans, by Professor W. D. Ross. My attention
- was called to the appositeness of this particular quotation by Mr. F. J. Carson.
- 346 Final Interpretation
- In it there is no loss, no obstruction. The world is felt in a unison of im-
- mediacy. The property of combining creative advance with [525} the re-
- tention of mutual immediacy is what in the previous section is meant by
- the term 'everlasting/
- The wisdom of subjective aim prehends every actuality for what it can be
- in such a perfected system— its sufferings, its sorrows, its failures, its tri-
- umphs, its immediacies of joy— woven by Tightness of feeling into the har-
- mony of the universal feeling, which is always immediate, always many,
- always one, always with novel advance, moving onward and never perish-
- ing. The revolts of destructive evil, purely self-regarding, are dismissed into
- their triviality of merely individual facts; and yet the good they did achieve
- in individual joy, in individual sorrow, in the introduction of needed con-
- trast, is yet saved by its relation to the completed whole. The image— and
- it is but an image— the image under which this operative growth of God's
- nature is best conceived, is that of a tender care that nothing be lost.
- The consequent nature of God is his judgment on the world. He saves
- the world as it passes into the immediacy of his own life. It is the judgment
- of a tenderness which loses nothing that can be saved. It is also the judg-
- ment of a wisdom which uses what in the temporal world is mere wreckage.
- Another image which is also required to understand his consequent na-
- turet is that of his infinite patience. The universe includes a threefold
- creative act composed of (i) the one infinite conceptual realization, (ii)
- the multiple solidarity of free physical realizations in the temporal world,
- (iii) the ultimate unity of the multiplicity of actual fact with the pri-
- mordial conceptual fact. If we conceive the first term and the last term in
- their unity over against the intermediate multiple freedom of physical
- realizations in the temporal world, we conceive of the patience of God,
- tenderly saving the turmoil of the intermediate world by the completion of
- his own nature. The sheer force of things lies in the intermediate physical
- process: this is the energy of physical production, God's r61e is not the
- combat of productive force [526] with productive force, of destructive
- force with destructive force; it lies in the patient operation of the over-
- powering rationality of his conceptual harmonization. He does not create
- the world, he saves it: or, more accurately, he is the poet of the world, with
- tender patience leading** it by his vision of truth, beauty, and goodness.
- SECTION V
- The vicious separation of the flux from the permanence leads to the
- concept of an entirely static God, with eminent reality, in relation to an
- entirely fluent world, with deficient reality. But if the opposites, static and
- fluent, have once been so explained as separately to characterize diverse
- actualities, the interplay between the thing which is static and the things
- which are fluent involves contradiction at every step in its explanation.
- Such philosophies must include the notion of 'illusion' as a fundamental
- 348 Final Interpretation
- mary can [528] only be expressed in terms of a group of antitheses, whose
- apparent self-contradictions depend f on neglect of the diverse categories of
- existence. In each antithesis there is a shift of meaning which converts the
- opposition into a contrast.
- It is as true to say that God is permanent and the World fluent, as that
- the World is permanent and God is fluent.
- It is as true to say that God is one and the World many, as that the
- World is one and God many.
- It is as true to say that, in comparison with the World, God is actual
- eminently, as that, in comparison with God, the World is actual eminently.
- It is as true to say that the World is immanent in God, as that God is
- immanent in the World.
- It is as true to say that God transcends the World, as that the World
- transcends God.
- It is as true to say that God creates the World, as that the World
- creates God.
- God and the World are the contrasted opposites in terms of which
- Creativity achieves its supreme task of transforming disjoined multiplicity,
- with its diversities in opposition, into concrescent unity, with its diver-
- sities in contrast. In each actuality theref are two concrescent poles of
- realization— 'enjoyment' and 'appetition/ that is, the 'physical' and the
- 'conceptual.' For God the conceptual is prior to the physical, for the
- World the physical poles are prior to the conceptual poles.
- A physical pole is in its own nature exclusive, bounded by contradiction:
- a conceptual pole is in its own nature all-embracing, unbounded by con-
- tradiction. The former derives its share of infinity from the infinity of ap-
- petition; the latter derives its share of limitation from the exclusiveness of
- enjoyment. Thus, by reason of his priority of appetition, there can be but
- one primordial nature for God: and, by reason of their priority of enjoy-
- ment, there must be one history of many actualities in the physical world.
- [529] God and the World stand over against each other, expressing the
- final metaphysical truth that appetitive vision and physical enjoyment have
- equal claim to priority in creation. But no two actualities can be torn
- apart: each is all in all. Thus each temporal occasion embodies God, and
- is embodied in God. In God's nature, permanence is primordial and flux
- is derivative from the World: in the World's nature, flux is primordial and
- permanence is derivative from God. Also the World's nature is a pri-
- mordial datum for God; and God's nature is a primordial datum for the
- World. Creation achieves the reconciliation of permanence and flux when
- it has reached its final term which is everlastingness— the Apotheosis of
- the World.
- Opposed elements stand to each other in mutual requirement. In their
- unity, they inhibit or contrast. God and the World stand to each other in
- this opposed requirement. God is the infinite ground of all mentality, the
- unity of vision seeking physical multiplicity. The World is the multiplicity
- 350 Final Interpretation
- existence. The function of being a means is not disjoined from the func-
- tion of being an end. The sense of worth beyond itself is immediately
- enjoyed as an overpowering element in the individual self-attainment. It
- is in this way that the immediacy of sorrow and pain is transformed into
- an element of triumph. This is the notion of redemption through suffer-
- ingf which haunts the world. It is the generalization of its very minor
- exemplification as the aesthetic value of discords in art.
- Thus the universe is to be conceived as attaining the active self-expres-
- sion of its own variety of opposites— of its own freedom and its own
- necessity, of its own multiplicity and its own unity, of its own imperfection
- and its own perfection. All the 'opposites' are elements in the nature of
- things, and are incorrigibly there. The concept of 'God' is the way in
- which we understand this incredible fact— that what cannot be, yet is.
- SECTION VII
- Thus the consequent nature of God is composed of a multiplicity of
- elements with individual self-realization. It is just as much a multiplicity
- as it is a unity; it is just as much one immediate fact as it is an unresting
- advance beyond itself. Thus the actuality of God must also be understood
- as a multiplicity of actual components in process of creation. This is God
- in his function of the kingdom of heaven.
- Each actuality in the temporal world has its reception into God's na-
- ture. The corresponding element in God's nature is not temporal ac-
- tuality, but is the transmutation of that temporal actuality into a living,
- ever-present fact. An enduring personality in the temporal world is a route
- of occasions in which the successors with some peculiar completeness sum
- up their predecessors. The correlate fact in God's nature is an even more
- complete unity of life in a chain of elements for which succession does not
- mean loss of immediate unison. This element in God's nature inherits
- from the temporal counterpart [532] according to the same principle as in
- the temporal world the future inherits from the past. Thus in the sense in
- which the present occasion is the person now, and yet with his own past,
- so the counterpart in God is that person in God.
- But the principle of universal relativity is not to be stopped at the con-
- sequent nature of God. This nature itself passes into the temporal world
- according to its gradation of relevance to the various concrescent occasions.
- There are thus four creative phases in which the universe accomplishes its
- actuality. There is first the phase of conceptual origination, deficient in
- actuality, but infinite in its adjustment of valuation. Secondly, there is the
- temporal phase of physical origination, with its multiplicity of actualities.
- In this phase full actuality is attained; but there is deficiency in the soli-
- darity of individuals with each other. This phase derives its determinate
- conditions from the first phase. Thirdly, there is the phase of perfected
- actuality, in which the many are one everlastingly, without the qualifica-
- 356
- Index
- Actual occasion (cont.)
- tity, 18, 22, 73, 77, HI, 211; used to
- stress extensiveness, 77; excludes God,
- 88
- Actual world, 4, 25, 27, 33, 46, 59, 286:
- as datum, 4, 16, 65, 69, 72, 65, 87,
- 154, 158, 211, 212, 230, 233, 286; and
- propositions, 11, 194-95, 204, 265; as
- process, 22; definition of, 23, 28, 150;
- and efficient causation, 24-25, 169,
- 178, 277; as determinate, 45; and God,
- 47, 65, 93, 220; as relative, 59, 65-66,
- 93, 210-11, 226, 284; conditions po-
- tentiality, 65, 129; as atomic, 67, 286;
- as nexus, 73, 77, 230, 238; as mine,
- 76, 81; withness of, 81; knowledge of,
- 81; order and chaos in, 86, 110-11;
- givenness of, 129; as ground of proba-
- bility judgments, 203; perspective of,
- 210; objective immortality of, 230; inde-
- termination of, 284; divisibility of, 285-
- 86
- Adaptation, 83, 107, 163
- Adequacy, xi, xii, xiv, 3, 6, 9, 11, 13, 15,
- 239, 343
- Adventure, 9, 14, 42, 78, 80
- Adversion and aversion (valuation up and
- down), 24, 32, 184, 234, 241, 247,
- 248, 254, 261, 266, 277, 278, 291,
- 328, 339
- Aesthetic, 5, 39: interests, xii; emphasis,
- 102; experience, 62, 183, 185, 212,
- 279; supplement, 213; harmony, cate-
- gory of, 255; fact, 279; laws, 280; cul-
- ture, 337; gods, 340
- Affirmation, 191, 243, 270, 273-74
- Affirmation- negation contrast, 24, 243,
- 256, 261, 267
- Aggregates, 173, 286
- Aim: at unity, 224; at contrast, 249;
- private, 290. See also Initial aim; Sub-
- jective aim
- Alexander, Samuel, 28, 41
- Algebra, 332
- All, 208
- All things flow, 208
- Alternation, 187
- Alternatives, II, 148, 161, 249, 278
- Analogous occasions, 99, 250, 251-53
- Analogy: and probability, induction, 49,
- 201, 204, 205, 206-07; and congruence,
- 97, 331, 333
- Analysis, 4, 19, 22, 23, 51, 153, 160, 166,
- 211, 235. See also Division
- Animal body, 106: in perception, 63, 1 18—
- 19, 169-70, 178-79, 311, 315; as part
- of environment, 64, 76, 119, 170, 234;
- theory of, 103; cell as, 103, 104; life of,
- 108; order of, 180, 339. See also Body;
- Bodily
- Animal faith, 48, 52, 54, 81, 142, 152
- Animals, 107, 181
- Anticipation, 27, 179, 204, 205, 278
- Antitheses, 348
- Any, 114, 162, 256, 257, 261
- Appearance: mere, 18, 54, 152, 229, 347;
- world as, 49; and reality, 72
- Appetition, 32-33, 51, 72, 83, 102, 150,
- 154, 163, 184, 212, 341, 348: in God,
- 48, 105, 207, 316, 347, 348
- Applicability, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 14, 20, 93
- Appreciation, 27, 47, 85, 212, 213, 311,
- 327
- A priori figleaf, 146
- Aquinas, Thomas, 11, 108
- Arbitrariness, 6, 7, 71, 91
- Aristotelian: (primary) substance, xiii, 21,
- 30, 50, 59, 79, 138, 157, 158; matter
- (primary substance) and creativity, 21,
- 31; substantial form. 34
- Aristotle, 10, 39: influence of, xi, 51, 84,
- 159; and Aristotelian logic, 30, 51, 209;
- and substance-quality (subject-predicate)
- thought, 30, 137, 2Q9; and ontological
- principle, 40; and entities present in
- others, 50; and final causes, 84; and
- forms, 96; and fluency, 209; and
- Platonism, 209; on generation, 209;
- and quantity, 332; and golden mean,
- 339; on God, 342, 343, 344
- Arithmetic, as metaphysical, 198-99
- Art, 9, 162-63 228, 280, 317, 339, 350:
- and God, 189; and morality, 317
- Asiatic thought, 7
- Association, 129, 175, 299
- Ate, goddess of mischief, 244, 351
- Atomicity, atomism, 27, 117, 235, 237:
- and final causation, 19; and continuity,
- extension, 36, 67, 72, 73, 123, 292; of
- actuality, 35-36, 45, 61, 62, 77, HO,
- 227, 235, 286, 307; of quantum theory,
- 238, 309; and Zeno, 307
- Atoms, 78, 95, 286, 333n
- Attribute, 40, 77, 78, 159, 288, 309
- Augustine, 14
- Authentic perceptive feelings, 262, 264,
- 269, 270 1
- Authority, 39
- 358
- Index
- Change (cont.)
- ventures of, 35, 55; meaning of, 73,
- 79, 80; of molecule, 80; in Cartesian-
- ism, 144; always obtains, 238; and
- order, 339. See also Motion
- Chaos: as non-social nexus, 72; absolute,
- 92; creation out of, 95-96, 199; pure,
- 111; borders of, 111; and triviality, 110,
- 199; not evil, 112; of diverse epochs,
- 112; zero, 115; arithmetic in, 199;
- occasions in, 199; of data, 248. See also
- Disorder
- Chemical, 95, 106
- Christianity, 342-43, 347
- Civilization, xi, 9, 17, 337, 340
- Clarity and distinctness, 8, 162, 173-74,
- 236
- Class, 46, 89, 228, 229
- Coalescence, 26, 225
- Cogredience, 125
- Coherence: as ideal, 3, 5, 6, 128, 225,
- 257, 349; theory, 190-91, 271; in
- actual entity, 224, 226
- Coincidence, 328, 333
- Colours, 44, 61, 64, 78, 162, 194, 326,
- 327
- Common sense: repressive, 9; and spe-
- cialism, imagination, 17; on experience,
- 50; Locke's expression of, 51, 52; no-
- tions presupposed by, 52, 128, 129; on
- space and time, 70, 72; objectivism of,
- 72, 144, 158, 160; on knowledge in
- experience, 161; on cause of sensa, 171;
- on presentational immediacy, 311, 324
- Communication, 4
- Comparative feelings, 254, 266, 270, 275-
- 76
- Comparison, 146, 164, 166
- Compatibility: and contrariety, 148; for
- synthesis, 148, 154, 223, 224, 240;
- judgment of, 274
- Complete locus, 307
- Complexity, 8, 80, 161, 227, 246: and
- atomism, 36; and intensity, 100, 279;
- of givenness and order, 100; and sim-
- plicity, 133; and knowledge, 161; of
- universe, 166; of data, 232; and auton-
- omy, 255; definition of, 278
- Composition, 58, 147
- Compulsion, 175
- Concavity and convexity, 307
- Concept of Nature, The, 125«, 128n,
- 243n, 287n
- Concepts, 16, 55, 194, 242
- Conceptual analysis, 247
- Conceptual imagination, 248
- Conceptualism, 40
- Conceptual origination, 247
- Conceptual Pole. See Mental pole
- Conceptual prehension (feeling, valua-
- tion, reproduction, registration, recog-
- nition), 32-34, 44, 45, 49, 87, 164-65,
- 189, 214, 239, 240-43, 248: definition
- of, 23, 184, 232, 239, 240, 243; cate-
- gory of, 26, 33, 53, 101, 225, 246,
- 248-49, 250, 251-52, 254, 260, 271,
- 276, 277, 316; derived from physical
- feelings, 26, 247, 250, 260; mutual de-
- termination (sensitivity) of, 27, 221,
- 235, 344; unconditioned, complete, 31,
- 32-34, 247, 344, 345; as appetition,
- 32, 33, 184, 341; connotations of, 33;
- pure and impure, 63, 184, 241, 313;
- originality in, 102, 105; negligible, 115;
- and Humian impressions, 160-63;
- blind, 161, 214, 241, 247, 343-44; and
- internal determination, 164; conscious-
- ness not necessary for, 165, 241, 344:
- as source of emotion, 212; of subjective
- aim, 224; basic, 224, 244; 256; objecti-
- fi cation by, 225; negative, 226-27, 240;
- as primary feelings, 232, 239; as primary
- mental operations, 239, 240; as feelings
- of negation, 243; novel, 244-45; derived
- from other conceptual feelings, 247,
- 248, 254 (see also Reversion); as pur-
- posive, 254; efficacy of, 254; and actual
- world, 256; generality of datum, 257,
- 275; concerns entire region, 285. See
- also Mental prehension; Valuation
- Concern. 55
- Concordance, 252
- Concrescence, 7, 26, 41-42, 49, 84, 108,
- 219, 220, 224-25, 232, 283, 316: as
- production of novel togetherness, 21;
- components of, 21, 47, 84; actual
- entity as, 22, 211, 212; eliminates inde-
- termination, 23, 85, 88; and final causa-
- tion, 24, 210; pre-established harmony
- of, 27; freedom of, 47-48; as indi-
- vidualization of universe, 51, 165, 316;
- and subjective aim, 69, 87, 167, 245;
- absorbs data into privacy, 85; responsi-
- bility of, 88; as process of addition,
- 151; as selective, 153-54; problem for,
- 154, 283; cosmology in description of,
- 167; one kind of fluency, 210; cate-
- goreal demands of, 237; dipolarity of,
- 360
- Index
- Cosmic epoch (cont.)
