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  1. ♪ ( Paul Johnson – “Hear the music” ) ♪
  2.  
  3. (Pearse) OK, everybody, and
  4. welcome back
  5.  
  6. to another episode of
  7. Porkins Policy Radio.
  8.  
  9. This is Episode 22.
  10.  
  11. As always, I am your host
  12. Pearse Redmond,
  13.  
  14. and you can find all of my work
  15.  
  16. by going to PorkinsPolicyReview.WordPress.com
  17.  
  18. Well, today we are joined
  19. by a very special guest
  20.  
  21. all the way in Germany.
  22.  
  23. We are joined by Christoph Germann,
  24.  
  25. who is an independent geopolitical
  26. analyst and researcher,
  27.  
  28. as I said, based in Germany.
  29.  
  30. He runs the excellent, excellent blog
  31.  
  32. The New Great Game,,
  33.  
  34. which can be found at ChristophGermann.BlogSpot.com,
  35.  
  36. and this blog focuses on Central Asia,
  37. the Caucasus,
  38.  
  39. regional powers such as
  40. Russia and China.
  41.  
  42. It's just a wealth of information,
  43.  
  44. and anything you need to know
  45. about Central Asia,
  46.  
  47. go to this website.
  48.  
  49. It's absolutely phenomenal.
  50.  
  51. He's a contributor to Boiling Frogs Post,
  52.  
  53. where The New Great Game Round-Up
  54. is published there as well every week,
  55.  
  56. and you can also go to BFP and find
  57. some of Christoph's own writing as well.
  58.  
  59. And as I said, it is such a pleasure to be
  60. talking with you, Christoph, today,
  61.  
  62. and thank you so much for
  63. coming on the show.
  64.  
  65. (Christoph) Great to talk to you.
  66. Thanks for having me.
  67.  
  68. (Pearse) Absolutely. Well, the topic
  69. of Central Asia
  70.  
  71. is something that is extremely important,
  72.  
  73. and unfortunately is not very
  74. well-understood here in the West.
  75.  
  76. The complexities of it,
  77.  
  78. the various players and actors
  79. that are involved in all of this.
  80.  
  81. And there are so many different countries,
  82.  
  83. and so many different things
  84. that are going on right there.
  85.  
  86. But for right now,
  87.  
  88. I think we should probably focus
  89.  
  90. on what's been going on
  91. in Xinjiang in China,
  92.  
  93. and the sort of recent...
  94.  
  95. I don't even know how to
  96. describe it right now,
  97.  
  98. but the situation there is increasingly
  99. more and more murky.
  100.  
  101. We've got a bombing that just took place,
  102.  
  103. I believe on March 30th.
  104.  
  105. Just after Xi Jinping,
  106. the President, left.
  107.  
  108. We had three dead, 79 injured.
  109.  
  110. This was, again, in Xinjiang,
  111.  
  112. which is in the far west of China.
  113.  
  114. And prior to that, we had a massive
  115. knife attack in Kunming,
  116.  
  117. and just as I turned on my computer today,
  118.  
  119. I saw that there was another knife attack,
  120.  
  121. this one in Guangzhou, I believe?
  122.  
  123. And several people were killed there.
  124.  
  125. So obviously there's a lot going on here,
  126.  
  127. but Christoph, perhaps before we
  128. get into what's going on,
  129.  
  130. just set up what is Xinjiang,
  131.  
  132. why is this so important to China,
  133.  
  134. and why is this such an important
  135. geopolitical chess game
  136.  
  137. for the West as well?
  138.  
  139. (Christoph) OK. Xinjiang is China's largest province.
  140.  
  141. It has abundant oil reserves,
  142.  
  143. and it's China's largest
  144. natural gas-producing region.
  145.  
  146. And many of the resources
  147. which reach China
  148.  
  149. transit Xinjiang via pipelines or railway.
  150.  
  151. And therefore the province
  152. is very important
  153.  
  154. for the development of China.
  155.  
  156. It's bordering not only the
  157. Central Asia republics,
  158.  
  159. but also Afghanistan and Pakistan.
  160.  
  161. The stability of Xinjiang is
  162. very important to Beijing,
  163.  
  164. and the problem that Beijing faces
  165.  
  166. is the East Turkestan independence
  167. movement,
  168.  
  169. which is a movement consisting
  170. of several groups,
  171.  
  172. political organizations on the one hand,
  173.  
  174. and terrorist groups on the other hand.
  175.  
  176. And they are trying to establish
  177.  
  178. an independent state
  179.  
  180. in the region now known as Xinjiang,
  181.  
  182. and they want to call it East Turkestan.
  183.  
  184. And they're using the Uyghur
  185. population of Xinjiang,
  186.  
  187. which is a Turkic ethnic group,
  188.  
  189. which is mostly Muslims,
  190.  
  191. and they're trying to use the Uyghurs
  192.  
  193. to destabilize the region.
  194.  
  195. The most important political groups
  196.  
  197. which are supporting this independent
  198. state called East Turkestan
  199.  
  200. are, for example, the
  201. World Uyghur Congress,
  202.  
  203. which is based in Germany
  204.  
  205. and financed by the
  206. National Endowment for Democracy.
  207.  
  208. And after the latest attacks,
  209.  
  210. the organization has been receiving
  211.  
  212. a lot of criticism from the Chinese media, because of a statement
  213.  
  214. which the spokesman of the
  215. World Uyghur Congress made.
  216.  
  217. This was, of course, after
  218. the attack you mentioned,
  219.  
  220. in late April, in Ürümqi,
  221. which is the capital of Xinjiang,
  222.  
  223. where three people died
  224. and 79 were injured
  225.  
  226. by two suspected perpetrators
  227.  
  228. which attacked people with knives
  229.  
  230. and then set off explosions.
  231.  
  232. And today we had another attack,
  233.  
  234. not in Xinjiang, but through
  235. a similar tactic,
  236.  
  237. also with knives.
  238.  
  239. And I think so far we have seen
  240. only reports
  241.  
  242. mentioning six people were injured
  243. but nobody died,
  244.  
  245. and this was the third high-profile attack
  246.  
  247. at a Chinese train station with knives
  248.  
  249. in a little more than two months.
  250.  
  251. The situation there is certainly escalating.
  252.  
  253. (Pearse) But I think it's important to really,
  254. kind of, dissect this,
  255.  
  256. because, again, here, the only time that
  257. we ever hear about the Uyghurs,
  258.  
  259. in America at least,
  260.  
  261. are these infamous handful of Uyghurs
  262. who were rendered to Guantanamo Bay
  263.  
  264. just after 9/11,
  265.  
  266. and much was made about them
  267.  
  268. and how they were innocent,
  269.  
  270. or at least most likely -- that was just
  271. the general impression --
  272.  
  273. and that they were settled
  274. in various places:
  275.  
  276. I think Slovakia, the Maldives,
  277.  
  278. these very bizarre countries
  279.  
  280. that you wouldn't expect to see
  281. an ethnic Uyghur in.
  282.  
  283. But anyway, that's all that we really
  284. hear about the Uyghurs,
  285.  
  286. and, if anything, beyond that,
  287.  
  288. it is like the World Uyghur Congress.
  289.  
  290. It is the... all of these
  291. various organizations.
  292.  
  293. And perhaps we could go in a little bit
  294.  
