Oscar Beltran de Otalora wikileaks torrent

"56619","3/15/2006 13:18","06MADRID644","Embassy Madrid","UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY","","VZCZCXRO9454
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INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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SIPDIS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, SP
SUBJECT: BASQUE JOURNALIST DOUBTS ETA READY FOR PEACE DEAL


1. (SBU) Oscar Beltran, a journalist for the Basque Region
daily \"El Correo\" and a former International Visitor grantee,
recently shared his observations regarding rumors of an
upcoming truce declaration by ETA.  He has covered ETA for
several years and reports extensively on the group.  Beltran
expects ETA to announce a truce soon, most likely on Good
Friday in an effort to draw parallels between the Northern
Ireland peace process and the situation in the Basque Region,
part of ETA\'s \"long-held dream of internationalizing the
conflict.\"  He said the rumors of a possible truce obscured
increasing tensions in the region, which he ascribed to a
sense among ETA members that they have recovered from Spanish
and French police actions in 2004 and 2005 that decimated
their leadership and can therefore resume the political and
military offensive.

2. (SBU) Beltran expressed concern that well-intentioned
Spanish government officials may believe that they are making
progress with ETA as a result of negotiations with the
organization\'s political wing, while in reality the ETA
military wing remained fully in control.  \"The ETA military
leadership doesn\'t care about Arnaldo Otegi (leader of ETA
political front group \"Batasuna\"), they operate according to
their own logic and make the decisions without consulting the
political leadership.\"  In his view, ETA\'s military wing did
not have a realistic appreciation of what was achievable and
believed it was operating from a relatively strong position,
an attitude that was not conducive to good faith negotiations.

3. (SBU) Beltran noted with concern that ETA carried out bomb
attacks to mark the March 9 general strike called by Batasuna
to protest the deaths in prison of two ETA members (one by
suicide, the other from natural causes).  He said that
although the strike was a total failure, the bombings were
worrisome since ETA had not previously joined in direct
support of political actions, such as the strike.  (NOTE:
Spanish officials were set to charge Otegi and other Batasuna
leaders with inciting the March 9 violence, but the examining
judge delayed a March 13 hearing due to Otegi\'s poor health.
END NOTE).

4. (SBU) According to Beltran, ETA has significantly ramped
up the extortion of Basque businesses to collect
\"revolutionary taxes.\"  He attributed this to both an
increased need on the part of the organization and to the
recovery of ETA\'s \"extortion wing\" from the 2004 arrest of
Maria Soledad Iparragirre, who was in charge of collecting
these funds.  Beltran said ETA was making up for lost time
and had probably run out of \"legitimate\" funds diverted from
public coffers when Batasuna was a legal political entity,
necessitating a crash program to generate funds for ETA and
Batasuna activities.  He was struck by the fact that ETA was
using strong-arm tactics against even businesses known to be
sympathetic to radical nationalists, sending company owners
pictures of their children as a clear threat of violence.

5. (SBU) Beltran said the Basque Socialist Party felt
tremendously confident that it could displace the Basque
moderate PNV as the largest party in the region.  He
described the PNV as riven by ideological and personal
struggles and clearly losing ground to the Socialists on one
side and to the radical nationalists on the other.  As for
the Popular Party, once the second power in the Basque
Region, Beltran said the party was in disarray and still
reeling from its fall to third place in the Basque Parliament
in the March 2005 elections, behind the PNV and the
Socialists.  He said, however, that observers of the Basque
political scene were more focused on the 2007 municipal
elections than on regional-level politics, since Batasuna
stands to make significant gains at the local level if an ETA
truce leads to the legalization of the group by the Zapatero
government.  Almost certainly, the PP would wage a pitched
political campaign to keep Batasuna out of the political
process, setting the stage for a major legal and legislative
battle at the national level.

AGUIRRE
"







"
"79833","9/27/2006 10:18","06MADRID2435","Embassy Madrid","CONFIDENTIAL","06MADRID1709|06MADRID2073","VZCZCXRO1661
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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN: SIX MONTHS ON, ETA\'S \"PERMANENT CEASEFIRE\"
ON SHAKY GROUND

REF: A. MADRID 1709
     B. MADRID 2073

MADRID 00002435  001.2 OF 002


Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

1. (C)  Summary:  Six months after the Basque separatist
group ETA announced a permanent ceasefire, many inside Spain
are now doubting its permanence.  Street violence and
vandalism continue in the Basque region and alleged ETA
supporters released a statement over the weekend claiming
that the group would refuse to disarm until the region gains
its independence.  Spanish newspapers have reported in recent
days that ETA might reconsider its ceasefire agreement if the
government fails to make significant progress toward the
legalization of its outlawed political wing, and Interior
Minister Rubalcaba announced earlier this week that talks
between the government and ETA had been postponed
indefinitely.  Post sees the potential for a hiatus, if not a
complete breakdown, in the GOS peace process with ETA as each
side remains intransigent, and forging some type of middle
ground does not at the moment appear possible.  End Summary.

2. (U)  The Basque region was hit with its fourth straight
weekend of \"kale borroka,\" or street violence perpetrated by
young ETA supporters, and recent acts of vandalism have
included attacks on a radio station in Pamplona and a nearby
headquarters of the Basque Socialist Party.  Adding to the
tension, on September 23 three masked figures claiming to
represent ETA read a statement saying that ETA\'s fight was,
\"not past, but rather present and future.\"  If genuine, the
message would be the most threatening released by ETA since
their announcement of a permanent ceasefire in March.
President Zapatero responded a day after the statement\'s
release that his government would hold firm in the management
of the peace process, but Interior Minister Rubalcaba
informed parliament on September 26 that a meeting with ETA
planned for this month would be postponed indefinitely.
Spanish newspapers have recently reported that ETA might
reconsider its ceasefire agreement if the government fails to
make significant advances toward the legalization of its
outlawed political wing Batasuna, and rumors are circulating
that ETA may take some sort of action, be it an ultimatum or
an outright return to violence intended to force the
government\'s hand, around the middle of October.

3. (C)  Post sees the potential over the coming weeks for a
hiatus, if not a complete breakdown, in the GOS peace process
with ETA.  As reported in REFTEL A, President Zapatero
announced in late June that he would launch direct
negotiations with ETA--as the group had in his opinion
followed through with its declaration of a permanent cease
fire--and that Minister Rubalcaba would brief political
leaders in September regarding the progress of the
negotiations.  Talks have not materialized, primarily because
the two sides have yet to find common ground on the \"Law of
Political Parties\" that was enacted in 2002 by the two main
Spanish political parties to ban ETA front group Batasuna
from the political process for its refusal to renounce
terrorism.  Zapatero insisted that Batasuna change its name
and party statutes in order to meet legal requirements, steps
that Batasuna continues to reject.  ETA radicals and Batasuna
political operatives have expressed frustration lately with
the lack of progress they believe the government has made in
addressing their concerns and charge that the government is
trying to indefinitely delay political negotiations involving
the legal status of Batasuna.  Batasuna insists that it has
kept its side of the bargain by respecting the ceasefire, and
criticizes the government for continuing to arrest and try
suspected ETA members while not lifting the ban on political
participation by Batasuna.

4. (U)  The government for its part is holding firm to what
it believes was agreed upon previously, namely that only a
Batasuna that respected democratic procedures would be
allowed to participate in the peace process, and that ETA
would limit itself in negotiations to its disarmament and
dissolution.  Zapatero insists that the government does not
intend to modify its firm stance on ending ETA violence, and
that the rules of the game are clear.  GOS officials remain
publicly optimistic that there is room for agreement and have
urged Spaniards to be patient as the process moves along and
not focus too heavily on the continuing street violence.  Our
contacts indicate that privately, however, officials in
Zapatero\'s government no longer believe that these messages
are meant for internal ETA consumption and are wondering
whether ETA hard-liners have won the day.

5. (C)  Poloff spoke with Basque journalist Oscar Beltran,
who covers ETA terrorism for the leading regional daily \"El
Correo,\" to request his assessment of recent tensions in the

MADRID 00002435  002.2 OF 002


peace process.  Beltran opined that legalization of Batasuna
under another name was no longer sufficient for radical
Basque nationalists, as their objective is now the complete
revocation of the \"Law of Political Parties.\"  Beltran said
that the Zapatero government had the votes to overturn the
law, but that the political price of doing so would be
extremely high.  Zapatero\'s options were therefore limited to
either an all-out conflict with ETA, or the ceding to key ETA
demands on political recognition and territorial ambitions.
Beltran described rumors currently circulating in the Basque
region that ETA would take \"important measures\" during
October that would leave clear whether or not the group
intended to hold to the ceasefire and peace process.  He said
ETA was not fully in control of its base, and gave as an
example the inability of the leadership to halt a hunger
strike by imprisoned ETA terrorist Juan de Chaos that could
inflame die-hard ETA fighters and undermine the group\'s
willingness to negotiate.

