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a guest Nov 5th, 2016 86 Never
  1. \
  2. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Departmenlof State  Case No. F-2016-07895 Doc No. C06130765 Date: 10/06/2016
  3. From:                                    H
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  9. Sent:                                          11/27/2011  3:34:50 PM +00:00
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  12. To:                                              Oscar Fl_ores I
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  27. Subject:                                  Fw: H:INTEL   Secret oHer to el Baradei/Muslim
  28. Brotherhood-Army alliance
  29.  
  30.  
  31.  
  32. AHachments:                               hrc_ll]emo_INTEL_Secret_oHer_to_e  I_Baradei,Muslim_Br
  33. otherhood-Armyalliance.docx·
  34. Pis print.
  35. From: sbwhoeo. ,--,.---: -;-:-;-;-=-=,.,--_j
  36. Sent: Wednesday, November   23, 2011 06:56 PM
  37. To:H
  38. Subject: H: INTEL  Secret offer  to el Baradei/Muslim Brotherhood-Army  alliance
  39. CONFIDENTIAL
  40. November 23, 2011
  41. RELEASE IN PART
  42. 86
  43. NEAR
  44. DUPLICATE
  45. 86
  46. UNClASSIFIED   U.S. Department of State  Case No. F-2016-07895 Doc No. C06130765 Date: 10/06/2016
  47. I
  48.  
  49. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2016-07895 Doc No. C06130765  Date: 10/06/2016
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  56.  
  57. For: HRC From: Sid
  58. Re: Secret offer to eiBaradei/Muslim Brotherhood-Army alliance
  59.  
  60.  
  61. SOURCE:   Sources with access to the highest levels of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, as well as
  62. Western Intelligence and security services.
  63.  
  64.  
  65. 1.  During a series of meetings over November  21 and November  22, 2011, senior officers of the
  66. Egypt's ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) met discreetly with Mohammed el Baradei ,
  67. the former director of the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (lEA) and candidate
  68. for the Presidency of Egypt.  These discussions centered on the possibility of el Baradei stepping
  69. in as interim Prime Minister in an effort to address  the frustration  of pro­ democracy
  70. demonstrators  currently clashing with Egyptian Army and Securiforces in Cairo's Tahrir Square.  
  71. The SCAF officers believe that eiBaradei's  record of political independence  from the SCAF will
  72. allow him to address the concerns of the demonstrators regarding extended military rule.  In these
  73. discussions el Baradei demanded  assurances that he would not be a puppet  of the SCAF, with the
  74. freedom to name his own cabinet.  The SCAF officers indicated ·that they would have to consider
  75. this, but noted that under any circumstances, the SCAF would remain  the ultimate authoriin Egypt,
  76. pending the conclusion in 2012 of a series of national elections beginning on November  28, 2011.
  77.  
  78.  
  79. 2. (Source Comment:  The leaders of the SCAF believe that eiBaradei  can not only calm the
  80. situation Tahrir Square, but due to his long experience  at the UN he will reassure foreign
  81. businesses regarding political and securi stability in Egypt.  These officers also believe they can
  82. control eiBaradei  if he accepts the position.  One sensitive source noted that eiBaradei  must
  83. certainly know that his position would be managed by the SCAF, but hope his ambition may lead him
  84. to accept  the offer.  Despite  the resignation  of the incumbent  Prime Minister,  Essam  Sharaf,
  85. and his cabinet, el
  86. Baradei has not yet responded  to the proposal, and one SCAF officer speculated that the caution
  87. diplomat was waiting to
  88. see what happens in Tahrir Square over the next week.)
  89.  
  90.  
  91. 3.  During the week of November  21, 2011extremely  sensitive sources  with access  to the
  92. leadership  of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt stated in strict confidence that MB Supreme
  93. Guide Mohamed  Sadie and his advisors maintain a secret and increasingly  clandestine relationship
  94. with senior advisors to Field Marshall Mohammed Hussein Tantawi and
  95. the SCAF, in an effort to establish  a relationship  that will allow them to cooperate and govern
  96. Egypt successfully following the parliamentary  and presidential elections scheduled  for the fall
  97. of 2011.  Despite increasing tensions and political violence as the November  28, 2011
  98. parliamentary elections approach, the highest levels of the MB and SCAF agree on
  99. ·the idea that they represent  the only two truly established political organizations in the
  100. country, and they must work together to gain full advantage  from the newly developing  political structure in Egypt.  The SCAF
  101. continues to pro  de a degree of funding and information to the MB, giving it an advantage  over
  102. competing  secular  and religious  based political movements.   For its part the MB provides
  103. intelligence to the SCAF regarding developments in the smaller and more radical political parties.  
  104.  At the same time, the MB, in coordination with the Egyptian Generallntelligen ce Directorate (GID)
  105. and Military Police forces, is working to reduce  the level of violence in demonstrations
  106. protesting extended military rule.
  107.  
  108.  