  295. about the National Endowment
  296. for Democracy,
  297.  
  298. how they're funding these.
  299.  
  300. And we know, we've touched
  301. upon this before
  302.  
  303. in a podcast about Tibet.
  304.  
  305. And I think that, again,
  306. anything with Xinjiang,
  307.  
  308. any sort of Western interest,
  309. we have to look beyond this.
  310.  
  311. Because of course it's very easy
  312. to paint China
  313.  
  314. as this oppressive, horrible,
  315. dictatorial government
  316.  
  317. that is pushing out the Uyghurs.
  318.  
  319. But let's get a little bit beyond that,
  320.  
  321. and let's get into who, what is
  322. the World Uyghur Congress,
  323.  
  324. who is the so-called
  325. Prime Minister-in-Exile,
  326.  
  327. who lives in Virginia, of all places?
  328.  
  329. And what does this really mean?
  330.  
  331. What's actually going on behind
  332. the scenes here?
  333.  
  334. (Christoph) Yes. The World Uyghur
  335. Congress, as I mentioned earlier,
  336.  
  337. is based in Germany, in Munich,
  338.  
  339. in close proximity to the headquarters
  340. of German intelligence,
  341.  
  342. the Bundesnachrichtendienst.
  343. And many other [xx] organizations
  344.  
  345. which have been cultivated by the CIA
  346.  
  347. were also based in Munich,
  348.  
  349. especially during the Cold War.
  350.  
  351. Like, for example,
  352.  
  353. the anti-Bolshevik bloc of nations,
  354.  
  355. which included Organization
  356. of Ukrainian Nationalists,
  357.  
  358. which is, of course, now again
  359. important in the Ukraine.
  360.  
  361. And you had, also, Radio Free Europe
  362. /Radio Liberty
  363.  
  364. was also based in Munich during this time,
  365.  
  366. and World Uyghur Congress
  367. is now based in Munich,
  368.  
  369. and it's financed by the National
  370. Endowment for Democracy
  371.  
  372. to the tune of about, I would say,
  373. $200,000 dollars annually.
  374.  
  375. And its current President is prominent
  376. Uyghur businesswoman
  377.  
  378. Rebiya Kadeer
  379.  
  380. She's living in exile in the United States
  381. since 2005,
  382.  
  383. after six years' imprisonment in China
  384. for leaking state secrets.
  385.  
  386. Kadeer had sent confidential
  387. internal records,
  388.  
  389. so called (xx)
  390.  
  391. to her husband,
  392.  
  393. who was working for Radio Free Asia
  394. and Voice of America at the time,
  395.  
  396. and the United States Government
  397. pressured the Chinese government
  398.  
  399. into letting Kadeer go after she
  400. spent a few years in prison,
  401.  
  402. and she has been living in the
  403. United States ever since,
  404.  
  405. and she has established a
  406. World Uyghur Congress,
  407.  
  408. which is leading the propaganda
  409. campaign
  410.  
  411. against the Chinese government,
  412.  
  413. with support from the mainstream media,
  414.  
  415. and especially CIA propaganda outlets
  416.  
  417. like Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Asia,
  418.  
  419. which is focusing on the Uyghur population, for example.
  420.  
  421. And as you mentioned earlier,
  422.  
  423. the Prime Minister of East Turkestan
  424.  
  425. is not directly connected to
  426. the World Uyghur Congress,
  427.  
  428. he is running the East Turkestan
  429. government-in-exile.
  430.  
  431. This was established in Washington, DC
  432. in 2004
  433.  
  434. and Anwar Yusuf Turani was elected
  435. Prime Minister of East Turkestan,
  436.  
  437. this not-existant state in Xinjiang.
  438.  
  439. And Turani is part of the same Gladio B network,
  440.  
  441. like Fethullah Gulen for example.
  442.  
  443. He was also investigated by the FBI
  444.  
  445. during the Gladio B counterintelligence
  446. investigation
  447.  
  448. which Sibel Edmonds mentioned.
  449.  
  450. (Pearse) Yeah, all of these characters, I think
  451.  
  452. -- as we'll see a little bit later --
  453.  
  454. all very interconnected.
  455.  
  456. And of course, much of Xinjiang
  457. has to do with oil.
  458.  
  459. this is a major hub, as you
  460. were saying, for China,
  461.  
  462. but also the world wants to
  463. get deeply involved in here,
  464.  
  465. and I know that you were recently writing
  466. on The New Great Game
  467.  
  468. about a proposed Russia-India pipeline
  469.  
  470. that would go through Xinjiang.
  471.  
  472. This is, I think, estimated at $30 billion,
  473.  
  474. Now, Christoph, now feasible is this?
  475.  
  476. Because we do hear a lot
  477. about pipeline politics,
  478.  
  479. and no doubt it is very important,
  480.  
  481. but it seems that there's always
  482.  
  483. a brand-new pipeline that is
  484. being talked about.
  485.  
  486. We had the Iran-Pakistan one...
  487.  
  488. there are so many different pipelines
  489.  
  490. that are constantly talked about.
  491.  
  492. How realistic is this?
  493.  
  494. Or is this, sort of, hype
  495. from the oil companies?
  496.  
  497. Is it really going to happen?
  498.  
  499. (Christoph) That's difficult to
  500. say at this point.
  501.  
  502. This is a pipeline project which
  503. has been talked about
  504.  
  505. for almost ten years.
  506.  
  507. It was first discussed in 2005.
  508.  
  509. And like many other pipeline projects...
  510.  
  511. you mentioned, for example,
  512. we had Nabucco,
  513.  
  514. which was a major project,
  515.  
  516. and which won't be implemented, ever;
  517.  
  518. or the TAPI pipeline from
  519. Turkmenistan to India,
  520.  
  521. but with this project,
  522.  
  523. we might see an implementation
  524. due to the New Cold war.
  525.  
  526. Russia is looking to reduce its
  527. dependence on the European market,
  528.  
  529. and wants to export more
  530. oil and gas to Asia.
  531.  
  532. For example, we have, on May 20th,
  533. Putin is going to visit China
  534.  
  535. and will probably sign a
  536. gas deal with China
  537.  
  538. about a major gas contract for Gazprom,
  539.  
  540. and they will build a new pipeline
  541. from Russia to China
  542.  
  543. to export natural gas to China.
  544.  
  545. This is one of the projects
  546. which will be, probably,
  547.  
  548. implemented in the near future,
  549.  
  550. and the same could happen
  551. with this pipeline,
  552.  
  553. the oil pipeline from Russia to India,
  554.  
  555. which, as you mentioned,
  556. would cost $30 billion
  557.  
  558. and would be the most expensive
  559. pipeline in the world,
  560.  
  561. but due to the terrain which the
  562. pipeline route runs through,
  563.  
  564. it's a mostly mountainous terrain,
  565.  
  566. and I think up to 35 percent of the route
  567. runs through mountainous terrain.
  568.  
  569. It will be very expensive,
  570.  
  571. and it won't be completed
  572. before 2020 or 2022.
  573.  
  574. So we have to see if this will happen,
  575.  
  576. but it would of course confirm a trend
  577. we are seeing right now
  578.  
  579. with India's relationship with Russia
  580.  
  581. and after the crisis in Ukraine started,
  582.  
  583. India was one of the first countries
  584.  