6. (C) Comment:  As the ceasefire negotiations enter their
seventh month, misperceptions, diverging tactics, ambiguities
and distortions threaten to unravel the fledgling process.
Each side has been boxed into a corner by its own actions
and/or pressure from opposing forces, and the middle ground
does not at the moment appear sustainable.  Batasuna leaders
sold the peace process to its more radical supporters as the
only viable entry ramp into political negotiations, but as
the government stalls on the question of legalization, these
supporters are becoming increasingly disenchanted and
agitated and are hinting at reconsidering a return to
violence.  The Zapatero government\'s maneuvering room has
been limited by constant attacks and criticism from ETA
victims organizations and the opposition Popular Party (which
has been vehemently opposed to Zapatero\'s ETA peace
initiative at a time when ETA was practically eliminated by
cooperation between Spanish and French police forces).  It is
important to note that ETA supporters have been saying for
over a month that the ceasefire declaration has been in
crisis (as reported in REFTEL B), and they have threatened to
respond in the past.  What is unclear, however, is just if
and when ETA\'s patience with the peace process will
eventually run out.

********************************************* ****************
CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS IN THE ETA PEACE PROCESS (2006)

March 22 - ETA declares \"Permanent Ceasefire\"

March 23 - Ceasefire takes effect

May 21 - Zapatero says he will announce in June the start of
direct talks with ETA

June 26 - Zapatero announces that he will begin \"long and
difficult\" peace talks with ETA

August 18 - ETA claims peace process \"immersed in an obvious
state of crisis\"

September 23 - Alleged ETA gunmen announce refusal to disarm
until the region gains its independence
********************************************* *****************
AGUIRRE
"





"91533","1/4/2007 16:37","07MADRID17","Embassy Madrid","CONFIDENTIAL","06MADRID3111|07MADRID1|07MADRID6","VZCZCXRO9083
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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2017
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, SP
SUBJECT: ETA ATTACK: FIRST DEATH CONFIRMED, ZAPATERO FACING
POLITICAL FALLOUT

REF: A. MADRID 6
     B. MADRID 1
     C. 2006 MADRID 3111

MADRID 00000017  001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Charge d\'Affaires Hugo Llorens, reason 1.4 (D)

1. (C) Summary. Authorities confirmed late on January 3 that
they had located the body of Ecuadoran immigrant Carlos
Alonso Palate in the wreckage of the airport parking garage
bombed by ETA on December 30.  Alonso Palate becomes the
818th victim of ETA terrorism and the first ETA victim since
May 2003.  Sources close to President Zapatero said that he
would appear before Parliament to discuss his \"new
anti-terrorism strategy,\" as Popular Party (PP) leader
Mariano Rajoy continued his criticism of Zapatero\'s handling
of the attack and other PP figures speculated that Zapatero
wants to maintain a dialogue with ETA.  An ETA expert told us
that ETA may have forshadowed the attack to Socialist Party
(PSOE) negotiators in a secret meeting in Ankara, but the
PSOE representatives may have misinterpreted the warning.
ETA\'s normally disciplined political front group Batasuna
appeared to be in disarray, with one of its leaders saying
only ETA could explain the rationale behind the attack, while
another insisted that there was no proof that ETA had
undertaken the bombing and that the Basque peace process
remained viable.  A Batasuna leader said the attack had been
\"completely unexpected,\" but failed to condemn the bombing.
End Summary.

//AUTHORITIES LOCATE BODY//

2. (U) Police located the body of Carlos Alonso Palate in his
vehicle, which had been on the lowest level of the five-floor
garage destroyed by an ETA bomb on December 30.  Crews
continue to search for the body of Diego Armando Estacio, a
second Ecuadoran immigrant who was in a separate section of
the garage.  There are now reports of a possible third
victim, an Uruguayan traveler whose family has reported
missing.  Alonso Palate is the 818th victim of ETA violence
and the first since May 2003, when ETA killed two police
officers in Navarra.  President Zapatero met with the
families of both victims, following criticism by one of the
families that he had not contacted them for days following
the attacks.  Zapatero also faced criticism for not having
visited the site of the bombing, which is expected to cost
over $40 million to rebuild, making it the most costly ETA
attack ever in economic terms.

3. (U) The Government took several steps to tighten security
in anticipation of possible additional attacks.  The Ministry
of Defense ordered increased security for all of its units
and the Basque Regional Government and the national
Government increased personal protection for politicians
considered to be under threat by ETA.  According to one press
report, there is concern that ETA has shifted its technology,
making current countermeasures against explosive devices less
effective.

//ZAPATERO TO SPEAK BEFORE PARLIAMENT//

4. (U) PP leader Mariano Rajoy harshly criticized the
Zapatero Government\'s response to the ETA attack, saying
Spain was \"like a boat without a helmsman.\"  Rajoy, who had
joined Madrid PP leaders in making an early visit to the site
of the bombing, called upon Zapatero to address Parliament to
explain his counter-terrorism policies.  Socialist (PSOE)
leaders countered that the PP should demonstrate unity with
the Government rather than criticizing Zapatero, pointing out
that former President Aznar had not appeared before
Parliament when ETA broke its truce with his Government in
1999, nor had the PSOE asked him to.  Nevertheless, just
hours later, sources close to the Zapatero Government told
Spanish media that he would appear in Parliament \"once all of
the facts were available\" to discuss his strategy.  Socialist
politicians discussed the possibility of establishing a new
counter-terrorism pact to broaden its current pact with the
PP.  Rajoy argued that the PSOE had broken the PP-PSOE pact
by engaging in talks with ETA and called on the PSOE to
re-implement the existing pact rather than open it to
renegotiation simply to include other political parties.

MADRID 00000017  002.2 OF 003


Some PP leaders expressed concern that Zapatero intends to
maintain contacts with ETA in spite of the bombing.
Meanwhile, the moderate Basque Nationalist Party (PNV)
reconfirmed its support for the Government\'s decision to
suspend negotiations with ETA.

//ETA MAY HAVE WARNED PSOE//

5. (C) Oscar Beltran (strictly protect), a journalist in the
Basque Region who has covered ETA for over 20 years, told
Poloff that ETA negotiator Josu Ternera may have warned PSOE
negotiators in mid-December that ETA would carry out
\"actions,\" but that these actions were not intended to
disrupt the peace process.  News reports indicate that
Ternera, accompanied by his son and by ETA member Ainhoa
Ozaeta, held a secret meeting in Ankara on December 15 with
Basque PSOE leader Jesus Eguiguren and two unnamed PSOE
figures, during which the participants made no progress, but
also did not break off negotiations.  Beltran speculated that
the PSOE negotiators in this meeting may have misinterpreted
Ternera\'s warning to mean that ETA would escalate vandalism
and street violence, as it had done in October and November.
Beltran said that police sources in Paris indicated that the
French authorities had expected an ETA attack before the end
of the year, fears that evidently were not shared by the
Spanish leadership.

//ETA SUPPORTERS AT A LOSS//

6. (U) Batasuna leaders emphasized their position that the
Basque peace process was \"more important than ever\" and
continued to accuse the Government of failing to move forward
on the negotiations and even insisted that there was no proof
that ETA had carried out the bombing.  But there were also
signs that internal Batasuna discipline was fraying.  Asked
to characterize the airport bombing, Batasuna spokesman
Pernando Barrena said that it was \"up to ETA to interpret
(the attack)....  we have no doubt that what ETA has to say
to the Basque people about this incident will be very
important.\"  Another Batasuna leader, Joseba Alvarez,
acknowledged that the bombing had created serious problems
and said that \"nobody had expected\" the bombing.  There were
numerous reports that Batasuna leader Arnaldo Otegi had
wanted to be more critical of the attack in his December 30
press conference, but had been overruled by more hard line
members of the organization.

7. (C) Beltran, the Basque journalist, said that there was
tremendous confusion within ETA\'s support groups because ETA
had yet to issue an official declaration regarding the
bombing.  He said that ETA had been expected to issue a
declaration on January 2, but since that failed to take place
Batasuna and other ETA supporters were simply falling back on
standard extremist rhetoric.  Beltran said that the December
30 bombing had severely demoralized Basque society and
politicians across the political spectrum, who are bracing
for further ETA violence.

8. (U) In a signal that Spanish judicial authorities intend
to ramp up pressure on ETA\'s political front groups,
prosecutors denied a request by Otegi to attend a conference
in Germany and asked police to prepare a report on the
actions of Batasuna leaders on the day of the bombing.  Otegi
is free on bond, but faces large fines and 15 months in
prison for slandering King Juan Carlos and for leading a 2003
ceremony to honor dead ETA fighter Manuel Benaran Ordenana.
In addition to Batasuna, six other ETA front groups face
judicial action on terrorism-related charges.