- ing characteristic of, 293, 332; straight
- and flat "loci in, 310; strain-loci in, 322
- Cosmological argument, 93
- Cosmology: motives of, xi; satisfactory,
- xii, 128, 143, 290, 316; seventeenth-
- century, xiv; Plato's, xiv, 93, 94; one-
- substance, 19, 110; monadic, 27; and
- unique seriality, 35; speculations of, 71
- and arbitrary factors in geometry, 91
- Newton's, 93, 94; general doctrine of
- 94; of philosophy of organism, 103
- three misconceptions hampering, 156
- and concrescence, 167; Kant's, 190
- based on simple physical feelings, 238
- and physical purposes, 276; and vacuous
- actuality, 309; and scientific theory,
- 323; last chapter of, 341; interpretation
- in, 341; as basis of religion, 349
- Counting and measurement, 327
- Creation, 85, 95-96, 223, 341, 348, 349
- Creative act, 245, 247, 250
- Creative advance, xiv, 21, 28, 45, 227, 277,
- 346: into novelty, 35, 128, 222, 349;
- God's purpose in, 105; propositions
- grow with, 188, 259; nexus not de-
- stroyed in, 238; general notion of, 289;
- relation of nature as extensive com-
- munity to, 289; metaphysical character
- of, 344; re-establishes itself, 347
- Creativity: as ultimate, 7, 20; as inexplica-
- ble by forms, 20; as conditioned (char-
- acterized, qualified) by actuality, 20,
- 29, 43, 84, 85, 87-88, 108, 164, 220,
- 222, 225, 237, 244; universal of uni-
- versals, 21; as principle of novelty, 21;
- discussion of, 21; transcendence of,
- 26, 43, 85, 87, 102, 237, 280; defini-
- tion of, 31-32; God and, 88, 225, 244,
- 344; as universal throughout actuality,
- 164; as fundamental fact, 211; transi-
- tion as, 211; as passing on, 213; as
- abstract possibility, 220; not an external
- agency, 222; meaningless without crea-
- tures, 225; new impersonation of, 237;
- transition of, 244; effect of adversion
- and aversion on, 277; has character of
- final and efficient causation, 277; su-
- preme task of, 348
- Creatures, 20, 22, 32, 69, 80, 225, 227,
- 255, 345, 351
- Critical judgment, 178
- Critical philosophy, 50, 173, 174, 175
- Criticism, 10, 151, 268
- Critique of pure feeling, 113
- Cumulation, 237, 238
- Custom, 326
- Daily life, 156, 174
- Datum (data), 23, 47, 52, 58, 86, 106,
- 165, 203, 224, 230-31, 248: and pri-
- mary phase, 16, 104, 144, 154-55, 206;
- objectivity of, 40; primary, 44, 49, 159;
- as potentiality, 65, 113; as absorbed into
- subject, 85, 153, 154, 164; order in,
- 100, 106, 113; inherited from past,
- 104, 116; limits and supplies, 110; and
- freedom, 110, 115, 203; character of,
- 110, 157; vector character of, 116, 117,
- 120; includes bodily organs, 117-19;
- analytic consciousness of, 120; intui-
- tions as, 142; as decisions received,
- 149-50; as objective content, 150, 152;
- found in past, 150, 233; involves actual
- entities (world), 153, 154, 211, 224,
- 233, 235; as perspective, 154; com-
- plexity of, 153, 185, 246; as universal,
- 159; modification of, 164; dead, 164;
- as environment under abstraction, 203;
- finitude of relevant, 206; as in being,
- 233; as public side of prehension, 290.
- See also Initial datum; Objective datum
- Dead, appropriation of, xiii
- Decay, 188
- Decision, 43: of subject-superject, 28;
- meaning of, 43; as meaning of actuality,
- 43; as basis of givenness, 43, 47, 62;
- as basis of explanation, 46; and onto-
- logical principle, 46; as modification
- of subjective aim, 47; God's, 47, 164;
- satisfaction as, 60; transcendent, 150.
- 164; transmitted, 150, 154; received,
- 150, 277, 284; immanent (immedi-
- ate), 163-64, 284; successive, 224; and
- indeterminations in initial aim, 224;
- adversion and aversion as, 254; in sub-
- jective aim, 277; and freedom, 284;
- relevance to contemporaries, 318
- Deduction, 8, 10, 343
- Definiteness: of experience, 4, 29, 240;
- of statement, 9; forms (potentialities,
- universal) of, 14, 20, 22, 34, 40, 158;
- definition of, 25; as exclusive limitation,
- 45, 240; as final cause, 223; private, 290
- Definition: of constructs, 3; of proposi-
- tions, II; of verbal expressions, 13; as
- soul of actuality, 223
- Deity, divine, 40, 93, 94, 343
- 362
- Index
- Emotion (cont)
- fied, 28, 106; transmission of, 114, 115;
- sensa as definiteness of, 114; quantita-
- tive, 116, 233-35; and sensation, 115,
- 141, 162; and physical energy, 116,
- 315; pulses (throbs) of, 116, 163, 327;
- blind, 162-63; as public and private,
- 212-13, 290; and struggle for existence,
- 226; qualitative, 233-34; pattern of,
- 237, 273, 275
- Emphasis, 47, 48, 102, 108, 110, 146,
- 163, 313
- Empiricism, 285: one side of philosophy,
- 3-4; Lockian, Humian, sensationalist,
- 50, 57, 145, 151, 153, 167, 171, 174,
- 316; ultimate ground of, 256
- Empty space: actual occasions in, 56, 92,
- 99, 177, 199, 314, 319; and material
- ether, 78; within cell, 99, 105, 106; and
- strains, strain-loci, 311, 319; and rest,
- 319; and presentational immediacy,
- 321; in brain, 339
- End(s), 40, 83, 222, 224, 339, 349-50
- Endurance: and Zeno, 68-69; undifferen-
- tiated, 77-79, 187; as repetition, 104,
- 128, 136-37: and rhythm, vibration,
- 279; passive, 309
- Enduring: substance, 79; soul, 104; per-
- sonality, 119, 350-51; percipient, 270
- Enduring objects, 99: definition of, 34-
- 35, 109, 161; self-identity of, 55; rele-
- vance of power to, 56; distinct from
- other societies, actual entities, 72; as
- referent of personal pronoun, 75; elec-
- trons as, 92, 326; humans as, 92, 161;
- as restricted corpuscular society, 92,
- 104; molecule as, 99, 326; living, 107,
- 109, 177; transition of matter or char-
- acter, 109; with consciousness, knowl-
- edge, 161, 177, 270; inorganic, non-
- living, 173, 177; subjective aims or
- physical purposes in, 187-88, 276, 279;
- simple, 198; intersection of, 199; and
- strains, 311; contemporary occasions of,
- 318; and strain-locus, 319; and pre-
- sented duration, 321; protons as, 326;
- material bodies as, 326
- Energy: radiant, 109; forms of, 116, 120,
- 239, 254; and emotion, 116, 315;
- transference of, 116-17, 238-39, 246;
- vector marks of, 117; quantity of, 117,
- 238-39; origination of, 246, 285: physi-
- cal theory of, 254; complexity deter-
- mines degree of, 255; fluent, 309; struc-
- ture of, 309
- Enjoyment, 9, 41, 49, 51, 85, 159, 166,
- 178, 262, 289, 340, 348, 350
- Entirely living nexus, 103-5, 107
- Entity (-ies ) : cannot be considered in iso-
- lation, 3, 28; synonymous with being,
- thing, 21, 211; and categories of exis-
- tence, 20; meaning of, 28, 43, 211, 243,
- 224; use of term, 30; proper, 30, 247,
- 224, 228; as felt by actualities, 41;
- self -identity of, 57, 225; two primary
- types of, 188; two pure types of, 188;
- impure types of, 188; two hybrid types
- of, 188-89; four main types of, 188;
- originating in concrescence, 211; not
- abstractable from creativity, 213, 243;
- categoreal types of, 219; objective func-
- tioning of, 222-23; temporal, 276. See
- also Actual entity; Thing
- Environment, 89, 90, 99, 110, 203-06,
- 207, 234, 254, 264-65
- Envisagement, 34, 44, 189
- Epiphenomenal, 292
- Epistemology, xii, 48-50, 52, 54, 73, 117
- Epochal theory of time, 68, 283
- Epochs, historical, 14, 15, 17, 338, 339,
- 340. See also Cosmic epoch
- Equations, 311
- Error: logical, 30; in higher organisms,
- 113, 168; and theory, 161; impossible
- in pure perceptive modes, 168; in sym-
- bolic reference, 168, 172, 183; and
- progress, 168, 187; arising below con-
- sciousness, 180, 271-72; God as source
- of, 189; in derivative judgment, 192;
- colour-blindness as, 253; some novelty
- in, 253; in conscious perceptions, 262,
- 268, 269; consciousness of, 270
- Essence: of actual entity, 41; Critical
- Realists' use of, 44; real, 53, 59-60,
- 193; nominal, 60; abstract, 60; of
- eternal objects, 115, 165, 315; specific,
- 148
- Eternal, 40, 189, 248, 345, 347
- Eternal object (s), 40: as (pure) potential
- (for ingression), 22, 23, 40, 44, 164,
- 184, 188, 214, 239, 290; as forms
- (determinants) of definiteness, 22, 23,
- 26, 40, 149, 154, 158, 227, 238, 239,
- 240, 241, 291, 312; as ultimate ele-
- ments. 22. 219: no novel. 22; ingression
- of, 23, 31, 41, 45, 52, 59, 64, 86, 114,
- 364
- Index
- Experience (cont.)
- 143, 167; obvious facts of, 145; naked
- and unashamed, 146; as primary meta-
- physical fact, 160; topsy-turvy explana-
- tion of, 162; purposeful, 162, 163;
- emotional, 162-63; and everlastingness,
- 163; nothing apart from, 167; blind,
- 178; of being one among others, 178;
- togetherness in, 189-90; occasion of,
- 189, 190; stream of, 189, 190; throb
- of, 190; concordant, 206; integral, 208;
- elucidation of, 208; ultimate, 208; of
- future, 215; complexity of, 267; objec-
- tive and subjective sides of, 277;
- aesthetic, 280; depth of, 318; direct,
- 16, 324-25
- Explanation, 7, 96: as explaining away,
- 17, 145; of abstract from concrete, 20;
- categories of, 20, 22-26, 28, 166; and
- decision, 46; based on vera causa, 77-
- 78; scientific, 77-78, 324; philosophi-
- cal, 129, 250; elements in, 153; as ana-
- lysis of coordination, 153; make-believe,
- 201
- Expression, 96, 209
- Extension, lower limit to, 206
- Extensive abstraction, 97, 287
- Extensive connection, 294-301: defining
- characteristic of extensive continuum,
- 97-98; and perception, 168-69; one
- scheme of, 286-87; as starting-point,
- 287; sui generis, 288; formal properties
- of, 288; primary relationship of physical
- world, 288-89; elimination of atomicity
- in, 292
- Extensive continuum, xii, 61-82: Des-
- cartes and Newton on, xii, 76; not in-
- volve continuity of becoming, 35; as
- datum, 62, 72-73, 76, 123; as real
- potentiality, 62, 66, 67, 76; not prior to
- world, 66; underlies whole world, 66,
- 72; exemplified in all actualities, 67; as
- basic limitation on abstract potentiality,
- 80; as physical field, 80; quantum of,
- 80; defining characteristic of, 97; atomi-
- zation of, 123, 124, 128; reason for
- careful discussion of, 167; limitation to
- finite region of, 206; standpoint in,
- 283; as order of this epoch, 293; based
- on divisibility of physical pole, 308;
- systematic structure of, 325; measure-
- ment possible throughout, 332
- Extensiveness: spatial and temporal, 61,
- 77, 80, 238, 283, 301; aboriginal poten-
- tiality of, 62; of actual entities, 77; as
- basic fact, 91; grades of specialization
- of, 91, 92; due to divisibility of satis-
- faction, 69, 221; as indefinite divisi-
- bility, 285; as pervading generic form,
- 287; derivation of, 287; of present
- cosmic epoch, 326
- Extensive order, 286
- Extensive perspective, 58
- Extensive quantity, 97, 332, 333
- Extensive quantum, 283, 284, 307
- Extensive region, 168-70, 301, 310
- Extensive relationships: knowledge of, 61,
- 122; as fundamental, 67, 288; external,
- 286, 287, 309; internal, 286, 309; as
- condition of transmission, 288; Des-
- cartes and Locke on, 288, 326; perma-
- nence of, 327-28
- Extensive scheme, 288, 318
- Extensive society, 96-97
- Extensive whole and part, 287, 288
- External world, 54-56, 62, 63, 116, 117,
- 120, 140, 156, 158, 171, 176, 206,
- 234, 313, 314, 321, 333
- Ezekiel, 85
- Fact(s), 6,9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 20, 39-
- 40, 42, 46, 51, 96, 129, 161-62, 188,
- 219, 220, 276, 290, 338, 343
- False propositions, 184-85, 186
- Fatigue, tedium, 16, 239, 339
- Feeler, 88, 222, 237
- Feeling (s) : Bradley's doctrine of, xiii;
- definition of, 23, 40-42; and Lockian
- ideas, 25, 51-53; as positive prehen-
- sions, 26, 40-42, 142, 221; integration
- of, 26, 232: mutual sensitivity (determi-
- nation) of, 27, 192, 221/223, 235,
- 275, 344; intensity of, 27, 277-78;
- Descartes' use of, 41; of actual entities,
- 49, 211, 230; vector character of, 55,
- 87, 119, 231; of bodily actualities, 75,
- 81; tone of, 85, 119, 120, 308; self-
- definition of, 85-86; subjective forms
- of, 85, 88, 211, 221, 232; aptness for,
- 87; between data and feeler, 88; nar-
- rowness and width of, 110-12; con-
- formity of, 113; quantitative, 116; spe-
- cific forms of, 116; intensity of, 118,
- 244; visceral and visual, 121; common
- sense requires, 128; give immediacy,
- 136, 155; compatibility of, 148, 223;
- blind, 161, 162, 163, 214; aesthetic,
- 162; use of term, 164, 211; successive
- - phases of, 164, 165-66; hierarchy of,
- 366
- Index
- God, 343-51: as non- temporal, 7, 40, 46;
- and ultimate, 7; and creativity, 7, 88,
- 222, 225, 348-49; actual entity, 18, 40,
- 46, 65, 87, 94, 110, 164, 244; and
- reasons of highest absoluteness, 19; and
- ontological principle, 19; objectification
- (prehension) of, 31, 189, 207, 225,
- 246, 316, 348; objective immortality
- of, 32; reason for name, 31-32; and
- religion, 31-32, 189, 207; satisfaction
- of, 32, 88: originates from mental pole,
- 36, 75, 87, 224, 345, 348; mediates
- between actuality and potentiality, 40,
- 49; as creator, 47, 225, 346, 348; of
- theologians, 47; and knowledge, 49,
- 144, 190; goodness of, 49, 345; power
- of, 49, 346; as included in actual world,
- 65, 220; as source of novelty, 67, 88,
- 108, 164, 247, 349; Descartes on, 74-
- 75, 144, 158; compared with occasions,
- 75, 87, 88, 110, 224; has no past, 87;
- threefold character of, 87-88; aim (pur-
- pose) of, 88, 100, 105, 345; source of
- order, 88, 108, 244, 247, 347: as self-
- causing, 88, 222; and terms actual
- entity and occasion, 88; as individual
- for own sake, 88; super jective nature
- of, 88; as transcended, 88, 222, 348;
- transcendence of, 88, 93, 95, 164, 348;
- as eternal, 93, 345, 349; immanence of,
- 93, 111, 348; tenderness of, 105, 346;
- fulfillment of, 105; source of initial aim,
- 108, 224, 244, 283; as principle of con-
- cretion (limitation), 164, 244; decision
- of, 164; as macroscopic res vera, 167;
- and ethics, art, error, 189; secularization
- of, 207; permanence of, 208, 346-48;
- relevance to conceptual valuations, 225,
- 244; as creator, 225, 342; analogy to
- Greek and Buddhist thought of, 244;
- as goddess of mischief, 244, 351; func-
- tions of, 207, 244, 350; intervention
- of, 247; eternal objects not created by,
- 257; source of physical law, 283; as
- modifying agency, 325; interpretation
- in doctrine of world and, 341
- — consequent nature of, 343-51: and
- truth, 12; growth of, 12, 346; impar-
- tiality of, 13; results from prehensions
- of world, 31, 345, 347; objective im-
- mortality of, 32, 351; harmonious, 88,
- 349; intensity of, 88; as locus of im-
- partial nexus, 231
- — primordial nature of, 343-51: non-
- temporal, 7, 31, 46; relation to crea-
- tivity, 7, 32, 105, 225, 344; completion
- of, 13, 345, 347; as eternal, 13, 345;
- conceptual, 13, 31, 87, 207, 343; crea-
- ture, 31; source of order, 32, 107; im-
- manence of, 32; efficacious, 32, 349;
- deficient in actuality, 34, 343-44, 345,
- 349, 350; and actual world, 44, 47, 105,
- 344; eternal objects subsist in, 46;
- standard of intensity, 47; as macro-
- scopic fact. 47; freedom of, 47-48,
- 344, 345; lure for feeling, source of
- initial aim, 67, 189, 344; subjective
- form of prehensions of, 88; seeks inten-
- sity, 105; basis of relevance of eternal
- objects, 108, 257, 278, 344, 349; pre-
- hension of, 207
- Good, 15, 33, 105, 338, 339, 346
- Greatness, 337, 341
- Habit, 140, 175
- Hallucination, 324
- Harmony: of thought, percepta, and sub-
- jective forms, 16; pre-established, 48,
- 255; ideal of, 102; requirements of,
- 111, 112; complex structure of, 340
- Hebrew, 208, 343, 347
- Hegel(ian), 11, 113, 166, 167, 210
- Heraclitus, 208, 309
- Hierarchy: of societies, 96-109, 192; of
- categories of feeling and thought, 166;
- patience for, 192
- High-grade, 222, 254, 314, 315, 318
- Historic route (individuality), 56, 119,
- 161, 188
- History, 10, 46-48, 111, 167, 227
- Hold u P> 280
- Homology, 127-28
- Human body: and rest of universe, 118-
- 19; as amplifier, 119; as involved in
- experience, 122, 129, 234; and pre-
- sented locus, 126-28; as an actuality,
- 287. See also Animal body; Body
- Hume, xi, 11, 39, 83, 91: on ideas of
- reflection, 40, 86-87, 160; skepticism
- of, 48-49, 51, 140; on impressions of
- sensation, 49, 86-87, 157, 159-60, 162,
- 242, 248, 315-16; on mind as pro-
- cess, 49, 54, 139-41, 151, 210; and
- Locke, 51 , 73, 11 3, 128, 138-39, 147;
- retains medieval assumptions, 51, 130,
- 141; retains subject-predicate categories,
- 51, 138, 159-60; on substantial form,
- 55; on causation, 57, 84, 123, 124,
- 368
- Index
- Indetermination(s) : as conditioned po-
- tentiality, 23; of eternal objects, 29, 44,
- 45, 149, 184, 256-57, 2*58; elimina-
- tion of, 45, 149, 154, 212, 224, 232;
- of transition, 207
- Indication, theory of, 194-97
- Indicative feeling, 258, 260, 261, 263,
- 264, 266, 269, 270, 271, 272, 274
- Indicative system, 194-95
- Indirect perceptive feelings, 262, 268, 269,
- 272
- Individual actuality (unity of experience),
- 15, 129, 198,211,245, 309, 318-19
- Individuality, 45, 84, 152, 154, 289, 309
- Individualization, 55-56, 115, 154, 225
- Induction, Inductive judgment, 5, 83,
- 199, 201, 203, 204-05, 207. See also
- Probability
- Inert facts, 310
- Inertia, 177
- Inference, 3, 49, 64, 272, 274
- Infinitesimals, 328, 332-33
- Infinity, 202-03, 206, 247
- Ingression, 29, 40, 41, 44, 52, 59, 64,
- 155, 233: definition of, 23, 25; requires
- objectification, 149; as evocation of
- determination, 149; and Locke's first
- use of idea, 149; positive and negative,
- 290; potential, 290-91; three primary
- modes of, 290-91; restricted and unre-
- stricted, 291
- Inherence: of quality in substance, 29, 78,
- 145, 158, 167, 232, 315; of subject in
- process, 224; of subjective form in feel-
- ing, 232; of quality in nexus, 315
- Inheritance: of defining characteristic, 34,
- 89; bodily, 109, 179; direct perception
- as, 119; intuition of, 167; physical and
- physiological, 171, 180; route of, 180,
- 181, 279; of initial aim, 244
- Inhibition, 90, 109, 163, 213, 223, 237,
- 263
- Initial aim (basic conceptual aim, initial
- subjective aim): towards depth, 105;
- inherited from God, 108, 224, 244,
- 283; determines endurance, 128; simpli-
- fication, modification of, 224, 245; con-
- ditional alternatives in, 224; relevant to
- actual world, 225; best for that im-
- passe, 244; determines initial relevance
- of eternal objects, 244; constitutes pri-
- mary phase of subject, 244; basis of
- self-causation, 244-45
- Initial datum(-a), 152, 221, 231, 232,
- 237, 238, 240, 241: as multiplicity, 30,
- 221, 230; treatment of, 224; diverse
- objectifications of, 226; of primary feel-
- ings, 231; complexity of, 232; actual
- entity as, 236; as cause, 236; actual
- world as, 286. See also Datum
- Initiative, 102. See also Originality; Origi-
- nation
- Inorganic, 98, 102, 103, 106, 177, 188
- Insight, 4, 9, 15
- Impectio, 49, 64, 76, 97, 325
- Instability, 106
- Instances, 194
- Instant, 68
- Integral feeling, 311
- Integration, 26, 56, 69, 180, 211, 223,
- 226, 232, 235, 245, 283: of physical
- and conceptual prehensions, 58, 108,
- 162, 164, 184, 214, 240-41, 248; initia-
- tive in, 101; directed by subjective aim,
- 102; final, 119; involving presentational
- immediacy, 173, 311; in transmutation,
- 227; at heart of concrescence, 227;
- phases of, 236; and reintegration, 247
- Intellect, 79, 209, 214, 254, 321
- Intellectual, 42, 56, 113, 156, 168, 214,
- 251
- —feelings, 187, 191, 247, 270, 271, 276,
- 280: definition of, 266; two species of,
- 266; main function of, 272; negligible,
- 275; and consciousness, 277, 280, 344;
- haunted by everlasting order, 340; dis-
- tinct from conceptual feelings, 344
- — supplement, 213-14
- Intelligence, 1 68
- Intensification, 56, 107, HI, 213: as
- God's aim, 67, 88; effected by propo-
- sitions, 263
- Intensity: minor, 15; as self-justifying, 16;
- in present and future, 27, 277-78:
- gradations of, 83, 84, 116; and order,
- 83, 84-85, 98, 100, 339; heightening
- of, 83, 272, 278, 279; and appetition,
- 83; of God's consequent nature, 88;
- enfeeblement of, 93; and specialization,
- 101; capture of, 105; sought by God,
- 105, 249; derived from body, 105; and
- contrasts, 109, 244, 277; reward of
- narrowness, 112; quantitative, 116-17,
- 233-34, 332; of items of knowledge,
- 161; and novel appetition, 184; subjec-
- tive forms of, 211; pattern of, 233, 234;
- 370
- Index
- Knowledge (cont.)