  585. which has supported Russia's stance
  586. on the matter
  587.  
  588. and accession of Crimea into
  589. the Russian Federation.
  590.  
  591. India was even more strongly
  592. supporting Russia
  593.  
  594. than China was at the time,
  595.  
  596. because the Chinese government's
  597. very anxious
  598.  
  599. with all these separatist movements,
  600.  
  601. because they don't want to encourage
  602. any separatist activities at home,
  603.  
  604. in Xinjiang, for example.
  605.  
  606. (Pearse) Yeah, and I wonder if this sort of
  607. uptick in violence in Xinjiang
  608.  
  609. is not related to India's getting a little
  610. bit closer with China in that region.
  611.  
  612. We've talked many times before
  613.  
  614. about these sort of low-intensity
  615. conflicts in Africa,
  616.  
  617. and how that relates to China's
  618. economic influence there.
  619.  
  620. So, how much is this new sort of trend
  621. of terror attacks related to this?
  622.  
  623. And on more... sort of, larger level, is...
  624.  
  625. I know, again, it's very easy
  626. to dismiss China
  627.  
  628. as a country that would exploit terrorism,
  629.  
  630. especially in the alternative media,
  631.  
  632. there is this desire to paint
  633. Russia and China
  634.  
  635. as somehow different or better
  636. than the United States,
  637.  
  638. so could you break that down a little bit?
  639.  
  640. Because I know you were talking recently
  641.  
  642. about some of this stuff in Xinjiang,
  643.  
  644. and know you mentioned that
  645. some of the evidence
  646.  
  647. that the Chinese government used
  648.  
  649. to confirm that these were Uyghur
  650. separatist attacks
  651.  
  652. were flags that were found there,
  653. literal flags.
  654.  
  655. So again, this brings up the whole idea
  656.  
  657. of a false-flag.
  658.  
  659. And is that something that China
  660. would use to exploit?
  661.  
  662. Because I'm not sure what to make of that.
  663.  
  664. (Christoph) It's rather difficult to say.
  665.  
  666. First, we have to consider that
  667.  
  668. in the late 1990s,
  669.  
  670. according to Sibel Edmonds,
  671.  
  672. the Gladio B operations in the region
  673.  
  674. were responsible for almost all
  675. terrorist attacks in Xinjiang.
  676.  
  677. It means all terrorist attacks
  678. in Xinjiang at the time
  679.  
  680. were orchestrated from a long distance:
  681.  
  682. from Turkey to Brussels, the United
  683. Kingdom, and the United States,
  684.  
  685. on behalf of these Gladio B operations.
  686.  
  687. But also, the problem the Chinese
  688. are now creating, you could say,
  689.  
  690. is that they are trying to paint
  691. all these attacks
  692.  
  693. as perpetrated by the
  694. same terrorist group,
  695.  
  696. which would be the East Turkestan
  697. Islamic Movement.
  698.  
  699. So they have cited evidence for this
  700.  
  701. by saying,
  702.  
  703. "Yeah, we found here flags from the
  704. East Turkestan Islamic Movement,"
  705.  
  706. for example, after the attack
  707. on Tiananmen Square last year,
  708.  
  709. which received a lot of attention,
  710.  
  711. where a truck was driven into
  712. a crowd in Tiananmen Square.
  713.  
  714. And it was driven by three Uyghurs:
  715. this is a fact.
  716.  
  717. But if these Uyghurs had anything
  718. to do with a terrorist group
  719.  
  720. that were a different matter.
  721.  
  722. And the Chinese government said,
  723.  
  724. "Yeah, we found here flags of
  725. this terrorist group, the ETIM".
  726.  
  727. And they did the same after
  728. the attack in Kunming,
  729.  
  730. the massacre in Kunming,
  731.  
  732. where 29 people were killed, I think.
  733.  
  734. And they had some perpetrators
  735. captured after the attack,
  736.  
  737. and they confessed that they were
  738. trying to travel abroad for jihad,
  739.  
  740. possibly in Syria,
  741.  
  742. so that's where, probably, terrorists,
  743. as you would call them, or separatists.
  744.  
  745. But they didn't get out of China,
  746.  
  747. and so they decided to stage
  748. this attack in Kunming.
  749.  
  750. And the Chinese government blamed it
  751.  
  752. on the East Turkestan
  753. Islamic Movement,
  754.  
  755. again, citing these ominous flags.
  756.  
  757. And this has been used
  758. by the United States
  759.  
  760. to question this terrorism altogether,
  761.  
  762. and say, "You don't have enough evidence
  763. to blame this on terrorists,"
  764.  
  765. "because you have only these flags,"
  766.  
  767. "and also we have all these
  768. mainstream media reports"
  769.  
  770. "based on the World Uyghur Congress"
  771.  
  772. telling us that all these attacks
  773.  
  774. are only consequences of
  775. government repression."
  776.  
  777. Which is, of course, pretty ridiculous
  778. coming from the United States.
  779.  
  780. (Pearse) Yeah, the hypocrisy is almost
  781. too much to handle at times.
  782.  
  783. And I think it's also important to note
  784.  
  785. that the East Turkestan Islamic Movement
  786.  
  787. is not listed on the
  788. State Department's list
  789.  
  790. of known terrorist groups,
  791.  
  792. or they don't categorize it as such.
  793.  
  794. -- (Christoph)Yes, exactly.
  795. -- So, funny that...
  796.  
  797. (Christoph) It's hard to say if this is a real,
  798. coherent group.
  799.  
  800. I would rather describe this as
  801. something simliar to al-Qaeda,
  802.  
  803. which is more about an
  804. underlying ideology
  805.  
  806. as a coherent group.
  807.  
  808. (Pearse) Yeah, definitely.
  809.  
  810. Any of these mysterious
  811. Islamic movements,
  812.  
  813. it's very difficult to kind of narrow down
  814.  
  815. what's really going on there.
  816.  
  817. But perhaps we could shift gears now
  818.  
  819. to another huge part in Central Asia
  820.  
  821. that also, again, as we were talking
  822. about with Gladio B
  823.  
  824. has connections with Xinjiang,
  825.  
  826. and that is what is going on
  827. right now in Azerbaijan.
  828.  
  829. And again, this is a country,
  830.  
  831. much like in the Xinjiang region,
  832.  
  833. which is very little-understood
  834. here in the West,
  835.  
  836. but something that some people
  837. might be familiar with
  838.  
  839. are the ongoing political problems
  840. in Turkey right now
  841.  
  842. between Erdoğan and Gülenists,
  843.  
  844. and Fethullah Gülen is someone who
  845. we've spoken about before,
  846.  
  847. but he is an imam who has set up
  848. a very powerful
  849.  
  850. and well-connected Islamic political
  851. educational movement
  852.  
  853. throughout the world.
  854.  
  855. He's set up schools in
  856. 140 different countries,
  857.  
  858. but he's very entrenched
  859. in Turkish politics,
  860.  
  861. and there is an ongoing fight
  862. between Gülen and Erdoğan.
  863.  
  864. Now, this is also happening a little bit
  865. in Azerbaijan as well,
  866.  
  867. where media has reported that
  868. there is a parallel structure
  869.  
  870. similar to the one in Turkey,
  871.  
  872. in Azerbaijan,
  873.  
  874. in terms of the Gülenists being in power.