//COMMENT//

9. (C) If it were confirmed that ETA negotiator Josu Ternera
had issued any kind of warning to Socialist negotiators prior
to the attack, it could prove a political bombshell for
Zapatero.  The PP would be able to point to this incident as
proof that the Zapatero Government was either incompetent in
handling the negotiations with ETA or weak in not immediately
pushing back on the ETA threat.  Even if this particular
incident does not gain traction in the media, Zapatero\'s
uncertain handling of the aftermath of the explosion has

MADRID 00000017  003.2 OF 003



already damaged his standing.  The PSOE is now focused on
organizing a response that both demonstrates toughness and
neutralizes PP criticism.  The need for Zapatero to make a
strong and credible presentation before Parliament appears to
be increasingly necessary if the PSOE is to stem the
bleeding.  A possible approach may be for the PSOE to seek to
create a new \"anti-terrorism pact\" that includes smaller
leftist and nationalist parties, particularly if the PP opts
out of a pact for reasons that appear petty or partisan.  The
PP feels vindicated in its frequent warnings to Zapatero not
to engage ETA and is in no hurry help Zapatero achieve a
graceful solution to his political predicament.

LLORENS
"









"179861","11/24/2008 17:34","08MADRID1231","Embassy Madrid","SECRET","06MADRID3111|06MADRID766|07MADRID1078","VZCZCXRO8366
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SIPDIS

PASS TO EUR/WE\'S ELAINE SAMSON AND STACIE ZERDECKI, S/CT\'S
MARC NORMAN, NSC\'S ELIZABETH FARR, AND NCTC\'S PAUL SAUPE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2033
TAGS: PINR, PINS, PREL, PTER, SP, FR
SUBJECT: SPAIN: ASSESSING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RECENT ETA
ARRESTS IN FRANCE

REF: A. 2007 MADRID 1078
     B. 2006 MADRID 3111
     C. 2006 MADRID 766

Classified By: DCM Arnold A. Chacon for Reasons 1.4 (b), (c) and (d)

 1. (C) SUMMARY:  French police and Spanish Guardia Civil
(GC) paramilitary forces conducted a joint raid in Cauterets,
France early on the morning of November 17 in which they
arrested ETA members Mikel Garikoitz Aspiazu Rubina (aka
\"Txeroki\" in Basque or \"Cherokee\" in English) and Leire Lopez
Zurutuza.  ETA,s military chief since 2003, Txeroki
represents the new generation of radical young hardliners who
in recent years have supplanted the old guard and taken
control over ETA.  Roughly 48 hours after Txeroki\'s capture,
Spanish Interior Minister Alfredo PerezRubalcaba publicly
assessed that not only was Txeroki the military chief, but he
had also assumed some political responsibilities following
the May 2008 detention of Francisco Javier Lopez Pena, aka
Thierry, which gave Txeroki control of overall strategy, thus
making him the number one man in ETA.  This cable provides an
assessment of the arrests, identifies the roles of the
detained, examines the capabilities of what\'s left of ETA,
and discusses the political reaction in Spain.  END SUMMARY.

2. (SBU) Media coverage most often describes Txeroki, age 35,
as the one who reportedly gave the order to bomb the parking
garage at Madrid\'s Barajas airport (See Reftel A) in December
2006 that effectively ended the \"permanent unilateral
ceasefire\" that ETA had declared nine months earlier (See
Reftel C).  According to recently arrested ETA members\'
comments in the media, Txeroki claimed to have been the
trigger-man in the shooting deaths of two GC officials in
Capbreton, France in December 2007.  The Spanish media
describe the arrests as a severe blow to ETA and note that,
since ETA officially declared an end to its ceasefire in June
2007 (See Reftel B), Spanish and French security forces have
detained the group\'s military, political, and logistical
senior leadership.

3. (S) Embassy Madrid POLOFF and Information Officer
discussed the arrests on November 21 with longtime ETA
watcher Jesus Maria Zuloaga (Please Protect), the Deputy
Director of conservative-leaning, Madrid-based La Razon
newspaper.  A native of the Basque Country, Zuloaga is a
well-connected source on ETA with contacts at the highest
levels of the GC and Spanish National Police.  He also says
he considers Interior Minister Rubalcaba a personal friend.
He is the author of a book on ETA and countless articles on
the group over 22 years in journalism.  He has been an ETA
target for years, including the intended victim of a letter
bomb in 2000.  In self-imposed exile from the Basque Country,
he lives in hiding and says he undergoes extensive security
precautions in his day-to-day life, including changing
residences every two years, not owning a car, and never
allowing his picture to be published.  POLOFF also discussed
the fallout of the arrests on November 24 with Oscar Beltran
Otalora (Please Protect), political editor of the
Bilbao-based newspaper, El Correo, and likewise an expert on
ETA issues.

//The Arrests//

4. (S) Press reports note that French police and the GC found
two handguns, two laptops, several memory sticks, maps and
just 3,000 euros in cash, which media reports attribute to
ETA,s recent difficulties in fund-raising.  Zuloaga says
that the information in the memory sticks will be where
Spanish security services will find the most valuable
information, because ETA has instituted a policy of keeping
PCs \"clean.\"  He added that ETA policy is to protect its pen
drives with Pretty Good Privacy (\"PGP\") encryption software,
Virus Script and Ultra Wipe, all of which are available for
free.  As of November 22, Spanish media reported that French
security forces had not yet broken the \"almost impenetrable\"
encryption and noted that in some cases in the past, ETA\'s
encrypted communications have never been broken.

//Txeroki\'s Role Within ETA//

5. (S) When the arrests were announced on November 17, media
outlets described Txeroki as the leader of ETA\'s military
wing.  He had held that role since 2003 and was a known

MADRID 00001231  002 OF 003


quantity to Spanish security forces.  Beltran told POLOFF
that Txeroki had acquired a myth-like status within ETA,
which made his detention a tough symbolic blow to the group.
Rubalcaba publicly called him \"probably the most wanted
objective\" of the Spanish security forces.  However, by
November 19, the Minister had re-evaluated his assessment of
Txeroki\'s role and told state-owned radio network Cadena SER
that Txeroki was in fact in charge of policy and strategy as
well.  Txeroki had assumed some political responsibilities
falling the May 2008 detention of his rival, Francisco Javier
Lopez Pena, aka Thierry, who had been ETA\'s political leader
and the chief negotiator with the Zapatero government during
peace talks in 2006, which Txeroki reportedly bitterly
opposed.  After Thierry\'s arrest, Txeroki reportedly
suspended the power of ETA\'s Executive Committee, the group\'s
highest authority, and assumed some of Thierry\'s duties,
which effectively gave him control of overall strategy and
made him the number one man in ETA.  In Rubalcaba\'s words,
Txeroki was \"in charge of everything, the political apparatus
and the so-called military apparatus.  The one who ordered
the killings was Txeroki.\"

//Txeroki\'s Successor As Military Chief//

6. (S) Even with Rubalcaba\'s re-evaluation of Txeroki\'s role,
Zuloaga cautioned Embassy officials not to magnify the
importance of his detention.  Spanish press reports suggest
that ETA\'s new military chief is Aitzol Iriondo Yarza,
Txeroki\'s 31-year-old deputy who is an information technology
expert with extensive experience in explosives and internal
security.  Zuloaga opined that Iriondo -- whose primary nom
de guerre is \"Gurbitz\" but who is also known as \"Gurbita,\"
\"Asier\" and \"Barbas\" -- is more dangerous, radical, and
methodical than Txeroki and will probably do a better job as
military chief than Txeroki did.  Zuloaga noted that, under
Txeroki\'s leadership of the military wing, ETA claimed \"only\"
seven lives in five years, which is lower than most previous
five-year periods.

//Lopez Zurutuza\'s Role Within ETA//

7. (S) Most Spanish media reports have depicted Lopez
Zurutuza as Txeroki\'s girlfriend.  However, Zuloaga says this
is incorrect and tells Embassy officials his sources inform
him that she is in fact the commander of ETA\'s \"legal cells,\"
i.e., those ETA members who have 9-5 jobs on weekdays but who
are then operational -- including in carrying out attacks --
on weekends.

//Txeroki\'s Alleged Plans//

8. (S) The Spanish media report that Txeroki had planned to
purge ETA\'s ranks of Thierry loyalists, whom he considered
dissidents and not trustworthy.  The media also report that
Txeroki\'s appointment planner has a series of meetings
scheduled until January 2009 in which he intended to create a
cell composed of French Basques, who would be able to transit
the border more easily and stay in hotels in Spain without
arousing suspicion.  Zuloaga assesses that Txeroki and Lopez
Zurutuza were meeting for the purpose of implementing attacks
in furtherance of ETA\'s November 5, 2008 communique, which
Zuloaga described as conveying the most violent threats he
had ever seen in his 22 years of monitoring ETA\'s activities.
 That communique and others have threatened to carry out
deadly attacks to force the GOS back to the negotiating
table.

//ETA\'s Status and Reprisals//

9. (S) Some Spanish media suggest that some 40 members of ETA
may be identified by authorities and compromised following
the arrest of Txeroki, while others suggest that ETA\'s
dedicated, core group numbers just 100 members (a number
which Beltran suggests is accurate).  Post-arrest Spanish
media reports suggest that ETA has only three operational
cells left, although Zuloaga suggests there are \"at least
four or five.\"  Meanwhile, Rubalcaba asserted on November 18
that among both ETA prisoners in Spanish jails and the
radical Basque nationalists who support violence there is
increasingly \"a sense of growing weakness\" and an almost
unstoppable process of deterioration in their support and
abilities, which he predicted will cause hardline leaders to
attempt a reprisal as a show of strength and to bolster

MADRID 00001231  003 OF 003


morale.