- for theory of, 158; belongs to inter-
- mediate phase, 160; as subjective form,
- 160-61; negligible without complexity,
- 161; as capacity, 161; has same explana-
- tion as efficient causation, 190; of
- nexus, 229; difficulties in theory of,
- 243; Locke's view of, 274; limits of,
- 276; of present world, 321; in scholar-
- ship, 338
- Language: ambiguous in relation to propo-
- sitions, xiii, 11, 12, 13, 195, 260, 264;
- ordinary (literary) and philosophical, 4,
- 11, 12, 13, 167, 174; as storehouse
- of knowledge, 5, 10, 11, 39; as ellip-
- tical, 13, 260; and undifferentiated en-
- durance, 77, 79; and substance-quality
- concept, 158; primitive, 159; and inter-
- preted presentational immediacy, 173;
- as example of symbolism, 182-83;
- Egyptian and Babylonian, 183; spoken,
- 264; interpretative vagaries of, 324
- Law(s), 14, 98: of cosmic epoch, 91, 98,
- 116; as statistical, 92, 98, 106, 205,
- 207; obedience to, 91, 98; interact with
- societies of occasions, 106, 204, 205,
- 327; of consciousness, 162; as substi-
- tute for causation, 167; induction not
- derivation of, 204; for feelings in satis-
- faction, 231; God as basis of, 283;
- arbitrary, 292; as problem in differential
- geometry, 333; ultimate, 333
- Least action, method of, 332
- Leibniz, 19, 27, 47, 48, 80, 190, 251
- Length, 333
- Life: and novelty of appetition, 102, 104,
- 178; not a defining characteristic, 104;
- bid for freedom, 104, 107; robbery, 105;
- clutch at vivid immediacy, 105; lurks in
- interstices. 105-06: wandering of vivid
- manifestations of, 106; catalytic agent,
- 106; not essentially social, 106-07;
- canalization of, 107-08; as gain of in-
- tensity, 107; centers of, 108; trigger-
- action of, 120; novel forms of energy
- in, 120; of enduring object, 161; and
- importance of presented duration, 177,
- 178; symbolism in higher grades of,
- 183; as approach to consciousness, 311;
- order and novelty in, 339; selection re-
- quired for depths of, 340
- Light, 36, 78-79, 163
- Limitation: implies decision, 43, 164; ex-
- clusive, 45; and incompatibilities, 149;
- God's role in, 164; in fluent things, 209;
- and subjective unity, 237
- Living occasions, 102, 104, 109, 184
- Living person: as enduring object, 107,
- 109; defining characteristic of, 107; re-
- quires living, non-social nexus, 107; not
- in cells, vegetables, lower animals, 107;
- objectified in God's consequent nature,
- 107n, 350; awareness of self as, 107;
- only partially dominant, 107, 109; in
- higher animals, 107
- Living Society (-ies) : cell as, 99, 104; defi-
- nition of, 102, 103; and non-living
- societies, 102, 104; subservient appa-
- ratus of, 103; requires food, 105-06;
- non-social nexus of, 105; causal aware-
- ness in lower, 176
- Locke, John, xi, 11, 39, 60, 130: antici-
- pated philosophy of organism, xi, 54,
- 123, 128, 147; cosmology of, xiv, 19,
- 91; on power, 18, 57-58, 210, 213;
- on substance, 18-19, 54-60, 75, 79-80,
- 228; on ideas, 19, 25, 41, 51, 52, 138,
- 155, 213, 260; two substances of, 19; on
- perpetual perishing, 29, 81, 210; over-
- thrown by Hume, 51; inconsistency in
- his epistemology, 51. 57, 113, 123, 128,
- 138/143, 146, 147, 149, 152, 157, 210,
- 242-43, 315; adequacy of, 51, 57,
- 60, 145-46; inappropriate metaphysical
- categories of, 51; book title of, 51; on
- mind as cabinet, 53n, 54; on perception
- of exterior things (ideas of particular
- existents), 54-56, 113, 117, 122, 138,
- 141, 146, 152, 213, 237, 242; on sub-
- stantial form, 55; sensationalist, 57,
- 146; and principle of relativity, 58; and
- ontological principle, 58; and relational-
- character of eternal objects, 58; ana-
- logue to Plato, 60; systematized by
- Hume, 73, 113, 128,' 147; reverses
- order of perception, 113, 143, 173;
- and substance-quality metaphysics, 138,
- 159; superior to Hume, 138; and mor-
- phology, 139-40; accepts sensationalist
- principle, 141, 157; introduces shift
- into philosophy, 144; followers of, 145;
- importance of, 145, 147; discards meta-
- physics, 145, 146-47, 153, 210; ana-
- lyzed mental operations alone, 151; and
- objective content of experience, 152;
- introduced anti-rationalism, 153; on ex-
- perience as constructive, 156; successor
- 372
- Index
- Mentality (cont)
- sitive experience, 248; as modifying
- agency, 325
- Mental operations: pure and impure, 33;
- and mind, 85, 213; proper place of,
- 151; abruptness of, 184, 187, 189; pri-
- mary and derivative, 248; consciousness
- not essential to, 248; as basis of efficient
- causation, 277; double office of, 277
- Mental originality, 107-08
- Mental (conceptual) pole, 45, 108, 240,
- 308, 316: first two phases of, 26, 249;
- physical realization of, 32; determines
- subjective forms, 70; enhancement of,
- 101, 184; hybrid prehension of, 107;
- inseparable from physical pole, 108,
- 239, 248; variation in importance of,
- 177, 239; life as novelty in, 184; God's
- origination from, 224, 348; how oc-
- casions originate from, 224; as subject
- determining itself, 248; out of time,
- 248; not necessarily conscious, 277; sub-
- jective side of experience, 277; indi-
- visibility of, 285, 308; originative energy
- of, 285; as appetition, 348; as infinite,
- 348
- Mental prehension: in all actualities, 56;
- pure, 63; blind, 308. See also Concep-
- tual prehension
- Mental progress, 254
- Metaphors, 4
- Metaphysical: systems, 8, 13, 14, 42; cate-
- gories, 8, 29; knowledge, 12; truth, 13,
- 28, 35, 225, 348; principles, 21, 40, 116-
- 17, 167, 342, 343; character (istics),
- 22, 90, 192, 220; stability, 40; gen-
- erality, 96, 222, 308; schemes based on
- Kant or Hegel, 113; difficulties, 117,
- 168; reasons, 133; fact, 157; capacities,
- 193; propositions, 193, 197-99; reason-
- ing, 225: necessities, 288: reason, 340:
- doctrine of creative origination, 341;
- character of creative advance, 344
- Metaphysicians, 237
- Metaphysics: first principles of, 4; aim of,
- 11, 219; novelty in, 12; as approxima-
- tion, 12, 13; and practice, 13, 151;
- success of, 14; haunted by abstract no-
- tions, 18; and religion, 42, 208; justifi-
- cation for, 42; motive for, 42; tasks of,
- 84, 208; proper meaning of, 90; con-
- nects behavior and formal nature, 94;
- generalizes human experience, 112; gen-
- eralizes physics, 116-17; investigates
- generic notions, 116; and classical the-
- ory of time, 125; Locke's avoidance of,
- 145, 146-47; necessity of, 146; rule of
- evidence, 151; and subjective experi-
- encing, 160; final question of, 189;
- thinness of modern, 208; complete prob-
- lem of, 209; of flux, substance, 209;
- and relevance of forms, 316. See also
- Philosophy; Speculative philosophy
- Method, philosophic, xiv, 3, 4-6, 8, 158
- Microcosm, microcosmic, 47-48, 215
- Microscopic, 128-29, 167, 214-15, 333n
- Mill, John Stuart, 12
- Milton, John, 95-96
- Mind: Hume on, 49, 54, 138, 139-41,
- 151, 159-60, 210; as process, 49, 54,
- 138, 140, 151, 210; as subject with
- predicates, 51; Locke on, 53-54, 213;
- Cartesian notion of, 54, 62, 108, 122,
- 160, 246; detached, 56; Newton on,
- 70, 71-72; with private ideas, 76; men-
- tal operations as, 85; lure for feeling as
- germ of, 85; Aquinas on, 108; as en-
- during object, 109; replaced by actual
- entity, 141; greyness as qualifying, 159;
- intellectual operations as, 214; suggests
- independent substance, 214. See also
- Body-mind problem
- Minima sensibilia, 124
- Modes: Spinoza's, 7, 81; of implication,
- 23; of expression, 96; of functioning,
- 166
- Molecular theory, 78, 94-95
- Molecule: in steel bar, 16; peculiar to
- our cosmic epoch, 66; not actual occa-
- sion, 73; as nexus, 73, 287; as moving
- (changing) body, 73, 80; as event, 73,
- 80; as enduring substance, 78; as his-
- toric route, 80; formed from atoms, 95;
- as society, 98; as enduring object, 99,
- 326 (or society of); as structured so-
- ciety, 99; as subservient society, 104;
- its behaviour within animal body, 106;
- span of life of, 287; prehensions of, 323;
- and dynamics, 323
- Monads, 19, 48, 80, 190
- Monism: ultimate in, 7; Spinoza's, 7, 48,
- 74, 81; static, 46; follows from subject-
- predicate thought, 137, 145, 190; one
- alternative for philosophy, 79; avoided
- by principle of relativity, 148; Hegel's,
- 210
- Morality, xii, 15, 27, 42, 84, 105, 222,
- 255, 317, 337, 343
- 374
- Index
- Novelty: in science, 10; in metaphysics,
- 12; creativity as principle of, 21; pro-
- duction of, 21; creative advance into,
- 28, 128, 187, 222, 349; inconceivability
- of, 40; and ordering of eternal objects,
- 40, 164; emergence of, 46, 187; God
- as source of, 67, 88, 164, 248, 349; as
- God's instrument, 88; as basis of trans-
- cendence, 94; of subjective form, 102,
- 164, 232, 233; originated by subjective
- aim, 102; conceptual, 102, 161; of
- definiteness, 104; primordial nature in-
- different to ? 105; possible, 161; and
- pure potentiality, 164; for God, 167,
- 349; of appetition. 184; probability of,
- 202, 203, 207; in phases of concrescence,
- 224; proximate, 249; and reversion, 249,
- 253; and transmutation, 269; and sys-
- tematic order, 339; and route of domi-
- nant occasions, 339; and loss, 340; in
- God, 345; passage into, 349
- Nunn, T. P., xii
- Object (s): as topic of science, 16; four
- main types of, 52; actual entities as,
- 56, 239; meaning of, 88, 239; Locke's
- talk of, 139; universals strictly are, 152;
- and knowledge, 155-56; as form of
- definiteness, 215; as transcendent, 215,
- 239-40; necessary conformity to, 215;
- Kant on, 21 5n; functioning as, 220;
- components of datum become, 231; as
- immanent, 239-40
- Objectification, 49, 50, 52, 53, 116, 137,
- 152,177, 180,206,210,235,245,246,
- 291: definition of, 23, 25, 41; as con-
- verse of prehension, 24; eternal objects
- in, 58, 120, 149, 155, 191; and power,
- 58; causal, 58, 64; presentational, 58,
- 61, 64, 321; as abstraction, 62, 63, 101,
- 160, 210, 221, 238, 307; of contempo-
- raries, 63, 67, 310, 321; retains exten-
- sive relationships, 67; and givenness, 76,
- 171; extensive continuum in, 76; as
- settled, 85; data of, 86; as efficient
- cause, 87; massive average, 101; im-
- mediate (direct), 112, 284, 307, 308;
- line of, 120; and repetition, 137, 139,
- 155; primitive mode of, 141; and
- Locke's second use of idea, 149; and
- immediacy, 155; relevant, 206; involves
- elimination, 210, 226, 274, 340; and
- divisibility, 227; of actual world, 233;
- as perspective of initial datum, 236;
- mediate (indirect), 284, 286, 307, 308
- Objective actuality, 159
- Objective content, 150, 152, 153, 155,
- 160, 213
- Objective datum, 164, 237, 240: of satis-
- faction, 26; in transmuted feeling, 27,
- 160, 232; and negative prehensions, 41
- (pi); as actual world, 65, 83, 212, 230;
- as primary phase, 65; as settled, 83, 150;
- order in, 88 (pi.); complexity of, 106,
- 210, 232; as perspective, 150, 221, 231
- (pi.), 236, 241; as real potentiality,
- 150; as objective content, 150, 152;
- proposition as, 221; nexus as, 221, 291;
- diverse elements cannot coalesce in,
- 225; particularities in, 228; as one,
- 230-31; of various feelings, 232; not
- formless, 233; subjective form repro-
- duces pattern of, 233-34; a feeling as,
- 236; as cause, 238; ingression in, 238,
- 291; physical, 248; as contrast, 283.