  875.  
  876. So, Christoph, perhaps you could
  877. explain this a little bit,
  878.  
  879. and a little bit about Gülen
  880.  
  881. for the listeners as well.
  882.  
  883. (Christoph) Yes, of course.
  884.  
  885. Fethullah Gülen is a Turkish preacher
  886. and former Imam
  887.  
  888. During the 1990s, he was preaching
  889. against the secular government in Turkey,
  890.  
  891. and when the Turkish government
  892. went after him to arrest him,
  893.  
  894. he was brought to the United States
  895.  
  896. and expanded his movement.
  897.  
  898. From his base in the United States
  899.  
  900. he opened, for example,
  901.  
  902. 350 mosques and madrasas in
  903. Central Asia and the Caucasus region,
  904.  
  905. which were then used to provide cover
  906.  
  907. for CIA operations in the region.
  908.  
  909. And now he's the head of a
  910. multi-billion-dollar movement
  911.  
  912. with millions of followers
  913.  
  914. and over 1,000 schools
  915.  
  916. in 150 countries.
  917.  
  918. The base of his movement is in Turkey,
  919.  
  920. but the Gülen movement
  921.  
  922. -- or Hizmet, as it's often called --
  923.  
  924. is also a strong influence in Azerbaijan.
  925.  
  926. And Turkey and Azerbaijan are,
  927. of course, the two countries
  928.  
  929. which served as the main conduits
  930. for the Gladio B operations
  931.  
  932. And the Azerbaijani authorities
  933.  
  934. have always been very supportive
  935.  
  936. of the Gülen movement's activities in Azerbaijan
  937.  
  938. until recently, when the power struggle
  939. in Turkey intensified,
  940.  
  941. and then the Azerbaijani media started
  942. making these reports, as you mentioned,
  943.  
  944. about a same parallel structure
  945. in Azerbaijan.
  946.  
  947. And they have also been reporting,
  948. the media,
  949.  
  950. linking the Gülen movement to the
  951. terrorist recruitment in Azerbaijan,
  952.  
  953. which is a huge problem,
  954.  
  955. because many Azerbaijanis
  956. are going to Syria
  957.  
  958. to fight against the Syrian government
  959.  
  960. on behalf of the NATO/Israel/GCC
  961. campaign.
  962.  
  963. And now the Gülen movement is blamed
  964.  
  965. for the terrorist recruitment
  966.  
  967. by some people in Azerbaijan.
  968.  
  969. That is something which we
  970. haven't seen before.
  971.  
  972. For example, the Grand Mufti
  973. of the Caucasus,
  974.  
  975. quite recently urged
  976. Azerbaijani authorities,
  977.  
  978. to take harsher measures against
  979. Islamic extremists,
  980.  
  981. including Wahhabis and Nurcus
  982.  
  983. And Nurcus
  984.  
  985. is a term often used to describe
  986. the Gülen movement.
  987.  
  988. And then we have also the replacing
  989. of Gülen schools in Azerbaijan
  990.  
  991. under the state-owned
  992. oil and gas corporation
  993.  
  994. of the Azerbaijani republic, SOCAR,
  995.  
  996. to get more control over Gülen schools.
  997.  
  998. And this came after Prime Minister Erdoğan
  999.  
  1000. had shut down several schools
  1001. of Gülen in Turkey
  1002.  
  1003. and had called on other countries
  1004. to follow suit.
  1005.  
  1006. And shortly after Erdoğan
  1007. won his decisive election
  1008.  
  1009. the Turkish local elections,
  1010.  
  1011. he traveled to Azerbaijan,
  1012.  
  1013. to meet with Azerbaijani President
  1014. Ilham Aliyev
  1015.  
  1016. and the main issue was talking about
  1017.  
  1018. Gülen's movement's activities
  1019. in Azerbaijan,
  1020.  
  1021. and shortly before Erdoğan's visit,
  1022.  
  1023. one of the most important figures of
  1024. the Gülen movement in Azerbaijan
  1025.  
  1026. had been exposed and had been sacked.
  1027.  
  1028. He had been working for Aliyev's
  1029. administration since 2007.
  1030.  
  1031. His name was Elnur Aslanov,
  1032.  
  1033. and he was considered to be the patron
  1034.  
  1035. of the Azerbaijani branch
  1036. of Gülen followers.
  1037.  
  1038. And shortly after Erdoğan's visit to Azerbaijan,
  1039.  
  1040. eight other high-ranking members
  1041. of the Gülen movement
  1042.  
  1043. were deported from Azerbaijan,
  1044.  
  1045. and many more followers of Gülen
  1046. were arrested.
  1047.  
  1048. So the Aliyev regime is apparently siding
  1049.  
  1050. with Prime Minister Erdoğan
  1051. and the Turkish government
  1052.  
  1053. against the Gülen movement,
  1054.  
  1055. although both the Gülen movement
  1056. and the Azerbaijani regime
  1057.  
  1058. are backed by the United States,
  1059.  
  1060. and we have seen many
  1061. more reports lately
  1062.  
  1063. about the abuse of human rights
  1064. in Azerbaijan
  1065.  
  1066. by Soros-funded media, for example.
  1067.  
  1068. So I think they are trying to get
  1069. some pressure on Aliyev
  1070.  
  1071. to stop the crackdown on
  1072. the Gülen movement.
  1073.  
  1074. (Pearse) Yeah, I mean, I think that is
  1075. the crux of this whole situation,
  1076.  
  1077. is that as much... the same
  1078. is true in Turkey:
  1079.  
  1080. as much as Erdoğan and the
  1081. Gülenists might be fighting,
  1082.  
  1083. in the end, America runs both of them
  1084.  
  1085. and ultimately holds all the cards here.
  1086.  
  1087. So sometimes I see this a little bit
  1088. as political theater;
  1089.  
  1090. and as you said, we've got the
  1091. Soros-funded NGOs
  1092.  
  1093. criticizing Azerbaijan, where in the end,
  1094.  
  1095. they're all sort of part of the same
  1096. club, the same network.
  1097.  
  1098. So it doesn't really mean as much.
  1099.  
  1100. And of course if Aliyev or Erdoğan,
  1101. both of them,
  1102.  
  1103. could really uncover some huge stuff.
  1104.  
  1105. And we've been talking
  1106. a lot about Gladio B.
  1107.  
  1108. Perhaps we can go back
  1109. a little bit to the 1990s,
  1110.  
  1111. because if either of these guys know
  1112. where the bodies are hidden,
  1113.  
  1114. and they know how deep the Gladio B
  1115. operations run,
  1116.  
  1117. and perhaps you could explain
  1118. a little bit to the listeners
  1119.  
  1120. back in the 1990s, what was going on
  1121.  
  1122. with Baku and the mujahideen
  1123. in Afghanistan,
  1124.  
  1125. how this became a hub.
  1126.  
  1127. (Christoph) Yes, of course: I would say
  1128. both Aliyev and Erdoğan
  1129.  
  1130. know exactly where the bodies
  1131. are buried,
  1132.  
  1133. but they won't disclose this
  1134. to the public.
  1135.  
  1136. Especially Aliyev:
  1137.  
  1138. he's very much dependent on his
  1139. masters in the United States,
  1140.  
  1141. and they have very much material
  1142. on him to blackmail him.