10. (S) Rubalcaba has announced that Spanish security forces
are on maximum alert for prospective reprisals from ETA,
which already has detonated a bomb in suburban Bilbao on the
night of November 20, which did not kill anyone but caused
extensive damage to a TV relay tower that is used by police
and security forces for radio signals.  Beltran remarked that
the ETA attack was a very disproportionate and weak response
in comparison to the blow that they had received.
Nevertheless, he suggested that ETA could execute a stronger
attack at any moment.  Zuloaga concurred, opining that if ETA
can carry out reprisals, they will.  However, he noted that
the border between Spain and France is \"practically closed\"
and that at the moment it would be difficult to carry out
ETA\'s usual modus operandi of bringing a stolen car from
France into Spain to carry out a car-bomb attack.  He
assessed that ETA members are \"fanatics, but not foolish,\"
suggesting that the group will instead wait one or two months
to regroup and then seek to carry out a more substantive
attack.

//The Political Reaction//

11. (C) President Zapatero on November 17 publicly declared
the arrest a \"serious\" and \"decisive\" blow to ETA,s
organization and capacity and a \"huge advance\" in the fight
against ETA.  He phoned French President Sarkozy to thank him
for French counter-terrorism (CT) efforts and the two leaders
agreed to convene in Madrid an extraordinary summit on CT
measures in the coming weeks.  The French Ambassador to Spain
has publicly suggested the first quarter of 2009 is a likely
timeframe.  Spanish media reports also suggest that National
Court Chief Prosecutor Javier Zaragoza will travel to France
in early December to secure a temporary extradition of
Txeroki to Spain, where he faces 22 charges for a range of
illegal activities.  Meanwhile, Rubalcaba has publicly
discarded any possibility that the GOS would renew
negotiations with ETA.  However, Beltran suggests that if
things keep going the way they are for ETA, the terrorist
group may in the long term be forced to ask for negotiations
from a position of weakness.

12. (C) COMMENT:  As Zapatero and Rubalcaba have indicated,
the arrest of Txeroki is a landmark event in the GOS\'s more
than 40-year battle against ETA.  He is now in jail in Paris,
where authorities have been unable to match the ballistics of
the guns found in his possession with those used in the
Capbreton murders.  French officials have nevertheless
charged him with leading a group with the objective of
preparing a terrorist attack (ie., the Capbreton murders).
The arrest also marks an important political victory for the
Zapatero administration, especially when viewed of the
context of other senior level ETA arrests since the end of
ETA\'s ceasefire - three in 18 months and two in the last six
months.  The GOS post-Barajas crackdown on ETA is putting the
squeeze on the group, whose internal divisions over the past
several years are now being portrayed as a true split between
the Txeroki and Thierry factions.

13. (S) COMMENT (CONTINUED):  Zuloaga is right to caution
against over-emphasizing the importance of Txeroki\'s arrest
and Rubalcaba prudently states that the end of ETA is not at
hand, but the arrests are indeed significant and will cause
further damage to the dramatically weakened terrorist group,
which appears to reeling from a series of problems which
include an internal schism on the direction the group should
take, declining social support in the Basque Country which
has led to decreased fundraising from their extortion
activity, low morale and paranoia ht the group has been
infiltrated by the security services, frequent arrests that
have created a larger (and politically divided) prison
population than ever before, and an increasingly younger,
more inexperienced leadership at the helm of the group.  In
the long term, Beltran suggests that the disenchanted ETA
prison population -- which includes numerous former leaders
of the group, whose views apparently carry weight -- is \"one
of the keys\" to an eventual resolution of the conflict.  He
says the GOS has been engaging them to secure their support
for an end to the violence.  END COMMENT.
AGUIRRE
"






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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000272

SIPDIS

PASS TO EUR/WE\'S ELAINE SAMSON AND STACIE ZERDECKI,
S/CT\'S MARC NORMAN AND JASON BLAZAKIS,
NSC\'S ELIZABETH FARR,
NCTC\'S PAUL SAUPE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2024
TAGS: PINR, PINS, PREL, PTER, SP, FR
SUBJECT: SPAIN: EXPERTS SEE WEAKENING OF BASQUE TERRORIST
GROUP ETA

REF: A. MADRID 139
     B. 08 MADRID 1231
     C. 08 MADRID 1055
     D. 08 MADRID 1306

MADRID 00000272  001.2 OF 003


Classified By: ADCM William H. Duncan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT:  Embassy Madrid recently pulsed
the opinions on Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) watchers
for their thoughts on the relative strength or weakness of
the group.  The consensus is that ETA is dramatically
weakened but retains the ability to kill and do significant
damage.  One Embassy contact provided to POLOFF and the
Embassy\'s Information Officer an alleged ETA internal
strategy document, which apparently came into his posession
from his contacts in the Spanish security services.  Post
cannot independently verify the authenticity of the file,
which our contact described as the ETA equivalent of the
documents retrieved from senior FARC official Raul Reyes\' PC
in 2008.  The document, which appears to have been finalized
in December 2008, is highly critical of the group\'s actions
in recent years and maps out a strategy for the way forward,
in which it makes clear that the group intends to fight to
the end and is not seeking \"an honorable exit.\"  Post will
pouch a copy of the document to interested parties.  END
SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

//The Judicial Perspective//

2. (C) On February 24, POLOFF and LEGAT spoke at length with
Magistrate Javier Gomez Bermudez, the President of the
National Court\'s Criminal Chamber, who has overseen several
high-profile ETA trials, including those for the 1995
assassination of the center-right Popular Party\'s regional
leader in the Basque Country, Gregorio Ordonez, and for the
1997 assassination of kidnapped Basque town councilman Miguel
Angel Blanco.  POLOFF and LEGAT asked for the magistrate\'s
thoughts on the relative strength or weakness of ETA and how
he envisioned ETA\'s armed conflict with the GOS would end.
He replied that, for all intents and purposes, ETA already is
over.  He couched his comments by adding that there will
always be some thug who will be willing to commit violence
and invoke some vaguely political rationale, but by and large
ETA has been defeated.  He further remarked that the number
of deaths ETA causes on an annual basis is nowhere near the
early 1980s, when the rate was one every three days.  He
agreed with the notion that ETA receives a disproportionate
amount of press and political discussion compared to its
current threat capability.  The amount of violence that
exists today - three or four deaths per year - will never go
away, he claimed.

//ETA\'s Capabilities, Weaknesses Discussed//

3. (C) The Ministry of Interior, however, treats the threat
posted by ETA as very real.  In a January 15 meeting with an
adviser to the Deputy Minister, POLOFF offered the Embassy\'s
congratulations for the Ministry\'s back-to-back arrests of
two of the terrorist groups\' military leaders in late 2008
(See REFTEL A).  The adviser described the arrests as
important, but added, \"we\'re not done yet,\" meaning ETA is
still active.  This senior Guardia Civil officer indicated
that he talks with his French counter-terrorism counterparts
about ETA \"every day.\"  He also remarked the latest
generation of ETA leaders has less political acumen, a notion
with which Oscar Beltran Otalora, political editor of the
Bilbao-based newspaper, El Correo, and an expert on ETA,
agrees.  Most of the ETA operatives today are very violent
and radicalized, but inexperienced and without any education,
Beltran claimed.  In a February 6 phone call with POLOFF,
Beltran likened ETA\'s current weakness to the last days of
World War II, when Hitler\'s army comprised \"child soldiers
and old men.\"  An entire generation of Etarras is in Spanish
and French jails, he noted.  COMMENT:  As reported in REFTEL
A, there were a record number of ETA members in jail as of
the end of 2008. END COMMENT.

4. (C) Jesus Maria Zuloaga, the Deputy Director of
conservative-leaning, La Razon newspaper whose bio and

MADRID 00000272  002.2 OF 003


credentials are provided in REFTEL B, discussed ETA\'s status
with POLOFF and Embassy Madrid\'s Information Officer on March
2.  Zuloaga said he still considers ETA to be \"very
dangerous.\"  Following the February 9 car bomb attack in
Madrid (See REFTEL A) and keeping in mind the
still-unexplained case of a Madrid gardener who was briefly
kidnapped in September 2008 in an apparent case of mistaken
identity (See REFTEL C), Zuloaga was adamant that ETA has
reconstituted a cell of some kind in the Spanish capital.  He
acknowledged that the official GOS stance is that this is not
the case, but Zuloaga claims this is a \"politically
convenient\" position, because if the Ministry of Interior did
publicly state that there was probably an ETA cell in Madrid,
then there would be immense pressure on the Ministry to
neutralize it.  Zuloaga said he has spoken with security
services personnel who interviewed the gardener, whose
reputation is that of a stable person who does not abuse
drugs or alcohol, but who now refuses to have his picture
taken by the press and has had to quit his job because he is
terrified and traumatized.  Zuloaga suggested that ETA may
have been attempting something similar to its kidnapping of
Miguel Angel Blanco, who was executed after ETA\'s demands for
a ransom were not met.