- See also Datum
- Objective diversity, category of, 26, 222,
- 225, 227-28, 230, 271
- Objective existence (objective), 45, 76,
- 83, 215, 219, 237
- Objective identity (unity), category of,
- 26, 57, 165 (unity), 222-23, 225,
- 227-28, 230, 231, 238, 249, 266, 271
- (unity)
- Objective immortality: as relatedness of
- actualities, xiii; attained in perishing,
- transcendence, 29, 60, 82, 223; condi-
- tions creativity, 31-32, 108; of super-
- ject, 45, 84, 245; enjoyment of, 56, 215,
- 278; involves repetition, 137; of mutual
- prehensions, 230; of nexus, 230; sub-
- jectivity of cause retained in, 237; em-
- bodied in simple physical feelings, 238;
- as reason for transmission, efficient
- causation, 245, 292; of God's concep-
- tual valuation, 247; everlasting, 347;
- requires God's primordial nature, 347;
- reconciled with immediacy, 351; final
- application of, 351
- Objective lure, 86: and subjective aim,
- 87; definition of, 87, 185; and potential
- difference, 87; richness of, 89; propo-
- sitions as elements in, 187. See also
- Lure for feeling
- Objectivism, 158, 159
- Objectivist principle, 160
- Objectivity, 156
- 376
- Index
- Originality: of conceptual prehension,
- 102; of response, 104; of living occa-
- sions, 106; canalization of, 107; con-
- ditioned by initial aim, 108; God as
- ground of all, 108. See also Initiative
- Origination: physical, 48; conceptual, 49;
- of energy, 117, 246; of feeling, 186,
- 232, 249; negation of, 213; of actual
- entity, 224; of decisions, 232; as private,
- 290, 310. See also Initiative
- Originative phases, 115, 117, 122, 168,
- 172, 177
- Ovate regions, classes, 302-09
- Overintellectualism, 141, 186
- Overlapping, 296
- Overstatement, 7
- Parallelograms, 331
- Participation, 20, 21, 40, 46, 95
- Particularity: of religion, 15; of experience,
- 43; of actualities, 55, 229-31; of propo-
- sitions, 197; of each entity, 225; two
- meanings of, 229; of nexus, 229-31; of
- contrasts, 229, 230; and first three cate-
- gories, 230; of feelings, 237, 255
- Particulars. 33-34, 41, 52-53, 57, 128,
- 146-47, 152, 158, 194, 210, 229, 344:
- and universals, 20, 48-50, 158
- Past: and present, 14, 105, 339; remote,
- 63; as source of datum, 116, 150; per-
- ception of, 120; defined by causal
- efficacy, 123, 170, 319-20, 322; practi-
- cally common, 127, 169; of personal ex-
- perience, 129; as determinate beyond,
- 163; not defined by presentational im-
- mediacy, 168; immediate, 178; as effi-
- cient cause, 210; conformity with power
- of, 210; immortality, 210, 238; as
- nexus. 214; determined by immediate
- decision, 284; durational, 320; treasures
- of, 339; paradoxical attitude toward,
- 340; present under abstraction, 340;
- inheritance of future from, 350
- Pathology, 102, 109
- Pattern, 192, 230-31, 245: as given, 44;
- sensa and, 114; as manner of contrast,
- 115; as simple, 115; individual essence
- of, 115; as complex, 115; as eternal
- object, 120, 257; predicative, 194, 197,
- 257, 280; two factors of, 233; qualita-
- tive, 233-35; of emotional intensity,
- 233-35, 237, 240; emotional, 273, 275,
- 280
- Percepta, 180, 181, 242
- Perception, xii, 3: sensationalist doctrine
- of, xiii, 52, 156 (see also Sensationalist
- principle; Subjectivist principle; Sensa-
- tionalism); confused, 27; visual, 36, 44,
- 117, 121; Humian doctrine of, 48-49;
- Descartes' view of, 48-49; of actual
- entities, 49, 58, 122, 158; representative
- theory of, 49, 54, 76; Locke's use of,
- 52; and power, 58; ordinary meaning of,
- 58; delusive, 64, 122; drops of, 68;
- crude (primitive), 81, 117, 119; of
- contemporary world, 81; sophisticated
- (higher grades of), 81, 117, 121; direct,
- 81, 113, 116-17, 119, 124; problems
- in theory of, 113, 117, 121; and causa-
- tion, 116, 173-75, 239, 290; common
- elements of, 117; ultimate truth of ani-
- mal, 118; interplay of two pure modes
- of, 121, 168; human, 125, 168; as
- awareness of universal, 158-60; nega-
- tive, 161; positive, 161; as interpreta-
- tive, 168; heightening of, 213; memory
- as physical, 239; blind, 287; fact of,
- 290. See also Causal efficacy, perception
- in the mode of; Presentational im-
- mediacy; Representation; Symbolic ref-
- erence; Sense-perception
- Perceptive feelings, 260, 261-63, 264,
- 266, 268, 270: definition of, 261, 269;
- three species of, 262
- —authentic, 262, 264, 268-69, 270
- —unauthentic, 263, 268, 270, 272
- Percipient: occasion, 63, 120, 145; final,
- 119-20, 245, 312, 313, 319; memoriz-
- ing, 120; enduring, 270
- Perfection, 47, 338, 345, 347, 348-49,
- 350, 351
- Periodicity, 327
- Perishing: of immediacy, xiii, 29, 85; con-
- trasted with changing, 35; as objective
- immortality, 81-82; everlastingness as
- devoid of, 346, 347; and yet living,
- 349, 351
- — perpetual: meaning of, 29; Locke on,
- 29, 146-47, 210; of absoluteness, 60;
- as attainment of immortality, 60; time
- as, 81, 128, 210, 340; as transition,
- 210
- Permanence: of forms, 29; enhanced by
- width, 163; and flux, 167, 209, 338,
- 341, 347, 348: as result of reproduction,
- 238; in measurement, 327-29
- 378
- Index
- Physical pole (cont.)
- 308; finite, exclusive, 348; as enjoyment,
- 348
- Physical purposes, 256n: and Bergson's
- intuition, 33, 280; subjective form of,
- 184; definition of, 184, 266; initial,
- 244; phase of, 248-49, 280; as com-
- parative feelings, 254, 275-80; more
- primitive than perceptive and intellec-
- tual feelings, 266, 272-73, 275; all
- actualities have, 276; eternal objects
- and objective datum in, 276; explain
- endurance, 276; two species of, 276-80;
- explain rhythm and vibration, 276;
- blind, 308; reinforce conceptual feeling,
- 316; and impressions of sensation, 316;
- in transmutation, 317; in presentational
- immediacy, 323
- Physical realization, 341, 346, 348
- Physical recognition (recollection), 260,
- 261-64, 269, 270, 271, 272, 274
- Physical time, 283, 288-89
- Physical world, 238, 325
- Physics (physical science, theory) : and
- metaphysics, xii, 4, 5, 116-17; Greek
- and mediaeval, 12; progress in, 14;
- relativity theory of, 35, 65, 125,
- 126; atomism and continuity in, 35-36;
- and Descartes' view of space, 72; po-
- tential difference in, 87; and Newton,
- 94, 96, 177; on chemical facts, 95;
- mathematical relations in, 98, 128, 231,
- 326, 327; electromagnetic field as topic
- of, 98; seventeenth-century, 113; and
- epistemology, 113, 117, 119; on body
- and universe, 119; and straight lines,
- 127; morphology in, 139-40; and the-
- ory of light, 163; and distinction of past
- and future, 170; on cause of sensa, 171;
- vibration in, 187-88; scalar and vector
- forms in, 212, 231, 238; investigates
- aspects of simple physical feelings, 238;
- quantum theory of, 238-39, 254; and
- continuous transmission, 307; and ac-
- tion at a distance, 308; from material-
- ism to organism in, 309; geometrical
- pattern in, 312; form of energy in, 315;
- needs distinction of intensive and ex-
- tensive quantity, 332
- Physiology, 5, 87, 103-04, 114, 118, 141,
- 171, 174-75, 234, 312
- Planes, 127, 306, 310, 319, 331
- Plato, 21, 39, 83, 159: founder of West-
- ern thought, xi; dominance of his cos-
- mology, xiv, 93; advance of philosophy
- since, 7; abiding appeal of, 20; foot-
- notes to, 39; and philosophy of orga-
- nism, 39, 44, 94-96; and limits of
- rationalism, 42; forms of, 43-44, 46,
- 96, 209, 291; modification of his real-
- ism, 50; analogue to Locke, 60; on
- mathematics, 62; inspired by Pythago-
- reans, 71; on perishing, 82, 84, 85; on
- peculiar ideals, 84; and recent logical-
- mathematical discoveries, 91; compared
- with Newton, 93-96; poeticized by
- Milton, 95-96; and substance-quality
- metaphysics, 137; on permanence and
- flux, 209; his vision of heavenly per-
- fection, 209; subordinated fluency, 209;
- schools based on, 209; on reminiscence,
- 242, 249; and straight lines, 302; prob-
- lem of, 346-47
- Plenum, world as, 238
- Pluralism, 18, 73-74, 78, 79, 137
- Points, 287, 292, 299-332 passim
- Position, 25, 195, 258
- Possibility: of interconnection, xii; trans-
- cendent, 31; of division, 61-62; of
- novelty, 161; abstract, 220, 276 (see
- also Eternal objects); of finite truth,
- 220
- Potential difference, 87
- Potentiality: pure (abstract, general), 22,
- 23, 40, 65, 66, 80, 149, 164, 184, 188,
- 214, 239, 343 (see also Eternal ob-
- jects); impure, 22, 188 (see also Propo-
- sitions); and principle of relativity, 22,
- 43, 212; real, 23, 27, 65-66, 67, 72-73,
- 76, 80, 96, 123, 150, 168-69, 220,
- 223, 267, 288, 308, 324, 326, 333;
- passes into actuality, 29, 308; con-
- trasted with actuality, 39-40, 148-49;
- correlate of givenness, 44, 133; meaning
- of, 45-46; unrealized, 46, 86; locus of,
- 46; and continuity, 61, 62; datum as,
- 65, 88, 113; in space- time, 70; as in-
- cluded in actuality, 72, 227, 290-91;
- and freedom, 133; retains message of
- alternatives, 149; propositional, 187,
- 267; in nature, 239; conceptually
- realized in God, 343; forms of, 349
- Power: and substance, 18-19, 56-58,
- 79-80; and ontological principle, 18,
- 79-80; of God, 49, 346; and enduring
- things, 56; active and passive, 57; as
- including relation, 57-58; and objecti-
- fication, 58; and perception, 58; in act-
- 380
- Index
- Primary feelings, 231, 239, 241-42
- Primary substance, xiii, 21, 30, 50, 138,
- 157," 158
- Principia Mathematica, 149n, 198n
- Principle of Relativity, The, 333
- Principles of Natural Knowledge, The,
- USn, 288n
- Priority, 54, 143, 162, 315
- Private: sensation, 18, 141, 234, 311, 315;
- subjective forms as, 22; synthesis, 85;
- and public, 151, 289-90, 310, 314, 316,
- 317, 329; qualities, 160; ideal, 212; indi-
- vidual fact, 213; nothing purely, 212;
- immediacy, 213; eliminated by theory
- of extensions, 292; psychological field,
- 325, 326, 333
- Probability, 6, 167, 199-207, 268, 274.
- See also Induction
- Process, 128: description of, 7; as ex-
- periencing subject, 16; actual entities
- as, 21, 22, 41, 54, 140, 219, 227, 243,
- 283; principle of, 23, 166, 235; genetic,
- 26, 154; and ingression of forms, 39-
- 40, 96, 154; of world, 39, 96, 340, 349;
- potentiality for, 43; as evaporation of
- indetermination, 45, 150; mind as, 49,
- 54, 138, 140-41, 151, 210; Hume's
- emphasis on, 54, 140; and product, 84,
- 255; as basic notion, 128; as attainment
- of end, 150; creative, 151; and under-
- standing, 153, 210; as essentially feel-
- ing, 153; correct order of, 156; repeti-
- tions of, 210; phases of, 212, 214-15;
- microscopic and macroscopic, 214-15;
- efficient and teleological, 214; and
- organism, 214-15; of integration, 227;
- genetic, 230; and loss, 340. See also
- Concrescence; Transition
- Progress, 14, 111, 187, 247, 254, 339
- Projection, 126, 172, 176, 177-78, 180,
- 310, 312, 314, 322-26, 330
- Proper entities, 30, 221, 224, 228
- Propositional feelings (prehensions): type
- of comparative feeling, 164; form of
- appetition, 184; and pure conceptual
- feelings, 185, 313; origin of, 191, 261,
- 263; definition of, 214, 256; conscious-
- ness, judgment not necessary for, 232,
- 259, 242, 261, 263; as pure mental
- feeling, 241; arise in late phase, 247,
- 260; analogous to transmuted feelings,
- 253; arise from integration, 257, 261 ,
- 264; two kinds of pure, 260, 261-62;
- elimination involved in, 261, 263; as
- imaginative freedom, 261; as lure, 263;
- involved in comparative feelings, 266;
- involve evaluative hold up, 280; lie be-
- tween physical purposes and intellectual
- feelings, 280; and Bergson's intuition,
- 280; importance of, 280; as approach to
- consciousness, 308
- Propositional imagination, 274
- Propositions, 22: and verbal statements,
- xiii, 11-13, 192-93, 195-97, 256, 268;
- truth and falsehood of, 8, 184-85, 186,
- 256, 258-59, 261, 268, 271, 285; pre-
- suppose context, 11-12, 195; meta-
- physical, 11, 193, 197-99; as impure
- entities, 22, 185, 187, 188, 257; as
- theories, 22, 184; novel, 33, 188, 219,
- 259; definition of, 24, 188, 196-97,
- 257; lures for feeling, 25, 185, 186-87,
- 224, 259, 273, 280; and judgments, 25,
- 184-85, 186-87, 189, 191, 192-93,
- 259; as indeterminate, 29, 257, 258,
- 263; subject-predicate form of, 30, 159;
- include demonstratives, 43; as objects,
- data, 52, 184, 189, 221, 243; present in
- actual entities, 147; consciousness not
- necessary for, 184, 186, 263; general
- and singular, 186, 196; universal, 186,
- 188; locus of, 186, 195; realization
- of, 186, 197, 267; logical subjects of,
- 188, 193, 258-59; and judging sub-
- jects, 193, 196-97; and eternal objects,
- 197, 256-57, 258; compared with
- actual entities, feelings, nexus, 196-97,
- 258-59; metaphysical, 197-99; incom-
- plete phase as, 224, 237, 247, 261; self-
- consistency of, 224; mere potentiality
- of, 224; not a class, 228; tales that
- might be told, 256; partially abstract
- from actual entities, 256, 258; intensify
- or inhibit, 263; objective probability of,
- 268; in coordinate division, 285
- Protons, 66, 78, 79, 91, 92, 98, 99, 326
- Psychology, xiii, 5, 18, 103, 141, 268, 325,
- 326
- Publicity, 22, 151, 289-90, 310, 314, 317,
- _ 329
- Pure conceptual (mental) prehension
- (feeling), 33, 63, 184, 241
- Pure physical prehension (feeling) : as
- opposed to impure, 33, 63, 214, 242,
- 316; as opposed to hybrid, 245, 250,
- 251-52, 308
- 382
- Index
- Reminiscence, 242, 249
- Repetition, 133-37, 139, 140, 148, 155,
- 210, 253, 279, 338
- Representation, 53, 54, 76, 144, 237
- Reproduction, 91, 92, 237, 238: concep-
- tual, 26, 249
- Responsibility, 47, 222, 224, 255
- Responsive phase. See Phase, first
- Rest, 319, 321, 323
- Res vera(e), xiii, 22, 29, 68, 69-70, 74-
- 75, 128, 137, 166, 167
- Reversion (category of), 26, 101, 104, 246,
- 247, 249-50, 251-53, 254-55, 260,
- 261, 262, 263, 269, 272, 277-79; as
- abolished, 250; double, 252; and physics,
- 254, 277, 278-79
- Rhythm, 78-79, 213, 327
- Sampling, 202-03, 206
- Santayana, George, 48-49, 52, 54, 81,
- 142-43, 152, 158
- Satisfaction, 40, 89, 153, 164, 219-
- 21, 227, 232-33, 235, 280, 292-93
- and subjective aim, 19, 87, 255; defini
- tion of, 25, 26, 211-12, 283; God's 32
- 88; unity of, 32, 115, 185, 235; sub
- jective form of, 41, 247, 267; exclusive
- ness of, 44, 45; as determinate, 48, 85
- 149, 154-55; subjectivity of, 52, 160
- as superject, sentiri, efficient cause, use
- ful, 60, 84, 85, 166, 188, 219, 220
- 292-93; temporal halves of, 69; divisi
- biltty of, 69, 220-21, 238, 283-86
- 292-93; intensity of, 83, 84, 92-93
- 100, 101, 111-12, 115, 116, 119; and
- order, 84, 110; differences in, 84, 111
- and notion of substance, 84; and indi
- viduality. 84, 154: no consciousness of
- 85; novelty in, 102, 232; depth of, 105
- 110-12; narrowness, width, triviality
- and vagueness in, 110-12; quantitative.