  1143.  
  1144. Sibel Edmonds wrote a
  1145. lengthy article about
  1146.  
  1147. how Azerbaijan was removed from
  1148. Russia's sphere of influence
  1149.  
  1150. in the mid-1990s,
  1151.  
  1152. by, for example, blackmailing
  1153. Ilham Aliyev,
  1154.  
  1155. and this attempted assassination
  1156. attempt on his father.
  1157.  
  1158. You can find article on
  1159. Boiling Frogs Post. It's called:
  1160.  
  1161. "CIA, Obama, George Soros
  1162. Misinformation"
  1163.  
  1164. "Campaign Targets Russia".
  1165.  
  1166. I don't go into much more detail about it,
  1167.  
  1168. but Abdullah Çatlı played
  1169. an important role.
  1170.  
  1171. Abdullat Çatlı was the go-to guy
  1172. for Gladio during this time,
  1173.  
  1174. the original Gladio,
  1175.  
  1176. and he was the one who organized
  1177. the assassination attempt.
  1178.  
  1179. And Çatlı traveled frequently
  1180. to Azerbaijan, but also to Xinjiang
  1181.  
  1182. to orchestrate operations in the region.
  1183.  
  1184. And Azerbaijan played an
  1185. increasingly important role
  1186.  
  1187. after it was removed from Russia's
  1188. sphere of influence,
  1189.  
  1190. but it was also a hub for these kind
  1191. of jihadi operations before.
  1192.  
  1193. This started in the early 1990s,
  1194. and early 1991,
  1195.  
  1196. Richard Secord, who played an
  1197. imporant role in Iran-Contra,
  1198.  
  1199. and two other US Air Force officers,
  1200.  
  1201. traveled to Baku,
  1202.  
  1203. and set up the front company Mega Oil.
  1204.  
  1205. Mega Oil wasn't in the business of finding oil. (laughter)
  1206.  
  1207. But it managed to recruit and arm
  1208. about 2,000 mujahideen,
  1209.  
  1210. and they were flown to Azerbaijan,
  1211. to Baku,
  1212.  
  1213. and then funnelled into the Balkans
  1214. and the Caucasus,
  1215.  
  1216. where they were used against Russia,
  1217. for example.
  1218.  
  1219. But after Azerbaijan came
  1220. into the Western camp,
  1221.  
  1222. these kinds of operations increased,
  1223.  
  1224. and we then, of course, had
  1225. the Gladio B operations,
  1226.  
  1227. where Turkey and Azerbaijan served
  1228. as the main conduits for,
  1229.  
  1230. and therefore Azerbaijan was
  1231. one of the four countries
  1232.  
  1233. exempt from the FBI monitoring
  1234. under FISA.
  1235.  
  1236. So for example, the pre-9/11
  1237. meetings in Azerbaijan
  1238.  
  1239. hadn't, or should not have
  1240. become known.
  1241.  
  1242. But thanks to Sibel Edmonds,
  1243.  
  1244. we know, of course, that there were
  1245. several meetings in Azerbaijan,
  1246.  
  1247. in Baku, in the US Embassy,
  1248.  
  1249. where US military intelligence officials
  1250.  
  1251. met with the likes of Ayman al-Zawahiri,
  1252.  
  1253. current number one of al-Qaeda,
  1254.  
  1255. and former Saudi intelligence chief
  1256. Prince Bandar bin Sultan,
  1257.  
  1258. who was directing [xx] war in Syria
  1259. until recently,
  1260.  
  1261. and Yasin al-Qadi,
  1262.  
  1263. another very interersting character.
  1264.  
  1265. And they... these meetings
  1266. were used to coordinate
  1267.  
  1268. the Gladio B operations in the region.
  1269.  
  1270. So I would imagine that Ilham Aliyev
  1271. knows a lot about these things,
  1272.  
  1273. but he won't say anything.
  1274.  
  1275. (Pearse) Yeah, and I think that that's
  1276. very important to keep in mind,
  1277.  
  1278. that whenever these politicians or
  1279. leaders start getting all upset,
  1280.  
  1281. and they're huffing and puffing
  1282. about this and that,
  1283.  
  1284. at the end of the day, they're gonna keep
  1285. their mouths shut for the most part.
  1286.  
  1287. And we saw that with Mubarak;
  1288.  
  1289. we saw that with any of these people
  1290. who might be kind of on the way out.
  1291.  
  1292. They could, if they... Erdoğan knows
  1293. a lot more than he's willing to say,
  1294.  
  1295. the same, as you said, with Aliyev,
  1296.  
  1297. but they're going to probably
  1298. keep their mouths shut.
  1299.  
  1300. And whenever their purpose is served
  1301. and they are shown the door,
  1302.  
  1303. they will live a comfortable life
  1304. after that.
  1305.  
  1306. And at the end of that, you mentioned
  1307. Yasin al-Qadi,
  1308.  
  1309. and if we could, I'd love to just
  1310. pick apart that a little bit,
  1311.  
  1312. because he is a character who
  1313. I've long been fascinated with,
  1314.  
  1315. and his role in PTech and 9/11,
  1316.  
  1317. and in helping to fund a lot of this stuff
  1318. is very interesting.
  1319.  
  1320. But again, everything is connected:
  1321.  
  1322. Yasin al-Qadi has come up again
  1323. in regard to Erdoğan,
  1324.  
  1325. and we have the Gülenist-supported newspapers like Today's Zaman,
  1326.  
  1327. which has been pushing lots of
  1328. stories about Yasin al-Qadi
  1329.  
  1330. and his connections with Erdoğan.
  1331.  
  1332. So maybe you could explore that
  1333. a little bit.
  1334.  
  1335. (Christoph) Yes, Yasin al-Qadi is a
  1336. very important and interesting character.
  1337.  
  1338. He's a Saudi businessman
  1339. and terrorist financier,
  1340.  
  1341. and Gladio B operator.
  1342.  
  1343. He's a multimillionaire from
  1344. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,
  1345.  
  1346. and he was trained as an
  1347. architect in Chicago.
  1348.  
  1349. And Chicago plays a central role
  1350.  
  1351. in these Gladio B operations,
  1352.  
  1353. and a lot of the operational and
  1354. logistic aspects of Gladio B
  1355.  
  1356. were being conducted from Chicago.
  1357.  
  1358. It's the best city when it comes
  1359. to money laundering,
  1360.  
  1361. because of the huge level of corruption.
  1362.  
  1363. And in the mid-1990s, FBI agents
  1364. from Chicago,
  1365.  
  1366. first and foremost Robert Wright,
  1367.  
  1368. led an FBI investigation called
  1369. "Vulgar Betrayal,"
  1370.  
  1371. the most significant US Government
  1372. investigation
  1373.  
  1374. into terrorist activities, terrorist financing
  1375.  
  1376. before 9/11.
  1377.  
  1378. And the investigation uncovered
  1379. Yasin al-Qadi's involvement
  1380.  
  1381. in financing numerous
  1382. terrorist activities.
  1383.  
  1384. For example, the 1998 Embassy
  1385. Bombings in Africa.
  1386.  
  1387. And since "Vulgar Betrayal,"
  1388. which had led to many actors
  1389.  
  1390. which were later involved in 9/11,
  1391.  
  1392. it was impeded and eventually
  1393. shut down in 2000.
