U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14550 “The complaint alleges that the defendants formalized their conspiracy by organizing the Association so as "to promote as astutely and covertly as possible under the guise of civic concern the conspiracy to deny the plaintiffs equal protection of the laws." 6 It is plaintiffs' contention that because of the clandestine as well as open pressure exerted by the Association before and during the Planning Board meeting of May 2,  the Board rejected the sketch plat, not only delaying plaintiffs' application, but also imposing upon them the burden of another filing fee. B.Y.S.  [**7]  filed a second set of sketch plats, which  [*808]  were also rejected by the Board after a hearing on July 25, at which defendants reiterated their earlier objections. Plaintiffs argue that the Board's decision was coerced by defendants' conspiracy and that community pressure and the presence of over 200 objectors at the meeting created "an atmosphere inimical to the rights and liberties of the plaintiffs." 7 In broad terms, the complaint alleges that plaintiffs' constitutional rights to equal protection and treatment in the processing of the zoning application and to free travel were violated by a conspiracy engaged in by the defendants to delay and obstruct their application for a zoning permit and to influence public officials to deny it, and that the conspiracy was effectuated by defendants' attending meetings before official bodies, filing a groundless complaint with a state agency, instituting a meritless action in the state courts, forming a civic organization, placing an advertisement in a local paper, distributing handbills, and conducting public meetings for the purpose of arousing and encouraging opposition to the application. Based thereon, the complaint alleges violations of three provisions of the civil rights laws, sections 1982, 1983 and 1985(3)  [**12]  of Title 42, United States Code. The Court considers each claim separately…seek to satisfy the state  [*810]  action requirement upon an argument that an active civic association has no purpose but to work in and through government, and "hence the use of a civic association as a vehicle for repression adequately satisfies the color of state law requirement." They argue further that there is a "symbiotic relationship" between a civic association and government, so that the Association's activities and those of its membership may be attributed to the town officials. The contention is far fetched and without substance. Plaintiffs' blunt, conclusory statement that the essence of "an active civic association is government involvement" is not factually accurate. Civic organizations are at times opposed to government and its officials. They are formed to present a particular point of view often counter to existing programs or to proposed state activity and to prod government officials with respect to policies or contemplated action.  [**15]  The defendant civic group was organized, among other reasons, to advance its position in opposition to plaintiffs' application for alleged noncompliance with zoning requirements and to remind public officials of their responsibility and duty to enforce existing zoning laws. 21 Even if such charges could be made in good faith, they would face the obstacle that Reisman or town officials may be protected from federal scrutiny into their legislative motivations and, therefore, immune against damage liability under the civil rights statutes. See Gillibeau v. City of Richmond, 417 F.2d 426, 430 (9th Cir); Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455, 458 (D.Md.1978); Athanson v. Grasso, 411 F. Supp. 1153, 1160 (D.Conn.). If so, they would be dismissed from the suit and state action negated, since HN9 "private persons cannot be held liable for conspiracy under (s 1983) if the other conspirators are state officials who are themselves immune to liability under the facts alleged." The complaint's failure to allege the threshold requirements for relief under the civil rights laws would alone justify granting defendants' motion to dismiss. However, other considerations of more compelling force require dismissal of the complaint. A fair reading of its allegations makes it clear that plaintiffs' claims under sections 1982, 1983 and 1985(3) are inextricably bound up with the defendants' exercise of First Amendment rights of assembly, petition and association…They contend that defendants assembled in large numbers to present their objections at public meetings, petitioned the executive and legislative authorities of the Town and State to oppose the development, and formed an association which distributed pamphlets and took a public position on an issue that was of great concern to them. Carried to its logical extreme, plaintiffs' position would question the "principle that the debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks." 50Plaintiffs purport to recognize defendants' First Amendment rights, but assert that nonetheless "the real motivation" for defendants' activities was to pressure town officials and harass plaintiffs, not to air public issues openly; thus, plaintiffs argue, defendants are not entitled to the immunity  [*817]  afforded by the First Amendment. 51 The Court cannot accept this position. HN33 The protection of the First Amendment does not depend on "motivation"; it depends on the nature of defendants' conduct. 52 Defendants' activities described in the complaint fall squarely under the protection of the First Amendment's guarantees of citizens' rights "peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." First, the complaint alleges that defendants sought to intimidate the Town Board and Planning Board by assembling in large numbers at public meetings and speaking against the B.Y.S. zoning application. Whatever its subjective impact on the officials of the Town, such action was nothing more than peaceable assembly petitioning municipal authorities for redress of grievances and is thereby entitled to First Amendment protection. 