5. (C) Zuloaga also opined on the recent turnover in ETA\'s
leadership.  He commented that he doubts that Jurdan
Martitegi is actually the new military chief, as the press
has reported (See REFTEL A), and suggests that Martitegi is
probably just one of the most high-profile militants still at
large whose name the GOS security forces know.  Zuloaga also
speculated on the December 9 arrest of Aitzol Iriondo, the
short-lived successor to ETA\'s long-time military chief,
Txeroki.  Zuloaga said that the Spanish security forces only
had a very small handful of officers monitoring the location
where Iriondo was arrested.  They could not believe that he
arrived at a location whose security had been compromised
following Txeroki\'s November 17 arrest, which Zuloaga cites
as evidence that Iriondol was either really dumb, was
sacrificed by rivals within ETA who set him up, or that there
is a mole in ETA who tipped off the security services about
his attendance at the meeting.

//Alleged ETA File Conducts \"Ferocious\" Self Criticim, Offers
Strategy For Future//

6. (S) Zuloaga (Please Protect) also provided Embassy
officials a 69-page document which he claimed was an internal
strategy document recently prepared by ETA, although Post
cannot independently verify its authenticity.  Zuloaga
described the file as the ETA equivalent of the documents
retrieved from senior FARC official Raul Reyes\' PC in 2008.
The document - which is written in Castilian Spanish rather
than Basque/Euskera - is part critical reflection on recent
ETA missteps, part rant against capitalism, globalization and
perceived oppression by the Spanish and French states, and
part political platform for the way forward in building the
type of society ETA would like to see in Euskal Herria, which
would be comprised of the Basque and Navarra regions in Spain
and the three historic Basque provinces in France:  Lapurdi,
Naforroa Beheree, and Zuberoa.  Zuloaga claims the file
likely was drafted over the course of the 18-month period
from the end of ETA\'s \"permanent unilateral ceasefire\" in
June 2007 until December 2008.  Zuloaga suggested the
document was the result of a \"virtual meeting\" of ETA\'s
Executive Committee, its highest ruling body, conducted by
passing the file to one another via thumb drives.  He
described its anonymous primary author as an intellectual who
is very experienced within ETA, a mature individual perhaps
in his 40s or 50s, and someone who thinks he knows fairly
well the policies of Spain\'s Socialist President Jose Luis
Rodriguez Zapatero and the Socialist party\'s Basque wing.

7. (S) For longtime ETA watcher Zuloaga, the document is
notable for conveying a much more pragmatic rather than
fanatical tone, while at the same time leaving no doubt that
the group intends to fight to the end and is not seeking \"an
honorable exit.\"  In Zuloaga\'s words, the document undertakes
a \"ferocious\" self-criticism of ETA\'s recent past  and in
particular calls for a \"profound reflection\" on the

MADRID 00000272  003.2 OF 003

limitations of the group\'s recent military operations.  In
particular, the author adamantly asserts that ETA should have
undertaken a greater number of attacks in the run-up to its
March 2006 declaration of a \"permanent unilateral ceasefire,\"
which the author claims would have then enabled the group to
negotiate with the GOS from a position of strength.  The
document also condemns the group for its lack of preparation
to develop a clear negotiating position during the ceasefire
and for not doing more to build public support for its stance
before, during, and after ceasefire.

8. (S) The document acknowledges that ETA currently is
weakened by Spanish and French security services, which are
putting considerable pressure on the group and limiting
recruiting efforts.  The author therefore suggests changing
the group\'s modus operandi to make itself less predictable.
The document suggests the group ought to conduct attacks
where and when security services least expect them and also
urges the group to constantly change its security measures,
in an effort to better protect its leadership.  (COMMENT:
Zuloaga pointed to the document as the explanation as to why
ETA did not conduct more high-profile or more destructive
attacks in the run-up to the March 1 election in the Basque
Region:  it was too predictable.  END COMMENT.)  The author
of the document recommends that the group at present
concentrate on raising money, while conducting \"selective,
discriminating, and prudent\" attacks in which it seeks to
cause \"the greatest possible damage to the enemy\'s interests\"
while making every effort to avoid collateral victims, in an
effort not to lose whatever public support the group has.
The document - which identifies 12 different categories of
approved targets - urges that the group lay low and bide its
time until a more politically convenient time to step up its
attacks.  The document states, \"It is an accepted reality
that the keys to the resolution of the conflict will be
political and will be done through a negotiation process.\"
However, it concludes by stating that \"ceasefires and truces
- whether partial or general - will only be established,
managed and maintained with the objective of reaching
inflection points and political jumping-off points within the
process of liberation.\"

//Comment//

9.(C) Anything is possible, but we think a return to the
negotiating table by Zapatero is unlikely, at least for the
foreseeable future.  The lure of negotiating with ETA for a
Spanish President is to be the one who delivers a definitive
end to a 40-year old problem that has baffled all previous
governments.  The risk, as Zapatero found to his cost, is
that ETA is brutal, untrustworthy, and has an unrealistic
agenda.  Many Spaniards say it has become little more than an
extortion racket.  Zapatero was much-criticized by his
political opponents during the 2008 general election for his
policy of negotiating with ETA, particularly when he was
forced to admit negotiations had continued after the 2006
Barajas bombing and after he had told the public that
negotiations had ceased.  He would be unwise to risk further
political damage, particularly as he carries the weight of
the financial crisis on his shoulders and faces a number of
regional elections between now and the next general election
in 2012.
CHACON
"



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SIPDIS

EUR/WE FOR ELAINE SAMSON AND STACIE ZERDECKI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, SP, PINS
SUBJECT: SPAIN: HISTORIC TRANSFER OF POWER IN BASQUE REGION

REF: A. MADRID 139
     B. OSC EUP20090429950021

MADRID 00000499  001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission William H. Duncan for rea
sons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT.  On May 5 Socialist Patxi Lopez
was sworn in as the first-ever, lehendakari, or regional
governor of the Basque Region, who is not a Basque
nationalist, an historic milestone for the troubled region.
His inauguration followed the March 1 regional election (See
REF A), in which the Socialists won enough votes in the
Basque Country to form a minority government supported by the
conservative Partido Popular.  Outgoing lehendakari
(1999-2009) Juan Jose Ibarretxe, whose Basque Nationalist
Party (PNV) had ruled the region for the past 29 years and
has struggled to accept being ousted from power, bitterly
announced his retirement from politics on the day of Lopez\'s
inauguration.  Lopez\'s inauguration - which the Basque
terrorist group ETA had plotted to attack shortly before its
latest military chief was arrested - presents a poisoned
chalice to Spanish President Zapatero in national politics.
The PNV has withdrawn its support in the Spanish Parliament,
where it had been a frequent ally to Zapatero\'s minority
government, which is viewed as increasingly weak and lacking
in parliamentary allies just as the global economic crisis is
reaching new depths and unemployment in Spain has topped 17
percent.  The next electoral test for the Zapatero government
will be the June 7 elections for the European Parliament,
which several polls suggest will be marked by low turnout in
Spain and declining enthusiasm for the Socialists.  END
SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

2. (U) In regional elections held March 1, the incumbent PNV
won the most seats and the most votes but failed to secure
the backing of one or more parties to give it a working
majority.  The vote represented the first serious challenge
to the Basque nationalists\' hold on power since the first
post-Franco regional elections were held in 1980.  The PNV
also had held the lehendakari post since it was created in
1936, although the lehendakaris spent roughly 40 years in
exile during the Franco regime.  Ibarretxe and the PNV had
until now relied on the support of radical separatist parties
to form a parliamentary majority.  In this year\'s election,
however, the radical parties banned by the Spanish Supreme
Court for their ties to the Basque terrorist group ETA were
barred from running.  An estimated 9.2% of votes cast were
blank ballots in protest. The Basque Socialists (PSE) won
enough seats to form a working majority with the conservative
Partido Popular (PP).

3.  (SBU)  Basque final election results confirmed
non-nationalist voters (50.45%) outnumbered nationalist
voters (48.29%) for the first time, meaning a majority in the
regional parliament will have the votes to counteract any
nationalist or separatist measures.  The conservative PP,
though it lost two seats, did better than had been predicted.
 Lower voter participation relative to 2005, combined with
the banning of any ETA-linked parties, hurt the PNV.