- 116; and Kant's apparent objective con
- tent, 155; transitoriness of, 163; as two
- dimensional, 166; as contentment of
- creative urge, 219; morphology of, 220
- genetic analysis of, 220, 235; objective
- datum of, 225, 235; two laws for, 231
- integrates simple physical feelings, 237
- withness of body in, 312; and God's
- completion, 347
- Scalar, 116, 177, 212
- Scheme of thought, xiv, 3-4, 8, 9, 14, 39,
- 337, 339
- Science, 11, 15, 39, 100, 264: special,
- xiv, 9-10, 11, 17, 116; first principles
- of, 8, 10; and philosophy, 9-10, 15-17,
- 116-17, 329; progress in, 14, 61, 71;
- and religion, 16, 42; theory of, 17, 169,
- 274, 323; of dynamics, 35, 72, 101,
- 173, 323; motive for, 42; and undif-
- ferentiated endurance, 77-78; explana-
- tion (interpretation) in, 77-78, 324,
- 326; observation, measurement, 127,
- 169, 329: induction in, 129, 204: and
- autonomy, 245; and mathematical rela-
- tions, 327; and publicity, 333. See also
- Physics
- Science and the Modern World, 11 n, 189,
- 204
- Seat, 310-11, 312-14, 322, 323, 326
- Secondary qualities, 63-64, 78, 113, 122,
- 323, 325
- Self, 150, 154: -correction, 15; -justifica-
- tion, 16; -creation, 25, 47, 69, 85, 289;
- -functioning, 25; -diversity, 25; -iden-
- tity, 25, 55, 57, 78, 79, 225, 227;
- -consistency, 26; -experience, 57; -defi-
- nition, 85-86; -causation, 88, 150, 222,
- 244; -production, 93, 224; -preservation,
- 102; -consciousness, 107; -analysis, 107;
- -formation, 108, 308; -enjoyment, 145,
- 289; -construction, 179; -realization, 222;
- -revelation and -transcendence, 227;
- -criticism, 244; -constitution, 244; -de-
- termination, 245, 255; -restraint, 337;
- -attainment, 350
- Sensa: as forms of emotion, 114, 115, 116,
- 314-15; as simple and complex, 114,
- 115; as eternal objects, 114, 120, 291;
- functions of, 114, 119, 121, 314-15,
- 325; zero width of, 114, 115; meta-
- physical definition of, 114; individual
- and relational essences of, 115, 314-
- 15; as forms of energy, 116; types of,
- 119; enhancement, change in character
- of, 120; effect presentational immedi-
- acy, 121, 124; and presented locus, 124,
- 126-27; and wave-lengths, 163; dona-
- tion of, 171, 176; well-marked, 176;
- projection of, 176, 310, 323-24; physi-
- cal feeling of, 316; participate in nature,
- 325
- Sensation, 141, 157, 172: private, 141,
- 142, 158-59, 234
- Sensationalism, sensationalist doctrine,
- 52-53, 57, 74, 128, 135, 141-42, 145-
- 46, 147, 155, 156, 190: rejection of,
- 384
- Index
- Strain (-feeling) (cont.)
- 318, 322: definition of, 310; geometri-
- cal interest in, 310; not require life,
- 311; and enduring objects, 311; straight
- lines ingredient in, 323
- Strain-locus, 126, 128, 322, 330: defini-
- tion of, 319; as four-dimensional, 319;
- and presented duration, 321, 322-23;
- real and potential, 323
- Stream of experience, 189, 190
- Structured societies, 99-109: definition of,
- 99, 103; examples of, 99, 102; domi-
- nant members of, 102; democratic, 108
- Stubborn fact, xiii, xiv, 43, 128-29, 219,
- 239
- Subject, 41, 45, 59, 182: as topic of re-
- ligion, 16; and feelings, 23, 88, 221—
- 22, 223-24, 231, 232, 233, 235, 236,
- 311; actual entity as, 23, 25, 28, 56,
- 87, 221-22; as superject, 28, 29, 45,
- 47, 69, 83, 84, 88, 151, 155, 166,
- 222, 223, 232, 233, 241, 245, 255,
- 289; never experiences twice, 29; as
- substance, 84, 157; meaning of, 88;
- ultimate, 118, 120, 180; prehending,
- 141, 258-64 passim, 268, 269; judging,
- 191, 200, 203, 258; and experienced
- fact, 195: entertaining, 266; as private
- side of actual entity, 289; feels itself,
- 315; triple character of, 316. See also
- Logical subjects
- Subjective aim: determinant of subjective
- forms, 19, 27, 235, 275; and final
- causation, 19, 24, 87, 104, 210, 277;
- definition of, 25; and reversion, 26, 102;
- as twofold, 27, 85, 277; at intensity,
- 27, 249, 277, 278; modification, self-
- creation of, 47, 69, 167, 224, 241, 244;
- phases of, 47; initial phase of, 67, 224,
- 244, 283, 344, 347 {see also Initial
- aim); indivisibility of, 69; and super-
- ject,' 69, 114; lure for feeling, 85, 328;
- germ of mind, 85; and objective lure,
- 87; God's, 88, 344; directs integration,
- 102, 224, 308; categoreal conditions of,
- 128; and Hegelian idea, 167; three
- possibilities for, 187-88; and ontologi-
- cal principle, 244; due to mental oper-
- ations, 277; and subjective harmony,
- 278, 279
- Subjective end, 224
- Subjective form(s), 16, 85-86, 88, 89,
- 141, 154, 155, 157, 168, 211, 226,
- 231-35, 249, 311: determination of,
- 19, 70, 106, 164, 192, 235, 244-45,
- 285; as private, 22, 233, 290; novelty
- in, 22, 102, 164, 232, 233; definition
- of, 23, 52, 85, 221; examples of, 24,
- 25, 86, 192, 234, 311; consciousness as,
- 23, 53, 162, 236, 241; of conceptual
- feelings as valuational, 27, 33, 240-41,
- 246, 247, 248; and subject-predicate
- proposition, 30; mutual sensitivity of,
- 42, 221; of satisfaction, 41, 154, 235,
- 283, 285; of negative prehensions, 41,
- 226, 237; and eternal objects, 85-86,
- 233, 241, 290, 291; partial conformity
- of, 85, 104, 106, 108, 164, 233, 235,
- 237, 241, 244, 246, 275, 291, 315, 316;
- of physical purpose, 184; judgment as,
- 190; as inhering in feeling, 232; em-
- bodies pragmatic aspect, 233; qualita-
- tive and quantitative factors of, 233-34;
- absent in first phase, 234; of preposi-
- tional feeling, 261, 263; of coordinate
- division, 285; as epiphenomenal, 292;
- omitted by presentational immediacy,
- 327
- Subjective harmony (category of), 27,
- 235, 241, 247, 249, 254-55, 261, 267,
- 279
- Subjective immediacy, 25, 29, 155
- Subjective intensity (category of), 47,
- 247, 277, 278, 279
- Subjective unity (category of), 26, 219,
- 222-25, 226-27, 230, 231, 235, 237,
- 240, 246, 247, 248, 249, 255, 283-84
- Subjective valuation, category of, 246
- Subjectivism: Cartesian, 80, 160, 309;
- solipsist, 152, 158
- Subjectivist bias, 159, 166
- Subjectivist doctrine, 189, 190: reformed,
- 189, 190
- Subjectivist principle, 29: regarding datum,
- 157, 158, 160; reformed, 157, 160,
- 166, 167; regarding reality, 166, 167,
- 191
- Subjectivity, 15, 40, 155, 237-38
- Subject-predicate, xiii, 7, 13, 30, 49, 51,
- 54, 56, 75, 137, 145, 159, 222
- Subordinate (sub-) societies, 99-100, 103,
- 104
- Sub-region, 284, 285, 287-88
- Subsistence, 46
- Substance, 25, 29, 40, 77, 81, 136: actual
- entity as ? xiii, 19, 41, 58, 75 ? 78;
- Descartes on, xiii, 6, 48, 50, 59, 74, 75,
- 80, 84, 108, 122, 144-45, 159, 160,
- 386
- Index
- Transmutation (category of), 63, 65, 77,
- 101-02, 111-12, 250-54, 262, 269,
- 272, 279, 280, 291, 292, 311, 313, 314,
- 317, 323: defintition of, 27, 251; and
- material bodies, 101; and functions of
- sensa, 114, 325; of causal efficacy into
- presentational immediacy, 119, 339; of
- conceptual origination into physical
- world, 164, 246; as physical feeling, 232,
- 253; and consciousness, 236; simplifies,
- 250, 253, 317; analogies to, 253; and
- error, 253; effected by propositions,
- 263; in strain, 310; in God, 350
- Triangle, 291
- Triviality, 110, 111, 254, 277, 285, 340-
- 41, 346
- Truth, 14, 16, 39, 159, 264, 342: and
- falsehood, 8, 11, 223, 256, 258, 261,
- 273; of propositions, 8, 184, 186, 259,
- 268; possibility of finite, 11, 220; and
- God, 12-13, 189, 346; pragmatic mean-
- ing of, 181; and value, 185; phase as
- proposition seeking, 224; -value of meta-
- physical propositions, 197; adds to in-
- terest, 259; coherence as, 271; attention
- and inattention to, 275
- Ultimate, the, 7, 20, 21, 342
- Unauthentic perceptive feelings, 263, 268,
- 270, 272
- Unconscious, subconscious, 52, 54, 186,
- 187, 242, 338
- Understanding, 52, 153, 251
- Uniformity, 112, 333n
- Unifying control, 107, 108
- Unison of becoming (immediacy), 124,
- 126, 128, 320, 322, 340, 345-46, 350,
- 351
- Unity: of actual entities, 22, 45, 47, 150,
- 211, 212, 286, 348; real, 22, 224, 229;
- of a multiplicity, 30, 46; of experience,
- 108, 113,' 128; of satisfaction, 115,
- 211; of a datum, 210; of aesthetic ap-
- preciation, 212; propositional, 224, 236;
- universe's genetic, 286; ultimate, ever-
- lasting, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350; of
- vision, 348-49. See also One
- Universality, 4
- Universal 14, 21, 43, 55, 57, 128, 146,
- 151-52, 158, 190, 229, 230, 273: and
- particulars, 20, 48-50, 56, 158; eternal
- objects mis-described as, 48, 149, 158;
- eternal objects as, 184, 283
- Universe, 22, 26, 47, 89, 94, 95, 166, 225:
- essence of, 4; rationality of, 4; included
- in each actuality, 28, 44, 80, 148, 154,
- 165, 223, 245, 316; not abstractable
- from an entity, 28, 192; solidarity of,
- 40, 56, 164, 220; as static, 46, 222; po-
- tentiality of, 46, 223; prehension of, 56;
- as one and many, 57, 167, 228, 167;
- evolving, 59, 88; freedom inherent in,
- 88; knowledge about, 119, 121, 122,
- 327; actuality of, 200; as organism, 215;
- novelty in, 222, 231; creativity of, 225,
- 346, 350. See also World
- Unrest, 28, 29, 32, 340
- Urge, 129, 219, 228, 239, 285
- Vacuous actuality, xiii, 29, 167, 309
- Vagueness, 65, 76, 81, 111-12, 116, 120,
- 121, 163, 176, 178, 237, 253
- Valuation, 19, 24, 108, 187, 254: pri-
- mordial, 40, 244; and reality, 142; as
- subjective form of conceptual feelings,
- 240, 247, 248, 311, 313; qualitative
- and intensive, 241; three characteristics
- of, 241; up and down, 241, 247, 248,
- 278 (see also Adversion and aversion);
- eternal principles of, 248: important in
- high-grade organisms, 254; and con-
- ceptual feelings, 254. See also Concep-
- tual prehension
- Value, 84, 104, 185, 228
- Vector(s), 55, 87, 117, 119, 120, 151,
- 177, 180, 212, 213, 231, 237-38, 309,
- 315, 316, 317, 319, 325: meaning of,
- 19, 116, 163; and scalar quantities, 177;
- all things as, 309
- Vegetables, 33, 98, 107
- Velocity, 321
- Vera causa, 77, 119
- Verification, 8, 10
- Vibration, 79, 94, 163, 188, 239, 277,
- 279
- Viscera, 118, 121, 141
- Vision, 33, 117, 118, 121, 167, 212, 214,
- 346, 347, 348, 349
- Volume, 300-01, 313, 322
- Von Staudt, Karl G.C., 331, 332
- Wave-lengths, 163, 327
- Waves, 36, 98
- Weierstrass, K.W.T., 328
- Whewell, William, 12
- Whole and part 96, 287, 288, 292
- Width, 110-12, 114, 163, 166, 279
- Words, 182
- 392 Editors' Notes
- Macmillan edition. In such a case we have not actually introduced a change,
- but have simply made this new edition conform to one of the original editions
- (in this case Cambridge).
- The external sources cited as the basis for some of the changes have been
- identified in the Editors' Preface.
- * xi.2 The bracketed number in the text indicates the exact place at which
- the corresponding page began in the 1929 Macmillan edition.
- t xi.14 inserted 'the' before 'scheme' (M v.17)— As explained above, the
- fact that there is a reference to only the Macmillan edition (M) means
- that this corrected edition follows Cambridge at this point.
- t xi.16 inserted comma after 'part' (M v.20) to conform to parallels in the
- previous and following paragraphs (as Cambridge did)— Series of intro-
- ductory phrases (e.g., "In the first case, ... in the second case, . . .")
- were quite often punctuated inconsistently. We have made the punc-
- tuation consistent at these points without further notation.
- * xi fn.l Whitehead used the thirtieth edition of Locke's Essay, which was
- printed for Thomas Tegg in London in 1846 by James Nichols. In the
- "Advertisement" at the front, Nichols says that this edition "is nearly
- an exact reprint of the sixth"; however, he also says that the sixth
- edition was "carelessly executed," and that in his edition "considerable
- pains have been bestowed on the punctuation." The punctuation of this
- edition differs considerably from that of the editions preferred today.
- In those few places where the quotations in Cambridge and Macmillan
- differed from this edition, we have brought them into conformity
- with it.
- t xii.8 deleted comma after 'cosmology' (M vi.25; C vi.15); changed 'bring'
- to 'brings' (M vi.26; C vi.16)
- f xii.25 changed 'them' to 'their' (M vii.IO)
- t xiv.20 decapitalized 'the' (M x.3)
- t xvii.26 decapitalized 'between' (M 3.22; C v.25)— We have made the cap-
- italization in the Table of Contents consistent without further notation.
- t xviii.18 inserted comma after 'namely' (M 4.8; C xii.7)
- t xviii.37 changed 'Giveness' to 'Givenness' (M 57.11)
- t xix.10 inserted comma after 'Determined' (M 57.20)
- t xix.22 italicized 'Essay' (M 57.32; C xiii.l)
- ** xx. 11 It might be supposed that 'Lure of Feeling' is an error, since White-
- head usually writes 'lure for feeling'; however, the text corresponding to
- this entry in the Table of Contents has 'lures of feeling' (88.3) .
- t xx.13 inserted comma after 'Environment' (M 58.29)
- t xx. 32 changed 'Trivial ty' here and in following line . to 'Triviality'
- (M 59.8, 9)
- t xx. 3 5 changed 'Co-ordination' to 'Coordination' (C xiv.ll)— Macmillan
- usually did not hyphenate 'coordination' and 'coordinate'; Cambridge
- always did. We have, usually without further notation, written these
- words without the hyphen.
- t xxi.7 changed 'Amplifyer' to 'Amplifier' (M 59.23)
- t xxii.23 changed comma after 'Feeling' to colon (M 60.40; C xv.37)
- f xxii.3 1 changed semicolon after 'Misconceptions' to colon (M 61.8)
- f xxiii.5 changed 'Propositions' to 'The Propositions' (M 61.23)
- * xxiii.29 'Samples' is evidently used here as a verb.
- t xxiii.35 changed comma after 'Spatialization' to semicolon and comma after
- 'Fluency' to colon (M 62.14; C xvii.3)
- 394 Editors' Notes
- t 18.2 While correcting proofs, Whitehead changed the title of this chapter
- from "The Categorical Scheme" to "The Categoreal Scheme." Mac-
- millan, unlike Cambridge, did not change the running heads accord-
- ingly. We have made these changes without further notation.
- f 1832 capitalized 'Cartesian' (M 28.11)
- f 18.34 Macmillan inserted the abbreviations 'Bk./ 'Ch/ and 'Sect/ into
- this reference, the first one to Locke's Essay within the body of the
- work (C 25.8). For the edition used, see the note for xi fn.l.
- f 18.35 put quoted words in double instead of single quotation marks
- (M 28.14-15; C 25.8-9)
- i 19.40 changed 'MonodoZogy' to 'Monadology 9 (M 29.28; C 26.19)— This
- change was made by Whitehead throughout his Macmillan copy. We
- have incorporated this correction without further notation.
- f 20 fn.2 added Tress' (M 30 fn.2)
- $ 21.1 capitalized 'Category' (M 31.8)— Both editions were hopelessly in-
- consistent in the matter of capitalizing references to particular cate-
- gories. There are three major types of references involved: (1) Expres-
- sions such as 'fourth category of explanation' and 'ninth categoreal
- obligation' were usually not capitalized, but occasionally were — e.g.,
- 'fourth Category of Explanation/ (2) Whitehead often used Roman
- numerals to refer to the categoreal obligations. Such references in the
- present chapter were uncapitalized — e.g., 'category (iv)' — in conformity
- with the fact that the Roman numerals were not capitalized in the
- initial listing of the categoreal obligations in this chapter. Later in the
- book, the Roman numerals were capitalized, in conformity with the
- presentation of the categoreal obligations in Part III. The word 'cate-
- gory' preceding the Roman numeral was also capitalized— e.g., 'Cate-
- gory IV/ However, when the term 'categoreal condition' was used, it
- was left uncapitalized, even though the Roman numeral was capitalized—
- e.g., 'categoreal condition IV.' (3) In references to 'the Category of the
- Ultimate,' and to particular categoreal obligations which designate them
- by name (e.g., 'the Category of Transmutation'), either the name of
- the category, or both it and the term 'category' (or 'categoreal condi-
- tion'), were very frequently capitalized. In a couple of places (here and
- 247.27), Cambridge capitalized the entire reference which Macmillan
- had left partially or wholly uncapitalized. On the basis of these prece-
- dents, and of the high frequency with which instances of this third type
- were already capitalized, we capitalized (without further notation) the
- remaining instances of this third type. However, there was no similar
- justification for bringing consistency into the references of the first and
- second types.