  1394.  
  1395. The United Nations had placed
  1396. sanctions against al-Qadi
  1397.  
  1398. in 1999 and 2000,
  1399.  
  1400. because of his connections to
  1401. Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda,
  1402.  
  1403. and during this time al-Qadi was,
  1404. of course, a frequent figure
  1405.  
  1406. in the pre-9/11 meetings in Azerbaijan,
  1407.  
  1408. along with Prince Bandar and Zawahiri.
  1409.  
  1410. And he was also involved
  1411. in funding PTech,
  1412.  
  1413. which played an important role in 9/11,
  1414.  
  1415. which most of the listeners
  1416. will probably know.
  1417.  
  1418. And if you haven't heard about it,
  1419.  
  1420. I would refer them to Indira Singh...
  1421.  
  1422. (Pearse) Yes.
  1423.  
  1424. (Christoph) Which explained this in pretty stark detail.
  1425.  
  1426. And after 9/11, some of al-Qadi's
  1427. assets were freezed
  1428.  
  1429. because his name had become widely known
  1430.  
  1431. due to his involvement in PTech,
  1432.  
  1433. but he was allowed to escape
  1434. the United States,
  1435.  
  1436. and he ... this was, of course, due to
  1437. his close contacts in Washington.
  1438.  
  1439. For example, before 9/11,
  1440. he had regularly spoken
  1441.  
  1442. of this relationship with Dick Cheney,
  1443. for example. (laughter)
  1444.  
  1445. And after he left the United States,
  1446. he went to Albania...
  1447.  
  1448. -- he has an Albanian passport --
  1449.  
  1450. and he lived there for a few months
  1451.  
  1452. before he went to Turkey.
  1453.  
  1454. United States asked publicly for
  1455. his extradition to save face,
  1456.  
  1457. But it didn't really want his extradition,
  1458.  
  1459. and Turkey played its part
  1460. and refused the request.
  1461.  
  1462. (Pearse) Right. (laughs)
  1463.  
  1464. (Christoph) And at this time,
  1465. al-Qadi was backed
  1466.  
  1467. by Fethullah Gülen and the
  1468. Turkish government.
  1469.  
  1470. And he has several interesting
  1471. business connections in Turkey,
  1472.  
  1473. but not only in Turkey:
  1474. also with other countries,
  1475.  
  1476. especially the countries with
  1477. play an imporant role
  1478.  
  1479. in the Gladio B Operations,
  1480.  
  1481. meaning Azerbaijan, where he has
  1482. several front businesses,
  1483.  
  1484. and he operates also, with complete
  1485. backing and immunity,
  1486.  
  1487. in the United Kingdom,
  1488. where he lived also.
  1489.  
  1490. I think he lived until recently
  1491. in the United Kingdom.
  1492.  
  1493. I'm not sure where he is currently,
  1494.  
  1495. but his businesses extend
  1496. throughout the whole world
  1497.  
  1498. and include banking,
  1499. diamonds, chemicals,
  1500.  
  1501. construction, transportation, real estate.
  1502.  
  1503. One journalist wrote about him:
  1504.  
  1505. "It would be hard to find a more
  1506. strategically-placed individual"
  1507.  
  1508. "to advance the agenda of al-Qaeda
  1509. or any other terrorist organization."
  1510.  
  1511. And in 2012, the United Nations
  1512. Security Council
  1513.  
  1514. removed al-Qadi from the terrorist list,
  1515.  
  1516. (xx) the last terrorist list he was on
  1517.  
  1518. after he had been removed
  1519. from every other terrorist list
  1520.  
  1521. over the last few years.
  1522.  
  1523. And he has a close relationship
  1524.  
  1525. with Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan,
  1526.  
  1527. and people around Erdoğan.
  1528.  
  1529. When the media focused on al-Qadi
  1530. a few years ago in Turkey,
  1531.  
  1532. and his links to terrorism
  1533. were mentioned,
  1534.  
  1535. Erdoğan was one of the first
  1536. to come out and say,
  1537.  
  1538. "I know Yasin. I believe in him
  1539. as I would myself."
  1540.  
  1541. (Pearse) Yes, yes.
  1542.  
  1543. (Christoph) He's a close... Yasin al-Qadi
  1544. is close to Erdoğan's son Bilal,
  1545.  
  1546. and Erdoğan's right-hand man
  1547. Cüneyt Zapsu
  1548.  
  1549. who is also involved in
  1550. these kind of operations.
  1551.  
  1552. He's under(xx) of the Turkish-German
  1553. Business Council.
  1554.  
  1555. This is the German equivalent to
  1556. the American-Turkish Council.
  1557.  
  1558. It's involved in drug trafficking,
  1559.  
  1560. transferring drugs from Turkey
  1561. to Belgium and the Netherlands.
  1562.  
  1563. Yasin al-Qadi was frequently in Turkey
  1564.  
  1565. to meet with Erdoğan or his sun Bilal,
  1566.  
  1567. and other business associates.
  1568.  
  1569. And during his visits, for example,
  1570. in 2012,
  1571.  
  1572. he was escorted by Erdoğan's
  1573. security guards
  1574.  
  1575. despite being banned
  1576. from entering Turkey,
  1577.  
  1578. he made at least five visits to Turkey
  1579. during this time
  1580.  
  1581. where he'd always meet
  1582. with Hakan Fidan,
  1583.  
  1584. the head of Turkish intelligence,
  1585.  
  1586. who came recently in the spotlight
  1587.  
  1588. because of the false flag tape which
  1589. was leaked by the Gülen movement,
  1590.  
  1591. and after one of these meetings
  1592. in early 2013,
  1593.  
  1594. al-Qadi was involved in a
  1595. car accident in Turkey,
  1596.  
  1597. which was reminiscent of the
  1598. Susurluk car accident in 1996.
  1599.  
  1600. al-Qadi and one of his business
  1601. associates, Usama Qutb,
  1602.  
  1603. who is also linked to financing
  1604. terrorism and the like,
  1605.  
  1606. and İbrahim Yıldız, the police lieutenant
  1607. from Erdoğan's guards office,
  1608.  
  1609. had an accident in Turkey.
  1610.  
  1611. And when they crashed,
  1612.  
  1613. a close friend of Yasin al-Qadi,
  1614. a Turkish billionaire,
  1615.  
  1616. Mustafa Latif Topbas, who is a
  1617. close friend of them
  1618.  
  1619. and had been financing al-Qadi's
  1620. operations to some extent,
  1621.  
  1622. immediately reported the accident to
  1623. Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan,
  1624.  
  1625. and Erdoğan asked his son Bilal
  1626. to go to the hospital
  1627.  
  1628. and check that Qadi's OK.
  1629.  
  1630. (Pearse) Yeah.
  1631.  
  1632. (Christoph) But this close relationship
  1633. has been a problem recently
  1634.  
  1635. for the Turkish Prime Minister,
  1636.  
  1637. because the Gülen movement,
  1638.  
  1639. which supported al-Qadi and
  1640. his operations earlier,
  1641.  
  1642. is now trying to portray him
  1643. as the al-Qaeda financier,
  1644.  
  1645. and use his relationship to Erdoğan
  1646.  
  1647. to target the Turkish Prime Minister.
  1648.  
  1649. This is, of course, pretty ridiculous.
  1650.  