4.  (U) 2009 Basque Election Results, 65.88% Participation,
75 Seats Total
PNV          38.56 percent          30 seats
PSE          30.71                  25 seats
PP           14.09                  13 seats
Aralar        6.05                   4 seats
EA            3.68                    1 seat
EB-IU         3.51                    1 seat
UPyD          2.14                    1 seat

5.  (SBU)  On March 5, the PSE rejected the PNV\'s proposal of
a \"stability agreement\" offering either a coalition
government or a legislative agreement that would have allowed
Ibarretxe to remain his office.  After more than three weeks
of intense negotiations, the PSE and PP established a formal
compromise to elect Lopez as lehendakari.  The PP has
promised not to censure Lopez as long as the PSE follows
their negotiated agreement, entitled \"Basis for Democratic
Change in Service of Basque Society.\"  The primary points
include:  the fight against ETA; measures to revive the
economy, including new job creation; stabilizing the system
of Basque self-governance; bilingual rights and continued
implementation of the two official languages (Euskera and
Castilian); and the prohibition of terrorist propaganda on
the public radio-television network.  Side agreements with
other parties are not discarded as long as they do not alter
the PSE-PP accord.


MADRID 00000499  002.2 OF 003


6. (C) There is an atmosphere of optimism and goodwill within
Spain and the Basque Region that change is imminent that will
help make the Basque Region \"normal.\"  El Pais, Spain\'s
left-of-center flagship daily, on May 19 published an
editorial suggesting that the new lehendakari\'s challenge is
to implement the reforms he campaigned on, while not
antagonizing the moderate Basque nationalists within the PNV
and elsewhere, and maintaining the support of the PP.
However, Prof. Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca, an ETA and electoral
politics expert at the Juan March Institute, privately told
POLOFF on May 20 this task is nearly \"impossible,\" and he
opted not to speculate how long the PSE government would
last.  He highlights that the PSE\'s minority government holds
fewer seats than the primary opposition party, the PNV, and
also suggested that if the PSE\'s accord with the PP falls
apart, the PSE\'s next likely ally would be with the moderates
among the PNV, so the PP has an interest in not pushing the
PSE too hard.  Meanwhile, Basque journalist and long-time ETA
observer Oscar Beltran predicted to POLOFF the PSE minority
government would last at least two years.

//Key Players in Basque Politics Following the March 1
Election//

7. (C) Francisco \"Patxi\" Javier Lopez Alvarez was born in
1959 in the Basque town of Portugalete.  In 1975 he joined
the Young Basque Socialists movement (serving as its
Secretary General during 1985-88) and joined the PSE in 1977.
 He was a member of the national parliament during 1987-89
and has been a member of the regional parliament since 1991.
He has been Secretary General of the PSE since 2002 and led
the PSE in the 2005 election, in which he helped the PSE earn
the most votes while Ibarretxe and the PNV secured the most
seats.  Lopez is married without children.  Beltran on May 19
told POLOFF that he believes Lopez will be very pragmatic and
will not attempt any \"acts of vengenace\" for the past.

8. (C) Rodolfo Ares, the Secretary of the PSE for
Organization and the right-hand man of Lopez, has assumed the
key post of regional Minister of Interior, which is charged
with defeating ETA.  Born in 1954, he has spent his career in
Basque politics.  Ares, together with Lopez and Ibarretxe, in
early 2009 was a defendant in a short-lived trial for holding
talks with the outlawed political wing of ETA during the
terrorist group\'s 2006 ceasefire.  The case was shelved. (See
REF A).  Beltran has suggested to POLOFF that Aras is the
behind-the-scenes brains who provides the strategic vision to
Lopez and the rest of the PSE.

9. (SBU) The Basque PP\'s ability to reach an accord with the
PSE despite several key differences in their policy platforms
has strengthened the leadership of 39-year-old Antonio
Basagoiti, leader of the PP\'s Basque wing since mid-2008.
The PP\'s national leader, Mariano Rajoy, had supported
Basagoiti\'s promotion.  A longtime veteran of Bilbao city
hall, Basagoiti holds a law degree.

10. (SBU) As part of its price for supporting the PSE, the PP
negotiated that one of its members would preside over the
Basque Parliament, the second most powerful position in
Basque politics.  On April 3, 35-year-old Arantza Quiroga,
the number-three official in the Basque wing of the PP,
became the first woman to hold the post.  It is the most
senior post that a PP official has ever held in the Basque
regional government.  Quiroga publicly self-identifies with
the conservative wing of the PP.  Regional PP officials
publicly tout Quiroga, who holds a law degree, as a rising
star.

11. (C) In the short term, Ibarretxe\'s retirement leaves the
PNV under the guidance of Inigo Urkullu, who has been party
leader since December 2007.  Urkullu is known to be more of a
moderate Basque nationalist, far less strident than
Ibarretxe, who polarized Basque society with his unyielding
quest for Basque \"free association\" with Spain. However, the
PNV remains divided and it remains to be seen whether the
moderates or the radicals achieve the upper hand.
Sanchez-Cuenca told POLOFF that Urkullu\'s primary rival for
control of the PNV will be Josepa Igiber, the ideologue of
the party\'s radical wing.

//Weakened and Divided, ETA Lingers as Threat, Despite Even
More Key Arrests//

12. (C) Meanwhile, ETA has announced that it will not
recognize the authority of the new PSE-led government and on
April 12 publicly identified incoming senior officials of the
government as priority targets.  ETA publicly declared that

MADRID 00000499  003.2 OF 003


Lopez would be the \"primary objective\" of their upcoming
activities as they \"continued striking out against enemies of
the Basque Country and its interests.\"  These plans were
derailed on April 18 when the terrorist group, already
dramatically weakened, suffered yet another blow by Spanish
and French security services, who arrested ETA\'s latest top
military leader, Jurdan Martitegi, amidst a plot to explode a
van-bomb at Lopez\'s investiture ceremony.  Martitegi, who
held the top military post since December 2008, was the third
consecutive military leader detained in six months while a
separate joint Spanish-French operation also nabbed Ekaitz
Sirvent Auzmendi, allegedly ETA\'s top forger, in Paris on
April 10.  Rogelio Alonso, a professor at the King Juan
Carlos University in Madrid who also works at the Real
Instituto Elcano\'s Global Terrorist Program, cautioned to
POLOFF on May 19 not to make too much of this, however,
noting that ETA has an impressive \"ability to regenerate.\"
Spanish press reports (See REF B) already identify Iurgi
Mendinueta, age 27, as ETA\'s most likely new military chief.
Two women -- Izaskun Lesaka, 32, and Iratxe Sorzabal, 37 --
allegedly form part of his inner circle.  All three
reportedly are known to Spanish and French security services.
 Sanchez-Cuenca told POLOFF that there is increasing media
interest in Josu Ternera, a veteran ETA member in the
political wing, who is likely \"the real power\" in ETA  -
which remains divided.  Sanchez-Cuenca suggested that
Ternera, who favors ETA\'s disarmament and negotiations with
the GOS, is more important than the last few military leaders
have been.

13. (C) Sanchez-Cuenca also shared with POLOFF an advance
copy of his lengthy, soon-to-published analysis of the March
1 Basque election and its significance.  In it, he describes
ETA as \"an extremely resilient group... with tentacles in
civil society - unions, student associations,
environmentalist groups, mass media, culture, etc. - and a
broad political organization that provides legitimacy and
public support for violence.\"  His article concludes with the
assessment that \"the political movement around ETA is far
from disappearing.\"

//Impact of Change in Basque Government on National Politics//

14. (C)  For the Socialists, the ability to govern the Basque
Country is a poisoned chalice.  By supporting Lopez\'s efforts
to become lehendekari, Zapatero helped bring historic change,
but at the expense of PNV support in the national parliament
-- just as there are increasing calls on the GOS to fix the
worsening economic crisis.  Seven seats shy of a working
majority, Zapatero\'s PSOE has just lost the support of the
PNV\'s six seats, making the Socialists increasingly isolated
in Parliament.  Although there is a precedent in Spanish
regional politics for the party that wins the plurality of
seats and votes not to be part of the resulting government,
the PNV feels burned by the PSE and is in no mood to support
at the national level the Socialists that just unseated it at
the regional level. PNV officials frequently have described
the PSE-PP alliance to POLOFF as \"unnatural\" and \"illogical.\"
 The PNV has already shown its displeasure by voting against
Zapatero and siding with the PP on congressional votes
regarding judicial review and infrastructure issues.

15. (C) Josu Erkoreka, the PNV\'s parliamentary caucus leader,
revoked the party\'s support for the PSOE and on March 11
accused the PSOE and the Spanish judicial system of being in
cahoots to manipulate the outcome of the March 1 elections in
Basque Country, to the PNV\'s detriment.  On March 11,
Erkoreka privately told Embassy officials that he sees the
PSOE in a quickening tailspin in which it will be unable to
pass any legislation at the national level and professed not
to understand why Zapatero was sacrificing the Socialists\'
prospects at the national level for power at the regional
level in the Basque Country.