53 Thus in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. 54 the Supreme Court held that HN34 the right to petition governmental bodies that make and enforce the law is central to our representative democracy, because "these branches of the government act on behalf of the people and, to a very large extent, the whole concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people to make their wishes known to their representatives." 55 Finally, the formation of the Willow Tree Civic Association, even for the purpose of formally organizing the community against the plans of the plaintiffs, was constitutionally privileged. 58  The defendants have every right to band together for the advancement of beliefs and ideas, however unpalatable the ideas or whatever the underlying motive. 59 Plaintiffs respond by reliance upon the Supreme Court's holding in California Motor Transport that the right to petition is not without its limits. The complaint in that case alleged that the purpose of the conspiracy was to put the plaintiff out of business and to establish a monopoly. In furtherance of the conspiracy, defendants purportedly engaged in sham proceedings before administrative and judicial tribunals; the claim was that the "machinery of the agencies and the courts was effectively closed to respondents" by "a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims" that, if borne out at trial, would constitute abuse of the judicial process 60 and that the defendants became, in fact, the regulators of plaintiff's enterprise. The facts in the instant case are a far cry from the complaint upheld in California Motor Transport or, for that matter, the one dismissed in Noerr. In the former case the defendants alleged conduct that not only violated the antitrust laws, but effectively deprived plaintiffs of the machinery of the agencies and the courts. Plaintiffs here allege no facts that even approach those in California Motor Transport. Their allegations are that part of the means employed to impede their application for a zoning permit involves a single lawsuit against the Town and plaintiffs and an administrative inquiry initiated at the instigation of one of the defendants. Even if both were groundless, they hardly amount to grave abuse of those processes as to bar plaintiffs from responding to the claims made before those bodies. Indeed, plaintiffs do not allege that they were prevented from responding to the charges. Moreover, the complaint makes it clear that they were not denied access to the Planning Board which heard and considered their applications. The complaint's description of defendants' active lobbying before the Town Board and Planning Board, bodies making and enforcing the Ramapo zoning [**44]  laws, pales into insignificance when compared with the railroad's publicity campaign depicted by the Noerr Court as "malicious in that its only purpose was to destroy the truckers as competitors, and fraudulent in that it was predicated upon the deceiving of those authorities through the use of the third-party technique." 61 Yet the complaint was dismissed by the Court in Noerr, as it should be dismissed here. Virtually all the conduct alleged against defendants falls squarely under Noerr's conclusion that HN36 the First Amendment protects "attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws," no matter how harmful their incidental impact on third parties may be. 62 The actions attributed to the defendants upon which plaintiffs predicate their claims under sections 1982, 1983 and 1985(3) are protected by the First Amendment's guarantees of the rights to assemble, to petition their government and to associate. Accordingly, they [**45]  cannot serve as the basis for liability under the civil rights statutes. An interpretation of sections 1982, 1983 and 1985(3) that would penalize such protected conduct would raise substantial constitutional questions. As the Noerr Court aptly stated: "The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course,  lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms." 63 This Court's reluctance to impute to Congress such a design is reinforced by the fact that allowing suits against private persons for conduct within the boundaries of the First Amendment would have a dangerous "chilling effect" on the exercise of those rights. 64 The Court holds that the statutes do not afford a remedy for injuries that may be sustained as an incident to private individuals' exercise of their fundamental rights to assemble, petition and associate for the purpose of influencing openly and without force officials of state and local governments. 65     To permit maintenance of this type of civil rights lawsuit against a private individual would under the circumstances and uncontested facts shown in this case, have an unfortunate and unjust chilling effect upon the exercise by members of the public of their First Amendment right to complain about a public nuisance." Plaintiffs by their pleading have sought to transmute a zoning dispute, still pending, into assorted claims of violation of federally protected constitutional rights. To uphold the complaint would, as Judge Waterman stated in a similar context, "be inviting every party to a state proceeding angered at delay to file a complaint in this court reciting the history of his state case and concluding with a general allegation of conspiracy." 66 Such was not the intendment or purpose of the civil rights acts. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the complaint for [**47] failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. So Ordered.