- * 21.14 In the margin of his Macmillan copy, Whitehead wrote: " 'Poten-
- tiality' is closely allied to 'disjunctive diversity/ "
- * 21.18 In the margin of his Macmillan copy, Whitehead wrote: "cf. p. 47/'
- The reference is to 31.29 of this corrected edition.
- + 22.17 changed period after 'Prehension' in previous line to comma and in-
- serted 'or Patterned Entities.' (M 33.6; C 29.28)— This change was
- made by Whitehead in his Macmillan copy.
- i 22.29 inserted 'in disjunctive diversity' (M 33.21; C 30.7)— This change
- was made by Whitehead in his Macmillan copy.
- * 22.35 In the margin of his Macmillan copy, Whitehead wrote: "cf. Plato's
- Sophist 247 i.e. disjunctive diversity is potentiality."
- f 22.36 deleted comma after 'actuality' (M 33.30; C 30.15)
- t 23.4 deleted comma after 'concrescence' (M 34.7; C 30.27)
- 396 Editors' Notes
- t 36.39 took Tarts' out of single quotation marks (M 5428; C 50.11)
- t 39.13 inserted 'the' before 'European' (M 63.3; C 53.15)
- t 39.28 changed writing' to 'writings' (M 63.23)
- ** 40.13 It has been suggested that 'orderings' should read 'ordering/ Evi-
- dence for this is provided by the fact that the Table of Contents has it
- in the singular. However, the content of the previous sentence in the
- text, along with the use of 'such' (which normally takes a plural noun),
- supports the text as it is.
- * 40fn.l Whitehead would have, of course, been using their 1911-12 trans-
- lation, not their 1931 corrected edition, which most scholars today use.
- t 41 fn.6 took 'for' out of italics (M 65 fn.6)
- t 42.1 changed 'from' to 'form' (M 66.35)— This change was included on
- the list entitled "Misprints."
- t 42.7 deleted comma after 'theory* (M 67.4; C 57.10)
- * 42 fn.7 The quotation is from p. 455.
- ** 43.23 It has been suggested that 'decision' should read 'decisions.'
- * 43.29 In British usage, 'eat' can express the past tense.
- t 44.24 changed 'be' to 'the' (M 70.24)
- t 44.25 decapitalized 'he' (C 60.27)— Cambridge capitalized occurrences of
- 'he' and 'him' referring to God; Macmillan did not. We have followed
- Macmillan's convention without further notation.
- * 44.32 In the margin of his Cambridge copy, Whitehead wrote: "Thus con-
- sciousness is a factor in the subjective form of the prehension of data
- as given. Cf. pp. 344, 369, on the 'affirmation-negation contrast.' "
- These pages correspond to pp. 371-72 and 399 of the Macmillan edition
- and to pp. 243 and 261 of this corrected edition.
- * 44.39 In the margin of his Cambridge copy, Whitehead wrote: "Law of
- Excluded Middle."
- * 45.28 In the margin of his Cambridge copy, Whitehead wrote: "i.e. the
- 'Satisfaction' is always objective. It never feels itself."
- t 46.12 inserted closing quotation mark after 'God' (M 73.12)
- t 46.15 changed 'efficacity' to 'efficacy' (M 73.16; C 63.12)— Both editions
- sometimes had the archaic form 'efficacity' instead of 'efficacy.' The
- list entitled "Misprints" drew attention to this discrepancy in reference
- to Macmillan 184 (120 of this corrected edition); Cambridge changed
- 'efficacity' to 'efficacy' at 316.39. We have changed the remaining in-
- stances to 'efficacy' without further notation.
- t 46.24 put quotation mark before 'the' here and in preceding line instead of
- before 'multiplicity' and 'class' (M 73.28-29)
- t 47.17 deleted 'only' after 'illustrated' (M 74.38; C 64.31)— The presence
- of 'only' produced a contradiction between this sentence and the follow-
- ing one. This 'only' was perhaps transposed by the typist from the
- following sentence.
- t 49.33 italicized 'Meditations IV and 'IIV (M 78.24)
- * 50.4 The quotation is from Shakespeare's A Midsummer-Night's Dream,
- Act III.
- f 50.6 changed 'commonsense' to 'common sense' (M 79.3)
- f 50.28 deleted parentheses around 'A substance' (M 79.30; C 69.16)—
- They (or brackets) are not needed, since this is not a direct quotation.
- * 50fn.l3 As stated in the note for 40 fn.I, Whitehead was using the
- 1911-12 Haldane and Ross translation; this sentence was completely
- retranslated in their 1931 corrected edition,
- t 51.5 changed 'on 7 to 'Concerning 7 (M 80.17; C 70.2)
- t 51.28 capitalized 'Concerning 7 (M 81.9; C 70.29)
- 398 Editors' Notes
- t 75.21 changed period after 'conceive it' to comma (M 116.29; C 104.9)
- t 76.9 changed well' to 'dwell' (M 117-31) — This change was made by
- Whitehead in his Macmillan copy.
- t 76.9 put both passages in double instead of single quotation marks (M
- 117.29-31; C 105.7-9)
- t 76.41 changed 'exemplication' to 'exemplification' (M 118.33)
- t 76fn.8 decapitaiized 'the 9 (M 118 fn.8; C 105 fn.l)
- t 77.18 changed 'synonomously' to 'synonymously' (M 119.23)
- t 78.34 changed 'adventure' to 'adventures' (M 121.23; C 108.35)
- f 80.1 changed 'substance' to 'substances' (M 123.19; C 110.28)— This,
- incidentally, is a place where correcting the punctuation in quoted
- material required adding italics.
- f 80.5 inserted comma after 'substance' (M 123.25)
- t 80.24 put 'nexus' in single instead of double quotation marks (M 124.13)
- t 82.8 changed 'the' to 'a' (M 126.31: C 114.2)
- t 82 fn.9 inserted '28A'; changed W to TlatoW (M 126 fn.9; C 113 fn.l)
- t 83.17 changed comma before 'disorder' to semicolon (M 127.21; C
- 115.20)
- t 84.15 put 'final causes' in quotation marks (M 128.36; C 116.28)
- t 85.9 changed double to single quotation marks (M 130.12-13; C 118.2)
- — This is not a direct quotation: 'It' is not in the quoted passage,
- t 85 fn.l inserted '10' after 'xxxvii (M 131 fn.l; C 118 fn.l)
- * 86.15 Whitehead used The Philosophical Works of David Hume, in four
- volumes, published in 1854 by Little, Brown and Company, Boston,
- and by Adam and Charles Black, Edinburgh. The punctuation of the
- Treatise in this edition differs considerably from that in editions of the
- Treatise which are now more commonly used. In those few places where
- the quotations in Cambridge and Macmillan differed from this edition,
- we have brought them into conformity with it.
- t 86.30 changed 'of to 'or' (M 132.25)
- t 86.38 changed 'has never' to 'never has' (M 132.34; C 120.17)
- t 86.42 changed 'between' to 'betwixt' (M 133.3; C 120.22)
- f 86.44 deleted 'to' before 'raise' (M 133.6; C 120.24)
- f 87.4 changed 'instances' to 'instance' (M 133.11)
- t 87.35 deleted hyphen in 'threefold' (M 134.15)
- t 87.45 changed 'an unity' to 'a unity' (M 134.28)
- * 88.3 See the note for xx.II.
- t 88.6 changed 'This' to 'His' (M 134.35; C 122.9) -Whitehead's hand-
- written 'H' is such that it could appear to a typist to be 'TV; cf. the
- notes for 139.34 and 225.36.
- t 88.9 put closing quotation mark after 'nature' instead of after 'superjective'
- (M 135.2; C 122.13) to conform to parallels above
- t 88.13 changed 'goal' to 'goad' (M 135.8; C 122.18)-In agreement with
- most other scholars consulted, we do not think that the expression 'goal
- towards novelty' makes sense. Also, the presence of 'goal' in the text is
- easily intelligible as a mistranscription of Whitehead's handwriting. An
- objection to this change might be that the use of the word 'goad' in this
- context is incompatible with Whitehead's conception as to how God
- influences the world, i.e., by presenting ideals which serve as lures for
- feeling. It is, however, quite normal to say that one person goads another
- to action when the former insistently presents the latter with an attrac-
- tive ideal.
- ** 89.35 It has been suggested that 'a' should be inserted before 'man.'
- 400 Editors' Notes
- f 111.42 changed semicolon after 'character' to comma (M 170.35)
- f 113.6 changed 'experiental' to 'experiential' (M 172.27); deleted comma
- after 'attained' "(M 172.27; C 158.16)
- } 113.11 deleted 'as' after 'aesthetic' (M 172.33)— This occurrence of 'trans-
- cendental aesthetic/ unlike the other two in the immediate context, was
- neither capitalized nor put in quotes. The other two clearly name a part
- of the Critique, whereas this occurrence can be regarded as a reference
- to its content. On this reading, it is possible that the deleted 'as'
- was a mistranscription from an V originally completing the word
- 'aesthetics.'
- * 113.20 In his Macmillan copy, Whitehead underlined 'responsive con-
- formity of feeling' and wrote "cf. p. 53" in the margin. The reference
- is to pp. 35-36 of this corrected edition; cf. the note for 36.1.
- t 113.34 deleted comma after 'question* (M 173.25; C 159.12)
- t 114.24 changed 'for' to 'from' (M 174.34^
- t 114.42 changed 'show' to 'shows' (M 175.20; C 161.5)
- t 115.34 deleted comma after 'feelings' (M 176.29; C 162.11)
- t 116.41 changed 'experiment' to 'experient' (M 178.20-21; C 163.37)
- t 117.35 changed 'anything' to 'any thing' (M 179.33; C 165.10)
- t 117 fn.l inserted 'Bk.I/ (M 179fn.l; C 165 fn.l)— The references to the
- Treatise were not uniform: sometimes 'Treatise' was omitted; sometimes
- the Part; and always the Book. We have, without further notation,
- brought all footnote references to the Treatise into standard form.
- * 117 fn.2 The italics in this quotation were also (as in the one before it)
- not in the original.
- t 118.8 inserted hyphens in 'such-and-such' here (M 180.14-15; C 165.25-
- 26) and in lines 10 and 18 (M 180.16-17 & 27-28; C 165.28, 166.2)
- t 118.11 changed 'though' to 'through' (M 180.19)— This change was in-
- cluded on the list entitled "Misprints."
- t 118.23 deleted comma after 'conclusion' (C 166.9)
- t 118.29 inserted 'to us' (M 181.4; C 166.13)
- f 119.36 changed 'nexus' to 'nexus' (M 182.32: C 168.2)— This change was
- made by Whitehead in his Macmillan copy.
- t 120.1 changed 'gives' to 'give' (M 183.6; C 168.11)
- t 120.6 changed 'vector-character' to 'vector character' (M 183.12-13; C
- 168.17) to conform to the usual spelling
- f 120.19 changed %' (M 183.29) and 'S' (C 168.35) to 'S/-This change
- was made by Whitehead in his Macmillan copy.
- + 121.11 changed 'be' to 'have been' and inserted 'a' before 'missile' (M
- 185.1; C 170.6)
- t 121.30 inserted dash after 'immediacy (M 185.27)
- t 121 fn.4 changed 'of to 'cf.' (M 185 fn.4; C 170 fn.l)— This change was
- made by Whitehead in his Macmillan copy.
- t 121 fn. 5 changed 'Meaning and Importance' to 'Meaning and Effect ';
- changed 'Macmillan' to '(New York: Macmillan, 1927; Cambridge
- University Press, 1928)' (M 185 fn.5; C 170 fn.2) -Parentheses were
- introduced to distinguish clearly the data relating to the lectures from
- that referring to the publications. It might be inferred that 'Meaning
- and Importance' was used in the title of the lectures; however, White-
- head's letter to the University, and the announcement in the Univer-
- sity's newspaper, had the following as the announced topic: "Symbolic
- Expression, Its Function for the Individual and for Society."
- t 123.42 changed 'ways' to 'way' (M 189.5; C 174.2)— The following sen-
- 402 Editors' Notes
- was responsible for the Index, it was not done with great care — e.g.,
- the important footnote on p. 333 was not indexed. Also, it is noteworthy
- that the Cambridge edition had the '-scopic 7 and '-cosmic' occurrences
- correctly indexed.
- f 131.21 changed 'colored' to 'coloured' (M 200.2)
- f 131.24 changed 'change' to 'chance' (M 200.4; C 183.34)
- f 131.25 changed 'would' to 'should' (M 200.5; C 18335)
- t 132.1 changed 'the' before 'substance' to 'a' (M 200.25; C 184.19)
- * 132 fn. 7 For the edition quoted, see the note for 86.15.
- f 133.10 deleted comma after 'freedom' (M 202.19; C 186.5)
- * 133.16 The italics are Whitehead's.
- t 134.27 deleted 'that' before 'this' (M 204.17; C 187.37)
- f 134.29 changed single to double quotation marks (M 204.20-21; C 187.
- 40-188.1)
- * 134.41 These latter italics are also Hume's.
- t 135.3 deleted 'by' before 'the nature' (M 205.5; C 188.19)
- t 135.29 changed single to double quotation marks; changed 'Ideas' to 'the
- Idea'; and decapitalized 'external' (M 206.5-6; C 189.18-19)
- * 135 fn.9 The passage to which Whitehead refers does not come at the end
- of the Appendix in some editions of the Treatise, e.g., that of Selby-
- Bigge, but is followed by other material. The last three sentences of
- the edition Whitehead used (see the note for 86.15) read: "The second
- error may be found in [Bk.I, Part III, Sect. VII], where I say, that two
- ideas of the same object can only be different by their different degrees
- of force and vivacity. I believe there are other differences among ideas,
- which cannot properly be comprehended under these terms. Had I said,
- that two ideas of the same object can only be different by their different
- feeling, I should have been nearer the truth."
- t 137.7 moved closing bracket from after 'time' to after 'such' (M 208.2;
- C 191.13)
- f 137.20 changed 'endeavor' to 'endeavour' (M 208.20)
- * 138.15 Whitehead used an edition (cf. the note for xi fn.l) based on
- Locke's English arrangement of the introductory material, not one based
- on Coste's French translation. In editions following Coste's arrange-
- ment, such as that of Campbell Fraser, the reference here would be
- 'Introduction, 8.'
- t 138.18 changed '6 and T to '6' (M 20936; C 193.8) -Although the
- quoted material is only from Sect. 6, Whitehead perhaps wanted to
- draw attention to some material in Sect. 7.
- * 138 fn.l 3 Whitehead means that the italics throughout the remainder of
- this paragraph are his.
- t 13934 changed 'thence' to 'hence' (M 212.1); changed 'This' to 'His'
- (M 212.2; C 195.7)— Cf. the note for 88.6.
- t 139 fn.l 5 changed footnote to its present reading from 'Cf. treatise, Bk.
- Ill, Sects. V and VI' (M 211 fn.l 5; C 194 fn.l)
- t 139 fn.16 put 'Transcendental Logic in quotation marks and changed
- 'Intro. I' to 'Introduction, Sect. Y (M 211 fn.16; C 195 fn.l) for the
- sake of consistency
- t 14038 changed 'founded in' (M 213.25) and 'founded on' (C 196.27) to
- 'found in'
- t 141.8 changed 'reflections' to 'reflection' (M 214.2-3)
- * 142.23 The quotation is from Scepticism and Animal Faith, Ch s 7=
- f 142.27 changed 'in' to 'is' (M 216.11)
- t 1433 decapitalized 'books' (M 216.35; C 199.29)— References elsewhere
- to the books of Locke's Essay are not capitalized.
- 404 Editors' Notes
- which is the "subjectivist principle"— which is "mitigated" by Descartes 7
- use of "realitas objectiva" We could have achieved the same effect by
- changing 'sensationalist principle" to 'sensationalist doctrine/ since the
- sensationalist doctrine includes the subjectivist principle and hence
- would likewise be mitigated by one who sometimes referred to real ob-
- jects. But we thought it more likely that Whitehead intended 'subjec-
- tivist principle/ For one thing, that is the term used in the previous
- sentence. Also, the inadvertent substitution of 'sensationalist' for 'sub-
- jectivist' seems more likely than the substitution of 'principle' for
- 'doctrine/ especially given the previous paragraphs.
- f 158.29 changed 'generalization' to 'generalizations' (M 240.17: C 221.9)
- to conform to the following sentence and to 159.17
- t 158.43 inserted comma after 'is' (M 240.36)
- t 159.10 deleted comma after 'experiences' (M 241.14; C 222.4)
- f 159.36 inserted comma after 'muddle' (M 242.10)
- f 159.42 inserted single quotation mark before 'realitas' (M 242.17)
- f 160.6 deleted comma after 'mind' (M 242.30; C 223.19)
- f 160.9 changed 'an' to 'a' (M 242.33)
- * 160.19 The quotation is from the Treatise, Bk. I, Part I, Sect. I.