  1651. As you mentioned earlier, the reports
  1652. by Today's Zaman, for example.
  1653.  
  1654. (Pearse) Yeah, again: anyone
  1655. who wants to really dismiss
  1656.  
  1657. this whole myth of al-Qaeda
  1658. and what's really going on:
  1659.  
  1660. just check in to Yasin al-Qadi,
  1661.  
  1662. because his various connections
  1663.  
  1664. are beyond strange and bizarre;
  1665.  
  1666. and the way this guy has just
  1667. floated in and out
  1668.  
  1669. of every kind of situation,
  1670. and countries, and whatnot,
  1671.  
  1672. is startling.
  1673.  
  1674. And really just destroys this
  1675. whole myth of al-Qaeda.
  1676.  
  1677. But going back a little bit to Azerbaijan
  1678. in particular right now:
  1679.  
  1680. I recently also saw on your Twitter
  1681. account, again, just this morning
  1682.  
  1683. a little bit more about the jihadis
  1684. that are going in there.
  1685.  
  1686. How do you...
  1687.  
  1688. it seems as if Azerbaijan is one of
  1689. the main central Asian countries
  1690.  
  1691. that is either shipping jihadis into Syria,
  1692.  
  1693. or is at least allowing them
  1694. to go into Syria.
  1695.  
  1696. How do you see this playing
  1697. out in the near future?
  1698.  
  1699. Obviously, the conflict in Syria
  1700. is probably just starting up.
  1701.  
  1702. But in the meantime, we've got an influx
  1703. of mujahideen going somewhere:
  1704.  
  1705. eventually, they do come back.
  1706.  
  1707. And I know that Azerbaijan
  1708. has been a little bit hesitant.
  1709.  
  1710. As you said, we also had the
  1711. Grand Mufti in Central Asia
  1712.  
  1713. saying that they need to take
  1714. a tougher stance on this.
  1715.  
  1716. But how do you see that happening
  1717. in the near future
  1718.  
  1719. or a few years down the line?
  1720.  
  1721. (Christoph) Yes, of course:
  1722.  
  1723. Azerbaijani regime is very afraid
  1724.  
  1725. of jihadis returning to Azerbaijan
  1726.  
  1727. to conduct jihad in Azerbaijan.
  1728.  
  1729. This would be terrifying for them.
  1730.  
  1731. And we had to... one was arrested
  1732. when he returned to Baku
  1733.  
  1734. immediately after he left his flight,
  1735. he was arrested.
  1736.  
  1737. And they are trying to send him
  1738. to Syria or to Russia,
  1739.  
  1740. but of course not allow any terrorist
  1741. activities in Azerbaijan.
  1742.  
  1743. The same applies, of course,
  1744. to other countries,
  1745.  
  1746. Turkey has a huge problem
  1747. of this recently.
  1748.  
  1749. In Azerbaijan, there are some places
  1750. which...
  1751.  
  1752. as I mentioned, a report which
  1753. was published two days ago
  1754.  
  1755. about Azerbaijani city of Sumqayit,
  1756.  
  1757. which appears to be a hotbed
  1758. of Islamic extremism.
  1759.  
  1760. And recently, some people
  1761. have mentioned
  1762.  
  1763. the increasing influence of
  1764. Wahhabism in the country,
  1765.  
  1766. and also of the Gülen movement,
  1767.  
  1768. and has cited this as reasons
  1769.  
  1770. for the influx of Azerbaijanis,
  1771. fighters, into Syria.
  1772.  
  1773. There's a strong connection between
  1774. Azerbaijan and Saudi Arabia.
  1775.  
  1776. Both countries have close relations,
  1777. as we saw earlier,
  1778.  
  1779. when Prince Bandar visited Azerbaijan
  1780. frequently in the late 1990s
  1781.  
  1782. for these infamous pre-9/11 meetings;
  1783.  
  1784. and more recently, a Croatian
  1785. businessman and arms dealer,
  1786.  
  1787. a leading figure in the
  1788. Balkan arms trade,
  1789.  
  1790. has relocated his corporations to Baku,
  1791.  
  1792. and he's supplying weapons to the
  1793. so-called Syrian rebels via Jordan.
  1794.  
  1795. And this operation, these operations,
  1796.  
  1797. are understood to be taking place
  1798.  
  1799. with the financial support and protection
  1800.  
  1801. of several intelligence agencies
  1802. in the Middle East,
  1803.  
  1804. probably Saudi intelligence,
  1805.  
  1806. because his relocation to Baku
  1807. happened at a time
  1808.  
  1809. when Prince Bandar was in charge
  1810. of the jihadi mercenaries in Syria.
  1811.  
  1812. So you have seen many Azerbaijanis,
  1813. fighters leaving for Syria.
  1814.  
  1815. There were reports in local media
  1816. of anywhere from 200 to 400,
  1817.  
  1818. with more than 100 killed in action
  1819. in Azerbaijan,
  1820.  
  1821. media published videos showing
  1822. Azerbaijani fighters in Syria
  1823.  
  1824. on a regular basis,
  1825.  
  1826. And this is a huge topic in Azerbaijan.
  1827.  
  1828. As I mentioned earlier, the
  1829. Azerbaijani government
  1830.  
  1831. encourages these activities abroad,
  1832. but not at home.
  1833.  
  1834. And they have also encouraged
  1835. these activities before
  1836.  
  1837. in Russia, for example, in Dagestan,
  1838.  
  1839. which is bordering Azerbaijan.
  1840.  
  1841. (Pearse) Yes. And another, I think,
  1842. development that is going on there,
  1843.  
  1844. that you pointed on in
  1845. The New Great Game,
  1846.  
  1847. was, we've got the influx of
  1848. Azerbaijani jihadis into Syria,
  1849.  
  1850. but we've also got an exit
  1851. of ethnic Armenians
  1852.  
  1853. who are fleeing Syria.
  1854.  
  1855. And in the... Kassab, I believe,
  1856. is the name of the town
  1857.  
  1858. that is ethnically Armenian.
  1859.  
  1860. And they are coming back,
  1861.  
  1862. and they are being resettled
  1863.  
  1864. in a region that is called
  1865.  
  1866. -- if I can try and pronounce this right --
  1867.  
  1868. Nagorno-Karabakh;
  1869.  
  1870. and this is a breakaway region
  1871. that was part of Azerbaijan,
  1872.  
  1873. but is now ostensibly under
  1874. Armenian control.
  1875.  
  1876. So I don't know if you want
  1877. to talk about that,
  1878.  
  1879. but I found that to be another
  1880. very interesting
  1881.  
  1882. sort of development that is going on.
  1883.  
  1884. And Armenia and Azerbaijan
  1885. fought a pretty nasty war
  1886.  
  1887. over this little tiny sliver of land.
  1888.  
  1889. And it seems that this could intensify
  1890.  
  1891. in the next couple of years.
  1892.  
  1893. (Christoph) Yes, this is
  1894. a constant threat,
  1895.  
  1896. a constant point of tensions,
  1897.  
  1898. between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
  1899.  
  1900. The two countries are arch-enemies
  1901.  
  1902. because of the conflict about
  1903. Nagorno-Karabakh,
  1904.  
  1905. which... as you mentioned, the nasty war.
  1906.  
  1907. and Azerbaijan is strongly opposed
  1908.  