16. (SBU)  Meanwhile, the moderate Catalan nationals,
Convergence and Union (CiU, which has 10 seats in the
national parliament) also lost power at the regional level to
the Socialists in the 2003 and 2006 elections, despite having
won more seats.  The CiU publicly has stated that the PSOE
cannot automatically count on its support.  Among other
parties in the national parliament, the Republican Left of
Catalonia has three seats while a handful of other parties
hold one or two seats.
DUNCAN
"








"230431","10/20/2009 13:38","09MADRID1026","Embassy Madrid","CONFIDENTIAL","09MADRID139|09MADRID499|09MADRID707","VZCZCXRO4671
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHMD #1026/01 2931338
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201338Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1355
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 4161
RUEHMD/USDAO MADRID SP
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001026

SIPDIS

EUR/WE FOR ALEX MCKNIGHT AND STACIE ZERDECKI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, SP, PINS
SUBJECT: SPAIN: BASQUE REGION REFLECTS ON POLITICAL CHANGE
IN 2009

REF: A. MADRID 499
     B. MADRID 139
     C. MADRID 707

MADRID 00001026  001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission William H. Duncan for rea
sons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) SUMMARY:  A broad range of Basque politicians and
civic leaders privately reflected privately on political
changes in the Basque Region in 2009 and assessed the first
four months of the Socialist (PSE) government led by
Lehendakari - regional premier or U.S Governor equivalent -
Patxi Lopez (See Refs A and B) in separate mid-September
meetings with POLOFF.  While nearly all of those consulted
agreed that there has been significant change in the region,
there were mixed reviews on how successful the PSE government
has been in its initial months in office.  For its part, the
PSE drove home the message that it is trying to make the
Basque Region \"normal\" and \"boring\" to counter its long-held
reputation for violence and conflict.  Both the PSE and its
de facto junior partner, the conservative Popular Party (PP),
suggested their alliance was likely to last for the duration
of the four-year legislature.  END SUMMARY.

//PSE:  Important Changes Will Take Time to Consolidate//

3. (C) Andoni Unzalu, Secretary General for Communications
and a key Lopez political adviser, Guillermo Echenique,
Secretary General for Foreign Relations, and Irune
Aguirrezabal, Director of Foreign Relations, on September 9
told POLOFF that they were \"satisfied\" with the PSE\'s
progress to date and suggested that little by little, the PSE
was implementing important changes, but these symbolic
efforts were not necessarily quantifiable.  These officials
from the Office of the Lehendakari asserted that they are
\"winning the first steps of this battle\" and that the public
knows that Lopez will defend the interests of all Basques.
They further claimed that the Basque public is \"learning to
live in more than a monocolor world\" after 70 years of
\"totalitarian rule,\" first by General Franco and later by the
PNV.  Unzalu stated that he did not have the least doubt that
the PSE can count on the support of the PP throughout Lopez\'s
full four-year term, arguing that it would be political
\"suicide\" to break their accord (Ref A).  Separately, Idoia
Mendia, spokesperson for the Office of the Lehendakari, told
POLOFF \"it\'s true\" that the PP and PSE have \"nothing in
common\" in terms of their social and economic policies, but
their pact serves the Basque Region and is open for other
parties to join.  She said the most important thing that has
happened so far under PSE rule is that the public has seen
that the region did not \"implode\" under non-nationalist rule.
 She asserted that the PSE is trying to emphasize dialogue in
its interaction with other parties and the public.

//PP Sees \"New Era\" in Basque Region//

4. (C) Anton Damborenea, President of the PP in the Basque
province of Vizcaya, and Leopoldo Barreda, spokesperson for
the PP caucus in the regional parliament, were positively
giddy in reflecting on the \"night and day difference\" in the
political fortunes of the PP Basque wing over the past year.
They assessed that the March elections and the subsequent
PSE-PP pact to form a government have created the \"end of an
era\" in Basque politics and that the region has entered
\"uncharted territory\" in which \"everything is unwritten.\"
They said that although some leading conservative opinion
leaders grumbled about PP regional leader Antonio Basagoiti\'s
pact with the PSE, the PP national party headquarters itself
never objected to the deal.  The two PP officials suggested
that the PSE-PP accord would likely hold for the full
legislature but will become strained as the next scheduled
regional election draws closer.  The duo also delighted in
saying that the Basque public is \"learning that the PNV is
just another party.\"

//PNV Still Adjusting to Life as An Opposition Party//

5. (C) Offering a different perspective, Inaki Goikeotxeta,
the senior official on foreign policy issues within the
Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) admitted that 2009 has been \"a
pretty tough year\" and suggested that what has occurred in
the Basque Region has not been an era of change but a change
of era.  However, he was adamant that the PNV did not \"lose\"
the March 2009 election, as is sometimes reported in the
media.  He pointed out that - despite being dislodged from
office for the first time since 1980 - the PNV won the most

MADRID 00001026  002.2 OF 002


seats in the regional parliament and the largest percent of
the popular vote (Ref A).  Goikeotxeta said it was \"amazing\"
that the PSE and PP aligned in a \"marriage of convenience\"
and asserted that the only thing they accomplished was to
remove the PNV from power.  He pointed to a July 2009 poll by
Euskobarometro - the region\'s most respected polling firm -
that found that 65 percent of respondents had little or no
faith in the Lopez government.  He further alleged that the
PSE and PP do not have any policy initiatives beyond the
accord they signed.  Goikeotxeta criticized the PSE\'s efforts
to take down public posters and photos that glorify ETA
members (Ref C), calling this move too provocative for ETA
and some Basque nationalists.  He suggested that the PSE\'s
\"cure was worse than the illness\" and said that the situation
needs a \"prudent, proportional response.\"  He concluded his
evaluation by describing the PSE government as \"weak\" and
\"looking for our (the PNV\'s) help.\"

//Thoughts from Observers of Basque Politics//

6. (C) Eduardo Uriarte, Manager of Foundation for Liberty,
says there has been \"enormous change\" in the Basque Region in
the past year, although it has not happened as the Socialists
envisioned, since it has involved a PSE-PP partnership.  He
assessed that \"bit by bit\" there are \"appreciable changes\" in
the Basque Region under the Lopez Administration and judged
that the PSE has done well in defending civil rights, in
counter-terrorism initiatives and in supporting victims of
terrorism.  Uriarte added that he notes a certain relaxation
in the political atmosphere in the Basque Region these days
and - echoing Mendia - suggested that the public is realizing
that life under PSE rule is not as bad as the Basque
nationalist doomsayers said it would be.  He said that for
the first time people are beginning to mix socially with
other people who do not hold the same political views.
Uriarte is a former ETA member who was sentenced to death at
the famous Burgos trial of 1970, received amnesty during
Spain\'s transition to democracy and later was active in
Basque municipal politics as a Socialist.  His NGO lobbies
for peace in the Basque Region, as well as an end to ETA.

7. (C) According to Maite Pagazaurtundua, President of the
Association for Victims of Terrorism, under PSE rule, there
has been a \"qualitative jump\" in support for victims of
terrorism.  She said that under former PNV Lehendakari
(1999-2009) Juan Jose Ibbaretxe, the regional government
provided a bare minimum of support to terrorism victims \"to
cover appearances,\" but was never truly committed to victims\'
rights as a political priority.  In contrast, Pagazaurtundua
deemed important the Lopez Administration\'s political will to
make real changes in this area.  She also applauded the Lopez
Administration\'s initial steps to end a sympathetic editorial
slant to ETA in programming on the Basque public television
and radio network.

8. (C) Oscar Beltran, editor of Bilbao-based El Correo
newspaper, offered a \"wait and see\" approach to the PSE\'s
initiatives, suggesting that the Lopez Administration was
still in the formative stages and had not accomplished too
much just yet.  He pointed out that - broadly speaking -
officials holding the two most senior levels of power have
never been in government before and that officials in the
third and fourth tiers were either appointed by the PNV
during 1980-2009 or have always fulfilled their duties in an
PNV-led environment.  Beltran suggested that the PSE fears
their initiatives may be sabotaged from the inside.

9. (C) From his vantage point in Madrid, Ignacio
Sanchez-Cuenca, an ETA and electoral politics expert at the
Juan March Institute, agreed with the notion that most of the
PSE government\'s accomplishments to date have been symbolic.
He also assessed that - because of weak public support - both
the PSE and PP were under pressure to hide any partisan
differences and make their pact work.  Sanchez-Cuenca
acknowledged the PSE\'s efforts to remove public murals,
slogans and posters glorifying ETA, but noted that the
implementation of that initiative will fall to city halls
throughout the region, where the political will to do so -
especially in rural areas - is not very strong.  He also
praised the ascendant career of Basagoiti, whom he said has
accomplished quite a bit in a little more than a year as
President of the PP\'s Basque wing.
CHACON
"







"232594","11/2/2009 17:29","09MADRID1072","Embassy Madrid","CONFIDENTIAL","07MADRID1078|08MADRID1055|08MADRID1231|09MADRID139|09MADRID272|09MADRID499|09MADRID707|09MADRID775","VZCZCXRO6485
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHMD #1072/01 3061729
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 021729Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1407
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 4185
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHMD/USDAO MADRID SP
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 001072

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR EUR/WE ALEX MCKNIGHT
DEPT. FOR EUR/WE STACIE ZERDECKI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2019
TAGS: PINR, PINS, PREL, PTER, SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN: ETA LOSES MORE KEY LEADERS, EXTENSIVE
SUPPLIES

REF: A. MADRID 775
     B. MADRID 707
     C. MADRID 499
     D. MADRID 272
     E. MADRID 139
     F. 08 MADRID 1231
     G. 08 MADRID 1055
     H. 07 MADRID 1078

MADRID 00001072  001.2 OF 003


Classified By: ADCM William H. Duncan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT:  Spanish and French security
forces have re-doubled their efforts against the Basque
Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) terrorist group, following the
high-profile, deadly and destructive attacks that ETA
executed during July 29-30 to mark its 50th anniversary (Ref
A).  Joint operations since then have notched a string of
notable successes, including the arrests of ETA\'s political
leader (who doubled as the group\'s propaganda spokesperson),
number-two military commander, logistics chief, and liaison
with ETA members abroad as well as 10 Basque nationalist
political figures aligned with ETA.  Security forces also
seized more explosives and other supply material in one week
in August than at any other point in the past five years.
This cable discusses recent key events in reverse
chronological order.  When viewed in the context of ongoing
pressure against ETA (Refs B-H) since the formal end of its
most recent ceasefire (2006-07), ETA faces a tremendous
shortfall of experienced leaders and increasingly scant
supplies.  Post will provide Septel analysis on who\'s who
among ETA\'s remaining leadership.