- r 160.26 moved comma from outside to inside the quotation marks (M
- 243.17)
- f 161.29 changed exclamation point to question mark (M 245.2)
- t 161.37 inserted 'in' after 'is' (M 245.13)
- t 162.6 changed comma to semicolon (M 245.28)
- t 163.2 changed 'feelings' to 'feeling' (M 247.6)
- t 163.4 inserted comma after 'world' (M 247.8^
- f 163.22 changed 'are' to 'is' (M 247.32)
- t 164.4 inserted comma after 'prehensions' (M 248.27; C 229.9)
- t 164.27 put 'conformal' in quotation marks (M 249.19; C 230.3)
- t 164.35 changed 'earlier' to 'latter' (M 249.29; C 230.12)— 'Latter' is used
- instead of 'later' to conform to 165.36 and 166.5.
- f 165.14 inserted comma after 'example' (M 250.22)
- t 166.2 changed 'synthetized' to 'synthesized' (M 251.28)
- ** 166.36 This is clearly not a reference to the "subjectivist principle" as
- denned in the opening section of this chapter at 157.28-29; the same is
- true of the reference at 167.13. For one thing, the definition on 157
- is of a principle which Whitehead rejects, whereas these latter two
- references are to a principle which he accepts.
- ** 167.13 See the note for 166.36.
- t 167.17 changed 'presentation' to 'presentational' (M 253.29)
- t 167.31 changed all four instances of 'res veroe y on this Daze to l res verae'
- (M 254.10, 14, 28)
- t 167.37 changed 'conscresence' to 'concrescence' (M 254.18)
- t 171.2 changed 'sense' to 'sensa' (M 259.19; C 240.13)
- t 171.3 changed 'justaposition' to 'juxtaposition' (M 259.20-21)
- * 171 fn.l The words 'sensation 7 and 'reflection 7 were italicized in the
- original.
- t 172.35 changed 'grey-colour' to 'grey colour' (M 262.8)
- t 172.37 changed 'sensation' to 'sensations' (M 262.10-11)
- f 173.12 decapitalized 'dynamics' (M 262.37; C 243.27)
- f 173.15 inserted comma after 'always' (M 263.2)
- f 173.16 changed 'interpretive' to 'interpretative' (M 263.4)
- f 173.28 deleted commas after 'problem' and 'perception' (M 263.17-18)
- f 174.9 took 'Critiques' out of single quotation marks and italicized it (M
- 264.14; C 245.2) for the sake of consistency
- Editors' Notes 405
- t 174.15 changed 'behavior' to 'behaviour' (M 264.22) to conform to the
- usual spelling of both editions
- t 175.7 changed 'are' to 'is' (M 265.29; C 246.15)
- t 175.27 deleted comma after 'dogma' (M 266.19)
- t 175.29 inserted comma after 'Besides' (M 266.21)
- t 176.22 changed 'experience' to 'experiences' (M 267.30)
- t 176.23 italicized 'hand' (M 26732; C 248.15) to correspond to 'eye'
- t 176.35 deleted 'to' after 'descend' (M 268.10; C 248.29) -The discussion
- was already about 'organic being.'
- t 177.9 deleted' comma after 'definition' (M 268.34)
- t 177.40 changed 'spatiatization' to 'spatialization' (M 269.34)
- t 179.12 changed 'produce' to 'produces' (M 271.38)— This change was in-
- cluded on the list entitled "Misprints."
- f 179.23 changed 'principle' to 'principal' (M 272.15)
- f 179.25 changed 'sensations' to 'sensation' (M 272.16-17; C 252.32)
- t 179.26 changed 'discernable' to 'discernible' (M 272.18)
- t 179.32 changed 'conjectually' to 'conjecturally' (M 272.26)
- t 179.45 changed 'experiental' to 'experiential' (M 273.4)
- M80.7^ changed 'are' to 'is' (M 273.13; C 253.27)
- ** 180.11 Some have suggested that 'construed' should be changed to 'con-
- structed/ but we believe that the text is correct as it stands.
- t 180.13 deleted comma after 'organs' (M 273.21; C 253.34)
- f 181.9 inserted 'with' before 'which' (M 274.32)
- t 181.15 inserted 'as' after 'far' (M 275.4)
- f 181.42 changed 'percept' to 'percepta' and deleted comma after 'symbols'
- (M 276.2) — The first change was made by Whitehead in his Macmillan
- copy.
- f 181.44 changed 'precipient' to percipient' (M 276.6)
- t 182.28 inserted comma after 'word'^M 277.3)
- t 182.38 deleted 'of after 'suggest' (M 277.16)
- t 184.33 italicized 'Logic' (M 281.10)
- t 184.35 inserted 'a' after 'is' (M 281.13)
- t 185.42 changed 'in' to 'is' (M 282.29)
- t 185.44 inserted 'a' before 'new' (M 282.31)
- f 187.10 inserted comma after 'of (M 284.25)
- f 187.13 changed 'a non-conformal proposition is' to 'non-conformal proposi-
- tions are' (M 284.29-30)— As usual, the change made by Cambridge
- was an improvement, since the following sentence uses the plural pro-
- noun.
- f 187.17 inserted comma after 'entities' (M 284.34; C 264.26)
- f 187.22 inserted 'of before 'feeling' (M 2853)
- t 18732 inserted '(i),' after 'Either' and changed 'satisfaction' to 'satisfac-
- tions' (M 285.16)
- f 187.43 changed 'data. But' to 'data, but' (M 28531)
- f 188.27 inserted comma after 'entities' (M 286.31)
- f 18839 deleted comma after 'entity' (M ?« 7 9; C 26634)
- f 189.9 decapitalized 'the' (M 287.27; C 267.14)^
- * 189.12 The word 'abrupt was not italicized in Science and the Modern
- World, but Whitehead evidently wanted it stressed here.
- f 189.14 inserted 'graded' before 'envisagernent' (M 28734; C 267.19)
- f 189.18 changed 'VI' to 'IF (M 288.1)
- f 189.20 inserted comma after 'hand' (M 288.4; C 267.25)
- f 190.27 changed both instances of 'illusioriness' to 'illusoriness' (M 289.30,
- 31)
- f 190.44 inserted 'a' before 'proposition' (M 290.14; C 26934)
- 406 Editors' Notes
- t 191.15 changed 'experiment' to 'experient' (M 29036; C 270.18)
- t 191.21 deleted comma after 'suspension' (M 291.5)
- t 191.36 inserted 'a' before 'feeling' (M 291.26; C 2*71.6)
- ** 191.43 Whitehead's sentence can lead to confusion as to which of the
- two senses is the 'latter.' Some scholars have thought a change to be
- necessary. But we believe that the text is correct, with the 'latter' sense
- being the one introduced second in the previous paragraph, i.e., in the
- sentence at 191.37-40.
- t 192.22 changed 'on' to 'in' (M 292.28; C 272.7)
- t 192.40 deleted comma after 'background' (M 293.13; C 272.28)
- t 193.15 inserted comma after 'include' (M 294.2)
- t 193 fn.l changed 'Ch. VI' to 'Ch. V (M 293 fn.l; C 273 fn.l)
- t 196.26 inserted 'a' between 'of and 'more' (M 298.34; C 278.6)
- t 197.6 deleted comma after 'direct' (M 299.28)
- t 197.19 inserted hyphen in 'judgment-feelings' (M 300.7; C 279.14) —
- Cambridge always printed this expression without the hyphen; Mac-
- millan sometimes inserted it. In bringing consistency into the text,
- which we have done without further notation, we chose to use the
- hyphen, since 'judgment' is not an adjective.
- f 197.21 changed 'terms' to 'term' (M 300.10)
- t 197.39 inserted hyphen in 'truth-value' (M 300.33)
- t 198.20 deleted commas after 'analogous' and 'simple' (M 301.27; C 280.31-
- 32) to conform to similar passages
- * 198 fn.2 The asterisk in this footnote is not ours, but is part of the refer-
- ence to Principia.
- f 200.27 inserted comma after 'Thus' (M 305.2)
- t 201.27 changed 'next section' to 'next two sections' (M 306.17; C 285.13)
- — Whitehead evidently added one more section than he had intended
- when writing this passage; cf. the note for 206.35.
- t 201.30 changed 'relevant' to 'relative' (M 306.21; C 285.16)
- f 201.34 inserted comma after 'reason' (M 306.27)
- t 202.10 changed 'as to which set—favourable or unfavourable— the proposi-
- tion belongs' to the present reading (M 307.16-17)
- t 202.36 deleted comma after 'overcome' (M 308.12)
- t 202.41 deleted comma after 'ground' (M 308.19)
- t 202.43 inserted 'an' after 'have' (M 308.21; C 287.13)
- f 203.13 changed 'these' to 'there' (M 309.2)
- t 203.21 deleted comma after 'induction' (M 309.13)
- t 204.18 changed 'derivation' to 'divination' (M 310.28; C 289.15)
- t 206.19 inserted comma after 'depend' (M 313.32)
- f 206.21 changed 'require that exact statistical calculations are' (M 313.35)
- and 'require exact statistical calculations to be' (C 292.14) to the
- present reading
- f 206.32 deleted comma after 'theory' and inserted commas after 'which'
- and 'me' (M 314.10)
- t 206.35 changed 'two' to 'three' (M 314.13; C 292.29)-Cf. the note for
- 201.27.
- f 207.5 changed brackets around 'by (hi)' to commas (M 314.31; C 293.8)
- t 208.9 changed 'banquetting' to 'banqueting' (M 317.11; C 295.10)
- t 208.25 deleted comma after 'flow' (M 317.32; C 295.31)
- t 208.29 inserted 'that with which' after 'as' (M 318.3)
- t 209.22 changed 'difference' to 'different' (M 319.3)
- t 210.7 italicized 'concrescence' (M 320.4; C 297.36)— It is parallel with
- Editors Notes 407
- 'transition' (and both terms are put in quotation marks in the following
- paragraph ) .
- t 211.9 put quotation mark before 'the' instead of before 'novel' (M
- 321.26)
- ** 211.24 It has been suggested that 'relative' ought to read 'relatively/
- but we believe that this change would be incorrect.
- f 211.25 deleted comma after 'concrescence' (M 322.10; C 300.1)
- f 211.30 deleted comma after 'alien' (M 322.17; C 300.7)— This change
- was made by Whitehead in his Macmillan copy.
- ** 212.37 It might be thought that the twofold reference in this paragraph
- to the 'principle of relativity/ which is the fourth category of explana-
- tion (and is often referred to as such), as the third metaphysical prin-
- ciple is erroneous. However, it is possible that this paragraph was
- incorporated from Whitehead's GifFord Lectures (which were greatly
- revised and expanded for publication)- and that this reference reflects
- a numbering used therein for some of his metaphysical principles, such
- as the ontological principle, and the principles of process and of rela-
- tivity; compare 22.35-40, 23.26-29, and 24.35-39 with 149.37-40 and
- 166.27-42.
- t 213.11 inserted closing quotation mark after 'passing on' (M 324,30)
- t 213 fn.l changed 'II, XXI, 1' to 'Essay, II, XXI, 3' (M 325 fn.l; C 302
- fn.l)
- t 214-5 changed 'negations' to 'negation' (M 326.2)
- t 214.6 deleted comma after 'irrelevance' (M 326.3)
- t 214.26 inserted 'of before 'the full' (M 326.28; C 304.14)
- f 214.29 changed 'rnascroscopic' to 'macroscopic' (M 326.32) — This change
- was included on the list entitled "Misprints."
- t 214.35 changed 'in' to 'is' (M 327.4)
- f 215.21 changed 'rnascroscopic' to 'macroscopic' (M 327.38)
- t 215.26 changed '2d' to '2nd' (M 328.6)
- t 219.8 changed 'genetic-theory' to 'genetic theory' here and in line 11
- (M 334.38, 335.4)
- t 219.15 changed 'already-constituted 7 to 'already constituted' (M 335.9)
- t 219.37 changed 'objective' to 'objective' (M 336.1)
- t 220.3 inserted 'a' before 'given' (M 336.6; C 310.13)
- I 221.25 changed 'datum' to 'data' (M 338.16; C 312.20)
- ** 222.35 When Whitehead was writing this material he evidently had not
- yet formulated the ninth categoreal condition, that of 'Freedom and
- Determination' (cf. 27.41). However, although there are six categoreal
- conditions beyond the three discussed in the present chapter, we have
- let 'five' stand, since 'Freedom and Determination' is not discussed as
- a categoreal condition in the following material; cf. 248.6 and the note
- for 278.6.
- f 224.31 changed 'in' to 'into' (M 343.3; C 317.3)
- t 224.32 deleted comma after 'process' (M 343.5; C 317.5)
- f 225.18 inserted comma after 'But' (M 344.8)
- f 225.21 put 'creativity' on previous line in quotation marks (M 344.9); put
- 'temporal creatures' in quotation marks (M 344.10; C 318.8)
- t 225.36 changed 'There' to 'Here' (M 344.30; C 318.25)— Cf. the note
- for 88.6.
- f 226.6 inserted comma after 'entities' (M 345.12; C 319.8)
- j 226.32 changed 'phrase' to 'phase' (M 346.8)
- f 226.40 deleted comma after 'itself (M 346.17; C 320.11)
- 408 Editors' Notes
- t 227.36 This paragraph was originally preceded by the paragraph which now
- closes this section.
- t 228.5 inserted hyphen in 'class-theory' (M 348.20)
- f 228.7 inserted 'Bk.I,' (M 348.23; C 322.14)
- t 228.16 This paragraph originally appeared two paragraphs higher, i.e., prior
- to the paragraph beginning 'The third category. . . .'
- t 229.43 changed 'are' to 'is' (M 351.3; C 324.28)
- t 230.24 deleted comma after 'percipient' (M 351.36; C 325.23)
- t 231.39 changed 'constitutions' to 'constitution' (M 353.36; C 327.21)
- t 232.10 changed 'is' (M 354.18) and 'in a' (C 328.4) to 'in'-This is a
- place where the Cambridge editor "miscorrected" the text; Whitehead
- uses this and similar expressions (i.e., without an article) several times,
- e.g., in the latter part of the same sentence.
- f 232.29 changed commas after 'entity' and 'object' to semicolons (M
- 355.5, 6)
- ** 233.22 Many scholars have thought that some of the instances of 'quali-
- tative' in this paragraph should have been 'quantitative,' but we believe
- the text to be correct. To see how two types of pattern are involved,
- the reader will be aided by mentally inserting 'quantitative' before each
- 'intensive.'
- f 233.34 changed 'iself to 'itself (M 356.35)
- t 234.19 inserted 'is' after 'which' (M 357.35; C 331.16); deleted 'displays'
- after 'tone quality' (C 331.17)— This is another place at which the
- Cambridge editor "miscorrected" the text.
- t 234.21 changed comma after 'separate' to dash (M 358.1; C 331.19)
- t 235.29 changed 'determinations' to 'determination' (M 359.33; C 333.10)
- t 237.27 deleted comma after 'effect' (M 363.12; C 336.5)
- t 239.3 inserted comma after 'Further' (M 365.25)
- f 240.11 deleted comma after 'conceptual' (M 367.16; C 340.2)
- t 241.2 inserted comma after 'object' (M 368.24)
- t 242.23 changed 'this' to 'his' (M 370.30; C 343.13)
- t 242.27 took 'e.g.' out of italics (M 370.35)
- t 242.41 inserted 'Bk.I,' (M 371.15; C 343.32-33)
- t 242.43 changed single to double quotation marks (M 371.15-18)
- t 244.25 moved take-out quotation mark from after 'society' (M 373.29;
- C 344.29) to end of sentence
- t 245.37 deleted comma after 'simple' (M 375.26; C 347.19)
- t 247.42 deleted comma after 'chapter' (M 378.34)
- * 248.6 Cf. the notes for 222.35 and 278.6.
- t 248.14 inserted 'of before 'the nexus' (M 379.18; C 351.2)— Cf. 26.36.
- * 250.10 In his Macmillan copy, Whitehead underlined 'The Category of
- Reversion is then abolished' and wrote "cf. p. 40" in the margin. The
- reference is to p. 26 of this corrected edition.
- t 251.13 deleted commas after 'one' and 'same' (M 384.3; C 355.15-16)
- t 253.9 changed 'cf. Ch.V, and also' to 'Ch.V; cf. also' (M 386.38; C 358.8)
- t 254.2 changed 'transmuted' to 'transmitted' (M 388.11; C 359.15)
- t 254.42 changed 'subject' to 'subjective' (M 389.25)
- ** 255.19 It has been suggested that 'Aesthetic Harmony' should be changed
- to 'Subjective Harmony,' but this expression seems to be simply an
- alternative way of referring to Categoreal Obligation VII. (This is one
- of the places where we added the capitalization; cf. the note for 21.1.)
- % 255.26 This paragraph was originally followed by the two paragraphs which
- now appear prior to the last paragraph of Section V of the following
- chapter; cf. the note for 264.15.
- Editors' Notes 409
- t 256.32 changed 'seventeenth' to 'eighteenth* (M 392.10-11; C 363.6)
- f 256fn.l deleted comma after 'Cf.' (M 391 fn.l)
- t 257.29 In his Cambridge copy, Whitehead indicated that '(qua possi-
- bility)' should be inserted in the text after 'referent' (M 393.17;
- C 364.9).
- t 257.36 inserted comma after 'eternal object' (M 393.25; C 364.17);
- changed 'nexus' to 'nexus' (M 393.26; C 364.18)
- t 259.5 inserted 'a' before 'datum' (M 395.24; C 366.13)
- t 259.27 deleted comma after 'subjects' (M 396.16; C 367.4)
- t 261.10 changed 'predicate' to 'predicative' (M 398.31; C 369.16)
- t 261.43 This paragraph was originally preceded by the paragraph which now
- appears prior to the last paragraph of this section.
- + 262.44 This paragraph originally appeared as the second paragraph of this
- section.