  109. 4.  This knowledgeable  individual,  a source with access to the highest levels of the Egyptian
  110. GID, states in confidence that the MB and SCAF are becoming increasingly frustrated with each
  111. other, the MB over what they see as heavy handed missteps by the SCAF that serve only to increase
  112. popular support for more radical political and religious groups.  For its part, the SCAF leadership
  113. is concerned that the MB has been unable to dampen  the level of violence aHached to recent
  114. demonstrations in Tahrir Square.  Prior to November 18, 2011, according to these individuals, MB
  115. operatives  were able to reduce  the level of violence in the pro-democracy demonstrations, even on
  116. those occasions where the Brothers joined ongoing demonstrations that had begun to turn violent. In
  117. the opinion of these sources, the
  118. groups currently demonstrating in Tahrir Square are so diverse and so frustrated that the MB has
  119. been unable to gain any
  120. · kind of control.  In all of these cases the MB maintains public  support for early transfer of
  121. power  to a civilian government. In the opinion of these sources the MB's immediate concern is to
  122. reduce to the level of violence, fearing that if maHers get out of hand Tantawi may feel compelled
  123. to cancel or delay the parliamentary elections.
  124.  
  125.  
  126. 5. (Source Comment:  Speaking in confidence, an individual with access to the leadership of the
  127. SCAF stated that Tantawi and his advisors realize that any delay in the November  28 election date
  128. will result in increased levels of violence throughout the country.  At the same time, reporting
  129. from police and Military Intelligence  sources indicates that the demonstrations will continue,
  130. even in the face of deadly force. For his part Tantawi has informed the MB leadership  that the
  131. Army and security forces will use increasingly aggressive measures to counter the demonstrators,
  132. and he asks that they step up their efforts to reduce  the level of violence  among the
  133. pro-democracy  demonstrators.)
  134.  
  135.  
  136. 6.  According to knowledgeable individuals, Sadie and the other leaders  of the MS are also
  137. extremely concerned over the growing violence in Cairo.   They note that during recent aHacks
  138. against the Coptic Christian  communi!y in Egypt, the MS and  the SCAF  worked discreetly  to
  139. ensure  that the military and security forces did not intervene forcefully to protect the Copts as
  140. they were besieged  by lslamist  groups.   At that time the MS warned  that any serious
  141. intervention would set off violent demonstrations among the many small and often radicaipolitical
  142. groups that formed during the uprising against former President Hosni Mubarak.  In this discussion
  143. Subhi Saleh, a lawyer and former Member of Parliament, who served as the MB delegate  to the March
  144. 2011 constitutional commission,  pointed out that discussions between the MB and the SCAF regarding
  145. the Copts had been relatively simple, because both sides were not concerned about the fate of the
  146. Coptic Christian communiIn   the case of the Tahrir Square demonstrations,  the MS and SCAF cannot
  147. ignore  the scope of the movement.   According a knowledgeable source, Subhi advised Sadie to
  148. remember that Tantawi is first and foremost a military man who will be tempted to react  with a steady  
  149. escalation  of force if the demonstrators do not begin  to disperse.   This source believes  that
  150. Sadie agrees  with this analysis but added that the MB's ability to influence  the young
  151. demonstrators is increasingly limited.
  152.  
  153.  
  154. 7.  (Source Comment   One particularly sensitive individual added that Subhi, speaking on behalf of
  155. Sadie, warned SCAF officers that the MB believes an increasing number of Egyptian Army conscripts
  156. are sympathetic to the Tahrir Square demonstrators.   At the same time, Subhi stated in confidence  
  157. that MB sympathizers associated with the SCAF have advised that the GID is continuing well
  158. established, discreet liaison discussions  with tlie Israeli Massad, providing Tantawi with a
  159. vehicle to address potential areas of conflict with Israel. The Brothers fear that through this
  160. relationship Israel can influence and manipulate the SCAF, particularly regarding support for Hamas
  161. and other Palestinian groups, as well as border securi .)                                          
  162.        
  163.                                                               .
  164. 8. In lhe opinion of these knowledgeable  sources, the MB and the SCAF will continue to work
  165. together secretly in
  166. an effort to establish a stable government  in Egypt.  At that point they can be expected to begin
  167. competing aggressively with each other for final control of the country.  Both bodies are
  168. particularly interested in creating a secure environment throughout the country, looking to
  169. reassure  foreign investors and tourists.  These individuals believe, however, that Egypt will see
  170. repeated episodes of often intense violence as the members of the pro-democracy movement become
  171. increasingly frustrated by the domination of the political process by the established leaders of
  172. the military and the MB.
  173.  
  174.  
  175.  
  176.  
  177. Message Headers:                                                                                    
  178.                                                                                                    
  179.                                    86
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  184.  
  185. From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
  186. To: Oscar Floresc.._,.,,----:-..,.,-=-_J Date: Sun, 27 Nov 201110:34:50 ·0500
  187. Subject:  Fw: H: INTEL. Secret offer to el Baradei/Muslim Brotherhood·Anny
  188. _alliance
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  197. UNClASSIFIED U.S. Department of State  Case No. F-2016-07895 Doc No. C06130765 Date: 10/06/2016
  198. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2016-07895 Doc No. C06130765 Date: 10/06/2016
  199. )
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  201. PR_RIM_MSG_REF_10: PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID: PR_RIM_DELETED_BY _DEVICE: PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_6:
  202. PR_RIM_MSGJTATUS: PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESSAGE_ID:
  203. true
  204. -1299103796
  205. -3 true true
  206. 1
  207. UNCLASSIFIED  U.S. Department of State  Case No. F-2016-07895 Doc No. C06130765 Date: 10/06/2016
  208. 86
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