2. (C) The domino effect of arrests is likely to continue as
the most recent detentions - and a trove of documents seized
as evidence - may lead to the identification and detention of
still others.  Meanwhile, in continuing its longstanding
tit-for-tat relationship with the security services, look for
ETA to respond to the recent arrests and seizures by
conducting attacks where and when it can to buck up sagging
morale and show the public it remains a force to be reckoned
with.  END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

//Detention of Alleged Liaison with ETA Members Abroad//

3. (SBU) French authorities, supported by Spain\'s Civil Guard
(GC), on October 27 arrested Joseba Agudo, a longtime lawyer
for arrested ETA members, in Hendaya, France.  He is accused
of being the chief of ETA\'s \"Refugee Committee\" and of
passing along direct orders from ETA during his visits to
numerous Spanish prisons and various travels to South America
and Europe.  Agudo - whose role was brought to light through
documents seized during the 2008 arrest of longtime political
leader (2004-08) \"Thierry\" - reportedly encouraged ETA
members who had fled abroad to return to fight for the cause.


//ETA\'s Alleged Political Leader/Chief Spokesperson Arrested//

4. (SBU) A combined unit of French police and Spanish GC on
October 19 arrested ETA\'s alleged political leader, Aitor
Elizaran, in Carnac, Brittany.  Although the Spanish press
initially provided conflicting reporting on Elizaran\'s exact
role, Rubalcaba in a press conference that same day
identified him as the highest-ranking official in ETA\'s
political apparatus and a member of the group\'s Executive
Committee.  Longtime ETA military chief (2004-08) \"Txeroki\"
reportedly was influential in appointing Elizaran as
political chief shortly after May 2008, when Thierry was
detained.  Elizaran, age 30, reportedly is the one who gave
political orders to ETA and to the \"izquierda abertzale\" (or
Basque patriotic left).  Oihana San Vicente, a key deputy of
Elizaran\'s, also was arrested.  Both were armed and carrying
false identification and computers.  Rubalcaba publicly has
described the information gathered from the duo\'s arrest as
\"very valuable.\"

5. (SBU) French and Spanish security forces reportedly
believe that Elizaran was dual-hatted as ETA\'s primary
spokesperson and served as one of the masked figures who
regularly appear in video communiques released by the
terrorist group.  The vast array of items recovered from the
stolen car in which Elizaran was traveling led the Spanish
press to describe the vehicle as a kind of \"mobile propaganda
unit.\"  Among the items discovered were three sets of black
berets, white masks, and jackets embroidered with the ETA

MADRID 00001072  002.2 OF 003


seal similar to those used in ETA\'s video messages.  In the
house in Carnac where Elizaran was staying, police also found
a video library, ETA flags, and other assorted symbolic
emblems used during videotaped messages.

//Arrest of \"Board of Directors\" for Nascent, ETA-Aligned
Political Party//

6. (SBU) The detention of Elizaran and San Vicente occurred
six days after the detention of Arnaldo Otegi and nine other
leaders of the izquierda abertzale for trying to establish
\"Bateragune\" (whose name translates to \"All Together\") as a
replacement political party for Batasuna, which was outlawed
in 2003 for its ties to ETA.  The suspects could face 15
years in jail for belonging to a terrorist group and for
obeying orders from ETA.  It is believed that Elizaran was
delivering directives to the 10 suspects in this case,
although initial press reports have acknowledged that proof
of this may not (yet) be available.  On October 16
Investigating Judge Baltasar Garzon of Spain\'s National Court
ordered Otegi, the former spokesman of Batasuna and the
public face of radical Basque nationalists, to be kept in
preventative detention.  Otegi - whom Spanish security
services believe goes by the name of \"Ronaldinho\" in internal
ETA correspondence - also was reportedly was seen in France
with ETA members prior to the late July attacks that marked
ETA\'s 50th anniversary.

//ETA\'s Reported Number-Two Military Official Arrested//

7. (SBU) On October 11, alleged ETA members Iurgi Mendinueta
Mintego and Joanes Larretxea Mendiola were arrested in France
as part of a joint Spanish GC-French Police operation.
Mendinueta, who also reportedly was close to Txeroki,
reportedly was the number-two official in ETA\'s military wing
and had been on the lam since 2002.  Some press reports
earlier this year had identified him as one of three likely
candidates to take over the military wing after Txeroki\'s
successor was arrested.  Meanwhile, Larretxea\'s mug shot had
been included in a \"Most Wanted\" poster disseminated by the
Spanish Ministry of Interior after the late July 2009 ETA
attacks in Burgos and Mallorca, the latter of which claimed
two GC victims.  Both men are believed to be part of ETA\'s
military arm, and they were arrested in possession of
weapons, detonators, detonator cords, fake documentation, and
various pen drives.  At the suspected terrorist  hide-out,
police discovered fake license plates and the machinery to
make them.  Those operations were unrelated to the arrest of
another ETA member, Ibai Seuskun, in France on October 10.
Seuskun, on the run from Navarra police for over a year,
sought help for a gunshot wound in his hand, and the owners
of the farm were he sought aid turned him in to police after
he identified himself as an ETA member.

//Arrest of Trio, including Alleged Logistics Chief and
Senior Military Wing Official, ...//

8. (SBU) French security forces, aided by the Spanish
National Police, arrested three alleged members of ETA\'s
military logistics wing on the morning of August 19 in Le
Corbier, in the French Alps.  Aitzol Etxaburu, Alberto
Machain Beraza, Andoni Sarasola - all reportedly armed and
carrying false identity papers - were allegedly in charge of
providing weapons and explosives to cells for terrorist
attacks in Spain.  Extaburu, also known for his close ties to
Txeroki, had been on the run since his alleged involvement in
a 2005 car bomb attack in the Basque Region.  He reportedly
became ETA\'s short-lived logistics chief following the July
2009 arrest of Itziar Plaza (see Ref B).  Like Larretxea,
Machain rose to public prominence weeks earlier after his
picture appeared as one of the six ETA suspects wanted in
connection with the late July 2009 ETA attacks.  Sarasola, a
one-time candidate for the radical left in local politics,
was profiled in the Spanish media earlier this year as one of
the three top leaders - along with Mendinueta - of ETA\'s
military wing following the back-to-back arrests of Txeroki
and his successor in late 2008.  Sarasola\'s brother, Martin,
was one of the those responsible for the deadly December 2006
bombing of the T4 parking garage at the Madrid airport that
brought a de facto end to ETA\'s \"permanent unilateral
ceasefire.\"

//... Leads to Largest Arms Cache Seizures Since 2004//

9. (C) In the week following the August 19 arrests, French

MADRID 00001072  003.2 OF 003


and Spanish authorities located 14 \"zulos\" or hidden arms
caches in France.  These raids resulted in the capture of
nearly a ton of explosives, more than 200 kilos of ammonium
nitrate, dozens of weapons, 7,000  rounds of ammunition, 150
license plates, roughly 250 detonators, a slew of documents,
forged ID cards, radios, mobile phone cards, tools for
stealing cars, etc.  Two ETA caches discovered on August 20
alone exceeded the total amount of explosive material seized
from ETA in all of 2008 and together was sufficient to have
made 100 limpet bombs or to have carried out at least 50
attacks, according to the media.  In a rare public statement,
Parisian prosecutor Jean-Claude Marin told reporters on
August 25 that the week-long crackdown was \"a major blow to
ETA\'s supply network.  There hasn\'t been a find on this scale
since 2004.\"  Oscar Beltran, editor of Bilbao-based El Correo
newspaper, was more skeptical, however, noting ETA
traditionally safeguards its operations by compartmentalizing
its members\' knowledge and duplicating its efforts.  On
September 9 he told POLOFF that while the arrest of these
three individuals led to the seizure of 14 zulos, it is very
likely another three individuals know of another 14 zulos.
CHACON
"