  1909. to settling these refugees
  1910. from Syria in the region,
  1911.  
  1912. because they are saying
  1913. this is just a way
  1914.  
  1915. to consolidate Armenia's influence
  1916. over the region,
  1917.  
  1918. and to claim that this is their land.
  1919.  
  1920. And this conflict is often mentioned
  1921.  
  1922. in the Azerbaijani and Armenian media,
  1923.  
  1924. although it is receiving little
  1925. attention anywhere else,
  1926.  
  1927. but there are, almost on a daily basis,
  1928. reports
  1929.  
  1930. about shootings at the border
  1931. and at the contested areas.
  1932.  
  1933. And you could say a war between
  1934. these two countries
  1935.  
  1936. about Nagorno-Karabakh
  1937.  
  1938. could happen at any time.
  1939.  
  1940. And last year,
  1941.  
  1942. there was...
  1943.  
  1944. there were questions raised about
  1945. Azerbaijan's relationship with Russia,
  1946.  
  1947. because the country has been buying
  1948. a lot of Russian weapons.
  1949.  
  1950. And the Armenians were concerned
  1951.  
  1952. about Russia's role in the
  1953. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
  1954.  
  1955. until one Russian commander of...
  1956.  
  1957. -- the Russians have a
  1958. base in Armenia --
  1959.  
  1960. He came out and said,
  1961.  
  1962. if there was...
  1963.  
  1964. a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan
  1965. would happen in the region,
  1966.  
  1967. Russian would back Armenia in this war.
  1968.  
  1969. And this caused a lot of concern
  1970.  
  1971. in Azerbaijan, of course.
  1972.  
  1973. (Pearse) Yeah. And again, as we said,
  1974.  
  1975. just so many different interconnections
  1976.  
  1977. with all of these various players
  1978. and countries and everything.
  1979.  
  1980. And surely we could talk, probably,
  1981.  
  1982. for hours about Central Asia
  1983.  
  1984. and the Caucasus and all these things.
  1985.  
  1986. I barely just scratched the surface.
  1987.  
  1988. Christoph, is there anything else
  1989. that you want to mention,
  1990.  
  1991. either on Xinjiang, Azerbaijan,
  1992. or anything else?
  1993.  
  1994. What should we be looking out for
  1995. in the near future,
  1996.  
  1997. in terms of developments in Central Asia
  1998. and the Caucasus?
  1999.  
  2000. (Christoph) Yes, I think the
  2001. situation in Xinjiang
  2002.  
  2003. is very, very interesting right now.
  2004.  
  2005. I can't predict where it's heading,
  2006.  
  2007. because we have seen a lot of
  2008. attacks outside of Xinjiang,
  2009.  
  2010. primarily at railway stations.
  2011.  
  2012. And I think this is probably an attempt
  2013.  
  2014. to attract international attention
  2015. to the Uyghur problem
  2016.  
  2017. And the mainstream media is,
  2018. of course,
  2019.  
  2020. portraying this as government oppression,
  2021.  
  2022. and the Uyghurs are just striking back
  2023.  
  2024. (xx).
  2025.  
  2026. And I think this could be used for an
  2027. increasing propaganda campaign
  2028.  
  2029. against the Chinese government.
  2030.  
  2031. So we have to keep a close eye on that.
  2032.  
  2033. (Pearse) And of course, very funny
  2034.  
  2035. that here in America, in the West,
  2036.  
  2037. we can understand that, "Oh, this --
  2038. brutal policies by the Chinese --"
  2039.  
  2040. "is resulting in terrorism."
  2041.  
  2042. But of course, when we
  2043. bomb entire nations,
  2044.  
  2045. and they tend to get angry,
  2046.  
  2047. we're so surprised that that
  2048. could ever happen.
  2049.  
  2050. But as I said before,
  2051.  
  2052. there's so much with Central Asia,
  2053.  
  2054. and this is a very fluid situation there,
  2055.  
  2056. constantly with lots of new information.
  2057.  
  2058. And one of the best way to really
  2059. keep up to date with this
  2060.  
  2061. is to check out your blog.
  2062.  
  2063. So Christoph, please tell everybody
  2064.  
  2065. where they can go to read your work,
  2066.  
  2067. and just describe the kind of work
  2068.  
  2069. that you're doing at
  2070. The New Great Game.
  2071.  
  2072. (Christoph) Yes, of course.
  2073.  
  2074. I publish a weekly round-up
  2075.  
  2076. about developments in Central Asia
  2077. and the Caucasus region
  2078.  
  2079. on my blog at
  2080. ChristophGermann.BlogSpot.com
  2081.  
  2082. which you can also find
  2083. at Boiling Frogs Post,
  2084.  
  2085. where I contribute to regularly.
  2086.  
  2087. I publish other articles
  2088.  
  2089. about, for example,
  2090.  
  2091. the situation in Turkey,
  2092.  
  2093. or NATO's new Cold War,
  2094.  
  2095. which has been running into a few
  2096. problems in Germany recently.
  2097.  
  2098. And you can find these articles
  2099. all on Boiling Frogs Post.
  2100.  
  2101. (Pearse) Excellent. And I really can't
  2102. stress enough how great your writing is,
  2103.  
  2104. and how informative it is.
  2105.  
  2106. And it's just amazing to be speaking
  2107. with you today.
  2108.  
  2109. So, Christoph: thank you so much
  2110. for joining us on this show,
  2111.  
  2112. and I hope that we can talk again
  2113. very soon.
  2114.  
  2115. (Christoph) Thank you very much.
  2116. I really enjoyed it.
  2117.  
  2118. (Pearse) OK, everybody:
  2119.  
  2120. so, that about does it for our conversation
  2121.  
  2122. with Christoph Germann of
  2123. The New Great Game
  2124.  
  2125. -- which, of course, you can find
  2126.  
  2127. by going to
  2128. ChristophGermann.BlogSpot.com
  2129.  
  2130. Well, I hope you have enjoyed
  2131. this podcast,
  2132.  
  2133. and if you have,
  2134.  
  2135. then please do visit
  2136. PorkinsPolicyReview.WordPress.com.
  2137.  
  2138. And there, of course,
  2139.  
  2140. you can follow us through the RSS feed,
  2141.  
  2142. through email updates,
  2143.  
  2144. always follow us on Twitter
  2145. @porkinspolicy,
  2146.  
  2147. and also please do subscribe
  2148. to my YouTube channel,
  2149.  
  2150. which is
  2151. YouTube.com/1138porkins
  2152.  
  2153. And again, if you like the work
  2154. that we do here,
  2155.  
  2156. please spread the word.
  2157.  
  2158. Email it to a friend; put it up
  2159. on your social media.
  2160.  
  2161. I've been getting lots of
  2162. really great feedback,
  2163.  
  2164. some really, really very sweet
  2165. emails from listeners,
  2166.  
  2167. and I really do appreciate that as well.
  2168.  
  2169. So please, feel free to email me as well.
  2170.  
  2171. Well, I'm gonna leave it there,
  2172.  
  2173. and I will be talking to you very soon.
  2174.  
  2175. ♪ ( The Whispers – “And the
  2176. Beat Goes On” ) ♪
  2177.  
  2178. [Subtitled by "Adjuvant"]
  2179. [CC-BY 4.0]
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