- t 263.10 deleted comma after 'feeling' (M 401.32; C 372.11)
- t 264.15 This and the following paragraph originally appeared at the end of
- Chapter III of this Part. The correct location of these two paragraphs
- is less obvious than that of those moved in Section VII of Chapter I
- and Section IV of Chapter IV, but they seem to fit here better than
- anywhere else.
- f 265.5 changed 'are' to 'is' (M 404.16; C 374.26)
- t 265.26 deleted 'as well as "immortality," and' after 'Athenianism' and
- put 'mortality' in quotation marks (M 405.5, 6; C 375.16, 17)— The
- deletion was made by Whitehead in his Cambridge copy,
- t 267.4 deleted comma after 'respectively' (M 407.18; C 377.16)
- t 267.21 changed comma after first 'feelings' to semicolon (M 408.4; C 378.1 )
- — This change was included on the list entitled "Misprints."
- f 268.2 inserted 'the' after 'all' (M 40834; C 378.28)
- t 268.37 deleted comma after 'feelings' (M 410.5; C 379.33)
- f 270.42 put 'suspense-form' in quotation marks (M 413.11; C 382.32)
- t 271.16 changed 'imaginative feelings' to 'imaginative feeling' (M 413.34;
- C 383.18)
- t 271.18 changed 'doctrine' to 'datum' (M 413.36; C 383.19)— The datum
- of a propositional feeling is a proposition, and a proposition is what is
- constituted by logical subjects and a predicative pattern. This is one of
- those errors most easily explainable as due to the typist's misreading of
- Whitehead's handwriting.
- f 271.18 changed 'indicative feelings' to 'indicative feeling' (M 413.36;
- C 383.20)
- t 271.19 inserted 'the' before 'physical' (M 413.37; C 383.21)
- t 272.21 put 'physical recollection' in quotation marks (M 415.25; C 385.3)
- f 272.22 inserted comma after 'imaginative feeling' (M 415.26; C 385.3)
- t 272.23 put 'intuitive judgment' in quotation marks (M 415.27-28;
- C 385.5)
- t 272.24 put 'indicative feeling' in quotation marks (M 415.29)
- t 272.36 deleted comma after 'other' (M 416.8)
- t 272.45 changed 'more' to 'mere' (M 416.19; C 385.33)
- f 274.6 deleted comma after parentheses (M 418.8)
- t 274.27 changed 'practice' to 'predicate' (M 418.33; C 388.4)
- t 275.36 deleted comma after 'subject' (M 420.30; C 389.34)
- t 276.16 changed 'physical' to 'conceptual' (M 421.25; C 390.25)
- t 276.23 deleted comma after 'developed' and changed 'required' to 're-
- quires' (M 421.34; C 390.34)
- t 276.38 changed 'according' to 'accorded' (M 422.16; C 391.16)— The
- 410 Editors' Notes
- word 'according' would suggest, contrary to Whitehead's position, that
- the conceptual valuation is completely determined by the physical feel-
- ing. It would also prevent this sentence from speaking to the issue that
- dominates the rest of the paragraph, which is how, in a physical pur-
- pose, the fate of a physical feeling is determined by the conceptual
- valuation given (accorded) to it. Whitehead does, in other places, stress
- that the conceptual valuation is partly determined by the physical feel-
- ing; but that is not the topic of this paragraph.
- t 277.12 deleted comma after 'phase' (M 423.3; C 392.1)
- f 277.22 inserted comma after 'subjective aim' (M 423.18; C 392.15) to
- conform to the parallel in the first part of the sentence and to avoid the
- false suggestion that there might be a subjective aim which is not "the
- final cause"
- t 277.42 changed 'subject' to 'subjective' and inserted 'at' before 'intensity'
- (M 424.6 & 7: C 393.2 & 3^ to conform to 27.30-31
- t 278.6 deleted 'final' after 'this' '(M 424.17; C 393.11)— As mentioned in
- the note for 222.35, Whitehead evidently added the ninth category
- after writing this section; cf. also the note for 278.35.
- f 278.31 changed 'Category IV to 'Category V (M 425.11; C 394.4)
- t 278.35 changed 'this final category' to 'Category VIII' (M 425.16-17;
- C 394.9)-Cf. the note for 278.6.
- t 278.36 changed 'had' to 'has' (M 425.17; C 394.10)
- f 279.33 changed 'are' to 'is' (M 426.35; C 393.23)
- t 279fn.l inserted 'Sect. VII' (M 427 fn.I; C 395 fn.l)
- t 280.34 inserted comma after 'Also' (M 428.17)
- t 283.2 changed 'CO-ORDINATE' to 'COORDINATE (C 401.2)-Cf.
- the note for xx.35.
- f 283.26 changed 'soZjdo' to 'soZido' (M 434.23)
- f 284.39 deleted comma after 'separate' (M 436.10; C 403.21)
- t 286.17 changed 'Ch. VIII, Sects. IV to IX' (M 438.22-23) and 'Ch.
- VIII, JJ IV to VI' (C 405.28) to 'Ch. IV, Sects. IV to IX'-Chapter
- VIII has only six sections, so the Macmillan reference is clearly errone-
- ous, and the subject at issue is not discussed in the sections cited by
- Cambridge.
- t 286.19 deleted commas after 'sense' and 'influences' (M 438.23-24;
- C 405.29-30)
- t 286.26 deleted comma after 'plan' (M 438.34)
- t 286.39 italicized 'Q a Q 2 ' and changed 'either' to 'other' (M 439.13-14)
- t 287.1 inserted comma after 'as' (M 439.21)
- t 287.3 changed 'purpose' to 'purposes' (M 439.23)
- t 287.8 inserted 'the' before 'morphological' and changed 'structure' to 'struc-
- tures' (M 439.29; C 406.32-33)
- t 287.15 changed 'taken in by my' to 'taken by me in my' (M 439.38)
- t 287.17 deleted comma after 'point' (M 440.3; C 407.8)
- t 287.30 capitalized 'Part' (M 440.19; C 407.23)
- t 287 fn.2 changed 'Lajuna's' to 'Laguna's' (M 440 fn.2)
- t 288.17 inserted comma after 'Also' (M 441.22)
- t 290.2 changed 'an' to 'a' (M 444.1)
- f 290.22 changed comma after 'fact' to semicolon (M 444.27)
- t 291.25 capitalized 'Platonic' (M 446.11; C 413.7)
- t 291.26 changed 'VIII' to 'IV (M 446.14; C 413.9)
- t 294.26 changed semicolon to colon (C 416.31)
- $ 294.34 We have followed Macmillan, as against Cambridge, in italicizing
- the numbers of Definitions and Assumptions here (C 417.6) and below.
- Editors' Notes 411
- f 296.1 These diagrams were on p. 451 of the Macmillan edition.
- t 296.22 changed '15' to '13' (M 452.37}
- f 297.1 changed 'Iff to '14' (M 453.1) '
- f 297.7 deleted '1/ after 'Definition 6/ (M 453.9; C 419.34)
- t 297.11 changed 'IT to '19 (M 453.14)
- f 297.14 changed '18' to 'Iff (M 453.17)
- t 297.15 changed '19' to 'IT (M 453.19)
- t 297.17 changed '20' to '18' (M 453.21)
- t 298.1 inserted 'and' before '(ii)' (M 454.18-19; C 421.4)
- f 298.23 changed period after l B' to comma (M 455.9)
- t 298.33 changed comma after 'A/ to semicolon (M 455.23; C 422.7)
- t 298.35 changed comma after 'A 2 ' to semicolon (M 455.25; C 422.9)
- f 298.42 changed '2V to '19' (M 455.34)
- t 299.3 changed 'IT to '20' (M 456.3)
- t 299.10 deleted comma after 'belones' (M 456.12; C 422.32)
- t 299.13 changed '23' to '2V (M 456.15)
- f 299.14 deleted comma after 'element' (M 456.16; C 422.36)
- t 299.15 changed '24' to '22' (M 456.18)
- f 299.16 deleted comma after 'element' (M 456.19; C 432.2)
- t 299.17 changed '19 to '23' (M 456.21)
- t 299.23 changed l 2ff to '24' (M 456.28)
- f 299.33 changed 'satisfied' to 'satisfies' (M 457.3-4)
- t 299.41 changed 'definitions' to 'definition' (M 457.13)
- t 300.7 changed '27' to '29 (M 457.26)
- f 300.8 changed colon after 'end-points' to semicolon (M 457.27; C 424.10)
- f 30030 changed '28' to 'Iff (M 458.18)
- t 300.40 changed '33' (M 459.33) and '3J' (C 426.11) to '27— This As-
- sumption appears to have been added after the text was otherwise com-
- pleted; it came at the very end of the chapter in both editions. Since
- it refers explicitly to Definition 23, it has been relocated directly after
- this Definition.
- f 301.4 changed '29' (M 459.3) and '27 (C 425.20) to '28'
- t 301.8 changed '30' (M 459.8) and '28' (C 425.24) to '29'
- f 301.10 changed '3V (M 459.11) and '29' (C 425.27) to '30'
- t 301.12 changed '32' (M 459.14) and '30' (C 425.30) to '3V
- t 301.20 Neither edition had a new paragraph at this point (M 459.25;
- C 426.3), but it is clearly desirable.
- t 301.25 This paragraph was originally followed by Assumption 33, which
- has been changed to Assumption 21 and moved to the appropriate place,
- X 301.26 Whereas Cambridge placed this paragraph at this point in the text,
- Macmillan had it (under the heading "Corrigenda") at the very back
- of the book, after the Index, with an indication that it belonged on
- page 459. The page references in the paragraph were to 504 and 463 of
- the Macmillan edition. We took each 'i.e.' out of italics (M 544.5, 19).
- t 302.12 changed single to double quotation marks (M 460.17-18; C 427.16-
- 17)
- f 302.18 deleted comma after 'imply' (M 460.25)
- t 302.27 changed single to double quotation marks (M 461.6-7; C 427.32-
- 33)
- I 303.30 inserted comma after 'words' (M 462.19)
- f 304.17 changed 'Ch. Ill' to 'Ch. IP (M 463.18); changed 'Ass. 33' (M
- 463.19) and 'Ass. 31' (C 430.8) to 'Ass. 27'
- * 304.25 See the added paragraph on p. 301.
- t 304.38 changed 'These' to 'There' (M 464.9)
- 412 Editors' Notes
- t 305.8 changed 'relatively' to 'relating' (M 464.24)
- f 306.19 changed lies' to 'lie' (C 433.7)— Whitehead has consistently been
- using the subjunctive.
- f 306.21 changed '6' to '6.V (M 466.26)
- f 306.39 changed 'lies' to 'lie' (C 433.32)
- f 309.2 changed 'become' to 'becomes' (M 470.23)
- t 309.18 deleted comma after 'bodies' (M 471.8; C 437.21)
- t 311.8 inserted comma after 'case' (M 473.28; C 440.22) to conform to
- parallel two sentences above
- t 311.35 changed 'realisation' to 'realization' (M 474.24)
- f 314.7 inserted hyphen in 'high-grade' (M 478.9)
- t 314.39 inserted hyphen in 'life-history' (M 479.14; C 446.4) to conform
- to other occurrences
- t 315.20 changed colon after 'physics' to semicolon (M 480.8; C 446.35)
- t 316.22 inserted comma after 'forms' (M 481.32: C 448.18)
- t 317 fn.l placed commas around 'Symbolism' in place of Cambridge's pa-
- rentheses; changed comma after 'New York' to colon; added '1928'; and
- put publication data in parentheses (M 482 fn.l; C 449 fn.l)— Cf. the
- note for 121 fn.5.
- t 319.2 inserted comma after 'example' (M 485.24)
- f 319.8 changed semicolon after 'world' to comma (M 485.38)
- f 319.27 changed '-dimensioned' to '-dimensional' (M 486.20)
- t 319.33 took reference out of italics (M 486.28); changed 'VI' to 'VIII'
- (M 486.28; C 453.10)— The reference is to Part II, Ch. IV, Sect. VIII.
- f 319.43 changed 'parts' to 'pasts' (M 487.4; C 453.23)
- t 320.1 deleted comma after 'occasions' (M 487.5; C 453.23); inserted
- comma after 'S' (M 487.5)
- t 320.22 deleted comma after 'M' (M 487.33; C 454.14)
- t 320.26 inserted comma after 'views' (M 487.37)
- t 320.38 changed 'present' to 'future' (M 488.15; C 454.33)
- f 320.44 inserted comma after 'secondly' (M 488.22; C 455.2)
- t 321.3 deleted comma after 'M' (M 488.26)
- t 321.13 inserted comma after 'occasions' (M 489.3)
- t 321.35 inserted hyphen in 'life-history' (M 489.31)
- t 322.16 deleted comma after 'future' (M 491.19)
- t 323.20 changed The' to 'The' (M 493.4)
- i 324.21 changed 'previous chapter' to 'Ch. IIP (M 494.26; C 460.16)-
- Whitehead evidently ended up with one more chapter in Part IV than
- he had intended when writing this passage.
- t 325.15 changed 'the previous chapter' to 'Ch. Ill' (M 495.38; C 461.27) —
- Cf. the note for 324.21.
- t 325.36 changed 'presentation' to 'presentational' (M 496.28)
- f 325.43 italicized 'Meditation I' (M 496.36-37)
- t 326.3 changed 'Part I, Sect. XII' to 'Sect. XII, Part I' (M 497.4; C 462.29)
- f 326.4 inserted comma after 'Hume' (M 497.5)
- t 326.16 inserted comma after 'When' (M 497.21)
- t 326.42 changed 'natures' to 'nature' (M 498.16; C 464.2)
- f 328.8 changed 'In-mathematics' to 'In mathematics' (M 500.10-11)
- t 328.14 inserted hyphen in 'yard-measure' here, at 328.27, and at 329.8 & 9
- (M 500.18 & 37; M 501.29 & 31)
- f 328.36 inserted comma after 'from' (M 501.9; C 466.29)
- f 329.3 inserted hyphen in 'wave-lengths' (M 501.23)
- t 329.5 inserted 'are' after 'tests' (M 501.26) — This change was included on
- the list entitled "Misprints."
- Editors' Notes 413
- t 329.7 deleted comma after 'congruence' (M 501.28; C 467.9)
- t 329.30 changed 'depend' to 'depends' (M 502.21)
- t 330.2 inserted 'the' before 'meaning' (M 503.4; C 468.21)
- f 330.12 changed 'inter-connections' to 'interconnections', (M 503.16)
- * 330.42 See the added paragraph on p. 301.
- t 331.7 inserted comma after 'containing' (M 504.29)
- t 331.16 deleted comma after 'line' and changed 'itself is' to 'is itself
- (M 505.2-3)
- t 331.36 deleted comma after 'parallelograms' (M 505.29; C 471.7)
- t 331 fn.l took 'Sixth Memoir on Quantics' out of italics and put it in quota-
- tion marks; changed 'Trans. R.S.' to 'Transactions of the Royal Society';
- and decapitalized 'von' (M 505 fn.l; C 470 fn.l)
- f 333 fn.3 inserted comma after 'measurement' in second line (M 508 fn.3);
- changed 'Vol. XXIV to 'Vol. XXV (M 508 fn.3; C 473 fn.l)
- t 337.14 inserted comma after 'selection' (M 512.17; C 477.17)
- f 339.6 deleted comma after 'curse' (M 514.36; C 479.33)
- * 340.11 Mathew Arnold's poem, "Resignation/' which was written as advice
- to his sister, begins with the following two lines in italics:
- To die be given us, or attain!
- Fierce work it were, to do again.
- These lines are presented as sentiments expressed by pilgrims on the
- way to Mecca. Whitehead evidently quoted these lines (imperfectly)
- from memory, and they clearly conveyed a different message to him
- from the one implied by the title of Arnold's poem.
- t 340.38 deleted 'the' after 'means' (M 517.26; C 482.20)
- t 341.8 inserted comma after 'therefore' (M 518.4)
- f 342.3 inserted 'SECTION I' (M 519.3)
- i 343.9 changed 'theistic idolatrous' to 'idolatrous theistic' (M 520.26;
- C 485.21)
- f 344.20 inserted comma after 'creative act' (M 522.24)
- t 344.25 changed 'mover' to 'moves' (M 522.30; C 487.23)
- f 344.26 changed ' a mover' to 'something' (M 522.31; C 487.24)
- + 344.29 inserted 'move in this way; they move without being moved. The
- primary objects of desire and of thought' (M 522.33; C 487.26)
- t 344.31 changed 'desire' to 'wish' (M 522.35; C 487.28)
- t 344.33 deleted 'side' after 'one' and changed 'list' to 'two columns' (M
- 523.3; C 487.30)
- t 344 fn.l changed '1072' to '1072a 23-32' (M 522 fn.l; C 487 fn.l)
- t 345.9 inserted comma after 'Thus' (M 523.26)
- t 346.21 deleted comma after 'nature' (M 525.25; C 490.10)
- ** 346.35 In his Macmillan copy, Whitehead crossed out 'leading' and wrote
- both "persuading" and "swaying" in the margin. No change was made
- in the text, partly because Whitehead did not clearly specify a sub-
- stitute.
- f 347.1 capitalized 'Platonic' (M 526.18; C 491.3)
- f 348.2 changed 'self-contradiction' to 'self-contradictions' (M 528.2);
- changed 'depends' to 'depend' (C 492.21)
- f 348.20 changed 'these' to 'there' (M 528.24)'
- f 349.7 changed colon after 'forms' to semicolon (M 529.29; C 4947)
- t 350.6 deleted comma after 'suffering' (M 531.7; C 495.20)— This change
- was made by Whitehead on Mrs. Greene's typescript.
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